Values are a necessity for the making mankind humane, and a person without values sheds his humanity and turns into a frightening savage. Values are the sublime that man aspires to and seeks to achieve, to perfect his personality and enrich his life with meaning. Only the most extraordinary human beings can reach their ultimate, but values are nevertheless a necessity for human life, an existential condition for every vital and creative society.

BY ABD AL-JABBAR AL-RIFA’I


THERE ARE three groups of values by which a person may derive and satisfy the basic moral requirements for his life: spiritual values, moral values, and aesthetic values. Each of these has its basic function, each achieves the perfection of man in its own way, and each satisfies the basic needs in the life of the individual and society. Between these three groups of values, there is an organic relationship of mutual influence and effect. The existence of each enhances and enriches the existence of the other, and the consolidation of each of them consolidates the existence of the other.

Value-based truths, like religious truths, have been progressively realized by man throughout history, as man’s vision with the passage of time became clearer, maturer, and more integral, depending on how his consciousness grew, how his experiences accumulated, and how his tools and methodologies of knowledge acquisition developed. How these of values are realised in the life of the individual and the group, and happiness, success and perfection achieved are relative matters.

We do not mean ethics in the sense of aḥkām (‘rulings’) according to the fiqh classification, or what in our heritage was known as al-ādāb al-shar‘iyya


But it is dignity and universality that are the criteria on which moral values are to be determined, in the sense that these values are comprehensive, and that they constitute a universal law held by all peoples in common, since the destiny of all peoples on earth is intertwined. The concepts of dignity, freedom, equality, justice, honesty and sincerity – like other universal human values – did not manifest themselves all at once, but rather required that humanity attained an awareness of its meanings as are recognised today. It had to learn their limits, their examples and how they could be applied through a series of painful milestones, traveling a long, bitter and arduous path over history. This is what the Universal Declaration of Human Rights concluded: that human rights are no longer values that are somehow organically linked to a local culture or societal identity, for some localised cultures and societal identities can be set off from others, and the boundaries of their status and the scope of their rights and freedoms can vary according to notions on gender, belief and ethnicity.

There is no moral life without universal values that transcend time, space and reality, values that are fixed standards for truth, goodness, justice, virtue, peace, honesty, dignity, equality, freedom and sincerity. These values stand outside history, yet have been applied over history – always in harmony with the rhythm of man’s worldview, his sciences and knowledge. The way they manifested themselves express the level of consciousness, civilizational development, culture, and the way of life in every age. According to Immanuel Kant, “The essential characteristic of any law is that it is holistic, that is, true in all cases without exception”.

The same goes for the moral law, or the law of liberty, which says that the moral actor will acts morally if reason has control over all his inclinations. If this is a law, then it must brook no exception under any circumstances, it cannot be true for some people as opposed to others but must be true for all alike. Take ‘duty’, for example: it is not a duty only for me alone, or for one specific circumstance alone, no exception to this duty can be allowed for the benefit of one or other person. 

“Morality must consist of laws that are true to all rational beings alike” as Kant also argues, and that a man who performs any deed must do so in such a way as to make it a general law for all men:

“So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means”.[1]

By ethics we mean what is governed by the practical mind or the moral mind, that is, ethics in the philosophical sense. And by this we do not mean ethics in the sense of aḥkām (‘rulings’) according to the fiqh classification, or what in our heritage was known as al-ādāb al-shar‘iyya (‘legal ethics’), ethics as a type of jurisprudential ruling when the concept of Sharī‘a became identical to the concept of fiqh.

Why was the catalogue of ethics scarce in this heritage, compared to the catalogues of hadith, of scholarly authority figures, of tafsīr, fiqh, scholasticism, linguistics, and other disciplines?

Universal moral values do not deny the right to differ, the right to another belief, the right to think differently, the right to formulate and express one’s different opinion. Takfīr, on the other hand, confiscates and denies all these rights, because it sees the Truth as having only one face, and believes only in the existence of one image of God, one conception of His attributes, one path to Him, of specific dogmatic frameworks for believing in Him, and eternally valid specific words to refer to Him.

Should we not interrogate our moral heritage in the Islamic world? Why it is failed to construct a moral conscience that could protect the life of an individual and a society from violations against dignity, the loss of rights and the encroachments on personal privacy? Why was the catalogue of ethics scarce in this heritage, compared to the catalogues of hadith, of scholarly authority figures, of tafsīr, fiqh, scholasticism, linguistics, and other disciplines? Why does this heritage, for all its potential, lack a realistic approach that could provide insights into the nature of the human being in the light of philosophy, human sciences, sociology and modern knowledge, insights that did not coerce men, even violently, to do what is contrary to his human nature?

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By this lack of a realistic approach that provides deep insights the nature of the human being we mean an inherited approach that can accommodate opposing elements born from diverse contexts, elements that come from societies that have lived in different times, that hail from multiple cultures and diverse identities, elements that draw their authority from sources that are not uniform.

Therefore, this heritage of ours has failed to generate what is different or unite what is plural, to identify commonalities and extract therefrom moral essences. It has failed to formulate a vision that enshrines the moral life or seeks to achieve a balance that responds to the diverse requirements of a human being’s nature and satisfies them in an ethical context. A vision, that is, that does not sacrifice the body to the soul, or the intellect to feelings and emotions, or forces the whole into a single one.

The right to difference demands the building of values of diversity, of pluralism and coexistence. But this is impossible in a society where rulings on disbelief or on difference proliferate. Takfīr[2] is the most dangerous landmine in our heritage, something that undermines any attempt to engage with the present era. It is the harshest and most violent element resisting to the possibility of the Muslim having an active presence in the world today. Takfīr in the ancient ‘ilm al-kalām[3] prevents the Muslim from any organic and creative participation in societies with other religions and cultures, and also impedes the birth of citizenship, the fundamental pillar of the modern state.


[1] This is Kant’s second formulation of the Categorical Imperative. It s the core of what philosophers call the Humanity Formula, and is the direct source of the principle that persons are ends in themselves. (Ed.)

[2] ‘Excommunication’, or more accurately, the process of accusing someone of kufr (‘Disbelief’). (Ed.)

[3] ‘The Scholarship of Discourse’: the term denotes scholastic theology, the discipline of seeking theological principles through dialectic, that is, the seeking of philosophical demonstrations to confirm religious principles. The ‘Ilm al-Kalām developed as a rational theology, practiced by mutakallimīn.(Ed.)