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MOHAMMED AND ISLAM

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TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN

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INTRODUCTION

Through the publication during the past fifty years of a large number of Arabic sources for the study of Moham-medanism, before that accessible only in the manuscript collections of European libraries, our knowledge of the origin and course of Islam, and more particularly of the development of Islamic theology in the various countries to which the religion spread, has been greatly extended. Hand in hand with the publication of important Arabic texts has gone the critical study of the material in the form of monographs, and of papers in the transactions and journals of learned societies. Naturally, European scholars—in Germany and Austria, in England and France, Holland and Italy—have been the chief workers in this field, though during the last decades some valuable contributions have been made by American scholars.

The strong impetus to Arabic studies, the result of which is seen in the considerable body of scholars now devoting themselves to the subject, may be traced back to the distinguished French Orientalist, Silvestre de Sacy (1758-1838) and to his pupil Heinrich Leberecht Fleischer (1801-1888), for many years Professor of Oriental Languages at the University of Leipzig, and who had the distinction of training a large proportion of the Arabic scholars of the following generation. Other notable Arabists of the middle of the nineteenth century were Gustav Wilhelm Freytag of the University of Bonn (1788-1861) also a pupil of de Sacy, Ferdinand Wuestenfeld (1808-1899), particularly active in the publication of Arabic texts, Heinrich Ewald (1803-1875) of the University of Göttingen, and Reinhart Dozy of the University of Leyden (1820-1883), while coming closer to our own days we have the late Professor M. J. de Goeje

(1836-1909), Dozy's successor; Ignazio Guidi of Rome (1844-), Julius Wellhausen of Göttingen (1844-), and Theodor Noeldeke of Strassburg, the latter perhaps the greatest Semitist of any age and who is still active at eighty. Among the pupils of Professor Fleischer, during whose lifetime Leipzig was the center of Arabic studies, were such eminent scholars as the late David Heinrich Müller of the University of Vienna (1846-1913), the late Albert Socin (1844-1899) who became Fleischer's successor, the late Hartwig Derenbourg (1844-1908) who filled the chair of Silvestre de Sacy in the Ecole des Langues Orientales Vivantes, Paris, and Ignaz Goldziher of the University of Budapest, whose prodigious learning led Professor Noeldeke to proclaim him recently as "without a rival in the domain of Mohammedan theology and philosophy." English readers will, therefore, be particularly grateful to Mrs. Seelye for having made accessible to them a volume in which Professor Goldziher sums up in popular form the results of his life-long researches in the field in which he is an acknowledged master. The six chapters of the present work were originally prepared for delivery in this country under the auspices of the American Committee for Lectures on the History of Religion in 1908, but owing to illness, from which he has happily recovered, Professor Goldziher was unable, after he had prepared the lectures, to undertake the trip across the ocean. The present translation into English is authorized by the distinguished author, who has in the course of a revision of his work made some additions in order to bring it down to date. It was my good fortune to have had Mrs. Seelye as a pupil in Arabic for a time, and to suggest to her the preparation of this translation, at the same time undertaking, as my share, to go over her version and to compare it sentence for sentence with the original so as to make certain by our united efforts of having reproduced Professor Goldzi-

her's exposition accurately and, as I hope, in a readable form. The task was not an easy one, as in general translations from German into English require particular care and skill; and these difficulties are increased when it comes to translating a work such as that of Professor Goldziher, containing a great many technical terms and involving the exposition of a subject exceedingly intricate at times.

Before proceeding to outline the main features of Professor Goldziher's important volume, which will no doubt take rank as an authoritative presentation of the theme, it may not be out of place to give a brief sketch of the author's career.

Born in Hungary in 1850, he carried on his university studies at Budapest, Berlin, Leyden and more particularly at Leipzig. After obtaining his degree of Doctor of Philosophy, he travelled for a year in the Orient and was one of the first Europeans to continue his Arabic studies at Al-Azhar, the famous University of Cairo. Through this opportunity he not only became conversant with modern Arabic in addition to his knowledge of the classical speech, but came into close contact with native theologians which strengthened his interest in those phases of Mohammedanism to which he has devoted the greater part of his career. On his return to his own country he became connected with the University of Budapest, where he has occupied for many years the chair of Oriental Languages. His productivity has been as extensive as it has been valuable.

Apart from an earlier work on "Mythology among the Hebrews," of which an English translation was issued in 1877, he established his reputation as one of the leading Arabic scholars of his time by a volume on the Zahirite sect, published in 1884, and in which he betrayed that wide range of learning combined with rare acumen, which have made his researches so invaluable to all students

of Islam. Two volumes of "Mohammedan Studies" (1889-1890), followed by two further volumes of studies on Arabic Philology (1896-1899), deal with many important problems and embody results of investigations that, apart from their intrinsic value, opened up new avenues of research for others.

Professor Goldziher has been an active contributor to the leading Oriental journals of Europe and has received the recognition of honorary membership in the learned academies of England, France, Germany, Denmark, Holland, Austria-Hungary, Sweden, the United States, and even of India and Egypt, while Cambridge and Aberdeen Universities have conferred honorary degrees upon him.

The present volume reveals all those special qualities distinguishing Professor Goldziher's work, a thorough grasp of the niceties of Mohammedan theology, acquired as a result of the profound and long-continued study of the huge Arabic literature on the subject, critical insight and striking originality in the combination of innumerable details to present a vivid picture. The general aim of the work may be set down as an endeavor to set forth in detail the factors involved in the development of the rather simple and relatively few ideas launched by Mohammed, into an elaborate and complicated system of theology, at once legal and speculative and at the same time practical. The part played in this development through the military conquests of the followers of Mohammed during the first two or three generations after his death is shown by Professor Goldziher in the manner in which regulations for government and for religious practices are evolved, theoretically on the basis of the utterances in the Koran, but practically in response to the necessity of maintaining a strong hold on the followers of Islam, more particularly in the conquered lands outside of Arabia. A conflict ensued between the worldly minded elements concerned with

problems of taxation and strengthening governmental control, and the pious adherents whose absorption in the tenets and ideals of Mohammed's teachings was as complete as it was sincere. Professor Goldziher shows how this conflict led to the rise of innumerable "traditions" regarding Mohammed's sayings and doings, as the pattern to hold good for all times, and although these "traditions," growing into an extensive "Hadith" (that is, "tradition") literature, have turned out on a critical examination to be for the larger part entirely spurious, they have a value as showing the increasing emphasis laid on the Prophet's personality as the ultimate authority. It is to Professor Goldziher's researches that we owe largely the present view taken of the "Hadith" literature by Arabic scholars, and the place to be assigned to it in the development of both Mohammedan law and dogma. In this volume the learned author sums up his studies within this field, and adds much to reinforce his former conclusions of the manner in which this curious system of carrying back to a fictitious source the religious practices, political methods and theological doctrines arose with the growth of the little religious community, founded by Mohammed, into a world religion in close affiliation with widely extended political ambitions. Mohammedan law and Mohammedan dogmatism became the pivot around which the entire history of Islam has revolved down to our own days. The two chapters, in which this legal and dogmatic development of the religion are set forth, will give the reader entirely new points of view regarding the history of Islam, and prepare him for the exposition that follows of ascetic and mystic movements within Mohammedanism and which still hold a strong sway in Mohammedan lands.

In the fifth chapter Professor Goldziher touches upon the most intricate of all problems connected with Mohammedanism, the formation of the numerous sects in Islam.

The difficult theme is set forth in a remarkably illuminating manner. The author picks out the salient features of the two chief divisions of Mohammedanism—Sunna (or Orthodoxy) and Shi'ism—and then sets forth in logical sequence the almost endless ramifications of Sunnite and Shi'ite doctrines. For all who would seek to penetrate to the core of the great religion which still sways the lives of a very large proportion of mankind, some two hundred millions, Professor Goldziher's volume will be an indispensable guide. As a companion volume to it, in English, it may be proper to refer here to the lectures on Mohammedanism, delivered in this country, under the auspices of the American Committee for Lectures on the History of Religion, by Professor C. Snouck Hurgronje¹ before various universities and now published in book form. Always excepting Noeldeke, who forms a class by himself, Professors Goldziher and Snouck Hurgronje are the two leading Arabic scholars of the age, recognized as such the world over, and English readers are indeed fortunate to have at their disposal two works of such commanding interest and authoritative status that complement one another. It is to be hoped that the appearance of these two contributions to our knowledge of one of the great religions of the world will stimulate interest in the subject, and be of service also in promoting Arabic studies in our American universities.

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University of Pennsylvania, January, 1917.

¹ Mohammedanism by C. Snouck Hurgronje (New York, Putnam's, 1916).

MOHAMMED AND ISLAM

CHAPTER I.

MOHAMMED AND ISLAM.

I. The question, what from a psychological point of view is the origin of religion, has been variously answered by investigators of the subject who treat religion as an independent science. Prof. C. P. Tiele in his Gifford Lectures at Edinburgh has collected a number of these answers and submitted them to a critical examination.¹ He recognizes the consciousness of causality which he regards inherent in man, the feeling of dependence, the perception of the eternal, and the renunciation of the world as the ruling emotions from which have sprung the seeds of psychic religion. To me this phenomenon in the life of man seems to be of far too complicated a nature to justify its working evidence from a single motive. Nowhere do we find religion as an abstraction, disassociated from definite historical conditions. It lives in deeper and higher forms, in positive manifestations, which have been differentiated through social conditions.

Any one of these, together with other stimuli of religious instincts, may take a leading place without, however, entirely excluding other auxiliary factors. In the very first steps of its development, its character is ruled by a predominating motive, which maintains its leadership throughout the further development of the whole historical life of the religion. This holds good also for religious forms, whose rise is the product of individual inspiration. In the case of the particular religion, with the historical aspects of which we are to deal in these lectures, the name which its founder gave it at the very beginning, and which it has now borne for fourteen centuries reveals its prevailing features and characteristics.

Islam means submission—the submission of the faithful to Allah. This term, which characterizes better than any other the essence of the relation in which Mohammed places the believers to the object of their worship, epitomizes the feeling of dependence on an unlimited Power to whom man must give himself up, willingly or unwillingly. This is the predominating principle inherent in all expressions of this religion, in its ideas and its forms, in its morals and its worship, which determine, as its decisive mark, the characteristic instruction which man is to gain by it. Islam in fact, furnishes the strongest example of Schleiermacher's theory that religion arises from a feeling of dependence.

II. The task before us in these lectures does not demand that we should point out the peculiarities of this system of religion, but rather that we present the factors which have coöperated in its historical development. Islam, as it appears in its final shaping, is the result of various influences by means of which it has developed into an ethical view of life, into a legal and dogmatic system attaining a definite orthodox form. We have to deal also with the factors which have directed the stream of Islam into various channels. For Islam is no homogeneous church, its historical life finds its full expression in the very diversities which it has itself produced.

The forces which determine the historical life of an institution are twofold. First, the inner impulses springing from the very being of the institution and acting as impelling forces to further its growth. Second, those intellectual influences which come from without, which enrich the range of ideas, and make them more fruitful in bringing about its historical development. Although in Islam the practical proof of the impulses of the first kind are not lacking, nevertheless it is mostly the assimilation of foreign influences which mark the most important moments of its history. Its dogmatic development

betrays Hellenistic thought, its legal form shows the unmistakable influence of Roman Law, its civic organization, as it is unfolded in the 'Abbaside caliphate, shows the moulding of Persian civic ideas, while its mysticism illustrates the appropriation of Neoplatonic and Indian ways of thought. But in each one of these fields Islam proves its capability to assimilate and work over foreign elements, so that its foreign character is evident only through the sharp analysis of critical investigation. This receptive character stamps Islam from its very birth. Its founder, Mohammed, proclaims no new ideas. He brought no new contribution to the thoughts concerning the relation of man to the supernatural and infinite. This fact, however, does not in the least lessen the relative worth of his religious conception. When the historian of morals wishes to decide on the effect of an historical event, the question of its originality is not uppermost in his consideration. In an historical estimate of the ethical system of Mohammed the question is not whether the content of his proclamation was original in every way, the absolute pioneer conception of his soul. The proclamation of the Arabian Prophet is an eclectic¹ composition of religious views to which he was aroused through his contact with Jewish, Christian and other² elements, by which he himself was strongly moved and which he regarded as suitable for the awakening of an earnest religious disposition among his people. His ordinances, although taken from foreign sources, he recognized as necessary for the moulding of life in accordance with the divine will. His inmost soul was so aroused that those influences which had thus awakened him, became inspirations, that were confirmed by outward impressions and by divine revelations, of which he sincerely felt himself to be the instrument.

It lies outside our task to follow the pathological moments which aroused and strengthened in him the

consciousness of revelation. We recall Harnack's significant words concerning "Maladies which attack great men only, who in turn create out of this malady a new life, an energy hitherto unsuspected surmounting all barriers, and the zeal of prophets and apostles."³ Before us stands the prodigious historical effect of the call to Islam, more particularly the effect on the immediate circle, to whom Mohammed's proclamations were directly given. The lack of originality was made up for by the fact that Mohammed, with unwearied perseverance, announced these teachings as representing the vital interests of the community. With solicitous tenacity he proclaimed them to the masses in spite of their arrogant scorn. For no historical effect was connected with the silent protest of pious men before Mohammed's time, men who had protested, more by their lives than by their words, against the heathen Arabian interpretation of life. We do not know just what a certain Khālīd ibn Sinān meant when he spoke of the prophet who let his people go astray. Mohammed is the first effective historical reformer of Arabia. Therein lies his originality in spite of the lack of it in the subject matter of his teaching. The intercourse which the travels of his early life secured for him, and the fruits of which he garnered during the period of ascetic retirement, aroused the overwrought conscience of an earnest man against the religious and ethical character of his countrymen. Arabian polytheism, gross and bare as it was, and which for its fetishlike worship, had as its gathering place the national sanctuary,—the Ka'ba with its black stone—in Mohammed's home town, could not elevate the morals of a people imbued with tribal life and customs. Furthermore, the natives of this town were marked by a prevailing materialistic, plutocratic and haughty attitude. For the care of the sanctuary was not only a religious privilege, but also an important source of revenue.

Mohammed bemoans the oppression of the poor, the thirst for gain, dishonesty in commerce, and overbearing indifference toward the higher interest of human life and its duties toward the "prayerful and pious ones" (Sura 18, v. 44),—the "tinsel of its mundane world." The impressions of former teachings remained active in him, and he now applied them to these disquieting observations. In the loneliness of the caves near the city whither he was wont to withdraw, the man of two-score years felt himself more and more impelled through vivid dreams, visions and hallucinations to go among his people, and to warn them of the destruction to which their actions were leading them. He feels himself irresistably forced to become the moral teacher of his people, "their warner and messenger."

III. At the beginning of his career these observations turned to eschatological representations, which more and more completely took possession of his inmost soul. They form, as it were, the "*Idée mère*" of his proclamations. What he had heard of a future judgment which would overwhelm the world, he now applies to the conditions about him, the knowledge of which filled his soul with horror. He places before the careless, overweening tribes of the proud Meccan plutocrats, who know nothing of humility, "the prophecy of the approaching judgment," which he paints in fiery colors. He tells them of the resurrection and of the future reckoning whose details present themselves to his wild vision in terrifying form; of God, as judge of the world, as the sole arbiter of the "Day of judgment," who, in mercy, gathers out of the ruins of the world the few who had been obedient, who had not scorned and derided the cry of the "Warner," but who by introspection had torn themselves from arrogant ambitions and the power secured by worldly wealth, and had given themselves to a realization of their dependence on the one absolute

God of the universe. It is above all eschatological representation on which Mohammed founded the call to repentance and submission.¹ And one result—not the cause—of this perception, is the rejection of the polytheism, by means of which paganism had broken the absolute power of deity. Any characteristic predicated of Allah can “neither help nor harm.” There is only one Lord of the judgment day. Nothing can be associated with his unlimited and unchangeable decree. A feeling of such absolute dependence as that which possessed Mohammed could have as its object one being only, the only one Allah. But the terrible picture of the judgment, the features of which he had gathered largely from the literature of the Apocrypha, was not balanced by the hopes of the coming of the “Kingdom of Heaven.” Mohammed is a messenger of the *Dies Irae*, of the destruction of the world. His eschatology, in its picture of the world, cultivates only the pessimistic aspect. The optimistic aspect is entirely transferred to paradise, for the chosen. He has no ray of hope left over for the mundane world. It is thus simply a system of borrowed building stones which serves the prophet in the construction of his eschatological message. The history of the Old Testament, mostly, it is true, in the sense of the Agada, is used as a warning example of the fate of ancient peoples, who, hardening their hearts, scorned the exhortations sent to them. Mohammed classes himself as the last of the ancient prophets. The picture of the judgment and destruction of the world painted in glowing colors, the exhortation to prepare for it, by forsaking ungodliness and the worldly life, tales of the fate of ancient peoples and their attitude toward the prophets sent to them, reference to the creation of the world, and to the wonderful formation of man,—proof of the power of God,—dependence of the creature whom he can annihilate and recreate according to his inclination,—all

these are contained in the oldest parts of that book of revelations, recognized in the literature of the world as the Koran. It is composed of about 114 divisions (Suras), of very different scope; about one third belongs to the first ten years of Mohammed's prophetic activity during the time of his work in Mecca.

IV. It lies outside of my province to recount here the story of his success and his failures. The year 622 marks the first epoch in the history of Islam. Ridiculed by his countrymen and tribesmen, Mohammed flees to the northern city of Yathrib, whose people coming from a southern stock, showed themselves more receptive to religious influences. Here also, owing to the large colony of Jews, the ideas which Mohammed advanced were more familiar, or at least appeared less strange. Because of the help which people of this town gave to the prophet and his followers, whom they sheltered, Yathrib became Medīna, "the City" (of the prophet), by which name it has ever since been known. Here Mohammed is still further inspired by the Holy Spirit, and the majority of the Suras of the Koran bear the mark of this new home. But even though, in his new relations, he does not cease to fulfill and practice his calling as a "warner," his message takes a new direction. It is no longer merely the eschatological visionary who speaks. The new relations make him a warrior, a conqueror, a statesman, an organizer of the new and constantly growing community. Islam, as an institution, here received its shape; here were sown the first seeds of its social, legal, and political regulations.

The revelations which Mohammed announced on Meeccan soil had, as yet, indicated no new religion. Religious feelings were aroused in a small group only. A conception of the world marked by the idea of resignation to God was fostered, but was, as yet, far removed from strict definition, and had not yet given rise clearly

to teachings and forms. Pious feelings betrayed themselves in ascetic acts, which we also find among Jews and Christians, in devotional acts (recitation with genuflections and prostration), self-imposed abstinence, and deeds of kindness, whose modality as to form, time and amount, had not yet been determined by hard and fast rules. Finally the community of believers was not yet definitely formed. It was in Medina that Islam took shape as an institution, and at the same time as a fighting organization whose war trumpet sounds through the whole later history of Islam. The erstwhile devoted martyr, who had preached patient submission to his faithful Meccan followers scorned by their fellow citizens, is now organizing warlike undertakings. The man who despised worldly possessions is now taking in hand the disposition of booty and regulation of the laws of inheritance and of property. It is true he does not cease to proclaim the worthlessness of all worldly things. At the same time, however, laws are given, regulations are made for religious practices and the closest social relationships of life. "Here the laws of conduct take on definite form. These laws served as the basis of later legislation, although several, in the course of preparation during the Meccan teachings, had been carried in embryo by the exiles from Mecca to the Palm City of Arabia."¹

It was really in Medina that Islam was born. The true features of its historical life were formed here. Whenever, therefore, the need of religious reconstruction appeared in Islam, its followers appealed to the Sunna (traditional custom) of that Medina in which Mohammed and his companions first began to bring into concrete form the laws regulating the relations of life, according to his conceptions of Islam. We will return to this later.

The Hijra (flight to Medina) accordingly is not only an important date in the history of Islam, because of the change it wrought in the outward fortunes of the

community; marks, not only the time in which the little group of the prophet's followers, having found a secure haven, began to take aggressive measures and wage a war against the enemy, which in 630 resulted in the conquest of Mecca and subsequently in the subjection of Arabia; but it also marks an epoch in the religious formation of Islam.

The Medīna period brings about, moreover, a radical change in Mohammed's apperception of his own character. In Mecca Mohammed felt himself a prophet, and classed himself and his mission in the rank of the Biblical "Messengers," in order like them to warn and to save his fellow-men from destruction. In Medīna, under changed external relations, his aims also take a different trend. In this environment, differing so greatly from that of Mecca, other views in regard to his calling as a prophet became prominent. He wishes now to be considered as having come to restore and reëstablish the vitiated and misrepresented religion of Abraham. His announcements are interwoven with Abrahamic traditions. He asserts that the worship he is instituting, although formerly organized by Abraham, had in the course of time been vitiated and heathenized. He wishes to reinstate in the Abrahamic sense the *dīn*, or religion of the one God, as he had come, above all, to legitimize (musaddik) what God had made known in former revelations.²

In general, his contention, that the former messages were misrepresented and vitiated, played a greater part in the recognition of his own position as a prophet, and of his work. Fawning apostates strengthened him in the idea that adherents of the old religion had perverted the sacred writings, and had concealed the promises in which prophets and evangelists had announced his own future coming. This charge, originating in the Koran, was later extensively developed in Islamic literature.

The polemic against Jews and Christians now forms an important part of the revelations of Medīna. Although formerly he recognized cloisters, churches and synagogues as true places of worship (Sura 22, v. 211), the *ruhbān* (monks) of the Christians and the *ahbār* (scribes) of the Jews, who were actually his teachers, now became objects of attack. It does not suit him that these leaders, in reality merely selfish men, should exercise an entirely unwarranted, and in fact almost a divine authority, over their fellows (Sura 9, v. 31), leading the people astray from the way of God (Sura 9, v. 36). He gives the ascetic *ruhbān* credit for their humble bearing, and regards them as being in closer sympathy with the faithful than the Jews, who took a decisive stand against Islam (Sura 5, v. 85), and he reproaches the Scribes with additions they had made to the divine legislation (Sura 3, v. 72).

V. This Medīna decade was therefore a time of attack with sword and pen, as well as of defense. The change in Mohammed's prophetic character necessarily made itself felt in the style and rhetorical content of the Koran.

Even the oldest records of the book have clearly differentiated between the two divisions of the 114 Suras into which its contents are divided—differentiating with sure instinct the Mecca from the Medīna parts.

This chronological difference wholly justifies the critical and aesthetic consideration of the Koran. To the Mecca period belong the messages in which Mohammed presents the creations of his glowing enthusiasm in a fantastic oratorical form coming directly from his soul. He does not brandish his sword, he is not speaking to warriors and subjects, but is declaring rather, to his numerous adversaries the convictions which dominate his soul; that the power of Allah to create and rule the world is infinite; that the awful day of judgment and destruction, the vision of which destroys his peace of

mind, is near at hand; that the former peoples and tyrants who opposed the warners sent by God, should be punished.

Gradually, however, the prophetic energy weakens in the Medīna messages in which the rhetoric, having lost all vigor, because of the triviality of the object, had dropped to a lower plain and sunk to the level of common prose. With clever calculations and consideration, with wary cunning and policy, he now agitates against the internal and external opponents of his aims, he organizes the faithful, enacts, as has already been pointed out, civic and religious laws for the developing organization, as well as rules for the practical relations of life. He even at times includes in the divine revelations made to him his own unimportant personal and domestic affairs.¹ The diminishing of his rhetorical vigor is not offset even by the *Saj'*,—the rhymed prose characteristic of the Koran in general and occurring also in the suras of this period. This was the form in which the ancient soothsayers delivered their oracles. No Arab could have recognized them in any other form as the words of God. Mohammed, to the end, adhered to the claim that such was his speech, but how great a distance between the *Saj'* of the early Mecca and the Medīna speeches! While in Mecca, he announces his visions in *Saj'* lines, every one of which responds to the feverish beating of his heart. This form of revelation loses its swing and its strength in Medīna, even when he turns back to the subjects of the Mecca messages.²

Mohammed himself declared his Koran an inimitable work. His followers, without considering any one of its parts as having more merit than another, regarded the book as divinely supernatural, sent to them through the prophet. In fact it was to them the supreme miracle by which the prophet established the truth of his divine mission.

VI. The Koran then, is the first basis of the religion of Islam, its sacred writing, its revealed document. In its entirety it represents a combination of the two first epochs in the infancy of Islam, differing so much from one another.

Although the Arabian mind, owing to its inherent disposition and to the conditions of life, was not given to the consideration of supernatural things, the great success of the prophet and his immediate followers over the opponents of Islam did much to strengthen the belief of the Arabs in his mission. Although these historical successes did not, as one is apt to think, directly result in the complete union of these Arab tribes, politically divided and religiously only loosely bound by any central authority, and constantly quarreling over their local cults, nevertheless, they did become a strong element of union between these divergent elements. The prophet had held up as the ideal the union into an ethical and religious community which, according to his teachings, should be bound together by the feeling of dependence on the one Allah. "O, ye believers, fear God as he deserveth to be feared; and die not until ye have become Moslems. And hold ye fast by the cord of God and remember God's goodness towards you, how that when ye were enemies, he united your hearts and by his favor ye became brethren" (Sura 3, v. 97-98). Fear of God was now to have the preference over genealogy and tribal life. The conception of this unity broadened more and more after the death of the prophet, owing to the conquests whose successes have not yet been equalled in the history of the world.

VII. If anything in Mohammed's religious production can be called original, it is the negative side of his revelations. They were intended to eliminate all the barbarities of Arabian paganism in worship and social intercourse, in tribal life and in their conceptions of the world; in

other words, they were to eliminate the *jāhiliyya*, the pre-Islamic barbarity, in so far as it stamped these conceptions and customs as opposed to Islam. As we have already mentioned, the positive teaching and organizations show an eclectic character. Judaism and Christianity have an equal share in the elements of which these are composed, of whose peculiarities I cannot speak here.¹

It is well known that in its final form Islam has five points upon which its confession is based. The first drafts (liturgical and humanitarian) go back to the Mecca period, but their more definite, formal shape was given in the Medīna period. 1. The acknowledgment of one God and the recognition of Mohammed as the apostle of God; 2. The ritual of the divine worship, whose early beginnings as vigils and recitations, with their accompanying postures, genuflections and prostrations, as well as the ceremonial purifications, had its origin in the usages of oriental Christianity; 3. Alms, first a free-will offering, later a definitely determined contribution to the needs of the community; 4. Fasting—first on the 10th day of the month (an imitation of the Jewish Day of atonement (*‘āshūrā*)—later changed to the month of Ramaḍān, the 9th of the variable lunar year; 5. The pilgrimage to the old Arabian national sanctuary in Mecca, the Ka‘ba, the “house of God.”² This last requirement Mohammed retained from paganism, but clothed it in monotheistic garb, and gave it new interpretations through Abrahamic legends.

Just as the Christian elements of the Koran reached Mohammed largely through the apocryphal traditions and heresies disseminated throughout oriental Christendom, similarly many of the elements of oriental gnosticism found an entrance into Islamism. Mohammed appropriated a medley of ideas that reached him through his casual contact with men during his mer-

cantile travels, and utilized most of this material in a very unsystematic manner. How far removed from his original conception are the mystical words (Sura 24, v. 35) which the Moslems regard as their "golden text!" In Mohammed's conception concerning the laws given by God to the Jews, especially those dealing with forbidden foods, laid on them as a punishment for their disobedience, we see the influence of the depreciation by the Gnostics of the Old Testament laws promulgated, according to them, by a frowning God void of benevolence. Except in a very few cases these laws were abrogated by Islam. God had not forbidden to the faithful anything palatable. These laws were fetters and burdens laid upon the Israelites by God (Sura 2, v. 286; 4, v. 158; 7, v. 156). This, although not identical with Marcionistic theories, is in accord with them. Together with this and closely akin to the speculations which are crudely indicated in the Clementine homilies, we find the theory put forward of a pure ancient religion, to be restored by the prophet, and also the assumption that the sacred writings had been corrupted.

Besides Jews and Christians, the Parsees, whose disciples came under Mohammed's observation as *Majūs* (Magi) and whom he also regards as opposed to heathenism, left their impress on the receptive mind of the Arabian prophet. It was from the Parsees that he received the far-reaching suggestion which robs the Sabbath of its character as a day of rest. He chose Friday as the weekly day of assembly, but even in adopting the hexaameron theory of creation, he emphatically rejects the idea that God rested on the 7th day. Therefore, not the 7th day, but the day preceding is taken, not as a day of rest, but as a day of assembly on which all worldly business is permitted after the close of worship.⁴

VIII. If we are now to regard Mohammed's produc-

tion as a whole, and to consider for a moment its intrinsic value judged from its ethical effect, we must of course be careful to avoid an apologetic and polemic attitude. Even in modern presentations of Islam there is a strong tendency to take its numbers as the absolute standard by which to judge its religious value, and to found on that the final estimate. The same tendency considers the idea of God as deeply rooted in Islam because it inflexibly excludes the thought of His immanence. It also considers its ethics dangerous because it is dominated by the principle of obedience and submission which is already apparent in its name. This attitude assumes as possible that the dominating belief of the faithful, of living under an absolute divine law, or the belief in the detachment of the Divine being in Islam hindered the approach to God by faith, virtue, and benevolence, and kept one from His mercy (Sura 9, v. 100), as though a pious worshipper, fervent in his devotions, filled with the humble consciousness of his dependence, weakness and helplessness, raising his soul to the source of almighty strength and perfection, could differentiate himself according to philosophical formulae. Those, who would in a subjective spirit estimate the religion of others, should recall the words of Abbé Loisy, the theologian (1906): "One can say of all religions that they possess for the consciences of its adherents an absolute, and for the comprehension of the philosopher and critic, a relative value."¹ This fact has generally been lost sight of in judging the effect of Islam on its followers. Furthermore, in the case of Islam the religion has been unjustly held responsible for moral deficiencies, and intellectual lacks which may have their origin in the disposition of the races.² As a matter of fact, Islam, disseminated among a people belonging to these races, has moderated rather than caused their crudeness. Besides, Islam is not an abstraction to be considered apart from

its historical periods of development, or from the geographical boundaries of its spread, or from the ethnic character of its followers, but in connection with its various embodiments and effects.

In order to prove Islam's insignificant religious and moral value, men have appealed to the language in which its teachings were given. It has been said, e. g., that Islam lacks the ethical conception which we call conscience, and the attempt is made to prove this by the assertion that "neither in Arabic itself nor in any other language used by the Mohammedans can a word be found which would correctly express what we mean by the word conscience."³ Such conclusions could easily lead us astray in other lines. The assumption that a word alone can be taken as a credible proof of the existence of a conception, has shown itself to be a prejudice. "A lack in the language is not necessarily a sign of a lack in the heart."⁴ If this were so, one could assert that the feeling of gratitude was unknown to the poets of the Vedas, because the word "thanks" is foreign to the Vedic language.⁵ Even in the ninth century the Arabic scholar Jāḥiẓ disproves the remark of a dilettante friend who thought he found a proof of the avaricious character of the Greeks in the fact that their language apparently had no word for "liberality" (Jūd). Others also have come to the conclusion that the lack of the word "sincerity" (naṣiḥa) in Persian, was a sufficient proof of the inbred untrustworthiness of this people.⁶

Didactic sentences, principles mirroring ethical conceptions, should be tested by more than a word, a terminus technicus, such as those which are used in the consideration of the "question of conscience" in Islam. Among the forty (really forty-two) traditions of the *Nawawī*, supposed to present a compendium of the religious principles of a true Moslem, we find as No. 27,

the following quotation, which is taken from the best collections: "In the name of the prophet, virtue is the essence of good qualities; sin is that which troubles the soul, and thou dost not wish that other people should know it of thee." Wābiṣa ibn Ma'bad says: "Once I came before the prophet. He divined that I had come to question him as to the nature of virtue. He said: 'Question thine heart (literally demand a *fetwā*, a decision of thine heart); virtue is that which pacifies the soul, and pacifies the heart; sin is that which produces unrest in the soul and turmoil in the bosom, whatever meaning men may have given to it!' 'Lay thine hand upon thy bosom, and ask thine heart; from that which causes thine heart unrest, thou shouldst forbear.' " And the same teachings gave the Moslem tradition according to which Adam ended his exhortation to his children just before his death with the words . . . "As I approached the forbidden tree, I felt unrest in my heart," in other words, my conscience troubled me.

It would be unjust to deny that a power working for good lives in the teaching of Islam, that life from the standpoint of Islam can be ethically blameless; or that it calls for mercy towards all the creatures of God, business integrity, love, faithfulness, self-restraint, all those virtues which Islam borrowed from the religions whose prophets it recognized as its teachers. A true Moslem will exemplify a life which conforms to strict ethical requirements.

Islam is indeed a law, and demands ceremonial acts also from its adherents. Already in its earliest document—the Koran—and not only in the traditional teachings which indicate the development of Islam, do we find the feelings which accompany a deed described as the standard of its religious merit, and it is in the Koran also that legalism, unaccompanied by deeds of mercy and charity, is held of very little value.

“There is no piety in turning your faces toward the east or the west, but he is pious who believeth in God, and the last day, and the angels, and the Scriptures, and the prophets; who for the love of God disburseth his wealth to his kindred, and to the orphans, and the needy, and the wayfarer and those who ask, and for ransoming; who observeth prayer, and payeth the legal alms, and who is of those who are faithful to their engagements when they have engaged them, and patient under ills and hardships, and in time of trouble; these are they who are just, and these are they who fear the Lord” (Sura 2, v. 172). And in speaking of the rites of the pilgrimage, which he decrees (or rather retained from the traditions of Arabian paganism) on the ground that “we have imposed sacrificial rites on all people, so that they may commemorate the name of God over the brute beasts which he hath provided for them,” Mohammed lays the greatest emphasis on the pious frame of mind which should accompany the act of worship. “By no means can their flesh reach God, neither their blood; but piety on your part reacheth him” (Sura 22, v. 35, 38). The greatest importance is placed on the *Ikhhlās* (unclouded purity) of the heart (Sura 40, v. 14) *takwā al-kulūb*, “the piety of the heart” (Sura 22, v. 23), *kalb salīm* “a perfect heart” which accords with the *lēbh shālēm* of the Psalmist; standpoints which take into consideration the religious merit of the true believer. These convictions are carried still further, as we shall soon see, in the traditions, and spread over the whole field of religious life in the teachings concerning the significance of *niyya*,—the conviction that the purpose underlying all acts is the measure of religious deeds. The shadow of an egotistical or hypocritical motive, according to this precept, deprives every bonum opus of its worth. It will, therefore, not be possible for any impartial judge to approve Tisdall’s utterance: “It will

be evident, that purity of heart is neither considered necessary nor desirable; in fact, it would be hardly too much to say, that it is impossible for a Moslem.”⁷

And which is the “steep path” (perhaps to be compared with the “straight gate,” Matth. 7:13, which leads to life) which the company of the privileged, those who are to share the joys of paradise, follow? It is not the hypocritical life almost entirely devoted to the ceremonial—to the practices and forms of outward worship, that lies within this path, but rather the life devoted to good works. “It is to free the captive; or to feed, in a day of famine, the orphan who is of kin, or the poor man who lieth on the ground. Whoso doth this, belongs to those who believe and who recommend perseverance unto each other, these shall be the companions of the right hand” (Sura 90:12-18—compare with this the verses of Isaiah 58:6-9).

In our next lecture we will show that the teachings of the Koran find a further development and supplement in a great number of traditional sayings, which, even though not coming directly from the prophet, are nevertheless indispensable to the characterization of the spirit of Islam. We have already made use of several of them, and since, in accordance with the plan of this introductory lecture, we have examined the ethical value of historical Islam, as set forth in the Koran, it may be proper at this point to point out that the dogmas which are given in the Koran in primitive but clear enough form, have developed in a different way in a great many of the later utterances ascribed to the prophet.

To Abū Ḍarr for example he gives the following instruction: “A prayer in this mosque (in Medina) is of more value than thousands which are made in other mosques, with the exception of that in Mecca; the prayer made in the latter is worth a hundred thousand times more than that which is performed in other mosques.

But of more value than all these is the prayer offered in one's house, where one is seen by Allah alone, and which has no other aim than to draw one nearer to Allah." (Compare with this Matth. 6-6.) "Shall I tell you"—it is reported of him elsewhere—"what indeed stands on a higher level than all praying, fasting and giving of alms? The reconciling of two enemies." "If you"—so says 'Abdallāh ibn 'Omar—"bow so much in prayer that your body becomes bent as a saddle, and fast so much that you become dry as a cord, God does not accept such until you accompany these acts with humility." "What is the best form of Islam?" To this the prophet answers: "The best Islam is that thou shouldst feed the hungry, spread peace among friends and strangers (that is in all the world)." "He who does not refrain from falsehood, of what use is his abstention from food and drink to me?" "No one enters paradise who causes harm to his neighbors." Abū Hureira reports: "Some one was telling the prophet about a woman who was famous for her praying, fasting and almsgiving, but nevertheless slandered her neighbors greatly with her tongue." "She belongs in hell" decreed the prophet. Then the same man told of another woman who was noted for her carelessness in the matter of prayer and fasting, but was in the habit of giving whey (leben) to the needy, and never spoke ill of her neighbors. "She belongs in paradise" declared the prophet.

These quotations and numerous parallel sayings, which could easily be collected, do not represent simply the observations of ethically minded people, but indicate rather (perhaps owing to a polemic attitude toward spreading hypocrisy) the general attitude of dogmatic Islam. We are not told that holiness is dependent only on the practice of formal laws. "To believe in God and perform pious deeds," that is, deeds of philanthropy—

comprehends more and more the conception of the life acceptable to God. It is specially when the question of formalism in religious conduct is under consideration that emphasis is placed largely on *ṣalāt*; i. e., submission to the omnipotence of Allah to be manifested through the general liturgy; and *zakāt*; i. e., the furthering of the interests of the community by taking part in the required contributions, in connection with which the care of the poor, widows, orphans and travelers are the first to arouse the lawgiver's sense of duty. To be sure, Islam, in its development under the coöperation of foreign influences, has engrafted the subtlety of the casuists and the hypercriticism of the dogmatists, and has allowed shrewd speculations to strain and artificialize its obedience to God and its faith. We shall presently see this process of development, but we shall also come face to face again with efforts which mark a reaction against this growth.

IX. Let us now consider some of the darker sides of Islam. If Islam held itself strictly to historical witnesses, it could not offer its followers the ethical mode of life of one man as an example; an "imitatio" of Mohammed would be impossible. But it is not to the historical picture that the believer turns. The pious legends about the ideal Mohammed early take the place of the historical man. The theology of Islam has conformed to the demand for a picture which does not show him merely as the mechanical organ of the divine revelation and its spread among unbelievers, but also as hero and example of the highest virtue.¹ Mohammed himself did not apparently desire this. God had sent him "as a witness, as a mediator of a hateful and warring message, as a crier to Allah, with his consent as a shining torch" (Sura 33, v. 44-45). He is a guide, but not a paragon, except in his hope in God and in the last day, and in his diligent devotion

(v. 21). The realization of his human weaknesses seem to have honestly influenced him, and he wishes to be regarded by his followers as a man with all the faults of ordinary mortals. His work was greater than his person. He did not feel that he was a saint, and he did not wish to pass as one. We will return to this question when we come to the consideration of the dogmas concerning his sinlessness. Perhaps it is this very consciousness of human weakness which makes him reject all claim to miracles, which in his time and surroundings were considered necessary attributes of holiness. And we must also take into account his progress in the fulfilment of his mission, especially during the Medina period when conditions finally changed him from a suffering ascetic into a warrior and the head of a state. It is the merit of an Italian scholar, Leone Caetani, to have put before us in a very interesting work, "*Annali dell' Islam*," the worldly view in the oldest history of Islam. In this work, the writer carries out more sharply than has even been done before, a comprehensive critical review of the sources of the history of Islam. He makes many important corrections in the ideas about the activity of the prophet himself.

It is indeed clear, that the saying "More slayeth word than sword" cannot apply to his Medina work. With the departure from Mecca the times ended in which he "turned away from unbelievers" (Sura 15, v. 94) or "called them to the way of God merely through wisdom and good counsel" (Sura 16, v. 126); rather the time had come when the command sounded: "When the sacred months are passed, kill the unbelievers wherever you find them; seize them, oppress them, and set yourselves against them in every ambush" (Sura 9, v. 5). "Fight in the path of God" (Sura 2, v. 245).

From the visions of the destruction of this evil world, he formed with rapid transition the conception of a

kingdom which is to be of this world. His character inevitably suffered many an injury arising from the political change in Arabia due to the success of his preaching, as well as to his own leadership. He brought the sword into the world, and "it is not only with the staff of his mouth that he smites the world, and not only with the breath of his lips that he kills the Godless," it is a true war trumpet which he sounds, it is the bloody sword which he wields to bring about his kingdom. According to an Islamic tradition giving a correct account of his life, he is said to be known in the Thora as "The prophet of battle and war."²

The conditions of the community, which he felt it was his divine calling to influence, were such that he could not confidently rely on the assurance: "Allah will fight for you, but you can rest in peace." He had to wage an earthly battle to attain recognition for his teachings and still more for their mastery. And this earthly war was the legacy he left to his successors.

Peace was to him no virtue. "Believers obey God and the Apostle: and render not your works vain. . . Be not fainthearted then, and invite not *the infidels* to peace when ye have the upper hand, for God is with you, and will not defraud you of the *recompense* of your works" (Sura 47, v. 35, 37). Fighting must go on until "the word of God has the highest place." Not to take part in this war counted as an act of indifference to the will of God. Love of peace toward the heathen who hold back from the path of God is anything but virtue. "Those believers that sit at home free from trouble, and those who do valiantly in the cause of God with their substance and their persons, shall not be treated alike. God hath assigned to those who contend earnestly with their persons and with their substance, a rank above those who sit at home. Goodly promises hath he made to all. But God hath assigned to the strenuous a rich recom-

pense, above those who sit at home. Rank of his own bestowal, and forgiveness and mercy, for God is indulgent, Merciful" (Sura 4, v. 97, 98).

X. This association (entanglement) with the interests of the world, the position of continuous readiness for war which forms the framework of the second part of Mohammed's career as his character became corrupted by worldly ambition, influenced also the outward form of the higher conceptions of his religion. The choice of war as the means, and victory as the aim, of his prophetic calling, influenced also his conception of God whom he now wished to clothe with power by resort to arms. It is true, he apprehended the deity "in whose path" he waged his wars and performed his diplomatic acts, as monotheistic, clothed with powerful attributes. He unites absolute authority, unlimited power for recompense, severity towards stubborn evil-doers, with the attribute of mercy and gentleness (*ḥalīm*); he is tolerant toward the sinner and forgiving toward the repentant. "Your Lord hath laid down for himself a law of mercy" (Sura 6, v. 54). As a commentary on this appears the tradition: "When God had completed the creation he wrote in the book which is preserved near him on the heavenly throne: My mercy is stronger than my anger."¹ Even when "he smites with his punishment whomsoever he pleases, his mercy embraces all things" (Sura 7, v. 155). Nor is the attribute of love lacking among those ascribed to him by Mohammed. Allah is *wadūd*, "loving." "If ye love God, follow me, and God will love you and forgive your sins." Verily, "God does not love the unbelievers" (Sura 3, v. 92).

But he is also the God of war, which his prophets and their followers were to wage against the enemy. And it was inevitable that many mythological elements should enter into this attribute in Mohammed's conception of God, as for instance, the all-powerful warrior resists the

intrigues and perfidies of the enemy, continually opposing them with cunning even more powerful. For, according to an ancient Arab proverb, "Warfare is cunning." "They think of cunning—and I (also) think of cunning" (Sura 86, v. 15, 16). God characterizes the manner of war which he uses against the gainsayers of his revelations, as "efficient" cunning: "We will lead them by degrees to their ruin, by ways which they know not" (Sura 68, v. 45 = 7, v. 182). The word *keid*—a harmless kind of cunning and intrigue—is used throughout this passage.² The expression *makr*, denoting deeper cunning, is stronger; Palmer translates it in one place as craft; in another as plot, and again as stratagem. It includes, however, the idea of wiles (intrigue). ("They practice wiles against our signs. Say: God is swifter in the performing of wiles" [Sura 8, v. 30].) This is not true only in regard to the contemporary enemies of Allah and of his message, who manifest their enmity in fighting and persecuting Mohammed. God is said to have acted in the same way toward the earlier pagan peoples who scorned the prophets sent to them; toward the Thamudites for resisting Ṣalīḥ who was sent to them (Sura 27, v. 51), toward the Midianites to whom was sent the prophet Shu'eib, the Jethro of the Bible (Sura 7, v. 95-97).

One must not think that Mohammed conceived of Allah as a performer of intrigues. The real meaning to be taken from his threatening utterances, is that God treats each one according to his actions,³ and that no human intrigue avails against God, who frustrates all false and dishonorable acts, and, anticipating the evil plans of the enemy, turns betrayal and stratagem away from the faithful.⁴ "That God will ward off *mischief* from believers, for God loveth not the false, the infidel" (Sura 22, v. 39). Mohammed's own political attitude toward the hindrances which beset him is mirrored in the action

which he attributes to the Lord of the world against intrigues and evil-doers. His own inclinations and his militant methods in dealing with the internal adversary⁵ are ascribed to God in whose Cause his wars are waged. "Or if thou fear treachery from any people, throw their treaty to them as thou fairly mayest, for God loveth not the treacherous. And think not that the infidels shall escape us. They shall not weaken *God*" (Sura 8, v. 60).

It is true that the terminology betrays rather the tone of a calculating diplomat, than that of a patient martyr. We must emphatically recognize that it has not influenced the ethics of Islam, which forbid⁶ perfidious action even towards unbelievers. Nevertheless in Mohammed's conception of the deity the moment Allah is brought down from his transcendental height to the level of an active co-worker with the prophets entangled in the battles of this world, outcroppings of mythology betray themselves.

So the transition from the sway of the sombre eschatological ideas which filled his soul and his prophecies at the beginning of his career, to the mundane struggle so zealously carried on and so prominent in the final outcome, was completed in the outward growth of Mohammed's work. In this way historical Islam was stamped with the impress of religious warfare, in strong contrast to the beginning when a permanent kingdom in a world destined to destruction did not come within the range of his vision. That which Mohammed leaves behind as a legacy for the future conduct of his community is embodied in what he enacted in his Arabian environment; i. e., to fight unbelievers and to spread the kingdom of Allah's power, rather than of faith. According to this, the first duty of the Moslem warrior is the subjection of the unbeliever rather than his conversion.⁷

XI. Various views have been expressed concerning the question whether Mohammed's horizon was limited to his native country of Arabia, or whether the con-

sciousness of his prophetic calling had a wider vision; in other words, whether he felt he was called to be a national or a world prophet.¹ I think we should incline to the second proposition.² It is of course natural that he should interpret his inward call, and his anxiety over the condemnation of the unjust, as applying first of all to those nearest him, who, because of their condition, aroused him to a perception of his calling as a prophet. "Warn your nearest relatives," he gives as God's command (Sura 26, v. 214). He was sent "to warn the mother of cities and those living in its neighborhood" (Sura 6, v. 92). But undoubtedly, even at the very beginning of his mission, his inner perception was already directed to a broader sphere, although his limited geographical horizon would prevent his suspecting the boundaries of a world religion. At the very beginning of his mission he asserts that Allah had sent him *rahmatan lil-'ālamīna*, "out of mercy for the world" (Sura 21, v. 107). It is a commonplace in the Koran that God's instruction was given as *dikrun lil-'ālamīna* "remembrance of the world." Εἰς τὸν κόσμον ἅπαντα . . . πάσῃ τῇ κτίσει (Mark 16:15); (Koran 12, v. 104; 38, v. 87; 68, v. 52; 81, v. 27). This *'ālamūn* is constantly used in the Koran in all its various meanings. God is "lord of the *'ālamūn*." He has adopted the differences in speech and color amongst men as signs of the *'ālamūn* (Sura 30, v. 21). This is surely mankind in its widest sense. In the same sense Mohammed extends his mission over the whole area indicated by this word according to his own understanding of it. His point of departure is naturally his own people and country. Nevertheless, the connections which, toward the end of his career, he aspired to make with foreign powers, and the other undertakings planned by him, show a striving towards lands beyond Arabia. His goal, according to a remark of Nöldeke, extended to territories in which he was sure to meet the

Roman enemy. The last of the expeditions which he urged upon his warriors was an attack on the Byzantine kingdom. And the great conquests undertaken directly after his death, carried out by those most familiar with his views, are indeed the best commentaries on his own desires.

Islamic tradition itself, in various utterances of the prophet, indicates that he was convinced of having a mission to all mankind; to the red and black alike.³ It emphasizes the universal characteristic of his mission to the farthest boundaries imaginable.⁴ According to tradition the prophet voices, in unmistakable words, the thought of the conquest of the world and foretells it in symbolic acts; indeed, it even finds in the Koran (Sura 48, v. 61) the promise of the imminent conquest of the Iranic and Roman states.⁵ Naturally we cannot follow the Moslem theologians as far as this. But making due allowance for their exaggerations for reasons pointed out, we must still grant that Mohammed had already begun to imagine a great power spreading far beyond the boundaries of the Arabian nation, and including a large part of mankind. Shortly after the death of its founder it begins its victorious course in Asia and Africa.

XII. In a comprehensive characterization of Islam it would be a gross error to place the principal importance on the Koran, or to found a judgment of Islam simply on this sacred book of the Moslem community. It covers at the most only the first two decades in the development of Islam. Throughout the entire history of Islam the Koran remains as a divine foundation deeply revered by the followers of the religion of Mohammed. It is the object of a veneration such as has hardly yet been given to any other book in the literature of the world.¹ Even though, as a matter of course, later Islam constantly turns back to it as a standard by which to measure the product of all ages, and believes it to be, or at

least, strives to be in harmony with it; we must not lose sight of the fact that it does not by any means suffice for an understanding of historical Islam.

Owing to his own mental changes, as well as to various personal experiences, Mohammed himself was forced to nullify several Koranic revelations by means of newer divine revelations, thereby conceding that he abrogated by divine command that which, a short time before, had been revealed as the word of God. We must therefore be prepared for the concessions which appear when Islam crosses its Arabian boundaries and sets itself up as a world power!

We cannot understand Islam without the Koran, but the Koran does not by any means afford us a complete understanding of Islam in its course through history.

In our next lectures we shall consider more in detail the phases of development which led Islam beyond the Koran.

NOTES.

- I. 1. "Inleiding tot de Godsdienst wetenschap" (Amsterdam 1899) 177 ff.
- II. 1. This syncretic characteristic has been finally proved by K. Vollers in an analysis of the "Chidher-legends" in which he has found, together with Jewish and Christian elements, also late echoes of Babylonian and Hellenistic mythology. *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft* 1909. XII 277 ff.
2. Hubert Grimme has lately emphasized the influence of the ideas prevalent in S. Arabia, especially in his "Mohammed" (Munich 1904) and in the "Orientalischen Studien" (Nöldeke-Festschrift) 453 ff.
3. Harnack, "Die Mission und Ausbreitung des Christentums" 93, above.
- III. 1. *Kultur d. Gegenw.* 94, 12-23 fr. below.
- IV. 1. *Ibid.* 95. 12 fr. below ff.
2. This point of view was established by C. Snouck Hurgronje in his first work "Het Mekkaansche Feest" (Leiden 1880).
- V. 1. This peculiarity has been noticed by the Moslems themselves. Therefore, the following account concerning Abū Ruhm al-Ghifārī, a comrade of the prophet, is characteristic. During an expedition he rode at the prophet's side on a she-camel. The two animals came so near together that Abū Ruhm's rather thick sandals rubbed the prophet's leg causing him great pain. The prophet gave vent to his wrath by striking Abū Ruhm's foot with his riding whip. The latter, however, was in great perturbation "and" he says himself, "I feared, that a Koranic revelation would be given about me, because I had been the cause of this dreadful thing." Ibn Sa'd, *Biographies* IV. I, 180, 4-9.
2. Cf. Nöldeke, "Geschichte des Korans" (Göttingen 1860) p. 49. (New Edition by Schwally, Leipzig 1909 p. 63).
3. Nevertheless Moslem theologians do not wish to deny that certain parts of the Koran are more important in content, than others. This point of view, sanctioned also by the orthodox, is established by Taḳī al-dīn ibn Teymiyya. *Jawāb ahl al-īmān fī tafāḍul āy al-Kur'ān* (Cairo 1322; Brockelmann, *Hist. of Arabic Lit.* II 104, No. 19).
- VI. 1. Cf. R. Geyer in *WZKM* (1907) XXI 400.
- VII. 1. For the Jewish elements see A. J. Wensinck's dissertation, "Mohammed en de Joden te Medina" (Leiden 1908). C. H. Becker's work deals with the later development, but it also throws light on the early history. "Christentum und Islam" (Tübingen 1907).
2. For this summary of the five principal duties see Bukhārī, *Imān*

No. 37, *Tafsīr* No. 208, which also contains the oldest formula of the Moslem creed.

It would be useful for the understanding of the earliest development of Moslem morals, to investigate what duties from time to time were considered in old documents fundamental to the belief and religious practice of Islam. We would like to mention one which in a speech attributed to Mohammed is added as a sixth to the five points mentioned in the text and recognized since ancient times as one of the fundamentals of Islam: "That thou shouldst offer to men what thou desirest should be offered to thee, and that thou shouldst avoid doing to men what thou dost not wish to be done to injure thee." (Ibn Sa'd VI 37, 12 ff.; *Uṣd al-ghāba* III 266, cf. 275 of the same group.) This last teaching, taken by itself, appears as a detached speech of Mohammed. The 13th of the 40 traditions of the Nawawī (according to Bukhārī and Muslim): "none of you is a true believer until he desires for his brother, that which he desires for himself." Cf. Ibn Kuteiba, d. Wüstenfeld 203, 13. A similar saying by 'Alī ibn Ḥusein, Yā'kūbī, *Annales* ed Houtsma II 364, 6 (3).

3. Cf. now Martin Hartmann "Der Islam" (Leipzig 1909) p. 18.

4. Cf. my treatise on "Die Sabbath institution in Islam" (*Gedenkbuch für D. Kaufmann*, Breslau 1900; p. 89. 91).

VIII. 1. "Revue Critique et Littéraire." 1906 p. 307.

2. See C. H. Becker's excellent remarks in the treatise: "Ist der Islam eine Gefährdung für unsere Kolonien." (*Koloniale Rundschau*, May 1909, 290 ff.). Cf. also "L'Islam et l'état marocain" by Ed. Michaux Bellaire in the *Revue du Monde Musulman* 1909, VIII 313 ff. for the refutation of the widespread opinion, that the principles of Islam hinder practical progress.

3. Tisdall, "The Religion of the Crescent" (London 1906; Society for promoting Christian knowledge) 62.

4. Sproat, "Scenes and Studies of Savage Life" quoted by E. Westermarck, "The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas" II (London 1908) 160, with numerous examples. Because of the lack of an equivalent for the word "interesting," Turkish and Arabic people have as wrongly jumped to the conclusion that the races whose native languages these are, lack intellectual curiosity. (Duncan B. Macdonald, "The Religious Attitude and Life in Islam" (Chicago 1909) 121 and *Ibid.* 122, the quotation from "Turkey in Europe" by Odysseus.)

5. Oldenberg, "The Religion of the Veda" (Berlin 1894) 305, 9.

6. "Le Livre des Avars" ed. G. van Vloten (Leiden 1900) 212, 3 ff.

7. Tisdall l. c. 88.

IX. 1. It is the most zealous aim of the pious to imitate even in the smallest details the Mohammed of the legends gifted with the

highest perfections. This imitation at first had as its object not so much the ethical points of view as the manner of the ritualistic observances and of the outward habits of life. 'Abdallāh, the son of 'Omar, who in all things adopted the "imitatio" in this sense as his duty, was considered the most scrupulous follower of *al-amr al-awwal*, "of former things" (Ibn Sa'd IV, 1 106, 22). He tried during his expeditions always to halt where the prophet had halted, to pray everywhere where the prophet had prayed, to let his camel rest wherever the prophet's camel had rested. A tree was pointed out under which the prophet once rested. Ibn 'Omar carefully supplied this tree with water, so that it should be preserved and not wither. (Nawawī, *Tahdīb* 358.) In the same way they strove to imitate the habits of the "companions of the prophet." Their behavior is an example for true believers. (Ibn 'Abdalbarr al-Namari, *Jāmi' bayān al-'ilm wa-fadlihi* (Cairo 1326, ed. Maḥmaṣānī, 157); this is indeed the substance of all Sunna. The theological presentation of the prophet's biography starts from the point of view that the prophet himself believed that every detail of his actions in religious practice would count in the future. He, therefore, once omitted a formality so that the faithful should not make it Sunna (Ibn Sa'd II I 131, 19).

It was natural to expect that Mohammed should soon be regarded as an ethical example. There is a great deal of literature on this subject. The theologian of Cordova Abū Muhammad 'Alī ibn Ḥazm (d. 456/1069), known for his unbending traditionalism in dogma and law, advances this ethical claim in his treatise on the "Habit and Elevation of Soul" (*Kitāb-al-akhḥlāk wal-siyar fī mudāwāt al-nufūs*) which also deserves attention because the writer has included "Confessions" in it: "Whoever strives for the blessedness of the other world and the wisdom of this, for justice in behavior, and for the union of all good qualities, as well as for the merit of all virtues: he can follow the example of the prophet Mohammed, and as far as he is able, imitate his qualities and his manners. May God help us with His grace, that we may be able to resemble this paragon." (Cairo 1908, ed. Maḥmaṣānī p. 21.)

But there was a step beyond this. Although belonging to a period of thought to be treated in a later division, we must nevertheless add in this connection, that at a higher level of development of Moslem ethics under the influence of Sufiism (Chapter IV) it became an ethical ideal that one should strive to realize (manifest) the "qualities of God" in one's daily life. Compare the Greek point of view "to follow God" with the Jewish point of view expressed in the Talmud (Sōṭā 14a.) and in Sifrē, (Deut. 49, ed. Friedmann p. 85a, 16).

Even the old Sūfī Abū-l-Husein al-Nūrī assumes this as an ethical aim ('Aṭṭār, *Taḍkirat al-auliya* ed. R. A. Nicholson, London 1907 II 55, 1). Ibn 'Arabī, from this standpoint of the imitation of God, demands the virtue of showing kindness to one's enemy. (Journ. Roy. As. Soc. 1906, p. 819, 10.) Under the influence of his Sufistic religious views Ghazālī shows up an exhaustive summary of the preceding discussion as follows: "The perfection and happiness of man consist in the striving for the realization of the qualities of God and also in adorning oneself with the true essence of His attributes." In the introduction to his "Fāṭṭihāt 'al-ulūm" (Cairo 1322) he gives as a Hadīth the saying: *takhallakū bi-akhlāk illāhī* (to try to acquire the qualities of Allah). This is supposed to give deeper significance to the idea of the names of God (*al-Maḥṣad al-asnā*, Cairo, 1322, p. 23 ff.). Ismā'il al-Fārānī (c. 1485) reflects Ghazālī's point of view in his commentary to Alfārābī (ed. Horten, Zeitschr. für Assyriol. XX 350). This conception of the ethical aim, in the case of the Sūfīs, was also influenced by the Platonic conception, that the desired escape from mortal nature (*θνητὴ φύσις*) lay in "being as much like God as possible." (Theaet. 176 B. Staat 613 A.) According to later Greek scholars "growing in likeness (*tashabbuh* = *ὁμοιωσις*) to the creator according to man's measure of strength" (Alfārābī's "Philosophische Abhandlungen" ed. F. Dieterici, Leiden 1890, 53, 15 and often in the writings of the "Pure Brethren") is given by the Arabian philosophers as the practical aim of philosophy. Sūfīism, however, goes a step further in the definition of the summum bonum, to which we will return further on.

2. "Oriens Christianus" 1902, 392.
- X. 1. Bukhārī, *Tauḥīd* No. 15. 22. 28. 55. J. Barth (Festschrift für Berliner, Frankfurt a. M. 1903, 38 No. 6) brings this speech into a summary of the Midrashic elements in Moslem tradition.
2. Several commentators place in this group Sura 13, V 14. cf. Kālī, *Amālī* (Bulāk, 1324) II 272.
3. Cf. Hupfeld-Riehm, Commentary to Ps. 18, 27.
4. The common saying: *Allāh yakhūn al khā'in* (Allah betrays the treacherous) is explained in this sense: cf. *khada'atnī khada'ahā Allāh* (they have deceived me, may Allah deceive them) (Cf. Sura 4, v. 141) Ibn Sa'd VIII 167, 25. Mu'āwīya in a threatening address to the resisting 'Irākians is said to have used the words: "For Allah is strong in attack and in punishment, he defrauded those who practice perfidy against him." Tabarī I 2913, 6.

If then *makr* and *keid*, which are ascribed to God, mean nothing but the frustration of the opponent's cunning, then the phrase *Makr Allāh* has passed from the Koran into the speech of Islam

and been unobjectionably appropriated by it, even in associations which do not fall under that interpretation. A very favorite Mohammedan supplication is: "We seek refuge with Allah from the *Makr Allāh* (Sheikh Hureyfish, *Kitāb al-raud al-fā'ik fi-l-mawā'iz wal-raḡā'ik*, Cairo 1310, p. 10, 16; 13, 26) which belongs in the group of prayers in which one seeks help from God with God. (Cf. 'Aṭṭār, *Taḍkirat al-auliyyā* II, 80, 11; ZDMG XLVIII 98.) Among the prophet's prayers, which the faithful are commanded to use, the following plea is also mentioned: "Help me and not those against me, practice *makr* for my good, but do not practice it for my evil." Nawawī, *Adkār* (Cairo 1312) p. 175, 6 according to tradition *Tirmiḍī* II 272. This formula is found in still stronger form in the prayer-book of the Shiites *Ṣaḥīfakāmila* (see Nöldeke-Festschrift 314 below) 33, 6: cf. also the following speech: "Even if one of my feet were standing in paradise, and the other was still outside, I should not feel safe from the *Makr Allāh*" (Subkī, *Ṭabaḳāt al-Shāfi'iyya* III 56, 7 below) cf. 'Aṭṭār l. c. II 178, 21. The Moslems themselves take this expression as meaning the "unavoidable severe punishment of God."

5. Cf. especially Ibn Sa'd II, I 31, 14.

6. Ibid. IV, I 26 above.

7. The oldest battles of Islam are set forth from this point of view in the "Annali dell Islam" by Leoné Caetani, vol. II passim.

XI. 1. Cf. now also Lammens, "Études sur le regne du Calife Omaïyade Mo'āwia" I 422 (in *Mélanges de la Faculté orientale de l'Université Saint Joseph* III—1908—286), which rejects the acceptance of the early conception of Islam as a world of religion.

2. I agree with Nöldeke's view (in his review of Caetani's work, *Wiener Zeitschrift f. d. Kunde d. Morgenlandes* XXI—1907—307). Nöldeke there emphasizes the passages in the Koran in which Mohammed (already in Mecca) feels himself to be a messenger and warner *kāffatan lil-nās* "to all mankind."

3. i. e. Arabians and Non-Arabians. (Muhammudansche Studien I 269.) But already the old interpreter, Mujāhid, assigns the expression "the red" to men, "the black" to the jinn ("Musnad Ahmed" V, 145 below).

4. It gives a scope to this universality which exceeds the circle of mankind, in truth, so that not only the jinn are included, but in a certain sense, the angels also. Ibn Hajar al-Heitamī in his *Fatāwī Ḥadīthiyya* (Cairo 1307) 114 ff. gives a lengthy explanation of the Moslem view of this question.

5. Ibn Sa'd II, I 83, 25.

XII. 1. However one may judge of the rhetorical worth of the Koran, one cannot deny an existing bias. The people who were appointed to the unsettled parts, (under the Caliph Abū Bekr and 'Othmān)

fulfilled their task at times in a very bungling way. With the exception of the oldest short Mecca Suras, which the prophet, even before his flight to Medina, had used as liturgical texts, and which, being detached, short, isolated pieces, were in little danger of change from being edited, the sacred book, especially several of the Medina Suras, often present a picture of disorder, of lack of unity, which caused a great deal of trouble and difficulty to the later expounders, who were obliged to regard the given sequence as inviolable. If one is to attack the text of the Koran as was lately urged by Rudolf Geyer (*Gött. Gel. Anz.* 1909, 51), with a view to producing "an edition truly critical and in accord with the conclusions of science," one must also take into account the removal of verses from the original context as well as interpolations. (Cf. August Fischer, in the *Nöldeke-Festschrift* 33 ff.) The confused character of the collection appears very clearly in the survey which Nöldeke has given concerning the order of detached Suras, in his "History of the Koran" (1 ed. pp. 70-174; 2 ed. pp. 87-234).

The assumption of interpolations sometimes helps us to explain the difficulties. I should like to demonstrate this by an example.

In the 246th Sura (from verse 27 on) we are told how decent people are to visit each other, how they are to announce themselves, how they are to greet the inmates, and how women and children should then behave. The precepts concerning these relationships have fallen into confusion because from v. 32-34 and from v. 35-56 digressions have been introduced which are only loosely connected with the main theme. (See Nöldeke-Schwally p. 211.) Finally at v. 57 the announcement of the visit is again taken up till v. 59. Then v. 60 says: "It is no restriction for the blind and no confinement for the lame and no confinement for you yourselves, that you eat (in anyone) of your houses, or in the houses of your mothers, or in the houses of your brothers, or in the houses of your sisters, or in the houses of your paternal uncles, or in the houses of your paternal aunts, or in the houses of your maternal uncles, or in the houses of your maternal aunts, or of any house of which you have the key, or of your friend. It lays no crime on you, whether you eat apart or together. (61) And when you enter a house, then greet each other with a greeting from Allah, fortunate and good." Mohammed here gives his people permission to sit freely at table with their relatives, to allow themselves to be invited to eat even with female blood-relatives. One can't overlook the fact that the first words of v. 60, which extends the liberty of the blind, lame and ill, in their natural connection have nothing to do with the subject. An author writing of "Medicine in the Koran" has taken this connection very seriously and has added

the criticism to the fact that indeed the company of the blind and lame at meals was not harmful, that, "on the contrary, a meal in common with a sick person can be very dangerous from the standpoint of health. Mohammed would have done better not to object to the disinclination to it." (Opitz, "Die Medizin im Koran," Stuttgart 1906, 63.)

But upon closer consideration, we see that this passage so foreign to the subject matter was introduced from another group. It did not originally concern itself with the question of taking part in meals outside of one's own house, but rather with taking part in the warlike undertakings of young Islam. In the Sura 48 v. 11-16, the prophet declaims against those "Arabians who remain behind," who did not take part in the warlike expeditions, and threatens them with severe divine punishment. To that he adds v. 17: "It is no compulsion (*leisa . . . ḥarajun*) for the blind, and it is no compulsion for the lame, and it is no compulsion for the sick"—in the text word for word like Sura 24 v. 60a—, i. e., the remaining away of such people or of those seriously prevented for some other reason, counts as pardoned. This saying has now been introduced into other connections as a foreign element, and has apparently influenced the editing of the verse whose original beginning has not been construed in a right way. Even Moslem commentators, although without recognizing an interpolation, have tried to explain the words according to their natural meaning as a pardon to those who remain away from battle on account of bodily inability; but they must submit to the objection to this view, that according to it, the passage in question "does not accord with what precedes and what follows." (Baidāwī, ed. Fleischer II 31, 6.)

CHAPTER II.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW.

I. In Anatole France's narrative "Sur la Pierre Blanche" a group of learned men, interested in the fate of the ancient world, discuss in friendly conversation, serious questions of religious history. In the course of this exchange of thoughts he puts into the mouth of one of them: "Qui fait une religion ne sait pas ce qu'il fait," that is "Seldom does the founder of a religion know the possible historical extent of his creation."

This is remarkably true of Mohammed. Even if we must grant that after the successes which he himself gained in battle, the thought of Islam's sphere of power extending far beyond the boundaries of his own country, hovered before his mental vision, still, on the other hand, the institutions organized by him could not provide for the extensive relations into which conquering Islam was very soon to enter. But the objects looming largest in Mohammed's horizon were after all those of the immediate future.

Even under his immediate followers, the first caliphs, the community of Islam, growing out of the religious body which it had been in Mecca and out of the primitive political organization to which it had developed in Medīna, is already on its way to become a world power—a growth partly owing to inward consolidation, partly also to propagation by conquest.

In the mother country as well as in the conquered provinces, new relations were constantly emerging, which demanded regulating. It was time to lay firm governmental foundations for administration.

The religious thoughts in the Koran, moreover, were in embryo only, and were to attain their development

through the wide sphere which was now opening before them.

It was the events through which Islam came into contact with other spheres of thought that first awoke in the breasts of its more thoughtful followers real speculation on religious problems,—speculation hitherto dormant in the Arab. Moreover, the religious laws and ordinances pertaining to practical life, and the forms of legal ritual, were scanty and indefinite.

The unfolding of the world of Moslem thought as well as the definite directions given to the various forms of its manifestations and the establishment of its institutions, are all the result of the work of following generations. Nor is this result brought about without inward conflicts and without adjustments. How wrong it would be under these circumstances to assume, as is often asserted at present, that Islam “enters the world as a rounded system.”¹ On the contrary, the Islam of Mohammed and of the Koran is immature and needs for its completion the activity of the coming generations.

We wish first to consider only a few requirements of the external life. The most immediate needs were provided for by Mohammed and his helpers. We may credit the tradition which tells us that Mohammed himself established a graded tariff for the impost taxes.² The conditions of his own time make it imperative to raise the *zakāt* from the primitive level of communistic alms to a regulated governmental tax of an obligatory amount.

After his death such regulations were, by sheer necessity, forced more and more into prominence. The soldiers scattered through distant provinces, especially those who did not come from the religious circle of Medina, had not gotten their bearings as to the mode of religious practices. And first now for the political demands.

The continuous wars and the extensive conquests

demanding the establishment of military standards as well as further laws for the conquered peoples. These laws had to deal with the legal status of the subjects and with the economic problems arising from new conditions. It was especially the energetic caliph, 'Omar, the actual founder of the Moslem state, whose great conquests in Syria, including Palestine and Egypt, brought about the first definite regulation of political and economic questions.

II. The details of these regulations cannot interest us here, since for our purposes the general knowledge of the fact is alone of importance, namely that the legal development of Islam began immediately after the prophet's death and kept pace with its need.

One of these details I must nevertheless take up, on account of its importance for an understanding of the character of this early period. It is not to be denied that the oldest demands laid upon the conquering Moslems face to face with the conquered unbelievers (in this first phase of Moslem legal development), were penetrated with the spirit of toleration.¹ Whatever semblance of religious tolerance yet remains in Moslem states, and such semblances have been frequently verified by eighteenth century travelers, goes back to the first half of the seventh century with its outspoken principle of freedom in religious practices granted to monotheists of another faith.

The tolerant attitude of ancient Islam drew its authority from the Koran (2, v. 257). "There is no compulsion in belief."² Even in later times in a few cases people fell back on this to ward off from those heretics who had been forced to embrace Islam the severe penal consequences generally the lot of apostates.³

The accounts of the first Moslem decade offer many an example of the religious tolerance of the first caliphs towards followers of the ancient religions. The direc-

tions given to the leaders of conquering bands are very instructive. As a leading example we have the contract which the prophet made with the Christians of Nejrān, guaranteeing⁴ the protection of Christian institutions; and also the directions which he gives Mu'ād ibn Jebel for his conduct in Yemen: "No Jew is to be disturbed in his Judaism."⁵ The peace treaties conceded to the Byzantine empire crumbling more and more under Islam, were actuated by this lofty spirit⁶ though there were certain barriers against the public practice of religious ceremonies (they could practice their religion undisturbed) by the payment of a toleration tax (*jizya*). On the other hand, it is noteworthy that an historical study of the sources leads to the conclusion^{6a} that many a restriction,⁷ introduced in these old days, did not come into practice until a time more favorable to fanaticism. This, for example, holds true of the decree against the building of new, or the repairing of old, churches. 'Omar II in his narrow-mindedness, was apparently the first to take such a measure seriously. His example was readily followed by rulers of the stamp of the 'Abbāside Mutawakkil. And the fact that such stern rulers found occasion to attack temples of other faiths erected since the conquest, is in itself proof that there had hitherto been no hindrance to such erections.

Just as the principle of tolerance ruled in the sphere of religion, so it did in that of every-day life,—in fact the kindly treatment of heretics in civic and economic matters was raised to the level of law. The oppression of non-Moslems (*ahl al-ḍimma*) who were under Moslem protection, was condemned as a sin.⁸ When the governor of the Lebanon province once took very severe action against the inhabitants, who had revolted against the oppression of the tax gatherers, he was incurring the rebuke of the prophet: "He who oppresses a protégé and lays heavy burdens upon him, I myself will appear as his

accuser on the judgment day.”⁹ Until quite recently there used to be pointed out the site of the “Jew’s house,” in the vicinity of Bostra, about which Porter in his book “Five Years in Damascus,” tells the following legend. ‘Omar had once torn down a mosque standing on this site, because the governor had seized a Jew’s house in order to replace it by a mosque.’¹⁰

III. While, in this constructive period, the first task was to decide the judicial relation of conquering Islam to the subjected nations, still, the inner religious life and its legal regulation could not be ignored in any of its branches. In the case of the soldiers who had already been scattered far and wide, before the religious rites and ceremonies had been definitely fixed, and who in these distant lands formed a religious community, it became necessary to provide a fixed standard for their ritualistic duties with due allowance for necessary modifications. They had also to be provided—and this was especially difficult—with strict regulations dealing with the juridical conditions, till now entirely foreign to the majority of the Arabian conquerors. In Syria, Egypt and Persia, they were forced to compromise with the customs of the country, based on ancient civilizations, and adjust the conflict between inherited laws and those recently acquired. In other words, Moslem legal procedure had to be regulated on its religious, as well as its civic side. The Koranic provisions, limited to the primitive conditions holding in Arabia, had not kept pace with the new problems and were entirely insufficient. Its regulations could not provide for the unexpected problems arising from conquests.

The worldly-minded functionaries, who, especially during the prime of the Omayyad rule, promoted the external splendor of the new kingdom, manifested little care for such needs. Although they did not entirely neglect religious aspects, still their greatest interests did not lie in

the development of the legal aspect of a religious organization, but rather in the strengthening of the political organization, and the retaining of that which had been won by the sword as the privilege of the Arabian race. Established custom was used to satisfy the legal demands of the day, and in debatable cases cunning, and I fear, even an arbitrary spirit, was sufficient for the administration of justice. Moreover, they did not follow very closely the rules which had already been enacted by the first pious caliphs.

This could not satisfy those pious people who were striving to organize the new life in the sense of a religious law divinely ordained and in accord with the views of the prophet. The injunctions of the prophet were to be applied to all things, both religious and civic, and were to be considered as the standard of practice. The "companions," that is, that group of people which had lived in the company of the prophet, had seen him act and heard him judge, proved the best source for this information. So long, then, as a "companion" survived, his word could determine the demands of pious usage and the details of divine law. After the passing of this first generation, people had to be contented with the statements which the following generation had received directly from their predecessors concerning the questions prevailing at that time, and so on from generation to generation to the latest times. Any kind of act or judgment was considered proper, if it could be vindicated as coming through a chain of tradition, dating back to a companion of the prophet, who, as an eye-witness had declared it to be in accord with the wish of the prophet. The usages of ritual and of law formed of the authority of such traditions, were sanctified as practiced under, and sanctioned by, the prophet. They were confirmed by the authoritative founders and first adherents

of Islam.¹ This is *Sunna*,—sacred custom. The form in which it is stated is *Hadīth*, tradition. These terms are not identical. The *Hadīth* is the document of the *Sunna*. It is through the many credible reports transmitted from generation to generation that this *Hadīth* declares what the “companions,” basing their decisions on the sanction of the prophet, regarded as right in religion and law, and what from this point of view should be the single rule of practice.

It is clear therefore that even in Islam the theory of sacred ex-Koranic legislation could be formed, that like the Jews, Islam too could have a *written* and *oral* law.²

Since the *Sunna* is the sum of the customs and of the conceptions of the oldest Moslem community,³ it stands as the most authoritative interpretation of the very insufficient teaching of the Koran, and through which the Koran becomes a living and active force. Adequately to estimate the *Sunna* it is of vital importance to keep in mind the saying which is ascribed to ‘Alī, and which he gave to ‘Abdallah ibn ‘Abbās as instruction, on his departure to negotiate with the insurgents: “Do not fight them with the Koran, for it can bear different interpretations, and is of varying meanings; fight them with the *Sunna*; from that there is no escape.”⁴ This cannot possibly be an authentic utterance of ‘Alī; but it comes, in any case, from ancient times and reflects the ancient Moslem mode of thought.

We need not conclude that there is not a grain of truth here and there in the *Hadīth* communications, of later generations, coming, if not directly from the mouth of the prophet, still from the oldest generation of Moslem authority. But on the other hand, one can easily perceive that the great distance from the source both in respect to time and extent brought with it the increasing danger of inventing doctrines, whether of theoretical

value or for practical purposes, in outwardly correct Ḥadīth-forms and assigned to the prophet and his "companions" as the highest authority.

It soon resulted in the fact, that every opinion, every party, every advocate of any doctrine, gave this form to his proposition; consequently the most contradictory teachings bore the garb of this documentary authentication. In the sphere of ritualism or dogma, in juridical relations, or in political division, there was no school or party doctrine which could not produce a Ḥadīth or a whole group of Ḥadīths for their own use, which had the outward appearance of correct tradition.

This condition of affairs could not remain hidden from the Mohammedans themselves. Their theologians set in motion an extraordinarily interesting scientific discipline, that of the Ḥadīth-Criticism, so that when the opposing elements could not be harmonized the true traditions could be separated from the apocryphal.

Naturally the point of view of their criticism is not ours, and the latter finds a broad field of action, where the Moslem critic believes he is producing indubitable tradition. The final outcome of this critical activity was the recognition in the seventh century of six works, as canonical standards, gathered by theologians of the third century from an almost infinite mass of traditional material and forming the Ḥadīths which to them seemed credible, and which were elevated by them to the rank of decisive sources of that which should be regarded as the Sunna of the prophet. Among these six Ḥadīth collections there are the first group of *Bukhārī* (d. 256/870) and of *Muslim* (d. 261/875), the most important sources of prophetic Sunna, designated as "source" groups because of the formally incontestable data contained in them. To these were added also as authoritative sources, the collections of *Abū Dāwūd* (d. 275/888), *al Nasā'ī* (d. 303/915), *al Tirmidī* (d. 279/892), *Ibn Māja* (d. 273/

886), the last to be added in spite of some opposition. Still earlier *Mālik ibn Anas* had codified the customs of Medīna, the home of all Sunna; without, however, being guided by the point of view of Ḥadīth collections.

So a new group of written sources of religion arose beside the Koran, which became of the greatest importance in the knowledge and life of Islam.

IV. From the point of view of the religious historical development with which we are concerned, it is the process of growth rather than the final literary form of the Ḥadīth which engages our interests. Even the questions of genuineness and age are secondary by the side of the circumstance that the struggles of the Moslem community are faithfully mirrored in the Ḥadīth, and that furnishes inestimable documents for following the ultra Koranic religious aim.

For not only have law and custom, religious teachings and political doctrines clothed themselves in Ḥadīth-form, but everything in Islam, both that which has worked itself out through its own strength, as well as that which has been appropriated from without. In this work foreign elements have been so assimilated that one has lost sight of their origin. Sentences from the Old and New Testament, rabbinical sayings as well as those from the apocryphal gospels, the teaching of Greek philosophers, sayings of Persian and Indian wisdom, have found room in this garb among the sayings of the prophet of Islam. Even the Lord's prayer is not lacking in well confirmed Ḥadīth-form. In this form more distant intruders have acquired, in a direct or indirect manner, citizenship in Islam. An interesting example is found in the story belonging to the literature of the world,¹ of the parable of the lame man who steals the fruit of a tree from the back of a blind man, and the application of this parable to the common responsibility of body and soul. It appears in Islam as Ḥadīth, with a careful train

of tradition, Abū Bekr ibn ‘Ayyāsh>Abū Sa‘īd al-Baḳḳāl>‘Ikrima>ibn ‘Abbās.² This parable and its use was known also to the rabbis. In the Talmud it is put in the mouth of Rabbi Yehūdā ha-nāsī, in order to silence the doubt of the emperor Marcus Aurelius.³ It may have entered the Moslem group from this side. In this way a whole store of religious legends have entered in, so that in looking back on the elements here mentioned as being contained in the traditional material, we can distinguish, both in the Jewish religious literature as well as in the Moslem, between HALĀKHIC (legal) and AGĀDIC (homolitical) elements.

The eclecticism which stood at the cradle of Islam thus develops into rich results. It is one of the most attractive problems to investigators, who devote their attention to this part of the religious literature, to seek in the varied materials the widely branching sources, from which they are formed, and to detect the movement of which they are the documents.

In this way has the Ḥadīth formed the framework for the oldest development of the religious and ethical thoughts of Islam. The extension of the morality based on the Koran finds its expression in the Ḥadīth which became also the subtler medium for the ethical emotions to which Islam at the time of its rise and struggle for existence was as yet insensible. The Ḥadīth embodies definitions of that higher form of piety which is not satisfied with bare formality and of which we have already given some examples.¹ The Ḥadīth is fond of striking the chords of tenderness—the tenderness of God as well as of men. “God created a hundred parts of mercy, of these he kept ninety-nine for himself and gave one to the world. From this flows all the gentleness, which is evinced by man.”⁴ “If you hope for mercy from me,” says God, “then be merciful toward my creatures.” “He who cares for widows and orphans, is as highly

¹ See above p. 20.

honored, as he who devotes his life to religious war in the way of God; or he who spends the day in fasting and the night in prayer.”⁵ “He who strokes the head of an orphan, receives for each hair which his hand touches, a light on the day of resurrection.” “Each thing has its key; the key to paradise is love for the small and poor.” And in the Ḥadīth we find teachings of this kind directed to single comrades of the prophet, in which Mohammed recommends the duty of ethical and human virtues as the true essence of religion. None of these numerous teachings seems to me worthier of mention than that of Abū Darr, a former dissolute “companion” of the tribe of Ghifār, who turned to Islam and at the time of the first revolution was one of the most conspicuous figures of the party. He recounts: “My friend (the prophet) has given me a sevenfold admonition: 1. Love the poor and be near unto them. 2. Look always at those who are beneath thee, and do not look up to those who are above thee. 3. Never request anything from anyone. 4. Be faithful to your relatives, even when they anger you. 5. Speak always the truth, even when it is bitter. 6. Do not let thyself be frightened from the path of God by the taunts of the revilers. 7. Proclaim often: ‘There is no power nor strength except through Allah, for this is from the treasure which is hidden under the throne of God.’”⁶

The serious nature of religious formalism itself is heightened through claims which are first of all made in the Ḥadīth. The value of the work (as we have already mentioned above, p. 17) is estimated according to the sentiment which its practice arouses. This is one of the chief fundamentals of Moslem religious life. The importance attributed to it is evident in the fact that a motto inculcating this has been inscribed over one of the chief entrances to the mosque of Al-Azhar in Cairo, the much frequented centre of Moslem theological learning, to serve as an exhortation to those entering, who are here

engaged in either learning or meditation: "Deeds will be judged according to intentions, and each man will be rewarded according to the measure of his intentions." This is a sentence from the Hadith, which has become the guiding thought of all religious deeds in Islam. "God speaks: Approach me with your intentions, not with your deeds.'" This Hadith, although of later origin, has grown from the conviction of the believer, and characterizes his estimate of religious values. The moral effect of the content of dogmatic teaching is heightened by the development in the Hadith.

A single example, though of the utmost importance for the estimate of Moslem religious thought, will suffice. In the sense of Koranic monotheism *shirk*, "association," is the greatest sin, which God will not forgive (Sura 31, v. 12; 4, v. 116). In the development of this earliest dogmatic conception, as it is given in the Hadith, not only the outward veiling of the belief in the unity of God, but also every kind of worship which is not an end in itself is branded as *shirk*. A number of moral defects have also been included in this category. Hypocritical religious exercises, which are practiced in order to win the approval or the admiration of men, are classed as *shirk*, for the consideration of man is therein mingled with the thought of God.⁸ Hypocrisy cannot be reconciled with true monotheism. Even pride is a kind of *shirk*. Thus the ethics of Islam have been able to form the category of "small" or "hidden" *shirk* (lying in the depths of the soul).

The aims also of the religious life are given a higher plane than in primitive Islam. We encounter utterances which harmonize with the mysticism of a later date. The following revelation of God to Mohammed is found, in a Hadith sanctioned by one of the best authorities and so generally accepted as to be included in the compendium of the forty-two most important sayings: "My servant

comes constantly nearer to me through voluntary pious works, until I love him; and when I love him, I am his eye, his ear, his tongue, his foot, his hand; through me he sees, through me he hears, through me he speaks, through me he moves and feels.’”⁹

The legal decisions drawn up in traditional form, and also the ethical and constructive sayings and teachings, have claimed for the group in which they have arisen, the authority of the prophet. They also, by means of an unbroken chain of tradition, trace their connection back to the “companion,” who had heard the saying or rule from the prophet himself, or had seen certain customs practiced by him.

It did not require any great ingenuity on the part of Moslem critics to question the truth of a great part of this material. This suspicion was due to the anachronisms¹⁰ and other questionable features of many of the statements and to the contradictions manifest in them. Besides, the names of those men are explicitly mentioned who with a certain aim in mind invented and circulated *Ḥadīths* as an aid to these aims. And many a pious man toward the close of his life frankly confessed what great contribution the *Ḥadīth* fiction owed to him. Little harm was seen in this if the fiction served a good end. An otherwise quite honorable man could be stamped as a suspicious medium of tradition, without having his civic or religious reputation injured. On the one hand, people read that in the name of the prophet the pit of hell was prepared for those who falsely ascribed utterances to him, and on the other hand, they justified themselves by sentences in which the prophet is supposed to have anticipated such fictitious utterances from the first as his spiritual right. “After my death the speeches ascribed to me will increase, just as many speeches have been ascribed to earlier prophets (which in reality they never uttered). That which is ascribed to me as my utterance must be

compared with the book of God; that which is in harmony with it comes from me, whether I have truly said it or not." Further on: "That which is well spoken I have said myself."

The inventors of tradition, as is evident, boldly show their cards. "Mohammed has said it," means here only "it is right, incontestable from the religious point of view, indeed desirable, and the prophet himself would have sanctioned it with his approval." We are all reminded of the Talmudic utterances of R. Josua b. Lēvī that anything which a keen witted pupil might teach up to the latest period was as if revealed to Moses himself on Sinai.¹¹

V. The *Pia fraus* of the inventors of tradition was met with forbearance on all sides, when it was a question of ethical and devotional Ḥadīths. Stricter theologians, however, assumed a more serious attitude, when ritualistic practices or legal judgments were to be founded on such Ḥadīths; the more so, when the advocates advanced different points of view and different Ḥadīths. This was not to be the exclusive basis on which the decision as to religious ritual and practice, and as to law and justice, was to be founded.

This consideration has contributed much in arousing a tendency to be found at the very beginning of the development of law, to make use of deductive methods in deciding the religious standards by the side of authentic tradition. The representatives of this tendency also thought they could best regulate the new relations in their formative thought, by the use of analogies and arguments, or even on the basis of subjective judgments. The Ḥadīth was not discarded when it was thought to afford a safe basis but free speculative treatment was allowed, even encouraged as a legitimate method of legal reasoning.

It is not surprising that the influences of foreign culture have had their share in the formation of this legal

method and the peculiarities of its use. Even Islamic jurisprudence bears, for example, in its methods as well as in its detailed enactments special undeniable traces of the influence of Roman law.

This legal activity, which had already reached its efflorescence in the second century of the Mohammedan era, brought a new element to Moslem moral culture: that is the knowledge of *fikh*, of religious law, which in its caustic corruption was soon to prove disastrous for the trend of religious life and science. The political changes played an important part in its development, for they led the public spirit of Islam into new paths, marked by the fall of the Omayyad dynasty and the rise of the 'Abbāsides.

In earlier discussions I have had the opportunity of considering the motives which predominated in the administration of both these dynasties. Elsewhere I have pointed out the influences calling forth those theocratic changes, which, aside from the question of dynasty, give to the 'Abbāsīde epoch its definite character, as contrasted with that of its predecessor. Here, therefore, I wish only to indicate briefly that the ruin which the 'Abbāsides brought upon the caliphate, marks, not merely a political revolution, a change in dynasty, but also a profound upheaval in respect to religion. In place of the government of the Omayyads, who had guarded the traditions and ideals of ancient Arabia at Damascus and in their desert castles, and were accused of worldliness by the pietist group, we find now a theocratic government, imbued with the principles of church politics. While on the one hand the 'Abbāsides base their right to the government on the fact that they are descendants of the prophet's family, on the other they also claim to establish on the ruins of a government condemned by the pious as godless, a rule in accord with the Sunna of the prophet and the demands of given religion.¹ They zeal-

ously endeavored to maintain and cultivate this appearance on which their claims are founded. Thus they do not wish to be mere kings, but primarily princes of the Church, to consider their caliphate as a Church state in the government of which, as contrasted with the standpoint of the Omayyads, divine law was to be the only standard. In contrast to the Omayyads, they endeavor while exploiting their claims of legitimacy, to apparently meet the demands involved in this claim. They fairly overflow with unctious piety in the endeavor to restore the sanctity of prophetic recollections. Their insignia, indeed, is assumed to be a prophet's mantle. They ostentatiously indulge in pious talk. They wish, in this way to emphasize the contrast between themselves and their predecessors. The Omayyads had refrained from hypocritical cant. Even though, as we shall see later, they were actuated by Moslem orthodox belief, they did not hypocritically emphasize the religious aspect of their office. Among the rulers of this dynasty, it is from 'Omar II alone, a prince brought up in the company of pious men at Medina, whose blindness to political claims contributed to the fall of his house, that we can find the denial of the right of a government to exist for the administration of purely worldly affairs in the state. For example, he was considered capable of giving the advice to his viceroy in Emessa, when the latter informed him that the city had been laid waste and a certain outlay was necessary for its reconstruction: "Strengthen it with justice and cleanse its streets of injustice."² This does not sound like the Omayyads. With the 'Abbāsides, who indeed, in increasing measure surrounded themselves with all the splendor and outward pomp of the Persian Sassanian kings, pious phrases are the order of the day. The Persian ideal of a government in which religion and government are closely united,³ is the evident plan of the 'Abbāsīde rulers.

Religion is now not simply a matter of interest to the state, but its central business.

One can easily imagine how greatly the reputation of the theologians was increased both at court and in the state. In as much as the state, law, and justice were to become regulated and develop according to religion, it was necessary to show especial favor to those who guarded the Sunna and its learning, or who disclosed divine law according to scientific methods. With the rise of the new dynasty the time had come in which the legal development of Islam was to rise from former meagre and modest beginnings.

To hold the Ḥadīths of the prophet in high esteem, to hunt them down and to transmit them, was no longer simply a pious exercise in theory, but a matter of highly practical importance. It was necessary, therefore, that the sacred law should be presented with the greatest care, because both the rules of ritual and of the state, as well as the administration of justice in all its departments, even in the simplest civic regulations, were to be in accord with the divine law. The time for the development of law and its establishment had come, the time of *fikh* and of those learned in the law, the *fuḳahā*. The Kāḍi is the great man.

Not only in Medīna, the actual birth-place of Islam and the native town of the Sunna, where a piety which strove against worldly command had cherished even till now the spirit of the sacred law, but also in the new centres of the kingdom, in Mesopotamia, in the furthestmost parts of the state, both east and west, the study of the science of law expands more and more under the shadow of the theocratic caliphate. The Ḥadīths are transmitted hither and thither, new propositions and decisions are derived from this material. The results do not always agree; differences appear even in the points of view and methods. Some accord the Ḥadīth the highest authority

and in those cases where contradictory Ḥadīths give different answers to the same question, one had to decide for the supremacy of one or the other. Others, however, considering the untrustworthy nature of the Ḥadīth proof, were not much embarrassed by that which was positive. They desired freedom in their conclusions. Firmly established local usages and legal customs could not be simply set aside. The grades between these opposite tendencies gave rise to parties and schools, who differed not only in the details of the decisions, but also in questions of method. They are called *Maḍāhib* (sing. *maḍhab*) which means Tendencies or Rites but not sects.

From the very beginning the champions of these differing claims cherished the absolute conviction that standing on the same ground, and on a basis of equality, they served the same cause; they therefore treated each other with proper consideration.⁴ Seldom is a harsh judgment uttered by over-zealous followers of the differing schools. It is only with the increase of the overweening self-glorification of the Fuḳahā that signs of fanatical Maḍhab opinions appear. Serious theologians have consistently condemned such one-sidedness.⁵ On the other hand mutual tolerance characterized the Ḥadīth formula ascribed to the prophet: "The differences of opinion in my community is (a sign of divine) mercy." There are in fact indications that this principle presents a basis of adjustment of the attacks to which the diversity of form, and uncertainty of the legal usage in Islam, are exposed from both internal and external adversaries.⁶

Even up till the present day the view prevails that the variations in custom of the different schools should be equally recognized as orthodox, so long as they claim as authority the teaching and practice of witnesses, who have been recognized by the consensus of opinion as authoritative teachers (Imam). We will come back to this later on. The step of changing from one Maḍhab

to the other, which could easily be taken from matured expediency, causes no change in the religious status, and is accompanied by no formalities. Mohammed ibn Khalaf (d. about 1135), a theologian of the fifth century of the Mohammedan era, won the nickname of Ḥanfash because he went over in succession to three different schools. He was first a Ḥanbalite, then he joined the followers of Abū Ḥanīfa, and later went over to the Shāfi'i. In his nickname the names of the Imams of these groups are phonetically combined.⁷ Various members of the same family, father and son, may belong to the different Maḏāhib. In fairly recent times even, we find it noted that a pious man in Damascus prayed God to give him four sons, so that each one could belong to one of the four Maḏāhib. Our authority adds that this prayer was granted.⁸ It is not unusual to find in the biographies of famous theologians the constantly recurring trait that they gave their decisions simultaneously on the basis of two outwardly different schools.⁹ This presented nothing fundamentally absurd.

Of the various schools with their petty rituals and legal variations, four are still in existence, which constitute the divisions of the great Mohammedan world. Personal considerations were at first determining factors in leading to the predominance of the one or the other school in particular districts of the Islamic world, through the disciples of a particular school obtaining recognition in a certain territory and founding schools therein. It is by such means that the school of the Imam al-Shāfi'i (d. 204/820) obtained footing in some parts of Egypt, in East Africa, as well as in South Arabia, and from there extended to the Indian archipelago. Other parts of Egypt, however, all North Africa, as well as Spain in former times, and latterly also German and English West Africa adopted the teaching of the great Imam of Medīna, Mālik ibn Anas (d. 179/795). On the

other hand Turkish provinces, the Western as well as the Central Asiatic, like the Mohammedans of the Indian mainland, adopted the teachings of Abū Ḥanīfa (d. about 150/767), the same Imam who was regarded as the founder and first codifier of the speculative law school. Comparatively the least extended at the present time is the school of the Imam Aḥmed ibn Ḥanbal (d. 241/855). It represents the extreme wing of the fanatical Sunna cult. Formerly, up to the fifteenth century, it dominated Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine. Within the territory of the Ottomans as they rose to the leading position of the Moslem world, the intolerant Ḥanbalite teachings constantly lost ground, while the influence of the Ḥanifite system spread.¹⁰ We will, however, have opportunity in the course of these lectures to speak of a renaissance of the Ḥanbalite movement in the eighteenth century. The Mohammedans of the Philippines belonging to the United States, follow the Shāfi'ite ritual.

VI. It is now time to consider a great fundamental dogma which is more characteristic than any other of the legal development of Islam; it forms at the same time a mediating element within the divisions arising from the independent development of the schools.

Despite the theoretical uncertainty of usage in the theological circles of Islam the fundamental principle was established and consistently maintained among Moslem theologians, and with varying application, which was expressed in the utterance ascribed to the prophet, "My community will never agree in an error (ḍalāla)," or as grouped in a later form, "Allah has afforded you protection from three things: do not curse your prophet, lest you be entirely destroyed; never amongst you will the people of falsehood gain the victory over the people of truth; and you will never agree in a heretical teaching."¹¹

Herein is declared the infallibility of the “consensus *✓*
ecclesiae.”² This fundamental principle of Moslem
 orthodoxy is expressed by the Arabic term *ijmā* (agree-
 ment). In the course of our presentation we will often
 meet with its use. It gives the key to the understanding
 of the history of the development of Islam in its civic,
 dogmatic, and legal relations. That which is decreed by
 the whole Moslem community to be true and correct must *✓*
 also be regarded as true and correct. Forsaking the *z*
Ijma separates one from the orthodox Church. That
 this principle first appeared in the course of the develop-
 ment of Islam shows that it could not easily be deduced
 from the Koran. A school anecdote recounts that the
 great Al-Shāfi’i who regarded the principle of the con-
 sensus as one of the most authoritative criteria in the
 establishment of law, when asked for a confirmation of
 it from the Koran, had to beg for a period of three days
 in which to consider. At the expiration of this time,
 he appeared before his hearers, sick and weak, with
 swollen hands and feet and bloated face,—so great an
 effort had he been forced to make, in order to point out
 the verse, Sura 4, v. 115, as a support of the doctrine of *✓*
 “consensus.” “But whoso shall sever himself from the
 prophet after that ‘the guidance’ hath been manifested
 to him, and shall follow any other path than that of the
 faithful, we will turn our back on him as he hath turned
 his back on us, and we will cast him into Hell;—an evil
 journey thither.”³ On the other hand he could furnish
 many supports from Ḥadīth-utterances, which were
 accepted as teachings of the prophet.⁴

Everything then which is sanctioned by the consensus
 of sentiment of the followers of Islam is right, and lays
 claim to obligatory recognition; and it is regarded as
 right only because of this general sentiment of the con-
 sensus. Only those interpretations and variations of
 the Koranic text and of the Sunna are right which the

consensus has endorsed. In this sense it possesses the actual "*autoritas interpretativa*." Only those dogmatic formulae are in accordance with religion, in which, often after violent discussions, the consensus finally acquiesces. Those forms of divine worship and of law which the consensus ratifies, are exempt from all theoretical criticism. Only those men and writings are accepted as authorities who have recognized the common consciousness of the community, expressed not only by synods and councils, but through an almost instinctive "*vox populi*," which in its collective capacity is not liable to error. We shall later on have occasion to see the application of this principle as the criterion of orthodoxy, and to demonstrate how the universal recognition of certain religious phenomena, which from the theoretical standpoint would be condemned as hostile to Islam, but nevertheless could be stamped with the mark of orthodoxy, can be explained by the predominating position acquired by this principle in Islam. The phenomena were justified by the *ijmā* and therefore, notwithstanding the theological objections which stood in their way, they were ultimately accepted, and even at times recognized as obligatory.

The extent of this *ijmā* was at first confined more to the general feeling than to a definite theological definition. In vain has the attempt been made to limit it in time and place and to define as *ijmā* that which could be proved as the consensus of opinion of Mohammed's⁵ "*companions*" or of the old authorities of Medina. Such a limitation could not suffice for the later development. On the other hand, however, to abandon completely the *ijmā* to the instinctive feeling of the masses could not be satisfactory to a theological discipline. A satisfactory formula was evolved defining *ijmā* as the unanimous judgment and teaching of the recognized religious teachers of Islam at a specified time. They were

the people of the "binding and loosing," the men who were called to formulate and announce the law and the dogma, and to decide on the correctness of its application.

It will have become apparent that the germ of freedom of action and the possibility of development in Islam is contained in this principle. It offers a desirable corrective of the tyranny of dead letters and of personal authority. It has proved itself, in the past at least, a leading factor in the adaptability of Islam. What could its consistent adaptation accomplish for the future?

VII. With this principle of agreement in mind let us now take a survey of the dissensions occurring within the legal development.

It is mostly in minor details that the above-mentioned rituals differ from each other, and one can understand that these differences did not give rise to the divisions into sects.

Many formal differences are apparent in the form of the prayer rituals: for example, as to whether one should repeat certain formulas aloud or silently; as to how high above the shoulder the outspread hands should be raised in the beginning of a prayer, at the introductory phrase, "Allāhu Akbar" (God is great); as to whether the hands should be dropped during the prayer (so the rite of Mālik), or crossed, and in this case whether above or below the navel. There are also differences in some detailed formalities of genuflections and prostrations.

The disputes over the question as to whether a prayer is acceptable if a woman is beside the one praying, or if in the very midst of the line of worshippers, is very interesting. On this matter the school of Abū Ḥanīfa takes a decided anti-feminine position, as opposed to the others. Among such details a special question under dispute has always impressed me, because in its religious aspect it appears to be of far-reaching significance.

The ritual language of Islam is Arabic. All religious formulas are repeated in the language of the Koran. If now, someone is not conversant with Arabic may he say the Fātiḥa,—the prayer forming the first sura of the Koran and designated as the “Lord’s Prayer” of Islam, in his mother tongue? Only the school of Abū Ḥanīfa, which was itself of Persian origin, is decided in the permission of the use of the non-Arabic tongue in the performance of this devotional formula. Their opponents have therefore blamed them for a tendency toward Magism.

In other matters of the ritual, differences sometimes appear which are linked with considerations of a fundamental nature. To these belong such things as the question of substitution for fasting or the breaking of a fast. While Abū Ḥanīfa is lenient toward unintentional violation of the law of fasting, Mālik and Ibn Ḥanbal insist that the fasting on the day in question becomes invalid through the unwitting violation of the strict regulation, and demand the substitution required in the law. They demand the same substitution for omission to fast, prompted by unavoidable considerations of health. Furthermore when a renegade repentantly returns to Islam, he must make up for all the fast days which have passed during his apostasy, by complementary fasts on ordinary days. Abū Ḥanīfa and Shāfi’i ignore such an arithmetical view of the law of fasting.

The treatment of the dietary regulations in the old traditions afford considerable opportunity for many differences in this branch of the law. First of all the subjective test which the Koran stipulates concerning animal food gives occasion for differences of opinion. The most remarkable, indeed, is the difference in regard to horse-meat which is allowed in ~~one~~ maḍāhib and forbidden in others.¹ In many cases, it is true, these differences of opinion are merely of a casuistic nature,² since they

some/

often refer to animals which would actually never be used as food.³ To give at least one example in this field I would mention that Mālik, in opposition to the other schools, did not consider the use of wild animals for food as forbidden. The difference, indeed, is practically eliminated even for him, since he stamps as *makrūh* (deprecated) those animals which he has taken out of the category of *ḥarām* (forbidden). Attention should be called to the fact that in this instance, a great part of the ground of dispute depends upon the various conceptions as to the degree of acceptance or rejection, or as to whether certain actions or restrictions are obligatory or only desirable.⁴

Nevertheless life, within the meaning of the law, is not exhausted in ritualistic practices. Islamic sacred law includes indeed all branches of the administration of justice,—civic, criminal and political. No single chapter of the code could escape regulation by sacred law. All actions of public and private life are subject to religious ethics, by which the theological jurists thought to harmonize the whole life of a Moslem, with religious demands. There is hardly a chapter in jurisprudence which does not include the difference of opinion of the various orthodox schools. And it is not always questions of secondary importance, but sometimes matters deeply affecting family life. To mention only one: concerning the extent of the authority of the legal agent (*walī*) as to the bride's portion in a marriage contract. The various schools disagree concerning cases in which the *walī* may assert a right of protest against a marriage about to be performed, or concerning the question, as to how far the intervention of a *walī* is essential to the validity of a marriage.

The unique position held by Abū Ḥanīfa and a few other leaders, regarding an important question of juridical procedure much discussed in older times, comes

under these legal difficulties. They combat the usage, founded on numerous traditions, according to which in pecuniary affairs, in default of regular witnesses according to the rules for the ratification of a claim, the place of one may be supplied by the plaintiff under oath. Adhering to the strict sense of the Koran command (Sura 2, v. 282) they demand the witness of two men, or of one man and two women, on behalf of the claim upon which devolves the onus probandi. They do not accept the substitution of other means of proof for the evidence of a witness.⁵

The investigation of the numerous variations in Moslem law, as well as that of the arguments advanced by the champions of the opposing opinions and practices, besides the criticism of these arguments from the point of view of each school, forms an important branch of juridical theology in Islam. It has also constantly offered an opportunity for the manifestation of scientific acumen, in a field which is of the greatest religious interest to current Islam. An extensive literature has arisen from of old in the scientific study of law, in connection with the significance laid upon this sphere of investigation.⁶

VIII. The prevailing trend of this legal scientific development is of greater interest than the details of the differences within the schools of law. In this connection it is to be presumed that those who desire to understand Islam, will be interested in the question of hermeneutics. In religions whose forms of confession and practice are founded on definite sacred texts, the legal as well as the dogmatic development comes under consideration in the exegesis of the sacred text. In such cases the religious history is also a history of exegesis. And this is true of Islam in a very marked sense, for its internal history is mirrored in the methods adopted for the explanation of the sacred texts.

To characterize the general tendency of the legal scientific efforts we may instance the following circumstance. It was not the aim of the purists to make life bitter for the Moslems by erecting a wall of legal restrictions. From the beginning they laid importance on the following Koranic injunction (Sura 22, v. 77); "Allah hath not laid on you any hardship in religion," and (Sura 2, v. 181): "Allah wisheth you ease, and wisheth you not discomfort," principles which are variously expressed in the Ḥadīth: "This religion is easy," i. e., free from uncomfortable difficulties. "Liberal Ḥanīfism is most pleasing to God in religion."¹ "We have come to make it easier, not more difficult."² "He who forbids that which is allowed, is as much to blame as he who interprets that which is forbidden, as allowed,"³ is given by 'Abdallāh ibn Mas'ūd (d. 32/635), one of the authorities belonging to the old Moslem generations, as a leading thought for the development of the law.³

The expounders of law have ~~not~~ been faithful to this principle. *Sufyān-al-Thaurī* (d. 161/798), a man of the highest standing among them, says: "It is the part of science to found a permission on the authority of a trustworthy witness. Anyone can easily justify restrictions."⁴ The more reasonable teachers allowed themselves, even in later times, to be guided by such principles. The following principle from the laws concerning food is characteristic, "If there are doubts as to whether a thing is to be considered permitted or forbidden, the preference is to be given on the side of permission, for that is the root," i. e., in themselves all things are permissible; prohibition is accessory, in case of doubt one should go back to the original basis.⁵

From this point of view they exercise all their ingenuity to find a way out of the burdensome situation which the wording of Koranic law sometimes lays upon the believers. Many a difficulty could be interpreted away

or alleviated by liberal exegesis of the text. The obligatory character of a command or prohibition was easily nullified by hermeneutic rules. The imperative or prohibitive form of speech serves for the expression of the desirable⁶ or meritorious. The omission or commission of an act, ordered or forbidden by such a form of speech is, therefore, not a serious transgression, and does not incur punishment.

A leading teacher of Moslem law of the first century, *Ibrāhīm al-Nachā'ī* (d. 96/714-15) followed the principle, of never defining anything as absolutely commanded or forbidden, but going only up to the point of maintaining: this has been disapproved of by the companions, that has been recommended.⁷ A teacher of the following generation, '*Abdallāh ibn Shubruma* (d. 144/761-2) would give a definite opinion only on that which was permitted (*ḥalāl*). He felt there was no way to decide what (beyond that qualified as such in trustworthy tradition) was definitely forbidden (*ḥarām*).⁸

Many more examples could be given of the predominance of this legal scientific view. The Koran says (Sura 6, v. 121): "Do not eat of that on which Allah's name has not been invoked for that is sin." He who looks at or considers this law from the point of objective exegesis will find here only a strict prohibition of the flesh of an animal which has not been ritualistically blessed at its slaughter."⁹ The whole context of this legal utterance "invoking Allah" indicates a definite ritualistic act, and not an inward thought of God and his kindnesses. "Eat," so runs the injunction, "that over which the name of God has been pronounced . . . why do you not eat that over which the name of God has been pronounced. He has indeed specifically set forth that which he has forbidden you to eat." In this way those are admonished who, on ascetic grounds or because they clung to the superstitious uses of paganism—for even

paganism had some food restrictions—practiced abstinences which Mohammed declared obsolete, and annulled. But he insisted on the essential condition that the partaking of animal food freely permitted, should be preceded by the naming of the name of Allah.¹⁰ This is probably borrowed from the Jewish custom of requiring *berākhā* (blessing), before slaughtering and before eating. Mohammed stamps the omission of this as “*fisk*,” sin. The unmistakable character of the custom prescribed by Mohammed is thereby definitely strengthened. That which had not been blessed in this manner should not be used as food. The strict interpreters of the law,—of the four schools especially that of Abū Ḥanīfa,—apply this to the theoretical exegesis, and to the daily practices of life. Moreover, those Moslems who emphasize strictness in legal acts, consider it essential to this very day. Even in the chase (Sura 5, v. 6) the mention of the name of Allah must precede the sending forth of the falcon or the hunting dogs. Under these conditions only can the hunted animal be used as food.¹¹ The experiences of daily life soon made clear the difficulties of strict conformity to such a law. How was a Moslem to convince himself that the command was really carried out? In most of the schools the interpreters of the law very soon discovered that the prohibitive grammatical form in which the text was expressed was not to be taken literally; it was intended merely to express a wish whose fulfilment is desirable, but is not to be taken in a strictly obligatory sense, and therefore did not involve the consequences of an indispensable law.¹² If compliance with the law, or rather the wish, fails through oversight or other hindrance, this failure would not militate against the allowance of such flesh as food. In this way by a gradual leniency the principle was finally reached, viz., “When an animal is slaughtered by a Moslem, whatever the conditions, the food becomes allowable whether

or not the name of God is pronounced (at the slaughter).” For “the Moslem always has God in his mind whether he declares it in speech or not.” And when this conviction had once been reached, it was not difficult to devise some traditional verification by which such a principle could be sanctioned as a Ḥadith, traceable to the prophet.

Under such circumstances they had the grammar indeed on their side. As a matter of fact the omission in the content of every speech appearing, in the imperative form, could not be stamped as a great sin. In Sura 4, v. 3, it is said for example, “Then marry whoever pleases you from among the women.” From this,—so argue the theologians,—it cannot be deduced that one *must* marry; but rather that one *may* marry if one will. But it must not be denied, that in fact, among many sagacious interpreters of the revealed word of God, those are not lacking who have deduced from the imperative form that it is the duty of every Moslem to marry, and that this is a prohibition of celibacy. “Marry,” that means “you must marry,” not merely, “you may marry.”

IX. The most marked example of the liberty advocated by the schools of interpretation in opposition to the restrictive attachment to word of the law is their attitude toward a law which is generally reckoned among those which stamped Moslem practical life,—the prohibition of wine drinking.

The drinking of wine is stigmatized in the Koran as an “abomination.”¹ But it is known how much opposition was presented to this divine prohibition in the earliest days of Islam, by a community which did not wish to barter Arabian freedom for legal restrictions.^{1a} We wish simply to allude to the fact that the Moslem poetry of wine² as well as the rôle which intemperance and drunkenness played in the diversions of the caliphs,—

they were religious princes,—and of those in high positions in the kingdom, hardly portrays a society whose religious law stamps this indulgence as “the mother of all offensive things.” All this can come under the head of libertinism, and be regarded as a frivolous violation of a religious law otherwise considered valid.

Certain antinomian tendencies very soon make themselves felt in this connection. Even some of the prophet’s companions in Syria, among whom Abū Jandal is the most noted, would not allow themselves to be misled in the use of wine by the Koran, and justified their excess by the Koran verse (Sura 5, v. 94): “For those who believe, and practice good works, there is no sin in what they enjoy, as long as they trust in God and practice good works.”³ It is true that they were severely censured for this exegetical freedom by the strict caliph ‘Omar.

Of an essentially different order is the fact that the theologians of the East used their ingenuity to limit by interpretation, the extent of the prohibition of other strong drinks, which a stricter interpretation had later included in the law concerning wine. On the one hand the attempt is made to justify the conclusion that, with the exception of wine, it is not the drink itself but only intoxication that is forbidden.⁴ Traditions are invented in favor of this, among which there is one which gives the words of the prophet in the name of Āyesha.⁵ “You may drink, but do not become intoxicated.” Under the protection of such documents, even pious people have not limited themselves to pure water. On the other hand every effort has been made by the strict to prove that “a drink, which when taken in quantity, results in intoxication is forbidden even in the smallest measure.” There was also a widespread school of theologians which, clinging to the letter, held only wine (*khamr*) as forbidden, that is, grapewine. Other fermented drinks are

only sharāb (a drink) or nabīd,⁶ not "wine." In this way they could issue a license for apple and date wine, etc., and open a wide door to the faithful, through which,—naturally granting that this indulgence did not go so far as intoxication,—many a concession was made to "thirst" in a lexicographical process.⁷ Even such a pious caliph as 'Omar II is said,—according to one statement,⁸—to have declared the *nabīd* as permissible. An 'Abbāside caliph who did not wish to clash with the law, urgently questioned his Kādī as to his views of the nabīd.⁹ And since such drinks could not be dispensed with at social functions, the treatment of the question of wine which was opened by the lawyers was also interesting to polite society, especially because it was often linked with philological and aesthetic subjects. In the aesthetic circles which the caliph al-Mu'taṣim held at his court, one of the pet themes of discussion of the flower of the higher society gathered there, was to consider the synonyms of wine in classic Arabic, as well as the relation of the prohibition of wine to these synonyms.¹⁰ We will probably not go astray in the assumption that it was not the rigorous conception of this relation which was pre-eminent in the debates of the bel-esprits of Bagdad. Opinions were put forward which gave the most radical opposition to religious restrictions, and even went so far as to ridicule the pious who accepted them. A poem is ascribed to Du-l-rumma in which the latter are alluded to as "thieves, who are called readers of the Koran."¹¹ Or the saying of another poet: "Who can forbid rain water when grape water is mixed with it? In truth the difficulties which legal interpreters lay upon us are repugnant to me, and I like the opinion of Ibn Mas'ūd."¹²

The subtlety of the Kūfi theologians, already in the second century, furnished the basis of Ibn Mas'ūd's theory. Even if "grape water" could not be granted,

nevertheless various legal subterfuges were provided, which were made use of even by well intentioned men.¹³

It is not unusual to read in the biographies, statements like the following: "Wakī' ibn al-Jārrāh, one of the most famous Irak theologians, who is famous for his ascetic habits (d. 197/813), persisted in drinking the nabīḍ of the Kūfis" ignoring the fact that this drink was actually wine.¹⁴ Khalaf ibn Hishām, a famous Koran reader in Kūfa (d. 229/844) drank sharāb "drink" (one does not call the devil by his real name) "on the ground of interpretation"; his biographer indeed, adds that towards the end of his life this Khalaf repeated all the prayers which he had performed during the forty years in which he did not deny himself wine; the prayers of a wine-drinker were invalid and ought to be replaced.¹⁵ When Sharīk, Kādī of Kūfa in the time of the caliph Mahdī, recited the sayings of Mohammed to the people eager for tradition, the odor of nabīḍ was apparent in his breath.¹⁶ Taking an example from later times, which concerns a famous religious preacher of the sixth century of the Mohammedan Era: Abū Manṣūr Kūṭb al-dīn al-amīr, who was sent by the caliph al-Muktafi as ambassador to the Seljuk Sultan Songor ibn Melikshāh. This pious man who, after his death, enjoyed the distinction of being buried near the pious ascetic al-Juneid, composed a treatise on the lawfulness of drinking wine.¹⁷

Naturally the zeal of the more conservative element was aroused against such tendencies and phenomena within the legal group. They, "in contrast to the liberty deduced from an erroneous interpretation of the Sunna" by many, adhered firmly all their lives to drinking only "water, milk and honey."¹⁸ As in the case of all liberal tendencies appearing in the historical course of Islam, they knew how to bring forward a word of

the prophet condemning the mitigation here described. "My community," thus runs the Ḥadīth they quote, "will one day drink wine, they will call it by a disguised name and their princes will support them in this."¹⁹ Such people are threatened with being turned into apes and swine by God, as happened to the religious sinners of earlier nations.²⁰

At all events, the method adopted by the widely-recognized Kūfic theological school, indicates that as legal subtlety was more and more applied to the deduction of religious law, many an alleviation was suggested, by means of which the severity of the text could be mitigated.

A great part of the "contrasted teachings" of the ritualistic schools, into which the Mohammedan world is divided, consists in the disputes over the admissibility of such hermeneutic arts and the measure and variations of their practice. It will be sufficient here to establish the fact from the point of view of Islamic history, that the overwhelming majority of those schools has in many cases brought into vogue the free use of such hermeneutical methods. The aim of all this was to harmonize life, from the point of view of the law, with the actual conditions of social position; to adapt the narrow law of Mecca and Medīna to the broader conditions, since, through the conquests of foreign lands, and, through the contact with fundamentally different modes of life, demands asserted themselves which could not easily be made to harmonize with the letter of the law.

It is only from this point of view that the dull pedantry of the legal scholars can interest the historian of religion and culture. With this in mind I have, therefore, alluded to these matters of significance for religious ethics. The discussion will prepare us for what we shall have to say in the last chapter about the adaptation to new conditions.

10. But before closing we must speak here of two harmful consequences which issued from these subtleties, arising from such training of the theological mind. The one concerns a general bent of the mind called forth by such efforts, the other an erroneous value put upon the religious life as such, at the expense of the religious sentiment.

The predominance of the spirit of casuistry and hair-splitting, especially in 'Irāq,¹ was directly due to the increase of the tendencies just described. Those who propose to explain the word of God and to regulate life accordingly, lose themselves in absurd subtleties and useless sophistries, in devising possibilities which never occur, and in the investigating of puzzling questions, in which the most subtle casuistry is closely united with the play of the boldest, most reckless phantasy. Disputes arise over farfetched cases in law never actually occurring and casuistically constructed, as for instance what pretension to an inheritance a great grandfather of the fifth degree could have in the property of a great grandchild of the fifth degree who died childless.² And this is a relatively moderate case. Even in earlier times laws of inheritance with their many possibilities, were an especially favorite and suited arena for these mental gymnastics of a casuistic order.³ The popular superstitions also offer material for such use. Since the people regarded the metamorphosis of men into animals as within the range of natural occurrences, questions concerning the relation of such bewitched individuals, and their legal responsibilities were seriously discussed.⁴ On the other hand, since demons often take on human form, the religious consequences of such a change were considered, as for example, it was argued in all seriousness, whether such beings were to be included for the necessary number of those taking part in the Friday services.⁵ Furthermore, the divine law must also decide

how the human offspring resulting from the marriage of a demon to a human being, a natural possibility in the minds of the people, should be treated; what in the laws regulating family life such a marriage entailed. In fact, the question of the jinn marriage⁶—marital combinations with demons—was treated in this circle with as much seriousness as any important instance of canonical law.⁷

The defendants of such combinations, to whom Ḥasan al-Baṣrī also belongs, offer examples of such alliances with followers of the Sunna. Damīrī, the compiler of a very important zoological dictionary, who has included such data in his article on the “jinn,” speaks of his personal acquaintance with a sheikh, who had lived in marital relations with four demon-women.

The legal subtlety further devises artifices which serve men under certain circumstances,—legal fictions which form an integral part of the Fikḥ. They are frequently of use in appeasing the conscience in the matter of oaths. The legal scholar is consulted for the contrivance of “evasions,” a phase of his activity that cannot be extolled as a factor of the ethical sentiment in social life. According to a poet of the time of the Omayyads, “there is no good in an oath which cannot be evaded.”⁸ Legal study gallantly met these requirements more than half way. Although the other schools were not behind in all this, the Ḥanifite school, whose cradle was in the ‘Irāq, did most in inventing these devices.⁹ It followed in this respect the example of its master, the great interpreter who devoted a long digression in his exhaustive commentary of the Koran, to the presentation of the excellence of the Imam Abū Ḥanīfa. Most of the evidences which he gives of his profound legal knowledge refer to the solution of difficult questions concerning laws dealing with oaths.¹⁰

One must acknowledge it is not only the pious mind

which rebels against the intimate union of such matters with religion and the word of God, brought about by the ruling theology. We shall be able to see the strongest example of such a resistance in the eleventh century, A. D. (chapter IV). But it is also the popular sense of humor which exposes these theological legal pettifoggers and their self-complacent arrogance through its sarcasm. Abū Yusūf, a disciple of Abū Ḥanīfa whom we just mentioned (d. 182/795), the great Kāḍī of the caliph al-Mahdī and Hārūn al-Raschīd, is the literary butt of the wit of the people, amusing themselves at the expense of lawyers; he also found his way into the Arabian Nights.

Secondly let us note the harmful consequences on the trend of religious life. The predominance of casuistical efforts in relation to legal religious science, gradually impressed a legalistic character upon the teachings of Islam. As I have said elsewhere: "Under the influence of this tendency religious life itself was placed under a legal control, which naturally could not be favorable to the propagation of true piety and godliness. Consequently the faithful follower of Islam stands, even in his own view, from now on, under the constraint of human laws, in relation to which the word of God, which to him is the means and source of devotion, regulates only an unimportant part of the observances of life, and retires into the background. Those who investigate the practical application of law with the help of legal niceties and who keep watch over the punctilious adherence to it, are recognized as religious teachers. It is only to this class, not to the philosophers of religion or to the moralists, not to mention the advocates of human science, that the word ascribed to the prophet refers: 'The scholars (*ulemā*) of my community are like the prophets of the Children of Israel.'"¹¹

We have already shown that there were not wanting

earnest men who raised their voices in vigorous condemnation of this deviation from the religious ideal as it very early manifested itself in Islam, and who earnestly strove to save the inner religious life from the clutches of the hair-splitting lawyers of religion. We have seen that they could claim reliable Ḥadīth. Before we can understand them we must undertake to find our way through the dogmatic development of Islam.

NOTES.

- I. 1. Abraham Kuenen, "National Religions and Universal Religions." (Hibbert Lectures 1882) 293.
2. See for example Ibn Sa'd IV, II 76, 25.—Ancient traditions concerning the impost tariff Muh. Stud. II 50 note 3; 51 note 3. Outside of the tariff the tax collectors are given written instructions of a positive nature, which have to do with the careful administration of the tariff, *ibid.* VI 45, 16.
- II. 1. "In the earliest times the Arabs were not fanatical, but were on almost brotherly terms with their Christian Semitic cousins. However, after the latter had very soon become Moslems, they brought into the new religion that implacability and blind hostility toward the believers of Byzantium, which formerly had been the cause of the decline of oriental Christendom. Leone Caetani "Das historische Studium des Islams" (Berlin 1908, from a lecture at the international historical congress held in Berlin) 9.
2. Cf. 'Omar's application of this principle to his Christian slaves. Ibn Sa'd VI 110, 2. Proselytism is not ascribed even to Mohammed. "If you turn to Islam, it is well; if not, then remain (in your former faith); Islam is wide" (or broad, *ibid.* 30, 10).
3. According to Kifti ed. Lippert 319, 16 ff., Maimūnī, who before his emigration had been forced to assume in Spain for a short time the appearance of a Moslem, was denounced in Egypt where he stood at the head of Judaism, by a Spanish Moslem fanatic, Abū-l-'Arab, who reported him to the government as an apostate. According to the law, death is the punishment for apostasy. 'Abdalrahīm ibn 'Alī, famous as *al-Kāḍī al-fādīl*, pronounced the sentence however "that the confession of Islam by a person who is forced to it, is invalid according to the religious law," so the charge of apostasy could not be carried out. The Mufti of Constantinople made the same decision toward the end of the 17th century, in the matter of the Maronite emir Yūnus, who was forced by the Pasha of Tripoli to confess Islam, but very soon after openly renewed his allegiance to Christianity. The Mufti gave the verdict that the enforced confession of Islam was null and void. The Sultan ratified the Mufti's verdict. The contemporary patriarch of Antioch, Stephanus Petrus, alludes to this in a circular letter: "postea curavit (Yūnus) offerri sibi litteras ab ipse magno Turcarum Rege atque Judicium sententias, quibus declarabatur negationem Fidei ab ipso per vim extortam irritam esse et invalidam." (De la Roque, "Voyage du Syrie et du Mont Libanon"—Paris 1722—II 270-71) cf. also Moulavi Kherāgh 'Alī, "The proposed political, legal and social Reforms in the

- Ottoman Empire (Bombay 1883) 50-58," concerning the question of the treatment of apostasy in Islam.
4. Wākidi ed. Wellhausen ("Skizzen und Vorarbeiten" IV). Text 77, 1.
 5. Balāḍorī, "Liber expugnationis regionum" ed. de Goeje 71, 12.
 6. Cf. de Goeje, "Mémoire sur la Conquête de la Syrie" (Leiden 1900) 106. 147.
 - 6a. See about such agreements and their criticism Caetani "Annali dell Islam" III 381; 956-59.
 7. So, for example, if we assume that at the conquest of Syria the Christians were forbidden to let the knockers (*nākūs*) of their Churches be heard, an anecdote told of the Caliph Mu'āwīyya by Ibn Kuteiba '*Uyūn al-akhbār*, ed. Brockelmann 138, 11 ff., would be impossible. The noise of these knockers disturbs the aging caliph; he sends a messenger to Byzanz to cause the cessation of the noise. For the building of Churches cf. ZDMG XXXVIII 674.
 8. Tabarī I 2922, 6 ff. 'Omar deprecates the use of violent measures towards the conquered, on account of the separatists. The prophet has said: "He who tortures man in this world, him will God torture on the day of judgment." Yā'kūbī, "Historiae" ed. Houtsma II 168, 11. cf. the instruction given to the governor of the district of Emesa (Ibn Sa'd IV, II 14, 8).
 9. Balāḍorī *ibid.* 162. The Sheikh ul-Islam Jemal al-dīn must have had maxims of this kind in mind, when in reference to religious equality in the new Turkish constitution, he explained to the correspondent of the "Daily News" (August 8, 1908) "You may rest assured that however liberal the constitution is, Islam is still more liberal."

Nevertheless the fanaticism towards unbelievers has, according to a precedent to be examined later, brought into the field sayings of the prophet favoring the harsh treatment of non-Moslems. The prophet's command to prevent unbelievers from giving the salaam-greeting, and to reply to them with ambiguous word-play, has been received as true even in well substantiated Ḥadith. (Bukhārī, *Jihād* no. 97, *Isti'dān* no. 22, *Da'awāt* no. 67. Cf. Ibn Sa'd IV, II 71, 6; V 393, 26.) That it was nevertheless not always found to be compatible with the spirit of Islam, is evident in the statements of Ibn Sa'd V 363, 26; VI, 203, 3 ff. Other utterances of this kind have been rejected as apocryphal, e. g. "When anyone shows a friendly face to a *ḍimmī* (Jew or Christian ward) it is as if he had punched me in the ribs." (Ibn Ḥajar *Fatāwī ḥadīthiyya*—Cairo 1307—118) cited as an absolutely unfounded invention: "The prophet once met the angel Gabriel and wished to take his hand; the angel pushed him away with the justification, 'you have just seized the hand

of a Jew; you must first perform the ceremonial cleansing (before you may touch me)' '' (*Ḍahabī*, "Mizān al-ī'tidār," Lucknow 1301, II 232, and further *ibid.* 275 as *ḵabar bāṭil*.) "If anyone (Moslem) has intercourse with a 'ḍimmi' and humbles himself before him, on the day of judgment a stream of fire will be raised between them, and the Moslem will be told: 'Go through the fire to the other side, so that you may settle your account with your community.' '' (*ibid.* II 575.) At the time of this saying, partnerships between Moslem and Jew were very frequent. The relations arising from it repeatedly form the theme of Jewish theological-legal discussion (see Louis Ginzberg, *Geonica*, New York 1909, II 186). The fanatical Ḥadīth seriously warns against such business partnerships, from the standpoint of Islam.

Every phase of opinion has been marked with words adapted from the prophet. People like the Ḥanbalites who take exception to Moslems who differ from them in their social tolerance (ZDMG LXII 12 ff.), are naturally no less hostile to those of another faith, and readily cling to the spiteful sayings, while they endeavor to undermine tolerant teachings. It is characteristic that some (indeed his school) make the Imām Aḥmed ibn Ḥanbal reject as false the tradition, "Whoever harms a *ḍimmī*, it is as if he had harmed me," (Subkī, *Ṭabaḳāt al-Shāfi'iyya* I 268, 6 fr. bel.). The leading Moslem teachings have always taken exception to such views, as well as to the documents upon which their upholders depend.

10. Porter, "Five Years in Damascus." (London 1870) 235.

III. 1. For example the question whether it is permitted to remove a body from its place of death to another place, is decided by al-Zuhri by bringing up the precedent that the body of Sa'd ibn abī Waḳḳās was brought from al-'Aḳik to Medina. Ibn Sa'd III, I 104-105.

2. ZDMG LXI 863 ff.

3. Judging from some of Ibn Sa'd's writings XI 135, 19 ff. important for the conception of the Sunna, it appears that in the 1st century, the opinion was held that only those sayings could count as Sunna which the prophet had attested, not those attested by his companions. But this limitation could not be carried out.

4. "Nahj al-Balāgha" (the speeches ascribed to 'Alī) II 75, 7 (ed. Muḥammed 'Abduh, Beirut 1307). The word "escape" is expressed in the text by *mahīsan*. Cf. Huart, "Textes persans relatifs à la secte des Houroufis" (Leiden-London 1909), Gibb series IX, text, 76, 17 has mis-read this word as *masiyyan*, and brought out the strange meaning (Tr. 120, 23) "car ils ne trouveront pas personne qui en soit châtrée."

IV. 1. Steinschneider, "Die Hebräischen Übersetzungen des Mittelalters" 852 note 43; also his "Rangstreit-Literatur" (Vienna

- 1908, Sitzungsber. d. Akad. d. W. Phil. history Kl. Bd. 155) 58. Much literature of this character can be found collected by E. Galtier *Futūh al-Bahnasā* (Mem. Inst. franc. d'arch. orient du Caire XXII, 1909) 20 note 1.
2. Ibn K̄ayyim al-Jauziyya, *Kitāb al-rūh* (Haidarabad 1318.) 294.
 3. Bab. *Sanhedrīn* 91a. at the bottom.
 4. Bukhārī, *Kitāb al-adāb* no. 18.
 5. Ibid. no. 24. 25.
 6. Ibn Sa'd IV, I 168 below.
 7. Ibn Teymiyya, *Rasā'il* (Cairo 1324) II 342.
 8. Ibn Ḥajar, *Iṣāba* ed. Calcutta II 396. "At the time of the prophet we regarded hypocrisy as a minor *shirk*."
 9. "Arba'ūn al-Nawawī" no. 38.
 10. The critics have sometimes a sharp eye for anachronisms. But endeavor, in their efforts, to justify utterances that in their form appear to be authentic, by finding means to set aside inherent difficulties; even to the extent of admitting as possible anticipations of later conditions in the ancient Ḥadīth. There is a story in the Musnad of Aḥmed b. Ḥanbal according to which the woman Ummal-Dardā tells how the prophet once saw her in the street and asked her whence she came. "From the bath" (*ḥammām*) was her answer. Ibn al-Jauzī, who was writing a book of his own on false Ḥadīth, does not hesitate to throw aside both the story and the moral for which it is the background, on the ground that at that time there were no baths in Medina. While others quiet the scruples of Ibn al-Jauzī in spite of the anachronisms, see Ibn Ḥajar al-Asḳalānī, *al-Kaul al-musaddad fi-l-ḍabb'an al-Musnad* (Haidarābād 1319) 46.
 11. Jerus. Talmud *Khagīgā* 1, 8 toward the end.
- V. 1. See Kult. d. Gegenw. 108, 7 ff. cf. Muh. Studien II 52 ff.
2. Beihakī, *Maḥāsīn* ed. Schwally 392—"Pseudo-Jāhiz" ed. van Vloten 181 above.
 3. Cf. ZDMG LXII note 2.
 4. The saying of Yahyā b. Sa'īd (d. 143/760) is very important for judging of this decision: "Men of (religious) science are people of broad horizon. Differences of opinion are constantly prevailing among those who have to give decisions. What one proclaims as permitted the other holds as forbidden. Nevertheless they are far from finding fault with each other. Each one feels the question which is put before him weighing on him like a heavy mountain, and when he sees a gate open (for his release) he feels himself relieved of the burden," Ḍahabī, *Taḍkirat al-huffāz* I 124. Yahyā's statements resemble those of El'azār ibn Azaryā (b. Talmud Babli *Khagīgā* 3 b) about the difference of opinion in Jewish law (referring to Ecces. 12, 11). "Although some proclaim as clean what others hold unclean, some allow

what others forbid, some declare as forbidden what others admit . . . nevertheless all (these contradictory opinions) are given by one shepherd, by God, 'who spake all these words' (Exod. 20, 1). In like manner it is said of the controversial schools of Shammai and Hillel that "both are the words of the living God." (Talmud Babli *Ērūbhīn* 13 b.) On the other hand R. Simon ibn Jokhai regards such legal differences of opinion as forgetfulness of the Thora (Sifrē, Deuteron. 48 ed. Friedmann 84 b, 11).

5. A very remarkable judgment of later times against the Maḍhab-Fanaticism of the Fukahā is to be found in Tāj al-dīn al-Subkī, *Mu'īd al-ni'am wamubīd al-nikam* ed. Myhrman (London 1908) 106-109. At the same time a proof of the fact that at the time of the writer (d. 771/1370) such fanatical opinions were very common among the legal authorities of Syria and Egypt.
 6. Concerning this principle see my "Zahiriten" 94 ff. That the differences in religious practice were very early objects of censure, is to be seen in Ma'mūn's discussion of it in Taifur, *Kitāb Baghdād* ed. Keller 61, and from a very important passage in an epistle to the caliph ascribed to Ibn al-Mukaffa. (Arab. Zeitschrift *Muktabas* III 230—*Rasā'il al-bulaghā* Cairo 1908 54.)
 7. Ḍahabī, *Mizañ al-i'tidāl* II 370.
 8. Muhibbī, *Khulāṣat al-athar fī a'yān al-karn al-hādī'ashar* (Cairo 1284) I 48, Ibrāhīm ibn Muslim al-Samādī (d. 1662).
 9. For example Ibn al-Kālānisi, "History of Damascus" ed. Amedroz 311 (from the 6th century of the Hijra) the Kādī who is introduced as an illustration, gives his decisions on the ground of Ḥanifite and Ḥanbalite *Maḍhab*, cf. the present attribute *muftī al-firaḳ* i. e. muftī of the various parties, to whom he can give decisions in each case from the standpoint of their own Maḍhab teachings.
 10. Cf. Kult. d. gegenw. 104, 13-29.
- VI. 1. *Kenz al-'ummāl* VI 233 no. 4157 from Musnad Aḥmed.
2. Their consensus can only be one upheld by errors; "fa-ijmā-'uhum ma'sūm" (Ibn Teymiyya, *Rasā'il* I 17, 3; 82, 10). *Ma'sūm* (upheld immune) means about the same thing as infallible; the same expression as the one applied to the infallibility of the prophets and Imams. (See below V § 10.)
 3. *wa nuṣlihi*. E. Palmer translates: "We will make him reach hell" on the assumption that only the 1st form and not the 4th conjugation of the verb *ṣalā* can have the meaning of cook, burn, heat. Baidāwī confirms this distinction ib., who gives the meaning *ajala* (IV stem) to let one come in, for the colloquial reading. But from the statements in *Lisan al Arab* XIX 201 it is evident that the 4th form also permits of the translation we prefer.

4. Subkī, *Tabakāt al-Shāfi'iyya* II 19 below. Elsewhere the collection of Koranic evidence does not seem to have cost the Shāfi'i so much trouble. He finds for example in Sura 98 v. 4 the strongest proof against the teachings of the Murjiites (Subkī l. c. I 227) rather far-fetched. Later other Koranic proofs have been found for the Ijma-teachings; as for example Fakhr al-dīn al-Rāzī (*Mafātīh al-ghaib* III 38) deduces it from Surah 3 v. 106. cf. for other documentary proofs Snouck Hurgronje in "Revue de l'Histoire des Religions" XXXVII (1898) 17.
 5. Abū Dāwūd II 131. Tirmidī II 25, Baghawī, *Maṣābiḥ al-Sunna* I 14.
- VII. 1. Cf. about this question and the Koran material involved, Snouck Hurgronje in his review of Van den Berg's "Beginnels van het Mohammedaansche Recht" 1 art. 26-27 of the reprint; "Juynboll Handbuch des Islamischen Gesetzes" (Leiden 1908) 175 ff.
2. Cf. the casuistic, and in part quite preposterous questions, in Jāhiz, *Ḥayawān* VI 52, laid before Sha'bī. With reference to the Sura 6 v. 146 ("I find in that which is revealed to me, nothing forbidden for those eating, that they may enjoy &c. . . .") he proclaims the eating of elephant flesh as permissible.
 3. In the zoölogical encyclopedia of Damīrī, the author at the close of each article treats the question of the legal religious position of the animal in question, as well as the differences in this regard of the *maḍahib*.
 4. Cf. About these categories "Zahiriten" 66 ff. Juynboll. "Handbuch des Islamischen Gesetzes" 56 ff.
 5. Cf. especially Zurkānī to *Muwatta* (Cairo 1279/80) III 184.
 6. Friedrich Kern has discussed most extensively the literature of this branch of Moslem jurisprudence, ZDMG LV 61 ff. and in the introduction to his work of the *Kitāb ikhtilāf al-fuḡahā* of Ṭabarī (Cairo 1902) 4-8 on the difference of the schools. Among the comprehensive works, the big "Book of the Scales" by the Egyptian mystic 'Abd al-Wahhāb al-Sha'rānī (d. 973/1565) is the one most used. This work has been partly translated into French by Perron: "Balance de la loi Musulmane ou Esprit de la législation islamique et divergences de ses quatre rites jurisprudentiels" (Algiers 1898 published by the general government of Algeria).
- VIII. 1. Bukh., *Imān* no. 28. The sentence has also been cited as a Koran verse, Nöldeke-Schwally "Gesch. d. Korans" 181.
2. Bukh., *Ilm* no. 12; *Wuḍū'* no. 61; *Adab* no. 79.
 3. Ibn Sa'd VI 126, 3.
 4. 'Abdalbarr al-Namārī, *Jāmi' bayān al-ilm wa-faḍlihi* (published in extract form, Cairo 1320) 115, 9. Cf. with this aspect the Talmudic principle: "the power to permit is more valuable," Talmud Babli *Berākhoth* 60a and frequently.

5. "Damīrī," "Ḥayāt al-ḥayawān," s. v. *sunjāb* II 41, 21.
 6. The Ḥadīth in the Bukh.; K. *al i'tisām* no. 16 treats of this.
 7. Al-Dārimī, *Sunan* (Cawnpore 1293) 36. The (permitted) account gives a meaning if one substitutes for *ḥalāl* of the text the expression "absolutely commanded" as I have assumed.
 8. Ibn. Sa'd VI, 244, 20.
 9. According to the Nomokanon of the Barhebraeus also, must "the name of the living God be invoked in battle." (See Bockenhoff, "Speisegesetze Mosaischer Art in mittelalterlichen Kirchenrechtsquellen"—Münster 1907-49.) See concerning the same facts in the Nomokanon, S. Fraenkel, *Deutsche Literaturz.* 1900, 188.
 10. Cf. Ibn Sa'd VI 166, 21.
 11. Muwaṭṭa II 356. See my article "Bismillāh" in Hastings Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics II 667b.
 12. Cf. Subkī, *Mu'īd al-ni'am* ed. Myhrman 203, 10.
- IX. 1. This subject is now well handled by Caetani l. c. 449. 477: "Il vino presso gli Arabi antichi e nei primi tempidell' Islam."
- 1a. "Muh. Stud." I 21 ff. cf. now also Lammens, "Études sur le règne du Calife Mo'āwiyya" I 411 (*Mélanges Beyrouth* III 275).
 2. The poets of the 'Omayyad epoch sometimes declare the wine of which they speak, explicitly "ḥalāl" (legally permitted); Jemīl al-'Uḍrī (Aghānī, VII, 79, 15). Ibn Kais al Ruḳayyāt (ed. Rhodokanakis 57, 5 *aḥallahu Allāhu lanā*). We must not deduce from this an allusion to the distinctions of the theologians (*khizānat al-adab* IV 201).
 3. *Uṣd al-ghāba* V 161, Suheilī, commentaries of Ibn Hishām ed. Wüstenfeld II 175.
 4. Cf. Subkī ed. Myhrman 147.
 5. Nasā'i, *Sunan* (ed. Shahdra 1282) II 263-269.
 6. *Nabīḍ* also means a drink of which the prophet himself partook. Ibn Sa'd II, I 131, 5. 9.
 7. That, however, conscience troubled a good many on this question, is shown in the story to the effect, that the Caliph, Ma'mūn, who allowed the Kādī Yahyā ibn Aktham to be present at his meals at which he himself indulged in the "nabīḍ," never offered the Kādī a drink. "I cannot suffer a Kādī to drink nabīḍ." Tayfūr *Kitāb Baghdād* 258, 8 ff. Ma'mūn expressed himself in the same way toward the Kādī of Damascus, who rejects the date-nabīḍ offered him. Aghānī X 124, 12.
 8. Ibn Sa'd V 276, 16.
 9. Yāqūt ed. Margoliouth II 261, 2.
 10. Mas'ūdī, *Murūj* (ed. Paris) VIII 105, 4.
 11. Kālī, *Amālī* (Būlāk 1324) II 48, 12.
 12. Ibn Kuteiba, *Uyun al-Akḥbār* ed. Brockelmann 373, 17. The monograph of Ibn Kut. concerning drinks there mentioned, for

which until now we had been directed to the compendium in *Ikḍ al-farīd*, has now been published by A. Guy in the Cairo Arabic monthly *Al-Mukṭabas* II (1325/1907) 234-248; 387-392; 529-535.

13. Ibn Sa'd VI 67 penult.; 175, 20.
 14. Ḍahabī, *Taḍkirat al-huffāz* I 281.
 15. Ibn Khallikān ed. Wüstenfeld no. 217.
 16. Ibid. no. 290.
 17. Ibid. no. 733.
 18. Ibn Sa'd VI 64, 3. 7.
 19. *Usḍ al-ghāba* V 12, 1.
 20. Bukh., *Ashrība* no. 6.
- X. 1. In the 'Irāk the *tauḥīd* (the discussion of questions of belief) was moved to the background; the *fiḵh* is predominant ('Attār, *Taḍkirat al-auliyya* II 175 above).
2. Ibn Khallikān no. 803.
 3. Cf. Th. W. Juynboll's article *Akḍarīya* in the Encyclopedia of Islam I 242. The question of the inheritance of a grandfather was from ancient times an object of legal casuistry (Ibn Sa'd XI 100, 9) and of difference of opinion. (Damīrī I 351, s. v. *hayya*.) Cf. *Kitāb al-imāma valsiyāsa* (Cairo 1904) II 76. The accounts collected in the *Kenz al-'ummāl* VI 14-18 concerning this question of inheritance give a very instructive glimpse of the conditions of the rise of jurisprudence in the early days of Islam.
 4. Damīrī II 289-90, s. v. *ḵird*.
 5. Ibid. I 265, s. v. *jinn*.
 6. Sexual relations between men and jinn is a type of fable which passed from the Babylonian group of stories, through the medium of the folk-lore of the Arabs, into Moslem superstitions. The names of persons of ancient Arabia as well as those of other peoples who were the fruit of such a misalliance are given. Cf. Jāḥiẓ, *Ḥayawān* I 85 ff., where such fables are energetically rejected. Jāḥiẓ calls those who concede such a possibility "wicked scholars" and declares explicitly that he only cites the report. (Cf. also Damīrī II 25-27 s. v. *si 'lāt*.) Examples of Moslem popular beliefs by R. Campbell Thompson, "Proc. of Soc. of Bibl. Arch." XXVIII 83 and Sayce. "Folk-lore" 1900 II 388. The reality of such a union can also be deduced from the Koran 17 v. 66, 55 v. 56. 74 (Damīrī l. c. 27, 19). The difference in species of those contracting such a union (with reference to Sura 16 v. 74 "Allah has given you wives from yourselves") was brought to bear by the religious laws as impedimentum dirimens, against the permissibility of such alliances, but was not everywhere recognized as such (Subkī, *Tabaḳāt al-Shāfiyya* V 45, 5, fr. bel.). It is evident that this

legal repudiation of such unions, was not taken as indisputable, for Yahyā ibn Maʿīn and other orthodox authorities attribute the keenness of several scholars whom they mention by name to the fact that one of their parents was a Jinn (Ḍahabī, “Taḍkirat al-huffāz” II 149). Ibn Khallikān mentions a foster brother of the Jinns no. 763. Cf. also “Abhandl. zur arab Phil” II CVIII; now also Macdonald, “The Religious Attitude and Life in Islam” 143 f.; 155. Alfred Bel recounts that the people of Tlemcen had it from an inhabitant of the town who had died not long since (1908) that besides his legitimate wife he had also been married to a *Jinniyya*. (“La population musulmane de Tlemcen” 7 des S.-A. from “Revue des études ethnographiques et sociologiques” 1908.) The question as to whether angels and jinn have the lawful right to acquire possessions is discussed from the legal point of view. (Subkī l. c. V 179.)

7. Cf. “Abhandl. zur Arab. Phil.” I 109. We can here name al-Shāfiʿī as the exception to the ruling spirit of theological jurists. His school proclaims the following principle founded on his teaching. “If an otherwise irreproachable man announced that he had seen Jinn, we would consider him unfit for legal evidence.” (Subkī l. c. I 258, 4 fr. bel.)
8. Jarīr, *Dīwān* (ed. Cairo 1313) II 128, 13; *Naḳāʾid* ed. Bevan 754, 3.
9. ZDMG LX 223. Abū Yūsuf was the first to publish a tractate on such *ḥiyal* (Jāhiz *Ḥayawān* III 4, 2). And from this time on this subject forms a permanent part of the practical *fiqh*, especially in the Ḥanifite school. One of the earliest works of this kind by Abū Bekr Aḥmed al-Khaṣṣāf (d. 261/874) the court-jurist of the caliph al-Muhtadī, is the standard work of this kind of law; this work is now also generally accessible in a Cairo edition (1314).
10. *Mafātīh al-ghaib* I 411-413.
11. Kultur d. Gegenw. 111, 16 ff.

CHAPTER III.

DOGMATIC DEVELOPMENT.

A prophet is not a theologian. The message which he brings, springing from an impulse of his inner consciousness, and the conception of faith which he creates, do not present themselves as a carefully planned system. Indeed he generally defies the temptation to form a definite system. It is only in later generations, when the principles which inspired the first followers had taken deep root and led to the formation of a compact community, that the efforts of those who feel themselves the chosen interpreters of the prophetic utterances,¹ find acceptance, through the events taking place within the community as well as through external influences of the broader environment. These interpreters supplement and round off deficiencies in the teachings of the prophet, while often offering an incongruous interpreting of these teachings,—and ascribing meanings that were never intended by the founder. They give answers to questions which had never occurred to him, remove contradictions which had not in the least troubled him, devise vapid formulas and erect a broad rampart of association of ideas, by means of which they endeavor to insure these formulas from internal and external attack. They then derive from the words of the prophet and often from his letters, the sum total of their well-organized and systematized doctrines, and on this ground claim these teachings as those which he had in view from the very beginning. They quarrel over them and with sharp-witted and subtle arguments polemicize in arrogant fashion against those who, by the same means, reach other conclusions drawn from the living words of the prophet.

Such efforts presuppose the canonical summary and the definite form of the prophetic utterances as a sacred writing. Dogmatic commentaries gather round the sacred texts and obscure the spirit which originally imbued them. These commentaries are more concerned with proof than with explanation; they constitute the steady sources from which flow the speculations of the dogmatic systematizers.

Very shortly after its birth Islam also enters into a like theological development. Synchronous with the events which form the subject matter of our second chapter, the religious content of Islam became an object of reflection; parallel with the development of ritualistic speculation there arises an Islamic dogmatic theology.

It would be a difficult task to build up from the Koran itself a unified system of dogma compact in itself and free from contradictions. For the most important religious doctrines we obtain merely general impressions which in many of their details are contradictory. The religious conceptions reflected in the prophet's soul vary in color according to the predominating mood. Very soon therefore, the task of reconciling the theoretical difficulties arising from such contradictions was laid upon a harmonizing theology.

In the case of Mohammed the search for contradictions in his teachings seems very early to have begun. The revelations of the prophet were even in his lifetime exposed to critics who were lying in wait for its defects. The indecision, the contradictory character of his teachings, were objects of derisive remarks. As a result, however much he may once have stressed the fact that he reveals "a clear Arabic Koran, free from deviations" (Sura 39, v. 29; cf. 18, v. 1; 41, v. 2), in Medīna he had to admit that in the divine revelation "some of its signs are of themselves perspicuous,—these are the basis of the Book—and others are figurative. But

they whose hearts are given to err, seek for what is perplexing to arouse unrest, yet none knoweth its interpretation but God. And those firm in knowledge say: 'We believe in it: it is all from God our Lord' " (Sura 3, v. 5).

Such criticism of the Koran was especially marked in the next generation since not only the opponents of Islam were busy with the discovery of its weaknesses, but even in the company of the faithful the apparent contradictions in the Koran formed the subject of discussion. An example will presently be introduced to show how the Koran could supply arguments both for and against one of the fundamental tenets of the religion,—to wit, the question of the freedom of the will.

As in all other aspects of the internal history of Islam, it is the Ḥadīth that affords the picture of this spiritual agitation in the community. According to the Ḥadīth the question is traced back to the time of the prophet, and he is drawn into the discussion. In reality the question belongs to the time of budding theological reflection. The Ḥadīth claims that the faithful began troubling the prophet himself by pointing out the dogmatic contradictions in the Koran. Such debates aroused his wrath. "The Koran," he says, "was not revealed so that you should fight one part as a weapon against another, as earlier people did with the revelations of their prophets. In the Koran rather, one thing corroborates the other. Act according to that which you understand; that which arouses perplexity in you, take on faith."²

The view of the naïve believer is announced as the word of the prophet. Such is the Ḥadīth's method.

II. It was partly owing to political conditions, and partly to the impelling effect of external contact that the group of earlier adherents, little accustomed to dogmatic subtleties, was forced to take a stand in regard

to the questions to which the Koran gives no direct or definite answer.

As a proof that it was the political situation which gave rise to the internal dogmatic issues, we may point to the Omayyad revolution which offered the first occasion in the history of Islam, to pass beyond the discussion of new political conditions and public law, to the domain of theology and to decide from the viewpoint of religious requirements, the constitution of the organization.

At this stage we must once more come back to a point in the earlier history of Islam that we have already touched upon in the preceding chapter, namely the question of the religious character of the Omayyad rule. The view formerly current regarding the relationship of the Omayyads to the religion of Islam may now be regarded as entirely set aside. Following Islamic historical traditions, the Omayyads and the spirit of their government were formerly harshly contrasted with the religious requirements of Islam. The rulers of this dynasty, its governors and government officials, were represented as heirs of the old enemies of rising Islam, against which the old spirit, of the Koreish hostility, or at least of indifference toward Islam, revived in new forms.

To be sure they were not pietists and strict observers. The life at their court did not accord in every thing with that narrowing, self-denying standard which the pious expected the heads of the Moslem state to uphold, and the details of which they proclaimed in their Ḥadīths as laws imposed by the prophet. While it is true that stories of the details of the pious practices of some of them have come down to us,¹ they surely would not come up to the standard of the pietists whom the Medīna government under Abū Bekr and 'Omar held up as ideals.

We cannot deny to them the consciousness that they

stood as Caliphs or Imams at the head of a kingdom built up on the basis of religious revolution, and that they regarded themselves as faithful followers of Islam.² To be sure, there is a wide gulf between their ideas of the government of the Islamic state, and the pietistic expectations of the strict observers who witnessed their deeds with impotent displeasure, and to whose partisans we owe to a great extent the transmission of their history. In the estimation of "readers of the Koran" they failed to comprehend their duty to Islam. Their idea was to lead Islam into new paths. One of their strongest advocates,—the ill-famed Ḥajāj ibn Yūsuf,—reflects their attitude when he makes a scoffing remark about the "ancien régime" by the sick-bed of 'Omar's son.³

It is undoubtedly a new system which enters with them. The Omayyads frankly viewed Islam "from the political side by which he had united the Arabians and led them to the conquest of the world."⁴ The satisfaction which they find in the religion is largely based on the fact that through Islam "great fame has been attained, the rank and the inheritance of the people have been secured."⁵ They considered it their task, as rulers, to maintain and spread, both at home and abroad, this political power of Islam, and in this way rendered a service to religion. Whoever opposes them is treated as a rebel against Islam, much as the Israelite King Ahab treated the zealous prophets as "ōkhēr Jisrā'ēl," troubler of Israel (I Kings, 18:17). When they are fighting insurgents, who base their revolt on religious grounds, they are convinced that they are dutifully using the sword to punish the enemies of Islam, in the interests of Islamic progress and stability.⁶ Even when they attacked sacred cities, and directed their missiles against the Ka'ba, an act which for centuries their pious enemies laid at their door as a heinous profanation, they themselves believed that whenever the needs of the state

demanded it, the enemies of Islam should be punished, and the revolutionary movements, directed against the unity, and the internal power of the state, should be quelled.⁷ All those who in any way disturbed the unity of the state, consolidated by the statesmanship of this caliphate, were regarded by it as enemies of Islam. In spite of all their partiality for the prophet's family the proof of which Lammens, in his recent work on Mu'āwiyya's⁸ dynasty, was the first to collect, they oppose the 'Alīite pretenders, who were threatening their state. They do not shun the day of Kerbelā, whose bloody field furnishes to the present time the subject of martyr-ologies of their bitter Shiitic opponents.

The interests of Islam were not to be separated from those of the state. The attainment of power was identical with religious success. Their faithful followers appreciated their acts as performed in the interest of Islam. In the panegyrics of the poets belonging to their group they are continually celebrated as the defenders of Islam. Among their partisans there were groups who even went so far as to attach to their person the same religious sanctification which the champions of the rights of the family of the prophet ascribed to the 'Alīite pretenders, by virtue of their holy descent.⁹

This was not the view of those pious people who dreamt of a kingdom not of this world and who under various pretexts opposed the Omayyad dynasty and the spirit of its government. According to the judgment of most of them this dynasty rested on a sin that became a hereditary element. The new government was unlawful and irreligious in the eyes of those dreamers. It did not accord with their theocratic ideals, and appeared a hindrance to the practical realization of the kingdom of God for which they were striving. In its very beginnings it curtailed the rights of the holy family of the prophet and in its political activities showed

itself absolutely reckless toward the sanctuaries of Islam. Moreover in the estimation of the pious, the rulers of this dynasty did not in their personal bearing, rigidly conform to the ideal law of Islam, and were regarded as people, "who," as the first 'Alīite pretender Husein, the grandson of the prophet is reported to have said, "obey Satan, and forsake God, are publicly corrupt, thwart divine commands, appropriate to themselves an unlawful share of the booty of war,¹⁰ permit that which is forbidden by God, and forbid that which is permitted by him."¹¹ They forsake the sacred Sunna and issue arbitrary decrees, that run counter to religious ordinances.¹²

The imperative demand of the irreconcilable religious party was, that such people should be strenuously opposed, or that at least every sign of recognition of their rule should be passively withheld. It was easy to maintain such a position, but all the more difficult to convert the theory into practice. However, the welfare of the state, and the interest of the religious community being regarded as the first concern, it was imperative to avoid all agitation, and therefore to endure the existing government. Their appeal to the judgment of God, expressed in pious curses,¹³ proved an impotent weapon. That which God tolerates, man may not oppose. He may cling to the hope that God will in the future fill with righteousness the world which now is filled with unrighteousness. Out of these silent hopes arose the Mahdī idea, the firm belief in the future resurrection of a theocratic ruler divinely guided (*as a reconciliation between the actual and the ideal*). We will return to this later on. (Chapter V, 12.)

One of the external indications of authority in Islam was a function connected with the theocratic character of the prince,—the function which the ruler or his substitute fulfilled as leader in public worship,—i. e., of the *Imām*,

the liturgical head. However much it might irritate the pious to behold the representative of godlessness in this sacred rôle,—from which a state of intoxication even did not debar them,—they reconciled themselves to it. It was permissible, in the interests of peace in the state, to perform one's *ṣalāt* (prayer) standing behind the pious and the evil-doer. On this formula the tolerance of the pious was based.

But they did not all stop at this passive attitude. The question had to be adjusted on principle also. The experiences of daily life, the convictions of the irreconcilable advocates of religious demands, forced into prominence the question as to whether it was altogether right to exclude entirely from the faith the transgressor of law and to regard oneself as forced to submit to power. They are, after all, Moslems who confess God and the prophet with their hearts as well as their lips. It is true, they are guilty of infringing the law which was looked upon as disobedience and insubordination, nevertheless, they are believers. A large party answered this question in a sense which accorded much more with the demands of actual conditions, than the average standpoint of passive tolerance. They advanced the theory that it is a question of confession. To the believer practices cannot be harmful, any more than lawful deeds can be of use to the unbeliever. *Fiat applicatio*. The Omayyads, then, must be looked upon as truly good Moslems; they were to be recognized as *ahl al-kibla*, included among the people who turn toward the *Kibla* (the Ka'ba in Mecca) in prayer, and who thereby confess themselves, as of the company of the true believers. The scruples of the pious, it was held, were quite without foundation.

The party, whose followers theoretically set up this tolerant teaching, called themselves *Murji'a*.¹⁴ The word means "postponers," that is to say they did not pretend to judge the fate of men, but left it to God to sit in

judgment on them.¹⁵ As to their temporal relations they were satisfied with the knowledge of their incorporation in the community of the faithful.¹⁶

A similar tolerant judgment had already prevailed in an earlier period of internal strife, when those debating, at the time, the stormy question as to whether 'Othmān or 'Alī were to be regarded as orthodox or sinner, and in the latter case unworthy of the caliphate, did not take a partisan attitude but left the decision of the question to God.¹⁷

Such a modest view naturally did not suit the pious element who saw vain ungodliness and disgrace in the ruling politics of the state and in those who advocated them. Moreover the indulgent views of the Murjīs were in direct opposition to those of the followers of the 'Alīite claims, with their idea of a theocratic state, founded on divine right and to be ruled by the family of the prophet. For this reason the Murjīs and the followers of 'Alī stand in sharp opposition to one another.¹⁸ The opposition to another seditious movement was much more decisive. As the successes of the Omayyads increased and the objections of the opposing party culminated, certain of the Murji' partisans took occasion to define their principles, to go one step farther in their declarations and definitely to waive the charge of heresy against the ruling dynasty. This was all the more possible since the Kharijites (to be mentioned again later—Chapter V, 2), the bitterest political opponents of the existing form of government, were troubling the kingdom with the rebellious assertion that it was not simply a question of general belief, but that the commission of serious transgressions should mercilessly exclude men from the faith. What then shall be said for the poor Omayyads, who were considered by the Kharijites as the worst legal transgressors?¹⁹

The reason for the origin of this dissension, which goes

back to the early days of Islam, though a definite date cannot be set for it, is accordingly to be found in the peculiarity of the political form and in the position which the various social strata of the Moslem people adopted in regard to it. The discussion of the question as to what rôle should be accorded to the *'amal*,—works,—in the qualification of a Moslem as such, did not arise first of all from any dogmatic need.²⁰

A time, however, came in which the state is no longer primarily interested in the answer to this question. It thereupon becomes a question of common academic interest and further complicated by the addition of some dogmatic minutiae and subtleties. If “works” do not form a necessary element in the definition of orthodoxy,—say the opponents,—then a hair-splitting Murji’ might conclude that a person could not be branded as a *kāfir* because he bows before the sun: such a deed is only a sign of unbelief, not unbelief in itself (*kufr*).²¹

One particular question of dogmatic difference about which the Islamic theologians were constantly indulging in sophistries, developed from the Murji’ite mode of thought: is it possible to distinguish in the true faith, between an accurately graded more or less? Naturally according to the opinion of the people who do not regard practice as an integral part of Islamic qualifications, such a distinction does not hold. It is not a question of extent. Belief cannot be measured by ells, nor can it be weighed in the balance. On the other hand, those who consider practice as well as confession, a necessary element in the definition of a true Moslem, admit the possibility of an arithmetic measurement of the extent of belief. The Koran itself, indeed, speaks of the “increase of belief” (Sura 3, v. 167; 8, v. 2; 9, v. 125) and of guidance (Sura 47, v. 19). The larger or smaller extent of belief is measured by the larger or smaller amount of “works.” Orthodox Islamic theology is not theoretically

a unit on this question. Side by side with dogmatists who wish to hear nothing concerning a plus or minus in relation to belief, there are also those who hold to the formula: "Faith is confession and works, it can be therefore added to or diminished."²² It depends indeed on the direction of one's orthodoxy. Thus a controversial question which arose on political ground ended in such finesses as these.²³

III. Nevertheless about the same time there arose in connection with another question, the beginnings of truly dogmatic interest. In general those discussing these questions did not indulge in sophistries as to whether this or that person could be regarded as a true believer. They maintained, however, with an extraordinarily definite view of their own beliefs, a very definite position toward the naïve beliefs of the people not given to reflection.

The first unsettling of naïve belief in Islam is not contemporaneous with the entrance of scientific speculation, as though a result of the latter. It is not due to growing intellectualism. It appears, rather, to have been called forth through a deeper insight into questions of belief: through piety, and not through unrestrained thought.

The idea of absolute dependence had given rise to the grossest representations of the deity. Allah is an unrestrained potentate: "he cannot be questioned as to what he does" (Sura 21, v. 23). Man is a plaything in his hands, without a will of his own. One must be convinced that the will of Allah cannot be measured by human will, bounded by limitations of all kinds, and that human ability crumples into nothing beside the unlimited will of Allah and his absolute power. This power of Allah dominates the human will. Man can wish only where Allah guides his will; and this is true also with regard to his moral acts. Concerning these his will is

determined by the almighty power and eternal decree of God.

But the faithful must clearly understand that Allah does not constrain man. They must not imagine him as *ẓālim*, unjust or tyrannical or exerting such power as would mar the conception of even a human ruler. Indeed, it is in connection with reward and punishment that the Koran repeatedly asserts that Allah does no injustice toward anyone, not even so much as a fibre of a date (kernel) (Sura 4, v. 52) or "as a pit in the seed" (v. 123); "that he lays no burden on anyone which cannot be borne; that he has a book which speaks the truth, and no injustice will reach them" (Sura 23, v. 64). "And Allah has created heaven and earth in truth, and in order to reward each soul according to what it deserves, and injustice shall not reach them" (Sura 45, v. 21). But, on the other hand, the pious man must raise the question whether there can be a greater injustice than to punish actions, the definite will to perform which does not lie within the range of human ability; is it conceivable that God should rob man of all freedom and self-determination in action, determine his behaviour even to the smallest details, take from the sinner the possibility of doing good, "seal up his heart, spread a thick covering over his sight and hearing" (Sura 2, v. 6) and then in spite of this punish him on account of his disobedience, condemn him to eternal torture?

By virtue of an exaggerated feeling of dependence, many very pious Moslems preferred to imagine their God as such an arbitrary being. The sacred book afforded them many a support for this. The Koran has many parallels to the account of the hardening of Pharaoh's heart, also many passages which in varying languages convey the thought that whom God wishes to guide, his heart he expands for Islam, and whom he desires to deceive, his breast he makes narrow, as if he wished to

scale the heavens (Sura 6, v. 125). No soul can believe unless God decrees (Sura 10, v. 100).

There is no single teaching for which the Koran allows such contradictory interpretations as this very question. In opposition to the many definite utterances of the prophet, there were brought forward many expressions in which it is not Allah who is represented as the deceiver, but Satan, the evil enemy and treacherous tempter (Sura 22, v. 4; 35, v. 5-6; 41, v. 36; 43, v. 35; 58, v. 20) since Adam (2, v. 34; 38, v. 83 ff). And he who wished to champion man's complete freedom of will, not even threatened by Satan, could find innumerable unequivocal passages in the same Koran from which the very opposite of the *servum arbitrium* can be inferred. Man's good and evil deeds are characteristically designated as his "acquisition," that is actions which he has secured through his own efforts (e. g., Sura 3, v. 24 et als). "What they have acquired (of evil) lies on their hearts like rust" (Sura 83, v. 14). And even when it is a question of the "sealing up of the heart," this is made to agree with the thought that they "follow their inclination" (Sura 47, v. 15, 18). Desire leads man into sin (Sura 38, v. 25). God does not harden the hearts of sinners, but "they become hard (through their own wickedness) . . . they are like a stone, or still harder" (Sura 2, v. 69). Satan himself rejects the imputation that he leads man astray; man errs (through himself) (Sura 50, v. 26). And the same conception is confirmed by historical examples. God says, for example, that he "guided the wicked people of the Thamouds in the right path: And as to Thamoud, we had vouchsafed them guidance, but to guidance did they prefer blindness, wherefore the tempest of a shameful punishment overtook them for their doings. But we rescued the believing and the God-fearing" (Sura 41, v. 16). That is: God had guided them, they did not follow; of their own free

will they sinned against God's decree, they freely chose evil. God guides man into the path; but it depends on man whether he gratefully submits to the guidance or obstinately rejects it (Sura 76, v. 3). "Each man acts in his own way" (Sura 17, v. 86). "The truth is from your God, let him who will believe, and let him who will be infidel" (Sura 18, v. 28). "This truly is a warning: And whoso willeth, taketh the way to his Lord" (Sura 76, v. 29). In this also God does not stand in the way of the wicked. He gives them the power and disposition to do evil, just as he grants the good the disposition, smooths the path to do good (Sura 92, v. 7, 10).

In this connection I should like to take the opportunity for a remark, which is not unimportant to the understanding of the problem of free-will in the Koran. Many of those expressions of Mohammed which are generally quoted to prove that it is God himself who is the cause of the sinfulness of man, and leads him into error, will appear in a different light if we consider more carefully the meaning of the word which is generally used to express this "leading astray." If, in many passages of the Koran it is said "Allah guides whom he will, and lets whom he will go astray," such passages do not imply that God directly brings the latter class into the evil path. The decisive word *adalla* is not to be taken in such a connection, as meaning to "lead astray," but to allow to go astray, not to trouble about a person, not to show him the way out. "We let them (*naḍaruhum*) wander in his disobedience" (Sura 6, v. 110). Let us conjure up the picture of a lonely wanderer in the desert,—it is from this idea that the language of the Koran concerning leading and wandering has sprung. The wanderer errs in a boundless expanse, gazing about for the right direction to his goal. So is man in his wanderings through life. He who, through faith and

good works, has deserved the good will of God; him he rewards with his guidance. He lets the evil-doer go astray. He leaves him to his fate and takes his protection from him. He does not offer him the guiding hand, but he does not bring him directly to the evil path. For this reason the figure of blindness and groping about is often used for sinners. They do not see and must therefore wander without plan or goal. Since no leader comes to their aid, they fall irrevocably into destruction. "Now have proofs that may be seen come to you from your Lord, whoso seeth them, the advantage will be his own: and whoso is blind to them, his own will be the loss" (Sura 6, v. 104). Why did he not make use of the light offered him? "Assuredly we have sent down the Book to thee for man and for the ends of truth. Whoso shall be guided by it—it will be for his own advantage,—and whoso shall err, shall only err to his own loss" (Sura 39, v. 42).

This abandoning of man to himself,—the withdrawal of God's care, is a prominent thought in the Koran with regard to those who because of their former life make themselves unworthy of divine grace. It is said of God that he forgets the wicked, because they forget him, the conclusion is consistently drawn that God forgets the sinner (Sura 7, v. 49; 9, v. 68; 45, v. 33), i. e., he does not concern himself with him. Guidance is a reward of the good. "Allah does not guide the wicked" (Sura 9, v. 110). He allows them to wander aimlessly. Unbelief is not the result, but the cause of straying (Sura 47, v. 9; especially 61, v. 5). Indeed, "Whom God leaves in error, he does not find the right path" (Sura 42, v. 45) and "whom he leaves in error that one has no leader" (Sura 40, v. 35) and goes headlong to destruction (Sura 7, v. 177). It is everywhere the withdrawal of grace as a punishment that is the cause of godlessness, and not the circumstance of being led astray. The early Moslems

who stood close to the original points of view both realized and felt this. It is said in a Ḥadīth, "The heart of him who contemptuously neglects three Friday services (*tahāwunan*) is sealed by God."¹ By the sealing of the heart is understood a condition into which man falls only after the neglect of religious demands. An old prayer which the prophet taught Ḥusein, the neophyte who embraced Islam, runs: "O, Allah, teach me my right path and guard me from the evils of my own soul,"² i. e., do not leave me to my own devices, but extend to me a guiding hand. This is not a question of misleading. The feeling that to be abandoned to oneself is the direst kind of divine punishment is expressed in an ancient Moslem oath, "If my declaration prove untrue (in cases of assertion), or if I do not keep my promise (in promissory oaths), then may God cut me off from his care and strength and leave me to my own care and strength,"³ i. e., may he withdraw his hand from me, so that I am obliged to see how I can get along, deprived of his guidance and help. It is in this sense that we are to understand the *allowing* of a sinner to go astray⁴—and not that he has been *led* astray.

IV. We have seen that the Koran can be used in the defense of the most contradictory views in regard to one of the most important, fundamental questions of religious and ethical knowledge. Hubert Grimme, who has gone very deeply into the analysis of the theology of the Koran, has found a view which can help us out of this confusion. He thinks that the contradictory teachings which Mohammed gave concerning the freedom of the will and the choice of grace, belong to different epochs of his life and correspond to the impressions made upon him by his environment and experiences of the time. In the first Meccan period he takes the standpoint of complete freedom of will and responsibility. In Medina, however, he tends more and more to the teaching of the lack

of freedom and of the *servum arbitrium*. The crassest teachings on this subject appear toward the close of his life.¹ Provided the chronological order could be surely carried out, this view could serve as a guide for those who can consider it historically. We cannot, however, expect this from the early Moslems, who had to thread their way through the contradictory teachings, to declare themselves for one or another of the conflicting views and to evolve some sort of harmony out of the opposing opinions. The attitude of dependence which is prominent in the whole of the Moslem system was undoubtedly favorable to the denial of the freedom of the will. Virtue and iniquity, reward and punishment, should be entirely dependent on God's gracious choice. Man's will was not to be considered.

Very early, however (we can trace the movement to about the end of the seventh century), such a tyrannical conception disturbed the pious mind, which could not rest content with the unjust God implied in the current point of view.

External influences also contributed to the rise and growing confirmation of the pious views. The earliest protest against unlimited predestination finds its home in Syrian Islam. Kremer² forcibly points out the fact, that the early Moslem teachers were incited by their Christian theological environment to question unbounded determinism. For already in the Eastern Church the disputes over this point were absorbing the attention of the theologians. Damascus, the seat of Moslem learning at the time of the Omayyad caliphate, became the centre of the discussion of *ḡadar*, fatalism, and from here it was rapidly disseminated.

Pious views were put forward to establish the contention that man in his ethical and legal acts cannot be the slave of an unchangeable predestination, but rather that he is himself the author of his own acts and so

becomes the cause of his salvation or his condemnation. The motto of these people later became *khalk al-af'āl*—creation of acts. Because they limited the scope of *ḳadar* they came to be known as *Ḳadarites*, on the principle of *lucus a non lucendo*. On the other hand they called their opponents “people of blind compulsion” (*jabr*) *Jabarites*. This was the earliest dogmatic dis-sension within ancient Islam.

Although the Koran could supply both parties with arguments, still a mythological tradition, which either developed very early as a kind of *hagāda* in Islam, or perhaps first appeared in the course of these disputes,—exact dates cannot be furnished—favored the determinists. According to this, immediately after the creation of Adam, God took from his bodily substance,—imagined as gigantic,—all his descendants in the form of small ants, and at that early time, determined the classes of the blessed and the damned, and incorporated them in the right and left side of the body of the first man. An angel appointed for this special task indicates for each separate embryo the whole fate of his life (according to an expression borrowed from India: “written on his forehead”)³; among other things whether he is destined to be saved or condemned. The corresponding eschatological tradition was also developed from the standpoint of determinism. God sends the poor sinner quite arbitrarily to Hell. The “intercession” attributed to the prophet is the only mitigating element here.

The representations on which were based such conceptions, were far too deeply rooted in the popular mind, for the very contradictory teachings of the *Ḳadarites*, emphasizing free choice and full responsibility, to gain many adherents. The *Ḳadarites* defended themselves with difficulty against the attacks and opposition of the opponents who brought forward the old interpretations of the sacred text and the popular fables mentioned

above. The Kadarite movement is of great importance in the history of Islam, as the oldest effort to free itself from inherited and prevailing conceptions, not, indeed, in the interest of freedom of thought, but in the interest of the demands of the pious mind. It is not the note of protest of the intellect against pedantic dogma which sounds from the mouth of Kadarites, but the voice of the religious conscience, protesting against an unworthy representation of God and his relations to the religious impulses of his servants.

A number of traditional sayings invented to belittle them, show what opposition these tendencies encountered, how little sympathy the Kadarite ways of thought secured. As in other cases, here also an effort is made to base the general orthodox feeling on the teaching of the prophet himself. They were the magi of the Moslem community. As the followers of Zoroaster account for evil by opposing a principle of evil to the creator of the good, so the Moslems eliminate the evil deeds of man from the sphere of Allah's creation. It is not God, but the autonomous will of man who creates disobedience. The efforts of the Kadarites to prove their thesis by alleged disputes between Mohammed and 'Alī are sharply condemned and every possible abuse and contumely are hurled at their heads.³

Another remarkable fact appears here. Even the rulers in Damascus, who ordinarily showed very little interest in dogmatic questions, were greatly annoyed by the Kadarite movement spreading in Syrian Islam. They sometimes took an outspoken stand against those who advocated the freedom of the will.⁴

These declarations of opinion by the rulers who were busy with the great work of building up a new state, did not perhaps find their motive in aversion to theological wrangling. To be sure, men who are struggling with

extensive plans for the development of a state, and had to fight enemies of the dynasty on all sides, must have found it quite disagreeable to have the minds of the masses aroused by subtleties over the freedom of the will and self-determinism. Strong dominating personalities are not apt to be pleased with the reasoning of the masses. There was a deeper reason for the Omayyads to foresee a danger in the weakening of the dogma of fatalism,—not a danger to faith, but to their own politics.

They knew perfectly well that their dynasty was a thorn in the flesh of the pious, of those very men who, on account of their piety, possessed the hearts of the common people. They knew very well that to many of their subjects they were usurpers who had seized the reins of government by tyrannical force and were looked upon as enemies of the prophet's family, murderers of holy persons, profaners of the sacred places. There was one belief which was best fitted to restrain the people and prevent a movement against them and their representatives,—the belief in fate. God had decided from all eternity that these people should reign, and all their deeds were absolutely decreed by fate. It was very acceptable to them to have such views take hold of the people. They listened with pleasure when their poets praised them in terms which recognized their rule as willed by God, as a *decretum divinum*. The faithful could not resist this. The poets of the Omayyad caliphs, therefore, praised their princes as rulers: "whose rule was foreordained by the eternal decree of God."⁵

When the acts of the rulers appeared tyrannical and unjust, this dogma served to satisfy the people, as well as to legitimize the dynasty. The submissive subjects should regard "the Emīr-al-mu' minīn and his oppressive acts in the light of fate, whose acts no one should criti-

cise.’’⁶ These are the words of a poet of the gruesome deeds of an Omayyad prince, and follow them as an echo.

The belief was to take root that all acts must necessarily occur as decreed by God, and it was impossible for the will of man to prevent them. “These Kings” according to some of the older Kadarites, “shed the blood of the true believers, unjustly seize the goods of others, and claim, ‘our deeds spring from *ḡadar*.’ ”⁷ The Omayyad caliph ‘Abdalmalik, who confirmed himself in power after a severe struggle, locked one of his rivals in his palace and murdered him with the approval of his “palace” priest. He then had the head of the murdered man thrown into the crowd of followers of his victim, who were awaiting his return before the palace. The caliph sent word to them: “The prince of the faithful has killed your lord, as it was ordained in the eternal destiny of fate and in the unchangeable divine decree . . .” Thus runs the tale. Naturally it was impossible to resist the divine decree of which the caliph was the only instrument. Everyone acquiesced and did homage to the murderer of the man, whom but a short time before, they had considered a true believer. Even though this may not be implicitly accepted as history, it can nevertheless testify to the connection claimed between the acts of the government and inevitable fate. I must not, indeed, omit the fact that the appeal to the divine decree was accompanied by a number of dirhems, which were to mitigate the horror of the spectators at the sight of the head of ‘Amr ibn Sa‘īd which was thrown into the crowd.⁸

The Kadarite movement during the Omayyad dynasty is the first stage on the way to a weakening of universal Mohammedan orthodoxy. This is its greatest historical service, even though this was not contemplated by it. This significance of the movement must justify me in

discussing its various aspects at such length in this lecture. Soon, however, the breach which had now been made in the customary naïve belief of the people, was to widen and be spread over a wider area by the criticisms of the usual forms of belief, in so far as this was made possible by intellectual and spiritual growth.

V. In the meantime the Moslem world had become acquainted with Aristotle's philosophy which greatly affected the religious thought of many of the learned. However much the effort was made to reconcile the religious traditions with the newly acquired tenets of philosophy, Islam was threatened with immeasurable danger. But in certain points it seemed almost impossible to connect Aristotle, even in his Neo-Platonic garb, with the premises of Moslem faith. Belief in the creation of the world in time, in special providence, and in miracles, was not to be vindicated by Aristotle's philosophy.

In order to preserve Islam and its tradition for the chosen, however, there developed a new speculative system, known in the history of philosophy as *kalam* and whose advocates are called *Mutakallimūn*. At its origin the word *mutakallim*—literally 'speaker'—was used to indicate one who takes up some dogma or dogmatic problem, and adduces speculative proofs for his contentions. Accordingly *mutakallim* entails as a supplement the special question with which the speculative activity of the theologian is concerned. For example any one who discusses those questions raised by the Murji' would be called: "min al-mutakallimīna fi-l-irjā."¹ The term, however, is soon expanded to designate those "who take up the doctrines which are accepted in religious beliefs as truths not to be subjected to discussion, and make them objects of discussion and argument, and formulate them so that they may become plausible to thinking minds." Speculative activity in this direction then received the name of *kalām* (speech, oral discus-

sion). According to its tendency of serving as a support of religious teachings, kalām passed from the anti Aristotelian premises, and came to mean, in the true sense of the word, a philosophy of religion. Its oldest adherents are called *Mu'tazilites*.

This word indicates "those who separate themselves." It is not necessary to repeat the fable generally cited in explanation of the motive for this appellation, it is sufficient to accept as the right explanation of it the fact that the origin of this party lay in pious impulses. It was pious, partly ascetic people, *mu'tazila*, i. e., "those who withdrew themselves"—ascetics²—who gave the first impetus to that movement, which through the accession of rationalistic circles came more and more into opposition to the predominating beliefs.

In their final development only, do they justify the name of "freethinkers in Islam," a name given to them by the Zurich professor Heinrich Steiner, who was the first (1865) to write a monograph on this school.³ They start from religious motives like their predecessors, the old Kadarites. In their beginnings the *Mu'tazila* do not show the slightest tendency to free themselves from uncomfortable bonds, to break away from the strict orthodox conception of life. It is not a sign of great mental exaltation, that one of the first questions considered by the *Mu'tazila* and settled in their own mind is whether, in contradistinction to the Murji' conception, the commission of "major sins" constitutes essentially *kāfir*, and accordingly, liability to eternal punishment, to the same degree as does unbelief. It introduces into dogma the notion of a middle ground between the believer and the unbeliever,—strange subtleties for philosophical minds!

Wasil ibn 'Aṭa, who, in the history of Islamic dogma, is called the founder of the *Mu'tazila*, is described as an ascetic by his biographers. In an elegy he is praised as

one who “never touched either a dīnār or a dirhem”⁴ and his comrade also, ‘*Amr ibn ‘Ubeid*, is designated as an ascetic (zāhid) who spent whole nights in prayer, performed the pilgrimage to Mecca forty times on foot, and always looked as mournful “as if he had just come from the burial of his parents.” There is extant a pious ascetic exhortation of his, very well written, directed to the Caliph al-Manṣūr, in which we notice nothing of a rationalistic tendency.⁵ If the “classes” of Mu‘tazilites be examined, it will be found that for a considerable period⁶ their asceticism holds an important place in the noted peculiarities of many of these people.

In the religious points of view which their teachings especially advanced—the lessening of the omnipotence of God in favor of the demands of justice—there were indications of the beginnings of opposition to the currently accepted orthodoxy, many important considerations, which could easily attract even sceptics to their side. The connection with the kalām soon gives a rationalistic color to their modes of thought, and leads them more and more in the direction of rationalistic aims, the development of which on the part of the Mu‘tazilites brings them into a steadily growing attitude of opposition to the general orthodoxy.

In our final summary of them it will be found that they labor under the disadvantage of many unsympathetic traits. One service, however, they undoubtedly rendered. They were the first to broaden the religious sources of knowledge in Islam so as to embrace reason, ‘*akl*, which had been until then strictly avoided in this religion. Some of their most distinguished adherents go so far as to say that “the first condition of knowledge is doubt.”⁷ “Fifty doubts are better than one certainty,”⁸ and other expressions of this order. One could say of them that according to their method there was a sixth sense, the ‘*akl* (reason⁹). They made it the

criterion in matters of belief. One of their older adherents, *Bishr ibn al-Mu'tamir* from Baghdad, in a didactic poem on natural history, preserved and commentated upon by his associate Jāhiz, dedicates a true hymn of praise to reason:

How beautiful is reason as an emissary and comrade in evil and good!

As a judge who decides on that which is absent, as one judges that which is present;

. . . some of its deeds, that it decides between the good and the evil;

Through the possession of powers which God has distinguished with unsullied holiness and purity.¹⁰

Many of those who carried skepticism to the extreme, assigned to the testimony of our senses as low a place as possible among the criteria of knowledge.¹¹ At any rate they were the first in the theology of Islam to emphasize the right of Reason. In doing this, it is true, they radically strayed from their point of departure. In its highest point of development it characterizes a reckless criticism of those elements of the popular belief, which had long been regarded as an indispensable part of orthodox confession. They caviled at the rhetorical inaccessibility of the terms of the Koran, at the authenticity of the Ḥadith, in which the documents of popular belief take shape. Their negation directed itself especially within this system, against the mythological elements of eschatology. The accounts of the Širāt-bridge, as fine as a hair and as sharp as a sword, over which the faithful pass into paradise with the swiftness of lightning, while those destined to condemnation, in attempting to pass with uncertain steps, fall into the yawning abyss of hell; of the waves on which the deeds of men are tossed; and many other such presentations are elimi-

nated by them from the group of obligatory beliefs, and explained allegorically.

The predominating view which guided them in their religious philosophy was the purification of the monotheistic conception of God from all obscurity and disfigurement to which it had been subjected in the traditional popular belief, especially in two directions,—the ethical and the metaphysical. All representations which are derogatory to the belief in his *justice* must be discarded. The God idea must be purified of all representations which could obscure his absolute unity, singleness and unchangeableness. They nevertheless cling to the idea of the creative, active, foreseeing God and protest strongly against the Aristotelian idea of God. The Aristotelian teachings concerning the eternity of the world, the confession of the inviolability of the laws of nature, the rejection of a providence which reaches to the individual, are divisions which differentiate these rationalistic Islamic theologians with all the freedom of their speculative activity, from the followers of the Stagirite. On account of the inadequate proofs which they advanced, they had to bear the scorn and the sarcastic criticism of the philosophers, who would neither recognize them as equal opponents, nor their method of thought as worthy of consideration.¹² The reflection could justifiably be made on their course of action, that philosophical independence and the lack of an hypothesis were quite foreign to them; for they are fettered by a positive religion for whose purification they wished to work through intellectual methods.

As has already been mentioned, this work of purification has been applied especially to two themes,—divine justice and divine unity. Every Mu'tazilite handbook consists of two groups,—the one is embraced in the "chapter of justice," the other "that of the confession of unity." This division determines the character of all

Mu'tazilite theological literature. Because of this trend in their religious philosophical efforts, they have given themselves the name of "people of justice and of the confession of unity." In the historical sequence in which these questions appear, the question of justice takes the first place. They attach themselves directly to the propositions of the Kadarites, which are further developed by the Mu'tazilites. They start from the claim that man has unlimited freedom of will in his deeds, that he himself is creator of his actions. Otherwise it would be unjust for God to hold him responsible.

In the conclusion drawn from this fundamental idea, set up as an axiom, they go farther than the Kadarites. While inscribing on their banners the dogma of man's free will, and rejecting the idea of God's arbitrariness, they further maintain in connection with the conception of God that he is necessarily just. The notion of justice is not to be separated from the conception of God. No act of God can be thought of which does not correspond to the terms of justice. God's universal power has one limit and that is in the demands of justice, from which it cannot escape, which it cannot remove.

Through this method of reasoning, there is introduced into the conception of God an idea that was quite foreign to ancient Islam, that of *necessity*. There are things in relation to God which are designated as necessity. God *must*, is an assertion which from the point of view of ancient Islam would have appeared as a striking absurdity, if not indeed as blasphemy. Since God created man with a view to happiness, he was obliged to send prophets to teach the ways and means of attaining happiness. This was not the result of his sovereign will, a divine gift which his absolute independent will could have withheld; it was a necessary act of the divine good-will. He could not be conceived as a being whose deeds are good, unless he had given mankind a chance to be guided.

He had to reveal himself through prophets. He himself admitted this necessity in the Koran. "It rests upon Allah (it is his obligation) to lead into the right path,"—so they explain Sura 16, v. 9.¹³

By the side of this conception of necessity, another very closely affiliated with it is introduced into the conception of God, namely that of utility. God's decrees contemplate the good of man, and this again by virtue of necessity. Man can freely accept or reject these teachings, revealed for his own good. But the just God must reward the good and punish the evil. The orthodox fancy concerning his arbitrary wish to people paradise and hell according to his caprice, and the harsh fact that virtue and obedience offered no guarantee to the just for future reward, were eliminated through an opportunism whose implications God necessarily fulfills.

They emphasize the law of compensation which becomes another limit to God's arbitrariness, as set up by orthodox conception. The just, who suffer undeserved trouble and pain here on earth, in as much as God necessarily appears to them as useful and beneficial, *must* be recompensed in the other world. In itself this was nothing particularly characteristic. By a modification of the critical little word "must" it was made to accord with an orthodox postulate. But many of the Mu'tazilites applied this postulate not only to true believers, or to innocent children, who have been subjected to undeserved pain and suffering here on earth, but also to animals. Animals must be recompensed in another existence for the suffering which the selfishness and cruelty of man imposes upon them here. Otherwise God is not just. We thus obtain, as it were, a transcendental protection of animals—an instance of the consistency with which they carry out their doctrine of the justice of God and how, in the last resort they set up in opposition to man free in his choice, a God who in a certain sense

lacks freedom. Closely affiliated with this view is another conception in the domain of ethics. To the question, what from an ethical religious point of view is good and what is evil, or according to theological terminology, what is beautiful and what ugly, the orthodox answers: the "good-beautiful" is what God commands; the "evil-ugly" is what God forbids. The absolute divine will and its decrees are the measure of good and evil. There is nothing inherently good, or inherently evil. Murder is to be condemned because God has forbidden it. It would not be evil if divine law had not stamped it as such. Not so the Mu'tazilite. For him there is absolute good and absolute evil, and reason offers the measure for this judgment. This is the premise and not the divine will. A thing is not good because God has commanded it, but God has ordained it because it is good. If we could change these definitions of the theologians of Basra and Baghdad into modern terms, would it not amount to this; that God is bound in his giving of laws by the CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE!

VI. We are thus confronted with a series of ideas and fundamental principles which are well adapted to show that the opposition of the Mu'tazilites to the simple beliefs of orthodoxy, is concerned not only with metaphysical questions, but that the conclusions drawn by them enter deeply into fundamental ethical conceptions, and in positive Islam are of decisive importance in views concerning divine legislation.

But they had much more to accomplish in the other field, which forms the object of their rationalistic religious philosophy, namely in the field of the monotheistic idea. Within this field they first had to clear away a lot of rubbish which had obscured the purity of the idea.

In the first place they strove to efface the anthropomorphic conceptions of traditional orthodoxy, as incompatible with a worthy view of God. Orthodoxy would not listen to

any but the literal interpretation of the anthropomorphic and anthropopathic expressions of the Koran and of traditional texts. God's seeing, hearing, anger, smile, his rising and sitting, even his hands, feet and ears, which are mentioned so often in the Koran and other texts, were to be taken in a literal sense. The Hanbalite school contended especially for this primitive conception of God. It was Sunna to them. At most these old believers were willing to confess that while clinging to the literal interpretation of the text, they were unable to specify how these conceptions were to be actually thought out. They demand blind belief in the literalness of the text *bilā keif* "without a how," whence this point of view is known as *balkafa*. To determine further the reason why is beyond the grasp of human powers, and men should not meddle with things which transcend the range of human thought. The names of some of the older exegetes are preserved, by whom the assertion that God was "flesh and blood," and that he had limbs, was regarded as a correct statement. It is sufficient to add that these were not by any means to be thought of as like those of man, according to the word of the Koran: "There is nothing like unto him, and he is the hearing and seeing one" (Sura 42, v. 9). But one cannot imagine anything as actually existing, which has not substantiality. The conception of God as a purely spiritual being appears as atheism to these people.

To be sure the Islamic anthropomorphists have sometimes carried this conception to a degree incredibly coarse. Let me mention here certain facts from later times, in order to give an idea of how unrestrained such views must have been at a time when no spiritual opposition had yet mitigated them. The example of an Andalusian theologian will show the excesses which were possible in this field. A very famous theologian from Majorca, who died in Baghdad about 524/1130, *Muham-*

med ibn Sa'dūn, known by the name Abū 'Āmir al-Kurashī, went so far as to offer the following explanation of the verse of the Koran to which the heretics referred: " 'There is nothing like unto him (God).' This means only that nothing can be compared to him in his divine essence; but as regards form, he is like you and me. That is to be taken much as the Koran verse, in which God calls upon the wives of the prophet, 'Oh, wives of the prophet, ye are not as other women' (Sura 33, v. 32), i. e., other women are on a lower plane of virtue, but in form they are exactly like you." One must confess that there is considerable blasphemy in this orthodox hermeneutics. The same authority did not recoil from the most extreme consequences. On one occasion he read the Koran verse (Sura 68, v. 42), which says of the last judgment day: "On the day when the thigh shall be bared, and they shall be called to worship." And in order to refute as energetically as possible any metaphorical explanation of this sentence, Abū 'Āmir slapped his own thigh and said: "a true thigh, one just like this one."¹ Similarly, two centuries later, the famous Ḥanbalite Sheikh Takī al-dīn ibn Teymiyya (d. 728/1328) in Damascus, in a lecture is said to have quoted one of those texts, in which the "descending" of God is mentioned. In order to get rid of any doubt and to illustrate his conception of the rising of God *ad oculos*, the Sheikh descended a few steps of the pulpit saying: "just as I descend here."

Such is the outcome of the old anthropomorphic tendency, against which the Mu'tazilites first took up arms in the religious field, by spiritualizing, from the point of view of the purity and worth of the Islamic conception of God, all those anthropomorphic expressions of the sacred text, through the medium of a metaphorical interpretation. These efforts resulted in a new method of Koranic exegesis, to which was given the old name *ta'wīl*

in the sense of figurative interpretation, an exegetical trend, against which the Hanbalites at all times protested.²

In the case of traditions they could resort to the method of rejecting as false, texts which reflected a too crude anthropomorphic representation, or gave rise to such. In this way Islam was to be freed from a whole mass of foolish fables, which, favored by the greed for fables in the popular circles, had been piled up in the field of eschatology, and in the form of ḥadīths had received religious sanction. From a dogmatic point of view nothing has been so strongly stressed by the orthodox, as the conception founded on the words of the Koran, Sura 75, v. 23, that the just should see God bodily in the other world. This the Mu'tazilites could not accept. They were little impressed by the fine definitions, refusing every ta'wīl, which finds this idea of 'sight' in the tradition: "as you see the bright moon in the firmament."³ The material vision of God—an idea from which the Mu'tazilites eliminated the direct literal sense by a spiritual explanation of the phrase—continued to be a real apple of discord between them and such theologians as were imbued with their ideas, and the orthodox, clinging to the old tradition, with whom the conciliatory rationalists united in this question. Of these more will be said in the course of this chapter.

VII. In phases of the problem involved in the question of *tauhīd*, the confession of unity, the Mu'tazilites passed on to a still higher general point of view, raising in a very comprehensive manner the question of the divine attributes. Is it possible to ascribe attributes to God without disturbing the belief in his individual unchanging unity?

The answer to this question called forth a great expenditure of hairsplitting dialectic on the part of the various Mu'tazilite schools themselves,—for they offer

no definite unity in the various definitions of their dogmas,—and also on the part of those who tried to mediate between the orthodox point of view and their own. For we must anticipate here—to which we will later return—that from the beginning of the tenth century conciliatory tradition arose which poured a few drops of rationalism into the oil of orthodoxy, in order to save the old formulas from the unfettered rational views. The formulations of the orthodox dogmas attenuated by a few rationalistic phrases, which in their essence signify a return to traditional orthodoxy, are linked with the names of *Abū-l-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī* (d. in Baghdad 324/935) and *Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī* (d. in Samarkand 333/944). While the system of the former holds sway in the central provinces of Islamic territory, that of the latter gained its hold in the wider east, in Central Asia. There are no essential differences between the two tendencies. It is mostly a question of minor quarrels over words, of whose extent we can get an idea if we look at the following questions of difference as examples: The question should a Moslem use the mode of speech, “I am a true believer, so please God,” was decided by the followers of al-Ashʿarī and Māturīdī in a contradictory manner, each one substantiating his views by a dozen subtle theological arguments. In general the point of view of the Māturīdī is freer than that of their Ashʿarite colleagues. They are a shade nearer the Muʿtazilites than the Ashʿarites. Let us take as an example the various answers given to the question: “what is the basis of the obligation to know God?”

The Muʿtazilites answer: “Reason”; the Ashʿarites: “because it is written one must recognize God”; the Māturīdī: “The obligation to confess God is based on the divine command, which is grasped by reason; reason is not the source, but the instrument of the conception of God.”

This example gives us a good idea of the whole scholastic method of dogmatic strife in Islam.

In the further hairsplitting definition regarding *homousia* and *homoiousia*, extending even to single letters, we are reminded of the minute verbal disputes of the Byzantine theologians. Can we impute attributes to God? To do so would bring about a division in the essential unity of God. If one thinks of an attribute, as one naturally does in relation to God, as not separate from his essence,—not added to it but inherent in it from eternity, there would follow from the simple predication of such eternal entities, even though belonging to the essence of God and inseparable from it, the admission of an eternal essence by the side of an eternal God. But this would be *shirk*, i. e., association of something with God. The postulate of the *tauḥīd*, of the pure confession of unity, involves the rejection of attributes in God, whether of eternal inherent attributes or such as are added to his being. This method of reasoning led necessarily to the denial of attributes. God cannot be omniscient through Knowledge, nor omnipotent through Power, nor existing through a Life. There is no separate knowledge, power and life in God. All things which appear to us as attributes are inseparably one, and not different from God himself. “God is knowing” is nothing else than that “God is powerful,” and “God is loving,” and if we increased these expressions indefinitely, we would nevertheless assert nothing more than that God is.

There is no doubt that such considerations served to place the monotheistic idea of Islam in a purer light than was possible in the obscuring of the idea through popular beliefs that cling to the letter. But to the orthodox this purification necessarily appeared as *taʿṭīl*, i. e., robbing the conception of God of its content, a genuine kenosis.

An orthodox of the old school who flourished when this dogmatic strife was at its beginning naïvely characterizes the thesis of his rationalistic opponents by the statement: "The arguments of these people result in having no God in heaven." The absolute is not accessible, not knowable. If God is to be identified with his attributes conceived as a unity, then one could pray: "Oh, knowledge, have pity upon me!" And furthermore, the rejection of the attributes constantly clashes with the clear Koranic sayings, which speak of God's wisdom, his power, etc. These attributes, therefore, can, indeed must, be predicated of him. To deny them is undisguised error, unbelief and heresy.

It was now the task of the intermediary to reconcile the rigid denial of the rationalists with the old conception of attributes through acceptable formulas. The people who wander in al-Ash'ari's intermediary paths, found the formula: God knows through a knowledge which is not separate from his essence; the supplementary clause was intended to dogmatically save the possibility of attributes. But we are far from being through with the hairsplitting formulas. The Māturīdīs also strive to erect a connecting bridge between the orthodox and the Mu'tazilites, while accepting in a general way the agnostic formulation that there are attributes in God for they are set forth in the Koran, but that it is impossible to say either that they are identical with God, or that they are separate from God; nevertheless the Ash'aritic conception of the doctrine of attributes appeared to some of them as a formula derogatory to the deity. God is knowing through his eternal knowledge. Does not the expression 'through' give the impression of something instrumental? Is not the knowledge, the power, the will of God, all those divine energies which form the complete fullness of his essence, made manifest immediately, and if so is not this conception of

an immediate manifestation offset by the little syllable *bi* (through), which in speech has the function of an instrumental particle? In their dread of grammatically belittling the majesty of God, the sheikhs of Samarkand resort to the subtle method of expressing the intermediary formula thus: "He is knowing and has knowledge, which is attributed to him in the sense of eternity, etc."

It is evident that the Islamic theologians in Syria and Mesopotamia did not live in vain in the neighborhood of the dialecticians of the conquered nations.

VIII. The conception of the Word of God formed one of the most serious objects of this dogmatic strife. How is it to be understood that the attribute of speech is to be ascribed to God, and how is the activity of this attribute to be explained through the revelation embodied in the sacred writings?

Although these questions belong to the doctrine of attributes, they are nevertheless treated separately as an independent bit of dogmatic speculation, and at an early period formed an object of dispute independent of the connection with the question of attributes.

Orthodoxy answers such questions as follows: "Speech is an eternal attribute of God. As such, like his knowledge, his power and other traits of his eternal essence, it had no beginning and was never interrupted. According to this, that which is to be recognized as the activity of a speaking God, his revelation,—primarily in Islam, the Koran,—did not arise within time, through a special creative act of the will of God, but is from eternity. The Koran is uncreated,—an orthodox dogma maintained up till the present time.

According to this, it is naturally to be expected that the Mu'tazilites will discover here also a breach of monotheistic purism. In the anthropomorphic attribute indicated by the expression "the speaking one" ascribed to God, equivalent to the recognition of an eternal being

beside God, they saw nothing less than the negation of the unity of the divine being. In this case the opposition gained in popularity, since it does not (as in the ordinary questions of attributes) merely treat of abstract things, but moves something that is entirely concrete into the foreground of speculation. Separated from the strife over attributes, in which it had its origin, the burden of the question resolves itself into this formula: "Is the Koran created, or uncreated?" This formulation of the question was bound to arouse the interest of even the most ordinary Moslem, despite the fact that the answer involves a series of considerations to which he would be entirely indifferent.

The Mu'tazilites conceived for the explanation of the "speaking God" a very remarkable mechanical theory, which as it were carried them from "the frying pan into the fire." It cannot be the voice of God which manifests itself to the prophet, when he feels God's revelation working in him through his organs of hearing. It is a created sound. When God desires to declare himself phonetically, he does it by a special act of creation, and communicates speech through a material substratum. This the prophet hears. It is not the immediate speech of God but something created by him, manifesting itself indirectly, and corresponding to the will of God in its content. This view provided the form for their theme of the "created Koran," which they opposed to the orthodox dogma of the "eternal, uncreated word of God."

Over none of the Mu'tazilite innovations did such a violent strife rage as over this,—a strife which passed beyond scholastic bounds and made itself felt in everyday life. The caliph Ma'mun espoused the cause, and as the chief priest of the state he decreed, with threats of severe punishment, the acceptance of the belief in the creation of the Koran. His successor Mu'tasim followed

in his steps, and the orthodox theologians, and those who declined to take sides, were subjected to tortures, vexations, and imprisonment. Willing Kādīs and other officers of religion took upon themselves the office of inquisitors, in order to annoy and persecute the unyielding adherents of the orthodox formula, and also those who did not declare themselves decisively enough for the only saving belief in the creation of the Koran.

An American scholar, Walter M. Patton, has set forth in an admirable work, published in 1897, the course of this rationalistic inquisitorial movement as illustrated by a thorough study of the fate of the man, whose name has become the rallying cry of Moslem rigorism, the Imam *Aḥmed ibn Hanbal*.¹ I have said elsewhere and can repeat it here: "The Inquisitors of liberalism went if possible, to greater extremes than their brothers who clung to the letter. At all events their fanaticism is more repulsive than that of their imprisoned and ill-treated victims."²

It was not until the time of the Caliph Mutawakkil, a repulsive reactionary who knew well how to combine a life of debauch and the patronage of obscene literature with dogmatic orthodoxy, that the adherents of the old dogma were able to again raise their heads. From being persecuted they now become the persecutors, and they know well how to turn the old principle derived from experience "vae victis" to the greater glory of Allah. This was the time of political decline,—the time which has ever been the harvest season for the foes of enlightenment. The dogma of the uncreated Koran continues to spread. One is no longer satisfied with a general formulation of the dogma, indefinite in its statement, that the Koran is eternal and uncreated. What is the uncreated Koran? Is it the thought of God, the will of God, which finds its expression in this book? Is it the definite text, which God has imparted to the prophet,

“in distinct Arabic language without any obscurity?” In the course of time orthodoxy became very aggressive in the contention that “that which is between the two covers is the word of God, therefore the conception of the uncreated includes also the manuscript copy of the Koran with its letters formed in ink and written on paper. And that also which is “read aloud at the prayers,” that is, the daily Koran recitation, as it proceeds from the mouth of the faithful, is not different from the eternal, uncreated word of God. At this point the intermediary Ash‘arites and Māturīdīs made a few concessions dictated by reason. Al-Ash‘arī had advanced the theme in considering the main question: God’s speech (kalām) is eternal; but this refers only to spiritual speech (kalām nafsī) as an eternal attribute of God, which has had no beginning, nor has ever been interrupted. On the other hand the revelation made to the prophets as well as other forms of manifestation of the divine word, were in each case the expression of the eternal, unceasing speech of God.³ He applies this notion to every material manifestation of revelation.

Let us hear what Māturīdī says of the view of those desiring to find a middle way in these questions: “When it is asked: What is that which is written in the copy of the Koran? we say: ‘It is the word of God; therefore also that which is recited in the mosque and which issues from the mouth (organs of speech) is the word of God; but the (written) letters and the sound, the melodies and the voices are *created* things.’ This limitation is advanced by the sheikhs of Samarkand. The Ash‘arites, however, say: ‘That which appears written in the copy of the Koran is not the word of God, but a communication of this word, a narration of that which is the word of God.’ They therefore hold the burning of certain parts of a written copy of the Koran as permissible since it is not in itself the word of God. They base

this on the fact that the word of God is his attribute. His attribute cannot be separated from him in manifestation. Therefore what appears in a separated form, as the content of a written page, cannot be regarded as the word of God. But we (the Māturīdis) say to that: 'this assertion of the Ash'arites is much more inane, than that of the Mu'tazilites.' "

From this it can be seen, that those taking a middle ground do not agree among themselves. Orthodoxy is much more consistent in extending indefinitely the circle included in the doctrine of the uncreated word of God. The formula "my utterance of the Koran is created" became an arch heresy to them. A pious man like Bukhārī, whose canon of tradition is to the true believer the next holiest book to the Koran, was exposed to annoyances because he considered such formulas admissible.⁴

Al-Ash'arī himself, to whose followers as we have already seen, is ascribed a slightly freer tendency in the definition of the word of God, did not sustain his rationalistic formulas. In the last definite statement of his belief he speaks thus:

The Koran is on the well-guarded (heavenly) scroll, it is in the breast of him to whom knowledge is given; it is read by the tongue, it is written in books forsooth, it is recited by our tongues forsooth; it is heard by us forsooth, as it is written. "And when an idolator comes to you for protection, offer him protection that he may hear the word of God" (Sura 9, v. 6), what you say to him are therefore God's own words. That is to say: All this is identical in essence with the word of God written on the heavenly scroll, which is uncreated, from eternity, in truth (fi-l-hakikat); not in a figurative sense, not in the sense that all this is a copy, a quotation, a communication of the heavenly original. No: all this is identical with the heavenly original; what is true of this, is true also of the local and temporal forms of phenomena apparently produced by man.⁵

IX. In view of this character of the Mu'tazilite movement, these students of the philosophy of religion may lay claim to the title of "Rationalists." We will not disparage this title. They have the merit of being the first in Islam to raise REASON to the position of a RELIGIOUS SOURCE OF KNOWLEDGE; the first, indeed, to have undisguisedly recognized the use of scepticism as the first impetus to knowledge.

Can they on this account be also called liberal? That title, indeed, must be denied them, since they are the real founders of dogmatism in Islam by virtue of their formulas which run contrary to the orthodox principle. He who seeks salvation must preserve faith only in these fixed formulas, and no others. They endeavored to harmonize (by their definitions) religion and reason; but they produced narrow, uncompromising formulas, which they opposed to the more elastic traditionalism of the old believers, and which they defended with tiresome disputations. Moreover, they were intolerant to the extreme. Dogmatism always embodies an innate tendency toward intolerance. When the Mu'tazilites were fortunate enough to have their teachings accepted as the dogma of the state during the rule of three 'Abbāside caliphs, these dogmas were maintained by the inquisition, by imprisonment and by terrorism, until a counter movement afforded opportunity to breathe freely again to those who believed they possessed in religion the substance of pious tradition, not the results of doubtful rationalistic theories.

A few quotations will show the intolerant spirit of the Mu'tazilite theologians. "He who is not a Mu'tazilite is not to be called a believer," is a definite expression of one of their teachings. This is a result of their general teaching to the effect that no one can be called a believer who does not fathom God "in the way of speculation." According to this, the common people with

their naïve beliefs have no part with Moslems. There can be no belief without the operation of reason. The question "takfīr-al-‘awāmm," "who shall be condemned as unorthodox of the people in general," is a standing formula in the Mu‘tazilite science of religion. There are those who assert that a person should not perform his prayers behind a naïve believer who does not reason, that would be equivalent to performing one's worship behind some godless heretic. A famous member of this school, Mu‘ammar ibn ‘Abbād, reckoned everyone unbelieving, who did not share his view of attributes and freedom of will. From the same point of view another pious Mu‘tazilite, Abū-Mūsā al-Mazdār, whom we could regard as an example of the pietistic beginnings in this direction, declares his own views as the only ones which will insure salvation. One could, therefore, accuse him of upholding that only he and, at most three of his scholars, could enter into the paradise of the true believers.¹

It was indeed fortunate for Islam that the time during which the state favored such opinions was limited to those three caliphs. How far might not the Mu‘tazilites have gone, if they had had the ruling power longer at their command to foster their views. The teachings of Hishām al-Fūṭī, one of the most radical opponents of the acceptance of these views concerning the divine attributes and of fatalism, shows us from what point of view the subject was regarded. "He considered it admissible, treacherously to kill those who opposed his teachings; secretly or openly to deprive them of their power,—as unbelievers their life and power were forfeit."² These are naturally only theories of the school-room, but these theories went so far as to advance the idea that the territories in which the Mu‘tazilite faith did not rule, were to be regarded as hostile lands (dār al-ḥarb). In place of the division of the world into seven

climates the Moslem geography offers a more circumscribed division, viz., "those in Islamic lands and in hostile lands."³ To the second category belong all the territories whose inhabitants in spite of the call (da'wā) which has come to them to confess Islam, remain unbelievers. It is the duty of the head of Islam to attack such territories. This is the *Jihād*, religious war, commanded in the Koran, one of the surest ways to martyrdom. Many a Mu'tazilite included in these "hostile lands," those lands which were not controlled by their formulas of dogma. They should be attacked with the sword, as in the case of unbelievers and heathens.⁴

This is indeed a very energetic rationalism. Nevertheless we cannot praise as advocates of liberal and tolerant views, those whose teachings were the point of departure and soil of such fanaticism. Unfortunately, the historians of the virtues of the Mu'tazilites do not always think of this, and in many a casuistically phantastic description of a possible development of Islam the attempt is made to show how favorable it would have been for the unfolding of Islam, if the Mu'tazilites had obtained possession of the leading spiritual power. After what we have just heard, it would be difficult to believe this. We must not deny, however, that the result of their activity was salutary. They are the ones who helped to procure the recognition of 'aḳl reason, in questions of belief. This is their undisputed, and far reaching service, which assures to them an important place in the history of the religion and culture of Islam. In spite of all difficulties and repudiations the claim of 'aḳl made its way to a greater or less degree as a result of their aggressiveness, even into orthodox Islam. It was no longer easy entirely to avoid it.

X. Up to this point we have repeatedly mentioned the names of the two Imams *Abū-l-Ḥasan al-Ash'arī* and *Abū Mansūr al-Māturīdī*. These two men, the former

in the heart of the caliphate, the latter in Central Asia, settled through mediating formulas the controversial questions of dogmatism,—formulas now recognized as doctrines of orthodox Islam. It is not worth while to enter into the minute points of difference between these two closely allied systems. The first system obtained historical importance. Its founder, himself a Mu'tazilite scholar,—legend speaks of a vision in which the prophet appeared to him and instigated this change,—suddenly became disloyal to his school, and openly returned to the bosom of orthodoxy. He and others of his school disseminated the same conciliatory formulas, of more or less orthodox stamp. Nevertheless, even these were unable to satisfy the taste of the old conservatives, and for a long time they could not find entrance into the public theological instruction. It was not until the famous Seljuk vizier, Nizām al-mulk, in the middle of the eleventh century, created public chairs for the new theological teachings, in his great schools at Nisabur and Baghdad, that the Ash'arite dogma became officially recognized and was taught in the system of orthodox theology. Its most famous advocates could receive appointments in the Nizām-institutions. It was here that the victory of the Ash'arite school, warring on one side with the Mu'tazilites and on the other with intransigent orthodoxy, was determined. The activity of these places of teaching marks an important epoch, not only in the history of Moslem instruction, but also in that of Moslem dogmatism. Let us consider this movement more closely.

In speaking of al-Ash'arī as one who took the middle way, this characterization of his theological trend does not extend to all questions of doctrine over which the controversy of contradictory interpretations arose in the Islamic world in the eighth and ninth centuries. It is true he advances midway formulas also concerning the questions of the freedom of the will and the nature of

the Koran. But the position which he takes in a question which concerns more deeply than any other the religious views of the masses, must be regarded as the most authoritative for the indication of his theological attitude. I refer to the definition of the idea of God in its relation to anthropomorphism.

Indeed one cannot call his position in relation to this question conciliatory. Fortunately, we possess a compendium of the teachings of this greatest of dogmatic authorities in orthodox Islam, in which he presents his teachings in a positive form, as well as his polemical replies to the opposing opinions of the Mu'tazilites,—and it must be added, not without fanatical fury. This important treatise,¹ supposed to have been lost and which till lately has been known only through fragmentary quotations, has become accessible in the last few years through a complete edition published in Haidarābād. It is a treatise of fundamental importance for everyone who is interested in the history of Islamic dogmatics. In the introduction al-Ash'arī's relation to rationalism becomes doubtful:

The religious position to which we adhere is the acceptance of the book of our God, of the Sunna of our prophet, and in addition, of that which has reached us concerning his companions and their successors and the Imams of tradition. In this we find our strong support. And we adhere to that which Abū-'Abdallāh Aḥmed Muhammed ibn Ḥanbal (may God make his face to shine, and may he elevate his rank, and make rich his reward), teaches us and we oppose everything which his teaching opposes; for he is the most eminent Imam and the most perfect head; through him has Allah made clear the truth and taken away error, made clear the right way and put to naught the evil teachings of the heretic and the doubt of the doubter. May God have mercy upon him! He is the chief Imam and the exalted friend.

At the very beginning, then, of his *credo al Ash'arī* declared himself a Ḥanbalite. This does not, to be sure, suggest a middle way. In fact when he takes up the anthropomorphic question, he pours the whole vial of his scorn upon the rationalists, who seek a figurative explanation for the sensuous words of the sacred texts. He does not stop with the severity of the orthodox dogmatisers, but turns to the philologists. God himself says that he has revealed the Koran "in clear Arabic language"; it can then be understood only on the basis of the correct Arabic usage. But where in all the world, would any Arab have used the word "hand," etc., for good-will, and have made use of all that artificial speech, which those rationalists wish to read into the clear text, in order to rob its contents of the conception of God? "Abū-l-Ḥasan 'Alī ibn Ismā'il al-Ash'arī says: We seek right guidance through God, and in him do we find all that we need, and there is no might nor power, except with Allah, and it is on him that we call for aid. But this is what follows: When someone asks us: 'Has God a face?' we answer: 'He has one,' and thus contradict wrong teaching, for it is written: 'The face of the Lord endures full of majesty and honor' (Sura 55, v. 27). And when someone else asks: 'Has God hands?' we answer: 'Indeed, for it is written: the hand of God is above their hands' (Sura 48, v. 10), furthermore, 'that which I have created with my two hands' (Sura 38, v. 74). And it is reported: 'God stroked Adam's back with his hand and brought forth from it the whole of the descendants of Adam.' And it is reported: 'God formed Adam with his hand, and formed the Garden of Eden with his hand, and planted therein the tree Ṭūbā with his hand, and he wrote the Torah with his hand.' And it is written 'both his hands are stretched forth' (Sura 5, v. 69); and in the words of the prophet: 'both

his hands are right hands.' Thus literally and not otherwise."

In order to avoid gross anthropomorphism, he adds the clause to his credo that by face, hand, foot, etc., in these cases we are not to understand human members, and that all this should be taken as *bilā keif*, without questioning, "without a how" (see above). This does not smack of a middle way, it corresponds entirely to the old orthodoxy; nor does it represent a conciliatory position between Ibn Ḥanbal and the Mu'tazilites; on the contrary, as appears from the introductory explanation of al Ash'arī, it is an unconditional surrender of the Mu'tazilite renegades to the views of the unbending Imam of the traditionalists and that of his successors. Because of his wide-spread concessions to the beliefs of the people, he forfeited for the Mohammedan people the important achievements of the Mu'tazilites.² From his point of view the belief in magic, in witchcraft, not to mention the miracles of the saints, remains intact. All these things the Mu'tazilites had swept aside.

XI. The conciliation, which forms an important element in the history of Islamic dogmatism and whose substance can be regarded as the basis of dogmatic precept, sanctioned by the *CONSENSUS* (*ijmā'*), is not to be coupled with the name of al Ash'arī himself, but with the school which bears his name.

Even by deviation in the direction of orthodoxy, *'aql*, reason, as a source of religious knowledge, could no longer be set aside. We have just seen that part of al Ash'arī's confession, in which he expresses himself in a dignified manner concerning the sources of his religious knowledge. Nothing appears there as to the claims of reason, even as a subsidiary means to the knowledge of truth. The school is quite different. Although not so irreconcilable as the Mu'tazilites, still here the *naẓar*, the speculative knowledge of God, is

claimed for all the world, and *taklīd*,—the simple, thoughtless traditional repetition,—is condemned. And in connection with this common claim, the authoritative leaders of the Ash‘arite school, have in many points kept in line with the Mu‘tazilites, and have remained true to a method, which as I have just shown, their Imam not only denounced, dogmatically, but also stormed with arrows which he had drawn from the quiver of philology. The Ash‘arite theologians have paid little attention to the protests of the master, and have made great use of the method of *ta’wīl* (see above). In no other way could they avoid *tajsīm*,—anthropomorphism. The claim that the Ash‘arite and Ḥanbalite conclusions are the same, was quite impossible of proof. But what would al Ash‘arī have said to that method which now continued to extend its influence in the orthodox trend of the *ta’wīl*? All the tricks of an unnatural hermeneutics were brought into action in order to eliminate from the Koran and tradition the anthropomorphic expression,—we can use no other word.

As far as the Koran was concerned, the Mu‘tazilites had already sufficiently completed the necessary work. They cared less about tradition. In this regard they found an easy way out of the difficulty arising out of utterances in which there were objectionable expressions, by explaining them as spurious, and so not troubling themselves in the least about their reasonable interpretation. In this effort, however, orthodox theology could not participate, and the emphasis in its exegesis is principally placed on traditional texts. And how widespread had anthropomorphism become, even within the narrow limits of Ḥadīth! As a proof the following may be instanced taken from the collection of traditions of Aḥmed ibn Ḥanbal. One morning the prophet appeared among his companions with a very happy expression on his face. When he was asked the reason of his happy

mood, he answered, "Why should I not be happy? Last night the most Sublime appeared to me in the most beautiful form imaginable, and called to me with the question, 'Over what dost thou think the heavenly community is now disputing?'" When I had answered for the third time that I could not know, he laid his two hands on my shoulders, so that their coolness penetrated even to my breast, and it was revealed to me, what is in heaven and what is on earth." Then follow declarations about the theological discussions of the heavenly company.²

It would indeed have been a useless undertaking to remove such crass anthropomorphism by means of exegesis, and, besides, the rationalistic theologians did not feel themselves at all called upon to consider a text which, like the one we have just cited, had not been included in the canonical collection. Their responsibility is greater toward the texts which are to be found in the canon, and therefore are recognized by the whole community of true believers as authoritative. On these they used their arts. The following occurs in the influential collection of Mālik ibn Anas: "Every night our God descends to the lowest heaven (there are seven), when a third of the night is still left, and says: 'Who has a request to make of me, that I may grant it; who a wish, that I may fulfill it; who cries to me for forgiveness of sins, that I may forgive them?'" ³ This anthropomorphism is now disposed of by a grammatical artifice, which is made possible by the peculiarity of the ancient Arabic consonantal writing in which the vowels are not written. Instead of *yanzilu*,⁴ "he descends," they read the causative form, *yunzilu*, "he causes someone to descend," that is, the angels. Thus they avoid the impression given in the text of God's change of place. It is not God who descends, but he causes angels to descend, and make those appeals in his name. Or another example, from

Genesis I, 27, Mohammedan tradition had taken over the saying: "God created Adam in his image." God has no form. The little word *his* refers to Adam,—God created him in the form which he (Adam) maintained.⁵ These examples show the means constantly used to get rid of dogmatic difficulties by means of grammatical subterfuges.

In like manner recourse is often had to lexicographical devices, in which the many significations of an Arabic word may have been of great assistance. Here is an example, "Hell will not be full, until the Almighty places his foot upon it (hell); then it says: 'enough, enough.'"⁶ The depth of ingenuity, which has been applied to the interpretation of this text, so inimical to a refined conception of God, gives us a perfect example of the hermeneutic art so dear to the Ash'arite school. First of all it was thought that a purely external means of help could be found in the fact that in the traditional text the subject of the sentence: "he places his foot" was replaced by a pronoun: "Hell is not full until he places his foot upon it." Who? that is left in the dark; at least the natural predicate is not connected with a subject which would mean "God." This is naturally self-deception, and nothing is gained by it. Others wish to remedy this, by retaining the subject *al-jabār*, the Almighty, but explaining that the word did not refer to God. They can easily prove from the language of the Koran and of tradition that this word also means a stubborn person. So the *jabār* who places his foot on hell is not God, but some violent person, a man sent to hell, whose violent intervention brings to an end the populating of hell. But even this way of avoiding the difficulty proved, on serious consideration, very illusive. The meaning of the traditional saying was established by a number of parallel versions, and thus placed beyond all doubt. In many parallel texts, instead of *jabār*, Allah

or "the lord of majesty" is expressly used. One cannot get out of this cul-de-sac. The subject must be God. But what does not the dogmatic exegete attempt in his desperate ingeniousness? His art failed with the subject, he now tries it on the object. He (without doubt then, "God") places his foot: *ḳadamahu*. Must this word be explained as foot? It is indeed a homonym, and means several things. *Ḳadam* means among other things, also "a group of people, who have been sent in advance," in this case into hell. It is these people, then (not his foot) whom God sets in hell. But an authentic parallel version appears which unfortunately substitutes for the word *ḳadamahu* a synonym *riḵlahu*. This undoubtedly means: "his foot." There is, however, no "undoubtedly" in the Arabic lexicon. The same word can mean so many things. *Riḵl* also means *jamā'a*, "the congregation." Naturally God places such a congregation of sinners at the gate of hell, and the latter cries: "enough, enough, enough."

Although it is justifiable to call the process, apparent in this short extract, an example of exegetical absurdity yet the exegetes were not Mu'tazilites but Ash'arites of the deepest dye. How the founder himself would have poured forth the vials of philological wrath on the heads of his followers!

XII. This rationalistic attempt of the Ash'arite school, however welcome it was as the escape from the tajsīm condemned on all sides, was bound to call forth decided discontent on the part of all the orthodox, faithful to tradition. In conjunction with this there is another fact of importance to be considered. The method of the Ash'arites aroused opposition among the orthodox theologians, because of the teaching which they had in common with the Mu'tazilites and which is the essential basis of every Kalām: "that a demonstration based on traditional factors does not ensure certain knowledge."

The knowledge which depends only on traditional sources, is uncertain; it is dependent on factors which can have only a relative value in the establishment of the facts, as for example of the subjective factor in the interpretation of peculiarities of rhetorical expression (tropes, metaphors, etc.). Absolute value can be ascribed to such sources of knowledge only in questions of legal practice, and even here they afford ground for variations in regard to the consequences. In questions of creed they have only a subsidiary value. The point of departure must be proofs through reason. They alone ensure definite knowledge.¹ In this sense the late Egyptian Mufti Mohammed 'Abduh could recently affirm as a fundamental of true Islam "that in a conflict between reason and tradition the right of decision belonged to reason, a principle," he says, "which very few oppose, in fact only those oppose who need not in any way be considered."²

If then the Ash'arites with their proofs of reason generally uphold orthodox dogma, and true to their master's principle, guard against using their syllogisms to attain formulas which lead away from true orthodoxy, then the prerogative granted to reason over tradition in dogmatic demonstration was bound to be an abomination in the eyes of the intransigent old school. How much the more in the eyes of the anthropomorphists, clinging to the letter, and who would not listen to metaphors and tropes and other rhetorical exegetical expression of the written attributes of God?

To the adherents of the old traditional school then, there was no difference between Mu'tazilites and Ash'arites. The Kalām in itself, its principle, *c'est l'ennemi*, whether it leads to heretical or orthodox results.³ "Flee Kalām—no matter in what garb, as you flee before a lion," becomes the motto. Their feeling is expressed in a wrathful speech, attributed by them to al-Shāfi'ī. "My

judgment of the Kalām-people is, that they should be beaten with scourges and shoe-soles, and then led through all tribes and settlements with the cry, 'this is the reward of those who leave to one side the Koran and Sunna and give themselves to Kalām.' ''⁴ Kalām is a science, which does not result in the reward of God even if one reaches truth through it, and on the other hand one may easily become a heretic if one falls into error through it.⁵ The true believer in Islam should not bow the knee to '*akl*, reason. Reason is not necessary for grasping religious truth; this is contained in the Koran and Sunna.⁶ There is no difference between Kalām and Aristotelian philosophy—both lead to heresy. They could use no phrase such as "*fides quaerens intellectum*." Belief is exclusively bound to the letters which have come down through the centuries; and reason must not intrude in this sphere.

One can, therefore, assert of the mediating theology of the Ash'arites, that it fell between two stools. This is the reward of every mongrel movement looking in two directions. Philosophers and Mu'tazilites alike turn up their noses at the Ash'arites, as obscurantists, unmethodical minds, superficial dilettantes, with whom one cannot allow oneself to enter into serious disputation, but even this condemnation did not save them from the fanatical curse of the orthodox. Little gratitude was shown them for having fought Aristotelian philosophy in the interests of religion.

XIII. In addition to the actual theology of the Ash'arites, their natural philosophy also deserves special consideration. It may be said that it represents orthodox Islam's ruling conception of nature. The philosophy of Kalām is by no means to be regarded as a compact system, even though it can in general be said, that its philosophical view of the world follows mostly that of the pre-Aristotelian nature philosophers,¹ especially that

of the Atomists. From the very beginning, even in the pre-Ash'arite days, its adherents are reproached with not recognizing the constancy of nature and the regularity of phenomena. The Mu'tazilite al-Jāhiz mentions the objection of the Aristotelians to the adherents of his party, that their method in trying to prove unity, can be accepted only with the denial of all truths of nature.² Opponents unfamiliar with the deeper connection and meaning of his philosophical theories, could reproach Naẓām, one of the boldest followers of the school, with the charge that he denied the law of the impenetrability of the body.³ In fact there is handed down an opinion held by him, which appears to be the result of his tendency to adopt the view of nature held by the Stoics.⁴

Nevertheless, although the Mu'tazilites opposed the peripatetic philosophy, quite a few of them wrapped themselves in an Aristotelian mantle and wished to make themselves more tolerable by means of philosophical flourishes, which had little influence with the philosophers. The latter contemptuously look down upon the methods of Kalām and do not regard the Mutakallimūn as equal opponents, worthy of dispute. They could not find any ground in common. A serious strife over ideas was, therefore, impossible with them. "The Mutakallimūn assert that the most important source of knowledge is reason; but what they call reason, is in reality not reason, and their method of thought does not correspond, in a philosophical sense, to the rules. What they call reason, and with which they try to act according to reason, is only a tissue of phantastic suppositions."

To a still greater degree does this apply to the Ash'arites. What the Aristotelians, and neo-Platonists from the tenth to the thirteenth centuries, assert about the phantasies and unreasonableness of the natural philosophy of Kalām,⁵ is also especially true of the Ash-

'arites, who, in the interest of their dogmatic suppositions, oppose themselves to all modes of viewing things, which proceed from the regularity of law in nature. With the Pyrrhonists they deny the reliability of the sensuous perceptions and allow as wide room as possible to the supposition of the illusion of the senses. They deny the law of causality, the "source and loadstar of all rational knowledge."* Nothing occurs in the world as an absolute necessity according to unchangeable laws. What precedes is not the cause of that which follows. They entertain such fear of the idea of causality, that they do not even readily consider God as the first Cause, but rather as the "maker" (fā'il) of nature and its manifestations.⁶ They consequently grant the possibility of the unnatural. It is possible to see things which do not fall within the field of sight. It could sarcastically be said of them, that they grant the possibility of a blind man in China seeing a gnat in Andalusia.⁷ For the law of nature they substitute the idea of habit.

It is not law, but simply the habit laid upon nature by God, that makes certain things follow others; this succession is not, however, necessary. It is not necessary that abstinence from food and drink should be followed by hunger and thirst but it is usually so. Hunger and thirst arise because the accident of hungriness and thirstiness is attached to the substance; if the accident is left out (and God can withhold it), then hunger and thirst are also left out. The Nile rises and falls from habit not as a result of causal natural events. If the accident of the rise is left out, then the level of the river would not change. Each and every thing then, is explained by the hypothesis: "what appears to us as a law, is only a habit of nature." God has laid the habit upon nature, that definite constellations of the stars should correspond to definite consecutive occurrences.

* Th. Gomperz.

The astrologers, accordingly, may be right. They only express themselves wrongly.⁸ Every occurrence, whether in a positive or negative sense, is a special creative act of God. As a rule he follows the usual way in nature. This, however, is not without exception; when God suspends habitual natural phenomena, there occurs what we call a miracle, and they an interruption of habit. The continuity of habit corresponds to new acts of creation. We are accustomed to ascribe shadows to the fact that the sun is absent from a place. Not at all! The shadow is not the result of the absence of the sun; it is created and is something positive. In this way the adherents of Kalām are able to explain the tradition that in paradise there is a tree in whose shadow one can ride a hundred years without leaving its shade. How is this possible since before the entrance of the pious into paradise “the sun is folded up” (Sura 81, v. 1)? Where there is no sun there can be no shade! But shade has nothing to do with the sun; God creates the shadows; here is an example of the interruption of the habitual.⁹

This view of nature runs through the whole world conception of the Ash‘arite dogmatists. Al Ash‘arī himself had already widely used it. To him, for example, is ascribed the teaching that it is only a custom of nature that scent, taste, etc., cannot be perceived by eye-sight; God could give our eye-sight the power of noticing smell. But this is not the habit of nature.¹⁰

Thus, the orthodox dogmatism based on Ash‘arite fundamentals, demands the rejection of the views of causality, in whatever form. Not only is the working of unchangeable and eternal natural laws as the cause of all acts of nature denied, but even the formulas of causality which approach the standpoint of Kalām are condemned, as for example, that “causality is not eternal, but arose within time, and that God has given to the causes the power to constantly call forth the consequent events.”¹¹

If this view of the world excludes the conception of chance it does so in the sense that it stipulates a decisive aim for that which happens. But it does not take this exclusion of chance in the sense that, that which happens is the infallible consequence of a natural causality expressing itself in law. Within this view of nature there was found then, sufficient place for all the demands of dogmatism. How easily a formula was given for miracles, has just been shown. The same is true for the acceptance of all supernatural things, which are demanded by the dogmas of Islam. Since there is no law and no causality, there is also nothing miraculous or supernatural. If the accident of life vouchsafes decaying bones, resurrection is to follow. It is a special act, just as all natural phenomena are to be traced back to special acts, and not permanent laws.

In this way Kalām, in the form given to it by al Ash'arī and as accepted by Moslem orthodoxy, set up a system of thought in opposition to Aristotelianism which adapted itself very well to the support of the doctrines of faith. This has been the ruling Moslem philosophy of religion since the twelfth century.

But the essential values of their subtleties were to be degraded by a counterpoise, through the introduction of a religious historical factor, which will form the subject of the next chapter.

NOTES.

- I. 1. This claim is expressed in Islam in the sentence: “*al-‘ulamā warathat al-anbiyā*”: “the theologians are the heirs of the prophets.”
2. See the parts of the Ḥadīth bearing on the disapproval of such movements Ibn Sa’d IV, I 141, 15 ff. ZDMG LVII 393 f. Cf. also B. Tafsīr no. 237 (Sura 41), where a number of contradictions in the Koran are given, which were submitted to Ibn ‘Abbās.
- II. 1. Ibn Sa’d V 174, 13. Before his accession to the government, ‘Abdalmalik led a pious, ascetic life. For the piety of ‘Abdalmalik, see Wellhausen: “Das Arabische Reich und sein Sturz” 134. The *Kitāb al-imāma wal-siyāsa*, (Cairo 1904) wrongly ascribed to Ibn Kuteiba; (cf. de Goeje, “Rivistadegli Studi Orientali I 415-421), is fond of dates for the piety of the Omayyads. ‘Abdalmalik’s father, Merwān I—who, according to another source, worked zealously as caliph for the founding of religious law (Ibn Sa’d XI 117, 8)—was discovered by the people, who came to offer him the caliphate, before a little lamp busy with recitations of the Koran (II 22 end). ‘Abdalmalik himself, calls the people to a “revival of the Koran and Sunna. . . . There could be no disagreement as to his piety” (ibid. 25, 9). Acts of devotion to God are mentioned even of Ḥajāj, scorned by the pious (72, 3; 74, 10; cf. Tab. II 1186 arrangements of days for fasting and prayer in the Mosques; note especially Jāhiz, *Hayawān* V 63, 5 from below, where it is said of him that he manifested religious reverence for the Koran in contrast to the devotion of the Omayyad circle to poetry and genealogy). Further proof is furnished by the encomiums as religious heroes bestowed by the poets on caliphs and statesmen by way of flattery; e. g. Jerīr, *Dīwān* (Cairo 1313) I 168, 8; II 97, 5 fr. bel. (Merwān, the ancestor of ‘Omar II, is called *ḍu-l-nūr* [possessor of light] and introduced as adding to the fame of the pious caliph). Nakā’id ed. Bevan 104 v. 19 the same poet calls the caliph *imām al-hudā*, “the Imam of the (religious) correct guidance”; see also ‘Ajāj, append. 22, 15. cf. Muh. Stud. II 381.
2. Becker, “Papyri Schott-Reinhardt” I (Heidelberg 1906) 35.
3. Ibn Sa’d IV, I 137 5. 20.—Ḥusein and his partisans are opposed as “people who are disloyal to *dīn* and oppose the Imām (Yazīd, the son of Mu‘āwiyya).” (Ṭabarī II 342, 16.)
4. Thus characterized by Wellhausen, “Die religiös-politischen Oppo-

- sitionsparteien im alten Islam'' (Berlin 1901, Abhandlungen d. Kgl. Ges. d. Wiss. Göttingen, Phil. Hist. Cl. V no. 2) 7.
5. Tabarī I 2909, 16.
 6. The defeat of such rebels is praised by Jarīr (*Dīwān* I 62, 13) as the conquest of the *mubtadi' fi-l-dīn* (innovators in religion).
 7. Van Vloten, "Recherches sur la domination arabe etc." (Amsterdam 1894) 36.
 8. Lammens, "Études sur le règne de Mo'āwiyya" 154 ff. (*Mélanges Beyrouth* II 46 ff.)
 9. This follows from Ibn Sa'd V 68, 23 ff.
 10. This is frequently mentioned in colored accounts as one of their faults. (*Yasta'thirūna bilfey'*), Ibn Sa'd IV, I 166, 11; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan* II 183.
 11. Tabarī II 300, 9 ff.
 12. For their *bi'da's* Kumeit is very important, *Hāshimiyyāt* ed. Horovitz 123, 7 ff.
 13. e. g. Sa'id ibn al-Musayyab, who in every prayer cursed the *Banū Merwān* (Ibn Sa'd V 95, 5).
 14. This, however, does not exclude the possibility of a Murji'ite opposing the cruelties of the Hajāj (Ibn Sa'd VI 205, 12); without, however, involving a judgment with regard to the Omayyad caliphate.
 15. For example: Ibn Sirīn is spoken of *arja' al-nās li-hāqīhi-l-ummah*, i. e. he was the most indulgent in his judgment of his fellow-men, but severe with himself (Nawawī, *Tahqīb* 108, 7 fr. bel.).
 16. According to the report of several Murji'ites the pious caliph 'Omar II, with whom they discussed these questions, attached himself to their point of view. Ibn Sa'd VI 218, 20.
 17. Ibn Sa'd, *ibid.* 214, 19, *al-murji'at al-ūlā*. The views of Bureida ibn al-Huṣaib furnish an example of this tendency, *ibid.* IV, I 179, 11 ff.
 18. Murji'ites contra the adherents of 'Alī, see "Muh. Stud." II 91 note 5. cf. Sabā'i, the fanatical Shī'ite (adherent of 'Abdallāh ibn Sabā) in contrast to Murji'. Ibn Sa'd VI 192, 17. This contrast lasts up till the time when the Murji' confession assumed only a theoretical importance. Jāhiz ("Bayān" ed. Cairo, 1311-13, II 149 below) cites the following Shī'ite epigram:
 "If it amuses you to see a Murji'ite dying of his illness before his (real) death,
 Keep on praising 'Alī before him, and pronounce pious blessings for the prophet and those of his family (ahli beytihi)."
 19. The judgment of the Omayyad ruler is made very clear by these pious fanatics, Aghānī XX 106; the Kharijites kill in a most horrible manner a man, who disseminates a Ḥadīth, in which

the prophet warns against rebellion and recommends passive sufferance, Ibn Sa'd V 182, 15 ff.

20. This does not contradict the dates given by van Vloten on the Irjā', ZDMG XLV 161 ff.

21. Ibn Khallikān ed. Wüstenfeld, no. 114 Bishr al-Merici.

22. For differences of opinion on this question within the limits of orthodoxy (Ash'arites and Hanifites) see Fr. Kern, "Mitteilungen des Semin. für Orient. Spr." Jahrg. XI (1908) section II 267. It is very characteristic of the Hadīth, to ascribe already to a "companion" the theory of the "increase and decrease of faith," Ibn Sa'd IV, II 92, 15 ff.

23. It finally happened that the designation of Murji'a came to correspond to deistic views held in common by Moslems which set aside completely ritualistic observances, while clinging firmly to the principles of monotheistic faith. The characteristic sign of the Murji'ites is the depreciation of the 'amal. Mukaddasī (wrote 375/985) designates Murji, 'Moslems in name' whom he had observed in the province of the Demāwend, and of whom he reports, that there are no mosques within their territory, and that the population neglect the practical practices of Islam. They content themselves with the fact that they are *muwahhidūn*, 'monotheists' and that they pay their taxes to the Islamic state ("Biblioth. geograph. arab." ed. de Goeje III 393 below).

III. 1. Musnad Aḥmed (Jābir) quotes Ibn Kayyim al-Jauziyya *Kitāb al-ṣalāt wa-ahkām tārikihā* (Cairo, Na'asānī 1313) 46.

2. Tirmidī II 261 below; a favorite prayer formula begins: "O God, do not abandon us to ourselves, so that we become impotent." Behā al-dīn al-Āmilī, *Mikhlāt* (Cairo 1317) 129, 2, where a large number of old prayer formulas are collected.

3. Such formulas of oaths (barā'a) in Mas'ūdī, *Murūj* VI 297; Ya'qūbī ed. Houtsma II 505, 509; Ibn al-Tiktikā ed. Ahlwardt 232.

4. I see subsequent to the completion of this chapter that my view coincides with that of Carra de Vaux, "La Doctrine de l'Islam" (Paris 1909) 60.

IV. 1. Hubert Grimme, Mohammed vol. II (Münster 1895) 105 ff.

2. Alfred v. Kremer, "Culturgeschichtl. Streifzüge auf dem Gebiete des Islams" (Leipzig 1873) 7 ff.

3. Cf. on this ZDMG LVII 398.

4. Wellhausen, "Das Arab. Reich und sein Sturz" 217, 235. Wellhausen emphasizes in the later passage, that such a partisanship did not arise from dogmatic but political considerations. The advocates of free-will refer to letters, which Ḥasan al-Basrī is said to have sent to the caliphs 'Abdalmalik and Ḥajjāj, in which the pious man wishes to convince those in power of the absurdity of their clinging to a belief in a *servum arbi*.

- trium. Cf. Ahmed ibn Yaḥyā, *Kitāb al-milal wal-niḥal* (ed. T. W. Arnold, *Al-mu'tazilah* (Leipzig 1903) 12 ff.).
5. ZDMG *ibid.* 394. Note the fatalistic verse of Farazdaq, *ibid.* LX 25.
 6. Aghānī X 99, 10.
 7. Ibn Kuteiba, *Ma'ārif* 225.
 8. *al-Imāma wal-siyāsa* II 41.
 - V. 1. Ibn Sa'd VI 236, 19. Some name Moh. ibn al-Hanafīyya as the one who first defended the thesis of the Murji'; *ibid.* V 67, 16. For the definition given here see "Kultur D. Gegenw." I, V 64.
 2. For this meaning of the appellation *Mu'tazila* see ZDMG XLI, 35 note 4. cf. Ibn Sa'd V 225, 4, where *Mu'tazilite* is used as a synonym of 'ābid and zāhid to denote ascetics. In an old Arabic translation of the N. T., (publ. 1233) originating in Nestorian circles, Pharisee (one who sets himself apart) is translated by the same word (Mashriḡ XI 905 penult).
 3. A recent monograph has been written by Henri Galland, "Essai sur les Mo'tazelites, les rationalistes de l'Islam" (Geneva 1906).
 4. Cf. the biography by T. W. Arnold, *Al-Mu'tazilah* 18, 12.
 5. In Beihakī ed. Schwally 364, penult, ff.; the ascetic picture in Arnold, l. c. 22, 5 ff.
 6. In the 4th century already *sheikh min zuhhād al-mu'tazila*: "a sheikh of the Mu'tazilite ascetics," Yaḳūt ed. Margoliouth II 309, 11.
 7. Kremer, "Culturgeschichte des Orients unter den Chalifen" II 267.
 8. In Jāḥiẓ, *Ḥayawān* III 18 (cf. VI 11 on sceptics). Such principles make their impression even on a man as far from the Mu'tazilite point of view as Ghazālī; it is apparent in his expression (Mōznē ṣedek, Hebrew ed. Goldenthal, 235): "he who does not doubt, cannot think rationally." The Arabic original of Ghazālī's saying is quoted by Ibn Tufail, Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān (ed. Gauthier, Algiers 1900) 13, 4 fr. below.
 9. Māturīdī, Commentary to *al-Fiḡh al-akbar* (Haidarābād 1321; authenticity very improbable) 19.
 10. Jāḥiẓ l. c. VI 95 (in place of the gap here designated by dots, the Arabic text as well as in the Vienna Jāḥiẓ-manuscript has a word, evidently corrupt, according to the metre, which cannot be made out). To this independent activity of reason (96, 6) is opposed the dependent traditional repetition (*taḳlīd*), which marks the average man.
 11. Cf. Maimūnī, "Guide des égarés" I c. 73, propos. XII. On the scepticism of the Mutakallimūn see ZDMG LXII 2.
 12. "Buch vom Wesen der Seele" 13, note to 4, 5 ff.
 13. Fakhr al-dīn al-Rāzī, *Mafātīḥ al-ghaib* see St. V 432.

- VI. 1. Ibn 'Asākir, *Ta'rikh Dimashk*, section 340. (Lanberg Coll., now in the library of Yale University, New Haven, Conn.)
2. The Hanbalite theologian Muwaffak al-dīn 'Abdallāh ibn Kudāma (d. 620/1233) wrote: *Damm al-ta'wīl* (the condemnation of the ta'wīl), of which two manuscript copies have lately been acquired for the library of the Asiatic Society of Bengal ("List of Arabic and Persian Mss. acquired" . . . 1903-1907 no. 405. 795; add to Brockelmann I 398). In various writings Ibn Teymiyya (see concerning him ch. VI) frequently attacks the ta'wīl of the Mutakallimūn and indicates the proper boundary of ta'wīl in the traditional sense (e. g. *Tafsīr Sūrat al-ikhlāṣ* 71 ff., *Risālat al-ikhlāl fi-l-mutashābih wal-ta'wīl*, in *Majmū'at al-rasā'il* (Cairo 1323) II).
3. Abū Ma'mar al-Hudālī (d. 236/850 in Baghdād), *Taḍkirat al-huffāz* II 56.
- VIII. 1. "Ahmed ibn Ḥanbal and the Miḥna" (Leiden 1897). Cf. ZDMG LII 155 ff.
2. Muh. Stud. II 59.
3. Shahrastānī ed. Cureton 68.
4. ZDMG LXII 7.
5. *Kitāb al-ibāna 'an uṣūl al-dijāna* (Haidarābād 1321) 41.
- IX. 1. For references and further discussion see ZDMG LII 158 and the introduction to "Le livre de Mohammed ibn Toumert" (Algiers 1903) 61-63; 71-74.
2. Shahrastānī, l. c. 51 ult.
3. Māwerdī, "Constitutiones politicae" ed. Enger 61 ff. The Imām al-Shāfi'ī makes no difference between the two zones, *dār al-Islām* and *dār al-ḥarb*. On this account differences arise with other schools in regard to derivative questions cf. Abū Zeid al-Dabbūsī, *Ta'sīs al-naẓar* (Cairo o. J.) 58.
4. T. W. Arnold, *Al-Mu'tazilah* 44, 12, 57, 5.
- X. 1. For the title see above VIII note 5.
2. M. Schreiner "Zur Geschichte des Ash'aritentums." (Actes du Huitième Congrès international des Orientalistes, Section I A, 105.)
- XI. 1. In the rabbinical Hagada we find likewise the view expressed that questions of law are discussed after the manner of the school; bab. *Pesāchīm* 50a beginning *Khagīgā* 15b below, *Giṭṭīn* 6b below; God himself is supposed to occupy himself with the consideration of the varying opinions of rabbinical authorities, he himself searches in the law; a point of view often expressed in *Sēder Eliyyāhū rabbā* (ed. Friedmann, Vienna 1900) 61 penult.
2. Musnad Ahmed IV 66.
3. Muwaṭṭa (ed. Cairo) I 385. Other examples, which have formed the object of the ta'wīl will be found in the author's work: "Die Zahiriten" 168. A collection of Ḥadīths, as a support of the

- most crude anthropomorphism, was made, see Yākūt ed. Margoliouth III I 153. Also Bukh. Tauhīd no. 35 (ed. Juynboll 448), in Damascus by Ḥasan ibn 'Alī al-Ahwāzī (d. 446/1055).
4. In one version of Ibn Sa'd VI 37, 23 *yahbiṭu* closing: "and when morning comes he again returns on high."
 5. Other explanations also have been attempted to explain away the anthropomorphism of this utterance; they are put together in Abū Muh. ibn al-Sīd al-Baṭal-yūsi, *al-Intiṣāf* (ed. 'Omar al-Maḥmasānī, Cairo 1319) 120 f. (this book is of great importance for the knowledge of the questions treated here), Moh. al-'Abdārī's *Kitāb al-majal* (Alexandria 1293) II 25 ff. cf. also Subkī, *Ṭabaḳāt al-Shaḥfī'iyya* II 135, 13.
 6. Bukh, *Tafsīr* no. 264 (Sura 50 v. 29) with Ibn al-Athīr, *Nihāya* I 142; LA s. v. *jbr* V 182 cf. Bukh. Tauhīd. no. 7 (ed. Juynboll 448).
- XII. 1. See on this the definite formulation in Fakhr al-dīn al-Rāzī, *Ma'ālīm uṣūl al-dīn* ch. II par. 10 (ed. Cairo 1323, and the same author's work *Muḥaṣṣal* p. 9). After enumerating the subjective elements of the traditional demonstration he says: "from this it follows, that the traditional proofs only give conjectures, the proofs of reason, on the contrary have apodictical power; conjecture cannot be opposed to apodictical knowledge." The fundamental principle of Kalām is invariably *al-dalā'il al-naḳliyya lā tuf'īd al-yaqīn*, al-Ijī Jordjānī, *Mawākif* (Stambul 1239) 79.
2. *al-Islām wal-naṣrāniyya ma'al-'ilm wal-madaniyya* (Cairo 1323, printed after the death of the author) p. 56.
 3. Cf. Schreiner, "Beiträge zur Geschichte der theologischen Bewegungen im Islam." (Leipzig 1899) 64-75 = ZDMG LII 528-539.
 4. Ibn Teymiyya, in the great 'Aḳīda ḥamawiyya, *Majmū'at al-rasā'il al-kubrā* I 468 below.
 5. Subkī, *Ṭabaḳāt al-Shaḥfī'iyya* I 241, 5.
 6. A famous authority in tradition, Abū Suleymān al-Khaṭṭābī al-Bustī (d. 388/998), wrote a book: *al-ghunya* (not *al-ghayba*, as in "Abū-l-Mahāsīn ibn Taghri Birdī" annals ed. W. Popper, Berkeley 1909, 578, 15) '*an al-kalām wa-ahlihi*, "the superfluity of Kalām and its people." Subkī, *ibid.* II 218, 15.
- XIII. 1. On the sources of the metaphysics and natural philosophy of the Mu'tazilites we now have the investigation of S. Horowitz: "Über den Einfluss der Griechischen Philosophie auf die Entwicklung des Kalām" (Breslau 1909) and cf. the review by M. Horten in *Oriental Literatur-Zeitung* XII 391 ff. On the philos. of Kalām see Horten: "Die philosophischen Probleme der spekulativen Theologie im Islam" (Bonn 1910; "Renaissance und Philosophie" III).
2. *Kitāb al-ḥayawān* II 48.

3. Mawākif, l. c. 448.
4. Cf. S. Horovitz, l. c. 12 and Horten, ZDMG LXIII 784 ff.
5. See above note 5, 11 and 12.
6. Maimūnī, *Dalālat al-hā'irīn* I c. 69 beg.
7. Jorjānī to Mawākif 512, 3 fr. bel.
8. Ibn Hajar al-Heitamī, *Fatāwī ḥadithiyya* (Cairo 1307) 35.
9. *Ithāf al-sādat al-muttakīn* (ed. Cairo 1302) X 53.
10. Mawākif 506.
11. The unacceptable formulas of the conception of causality are collected in Senūsī (toward the end of the 15th century), "Les Prolégomènes théologiques," published and translated by J. D. Luciani (Algiers 1908) 108-112. Senūsī, whose compendia count as fundamentals of dogmatic orthodoxy, as is apparent in the list of his works (Belkacem al-Hafnaoui, "Biographies des savants musulmans de l'Algérie" I 185 penult.) has devoted another special work to the refutation of causality, "in which he opposes with strong arguments the doctrine of invariable causes."

CHAPTER IV.

ASCETICISM AND ṢŪFĪISM.

I. Early Islam was ruled by the consciousness of absolute dependence, and the conception of world negation.

As has been seen, it was the vision of the destruction of the world and of the judgment of mankind which first made Mohammed a prophet. This view bred a spirit of asceticism among his followers, and contempt of the world became their motto.

Nevertheless, although Mohammed, to the very end, proclaimed the blessedness of paradise as the goal of all faithful life, owing to the changing conditions in Medīna and to the spread of his warlike activities, the world point of view soon unconsciously came to play an important part in his considerations.

The vast majority of Arabs who came over to him were chiefly won and held by the prospect of material advantages. Not all belonged to those of whom the early historians of Islam speak, *kurra* (praying brothers) and *bakkā'ūn* (weeper, penitents). The prospect of spoils was indeed a most magnetic recruiting force for Islam. The prophet himself recognized this when he tried to heighten the zeal of the warrior through the *maghānim kathīra* (much booty) promised by Allah (Sura 48, v. 19). In the old accounts of the *maghāzī* (expeditions) of the prophet, it is surprising to note the vast and varied spoils which with the regularity of a natural law appear to follow in the wake of every holy war.

To be sure, the prophet does not deny the higher ends to be attained by means of these marauding expeditions. He preaches against the finality of merely worldly aims, of *dunyā*: "There are many *maghānim* with Allah"

(Sura 4, v. 96). "Ye strive after the trumpery of this world; but Allah wishes what is beyond" (Sura 8, v. 68). The ascetic tone of the first Mecca utterances passed over, to a certain extent, into the Medina realism. But actual conditions had led the spirit of the young Moslem community into quite other paths than those in which the prophet moved at the beginning of his activity, when he first called his faithful to follow him.

Even before his death and notably immediately after, the watchword had changed. In place of the denial of the world came the idea of the conquest of the world. Confession of Islam was to result for the faithful in "the attainment of material prosperity, in supremacy over the Arabs and subjection of the non-Arabs, and besides all this a kingly estate in paradise."¹ And this conquest of the world was not as a matter of fact, aimed only toward the ideal. The treasures of Ktesiphon, Damascus, and Alexandria were no inducement to the strengthening of ascetic inclinations. Far more surprising is it to find accounts as early as the third century of Islam, telling of the great wealth collected by the pious warriors and worshippers, of the great pieces of land which they called their own, the comfortable houses, which they built, both at home and in the conquered countries, and the luxury with which they surrounded themselves.

These facts are manifest in the accounts of the possessions of those people, whom Moslem piety most loves to honor. Take for example the property left by the Kureishite al-Zubeir ibn al-'Awwām, a man so pious that he was counted among the ten people whom the prophet, during his life-time, could assure of an entrance into Paradise because of their merit in Islam. The prophet called them his apostles (*hawārī*). This Zubeir left an estate, which after the deduction of all debts, yielded net proceeds amounting in the various reports to

between 35,200,000 and 52,000,000 dirhems. It is true he is accredited with great generosity; but he was nevertheless a Croesus, and the inventory which could be drawn up of the estates which he called his own in the various parts of the recently conquered lands does not look like contempt of the world, eleven houses in Medīna besides those in Baṣra, Kūfa, Foṣṭāt, Alexandria.² Another one of the ten pious men whom the prophet assured of paradise, Ṭalḥa ibn 'Ubeidallāh possessed lands worth roundly thirty million dirhems. When he died his treasurer disposed of 2,200,000 dirhems in cash, above and beyond this. His property in cash is valued according to another account in the following way: he left one hundred leather bags, of which each held three *ḳinṭārs* of gold.³ A heavy load that for paradise! About the same time (37/657) there died in Kūfa a pious man, named Khabbāb, originally a very poor devil, who in his youth was a craftsman in Mecca, according to Arab views at that time not even an honorable business for free gentlemen.⁴ He became a Moslem and had to suffer much from his heathen fellow-townsmen. He was tortured with red-hot irons and threatened with still other torments, but he remained steadfast. He also took a zealous part in the wars of the prophet. When this man, so zealous in his faith, lay on his death-bed in Kūfa, he could point to a trunk in which he had collected forty thousand—probably dirhems—and expressed the fear that through this wealth he had anticipated the reward for his endurance in faith.⁵

The rich share which came to the warriors of plunder and money offered favorable opportunities for amassing such worldly goods. After a campaign into North Africa under the leadership of 'Abdallāh ibn Abī Sarḥ during the time of the Caliph 'Othmān, each rider received three thousand *mithḳāls* in gold from the booty. Those who, like Ḥākim ibn Ḥizām, declined to accept the stipend

offered them by Abū Bekr and ‘Omar, must have been very rare.⁶

The predominant note in the Arab rush of conquests, was, as Leone Caetani shows with great clearness in several places in his work on Islam, material need and greed.⁷ This is to be explained by the economic condition of Arabia, which kindled the enthusiasm for migration from the inherited land to more favorable points. For this migration, founded on economic necessity, the new faith furnished a welcome motive.⁸ By this we do not mean to assert that it was these avaricious aims alone that prevailed in Islam’s holy wars. Besides those warriors who “had entered the war through worldly desires,” there were always men who, inspired by religious zeal, took part in the battles for the sake of paradise.⁹ But, to be sure, it was not this last faction which really stamped the character of the fighting masses.

So, in a very early epoch of its history, did Islam’s immediate outward success force the ascetic ideas, once so dominant, into the background. Frequently worldly considerations and worldly wishes, could be satisfied by a zealous share in the spread of the religion of Mohammed. Even in the generation after Mohammed it could be said that at this time every pious deed had double value, “because it is no longer the next life which is our care, as formerly, but the *dunya*, the interest of this life, which attracts us.”¹⁰

II. There was no break in the steady decline of ascetic tendencies, when with the rise of the Omayyads the theocratic spirit got the worst of it even in the government, and public spirit was no longer guided by the saints. According to a saying of the prophet which reflects the view of the pious, “there will be no more emperors in Syria and no Khosroes in ‘Irāk. By God, ye will spend your treasures in the path of God.” In Hadīths bearing on the subject, the spending of the

treasures gained as booty "in the way of God" and for the good of the poor and needy goes far to offset the materialistic aim and success of conquests.¹ But this did not exactly suit the people who had to decide about the spending of the acquired goods. The treasures which were amassed through conquests and continually increased through clever administration, were not, in the Ḥadīth, simply to be spent "in the way of God," i. e., for pious ends. The classes, into whose hands such worldly goods fell wished to use them for the enjoyments of this world. They did not wish simply to "gather up treasures in heaven." An ancient tradition tells that Mu'āwīyya, the Syrian governor at the time of the caliph 'Othmān, the subsequent founder of the Omayyad dynasty of caliphs, fell into a quarrel with the pious Abū Ḍarr al-Ghifārī, over the interpretation of the Koran verse (Sura 9, v. 34), "And those who hoard up gold and silver and do not give it out in the way of Allah, to them carry the message of painful punishment." The worldly-minded statesman held that this was a warning which could not be applied to the actual condition of the Moslem state, but which was directed against the covetous leaders of other religions (the preceding words apply to them); the pious ones, on the other hand, contended, "the warning is directed against them and against us." This did not suit Mu'āwīyya, and he considered Abū Ḍarr's exegesis dangerous enough to rouse the caliph against him. The latter summoned the man to Medīna, and exiled him to a small place in the neighborhood, so that he should not, by his hostile teachings, influence public opinion against the ruling spirit.²

This is a reflection of the ruling opinion, to which even the interpreters of the religious teachings had to yield. Those who interpreted the original ideal of Islam and, like Abū Ḍarr, in the name of the prophet propounded the teaching "Gold and silver amassed by him who does

not use it for pious purposes, it shall be to him as coals of fire,"—such a person was regarded as a recluse, since he declined to recognize anyone as his brother who, in spite of his fidelity to Islam, erected large buildings and claimed fields or herds as his own.³ As a matter of fact, we find in the specimens of religious thought, signs of the unconcealed disapproval of the asceticism which went beyond the norm of legal requirement, although in the first decade of the prophet's career it had received his unconditional approbation. We encounter an entirely changed spirit, with the Ḥadīth form supplying the necessary documents for its confirmation.

The ambition to acquire transcendental possessions could naturally not be blotted out of the Islamic view of the world; but it was to share its power with the appreciation of worldly interests. In support of this Aristotelian mean a teaching of the prophet was produced: "The best among you is not that one who deserts this world in favor of the next, nor he who does the opposite; the best among you is he who takes of both."⁴ ✓

Examples of excessive asceticism are constantly given in such a manner in the traditional sources as to imply that the prophet disapproved of such tales.

The most important documents on this subject are the reports of the ascetic tendencies of 'Abdallāh, the son of the general 'Amr ibn al-'Asī, famous in the early history of Islam. The story pictures him in contrast to his father, as one of the leading religious disciples of the prophet and the most zealous searcher of his law.⁵ The prophet hears of his inclination to impose continuous fasts on himself, and to deprive himself of sleep in order to recite the Koran during the whole night; and he exhorts him earnestly to limit these ascetic habits to a reasonable degree. "Your body has claims upon you, and your wife has claims upon you, and your guest has claims upon you."⁶ "He who practices continuous fasts

has (in truth) not fulfilled the fast," that is, it will not be counted to him as a religiously meritorious act.⁷

The prophet is made to blame people who give themselves up to unbroken devotional exercises to the neglect of their worldly business. Once a traveler was praised because when riding his pack animal he did nothing but repeat litanies, and when he dismounted he did nothing but pray. "But," asked the prophet, "who cared for the feed of his pack animal, and who prepared his own food?" "We all cared for his needs." "Then every one of you is better than he."⁸ There is an unreliable tendency in a great number of traditional stories of exaggerated penitential vows, bodily self torment and chastisement, which have as a type a certain Abū Isrā'il.⁹ To explain such efforts is of no religious, or at least of minor religious value. "If the monk (*rāhib*) Jureij (a diminutive of Gregorius) had been a true student of religion, he would have known that the fulfilment of his mother's wishes were of more value than his devoting himself to the service of God."¹⁰

Celibacy received the specially severe censure of the prophet. He sets to right a certain 'Akkāf ibn Wadā al-Hilālī, who had determined on a celibate life, with the following words: "You have then determined to belong to the brothers of Satan! Either you wish to be a Christian monk, in which case join them publicly; or you belong to us, then you must obey our Sunna. Our Sunna, however, demands married life."¹¹ Such sayings are also attributed to him with regard to those who wish to abandon their goods in order to devote them to pious ends, to the detriment of their own families.¹²

These teachings of the prophet connected with concrete cases correspond also to the current maxims ascribed to him. "There is no monasticism in Islam; the monasticism of this community is religious war."¹³ This sentence is especially noteworthy for the way

in which it contrasts the pious, contemplative life of the cloister cell, with the active life of a soldier which has just been mentioned as the cause of the disappearance of the ascetic tendencies of earliest Islam.

In considering the words of the prophet directed against monasticism, one cannot overlook the fact that they appear generally as a direct polemic against the ascetic life in Christendom. The prophet in several speeches is said to take a stand against the exaggerated fasts, beyond the number of legal restrictions. "For every bite which the true believer takes into his mouth, he receives a divine reward." "God loves better the Moslem who cares for his physical strength than the weakling." "He who eats with gratitude (to God) is as worthy as the self-denying faster."¹⁴ It is no virtue to dispose of one's goods and then to become a beggar oneself. Only he who has a superfluity should give alms, and even then he should first think of the members of his family.¹⁵ In all these teachings the thought seems to predominate, that the limit of worldly goods to be acquired is determined by law, and that no chastisements are desired beyond these.

It is important for our consideration to emphasize once more that it is hardly likely that Mohammed made any of the speeches which we have given here as linked with his name. He himself had, with due respect for worldly necessities, and with all the indulgence which he claimed for himself, as is evident in many places in the Koran,¹⁶ the highest regard for true asceticism, praying brotherhoods, penance and fasting,—with one exception perhaps,—celibacy. His thoughts, indeed, lie nearer to those sayings in which restraint (*zuhd*) from everything worldly is commended as a great virtue, through which one acquires the love of God.¹⁷ But it is also as important to notice how the anti-ascetic views of life, called forth by the external religion of Islam, expresses

itself in speeches and judgments which in accord with the procedure above set forth (p. 151 *seq.*) was attached to the authority of the prophet.

The same tendency is also apparent in another sphere of tradition and literature: in the accounts of the life of the prophet and of the Companions.

It is precisely from the little intimate traits, which tradition half unconsciously mingles with the portrayal of the representative of sacred interests, that we can best see the predominance of the anti-ascetic spirit. The prophet's own biography is full of such traits.

On the whole, indeed, we may accept Mohammed's continually increasing sensuality as an authentic fact. Nevertheless it is an unique phenomenon in the religious literature of all times and all peoples that Islam offers us in its view of the prophet. Never has the founder of a religion, without prejudice to the ideal picture which has been formed of him (page 20) been so described on his human, indeed his far too human side, as Mohammed has been described by Moslem tradition.¹⁸ The widespread dissemination of such traits would no doubt have been suppressed or modified in a circle in which asceticism was considered the perfect way of life. Instead, such views were regarded as furnishing a commentary to his own words: "I am only flesh as ye" (Sura 18, v. 110). Nowhere is there a sign of an effort to remove from him human lusts and passions. On the contrary one finds the frank effort to bring him humanly near to his faithful for all time. He is freely made to confess: "In your world women and sweet scents have become precious to me"—with the addition "and the comfort of my eyes is prayer." Every opportunity was embraced to give him attributes which are quite foreign to any inclination toward asceticism. Tradition, frankly enough, even lets his opponents accuse him of associating

only with women, which could not very well accord with the character of a prophet.¹⁹

We notice the same tendency in the intimate biographical notices which have come down to us from the pious Companions. Through the publication of the great compilation of Ibn Sa'd we are now in a position to follow this phase of Islamic biographical tradition, since we now have biographical material extending to the most minute details of the private life of the oldest hero of Islam, formerly neglected. It is notable that these biographies as a rule offer elaborate traditions of how these sacred persons were wont to perfume themselves, how they dyed their beards and hair, how they dressed and adorned themselves.²⁰ Perfuming especially, which the praying brotherhoods, sworn enemies of the cosmetic arts, zealously attacked, is always given a leading place. For example, 'Othmān ibn 'Ubeidallāh recounts as a memory of his school days, that the children were holding perfumes to their noses on an occasion when four men, mentioned by name, passed before the schoolhouse. Among them was Abū Hureira, one of the weightiest authorities on Islamic tradition.²¹

They revel also in the accounts of luxury which those who are recognized as models of piety manifested in their dress. One often reads that they wrapped themselves in velvet garments. For the justification of such luxury a saying which has come down from the prophet is often used: "When God favors a man with wealth, he likes the signs of it to be apparent." With this teaching the prophet blames wealthy people who appear before him in poor clothes.²² This would scarcely be in keeping with a religious tradition having its ideal in the denial of all worldliness.

Of the numerous examples which serve to characterize the spirit and the manner of life of the circle which

cherished these traditions, I wish to mention only a small detail which illustrates in a naïve manner the point under consideration.

The figure of Mohammed ibn al-Ḥanafīyya ibn 'Alī, whom a crowd of religious zealots acclaimed as the Mahdī, God's chosen redeemer of Islam, is the bearer of the theocratic idea under those first Omayyads decried as godless usurpers. His father, 'Alī, even before the birth of this son, was given the privilege by the prophet of giving the child the prophet's own name: like the prophet he was to bear the name Mohammed Abū-l-Ḳāsim. To him was attached the belief in the bodily continuance of the future parusia of the person chosen by God and recognized as the Mahdī, a belief with which we shall become more familiar in the following chapter. In this respect he was the object of the religious hopes of the pious and of the praise of poetical followers. We read the following details in the biographical tradition about this sacred personage. Abū Idrīs reports "I saw that Mohammed ibn al-Ḥanafīyya made use of various dyes. He confessed to me that his father 'Alī was not wont to use such cosmetics. 'Why do you do it then?' . . . 'In order to woo the women with success,' was the answer."²³ One would seek in vain indeed for such confessions in the Syrian or Ethiopic lives of saints. To be sure this Mahdī, if we test his character with historical accuracy, is to all appearances a worldly-minded man, not averse to sensual pleasures and advantages.²⁴ Yet in the tradition of Islam he is the embodiment of sacred interests. There was no contradiction of fact between this character and the apparently irreconcilable confession which perhaps not without a humorous intent is put into his mouth. Many other biographical accounts from the old times of Islam could be given as further examples to illustrate what we have seen to have been the teachings of the prophet.

III. Such utterances and teachings, however, would not have been emphasized, if at the time of their appearance, there had not manifested itself in the Moslem community, a powerful under-current, which continues to cherish the ascetic spirit of Islam and recognizes in it the true and pure religious manifestation. We have just mentioned that there were praying brotherhoods,¹ who regarded even the aestheticism of external appearances as a breach of the Islamic ideal of life; naturally we find Abū Isrā'il (referred to above, page 154) among these. Of 'Abdalrahmān ibn al-Aswad respected in the community, but whose garb did not suggest an unworldly demeanor, he says: "When I see that man, I think that I see before me an Arab who has turned into a Persian landlord. He is dressed like them, perfumed like them and rides like them."²

Especially in 'Irāk does this tendency seem to have found many adherents. Soon after the conquest and in the first Omayyad period, they are generally called *'ubbād* (sing. *'ābid*) that is, those who devote themselves to the pious service of God, persons like Mi'ḍad ibn Yezīd from the line of 'Ijl, who fought under the Caliph 'Othmān in the war in Aḍārbeijān. He returned with a number of the Companions to the cemetery in order there "to serve God."³ A perfect type of this character is to be found in the manner of life and views of al-Rabī' ibn Khuthyam in Kūfa, his sole interest in the things of this world revolved around "the number of mosques that have arisen in the tribe of the Teim family." He did not allow his little daughter, the most harmless childish games; he himself naturally turned away with all his soul from the frivolities introduced from Persia. He scorns the share of booty coming to him from the wars.⁴ For we must understand especially, that—as the two examples show us—the asceticism of these people did not extend to exemption from warfare, in as much as it contributed to the spread of the faith. We accordingly

find ascetic traits at this epoch of Islam among people whose share in war is given in detail. To Mohammed's speech against "monasticism" is added the clause: "the monasticism of my community is Jihād" (crusade).

The more public life turned to material interests and enjoyments, the more motives did those persons find who sought the ideal of Islam in the conditions prevailing at the time of its origin, to demonstrate in their own persons by laying aside all worldly interests the protest against secularization. In the biographies of the oldest professors of Islam even the martial heroes are portrayed as representatives of this ascetic tendency, in order to hold them up as models of true believers, protesting against all kinds of worldliness, and as types of asceticism.⁵ As a matter of fact we have data for the assumption that the trend toward asceticism coincides with resistance against the authorities. It is under the caliph 'Othmān that an investigation is started against a man, who was famed for having affronted the Imam, and who did not take part in the public Friday ceremonies as a protest against the recognition of the government. He was a vegetarian and a celibate.⁶ In view of the public conditions of which they disapproved in their hearts, many entrenched themselves in a retired life, denying the world and writing on their banner the motto: "Escape from the world."

In connection with this there is still another important external factor. It has just been noted that many of the anti-ascetic speeches bore ear-marks of an undisguised polemical opposition to the ascetic tendencies of Christianity. This is due to the fact that it is Christian asceticism which at the beginning of Islam offered the immediate example for the manifestation of the ascetic view of the world. Those who in Islam fostered inclination toward the denial of the world, were first aroused and influenced by the example of the wandering monks

and penitents in Christendom. Even before the time of Mohammed the penitents mentioned in the ancient Arabian poems gave to the Arabs a glimpse of the ascetic manner of life. In many parts of the heathen Arabian poetry Christian monks and nuns in their customs and their manner of dress are used as metaphors to illustrate a variety of things.⁷ It is they who suggest to Mohammed himself the appellation which he uses in the Koran (Sura 9, v. 113; 66, v. 5) for the pious ascetic members of his community, *sā'ihūn*, *sā'ihāt*, i. e., those of both sexes who 'wander about.' He was thinking at that time of the wandering monks with whom he had probably come in contact during the pre-prophetic period of his life.⁸ A variant of the traditional speech directed against monasticism runs as follows: "There is no itinerant monasticism" (*lā siyāḥata*) in Islam. The two expressions are synonymous.⁹

By the spread of Islam, especially in Syria, Babylonia and Egypt, those with ascetic tendencies had still greater opportunity of observing this mode of life, and the experience which they could gain from their contact with Christians developed the school of asceticism in Islam. Such inclinations now appear in increasing measure and win for themselves constantly broadening circles. The adherents of this trend even complement their doctrinal material from the New Testament from which they take parables and maxims and use them for the propagation of their view of life. The oldest literary work of this kind, as Professor Margoliouth has lately pointed out, is full of veiled borrowings from the New Testament.¹⁰ This ascetic note constantly increasing in the doctrines and life, impressed the believer of the usual type as very strained. This is evident, for example, in the story that a lady once saw a company of young people who were very deliberate in their gait and slow in their speech—a strong contrast indeed to the Arabs' liveliness in

speech and motion. On inquiring as to who these unusual people were, she was told that they were *nussāk*, that is, ascetics. She could not refrain from remarking: "Forsooth, when 'Omar spoke he was heard, and he hurried when he walked, and when he struck he hurt—such was the truly pious man (*nāsik*).'"¹¹ If one turns to Sura 31, v. 18, one would be inclined to say that the bearing of these young ascetics would have obtained the approval of Mohammed.

It is easy to understand that these people first manifest their asceticism in the line of food. That they should fast much is fairly comprehensible. Against such people, are directed the traditional sayings and stories dealing with the evil of immoderate fasting.¹² Together with this tendency we find examples of abstinence from meat, a form of asceticism for which examples are being drawn even from the time of the Companions.¹³ A certain Ziyād ibn abī Ziyād, who belonged as a client to the tribe of the Makhzūm, and is represented as an ascetic, world-renouncing individual, who constantly performed pious acts, clothed himself in coarse woolen garb (*ṣūf*) and refrained from meat, is said to have been the type of a whole class in the time of 'Omar II.¹⁴ The saying ascribed to the prophet attacks them as follows: "He who tastes no meat for forty days, acquires a bad character."¹⁵

Side by side with these negative elements in practical life there also arise positive aspects of worship and of the philosophy of life. They are not in themselves contradictory to the teachings of the Koran, but are rather exaggerations of single elements in its religious teaching and its ethics. But although in the Koran they are regarded as proper links in the chain of Moslem doctrines, in the circles to which Mohammedan asceticism owes its development, they are looked upon as of fundamental importance, by the side of which all other ele-

ments of the religious life move into the background. In this one-sided exaggeration lies the seed of the split which later broke out between such efforts and the teachings of Moslem orthodoxy.¹⁶

IV. Two factors especially appear in the oldest stage of Moslem asceticism as objects of such exaggeration: a liturgical and an ethical. The liturgical appears in the terminus *dikr*, literally "mention" (of the name of Allah), which has kept its place in the whole development of Moslem mysticism. Official Islam limits the liturgical worship of God to definite moments of the day and night. This limitation and demarcation is disregarded by the ascetic view, for they regard the exhortation of the Koran "Allah should be thought of frequently" (Sura 33, v. 14) from the point of view of religious practice, and exalt the devotional practices to which they give the name *Dikr* to first place in practical religion, by the side of which other practices lose their value and shrink into insignificance. It is these mystical litanies which to-day still form the backbone of the groups representing the heritage of those ancient ascetics.

The ethical peculiarity, which is sharply apparent in the asceticism of that ancient period, is the exaggeration of the confidence in God (*tawakkul*), which these Moslem ascetics have carried to the highest stage of inactive quietism. It is the complete indifference and the laying aside of all initiative in their personal interests. They completely give themselves over to God's care of them and his fate. They are in the hands of God like the corpse in the hands of the one who washes it:¹ absolutely weak and indifferent. They call themselves *mutawakkilūn*, that is, those 'who trust in God.' A number of their principles have come down to us from which it is evident that they scorn to raise a hand to obtain the needs of life. That would be a violation of the trust in God.

They do not trouble themselves about the "means," but commit their needs directly to God, and consider their trustful inactivity in contrast with the cares of tradesmen, the humiliation of the artizan and the self-debasement of the beggar as the most exalted kind of self-preservation. "They experience the Most High and receive their nourishment directly from His hand, without looking for the means." It is recounted as a special virtue of these people that they do not count the morrow in the number of days.² The future and its cares is completely left out of their sphere of thought. A Ḥadīth (to be sure a very suspected one)³ is quoted: "Wisdom comes down from heaven, but it does not enter the heart of any man who thinks of the morrow." "He who trusts in God is the 'child of the moment' ('of time,' *ibn al-waḳt*), he neither looks back into the past nor forward into the future."⁴

It is to be expected that complete *aktēmosurē*, poverty, and the rejection of all material goods, are regarded of the greatest importance by these people. He who belongs to them is a *fakīr*, a poor man. Furthermore, as they are indifferent to hunger and physical hardships of all kinds, so are they also indifferent to all other bodily discomforts. Bodily ills must not arouse in them the desire of alleviation by medical aid. Nor are they affected by the judgment and the opinion of men. "No man has entered into the trust in God to whom the praise and blame of mankind is not absolutely indifferent." With this quietism comes a complete indifference to the treatment they may receive from men. "Resist not evil" (Matt. v, 39).

That such a conception of life did not agree with the usual views of Islam, which in the first century had already started in the path of realism, is shown by a systematic collection of Ḥadīth speeches and tales, which

can only be understood in their signification as an obvious polemic against the religious consequences of the extravagant trust in God. How could this quietism find acceptance in a religious community which had just reached the height of its career of conquest, which had but a short time ago forsaken the deserts to establish itself comfortably in cities, surrounded by luxury and well-being?

V. At this period in Islam, two currents were striving against each other. They find expression in a dialogue between two pious men, Mālik ibn Dīnār and Mohammed ibn Wāsi', who converse on the theme of the summum bonum. While one finds the highest happiness in possessing a piece of ground from which substance can be obtained independent of man, the other is of the opinion that that man is blessed who finds his breakfast without knowing what will be his evening meal, and who finds his evening meal without knowing with what he will satisfy his hunger the next morning.¹ The pious reaction against excessive worldliness—a reaction reflecting the ascetic beginnings of Islam—manifests itself in the extreme expression of this quietistic view of life.²

It has already been noted that this tendency received its impetus from Christian monasticism, with whose aims the principles just referred to correspond almost word for word. It is noteworthy that the parts of the Gospel which are most used in the ascetic sayings, Matt. vi, 25-34; Luke xii, 22-30, about the birds of the air which sow not neither do they reap nor gather into barns, but are nourished by their heavenly father—find an almost literal reproduction in the core of the Tawakkul doctrine.³ Imitating the habit of Christian anchorite or monk, these world-denying penitents and ascetics of Islam were wont to clothe themselves in coarse woolen

clothes (*ṣūf*).⁴ This custom can be traced back at least to the time of the Caliph 'Abdalmalik (685-705) and is the source of the appellation *Ṣūfī*,⁵ an appellation which the followers of the ascetic tendencies assume at a time when their practical asceticism leads to further development and gives rise to a special kind of philosophy, which also influences the conception of religion.

VI. In this development the penetration of neo-Platonic speculation into the intellectual circles of Islam was of marked importance. This philosophical tendency whose marked influence on the development of Islam will be taken up again later, offered a theoretico-theological background for the practical ascetic tendencies which have just been described. He who is scornful of all earthly things, and fixes his soul on the only lasting thing, on the divine, can prepare himself for this "transcendent divine life and attitude," through the 'Emanation' doctrine of Plotinus with its dynamic pantheism. He feels the radiation of divine strength in the whole universe. The things of this world are like a mirror in which the divine is reflected. But these reflected images are only appearances and have only a relative reality, in so far as they reflect the only true existence. Man must direct all of his efforts accordingly. He must through introspection and the stripping off of the material covering, let the eternal beauty and goodness of the divine penetrate his being, and through inner aspiration get rid of the semblance of his personal existence, in order to attain the absorption of his personality in the one real divine existence.

In the beginning, my soul and thine were one: my appearance and thine, my disappearance and thine; it would have been untrue to speak of Mine and Thine. The I and the Thou have ceased between us!¹

I am not I, Thou are not Thou, nor art thou I. I am simultaneously I and Thou, Thou art simultaneously Thou and I.

In relation to Thee, O fair one of Khoten, I am at a loss to know if Thou art I or I am Thou.²

The limits of personality form the veil which hides the divine from man. With a little exaggeration, the prophet whom the Ṣūfīs claim is the herald of their theories, is made to say: "Thine existence is a sin, with which no other sin can be compared."³ By this is meant the manifestation of one's existence, the assertion of life as an independent individual. Through inward self-contemplation, through pious practices, through ascetic chastisement which results in ecstatic conditions where the person seems drunk with the divine,⁴ the personality, the ego, the duality toward God, is overcome, and there is attained a complete lack of feeling toward bodily conditions and an existence "without cares, without thought and needs and ills."—This is pictured by Jelāl al-dīn Rūmī, the greatest interpreter of this view of the world:

Cleanse thyself of all the attributes of self,
So that thou may'st see thy shining being.⁵

Even time and space cease in his consciousness to be the categories of his existence:

My place is without place; my track is trackless.⁶

For the Ṣūfī who comprehends the truth of heaven and earth there is no above and below, no before and after, no right and left.⁷

"He who does not go out of the palace of natural being," say Ḥāfiz, "cannot reach the village of truth."⁸ This stripping of all natural qualities (*ṣifāt*) which are called forth through the sensitiveness of the individual to the impress of the outer world, the denial of all acts of the will and feeling, the inner moods which he defines

with the word *jam'* (concentration, the Indian *samādhi*)⁹ in contrast to the condition of the soul which is affected by externalities, the Ṣūfī conceives under the picture of drunkenness. He is intoxicated by the stupefying draught of the beauty of the light of God, which streams into his soul and filling it, robs him of his physical sense.

The final goal of the Ṣūfī life, the rise of the individual into the one reality of the divine being is also represented by the picture of love. Of this love (*maḥabba*), Hallaj who, because of his claim to complete oneness with the godhead, was executed by the true believers in Baghdad (309/921), is seized, and he speaks of it to his followers before he gives himself up to the executioner. The most famous Arab Ṣūfī poet, 'Omar ibn al-Fāriḍ (d. Cairo 632/1235), one of whose mystic poems Hammer-Purgstall introduced into German literature under the title *The Arabic Canticle of Love** (Vienna 1854), on account of the prevailing theme of his poems received from later ages the epitaph *Sulṭan al-'āshikīn* (prince of lovers).

Intoxicating liquor itself, the Ṣūfīs like to call the love potion (*sharāb-al-maḥabba*).¹⁰

Love is the quenching of the will and the burning up of all physical qualities and longings.¹¹

Love came and freed me from all else; it graciously raised me, after it had thrown me to the ground. Thank the Lord that he has dissolved me like sugar in the water of union with him.

I went to the physician and said to him: "O thou intelligent one; what dost thou prescribe (as medicine) for love-sickness?" Thou prescribest the giving up of qualities (*ṣifat*) and the extinction of my existence. This is, "Leave everything that is."

As long as you are sober, you will not attain the joy of drunkenness; as long as you do not surrender your body, you will not attain the cult of the soul; as long as you do not annihilate yourself in love towards your friend, as water through fire, you will not attain being.

* Das Arabische Hohe Lied der Liebe.

On the day of judgment he is justified by this love:

On the morrow when man and woman go to the judgment-place, their faces will become yellow with the fear of the reckoning. I come before thee holding my love in my hand, and say: "My reckoning must be made through this."¹²

Love toward God is then the formula for the concentrated effort of the soul to let the appearance of the personal existence pass over into the Truth of the divine, all-comprehending being; a thought which has engendered a poetic literature of the choicest character in all the languages of cultured Moslems.

This view of the world has adapted itself now as a theocratic basis for quietism and *Dīkr*-cult of the practical ascetic. They strove by means of meditation and *Dīkr* practices to reach the ecstatic condition in which their divine intoxication and their love of God might be made manifest; an entirely different path from that by which orthodox Islam strove to attain the love of God commended in the Koran and in tradition.¹³

Šūfīism, accordingly, surpasses the ideal of the philosophers by setting up an aim for human perfection of soul, and by defining the summum bonum. Ibn Sab'īn of Murkia (d. 668/1269 in Mecca), a philosopher and a Šūfī, who was charged with the answers to the "Sicilian questions" of the Hohenstaufen Frederick II, finds the formula for this "that the ancient philosophers set up as their highest aim (see above p. 31) to become like God, while the Šūfī wishes to reach the merging into God through the ability to let divine grace penetrate him, to wash away the sensuous, and to purify the spiritual impressions."¹⁴

VII. As is the case elsewhere in religious orders, the Šūfīs in so far as they attached any value to it at all, wished to stand within the bounds of Islam, or at least, to be recognized as doing so. They wished to interpret

their view of the world into the Koran, and into the hallowed tradition, and prove their theories by the sacred texts. Thus they caused Islam to enter into the inheritance of Philo and manifested in their writings the conviction that beyond the apparent, indifferent meaning of the words of the sacred text are contained deep philosophical truths which are to be discovered by allegorical interpretation. When, for example, in the Koran (Sura 36, v. 12 ff.) the simile is introduced regarding

the inhabitants of the people of the city when the messengers came to it. When we sent two unto them and they charged them both with imposture—therefore with a third we strengthened them: and they said, “Verily we are those sent unto you of God.” They said, “Ye are only men like us: Nought hath the God of mercy sent down. Ye do nothing but lie.” They said, “Our Lord knoweth that we are surely sent unto you.”

This word of God, they contend, can surely not denote as common a daily occurrence as the sense of the word would imply. Rather is the city nothing else but the body, the three messengers being the spirit, the heart and reason. On this basis the whole story, the refusal of the two first, the reception of the third messenger and the behavior of the inhabitants of the city, as well as their punishment, is explained allegorically.

Thus the Şūfī exegetes have their own allegorical *ta'wīl* (see above p. 114), an esoteric interpretation of the scriptures, which has resulted in much literature,¹ and which permeated all Şūfī writings. In order to make this esoterism correspond to Islam by means of legitimate tradition they borrowed from the Shiites (see below Chapter V) the belief that Mohammed entrusted the hidden sense of revelation to his proxy ‘Alī; this teaching, cherished among the chosen only, forms the Kabbalah of Şūfīism. The Arab Şūfī poet mentioned

above, 'Omar ibn al-Fāriḍ, expresses this idea so deep-rooted in Ṣūfī circles, as follows :

And by means of Ta'wīl did 'Alī explain what was dark, by means of a knowledge which he received (from the prophet) as a legacy (waṣīyya).²

To them 'Alī was the patriarch of Moslem mysticism, a view which from the standpoint of the orthodox Sunnas was decidedly to be rejected. The prophet kept nothing from the great generality of his community, he shared no secret knowledge with any one.³

Together with this, however, we find the phenomenon that the worship of 'Alī appears to an extravagant extent in many Ṣūfī circles, at times even penetrates into the form of its mystical teachings, and that many variations of the fictitious chain of Ṣūfī tradition in the measure that it departs from orthodoxy, is carried along the line of the 'Alīite Imams. The Bektāshī orders, on whose 'Alī- and Imam-cult the recent investigations of George Jacob have thrown light, are an example of the steadily increasing prominence accorded in Ṣūfīism to the worship of 'Alī.

VIII. English scholars who have in recent years made a thorough study of the origin and development of Ṣūfīism, such as E. H. Whinfield, Edward G. Browne, and Reynold A. Nicholson, have clearly shown the neo-Platonic character of Ṣūfīism.¹ At the same time, other influences are not denied, which in the course of the development of this religio-philosophical system furnish essential elements. In a consideration of historical Ṣūfīism there are decisive factors which cannot be set aside, such as the influence of India which make themselves felt from the time when Islam by its spread eastward to the very boundaries of China, brings Indian thought more and more into its horizon. This Indian influence has mani-

fested itself partly in literature and partly in the introduction of Indian elements into the sphere of religious imagery.

When in the second century, activity in translation enlarged the literary treasures written in Arabic, and Buddhist works were embodied in Arabic literature, we find an Arabic version of the "Bilauhar wa-Budasif" (Barlaam and Joasaf), and also a "Budd-book."² In the highly cultivated circles, which led the adherents of the most varied religious views to a free exchange of ideas, followers of the *Shumaniyya*, i. e. of the Buddhistic view of the world, are not lacking.³ I should like merely to mention the fact that the religious view which arose in opposition to legal Islam, known as *zuhd* (asceticism), and which is not identical with our Ṣūfiism, shows strong evidences of the impression of Indian ideals of life. One of the leading upholders of the *zuhd* conception, Abū-l-'Atāhiya, is set up as an example of a highly honoured man: "the king in the garments of a beggar,—it is he whose reverence is great among men." Is this not the Buddha?⁴

And to anticipate a later period we may be reminded of what Alfred v. Kremer has said concerning the Indian elements which, as he showed, are to be found in the religious and social views of the world as expressed in the principles found in the life and philosophical poems of Abū-l-'Alā al-Ma'arrī.⁵

The wandering Indian monks bear witness to the fact that the Indian world did not appear on the Moslem horizon in a theoretical way alone. As early as the time of the 'Abbasides in Mesopotamia, these monks were a factor of practical importance to the adherents of Islam, just as in earlier times the wandering Christian monks (sā'ihūn) had attracted attention in Syria (above page 161). Jāḥiẓ (d. 255/866) pictures very graphically the

wandering monks who could have belonged neither to Christianity nor to Islam. He calls them "Zindik monks," an ambiguous appellation, which, nevertheless, as our case shows cannot be limited simply to Manichæan. His source of information tells him that such begging monks always go in pairs: "if thou seest one of them, thou art sure with careful observation to find his companion nearby." Their rule consists in never spending the night twice in one place. Four characteristics signalize their wandering life: holiness, purity, truth and poverty. One of the anecdotes told of the beggar lives of these monks, goes so far as to say that one of them preferred to bring the suspicion of theft upon himself, and endure maltreatment, rather than betray a thieving bird. He did not wish to be the cause of the death of a living being.⁶ If these people were not actually Indian Sadhus or Buddha monks, they were at least men who were following the example and method of the latter.

It was from such points of view, by such experiences and contact, that Sūfiism, which by virtue of its original tendencies shows itself so closely related to Indian thought, was to be influenced. We may, for example, take as signs of the influence of Buddhism the fact that the ascetic literature of the Mohammedans richly fostered the type of the powerful master who has cast aside his earthly kingdom and has denied the world.⁷ This teaching to be sure is very trivial in the presentation of this motive, and does not attain the overpowering sublimity of the Buddha type. A powerful king once saw two gray hairs in his beard: he pulled them out: they constantly reappeared, which led him to reflection: "these are two messengers, whom God is sending me in order to exhort me to forsake the world and give myself up to him. I will obey them." So he suddenly forsook his kingdom, wandered in forests and deserts, and

devoted himself to the service of God to the end of his life.⁸ There are a large number of ascetic stories which are concerned with this motif—the satiety of worldly power.

It is of decisive importance for the point under consideration that the legends of one of the leading patriarchs of Ṣūfiism bears the character of a Buddha biography. I refer to the legends of the saint Ibrāhīm ibn Edhem (d. about 160/2=776/8). The motives for his flight from the world are variously explained in different legends. All the versions agree, however, in representing Ibrāhīm as the son of a king from Balkh, who was induced to cast aside his princely cloak and to exchange it for the garment of a beggar, to forsake his palace, to give up all his relations in the world, even his wife and child, to wander into the desert, and there to lead a wandering life. According to some reports he was bidden to do this by divine voice: according to others, by the observation of the life of a poor man without any needs whose conduct he observed from the window of his palace. Of the motives assigned for the flight from the world one deserves special mention. The story is told by Jelāl al-dīn Rūmī, that one night Ibrāhīm ibn Edhem's palace-guard heard a noise on the palace roof. When the noise was investigated, men were caught who pretended that they were looking for their runaway camel. The intruders were brought before the prince, and when he asked them: "Who has ever looked for a camel on the roof of a house?" they answered: "We are simply following thy example, since thou dost strive after union with God while thou sittest on thy throne. Who has ever been able to draw near to God in such a place?" Thereupon he was said to have fled from the palace never again to be seen of any one.⁹

IX. Under Indian influence the Ṣūfi conception became much intensified. The pantheistic idea surpasses

the confines assigned to it within neo-Platonism. It is especially the idea of the absorption, however, of the personality which moves on the plane of the *Atman* concept. Even if it does not entirely attain to it, the *Şūfis* call the state of absorption *fanā* (destruction),¹ “*maḥw*” (extinction), “*istihlāk*” (annihilation) an almost indefinable goal, and of which they assert that it will bear no coherent definition. It manifests itself, they say, as an intuitive knowledge and defies logical comprehension. “When the temporal joins the eternal, no existence is left to the former. Thou hearest and seest nothing but Allah. When thou attainest the conviction that nothing exists outside of Allah, when thou dost recognize that thou thyself art he, that thou art identical with him, nothing exists outside of him.” The denial of self-existence is the condition of union with God.

Let me become non-existent, for non-existence
 Calls to me with the tone of an organ.
 “To him let us turn back.”²

Individual being merges completely into the all-being of the Godhead. Neither time nor space, not even the modalities of existence limit its boundlessness. Man raises himself to a complete identity with the foundation of all being, the comprehension of which lies beyond all knowledge.

As Buddhism has the “noble path,” the eight-fold way by which man attains by degrees the highest degree of the annihilation of individuality, so *Şūfiism* also has its *ṭarīka*, its path with manifold degrees and stations of perfection. Those who are on this path are wanderers (*al-sālikūna*, *ahl al-sulūk*). Even if the peculiarities of the way differ they nevertheless agree in principle. For example, in both, meditation,³ called in *Şūfiism* *murāḡaba*, in Buddhism *dhyānā*, forms an important part of

the preparatory steps to perfection. "Even the mediator and the object of meditation become completely one."

This is the aim of Ṣūfī *tauḥīd*, the interpenetration of Unity. It is fundamentally different from the usual Moslem monotheistic conception of God. A Ṣūfī goes so far as to say it is *Shirk* (above page 48) to assert that "I KNOW GOD": for in this sentence duality between the perceiving subject and the object of knowledge is involved. This also is Indian theosophy.⁴

X. Ṣūfīism is demonstrated as an institution in external life through the various Ṣūfī societies and orders whose members cherish the Ṣūfī views of the world and religion. Ever since about 150/770 these people have gathered together more and more in their own houses and cloisters where, far from the noise of the world, they try to live up to their ideals and perform in common the practices leading up to them. Indian influences are very evident also in the development of this cloister life, just as the beggar's life of the Ṣūfīs outside of the monastic community offers a reflex of the Indian begging monk (*sadhu*). The consideration of neo-Platonic influence alone is no longer sufficient for the practical demonstration of Ṣūfī asceticism. The reception of the initiates into the Ṣūfī community takes place through the investiture of the *Khirka*, i. e., of the garment which symbolizes the Ṣūfī's poverty and flight from the world. In its way the Ṣūfī legend carries the origin of the *Khirka* back to the prophet himself.¹ It is unmistakable, nevertheless, that this symbol of initiation resembles that of the initiation into the community of the Bhikshus through "the receiving of the robe and the rules."² Many forms also of the religious practice of the *Dikr* in the Ṣūfī communities as well as the means used for the bringing about of the "kenosis" and ecstasy, the discipline of breathing,³

have been investigated by Kremer in his Indian examples, and their dependence on the latter pointed out.

Among these means of devotion is the rosary which soon spread beyond the Şūfī circle, the Indian origin of which and its use in Islam in the nineteenth century are beyond question. It began in Eastern Islam which is the hearth of Indian influence exerted on Şūfī society. Like other innovations this foreign usage had to encounter for a long time the opponents of all religious innovations. As late as the fifteenth century al-Suyūṭī was obliged to issue a defense of the use of the rosary which has since then become so popular.⁴

In a historical estimate of Şūfīism one must always take into consideration this Indian influence which was of so much importance in the development of this religious system growing out of neo-Platonism.

Snouck-Hurgronje in his Leiden inaugural lecture justly brought forward among his proofs of the Indian descent of Islam in those countries, that in East Indian Islam Şūfī ideas form the kernel and foundation itself of the popular conception of religion.⁵

XI. In the preceding description of the Şūfī conception of life we showed the chief points of view common to Şūfīism, and how they made their appearance at the height of its development. In course of time these points of view were elaborated. The detailed historical development we cannot enter upon here, nor is it necessary to do so, since we may shortly expect a treatment of the subject by an authority on Şūfīism, Reynold A. Nicholson. Besides Şūfīism does not represent either in its theories or in its activities a unified and complete system. Not even in the formulation of the universal aim is any actual unanimity to be found, far less in the details of its philosophy. Besides the inner development,

we must not forget the external factors and historical influences which were very active in different parts of the Şūfī world, and caused many divergences and differences in the theoretical formation of the system.¹

This complexity is evident even in the treatment of the concept of Şūfīism. Nicholson in a survey of the course of development taken by Şūfīism² has been able to gather from the literary sources up to the fifth century of the Hijra, seventy-eight different definitions of the concept of Şūfīism (taşawuf). Even this does not seem to exhaust the list of definitions of a scholar of Nīsābūr Abū Manşūr ‘Abdal-Kāhir al-Baghdādī (d. 429/1037) who taught in Baghdad and whose writings concern themselves especially with the internal dogmatic ramifications of Islam. He gathered from the writings of the authorities on Şūfīism in alphabetical order, about a thousand definitions of the terms of Şūfī and Taşawwuf.³ This differentiation in the fundamental conception naturally corresponds to differences in detail.⁴

In the various Şūfī ramifications, various theories deviating from each other have appeared, according to the teachings of the founders who were regarded as the masters. Even the ascetic practices and customs, in which the practical side of Şūfī life is manifested, show many formal differences. The organization of the manifold Şūfī brotherhoods scattered over the whole Moslem territory rests on a variety of diverging rules.

Their relation toward legal Islam shows a fundamental difference. The first patriarch of the Şūfī concept of religion had, to be sure, preferred “the works of the heart” as they said, to the formal fulfilment of the Moslem laws: “the actions performed by the limbs,” without nevertheless, calling the latter worthless or superfluous. But they were only of value when accompanied by the former. It was not the limbs but the hearts which were to be recognized as the organs of religious

life. In this connection Ṣūfīism acquired the nomistic tendency, which claims to harmonize with formal legal Islam, but at the same time finds the entelechy of legal life in the intensifying of formal observances.⁵ On the other hand, there were those who, without denying the relative worth of legal formality, saw in the legalistic externalities symbolical *métaphors* and allegories. Still others made themselves absolutely free from the forms of Islam. The chains of the law do not bind those who understand. In fact, not only single members, but whole dervish orders (such as the Bektāshī monastery) are reported to have been absolutely unscrupulous with regard to the legal norms of Islam.⁶ Nor are there those lacking who not only apply this freedom to the laws of ritual, but hold that all laws of conventional morality and of social custom are not binding for the Ṣūfī. In fact they regard themselves as “beyond good and evil.” They have as examples the Indian Yogis⁷ and Christian Gnostics⁸: an analogy in occidental mysticism, as, for example, among the Amalrikites with their libertine principles of life, which in common with the Islamic Ṣūfīs they deduced from their pantheistic concept of the world. As the world of phenomena possesses no reality in the eyes of the Ṣūfīs they strongly deny all the attributes of this untrue apparent existence. To the demands of this life which is without substance, they are entirely indifferent.

From the point of view of their relationship to law the Ṣūfīs have been divided into two groups, the nomistic (with law) and the anomistic (without law). This dualism reminds us of the contrast reported by Clement of Alexandria in regard to the ancient gnostic Hermeneutics who offer two points of view in relation to law; some preaching a life of freedom and indifference to the law (*ἀδιαφόρως ζῆν*), others exaggerating abstemiousness and proclaiming a self-denying life (*ἐγκράτεια*)

καταγγέλουσι).⁹ The same is true of the differences in the Sūfī system.

XII. By dervishes are meant those who follow the Sūfī manner of life. They cannot, however, all be classed under one head. We must distinguish between the earnest representatives of the love of God and ecstatic exaltation, who endeavor to perfect their souls by a life of self denial and meditation; and the vagabond dervishes who in an independent dissolute beggar's life use Sūfism to cloak their idleness and to delude the masses; or the cloister brothers who, shrinking from work, use the exterior forms of the Sūfī life to obtain a care-free and independent existence.¹ They too, are full of the love of God, and pretend to be "walking on the way." But earnest Sūfīs would hardly care to be identified with them.

The dervish, who distributes the mysteries of the world, gives away each moment a whole kingdom without recompense. He is not a dervish who begs for bread, but he who gives up his soul.²

The true dervish is not the vagabond beggar and parasite. But even this vagabondage produces many a specimen of an ethical view of the world of interest to the historical student of religion. We will confine ourselves here to a single group of these three orders of dervishes.

There are the so-called *malāmatiyya*, literally "the people of blame," an appellation given not only to wandering dervishes, but used also to designate the more zealous and sedentary Sūfīs, on account of the peculiarity of their mode of life. The peculiarity of these people who have rightly been compared with the cynics of Greek philosophy, consists of the extreme indifference to external appearances. They emphasize the merits of offending through their behavior, and drawing down upon themselves the disapproval of men.³ They

commit the most shameless deeds simply to manifest their principle, "spernere sperni." They wish to be regarded as transgressors of the law even in case they are not truly such. They make a point of stirring up the scorn of men, simply in order to show indifference to their judgment. In doing this they exaggerate a generous Ṣūfī rule which Jelāl al-dīn Rūmī expresses as follows:

Forsake thy sect and become an object of disdain
Cast away from thyself name and fame and seek ill-will.⁴

They are scattered over the whole territory of Islam. Al-Ḳettānī, who has written a monograph on the saints of Fez,⁵ points out the Malāmite character of many of his hearers. The best type of the Malāmite dervish has been furnished by Central Asiatic Islam in the legend of the *Sheikh Meshreb*, "of the wise fool and pious heretic."⁶ Reitzenstein has recently shown that these dervishes possess a monastic attribute that is to be traced back to the philosophy of the cynics according to which "shamelessness (*ἀναισχυρία*) is a religious demand."⁷

XIII. Ṣūfīism very early took root in Moslem theological literature and in its popular expression it gained a large circle of Moslem adherents. In its quiet way, it became a powerful movement destined to have a lasting influence on the conception and tendency of religion in Islam. Ṣūfīism became a factor of great importance in the definite formation of Mohammedan religious views and thought.

Let us first, however, consider its position towards the various tendencies within Islam, each one of which was endeavoring to maintain its identity.

In relationship to the forms and dogmas of positive Islam as disclosed by the legal theologians and Mutakallimūn, Ṣūfīism appears primarily as a significant spiritual liberation, as a broadening of the narrowed religious

sphere. In place of painstaking blind obedience comes self-development through asceticism. In place of the subtleties of scholastic syllogisms comes the mystic submersion into the essence of the soul, and its liberation from the dross of materialism. The motive of the Love of God becomes the guiding motive of asceticism, of "kenosis" and of perception. Worship of God is regarded as a cult of the heart, and with a clear knowledge of the contrast, is opposed to the cult of the body, just as the book of knowledge of the theologians is replaced by knowledge that comes through the heart, and speculation by intuition. Law (*sharī'a*) is a pedagogical starting point on the Way of the *Ṣūfī*. It leads to the high path (*ṭarīqa*) which is to be trod, whose cares will be rewarded by the attainment of Truth (*ḥaḳīqa*), and whose final aim is not even reached by the acquisition of Knowledge (*ma'rifa*). Through Knowledge the wanderer is now prepared to attain Certainty (*'ilm al-yaḳīn*). Nevertheless it is only by the concentration of inner intuition on the only real existence that he can raise himself to the direct conception of true Certainty (*'ain al-yaḳīn*). At this stage the dependence of the disciple on tradition and teaching ceases completely. While the knowledge of the preceding stages (*'ilm al-yaḳīn*) is brought to mankind through the prophet, divine knowledge of the highest stages of perfection pour into the soul of the contemplator without any mediation.¹ There is still another stage beyond this, the highest, *ḥaḳḳ al-yaḳīn*, the Truth of Certainty which no longer lies on the way of the *Ṣūfī* self-instruction.

Fundamentally this path of development leads to the recognition of indifference, of mere confessionism to holy truth which should be one's aim.

"I am neither Christian nor Jew nor Moslem."²

The difference between churches, between formulas of belief and religious practices loses all significance in the

soul of him who is seeking union with the divinity. Everything is to him a cloak hiding the essence, a cloak which he must strip off when he has penetrated to the knowledge of the one reality. However much they may allege that they hold Islam in high estimation, the tendency to wipe out the dividing lines of all faiths is common to most of the Sūfis. These faiths have the same relative value for obtaining their highest goal, and the same worthlessness if they fail to arouse the Love of God. The latter is the only standard for the valuation of religions. There are utterances to the effect that the knowledge of the unity of God affords mankind a unifying element while laws bring about division.³

Jelāl al-dīn Rūmī gives expression to the following sentiment in a revelation of God to Moses.

The lovers of rites form one class, and those whose hearts and souls glow with love form another.⁴

And Muḥyī al-dīn Ibn 'Arabī:

There was a time, when I blamed my companion if his religion did not resemble mine;

Now, however, my heart accepts every form: it is a pasture ground for gazelles, a cloister for monks,

A temple for idols and a Ka'ba for the pilgrim, the tables of the Torah and the sacred books of the Koran.

Love alone is my religion and wherever their beasts of burden go, there is my religion and my faith.⁵

And again Jelāl al-dīn:

If the picture of our Beloved is in a heathen temple it is an absolute error to encircle the Ka'ba: if the Ka'ba is deprived of its sweet smell, it is a synagogue: and if in the synagogue we feel the sweet smell of union with him it is our Ka'ba.⁶

As we see, Islam is not left out of this indifference toward creed. Tilimsānī, a pupil of Ibn 'Arabī, is said

to have remarked boldly, "The Koran is absolutely *shirk* (see above page 48). Acknowledgment of unity is merely in our (that is *Ṣūfī*) speech."⁷

Within these manifestations of indifference towards the attributes of creed in relation to the one aim to which religion should lead, there appears side by side with the tendency toward the greatest tolerance ("The roads to God are as many as the number of the souls of men"⁸) a glimpse of the destructive, retarding character of verbal creeds. They are, it is held, not sources of truth. Truth is not to be fathomed by the strife between the various creeds.

Never blame the seventy-two sects for their quarrels,

Because they saw not truth, they knocked at the gates of fiction (*Hāfiz*).⁹

The conviction expressed by the mystic *Abū Sa'īd abū-l-Kheir*, the friend of the philosopher *Avicenna*, is not unusual:

As long as mosques and medresas are not completely laid waste, the work of the *Kalenders* (dervishes) will not be complete,

As long as belief and unbelief are not exactly alike, no single man will be a true Moslem.¹⁰

In such ideas as this, the *Ṣūfīs* agreed with the Moslem free-thinkers, who attained the very same results by different means.¹¹

The true *Ṣūfī* is antagonized even more by the dogma of *Kalām* than by the law taken as an aim in itself, since the latter can at least be of some value as a means to asceticism. This dogma claims a knowledge of God based on speculation. This knowledge is not learning, and is not reached through books nor through studies. *Jelāl al-dīn* supports his view by the words of Mohammed (*Sura 102*), when he says:

Discover in your heart the knowledge of the prophets
Without book, without teacher, without instructor.¹²

They are opposed to the usual theological book learning. They have no sympathy with the 'Ulamā and the Ḥadīth searchers. These—so they say—simply perplex our times.¹³

Of what use for the knowledge of truth are the proofs so commonly offered by the dogmatists, proofs upon which many of them make even faith depend?

"He who bases his belief upon proof," says Ibn 'Arabī, "his belief is not to be relied upon, for his belief is based on speculation and is therefore open to objection. Quite different is intuitive belief, whose seat is in the heart, and cannot be overthrown. All knowledge which depends upon reflection and speculation is not safe from doubt and disturbance."¹⁴ "In the assemblage of those gathered together in love a different procedure is customary, and the wine of love intoxicates in a different manner. The knowledge which is obtained in the Medresa is one thing, love is still another."¹⁵ The ṭarīqa does not lead through the "dizzy mountain paths of dialectic," nor through the narrow passes of syllogism, and the *yakīn* (certainty) is not to be obtained by means of the subtle conclusions of the Mutakallimūn. Knowledge arises from the depths of the heart, and the way to it is in introspection of the soul. "The Ṣūfīs," says Kūshairī, "are people of union with God (al-wiṣāl), not people of demonstration (al-istidlāl), like the general run of theologians."¹⁶ Even before this an older mystic had gone so far as to say, "When truth is revealed, reason ('aql) withdraws. This is the instrument for the fulfillment of the dependency of man upon God ('Ubūdiyya), but not the instrument for the comprehension of the true essence of the divine rule."¹⁷

This, then, is a direct denial of the teachings of the

Kalāmītes with their apotheosis of reason.¹⁸ How distasteful must the subtleties over the measure of individual liberty have appeared to those living in the Infinite, to whom a single act of the will appears as a drop in the sea of the world, a mote in the sunlight of the absolute will of God! The man, who denying himself, parts with all initiative cannot readily hear of will and self-determination. And how small must have appeared to them the quarrels over the positive attribute of being, which they could only grasp negatively, if at all? We therefore sometimes come across the great mystics in theological camps, who—from different viewpoints to be sure—strictly reject Kalām: Among these are ‘Abd al-Kādir Jilānī and Abū Ismā‘il Al-Herewī (author of the manual on Ṣūfīism, d. 481/1088), under the Ḥanbalites, Ruweim and Ibn ‘Arabī among the allied Zāhirites.¹⁹

The ideals of life for a Moslem were also presented in a different manner, varying from that of the dominant faction, and it is with these ideals that the Ṣūfis influence the masses. They turn from the powerful figures of the soldiers of the faith (the ancient martyrs are to be found only among the warriors), to the wan figures of the hermits, penitents and cloistered monks. Even the ideal figures of earlier times are made to don the attributes of new heroes; it is as if their swords were unbuckled and they were forced into the Ṣūfī cowl.²⁰

XIV. It was to be expected that the theologians by profession were not favorably disposed towards the Ṣūfis. Many are the ironical remarks applied to the coarse woollen clothing (ṣūf) whose use gave the Ṣūfis their name.¹ The philologist Al-Aṣma‘ī (d. 216/831) relates of a contemporary theologian that someone spoke in his presence of the people who went around in coarse penitential garb. “I did not know until now,” remarked the theologian, “that dirt belongs to religion.”² It is easily conceivable from the nature of the

thing that their teachings and perhaps also their religious conduct, their indifference towards the positive laws of Islam—which frequently goes so far as to deny all observances³—brought down upon them heavy attacks from the adherents of the current theology. They gave good cause for being regarded by the school of theologians as Zindīks, a name which serves as an ample cloak for all kinds of free-thinkers, not following the path trodden by the School. These Ṣūfīs spoke a language which must have struck the usual theologian as quite strange. Abū Sa‘īd Kharrāz was accused of disbelief, on account of the following sentence found in one of his books, “The man who turns back to God, clings to him, remains near to God, forgets himself and everything which is outside of God: if you ask him whence he came and where he wishes to go, he can answer nothing but: ‘Allah.’”⁴ If such a sentence appeared doubtful, how much more must the utterances about fanā and baqā, self-annihilation and union with the Godhead, about divine intoxication, about the worthlessness of the law, etc., have wrinkled the brow of the theologians! And how much more the practices of the Ṣūfīs, to which in the earliest times belongs the mystical dance! When at the end of the ninth century, the gloomy spirit of orthodoxy ruled in Baghdad, many a famous Ṣūfī was subjected to torture.⁵ The utterance of one of the most famous Ṣūfīs of the old school, al-Juneid (d. 297/909) is characteristic of the times, “no man has reached the rung of truth, as long as a thousand friends do not declare him a heretic.”⁶ And if one or another Ṣūfī ventured to draw the consequences of the union with the Divine too strictly, he ran the risk as in the case of al-Ḥallāj and Shalmaghānī, of becoming acquainted with the executioner.

XV. When we investigate the relation between Ṣūfīism and official Islam, there are two special phe-

nomena which engage our attention. Both signify a mediation between salient contrasts: one on the part of the Şūfī, the other on the part of the orthodox.

The first shows us, that Şūfīs too, on their side, felt the need of reconciling the opposition to Moslem law, even if only externally, so that Şūfīism should not appear from the start, as a negation of Islam. The anti-nomistic tendency prevailing in Şūfīism aroused great displeasure even in many less radical Şūfī circles. Earnest adherents of the latter bemoaned the contempt and disregard of Moslem law and declared these conditions to betoken the decay of Şūfīism.¹ The *ṭarīqa* and *ḥaḳīqa* (above page 182) presupposed the law. Without this the Şūfī "Way" is meaningless; it is the gate that leads to the latter. "Enter the houses through their gate" (Sura 2, v. 185).

The most important proof of this reaction within Şūfīism is to be found in a "Missive" (*risāla*), which the great Şūfī sheikh 'Abd al-Karīm ibn Hawāzin al-Kūsheirī issued in the year 437/1045 to the Şūfī communities in all countries of Islam. We must not suppose this to be a pastoral letter. This "missive," is a voluminous book, which in its Cairo edition (1304) fills no less than 244 printed pages. Its contents delineate the character of the most famous Şūfī authorities and give specimens of their maxims, closing with a compendium of the most important Şūfī teachings. The whole work shows the tendency to represent the harmony between law and Şūfīism, and to point out that the true authorities of this doctrine did not approve of the opposition towards current Islam, and that according to this, the true Şūfī must be a true Moslem in the traditional sense. The need for such a work elucidates the glaring contradiction which had developed in the eleventh century between the two currents. Says Kūsheirī to his companions:

Know that those of our community who know the truth, have mostly disappeared, only their trace has remained with us. A paralysis has entered our "Way"; one could even say that the "Way" has completely disappeared, for we have no sheikhs as examples, and no successors could allow themselves to be guided by such examples. Gone is renunciation, its carpet is rolled up, in its place worldly desires have gained the upper hand. Hearts have lost respect for religious law, indeed they regard the contempt for the religious ordinances as the strongest bond of union. They cast aside the distinction between permitted and forbidden, . . . care little for the fulfilment of religious duties, of fast, of prayers; they are running on the race-course of neglect . . . Not satisfied with that, they appeal to the highest truths and states, and pretend to have attained freedom from the bonds and chains (of the law) through the truths of the union (with God) (see above page 168). The truths of the unity of existence they say have been revealed to them, therefore the laws of the body are not binding upon them.

It was to prevent this state of affairs that Kusheirī wrote his book, which made such an impression on the Şūfī world, and helped to restore the almost broken links between orthodoxy and Şūfīism.

XVI. The second phenomenon to which we wish to direct attention is one of the epoch-making facts in the history of Moslem theology. It appeared not long after Kusheirī's work, and presents the complement of his effort. While he was bringing about a reaction of positive legalism against the nihilism of the mystics, legal Islam was being permeated by mystical views. This permeation is due to the influence of one of the greatest Moslem scholars, Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammed al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111), the Abuhamet or Algazel of the scholastics of the Middle Ages. This man influenced to a most powerful degree the Moslem religion as it existed in his time. The Moslem view of religion had been stifled by the casuistic quibbling of its legal activity, and the schol-

astic subtleties of its dogmatics. Al-Ghazālī himself was a famous teacher in both branches. As one of the ornaments of the Nizām University just founded in Baghdad (see above page 127), his legal writings belong to the fundamental works of the Shāfi'ite School. In 1095 he solved the crisis in his own life by renouncing all scientific success and all personal honors, which came to him through his brilliant position as instructor, withdrawing to a contemplative life, and to solitary self-examination, in the secluded cells of the mosques of Damascus and Jerusalem, in order to test the current tendency of the religious spirit, from which he had outwardly separated himself by his flight from the world. The results of his renunciation of tendencies in which he saw dangers for the goal of religion both in investigation and in life, are to be seen in a series of systematic works, and smaller tracts. In the former, in contrast to the verbose methods of the self-sufficient theologians, he presents in well-organized form, the method urged by him for the construction of a Moslem science. In the latter he advances in an effective manner, isolated views of his own thoughts on religion.

He saw these dangers especially in two aspects of theology. According to his convictions the arch enemies of inner religious activity were the subtleties of dogmatic dialectics and the hair-splitting of religious casuistry, which flooded the territory of religious science and devastated the general religious spirit. This man who had followed the ways of philosophy himself, and could never quite veil the influence it had had over his theological training,¹ remorselessly declared war against it, in a work famous in the philosophical literature of the Middle Ages, "*Destructio Philosophorum*," directed against the peripatetic philosophy of Avicenna, in which he had laid his finger on its defects and contradictions. In the same way he now refers to the hair-splitting of

Kalām dogmatism as a fruitless dissipation of the mind, which hinders and harms the purity and directness of religious thought and feeling, far more than it helps them. This is especially the case when, according to the claims of Mutakillimūn, they are carried beyond the limits of the School into the circles of the common people, in which they can only cause perplexity.

Even more vigorous is his attack upon the Fīkh adherents and their juridical casuistry. Here also he can refer to his own experiences. He had fled from a celebrated position of a professor of law at one of the most brilliant Moslem universities, to the solitude of a hermit's cell, and had himself won fame and recognition through the literature of the discipline which he was now attacking. He justified these investigations as part of the secular life, but protested vehemently against mingling legal casuistry with the affairs of religion. There is nothing more profane, nothing closer to the claims of worldliness, than this fear of studies, trumpeted as so superlatively holy by its haughty representatives. Blessedness is not attained by searching the canonical civil law, by studying purchase-deeds and inheritance negotiations, and all those subtleties which in the course of centuries had been attached to these studies. The religious dignity with which such speculation had been invested proved rather to be the means of the moral corruption of those who saw in them the most important elements of theology. They encourage the empty conceit and worldly ambition of such people. It is especially the petty investigations and disputes over the ritualistic differences of the Maḍāhib (see above page 62), which he sharply condemns as a vain occupation fatal to the religious spirit.² "Ghazālī, disapproving of the dialectic and casuistic methods used by the dogmatists and ritualists, would replace it by the religion of inner personal experience. For him the core of religious life lies in training

oneself for the intuitive life of the soul, and the consciousness of the dependence of man." Here the Love of God is to be the central motive. As Ghazālī always undertakes the analysis of ethical feelings with great skill, he furnishes in his system a comprehensive monograph on this motive and goal of religion, and points out the way to attain it.

Through these teachings Ghazālī rescued Ṣūfīism from its isolated position in the current conception of religion and made it a normal element of Moslem belief. By introducing some of the Ṣūfī's mysticism, he wished to spiritualize the ossified formalism of the ruling theology. His activity in this respect brings him within the range of this chapter. Ghazālī had himself mingled with the Ṣūfis and followed their manner of life. But he separated himself from them, through his rejection of their pantheistic aim and their contempt of the law. He did not desert the fundamentals of positive Islam, he only wished to ennoble and deepen the spirit in which its speeches and its laws operate on the life of the Moslem, and to bring it nearer the goal which he set for religious life. He teaches: "That it is the heart through which one strives to come nearer to Allah, not the body. By heart I do not mean the piece of flesh comprehended by the senses, but something which belongs to divine mysteries, and cannot be comprehended by the senses."³ It is in this spirit that he treats the fulfillment of the law in the great systematic work, to which he gave the proud title of "Revival of the Sciences of Religion," convinced that it marked a reformation and was destined to put new life into the withered frame of the ruling Moslem theology.

Like many reformers he endeavors, not to give the impression of founding something new, but rather to restore the old teachings which had been falsified by later corruption. Longingly he looks back to Islam's

early days and the life of direct faith. He habitually finds support for his objections in the lives of the Companions. Thus he kept intact the feeling for the "Sunna." Among the Companions, religion was not nourished by scholastic wisdom and idle juridical speculation. He wished to free the people from the harmful entanglement into which the religious spirit had been drawn, and to restore the ennobling influence of the law whose true aim had been neglected.

In place of the silent, impotent opposition to rigid formalism, cherished by pious Şūfis and their devoted followers, aloof from the main body of orthodoxy, we now find Ghazālī as a recognized authority, voicing the protest of orthodoxy against the corruption of Islam, through the activities of its Kalām and Fīkh authorities. The recognition which Ghazālī enjoyed as an orthodox teacher in Moslem circles, furthered the success of his efforts. Only here and there do we hear a voice of opposition from theologians, menaced in their highest religious dignity, protesting against the actions of the teacher so highly respected on all sides. In Spain the "Revival" was burned by a certain group of Faḳīhs, who could not forget their humiliation. But this was only a temporary and ultimately ineffectual opposition, which even in Spain itself was not everywhere countenanced.⁴ Such desperate attempts at self-defence could not prevent the body of Moslem orthodoxy from inscribing, soon after, the teachings of Ghazālī on its banner. His person was accorded the nimbus of sanctity, the recognition of succeeding generations gave him the title of "The regenerator of religion,"⁵ a renovator, whom Allah had sent to counteract the decay of Islam at the time that it passed from the fifth to the sixth century of its existence. The "Revival" was recognized as the book on Moslem science of religion, embracing all religious science and regarded almost as a Koran.⁶ Orthodox

Islam holds Ghazālī as the final authority. His name counts as a war-cry in the fight against tendencies hostile to Ijmā'. His work is one of the most significant milestones in the history of the formation of Islam.⁷

XVII. If, then, we are to regard the Moslem Ghazālī as the regenerator of Islam, we must here turn for a moment from the universal religious sentiment which he held, and by means of which he made the views of Ṣūfīism factors in Moslem religious life, and consider his contribution to a special phase of religious thought.

In many wise teachings, the greatest authorities of ancient Islam decisively oppose the hunt for heresy. They indefatigably reiterate that one should beware of branding anyone who regards himself as belonging to the *ahl al-ṣalāt* (those who take part in Moslem worship)¹ or the *ahl al-kibla* (those who turn towards the *kibla* in their prayers, and therefore acknowledge themselves as belonging to the faithful),² as an unbeliever merely because of deviating opinions. We have very useful material on this subject in the work of Muḥaddasī (about 985),³ a geographical writer who in his study of the Moslem world became especially interested in religious events.

Moslem dogmatics cannot be compared with like factors in the religious life of any Christian church. It is not councils and synods, which after a prolonged and active struggle, determine the formulas thenceforth to be considered as the criterion of correct faith. There is no ecclesiastical authority to fix the standard of orthodoxy. There is no exclusive, authorized exegesis of the sacred text, upon which to found content and method of the teachings of the church. The consensus, the highest authority in all questions of religious theory and practice, is an elastic and in a certain sense scarcely tangible object, and even this consensus is variously defined. In dogmatic questions it was especially difficult

to arrive at a unanimous decision concerning a consensus to be regarded as absolute. That which one party accepts as a consensus is far from being regarded as such by the other.

If we were to put the question to various orthodox Moslem authorities, all of whom are recognized as authoritative teachers in the religion of Mohammed—with the exception of unbending, intolerant partisans—as to what makes a man an unbelieving heretic, and what we are to understand by a heretic, we should receive the most contradictory answers. And even these answers would be given as frankly theoretical, for it would be regarded as cruel to commit oneself to one of these definitions for life and death. “A true Kāfir is virtually excommunicated: no one may have anything to do with him: no one may eat with him: any marriage contracted with him is invalid: he must be shunned and scorned: no one may pray with him, when he steps forward to lead the prayer: his evidence is not accepted in a trial: he cannot serve as a guardian in marriage: when he dies no prayer for the dead is said over his body. Any man into whose power he falls must make three trials to convert him, as though he were an apostate, if these attempts fail, he is to be condemned to death.”⁴

This is indeed a harsh dictum. In practice, however, scarcely anyone, a mere dwindling handful of Ḥanbalite fanatics, dreamed of actually carrying out such a conception.⁵ In reference to dogmatic heresy, the assertion of the *liberum arbitrium*, according to which man himself, not God, is the author of the deeds of men, Mohammed is made to say: “Its adherents are the Magi (dualists) of Islam.” According to the spirit of this opinion an undeviatingly severe attitude is enjoined against them. Nor are theological books sparing in their epithets of *kāfir* and *fāsiq* (malefactor), against men who, in their dogmatic views, fall away from the broad path of uni-

versal teaching. In the time of ancient orthodoxy, however, people were socially quite unmolested, indeed they even acted as highly honored teachers of the law and of faith.⁶ They were scarcely disturbed at all on account of their views, unless indeed one were to take seriously the scornful shrug of orthodoxy, or to take the occasional outbursts of their adherents as a criterion for the general conditions.

It is only teachings hostile to the state which are taken seriously,⁷ and we shall find within the Shiite division, factors related to politics and dogmatics. In the realm of belief the unfettered development of dogma is very slightly hampered. This is the reason for the noteworthy phenomenon, that within the dogmatic development of Islam, the recognition of the non-obligatory and non-authoritative character of certain opinions are markedly emphasized. Within the sphere of divergent opinion, freakish views are not infrequent which are rather to be regarded as semi-humorous ridicule of subtleties brought forward in a serious spirit, as endeavoring to carry the exaggeration of dogmatic niceties *ad absurdum*, rather than as serious expressions of opinion within the scholastic disputations that were often carried to an extreme.

Seldom, and only in especially dangerous cases is there any disposition to apply to the authors of such erratic views the procedure theoretically applicable to the *kāfir*.

XVIII. The spirit of tolerance, however, marks only the earlier times in which there were differences of opinions in abundance, and at which time the war over conflicting opinions had not yet kindled into party factions. It is in the train of scholastically cherished dogmatism that the evil spirit of intolerance first appears on both the orthodox and the rationalistic side.¹

In the reports of the last hours of Ash'arī, it is

recounted among other things, that he bade Abū 'Alī al Sarakhsī, in whose house in Baghdad he was dying, to come to his deathbed and with failing strength whispered to him the following declaration, "I bear witness that I considered no one from the ahl al-ḳibla as Kāfir, for they all direct their thoughts to the same object of worship, that in which they differ is only a difference in expression." According to another account, to be sure, his last word was a curse against the Mu'tazilites. I am inclined to give this latter report the preference. The spirit of that dogmatic age was more favorable to zealous persecution than to conciliatory tolerance. There is a substantial basis for the declaration that "the worship of the Mutakallimūn consists in heresy hunting."² The activity of the Mu'tazilites and of their dogmatic literature as set forth in a former chapter (Chapter III) reveals a picture that is in accord with such characterization. The epithets kāfir and heretic are constantly being bandied about as soon as any divergent opinion dares to manifest itself.

In the midst of this hair-splitting struggle over forms and definitions Ṣūfīism alone breathes a tolerant spirit. We have seen that it aspires to do away with confessionalism. Ghazālī to be sure did not go as far as that. His writings, however, are constantly belittling all dogmatic formulas and hair-splittings which set up the claim of having the only means of salvation. His dry, academic speech rises to the heights of eloquent pathos when he takes the field against such claims. He has championed the cause of tolerance in a special work entitled "Criterion of the Differences between Islam and Heresy." In it he declares to the Moslem world: That harmony in the fundamentals of religion should be the basis of recognition as a believer, and that the deviation in dogmatic and ritualistic peculiarities, even if it extends to the rejection of the Caliphate recognized by

Sunni Islam, which would therefore include the Shīte schism—should offer no ground for heresy. “Check your tongue in regard to people who turn to the *ḳibla*.”

That he recalls this ancient teaching to the minds of his fellow believers, that he took it up in earnest, and enlisted followers, is his greatest service in the history of Islam.³

He did not, it is true, as we have set forth, bring forward any new thought, but rather advocated a return to the better spirit of ancient times. Yet it was he who re-awakened this spirit after its long neglect, and enriched it with the views engendered in him by his *Ṣūfī*-ism. He turns away from theological wrangling and self-satisfied scholastic philosophy, and wishes to guide the souls of his companions to the spirituality of an unifying faith, to a cult whose altars are raised in the heart. This was the greatest influence which *Ṣūfī*ism had over the religious life of Islam.

NOTES.

- I. 1. Ibn Sa'd I, I 145, 13.
2. Ibid. III, I 77.
3. Ibid. 158.
4. See "Die Handwerke bei den Arabern" (Globus) LXVI No. 13.
5. Ibn Sa'd III, I 117.
6. Nawawī, *Tahdīb* 217, 4; also Sa'id Ibn al-Musayyab 284, 4 (fr. below), cf. Ibn Sa'd V 305, 4 ff. H. Lammens gives characteristic examples in this connection from other points of view in his "Études sur le règne du calife Mo'awiyya I 148; 152 n. 5; 165 ff.; 177; 233 ff. (Mélanges Beyrouth II 40; 44; 57 ff.; 69; 125 ff.) Cf. also Mas'ūdī, "Prairies d'or" IV, 254 ff.
7. "Annali dell' Islam" II 399; 405; 543.
8. Ibid. II 1080 ff.
9. Ibn Sa'd V 50, 27. See also for the two-fold motives of the hostile movement Nöldeke's review of Caetani's *Annali* WZKM XXI 305.
10. *Tahdīb* 362, 6.
- II. 1. Ibid. 519, 8. The Ḥadīth in Bukharī is very important. Jihād no. 36, where the prophet expresses his apprehension over "the blessings of the earth and the joys of the world," which are to be the lot of the believer after the prophet's death, and appeases this apprehension with the hope that the treasure to be gained thereby will be turned to pious ends.
2. Ibn Sa'd IV, I 166.
3. Ibid. 169, 8. 24. Abū-l-Dardā: "He who possesses two dirhems, will be more severely judged on the resurrection day, than he who can call but one dirhem his own" (Ibn Sa'd VI 200, 15).
4. Ibn Kuteiba, *Uyun al-akhbār* 375, 10.
5. Cf. Ibn Sa'd XI 125, 10 ff.
6. Ibid. IV, II 9 ff.—various versions. (This rule of the prophet is in different accounts directed to various other companions, e. g. 'Othmān ibn Maz'ūn, Ibn Sa'd III, I 287, 21, to 'Abdallāh ibn 'Omar, "Muh. Stud." II, 396 note 1.) The stories about the son of 'Amr presuppose the Koran already existing as a collection; 'Abdallāh wishes to recite the whole of it daily, the prophet considers it sufficient, if he goes through the whole book each month or at the most in ten or six days. For examples of praiseworthy mention, that pious men recite the whole Koran in 5, 6 and 7 days, see Ibn Sa'd VI 49, 6; 58, 12; 60, 24. During Ramaḍān even more is accomplished; it is customary to read the whole of the Koran in two nights. The assertion

Ibid. IV, II 11 ult., that 'Abdallāh could read Syrian, points perhaps to the Christian influence over his ascetic inclinations.

7. Musnad Ahmed II 64, *lā šāma man šāma al-abāda*.
8. Māwerdī, A'lām al-nubuwwa (Cairo 1319) 153.
9. Muh. Studien II 395.
10. *Uṣd al-ghāba* V 132, 7, cf. Ibn Sa'd IV, II 17, 13. For the cause and context of this utterance see the Hadīth stories given by J. Horovitz in "Spuren griechischer Mimen im Orient" (Berlin 1905) 78-9.
11. It is always the point of view of the *Sunna* which is emphasized in recommending matrimony. Celibacy is opposed to *Sunna*. The monastic mode of life (*raḥbāniyya*), comes under the point of view of *bid'a* (see Ch. VI.), Ibn Sa'd V 70, 6; *al-raḥbāniyya al-mubtada'a* (Ibn Kuteiba, 'Uyūn al-akhbār 375, 12 cf. Muh. Stud. II 23, note 6). The celibate ascetic in spite of his otherwise legal piety, is criticised as *tārik al-sunna* (he who forsakes *Sunna*) (Jāf'i; *Rand al-rayahīn*, Cairo 1297, 28, 8). It is all the more striking that 'Abdallāh ibn 'Omar, otherwise an ideal of the *Sunna* faith, originally had the intention of leading a celibate life (Ibn Sa'd IV, I 125, 19). The following utterance is cited by Ibn al-Jauzī concerning one 'companion,' Abū Berza, to be sure with disapproval: "Even if I were but one day removed from the end of my life, it is only as a married man that I should wish to meet Allah; i. e. I would marry even one day before my death for I have heard the prophet say: The worst among you are the unmarried." Such utterances, not formally recognized as valid by the critics of tradition, but consented to so far as the contents are concerned, form the basis for the opinion that celibates are not considered worthy to be leaders (Imam) in the canonical liturgies. (*Revue du Monde Musulman*, V 32, 9 fr. below.) It is, however, to be observed that in the system of Moslem asceticism the denunciation of married life is always excluded. (Cf. Lammens *Mo'āwiyya* 165—*Mélanges Beyrouth* II 57 note 8, collected dates and examples from sacred legends in C. Trumelet's "L'Algérie légendaire" (Algiers 1892), 436, 442.) The prayer which a man, famed as an ascetic, makes at the Ka'ba is very characteristic of this. (Subkī *Ṭabaḳāt al-Shāfi'iyya* III 289, 18.) Cf. also the interesting facts in E. Doutté's "Les Marabouts" (Paris 1900) 84 ff. and E. Montet's "Le culte des saints musulmans dans L'Afrique du nord et plus spécialement au Maroc" (Genève 1909, in the Jubilee publication of the University of Geneva) 39, 66.
12. See citations in my essay: "L'ascétisme aux premiers temps de l'Islam" (*Revue de l'Histoire des Relig.* 1898, XXXVII, 314 ff.).
13. Muh. Stud. II 394.
14. Arab. Mss. Gotha no. 1001, Fol. 93.

15. Ibn Sa'd IV, I 19, 15 ff. a very characteristic report.
 16. See on this subject: "Revue de l'Hist. des Relig." XXVIII, 381.
 17. Number 31 of the "Forty Traditions" of Nawāwī is the following teaching of the prophet: A man came to him with the question, "Show me a deed for which, when I perform it, God will love me, and men will love me." "Renounce the world and God will love you; renounce that which is in the hands of men, and men will love you." The saying is not to be found in the more careful collections and is merely attested to by the collections of Ibn Māja: a proof of the fact that it was not universally recognized as an authentic utterance of the prophet.
 18. Jāhiz, *Tria Opuscula* ed. Van Vloten 132 ff. ("Rasā'il" ed. Cairo 1324, 125) stresses the fact that the prophet was not of a morose nature, but constantly showed his sense of humor. Abū Zubeir ibn Bekkār (d. 256/870) published a monograph on the prophet's jokes (*Fihrist* 110, 6) from which is taken the quotation in Kaṣṭallānī, *Bukhārī-commentary* IX 500, 8.
 19. Cf. Nöldeke-Schwally, "Geschichte des Korans" 170, note. Very interesting data in Ibn Kayyim al-Jauziyya, *Kitāb al-jawāb al-kāfi* (Cairo) 171.
 20. It is not without a purpose that e. g. in the reports about Ibn Sa'd three full pages are devoted (III, I 133, 25 to 136, 5) exclusively to the documentation of the totally indifferent fact that the pious caliph was wont to care for his beard with cosmetics. (In the biographies of other 'companions' also this peculiarity is treated in full.) The purpose intended by such notices is obvious when we are told in the same work 150, 21 that: "some of the crazy Koran reciters (i. e. pietists) are of the opinion that the dyeing of the beard is forbidden." Traditions of the first kind are accordingly to serve in a great measure as an overpowering argument against those bigots regarding whose own conduct examples are naturally also furnished, e. g. VI 201, 12; 231, 13.
 21. Ibn Sa'd III, II 103.
 22. Ibid. IV, II 29, 10; VI 17, 17 and very frequently.
 23. Ibid. V 85, 5.
 24. Cf. the dissertation *Muh. ibn. al-Ḥan.* by Hubert Banning (Erlangen 1909) 73 above; concerning his greed for money, *ibid.* 68, by the gratification of which he wished to find compensation for the demands abandoned by him.
- III. 1. They are generally designated as *ḥurrā'*, literally as (Koran) reciters. Among the prophet's associates such *ḥurrā'* are mentioned and more definitely described as people who, during the day "obtained water and collected wood for the prophet (cf. Jos. 9, 21. 23. 27) and during the night stood before the pillars

(ZDMG LV 505) and prayed'' (Ibn Sa'd III, I 36 ult. 38, 8. 14). This designation is also generally extended to people, who, scorning all worldly interests devote themselves to pious practices and an introspective ascetic life; cf. e. g. Ibn Sa'd VI 255, 18. Dāwūd al-Tā'ī did not resemble in his clothes the *kurrā* (it is here a question of ascetics in general). Free-thinking or worldly-minded people use this word in its bad sense to express the conception of the pietists (above p. 65). The verb *ḡara'a* V, and *Taḡarra'a* with the elision of the hamza *taḡarrā* is a synonym of *tanassaka*, 'one who gives himself up to the ascetic life.' (Kālī, *Amālī* III 47 penult.) When the great philologist Abū 'Amr ibn al-'Alā devoted himself to asceticism, he burned up the gigantic philological material which he had collected (Jāḥiẓ in Abhandl. zur Arab. Phil. I 139, 9) just as the above-mentioned Dāwūd al-Tā'ī, after he had become an '*ābid*', would have nothing more to do with the sciences (even of the Ḥadīth), in which he had formerly been prominent. (Ibn Sa'd l. c.)

2. Ibn Sa'd VI 202, 18, cf. the same Abū Isrā'īl in connection with an utterance on the avoidance of superfluous dress in prayer, *ibid.* 231, 15.
3. *Ibid.* III, 6.
4. *Ibid.* 127, 22; 131, 14; 133, 11. 18. 25. The religious motive of his antipathy to poetry is also characteristic. (Cf. also 53, 17.) His article in Ibn Sa'd is very instructive for the knowledge of the various forms that the ascetic tendencies of the time assumed.
5. See the biographies of the early caliphs and companions in the Ṣūfī *Ṭabaḡāt*. Among them 'Ālī, especially, is an example of the ascetic life not only for the characteristics following up such tendencies, but also for the popular recollections. (Cf. especially Kālī *Amālī* II 149, 9 ff.) Moreover, even apart from the special purpose, the ascetic embellishments of biographies are far from rare. The picture of the death of the companion Mu'āḍ ibn Jebel may be given as an example. It was he whom Mohammed commissioned with the Islamizing of Yemen, and who fought many a battle by the side of the prophet. The plague raging in Syria snatched away many of the members of his family, and finally himself. In the last moment of his life he is made to talk on the love of God. And when death was already upon him, the following words are put into his mouth: "Welcome, O death! Welcome friendly visitor who finds me in poverty. O my God, thou knowest I have always feared thee, but to-day I hope for thee longingly. I have not loved the world, nor a long life in it to be spent in digging canals and planting trees, but in order to thirst in the mid-day heat, to defy misfortunes, to participate under the lead of the '*Ulamā* in the *Dikr*-gatherings. (Nawawī *Tahḏīb* 561.) The biographers of this

pious tendency are fond of investing the warriors of Islam with traits which supplement their bravery and heroism with the marks of ascetic piety. This characterises the ascetic literature up to the latest times. Even Nur al-Dīn and Salādin take the highest places in the hierarchy of saints (Yāfi'ī, l. c. 285 above), entitled to this quite as much as Alī who already at an earlier age was included among the saints.

6. *Usd al-Ghāba* III 88, s. v. 'Āmir ibn 'Abd al-Kais.
 7. See my *Dīwān des Huṭei'a* 218 (to 79, 7). To the proofs there given I now add those verses cited by Jāhiz, *Ḥayawān* V 145, 3, VI 121 penult. L. Cheikho treats the same subject in his periodical *al-Mashrik* XI (1908).
 8. See further proofs in "Revue de l'Hist. des Religions" XXVIII 381.
 9. An example, *Mashrik* XII, 611, 7 fr. bel., cf. also Munk, "Guide des Égarés" II 304 no. 2—athwāb-al-siyāḥa "Monastic garb" in contrast to the wild garments (Damīrī, *Ḥayāt al-ḥayawān* II 165, 1, s.v. 'akrāb). Concerning the raven as the bird of mourning, who lives among ruins and has black feathers, they say figuratively in this sense that he is practicing *siyāḥa* (Journ. As. Soc. Bengal 1907, 176, 7 fr. bel.).
 10. "Notice of the writings of . . . al Hārith . . . al-Muḥāsibī, the first Ṣūfī Author," in Transactions of the Third International Congress for the History of Religions (Oxford 1908) I 292 ff.
 11. Ibn Sa'd III, I 208, 26.
 12. It is reported of 'Abdallāh ibn Mas'ūd, one of the most pious companions of the prophet, that he refrained from all superfluous fasts (not commanded by strict law), and gave as his reason that he laid more stress upon prayer; fasting weakens too much and can easily injure prayer. Ibn Sa'd *ibid.* 109, 25. The same 'Abdallāh forbids Mi'ḍad and his companions (above p. 159) to perform their ascetic practices in the cemetery. Ibn Sa'd VI 111 6.
 13. Tabarī I 2924, 9; *Usd al-ghāba* V, 286.
 14. Ibn Sa'd V 225, 4.
 15. Tabarrī, *Makārim al-akhlāk* 66.
 16. For a fuller account see my treatise, "Materialien zur Entwicklungsgeschichte des Ṣufismus" WZKM (1899) XIII 35 ff.
- IV. 1. This simile is used in two ways. Apart from the one utilized in the text (Subkī, *Mu'īd al-ni'am* 224, 4; Yāfi'ī l. c. 315 ult. by Sahl al-Tustarī) it is applied to the adept and his master, likening him to the corpse in the hand of the washer, i. e. the pupil subjects his will completely to that of the Sheikh, e. g. 'Abd al-Karīm al Rāzī (pupil of Ghazālī) in Subkī, *Ṭabakāt* IV 258 ult. The improbable assumption that the similar expression in the constitution of the Jesuit order (perinde ac cadaver) has

been borrowed from the rule of the Šūfī brotherhood, has lately been brought forward again by G. Bonet-Maury "Les confréries religieuses dans l'Islamisme, etc." in the transactions of the third International Congress for the History of Religions II 344; also D. B. Macdonald (in his work to be mentioned below 6, note 4) considers the dependence of the rule of the Jesuit order on that of the Šūfī brotherhood as an assured fact. The possibility of an influence of Moslem Šūfiism on Christian mysticism is now admitted also by Carra de Vaux and has been strengthened by the proof of certain synchronisms. ("La Doctrine de l'Islam," 247-8.)

2. Ghazālī, *Ihyā* IV 445.
 3. Muḥibbī, *Khulāṣat al-athar* III 148. Sufyān ibn 'Uyeyna teaches "Thy care for to-morrow's nourishment will be counted to thee as a sin." (Dahabī *Taḍkirat al-ḥuffāz* III, 8.)
 4. Kuṣheirī, *Risāla fī 'ilm al-taṣawwuf* (Cairo 1304) 243, 10 fr. bel. 'Abdalkādir Jilānī, *Ghunya* (Mecca 1314) II 151; Behā al-dīn al-'Āmilī, *Keshkūl* (Bulāḡ 1288) I 94.
- V. 1. Dahabī, *Taḍkira* IV 39.
2. One of the oldest of the ascetic ideals is contained in a long-drawn-out apocryphal exhortation of the prophet to Usāma ibn Zeid, which has come down in two versions Suyūṭī, *al-La'ālī al-maṣnū'a fi-l-aḥādīth al-mawḍū'a*. [A similar work by Ibn al-Jauzī (Cairo 1317) II 166-7.] One of the versions is also given in *Ikhwān al-ṣafā* (Bombay 1306) I, II 98.
 3. Revue de l'Histoire des Religions XL 177.
 4. Šūf is the clothing of the poor as well as of the penitent ('*Uyūn al-akḥbār* 317 penult. 352, 6); Convicts also were clothed in Šūf-garb (Ibn Sa'd VIII 348, 21; *Aghānī* V 18, 20), Abū Mūsā al-Ash'arī says to his son, "If thou hadst seen us in company with the prophet when rain overtook us, thou wouldst have noticed a smell of sheep which came from our (damp) Šūf-garments." This is intended to emphasize the ascetic mode of life in the entourage of the prophet. (Ibn Sa'd IV, I 80, 18.)
 5. See Nöldeke in ZDMG XLVIII 47.
- VI. 1. Jelāl al-dīn Rūmī, Quatrain, The quotations here used are taken from the Hungarian translation of the *Rubā'īyyāt ḥazreti mew-lānā* (Stambul 1312, issued by the Persian journal "Akhter") by Professor Alexander Kegl (Budapest 1907; Abhandlung. der Ungar. Akad. d. Wiss. I. Kl., vol. XIX, no. 10).
2. Ibid.
 3. *Wujūduka ḡanbun lā yukāsu bihi ḡanbun ākharu* in 'Abdalkādir Jilānī, *Sirr al-asrār* (A. R. of the Ghunya) I 105.
 4. Duncan B. Macdonald has lately given a psychological analysis of the Šūfī position in the 6th and 7th lectures ("Saints of the

ascetic-ecstatic life in Islam”) in his “Religious Attitude and Life in Islam” (Chicago 1909) 156-219.

5. *Masnavi-i-ma'navi* translated by E. H. Whinfield (London 1887) 52.
6. *Dīwāni Shems-i-Tebrīzī* (ed. Nicholson, Cambridge 1898) 124.
7. *Farīd ed-dīn 'Aṭṭār, Taḍkirat al-auliya* (ed. Nicholson, London—Leiden 1905-1907) II 216, 8.
8. “Der Dīwān des . . . Ḥāfiz” pub. by Rosenzweig-Schwannau (Vienna 1858-64) I 324.
9. Oltramare, “L'Histoire des idées théosophiques dans l'Inde” I. (Annales du Musée Guimet, Bibliothèque d'études, T XXIII) 211 note 2.
10. Cf. the explanation of the Shāḍelī by Yāfi'i, *Rauḍ al-rayāḥīn* 289, (various stages of divine intoxication.)
11. Ghazālī, *Iḥyā* IV 348, 3 *Taḍkirat al-auliya* II 156, 9.
12. From Jelāl al-dīn Rūmī' (acc. to Kegl, above note 1).
13. The Ḥanbalite Ibn Kayyim al-Jauziyya in his ethical treatise *Kitāb al-jawāb al-kāfi li-man sa'ala 'an al-dawā al-shāfi* (Cairo, Takaddum Press) 141-147; 168-170 presents the conciliation of the love of God as the highest goal of Moslem life from the orthodox point of view, it is true not without a hostile intent toward opposing Ṣūfīism.
14. Journal Asiat. 1879 II 377 ff. 451.

- VII. 1. One of the earliest works of this kind is the exegetical book *Ḥaḳā'ik āl-tafsīr* (True Interpretation of the Scriptures) Abū Abd al-Rahmān al-Sulamī from Nīsābūr (died 412/1021; Brockelmann, “Gesch d. Arab Litt.” I 201). “He brought into it”—says an orthodox historian—“unfortunate thoughts and allegorical explanations of the *Bāṭiniyya* (Dahabī *Taḍkirat al-ḥuffāz*. III 249). From this Sulamī, who also fabricated Ḥadīths of a Ṣūfī order (Zeitschr. f. Assyrl. XXII 318) a work under the title *Sunan al-ṣūfiyya* is quoted (Suyūṭī, *al-La'ālī al-maṣnū'a* II 178 M.), the basis as it appears of the Ṣūfī Ḥadīth brought forward by him. A famous Koran commentary in the Ṣūfī spirit of which there are various editions (first *Bulāḳ* 1283 in 2 vols.), and from which one can best study the spirit and tendency of this exegesis is the *Tafsīr* of Muḥyī al-dīn ibn 'Arabī of Murcia (d. 638/1240 in Damascus). In Islamic literature the *Ta'wīlāt-al-Korān* of Abdarrazzāk al-Kāshī or al-Kāshānī of Samarkand (d. 887/1482), of which there are various manuscripts (Brockelmann l. c. 2. 203, No. 9), and representing the same tendency, is frequently quoted. The allegory of the sinful city and the three messengers of God, mentioned in our text, is taken from this latter work.
2. In v. 626 of his *Tā'iyya-kaṣīda* (Dīwān ed. Beyrouth 120, 8), famed in Ṣūfī circles.

3. Muh. Stud. II 14. Nevertheless, there are also statements in the Sunni tradition that the prophet favored certain 'companions' with teachings which he withheld from the others. Ḥuḍeifa ibn al-Yamān, one who also bears the title of *Ṣaḥīb al-sirr* or *s. sirr al-nabī* (possessor of the secret of the prophet), was especially favored in this respect. (Bukh. *Istiḍān* No. 38, Faḍā'il al-aṣḥāb no. 27.) It is now interesting to see that this notice, which of course can mean nothing but that Ḥuḍeifa received esoteric instruction from the prophet, is interpreted by the theologians to mean that Mohammed gave this companion the names of persons of doubtful standing (*munāfiḳūn*), not therefore any esoteric religious teaching—(Nawawī, *Tahḏīb* 200, 5). But we find Ḥuḍeifa actually the authority for a number of apocalyptic and eschatological Hadīths. In the canon of Muslim (V 165) in the section "Prerogatives of 'Abdallāh ibn Ja'far" the following statements about this man are included: "One day the prophet made me mount behind him, he then secretly whispered to me a Hadīth that I was not to communicate to anyone." Bukhārī has not included this utterance. It is to be noted that this 'Abdallāh ibn Ja'far was only ten years old when the prophet died.
- VIII. 1. The Plotinic elements in the Ṣūfī system of Muḥyī al-dīn ibn 'Arabī have been investigated by the Spanish scholar Miguel Asin Palacios in "La Psicología segun Mohidin Abenarabi" (Actes du 14^e Congrès internat. des Orientalistes—Algiers 1905—III 79-150).
2. Fihrist 118. 119. 136. Cf. for this literature Hommel, in the "Verhandlungen des VII Orientalistenkongr." (Vienna 1887) Sem. Sect. 115 ff. The educated classes show an interest in Buddha (Jāhiz, "Tria Opuscula" ed. Van Vloten 137, 10).
3. *Aghānī* III 24.
4. "Transactions of the Ninth International Congress of Orientalists" (London 1893) I 114.
5. "Über die Philosophischen Gedichte des Abū-l-'Alā al-Ma'arri" (Sitzungsber. d. Wiener Akad. d. W. Phil, hist. Cl. CXVII No. VI Vienna 1888) 30 ff.
6. Jāhiz, *Ḥayawān* IV 147, Roses in Zapiski VI 336-340.
7. e. g. the accounts in Yāfī'ī l. c. 208-211. The story of the Turkish king and his son-in-law the great ascetic in Ibn-Arabshah, "Fructus imperatorum" (ed. Freytag, Bonn 1832) I 48-53, reverts to this same circle of ideas.
8. Kurṭubī *Taḏkira*, ed. of Sha'rānī (Cairo 1310) 15 below.
9. "Mesnevi" (Whinfield 182). The picturesque representation of an episode of the miraculous tales of Ibr. ibn Edhem in the Delhi Archeological Museum, (Journ. Roy. As. Soc., 1909, 751; cf. now *ibid.* 1910, 167).

- IX. 1. In contradistinction to physical death the great *fanā* (*al-f. al-akbar*), they call this condition "the small f." (*al-f. al-asghar*). Cf. on the relation of the *Fanā*-conception to Nirvana the remark of Count E. v. Mälinen in G. Jacob's "Türkische Bibliothek" XI 70.
2. Mesnevi l. c. 159.
3. It is Ibrāhīm ibn Edhem who says: "Meditation is reason's pilgrimage (*haj al-'akl*)."
4. 'Aṭṭār l. c. II, 184, 8: Cf. Oltramare l. c. 116: "Connaître intellectuellement Brahman, c'est un propos absurde; car toute connaissance suppose une dualité, puisque dans toute connaissance il y a le sujet qui connaît et l'objet qui est connu."
- X. 1. In the effort to legitimatize their views and institutions from the earliest Moslem times, the following legend is manufactured in Ṣūfī circles: when Mohammed was announced to the poor (*fūḳarā*) that they should enter paradise sooner than the rich (Muh. Stud. II, 385, above), they went into ecstasies and rent their clothes (an expression of the ecstatic condition, WZKM XVI, 139, note 5). Then the angel Gabriel descended from heaven and said to Mohammed that Allah claimed his share of the tatters. He therefore took a tatter with him and hung it on the throne of God. This is the prototype of the Ṣūfī garb (*Khirkā*). Ibn Teymiyya, *Rasā'il* II, 282.
2. "Sacred Books of the East" XII, 85, 95.
3. Kremer "Culturgeschichte. Streiftzüge" 50 ff. Cf. for the Indian Rama Prasad, "The Science of Breath and the Philosophy of the Tatwas," tr. from Sanskrit (London 1890).
4. Cf. on this my paper "Le Rosaire dans l'Islam." (Revue de l'Hist. des Relig. 1890, XXI, 295 ff.)
5. Snouck Hurgronje "Arabië en Oost Indië" (Leiden 1907) 16. "Revue. de l'Hist. des Relig." 1908, LVII, 71. About this branch of Ṣūfīism, see now the dissertation of D. A. Rinke, "Abdoerraoef van Singkel. Bijdrage tot de kennis van de mystiek op Sumatra en Java" (Heerenveen 1909).
- XI. 1. Cf. now also the important paper by R. A. Nicholson, "The Oldest Persian Manual of Sufism" in Transactions of the Third International Congress for the History of Religions, I 293 ff.
2. "A historical Inquiry concerning the Origin and Development of Sufism," (Journ. Roy. Asiat. Soc. 1906, 303-348).
3. Subkī, Ṭabakāt III, 239 ult.
4. A mystic of the 4th century, of the Hīgra *Abū Sa'īd Ibn al-A'rābī*, of Baṣra (d. 340/951) expresses himself thus: "They (the Ṣūfis) use the words *al-jam'* (concentration) although their idea of it differs with each person. The same is true of *fanā*. They use the same word, but each one with a different meaning. The meanings of these words, however, are unlimited. They are

- (exponents of) intuitive discernment; but intuitive discernment cannot be bounded." Ḍahabī l. c. III, 70.
5. See the exposition of this principle by one of its oldest adherents Al-Hārith al Muḥāsibī (d. Baghdād 243/857); Subkī l. c. II, 41 penult.—the *kuḷūb* (hearts) play a most important part in the ethics of Moslem ascetics. This is already evident from the titles of their literary productions. See "Revue des Études Juives" XLIX, 157.
 6. See especially Jacob, Turkish Bibl. IX, "Beiträge sur Kenntniss des Ordens der Bektaschis" and more recently, by the same author "Die Bektaschijje in ihren Verhältniss zu verwandten Erscheinungen." (Munich, 1909, Abhandl. Bayer. Akad. d. Wiss. I. Kl., vol. XXIV, 3d div.), especially p. 43 on Gnostic Analogies.
 7. Oltramare l. c. I, 214 "A partir du Moment où la connaissance s'est éveillé en moi, où je me suis uni a Brahman, il n'y a plus pour moi d'actes ni d'obligations; il n'y a plus ni Veda ni pluralité, ni monde empirique, ni samsārā"; ibid. 356; "Tout alors lui (le yogin) devient indifferent. Dans le monde physique, d'abord: 'il n'y a plus pour lui d'aliments prohibés ou prescrits; tous les sucs sont pour lui sans sue' . . . dans le monde morale aussi 'la meditation du yogin libère de tout les péchés, quand même le péché s'étendrait sur de nombreux yojana.'"
 8. e. g. with the gnostic Epiphanes, son of Karpokrates. By the contemplation of the Highest, all external acts become indifferent and meaningless. This entails the rejection of all legality and social order. Even the Ten Commandments are scorned. The *gnosis monadikē*, the union of the spirit with the highest unity, raises him above all binding forms of religion. Neander "Gene-tische Entwicklung der vornehmsten gnostischen systeme" (Berlin 1818) 358-9.
 9. Stromata III, 5.
- XII. 1. Cf. Subkī, *Mu'īd al-ni'am* ed. Myhrman, 178 ff.
2. *Jelāl al-dīn*, quatrain. It is a constantly recurring complaint in the Ṣūfī literature itself that many unworthy elements associate themselves with the movement, misusing their affiliation for worldly ends.
 3. Cf. an old example by Sprenger, "Mohammed" III, CLXXIX, note (Shibli). The Malāmatī, however, are not to be confounded with the Malāmī brotherhood in Turkey, concerning which Martin Hartmann has lately made important contributions, "Der Islamische Orient" III (index s. v.).
 4. Mesnevi (Whinfield) 91.
 5. The analysis of the work by René Bassett, "Recueil de Mémoires et de Textes publié en l'honneur du XIV^e Congrès des Orientalistes" (Algiers, 1905) 1 ff.
 6. Hartmann, "Der Islamische Orient" I, 156 ff.

7. Reitzenstein, "Hellenistische Wundererzählungen" 65 ff.
- XIII. 1. 'Aṭṭār, *Taḍkirat al-auliyyā* II, 177, 11 ff. The polemic of the opponents of the Ṣūfī Ibn Teymiyya seems to be directed against this. He accuses the adepts of Ṣūfiism of arrogance. "That he wishes to obtain his knowledge from the same source from which the angel who comes to the prophet obtains his," i. e. direct divine revelation. (*Rasā'il* I, 20.)
2. Shemsī Tehrīzī 124.
3. Aṭṭār, *Taḍkirat al-auliyyā*. II, 159, 12. Ibn Teymiyya (l. c. I, 148 above) speaks of the Ṣūfis, who truly hate the prophets, especially Mohammed, because he brought division (*fark*) among men, and punished each one who did not acknowledge him.
4. Mesnevi (Whinfield) 83.
5. See the text in *Zāhiriten* 132. Cf. also Jacob, "Türkische Bibliothek" IX, 23.
6. Jelāl al-dīn, quarto.
7. In Ibn Teymiyya, l. c. I, 145.
8. Browne, "A Literary History of Persia." II, 268.
9. Ed. Rosenzweig-Schwannau I, 584 (Dāl No. 108).
10. Ethé in "Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akad. d. Wiss. Phil." Kl. II (1875) 157.
11. Cf. Friedrich Rosen, "Die Sinnsprüche 'Omars des Zeltmachers'" (Stuttgart and Leipzig 1909), especially the poems translated on p. 118 ff.
12. Mesnevi (Whinfield) 53.
13. Ḍahabī, *Taḍkirat al-ḥuffāz* IV, 15.
14. Journ. Roy. As. Soc. 1906, 819; cf. the chapters developing this train of thought in Ghazālī's *Iḥyā' ulūm al-dīn*. III, 13 ff.—the mystic Muḥyi al-dīn Ibn 'Arābī sent to his younger contemporary the dogmatic Fakhr al-dīn al-Rāzī, an epistle in which he pointed out the latter's lack of knowledge. Complete knowledge is received directly from God, not through tradition and teachings. Similarly, the Ṣūfī Abū Yezīd al-Bisṭāmī (d. 261/875) declared to the *Ulamā* of his time: "You are receiving dead knowledge from dead people; we receive ours from a living One who does not die"; quoting from 'Abd al-Wahhāb al-Sha'rānī in Ḥasan al-'Adawī's Commentary to Burda (Cairo 1297) II, 76. The epistle is given in full in *Keshkūl* by Behā al-dīn al-'Āmilī, 341-342; but this text lacks the reference to the speech of Abū Yazīd al-Bisṭāmī. Ibn Teymiyya (*Rasā'il* I, 52 below) gives the discussion of Ibn 'Arabī with Al-Rāzī (and one of his companions) in the form of an oral communication.
15. *Jelāl al-dīn Rūmī* quarto.
16. *Risāla fī'ilm al-taṣawwuf* end.
17. Aṭṭār, *Taḍkirat al-auliyyā* II, 274.
18. These thoughts, too, are to be found in the Indian theosophy,

and can easily be traced back through various mediums to it as the original source. I refer here to Oltramare's quotations l. c. on several teachings relating to this: p. 120 "Ce n'est pas par l'Enseignement que l'atman peut être perçu; ce n'est pas non plus par l'entendement, ni par la connaissance des écritures; seul, celui qu'il choisit le comprend; l'ātman leur révèle son existence" (from Kāthaka Upanishad): p. 115, "C'est pourquoi le brahmane doit se débarrasser de l'érudition et demeurer comme un enfant"; p. 210. "Cette connaissance n'est pas le fruit de quelque activité intellectuelle et dialectique. C'est le savoir profane qui a besoin de preuves et de raisonnements, mais l'Être se révèle par sa propre lumière; qu'est-il besoin de la démontrer?" The same thought is to be found stated thus in neo-Platonism: One is enabled to grasp the intelligible world through spiritual contemplation, not through logic and syllogism. (Theologie des Aristot. ed. Dieterici 163, 3.)

19. ZDMG LXII, 11 above.

20. Cf. above note 3. 5.

XIV. 1. Perhaps the decision of Auzā'i belongs to this also: "The Ṣūfī garb is in accord with Sunna in travelling, but during a continuous sojourn such a garb is *bid'a*. (*Taḍkirat al-ḥuffāz*, III, 232.)

2. Ibn Kuteiba, '*Uyūn al-akhbār*, 355, 5.

3. ZDMG XXVIII, 326, cf. above p. 108.

4. '*Aṭṭār* II, 40, 19.

5. Jour. Roy. As. Soc. 1906, 323.

6. '*Aṭṭār* II, 48; 74 below.

XV. 1. Such complaints are naturally not without a basis in the time after Kusheiri; a number of utterances have been collected in the commentary (*al-Futūḥāt al-ilāhiya*) of Aḥmed Ibn Moḥammed al-Shāḍalī from Fēz to *al-Mabāḥith al-aṣliyya*, of the Ṣūfī author, Abū-l-'Abbās Aḥmed Ibn Moḥammed Ibn al-Bannā al-Tujībī of Saragossa (Cairo 1324/1906 I, 21 ff.). The nihilistic tendency toward the law has never appeared so clearly in the Maghrib Ṣūfism as in the East. The warnings against it have made the greatest impression on western Islam. Cf. also the Maghrib criticism of Eastern Ṣūfism. ZDMG XXVIII, 325 ff.

XVI. 1. For the characterization of the further position of Ghazālī towards the philosophy opposed by him, the word of Abū Bekr Ibn al-'Arabī (Kādī in Seville d. 546/1151), is worthy of mention: "Our sheikh Abū Ḥamid entered the body of philosophy. He then wanted to slip out but could not do it." (Quoted by 'Alī al-Kārī in the commentary to the *Shifā* of the Kādī 'Iyād, Stamboul 1299, II, 509.)

2. The later Ṣūfī al-Sha'rānī in this theological group busied himself especially with the estimate of the ritualistic differences

of the teachings (see above) and developed a special theory about their relation to each other, according to which each of the diverging views of the law have a relative meaning only, and the same religious law has two sides: the strict (*tashdīd*, aggravation) and the indulgent (*takhfīf*, mitigating). The former holds good for the more perfect men from whom God demands self-denial; the latter for the weaker who are granted mitigation by the same law. The various schools of law, insofar as they disagree over any given law, represent the one or the other of these. On account of this demonstration Sha'rānī calls the work in which he treats it "Die Wage des Gesetzes" (the Scales of the Law). (See ZDMG XXXVIII, 676.) We mention this theory of Sha'rānī which he himself extols in several of his works with special emphasis as his own meritorious discovery, in order to emphasize the fact that it was proposed more than five centuries before him by an old Ṣūfī classicist, Abū Ṭalīb al-Mekkī (d. 386/996). (*Kūt-al kulūb*—Cairo, 1310—II. 20 middle) who was famous as *Sheikh al-sharī'a wal-hakīka* (master of law and mystical truth) (*Damīrī* II 120 s. v. *ṭajir*) to whose work Ghazālī acknowledges himself to be indebted. The seed of this distinction can be in reality traced back to the second century after the Hijra. The ascetic traditionalist 'Abdallāh ibn al-Mubārak (d. 181/797, cf. about him M. Hartmann in *Zeitschrift f. Assyr.* XXIII 241) gives two contradictory Ḥadīths from the point of view that the commands contained in one were for the chosen few (*al-khawāṣṣ*), the other for the common people (*al-'awāmm*) (quoted in *Ithāf al-sāda* Cairo 1311—VII 572).

3. *Ihya' ulūm al dīn* I 54, 17.

4. ZDMG LIII 619 note 2.

5. And many other extravagant epithets, of which quite a number can for example be found in the inscription of a pen case in an Arab museum in Cairo, a case that is supposed to have been presented to Ghazālī, although its authenticity is very doubtful. (*Bulletin de l'Institut égyptien* for 1906, 57, where the genuineness of this showpiece is taken for granted.)

6. The places in Yahuda, "Prolegomena zu . . . *Kitāb al-hidāya etc.*" (Darmstadt 1904) 14, note 2.

7. In the characterization of Ghazālī some features are taken from my essay in the "Kultur d. Gegenwart" 114-5.

XVII. 1. A contemporary of Ahmed ibn Ḥanbal, the Fikḥ scholar *Ḥarb ibn Ismā'īl al-Kermānī* (d. 288/901) was blamed for scorning the party of the *ahl al-ṣalāt* (who differed from him), in his book *Kitāb al-Sunna waljamā'a* (Yāqūt Geogr. WB. III 213 ult.).

2. Cf. my introduction to "Le Livre de Mohammed ibn Toumert" (Algiers 1903) 58-60.

3. *Bibliotheca Geograph. Arabie* ed. de Goeje III 365-366.

4. Introduction to "Ibn Toumert" l. c. 57.
 5. Cf. the article "Zur Gesch. d. ḥanbalitischen Bewegungen" ZDMG LXII 5 and passim. Abū Ma'mar al Ḥudālī (cf. above 145, VI, 3) says curtly: "He who says that God neither speaks nor hears nor sees, is not kindly, does not grow angry (attributes which the Mu'tazilites subject to a *ta'wīl*), he is a *kāfir*." But at the time of the inquisition (*mihna*) he too manifested weakness and made concessions to the Mu'tazilite authority, which freed him from further persecution. He could then easily have said: "We became *kāfirs*, and thereby escaped." *Taḍkirat al-ḥuffāz* II 56.
 6. ZDMG LVII 395. A number of the utterances and judgments of a strict Kūfī theologian Ibrāhīm al-Nakhā'ī, a contemporary of Ḥajāj (d. 96/714), are given by Ibn Sa'd VI 191, 7 ff. He explained his dissatisfaction with their teachings, warned the people of their evil consequences, and did not wish people to spend much time in their company. He calls their doctrine (l. 11. 13) *ra'j muḥdath* (a new-found opinion) or *bid'a* (see last chapter); but the word *kufr* or *kāfir* does not come to his lips. The seeds of a fanatical temper are already apparent in the middle of the 2d century of the Hijra, in Sufyān al Thaurī, and in a colleague of the same stamp, who did not wish to be present at the Murji'ite funeral, although the pious life led by the dead person was famous (ibid. VI 252, 4; 254, 1). Nevertheless they did not yet want to brand them as *kāfir*. It is noteworthy for the ruling opinion that the course taken by Sufyān is mentioned as an anomaly.
 7. Even here milder views sometimes appear; e. g. the judgment about the faith of the Karmaths in Yākūt ed. Margoliouth I 86 below.
- XVIII. 1. The views of the dogmatists on this subject are gathered together in "Les prolègomènes théologiques de Senoussi" ed. J. D. Luciani 96-112.
2. Jāḥiẓ, *Hayawān* I 80, 14; cf. 103, 8.
 3. It is characteristic of the common tendency of the post-Ghazālīan orthodoxy, that a theologian, so readily given to fanaticism as the Ḥanbalite zealot Takī al-dīn ibn Teymiyya (ZDMG LXII 25) on this question stands nearer to Ghazālī, whom he so strongly opposed, than many a rationalistic dogmatic. In his commentary to the 112th Sura, *Sūrat al-Ikhlās* (Cairo 1323 ed. Na'asānī, 112-113) he devotes to him an excursus which closes with the conclusion that Mu'tazilites, Kharijites, Murji'ites, as well as the ordinary Shī'ites, are not to be regarded as Unbelievers. They agree on the Koran and the Sunna, and go astray only over interpretations, nor do they in any way attack the binding force of the law. The Jahmiyya are to be excluded, because of

their intransigent removal of all divine names and attributes, and above all the Ismā'ilites, because they deny the validity of the ritual law. In this massive work of the militant Hanbalites, one can see the influence of an attitude that accords with the former mild view of the Sunna. From two absolutely opposing standpoints, Ghazālī and his chief opponent ibn Teymiyya reflect the influence of the dogmatic definitions of the various schools upon Islam.

CHAPTER V.

MOHAMMEDAN SECTS.

It is customary to attribute much more diversity to the ramifications of sects in Islam than is warranted by a correct estimate of the facts. Moslem theology is itself in great part to blame for this. In consequence of a misunderstanding of a tradition which gave to Islam the glory of possessing 73 varieties, as against 72 in Christianity, and 71 in Judaism, it made of this virtue 73 ramifications. This misunderstanding formed the basis for the enumeration of as many sects all of which were relegated to Hell, with the exception of the one which "escapes" and alone ensures salvation; to wit, the one that agrees with the demands of Sunna.¹ In more tolerant circles, where the name of Ghazālī is naturally not absent, a corresponding broader interpretation has been given to this statement: "All of them (these ramifications) will find their way to Paradise, only one goes to Hell; namely, the Zindīks."

Occidental views were partially influenced, owing to this misconception of the Mohammedan tradition of the 73 virtues and their transformation into ramifications. Not only are ritualistic tendencies (such as the Ḥanīfite, the Mālikite, etc.) spoken of as sects of Islam, but the same name is given to the dogmatic differences, the deviations from the aspect of general orthodoxy, which never served as the basis for the organization of a dissenting group. To speak for example of a Mu'tazilite sect, shows for instance a total misconception of the inner history of Islam. To be sure, the dogmatists were mutually all too ready to heap upon the opponents of their theses the epithet *kāfir*, unbeliever; and now and then they seriously attempted to challenge each other's

rights to belong to Islam, and to put into operation the practical results of this view (see above page 182). An orthodox son cannot share in the inheritance of his father, if the latter professes the Mu'tazilite doctrine of free-will, for according to Mohammedan law "disparitas cultus" is an obstacle to inheritance.² But such fanatical exaggeration does not fit in with the dominant trend of thought in the Islamic solidarity.³ Indeed this very application of the law of inheritance was directly ascribed to a lunatic.

Only those groups can be regarded as real sects in Islam, whose adherents separate themselves from the Sunna and from the historically recognized constitution of Islam in questions of fundamental importance for Islam; and such fundamental points stand opposed to Ijmā' (general consensus).

Schisms of this kind, which still maintain themselves in the present organization of Islam, may be traced back to its earliest times.

Apparently, it is not questions of "Religion" which stand in the foreground, but those pertaining to the organization of the state. Naturally, religious points of view will permeate political questions in the case of a community, based on religious bonds. The religious aspects assume the form of religious motives, which lend their local color to the political strife.

The significance of the oldest sectarian movements lies just in the fact that out of the warlike character of old Islam issue those religious points of view, which, further enriched through external factors, soon give to the schism a religious stamp. Nevertheless, political questions beset the parties at the outset; the religious interest mixes with this as a ferment, only to become very soon a determining element in the permanence of the rupture.

II. Inasmuch as Mohammed failed in an authentic manner to indicate his wishes in regard to a successor,

the decisions in each case after the death of Mohammed as to the succession, form the most momentous problem of the Islamic community.

^ In the fortunate choice of a successor (Caliph) lay the security for the continuation of the Prophet's work. From the very first there was among the influential Moslems, one group which was dissatisfied with the manner in which that dignity had been bestowed upon its first three candidates, Abū Bekr, 'Omar, and 'Othmān, without regard to their degree of relationship to the Prophet. From the latter point of view they would have preferred to raise to the Caliphate 'Alī, the cousin of the Prophet, his nearest of kin who moreover was married to Fāṭima, the Prophet's daughter. Their opportunity to protest vehemently came only with the accession of the third Caliph, for he was a member of the very family whose chief members had long maintained a stubborn opposition to Islam at its beginning, although influenced by the success of the movement, they joined it while Mohammed was still alive. The predominating influence over the state which this family attained during its rule, together with the enjoyment of its material advantages, led to an alignment of the dissatisfied and repressed, and finally to the assassination of the Caliph. War thereupon broke out between the party of 'Alī and the adherents of the murdered Caliph, who now appeared as the avengers of 'Othmān's blood, and who acknowledged as their candidate the Omayyad Mu'āwiyya, the governor of Syria.

It could not rightly be denied that 'Othmān, though belonging to a family not religiously fanatic, was himself a zealous adherent of Islam. Among the accusations that could be brought up against him, that of religious apathy is hardly prominent. Death found him in the midst of his preoccupation with the holy book, the text of which, fixed through his efforts, is still regarded

as the Masoretic text of the Koran. His opponents, to be sure, seem to have cast aspersions even upon this devout concern with the holy writ of Islam. In spite of his religious attitude there arose during his reign by the side of the political malcontents, a movement, weak in its beginnings, to be sure, but a movement of religious agitators, who saw in 'Alī and in 'Alī alone, the representative of divine right for the Caliphate. It was not this group, however, that enabled 'Alī to enter as the fourth in the group of Caliphs, without, however, attaining universal recognition for this dignity. He was obliged to struggle for it in warfare against the avengers of 'Othmān and their leader, the Omayyad Mu'āwiyya. By a sly bit of strategy which August Müller called "one of the most undignified farces in history,"¹ the latter succeeded, in the midst of a skirmish which might easily have ended disastrously for them, in having the decision submitted to arbitration. 'Alī was, from the political point of view, weak enough to assent to this seemingly peaceful solution of the problem. As it subsequently proved, however, he was tricked all along the line. His opponent kept the upper hand, and it does not take much perspicacity to realize that his final overthrow would have been inevitable even if the dagger of an assassin had not put an end to his struggles.

'Alī's assent to a decision by arbitration, was the first incentive to the subdivision of sects within Islam. In the caliph's camp, there were visionaries who reflected that the decision of the combated issue about the succession to the Prophet should not be entrusted to human hands. The divine trial by battle should have been carried out. All rule, said they, comes from God, and decision concerning it could not be attached to human consideration. With this dictum they now seceded from the throng of 'Alī's followers, and owing to this split they are known in the history of Islam as *Khārijites*

(Seceders). They set aside both aspirants as despisers of the law, because they were convinced that it was not the triumph of divine right² but the worldly motives of power and lust for supremacy which were the incentive and goal of their warfare. The Caliphate must be filled by the worthiest man through free choice of the congregation. They were prepared to take the consequences of this demand for free choice, in that they did not restrict this, as in the previous installations of caliphs, to any particular prominent family group, nor to the Kureish, the tribe from which the Prophet sprang. An "Ethiopian slave" would have the same qualifications of a caliph as the scion of the noblest clan. On the other hand they demand of the head of Islam the strictest devotion to God, and fulfillment of religious laws; if his conduct was not accordant to these demands, he was to be removed by the congregation. Moreover, they judged the conduct of the ordinary man by stricter standards than had been customary. Herein they present a sharp contrast to the views of the Murjiites (see above page 91). In contrast to them, they regard "works" so highly as an integral element in the definition of faith that they look upon any one who is guilty of a grave sin, as not simply a sinner but an unbeliever.³ Because of the strict point of view of their religious ethics they, with a certain degree of justice, have been called the Puritans of Islam.⁴

It may be mentioned as characteristic of the ethical point of view that they endeavored to invest the rigor of the law with a greater degree of ethical consideration than was customary in current orthodoxy. The following detail may serve as an example: Islamic law most definitely specifies the conditions of religious purity necessary for the performance of prayer. These qualifications refer without exception to states of the body. The Khārijites while accepting these conditions unquali-

fiedly, add certain clauses which I quote from a religious work of this sect that has recently appeared in print⁵: "In like manner the state of purification is cancelled by whatever issues from the mouth, of lying or evil report through which a fellow-being may come to grief, or whatsoever one would be ashamed to mention in his presence, furthermore by tale-bearing which stirs up hatred and enmity among mankind; furthermore, if anyone has scorned or uttered curses or ugly words against man or beast without their deserving it, then he has departed from the state of purification and must complete the ritualistic cleansing before he can perform the prayer." That is to say, untruthful, wicked, unseemly speech, in short ethical shortcomings, destroy the state of personal purification no less than does physical contamination. Ethical purity is demanded, as a preliminary condition for prayer.⁶

Legal, dogmatic, and ethical principles signalize the distinctive character of the Khārijites. On this ground after the victory of the Omayyads they continued their struggle against this dynasty which they looked upon as sinful, lawless and ungodly, and carried the revolution against them to the remotest corners of the great domain. They formed no definite organization; they clustered around no unified Caliphate; but their widely scattered bands under various commanders, harassed the parties in power, and called forth all the energy of the great generals to whose skill and luck in warfare the stability of the Omayyad Caliphate was due. Most willingly the Khārijites were joined by the disinherited classes of society, whose support they easily won by their democratic tendencies and their protest against the injustice of those in power. Their revolt easily became a nucleus for every anti-dynastic rising. It gave shape and form to the revolt of the freedom-loving Berbers of North Africa against the Omayyad officials. Moslem historians

have not been able to conceive of the dogged national resistance of Berbers as other than a "Khārijite" movement.⁷ Here indeed the Khārijite sect maintained its integrity in compact groups the longest.

After the suppression of their revolts, the Khārijites restricted themselves to the theoretical furtherance of their peculiar teachings—political, ethical and dogmatic, and after they were forced to abandon the conflict against ruling political conditions, they succeeded in producing a considerable theological literature.^{7a}

As the Khārijites at the time of their warfare appear in scattered groups, so the religious doctrine developing within these groups shades off into varying formulas that for the most part are traced back to their old leaders. It is remarkable that in certain important questions of dogma they stand nearest to the Mu'tazilites.⁸

Rationalistic tendencies had already shown themselves in their theologians at a time when their belief did not yet appear in any fixed, positive form, but was still in a state of flux and, in contrast with orthodoxy, emphasized the negative phases. In the midst of their opposition to the universal doctrines, there was one faction that recognized the Koran as the exclusive law-giving authority, and refused whatever was outside it as inapplicable for the regulation of religious affairs.⁹ One of their factions went so far as to attack the integrity of the Koran. According to them the "Joseph Sura" did not belong in the Koran; was purely a profane narrative and it was not possible that this erotic story should be on a par with the rest of the sacred books of revelation.¹⁰ The same thing was asserted by pious Mu'tazilites with regard to those sections of the Koran in which the Prophet curses his enemies (as, e. g., Abū Lahab). Such passages cannot possibly be regarded as "a sublime revelation on an authentic tablet."¹¹

Since the community of Khārijites was developed

apart from the general Sunna Ijmā', it is natural that the external manifestations of the ritual and law sometimes differed from the orthodox.¹² In order to distinguish itself from the consensus which found expression in the four ruling orthodox rituals, the Khārijites from their point of view designated themselves as *al-khawāmis* the "fifth," i. e., the separatists who were outside of the four communities (of the orthodox Maḏāhib).

Up till the present day even, there are Moslem communities who call themselves Khārijites. Out of the many subdivisions into which—as has been noted above—Islam had split owing to certain doctrinal differences, a system has maintained itself, which was called after its founder, Ibāḏite (in N. Africa generally pronounced abāḏite).¹³ The Ibāḏites are still to be found in numerous communal groups, chiefly in North Africa:¹⁴ in the territory of the Mzāb, in the environs of the Jebel Nefūsa (Tripolitan), whose inhabitants sent an Ibāḏite deputy to the second chamber in Constantinople; also in East Africa (Zanzibar). The Arabic 'Omān is the motherland of the East African Ibāḏites. It is noteworthy that the Khārijites, living far from the international traffic in out of the way corners, and as good as forgotten, have in recent years been attempting to arouse themselves to energetic activity and self-assertion. Awakened possibly by the interest of European scholars in their literature, a fact which did not escape them, in the last few years they have allowed a number of their theological documents to be printed. In addition to this they have attempted an aggressive propaganda through a magazine of which apparently only a few numbers have appeared.¹⁵

The sect of the Khārijites is therefore to be regarded in point of time as the oldest sectarian split within Islam, remnants of which still exist to-day as one of the groups outside of usual Sunna-orthodoxy, among the followers of Mohammed. Its history represents in a fairly uncom-

plicated form the type of Moslem sect; the inflow of the religious point of view into the civic conflict.

III. Of greater importance in the history of Islam is the sectarian upheaval due to the opposition of the Shī'ites.

It is an elementary fact that Islam appears in two forms; SUNNITE and SHĪ'ITE. This division, as we have already seen, arose through the question of succession. The party, which even during the first three caliphates secretly recognized the rights of the Prophet's family, without, however, entering upon an open conflict protested after the fall of their pretenders, against the usurpers of the later non-'Alīite dynasties. Their opposition was first directed against the Omayyads, later, however, against all succeeding dynasties who did not tally with their legitimistic ideas. To all their disqualifications they oppose the divine right of the descendants of the Prophet through the children of 'Alī and Fāṭima. Thus, as they condemn the three caliphs who preceded 'Alī as impious usurpers and oppressors, they also oppose secretly, or if the opportunity for strife offers, openly, the actual formation of the Moslem state in all times to come.

The very nature of this protest easily led to a form in which religious factors were predominant. In place of a caliph raised to the supreme rule by human device, they recognized the Imam as the only justifiable worldly and spiritual leader of Islam, divinely called and appointed to this office. They give the preference to the designation Imam as more in accord with the religious dignity of the chief recognized as such by virtue of his direct descent from the prophet.

The first Imam is 'Alī. Even the Sunnites, questioning the rights of his predecessors, consider him a man of unusual virtue and wisdom. Ḥasan al-Baṣrī calls him "the scholar of God in this community."¹ The Shī'ites raise him to a still higher position. According to them,

the Prophet entrusted to him wisdom which he withheld from the majority of his less worthy "companions," and this wisdom his family inherits (above page 171). By means of direct ordinance the prophet chose him as his follower, as the teacher and ruler, and formally named him for this position. He is therefore *waṣī*, i. e., the one chosen by the decree of the prophet. The denial of this decree, no matter in whose favor, separates in principle the orthodox Sunnite from this group of his opponents.² According to the belief of the latter, 'Alī alone may lay claim to the title of the *amīr al-mu'minīn*, "ruler of the faithful,"³ a title which the rulers of all the dynasties have borne since the time of 'Omar, and which has been corrupted in the Western literature of the Middle Ages in the forms Miramolin, Mira-Momelin, Miramomelli.⁴ The qualified successors of 'Alī as Imam, the heir of his position as ruler and of his special knowledge and spiritual qualities, belong only to his direct followers through his wife Fāṭima, i. e., the Prophet's grandson Ḥasan, then Ḥusein and then the successive 'Alīite Imams. According to this, each successor is the *waṣī* of his predecessor through whom, according to the divine order, an express decree consecrates him as the legitimate bearer of the divine office.⁵ This order was pre-ordained for all times by God and was fixed by Mohammed as a divine decree.⁶ This pinnacle of exegetic arbitrariness on the part of the Shī'ites endeavors to find a support even in utterances of the Koran in which this order is set forth.⁷

Every other form of the Caliphate, accordingly, is robbery from a worldly standpoint, and from a spiritual, the withdrawal of the only authoritative religious guide for the community. For the Imam of each age is authorized and qualified by extraordinary quality of infallibility given him by God, to guide and teach the people in all their religious affairs, it is a necessary con-

sequence of divine justice that God allows no community to go without this guidance. The presence of an Imam is imperative for every age; for without such an enlightened person the goal of divine law-giving and guidance would be unattainable. The Imamate is a necessary institution and passes down in unbroken line from one member of the legitimate family of the prophet to the other.

It happens therefore that among the Shī'ites the religious point of view soon predominates over the political. The immediate object of their protests therefore was the Omayyad dynasty whose behaviour, quite apart from the question of its legitimacy, was a constant offence to the pietistic circles. Hence, from their point of view, this dynasty placed worldly considerations in the foreground instead of a theocracy as conceived by the pious.

Soon after the rise of this dynasty, under the second ruler, the community of 'Alī supporters found the very ill chosen opportunity to send the grandson of the prophet, Husein, into the bloody battle against the Omayyad usurper. The battlefield of Kerbelā (680) resulted in a great number of martyrs, the mourning for whose memory still lends a sentimental trait to their faith. Soon after, the Shī'ites, under the banner of Mukhtār, met again unsuccessfully the victorious Omayyad power. This Mukhtār had brought forward as an 'Alīite pretender a son of 'Alī but not of Fāṭima, Mohammed, the son of the Hanifite; an early sign of the internal divisions of the Shī'ites.

IV. Thus do the Shī'ites even after their decisive defeat carry on their protest and battle against the order of things recognized by the Ijmā' of the Moslem state. They rarely succeeded in unfurling the banner of their Imam pretender, and even when they did, the attempt, hopeless from the beginning, ended in unavoid-

able defeat. In the hope that God would bring about a course of events leading to public success, they were forced to resign themselves to outward submission, while secretly doing homage to the Imam of each age, and endeavoring to hasten his day of victory through secret propaganda.

Secret organizations arose therefore, which under the guidance of a missionary leader *dā'ī* spread their ideas among the masses. They were naturally watched and checked by the ruling power; in fact the 'Aliite persecutions are a ceaseless care to the government, which is bound to see in this secret, revolutionary propaganda, a menace to the peace of the state. The 'Abbāsides recognized this even more clearly than the 'Omayyads. It was in fact the 'Aliite propaganda under the latter which made possible the return of the 'Abbasides in the middle of the eighth century and enabled them to bring about the fall of the Omayyads, superinduced by Shī'ite intrigues. Under the pretense that the claims of the grandson of Mohammed ibn al-Ḥanafīyya had been ceded to them, they used the Shī'ites for their own ends. After they garnered the fruits of the Shī'itic propaganda for their own preferment, however, they had to take all the more precautions against the continued agitation of those who did not even in them recognize the legitimate successors of the prophet. They therefore strove to alienate the people from the 'Alī-cult. Mutawakkil razed Ḥusein's grave to the ground. The people should not be allowed to recall in this consecrated place, that it was not a scion of the 'Abbās, but a son of 'Alī who bled for the cause of the Prophet's house. Many of the most honorable 'Aliites, as well as those who belonged to the line of Imams, were pursued; under the reign of the 'Abbāsides many ended their lives in a prison,¹ died by execution or by secret poisoning. Under the Caliph al-Mahdī, an important Shī'ite, marked because of his devotion to 'Alī,

was forced, because of the Caliph's persecution, to keep himself in hiding to the end of his life. His life was in danger even if he dared come out from his hiding place to attend the Friday service in the Mosque.² Since the 'Abbāsides acknowledged the rights of the Prophet's family and claimed that they possessed these rights through them, such opponents appeared even more dangerous to the claims of the dynasty than formerly when those in power had on principle disputed the rights of the "family." To the 'Abbasides it was therefore much more unbearable to be opposed on the ground of their legitimacy.³

An inexhaustible theme of Shī'ite literature are the "Calamities (*niḥān*) of the family of the prophet." This is supposed to have been foretold in the Ḥadīth; and in the speeches of 'Alī which were handed down, it is always a question of the bad luck which awaits his followers.⁴ One of these clumsy inventions reports that 'Alī refused to recognize visitors whom his gatekeeper K̲anbar announced as adherents (Shī'a), because he did not see in them the mark of recognition of the Shī'ite. True Shī'ites are to be known because their bodies are emaciated through want, their lips dried up for thirst, and their eyes bleary from continual weeping.⁵ The true Shī'ite is persecuted and miserable like the family for whose rights he struggles and suffers. It soon came to be considered a requisite of the prophet's family to suffer need and persecution. Tradition provides that every true descendant of the prophet's family must be afflicted with trials. The result is that the untroubled life of a man claiming such descent would arouse suspicion as to the authenticity of his genealogy.⁶

Since the Kerbelā day of mourning, the history of this "family" as presented by the Shī'ites with a tragic tendency, is a continual succession of suffering and persecution. The story of these mishaps told in poetry and

prose, forms a rich and cherished collection of martyr-ologies (a Shī'ite specialty) which constitutes the subject of their gatherings in the first part of the month of Muḥarram, the tenth day of which is the anniversary of the Kerbelā tragedy.⁷ The tragic occurrences of this day are represented at these gatherings in dramatic form. "Our anniversaries are our days of mourning"; with these words a prince, with Shī'ite tendencies, closes a poem in which he recalls the many *niḥān* of the prophet's family.⁸ The true devotee can never cease weeping, bemoaning, sorrowing over the misfortunes and persecutions of the 'Alīite family, and its martyrdom. "More touching than Shī'ite tears" has become an Arabic proverb.⁹

Modern Shī'ites of scientific tendencies, who are as keen in condemning the 'Omayyads as the naïvest follower of 'Alī, have found great religious strength in this mournful note sounded by their faith. They find in it an element of noble feeling, yes, even of humanism in contrast to the ossified law and its practices. It represents that which is most precious and human in Islam.¹⁰ "To weep for Ḥusein," says an Indian Shī'ite, who has written books on philosophy and mathematics in English, "that is the price of our life and our soul; otherwise we would be the most ungrateful of creatures. Even in paradise we would mourn over Ḥusein. He is the basis for Moslem existence." "Mourning for Ḥusein is the badge of Islam. It is impossible for a Shī'ite not to weep. His heart is a living grave, the true grave for the head of the beheaded martyr."¹¹

V. Considering the kind of work Shī'ism demands, and the dangers connected with its mission, it should be characterized as a propaganda which agitates rather than fights. The result of this is a mysteriousness and secretiveness enjoined upon its followers, in view of the dangers to its followers that might ensue upon the

betrayal of its holy secrets. According to the sayings of a Shī'ite Imam, the two angels who always accompany a man in order to record his words and deeds, withdraw as soon as two believers (i. e., Shī'ite partisans) begin a discussion. The Imam Ja'far, who propounded this, had his attention drawn to the contradiction between this saying and that of the Koran (Sura 50, v. 17): "Not a word doth he utter, but there is a watcher with him ready to note it down." This is the guardian angel, which hears his words! The Imam then drew a deep sigh, tears rolled down his beard and he said "Indeed, God for the sake of the believers has commanded the angels to leave them alone in their *têtē ā têtē*; but even if the angels do not write it down, God knows all secret and hidden things."¹

The continued danger in which the members of the Shī'ite party found themselves developed an ethical theory among them, highly characteristic of their spirit, and closely allied to the needs arising from their having to act continually in secret. This theory, to be sure, did not originate with them, for it was recognized by the other Moslems as supported by the Koran (Sura 3, v. 27) and in the case of the Khārijites served the same purpose. In the Shī'ite system, however, it became a fundamental teaching imposed upon every member of their circle as an essential duty in the interests of the community. This theory is contained in the word *takīyya*, which means "caution." The Shī'ite not only *may* but *must* hide his true faith; when in a gathering where opponents are prevalent he must speak and act as if he were one of them, in order not to bring danger and persecution on his fellow-believers.² One can easily imagine what practice of equivocation and dissimulation this *takīyya* entailed, especially since it is a fundamental rule of Shī'ite discipline. The inability freely to express one's true convictions, however, is also a discipline in

the restraint of anger against the powerful opponents, which issues in a feeling of violent hatred and fanaticism; it also results in very peculiar religious teachings quite incongruous with orthodox Islam. The Imam Ja'far al-Šādiq was once asked: "O, grandson of the prophet, I am unable to uphold your cause publicly, all I can do is inwardly to renounce your enemies, and to curse them; what then am I worth?" The Imam replied: "My father in the name of his father, the latter in the name of his father who heard the teaching directly from the mouth of the prophet, said to me: He who is too weak to assist us, the family of the prophet to victory, but on the other hand hurls curses on our enemies in private, him they (the angels) praise as blessed . . . and they pray to God for him: 'O God, have mercy upon this thy servant, who does all which he can do; were he able to do more, he would indeed do it.' And from God comes the answer: 'I have heard your request, and have mercy on his soul, which will be brought to me among the souls of the chosen and good.'"³ This cursing of the enemy is a religious law among the Shī'ites; to neglect it is a sin against religion.⁴ This attitude has also left its peculiar mark on Shī'ite literature.

VI. The Shī'ite system, accordingly, revolves around this theory of the Imamate, with the legitimate succession to this clique of men, chosen and designated by God from among the descendants of the prophet. The recognition of the Imam of the age, whether he appears publicly, known personally to only a few, or makes his claims in a secret propaganda, is as much of an article of religion as the confession of the one Allah and his prophet Mohammed, in fact is of much more importance than the recognition of the historical caliphate ever claims to be in the orthodox catechism.

According to Shī'ite dogma, the recognition of the Imam is not an appendix of dogmatic nicety, but an inte-

gral part of the faith, not to be separated from the highest truths. I quote a Shī'ite dogmatist: "Knowledge of God includes, besides the recognition of God and his prophet, inner devotion to 'Alī, as well as the practise of obedience to him and to the Imams (succeeding him), and the repudiation of their opponents: thus is God recognized. . . ." "No man is a true believer, until he recognizes God, his prophet and all Imams including the Imam of his own age, and until he submits everything to him, and completely acquiesces with him."¹ According to Shī'ite teaching to the five "fundamentals of Islamic faith" (see above page 13) is added a sixth: *al wilāya*, i. e., adherence to the Imam, which includes separation from their enemies.² As compared to all other religious duties, this one is the most important in the Shī'itic faith, "Love for 'Alī consumes all sins, just as fire consumes the dry wood."³ This view forms the centre of the religious character of Shī'ism. The Khārijites are justified in characterising this as "the fanatical sympathy for an Arabic clan, carried so far that its faithful believe that an unlimited devotion to it releases man from all good works, and frees him from the punishment of misdeeds."⁴

VII. In order to understand the Shī'ite belief in the Imam it is necessary to emphasize the inherent difference between the theocratic rule of the caliph in Sunnism and that of the legitimate Imam in Shī'ism.

For Sunnite Islam the caliph exists in order to insure the carrying out of the tasks of Islam, in order to demonstrate and concentrate in his person the duties of the Moslem community. "At the head of the Moslems"—I quote the words of a Moslem theologian—"there must stand a man who sees that its laws are carried out, that its boundaries are kept, and defended, that its armies are equipped, that its obligatory taxes are raised, that the violent thieves and street robbers are

suppressed, that assemblies for worship are instituted, that the booties of war are justly divided, and other such legal necessities, which an individual in the community cannot attend to.”¹ In a word, he is the representative of the judicial, administrative and military power of the state. As ruler, he is none other than the successor of his predecessor, chosen by human act (choice or nomination by his predecessor), not through special qualities of his person. The caliph of the Sunnites is in no sense an authority in doctrine.

The Imam of the Shī‘ites on the contrary is the leader and teacher of Islam by right of personal qualities given to him by God, he is the HEIR OF THE PROPHET’S MINISTRY.² He rules and teaches in the name of God. Just as Moses could hear the call from the burning bush: “I am Allah, the Lord of the world” (Sura 28, v. 30), so it is the direct message of God which is given to the Imam of each age.³ The Imam possesses not only the character of a representative of a rule sanctioned by God, but also supernatural qualities, raising him above ordinary men and this in consequence of a dignity not accorded to him, but by virtue of his birth and rather a consequence of his substance.

Ever since the creation of Adam a divine substance of light has passed from one chosen successor of Adam to the next, until it reached the loins of the grandfather of Mohammed and ‘Alī. Here this divine light divided itself, and passed in part to ‘Abdallāh, the father of the prophet, and in part to his brother Abū Ṭālib, the father of ‘Alī. From the latter this divine light has passed from generation to generation, to the present Imam. The presence of the pre-existent divine light in the substance of his soul makes him the Imam of his age and gives him extraordinary spiritual powers far surpassing human abilities. His soul-substance is purer than that of ordinary mortals, “free from evil impulses, and

adorned with sacred forms." This is more or less the idea which moderate Shī'ism has of the character of its Imam. In its extreme form (as we shall see) 'Alī and the Imam are raised into the vicinity of the divine sphere, aye into its very midst. Although this transcendental theory is not clothed in definite, uniform, dogmatic terms it may be regarded as the generally recognized Shī'ite view of the character of the Imams.

Other conceptions are linked with these. When God commanded the angels to bow down before Adam, this adoration was intended for the light substances of the Imam embodied in Adam. After this adoration God told Adam to raise his eyes to the heavenly throne, where he saw the reflection of holy light bodies "just as the face of a man is reflected in a cellar mirror." The heavenly reflection of these holy bodies was thus raised up to the divine throne.⁴ The popular superstition did not stop with such apotheosis, it extended the effect of the divine peculiarities, which are within the body of the Imam, to his earthly being also. The Shī'itic populace, for instance, believed that the body of the Imam casts no shadows. Such views as these naturally arise at a time when there was no visible incorporation of the Imam. The Imam Mahdī was also supposed to be invulnerable,⁵ though it should be borne in mind that this trait was occasionally also attributed to the prophet⁶ in the Moslem hagiology and to numerous Marabouts⁷, especially of North Africa.

VIII. Not merely popular belief, but theological theory as well, has lost itself in the maze of such speculations regarding the character of Imam. There are extravagant theories within Shī'ism, which regard 'Alī and the Imams as actual incarnations of the deity. They are not merely men who share divine attributes and powers which raise them above the level of everyday men, they are manifestations of the divine being itself, in

whom corporality is of passing and purely accidental moment. In the account of Shī'ite sects to be found in the polemic and religio-historical literature of Islam (Ibn Ḥazm, Sha'hrastānī, etc.) we find the various forms of this belief. Its adherents are still to be met with in a group of sects whose whole name '*Alī-ilāhī* (worshippers of 'Alī-God) sufficiently marks the characteristic beliefs. Such sects combine the divinity of 'Alī with the setting aside of certain parts of Moslem law. The elevation of 'Alī often leads in such heresies (in so far as divinity is not attributed to Mohammed also) to the belittling of the prophet in favor of the worshipping of 'Alī. Some went so far as to say that the angel Gabriel might have made a mistake in taking God's message to Mohammed instead of 'Alī for whom it was intended. A group, the '*Ulyāniyya*, were also called '*Dammiyya*, i. e., "fault-finders," for they accuse the prophet of usurping the dignity which rightly belongs to 'Alī.² In the sect of *Nuṣairī*, which we shall consider again at the end of the chapter, Mohammed is subordinated to the divine 'Alī, and regarded merely in the light of a veil (*ḥijāb*).

Those who hold such views are known even to the Shī'ites as *ghulāt*, i. e., "exaggerators." They go back to the ancient days of Islam and appear at the same time as the political partisans of the 'Alī family. In very old Ḥadīths, which are also familiar to Shī'ite circles, 'Alī and his followers are themselves made to object to such overestimation, which could serve only to arouse antipathy to the 'Alī family.³

On the other hand it is to be noted that these exaggerations not only raise 'Alī's position and that of his successors, but also modify decidedly the conception of God. The doctrine of the incarnation of the divine being in the persons of the holy family of 'Alīites has made possible in these circles an excessively materialistic idea of the divinity. In fact it has led to purely mythological

views which take away from their adherents the last remnant of their claim to oppose themselves and their views to heathenism. It would take too long to discuss here in detail all those systems which arose out of the Shī'ite doctrine of incarnation, adopting the name of their respective founders, Bayyāniya, Mughīriyya, etc. Suffice it to refer to accessible translations of this section of Islamic literature⁴ which will furnish abundant evidence to show that Shī'ism was a fertile soil for fostering absurdities calculated to bring about the total disintegration and decay of the God-idea in Islam.

IX. Among the extravagant views that thus arose and among which an impartial judgment must include the Imam theory of the average Shī'ite, the doctrine of the Sinlessness and Infallibility of the Imams assumed a rigid dogmatic form. It is one of the fundamental doctrines of Shī'ite Islam.

Even in orthodox Islam much stress is laid on the question as to whether the prophets, by virtue of their prophetic character, were sinless and especially whether this immunity held good for the last and greatest prophet. The affirmative answer to this question is obligatory on every believing Moslem.¹ But it is characteristic of the importance of this dogmatic teaching that the greatest diversity has existed since ancient times among the leading authorities as to its formulation. For example, they are not agreed as to whether this Immunity goes back to the period preceding the prophetic call, or whether it begins at the time when the divine message is imparted. Orthodox dogmatists also disagree concerning the question whether the sinlessness granted to the prophet covers only the capital sins, or whether it includes all kinds of transgressions. Many restrict this privilege to the first class of sins, while they grant that the prophets were subject as other mortals to venial sins, or at least "stumbling" (zalal); they "sometimes

indeed choose the less desirable of two possible kinds of actions." It is interesting to note that an effort was made to except John the Baptist (in the Koran Yaḥyā ibn Zakariyya), contending that he never sinned, nor even meditated a misdeed—but this Ḥadīth found little favor.² Opinions differ very little, however, with regard to the sinlessness of Mohammed. Sins great and small had no part in his life before as well as after his calling as a prophet. This view holds in spite of the view of the oldest adherents of Islam who attribute to the Prophet the acknowledgment of sinfulness and need of penitence: "Return to God (perform penance) for I return a hundred times a day."³ "My heart is often sad and I ask pardon from God a hundred times a day."⁴ In agreement with this is the assumption on the basis of which the following prayer of the Prophet has been handed down. "My Lord accept my repentance, and grant my request and wash away my sin (ḥaubatī) and give power to my proof and guide my heart, and strengthen my tongue and take all hatred from my heart."⁵ Were the belief in sinlessness established, the prophet would not be made to speak and pray thus, nor would he himself in the Koran (Sura 48, v. 2) in the proud anticipation of his imminent victory,⁶ have revealed the words: "in order that he may forgive him (the Prophet) all his sins, the earlier and the later."⁷

The main point involved from the dogmatical point of view is the general agreement among the various orthodox views concerning the sinlessness of the prophets and especially of Mohammed that this ethical privilege is to be regarded as a grace granted by God to the Prophet as a necessary attribute, not, however, as inherent in the substance of the Prophet from his birth. Nor does the question of theoretical infallibility ever enter as a doctrine in Sunni dogmatics. The human limitation of the Prophet rather, is brought forward so emphatically

that a supernatural knowledge would in itself appear irreconcilable with the fundamental conception of his character. As with his sinlessness so with his excess of knowledge as compared to other men, this latter is not a common virtue inherent in his person, but the result of information imparted to him by God from case to case. His truthfulness is accepted in order to recognize as divine all messages which he offers as such. And his office as prophet is founded solely on his election as interpreter by the divine will, not on personal disposition. He does not bring into his power as prophet intellectual privileges which raise him above the niveau of human knowledge. In the Koran he gives frank expression to this view which is strictly maintained in the views developed on the basis of tradition by the theologians of the earlier generations. In reply to his opponents who were desirous of placing the Prophet in an embarrassing position by questioning him on matters of which he knew nothing Mohammed would say, "Why do you ask me about things which I can know nothing about? I am only a man and know only what my God allows me to know."⁸ For the orthodox the view that anyone but God can know the secret things, is heresy to the utterance of the Koran (Sura 27, v. 66); "No one in heaven and earth knows the hidden, except God." The Prophet himself is included in this negation,⁹ how much more then others?

The Sunnis have a great respect for the pious and learned people descended from the prophet; they are the Imams of the Shi'ites. But they do not attribute to them any other personal attributes than they do to other scholars and pietists of Islam. When, for example, a Sunni theologian called al-Bāḳir, who is five degrees removed from the great-grandson of the prophet, speaks of Mohammed, he pays his respects to his great learning, to which he owed the epithet of "the cleaver" (al-bāḳir), and he praises his exemplary piety and devo-

tion to God. But in thus characterizing him he merely says: "He was an excellent man of the generation of the 'successors' (tābi'ī those who came after the generation of the "Companions"), a leading Imam (in the sense of a "learned man") concerning whose excellence there is general agreement; he is included among the Fuḳahā (learned in law) of the city of Medīna."¹⁰ How differently the Shī'ites characterized this individual whom they regarded as their Fifth Imam. To them he is not simply a lawyer from Medīna, but a sharer of the stainless light-substance of the Prophet's family. Even the Shī'ite who has already been mentioned, a modern soul, who writes in English and is permeated with rationalistic ideas, alludes to Ḥusein for example as "primordial cause of existence" . . . "this essential connection between cause and effect" . . . "the golden link between God and man."¹¹

The orthodox Sunni estimate of the prophet and his holy successors is not affected by fairy-like, childish conceptions with which fancy clothed the prophet, but which never formed an element of obligatory belief. The mystic al-Sha'rānī has a whole chapter in which the following traits are ascribed to the prophet and others: "He could see behind him as well as in front of him, he also possessed the gift of sight in the dark; if he approached a man who was naturally taller than he, he attained the latter's height, when sitting he was head and shoulders above those around him; his body never cast a shadow, for it was full of light."¹² There can be no doubt that such views are developed under the influence of the extravagant theories which the Shī'ites had formed with regard to their Imams. The prophet naturally could not be regarded as inferior to these Imams,¹³—a further proof, therefore for the manner in which Ṣūfīism attached itself to Shī'itic ideas, to which we have already alluded.

X. In Shī'itic Islam all these questions gain quite another significance. They raise the attributes ascribed to the soul of the Imam above the measure of human nature—as we have already seen, “By virtue of the fact that they are free from evil impulses.” They are not accessible to sin; the divine light-substance which they harbor, could not unite with sinful inclinations. On the other hand, it affords the highest degree of true knowledge, complete Infallibility.¹ The Shī'ites teach that utterances which can be traced back to the Imam through the medium of reliable tradition, furnish stronger evidence than the immediate data of our senses. Owing to the infallibility of their originators such traditions are absolutely reliable, while the latter are exposed to appearances and illusions.² In addition to the religious knowledge within the reach of all Moslems the Imams possess a secret knowledge which comes down through their line, an apocalyptic tradition which is inherited by the sacred family from generation to generation, and which includes all the truths of religion as well as all worldly happenings. ‘Alī knew not only the true meaning of the Koran, hidden from the common understanding, but also everything which would happen till the judgment day. Every revolution which up till then “would send a hundred on the wrong path and a hundred on the right,” was known to him; he knew who would be their leaders and agitators.³ The belief in this secret prophetic knowledge of ‘Alī’s gave his followers the opportunity to invent peculiar literary productions supposed to contain these secret revelations.⁴

‘Alī’s knowledge is inherited as a secret tradition by the Imams succeeding him. They also are inspired and can proclaim only truth. They are therefore the only and highest authority in doctrine and therefore the legitimate successors of the prophetic office. Only their sayings and decisions can command unbounded belief and obedience.

All religious teachings, accordingly, in order to be recognized as authentic must be traced back to one of the Imams. This manner of verifying all teachings predominates in Shī'ite religious literature. The spring of all Ḥadīth sayings is not the "Companion," who heard them from the Prophet, but the Imam who is the sole authority in the proclamation and interpretation of the will of God and of the Prophet. A special Koran exegesis has grown up which goes back to the Imams. In this exegesis the most important as well as the most trivial matter is considered in its relation to its association with the Imam theory and to other Shī'ite doctrines. The knowledge of this literature is essential to a thorough penetration into the spirit of Shī'ism.⁵

We may conclude from all this that many of the principles which Sunni theology recognizes as revealing what is right and true from a religious standpoint are belittled by the Shī'ites, because of the stress which they lay on the sources of knowledge. Even the *Ijma'* here sinks to the level of a mere formality. The influence which this principle has upon the decision of religious questions is theoretically granted, but the significance of the consensus consists, according to Shī'itic theology, in the recognition that it could never have been brought about without the direct coöperation of the Imams. It is this integral element alone which gives that principle its importance. For that matter historical experience does not point to the *Ijma'* as the test of truth. If the Sunnis on the one hand depend for their recognition of the historical caliphate upon the consensus of the true believers, which after the death of the prophet called forth and sanctioned the Moslem form of state then existing; the Shī'ites, on the other hand, find in that same fact a proof that the simple *Ijma'* is not always coextensive with the principle of truth and righteousness. In the decision of the question of the Caliph, according to the Sunnis, the

Ijma' sanctified injustice and violence. In this way this collective authority, therefore, is depreciated or is confined to the agreement of the Imams

If we wish to characterize concisely the basic difference between Sunnites and Shī'ites we might say: the former is a church based on an Ijma', the latter on authority.⁶

XI. It has already been noted that even in the earliest days of the development of the Imam theory there was no agreement among the Shī'ite community as to the personalities of the Imam. One of the earliest manifestations of Shī'ite idea as we have seen (page 224) appeared in connection with an Imam who did not trace his descent from the Fāṭimide line of 'Alī. And even within the Fāṭimide descendants various groups of 'Alī adherents have set up quite distinct lines of Imams—a divergence due to the numerous ramifications of the 'Alī family. After the death of the Imam Abū Muhammed al-'Askarī, the Shī'ites were already split into about fourteen divisions,¹ each claiming the privilege of direct descent from 'Alī.² The series of Imams most widely recognized at the present time among the Shī'ites is that set up by the sect of the so-called "Twelvers" (or Imamites). According to them 'Alī's rank as Imam was directly inherited by "visible" Imams, up to the eleventh, whose son, Muhammed Abū-l-Ḳāsim (born in Baghdād 872), was removed from the earth when scarcely eight years old, and since then lives hidden from the sight of men, in order to appear at the end of time as the Imam *Mahdī*, the saviour, to free the world from injustice and to set up the kingdom of peace and justice. This is the so-called "hidden Imam," who has lived on ever since his disappearance, and whose reappearance is daily awaited by the faithful Shī'ite. This belief in a hidden Imam is to be found in all branches of Shī'ism. Each one of the parties believe in the con-

tinued existence and ultimate appearance of that Imam who in the special order of Imams is regarded as the last.

The various parties based their belief in the continued existence of the final Imam who is to reappear, on supposedly authoritative utterances which, however, were invented as a support for the belief. An example of the nature of such proof is to be found in a saying, put in the mouth of Mūsā al-Kāẓim (d. 183/799) the seventh Imam of the Twelvers, but regarded by this party as the "Hidden One," who will eventually reappear. "Whoever shall say to thee that he nursed me in my illness, washed my dead body, embalmed, wrapped me in shrouds and lowered me into the grave, and that he shook the dust of my grave from his feet, him thou canst declare to be a liar. If (after my disappearance) any one asks about me, answer: he lives, thank God; cursed be anyone who is questioned about me, and answers: he is dead."³

The "Return" is therefore one of the decisive factors in the Imam theory of all subdivisions of the Shī'ites; they differ only in regard to the person and order of the hidden and returning Imam.⁴

From the very beginning, those who set their hopes on 'Alī and his successors, held the firm conviction that the Imam who had disappeared would eventually return. This belief was attached in the first place to 'Alī himself by a group of adherents who were followers of 'Abdallāh ibn Sabā. They regarded him even during his lifetime as a supernatural being and, refusing to believe in his death, were convinced (in a docetic manner) of his ultimate return. This is the oldest testimony to the extravagant 'Alī cult and indeed the first manifestation of Shī'ite schism.⁵ The next person to be regarded as a vanishing Imam who would some day return, was 'Alī's son, Mohammed ibn āl-Ḥanafīyya, whose adherents were convinced of his continued existence, and his reappearance.

The idea of the "Return" is not of itself an original doctrine. Probably this belief came over into Islam through Judaic Christian influences.⁶ The prophet Elias, removed to heaven to reappear at the end of time to reestablish the rule of justice on the earth, is evidently the prototype of the removed and "invisible Imams" who are to reappear as Mahdīs bringing salvation to the world.

Similar beliefs and eschatological hopes attached to them are to be found in numerous other circles. The sect of Dositheites did not believe in the death of their founder Dositheos, but clung to the conviction of his survival.⁷ According to the belief of the Indian Vaishnavas, at the end of the present world period Vishnu incarnate as Kalkhi will appear, in order to free the land of the Arians from their oppressors by which are meant the Islamic conquerors. The Abyssinian Christians look for the return of their Messianic king Theodorus.⁸ Among the Mongolian people the belief is still prevalent, that Jengiskhān, at whose grave sacrifices are brought, announced, before his death, that in eight or ten centuries he would reappear on earth to free the Mongols from the foreign yoke of the Chinese.⁹ Within Islam heresies arose, which after the failure of the movements inaugurated by them, clung to the reappearance of their founder. The followers of Bihafīrīd, who at the beginning of the 'Abbāside period attempted a Parsee reaction against Islam, believe after his execution that their leader who had ascended into heaven would reappear on earth to take revenge on his enemies.¹⁰ The same belief was held about al-Muḩanna', the "veiled one," who appeared as a divine incarnation after he had sought a voluntary death¹¹ by fire.

Up till comparatively modern times this phase of belief has sustained itself among Moslem groups standing outside of the Shī'itic circle. The Moslems in the Cau-

casus believe in the return of their hero Elija Maṣṣūr, a forerunner of Shāmīl (1791), who is to reappear a hundred years after the expulsion of the Muscovites.¹² In Samarkand the people believe in the reappearance of the sacred persons of Shah-zinde and Kāsim ibn ‘Abbās.¹³ Just as among the Kurds we find from the eighth century after the Hijra the belief in the return of the executed Tāj al-‘ārifīn (Ḥasan ibn ‘Adī).¹⁴

But among similar beliefs arising from the hope of a political or religious restoration among eastern and western peoples, the belief of the Shī‘ites in the hidden and returning Imam has been most effectively developed. The theological basis and defence of this belief against the scorn of the doubter and opponent, forms a prominent feature of their religious literature. Quite recently, a work has appeared in Persia aiming to strengthen the belief in the existence of the hidden “Imam of the age,” against increasing scepticism.

Just as many Jewish theologians and mystics have endeavored to compute the exact time of the appearance of the Messiah (based largely on the book of Daniel), so Ṣūfiites and Shī‘ites have calculated by means of cabalistic use, verses of the Koran and numerical combinations of letters of the alphabet, the exact time of the reappearance of the hidden Imam. Treatises dealing with such calculations are enumerated in the bibliographies of the older Shī‘itic literature. But just as in Judaism the “calculators of the end of time” as they are called, encountered severest reproaches, so the orthodox authorities of the moderate Shī‘ites have branded “the time determiners” (*al-waḥḥatūn*) as liars, and have found in utterances of the Imams the condemnation of such speculations. The disillusionment resulting from the failure of such computations easily shows the dejection which such definite promises brought about.

XII. While the belief in the ultimate appearance of a

Messiah is more specifically a doctrine of Shī'itic Islam, it must be recognized that even the followers of orthodox Sunna did not stand aloof from the belief in a Redeemer to appear at the end of time, and whom they themselves recognized as the Imam "Mahdī," i. e., as the one guided by God on the right way.¹ This hope voices the longing in the pious circles of Islam for relief from political and economic conditions against which their religious consciousness rebelled.

Public life and its relations appeared to them a breach with the ideal claims maintained by them, as a continuous offence against religious and social justice. They, while admitting that the Moslem must not "split the staff," in the interest of the unity of the community, submit to the ruling injustice as a divine decree and suffer existing ills. They were prompted by their feelings towards a reconciliation between existing conditions with the demands of their faith. The hope in the Mahdī furnished the point of departure of such a reconciliation.² The proof has been furnished that the first stage of this hope coincides with the expectations of the Second Advent of Jesus, who as Mahdī will bring about the restoration of justice and order in the world. In the course, however, of the further development of the hope, the eschatological activities of Jesus became merely an accompanying phenomenon. Those inclined to a realistic view conceded occasionally that the hopes of the Mahdī were brought nearer to fulfillment through certain rulers from whom the restoration of divine justice was expected. Much was hoped for in this respect, after the overthrow of the 'Omayyads, from certain rulers of the 'Abbāside dynasty. This idle dream, however, was soon dispelled. In the eyes of the pious, the world remained as base as before. The Mahdī idea consequently began to take the form of a Mahdī Utopia, whose realization was removed into a hazy

future, which encouraged the steady growth of crude eschatological embellishments. God will stir up a man from the family of the prophet, who will restore the disorganized work, fill the world with justice, as it is now filled with injustice. To the Judaic Christian elements to which the Mahdī belief owes its origin there were added features taken from the Parsee picture of Saoshyant, and in addition the irresponsible phantasy of idle speculation contributed its share to produce a rich Mahdī mythology. The Ḥadīth seized upon this material which formed the subject of so much discussion among the circle of the believers. To the prophet himself there was attributed a detailed description of the personality of the Redeemer proclaimed by him. While such traditions were excluded from conscientious collections they were taken up and repeated by those who were less scrupulous.

In the course of the history of Islam this belief was well calculated to serve the political religious rebels as a justification for their aspirations to bring about the overthrow of existing conditions, as well as to secure for the representatives of the Mahdī idea great popularity, and to promote a spirit of unrest in extended portions of the Islamic world. Such occurrences are familiar to us through recent occurrences in the history of Islam. For even at the present time claimants for the post of Mahdī have appeared in various parts of Islam, chiefly to oppose the growing influence of European states on Moslem territory.³ We are indebted to Martin Hartmann for interesting accounts of present tendencies in the Turkish world, from which it appears that in many circles the confident hope is held in the advent of the true Mahdī (fixed for 1355, i. e., 1936), who will subject the whole world to Islam, and with whom the "golden age"⁴ will be inaugurated. Shī'ism, by virtue of its principles, is well adapted to the cultivation of these hopes in the Mahdī.

From the very beginning Shī'ism represents the protest against the violation and suppression of divine justice which runs through the entire history of Islam, marked by the exclusion of the family of 'Alī from the universal rule to which they are alone entitled. The Mahdī doctrine thus becomes the vital nerve of the entire Shī'itic system.

Among the Sunnis the expectation of a Mahdī, despite its authorization in tradition and its theological elaboration,⁵ never became a fixed dogma, but appeared as mythological elaboration of the future ideal, as a supplement to the orthodox system. Sunni Islam emphatically rejects the Shī'itic form of this belief. It ridicules the long-lived, hidden Imam. It is sufficient for the Sunnis to regard the claim of the "Twelvers" as absurd, because according to Sunni tradition the Mahdī must bear the very same name as the prophet (M. ibn 'Abdallāh), whereas the father of this hidden Imam, i. e., the eleventh visible Imam, bore the name Ḥasan.⁶ Besides since the Shī'itic Mahdī disappeared as a child, he is disqualified canonically by virtue of his immaturity from the dignity of Imam, which can only be accorded to an "adult" (*bāligh*). Others even deny the existence of a surviving son of Ḥasan al-'Askarī.

On the other hand, the belief in an ultimate fulfilment of the Mahdī hope is of prime dogmatic significance in Shī'itic Islam. It forms the backbone of the Shī'ite system and is completely identical with the return (*raja'*) of the hidden Imam into the visible world, and who as the new law-giver is to take up the work of the prophet and to restore the rights of his family. He alone can fill the world with right and justice. Sober-minded Shī'itic scholars, in answer to the taunts of the Sunnites, make a serious endeavor to prove physiologically and historically the possibility of his extraordinary long life.⁷

Even during his bodily absence the hidden Imam is the genuine "leader of the time" and not without the

power to manifest his will to believers.⁸ He is the object of extravagant pæans on the part of the faithful, who not only praise and flatter him as a potentate among the living, but also apply to him the superhuman epithets commensurate with belief in him as the hidden Imam. According to them he surpasses even the high intellect of the spheres in spiritual greatness; he is the source of all knowledge and the goal of all longing. The Shī'itic poets are firmly convinced that such praises reach the hidden throne of the sublime personality of the Imam."

A remarkable proof of the active force still attached in Shī'itic circles to the belief in the hidden Imam is furnished by recent events in Persia, where, upon the introduction of a new constitution, "the consent and approval of the Imam of the time" was invoked. The authority of this invisible power is thus recognized as supreme in religious and political affairs. Every innovation must submit to the approval of his authority, even though this be only a matter of form. Thus we find the revolutionary party in Persia declaring in an "appeal to the public," issued in October, 1908, for the restoration of parliamentary government after the coup d'état of Shah Mohammed 'Alī, as follows: "You are perhaps not aware of the clear and undisputed decision of the 'Ulemā of the holy city of Nejef, according to which everyone who opposes the constitution is to be compared to him who draws the sword against the Imam of the Time (i. e., against the hidden Imam)—May Allah grant you the joy of his return!"¹⁰

The doctrine of the Imam, accordingly, maintains its active force. It has attained a dogmatic significance of fundamental importance and is an active, essential element of the religious and political system.

XIII. Now that we have learned to know the nature and significance of the dignity of the Imam as the very root of Shī'itic faith, in so far as the latter is distinct

from Sunni Islam, one question still remains to be considered which is essential to a complete understanding of Shī'ism.

Attachment to Islam is not covered by an act of submission to a definite form of political argument, whether in a theoretical or an actual sense; it demands, in addition, the recognition of a definite number of doctrines, in regard to the formulation of which various parties differ. It further demands the fulfilment of a definite series of ritualistic practices regulating life with legal nicety, the details of which form the subject of differences among the various recognized schools. The question now arises whether Shī'ism has developed outside of the Imam theory other peculiarities of a dogmatic or practical character, which further separate this sect in an essential degree from Sunni Islam. By way of answer we should like to point out that the characteristic doctrine of Shī'itic Islam involves a deviation from the point of view of the Sunna that extends to other dogmatic points of a basic character. The Shī'itic conception of the nature of the Imams necessarily exercises an influence on the form taken by their idea of God, their view of law and of the function of the prophet.

Another point to be taken into consideration is the circumstance that within the various tendencies of the many branches of Shī'ism, various points of view have come to the fore in questions of dogma, including, in the case of some of the schools, a crude anthropomorphic disposition. It can be proved, however, that that phase of Shī'ism which obtained an authoritative position in matters that were not connected with the doctrine of the Imam, is closely allied to the Mu'tazilite point of view,¹ which we discussed in a previous chapter (Chapter 3, page 110). It shows how far the theologians went in incorporating in their teachings the Mu'tazilite point of view. Their designation of themselves as "adherents of

justice, forms as we have seen, one half of the designation which the Mu'tazilites give to themselves. The point of union between the two appears to be their assertion that 'Ali and the Imams were the original founders of Mu'tazilite dogmatism, and that the later followers of Kalām merely developed doctrines already propounded by the Imams.² We accordingly find in their theological works an Imam named as the originator of a Mu'tazilite proposition. An opinion attributed to the Imam Abū Ja'far al-Bāḳir which recalls in its second part the well known utterance of a Greek philosopher, will illustrate what we have in mind:

God is designated as knowing and powerful in the sense that he grants knowledge to those who know and the ability to carry out to those who have the power. What you regard as his special traits, are created and brought about and in so far as these attributes are to be separated from his Unity, they represent the products of your own mind. It is the same as in the case of the snails who might imagine God to have two horns because these are necessary for their own perfection, and the absence of them would constitute, from their point of view, a defect precisely of the same order as when rational beings attribute their own traits to God.³

The connection between the prevailing dogmatism of the Shī'ites and the doctrines of the Mu'tazilites seem to be maintained as a definite fact and finds an unmistakable expression in the declaration of the Shī'ite authority, that the doctrine of the hidden Imam is a part of the teachings of those who accept the *'adl* and *tauḥīd* which represent the Mu'tazilite teachings.⁴ It is in particular a branch of the Shī'ites known as the Zeiditic which is even more closely and more consistently related to the Mu'tazilite doctrines than is the Imamitic.

The Mu'tazilite influence has maintained its hold in the Shī'itic literature up to the present time. It is a

serious error to declare that after the decisive victory of the Ash'arite theology the Mu'tazilite doctrine ceased to play any active part in the religion or the literature. The rich dogmatic literature of the Shī'ites extending into our own days refutes such an assertion. The dogmatic works of the Shī'ites reveal themselves as Mu'tazilite expositions by their division into two parts, one embracing the chapters on "the unity of God" and the other the chapter on "justice" (above, page 110). Naturally the presentation of the Imam doctrines of the infallibility of the Imam are also included. But even in regard to this latter point it is not without significance that one of the most radical of the Mu'tazilites, al Naẓẓām, agrees with the Shī'ites. And it is especially characteristic of the Shī'itic theology that their proofs for the theory of the Imamate are based entirely on Mu'tazilite foundations. The absolute necessity of the presence of an Imam in every age and the infallible character of his person are brought into connection with the doctrine peculiar to the Mu'tazilites of an absolutely necessary guidance through divine wisdom and justice (page 111). God must grant to each age a leader not exposed to error. In this way Shī'itic theology fortifies its fundamental point of view with the theories of Mu'tazilite doctrine.⁵

XIV. So far as the ritualistic and legal sections of their teachings go, the differences between Sunnites and Shī'ites are entirely of a minor character, rarely affecting usages of a fundamental kind.

The ritualistic and legal practice of the Shī'ites differs from the legal practices of the rest of Islam merely in the same way as within the sphere of orthodoxy there are which represent the Mu'tazilite teaching.⁴ It is in particular a branch of the Shī'ite known as the Zeiditic which is even more closely, consistently related to the shades of varying practice, involving invariably only insignificant formal differences, just as we find such

differences between the Ḥanīfites and Mālikites.¹ The observation has been made that the Shī'itic ritualism shows the closest affiliation to the Shāfi'itic school. Fundamental principles are not involved. To the Sunnites, the Shī'ite appears as a dissenter, not because of any peculiarities of his ritual, or because of the tendencies of his doctrines, but chiefly because of his deviation from the accepted statecraft of the Sunna.

How unimportant the ritualistic differences of the Shī'ites are from the practice of the Sunnite community, may be inferred from the modifications involved in the case of a Sunnitic community being forced to adopt Shī'itic ritual as a result of conquest. We select for this purpose the instructions issued by a Shī'itic conqueror in the year 866 in which are set forth the changes necessary to establish Shī'itic authority in Ṭabaristān.

You must require your subjects to regard the book of Allah and the Sunna of his messenger as the guide, as well as everything which has been handed down by the ruler of the faithful 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, as authentic as regards the fundamental teachings of value and its branches. Furthermore the supremacy of 'Alī over the entire congregation of the true believers must be publicly recognized. You must forbid them to believe in the absolute fatality (*jabr*) in the anthropomorphic conception, or to oppose the confession of the unity and justice of God. They must be forbidden to hand down traditions which accord virtues to the enemies of God and to the enemies of the Lord of the true believer ('Alī). You must command them to repeat aloud the Bismillāh-formula (the first Sura of the Koran at the beginning of a prayer); to recite the Kūnūt-request at the morning prayer;² to repeat the Allāh-akbar-formula five times in the funeral service, abandon the custom of rubbing the foot gear (in place of the washing of the feet before prayer)³; to add to the *aḍān* (call to prayer) and the *Ikāma* (the announcement of the beginning of the service in connection with the *Aḍān*) the sentence: "Come hither for the best of pious deeds"⁴; and to recite the *Ikāma* twice.

Except for the dogmatic principles, therefore, it is a question of minor ritualistic differences such as those found in greatest number within the orthodox sections.⁵ There are in all only seventeen points in which the Shī'itic law takes a separate stand and does not agree with one or the other of the orthodox customs.⁶

XV. The most serious differences between Shī'ite and Sunnite law is to be found within the province of marriage laws. At all events this variation is of more importance for our consideration and estimate of Shī'ism than those minute ritualistic differences in the religious practice. There is more specifically one point in the marriage law which merits attention from this point of view, to wit legitimacy or illegitimacy of a marriage agreement with a limitation as to time, the so-called temporary marriage.¹

Even in Plato's ideal state temporary marriage is recognized as legitimate in the selected circles, designated as 'the guardians,' though, to be sure, this is done from points of view that are removed from those prevailing in Islam. Theodore Gomperz has pointed out an analogy from New England in the case of the "Perfectionists" founded by John Humphrey Noyes, and which maintained its seat at Oneida for an entire generation,² and advocated among its principles trial marriage.

Naturally, the motives were different which actuated Mohammed at the beginning of his career as a lawgiver to tolerate a form of marriage which was common in heathen Arabia (for which we have also the testimony of Ammianus Marcellinus), technically known as "sensual marriage" (mut'a), but which it is preferable to designate as 'temporary marriage.' At the end of the period agreed upon in such a union, the validity of the marriage according to agreement ceases eo ipso without any formality or divorce.³ The validity of this form of

marriage was, however, abrogated after some years; it is a mooted question whether the prophet himself or (which is more likely) 'Omar was the first to declare such a marriage to be the "sister of prostitution" and to forbid it to the true believers. Even after this prohibition, however, it was indulged in to a limited degree, e. g., for the pilgrimage to Mecca. Since the recognition of the Mut'a form goes back to a Ḥadīth of Ibn 'Abbas, it has been satirically designated "as a marriage according to the fetwā of Ibn 'Abbas."⁴ The Sunnis in the course of the establishment of Islamic institution have accepted the protest against temporary marriage whereas the Shī'ites, basing their claim (Sura 4, v. 28),⁵ on the Koran, still recognize such a contract as valid.⁶ Its repeal by the Prophet they claim is not satisfactorily vouched for, nor is its abrogation by 'Omar⁷ valid, since, even if the tradition in regard to his attitude is accepted, his authority in matters of law is not recognized.

This difference between Sunnitic and Shī'itic Islam is therefore to be recognized as the most significant in the domain of legal practice.

XVI. In this connection several customs and usages belonging to the realm of *historical reminiscences* should be mentioned. These deal with the commemoration of the 'Aliides, the mourning of the Shī'ites over the martyrdom of the members of the sacred family. The Buyide regents, under whose protection the Shī'ite opinions could be more freely expressed, instituted a special religious feast (īd al-ghadīr), to commemorate the act of immersion which took place in the pond of Khumm, whereby the prophet appointed 'Alī as his successor. Upon this occurrence 'Alī's adherents have, since earliest times, based the legitimacy of their Shī'ite beliefs.¹ Older than this is the observance of the 'Āshūrā (10. Muḥar-

ram) as a day of repentance and mourning in memory of the Kerbelā catastrophe, which tradition fixes on this day. The pilgrimages also to the cities and graves in ‘Irāk,² sacred to the memory of ‘Alī, give to the cult of graves and saints in Shī‘ism a peculiar individual stamp, which far surpasses in inner significance the richly developed Sunni cult of saints.

XVII. Before we proceed from the exposition of the political, dogmatic and legal peculiarities of this Moslem sect to the religious-historical combinations, which manifested themselves on the basis of Shī‘ite doctrines, it is essential to call attention to some erroneous views about Shī‘ism which are still widely prevalent.

Let me briefly consider three of these erroneous views, which cannot be passed over in silence in this connection.

(a) The mistaken view that the main difference between Sunni and Shī‘ite Islam lies in the fact that the former recognizes, in addition to the Koran, the Sunna of the prophet as a source of religious belief and life, whereas the Shī‘ites limit themselves to the Koran and reject the Sunna.¹

This is a fundamental error involving a complete misunderstanding of Shī‘ism, and has arisen largely from the antithesis in the nomenclature between *Sunna* and *Shī‘a*. No Shī‘ite would allow himself to be regarded as an opponent of the principle of Sunna. Rather is he the representative of the true Sunna, of the sacred tradition handed down by the members of the prophet’s family, while the opponents base their Sunna on the authority of usurping “Companions” whose reliability the Shī‘ites reject.

It very frequently happens that a great number of traditions are common to both groups; differing only in the authorities for their authenticity. In cases where

the Ḥadīths of the Sunnites favor the tendencies of the Shī'ites, or at least are not opposed to them, Shī'itic theologians do not hesitate to refer to the canonical collection of their opponents. As an example we may instance the circumstance that the collection of Bukhārī and of Muslim, as well as of other collectors of Ḥadīths were used at the court of a fanatical Shī'ite vizier (Ṭālā'i' ibn Ruzzīk) as subjects for pious reading at the sacred Friday gatherings.²

Tradition is therefore an integral source of religious life among the Shī'ites. How vital a rôle it plays in Shī'ite teachings may be inferred from the circumstance that 'Alī's teaching about the Koran and Sunna, as above set forth (page 43) is taken from a collection of solemn speeches and sayings of 'Alī, handed down by the Shī'ites. Reverence for the Sunna is therefore as much of a requirement for the Shī'ites as for the Sunnites. This is illustrated also in the abundant Sunnite literature of the Shī'ites, and the discussions attached thereto, as well as in the great zeal with which the Shī'ite scholars fabricated Ḥadīths, or propagated earlier fabrications which were to serve the interests of Shī'ism. We must therefore reject the supposition that the Shī'ites in principle are opposed to Sunna. It is not as rejecters of the Sunna that they oppose its adherents, but rather as those faithful to the family of the prophet and its followers—that is the meaning of the word *Shī'ite*—or as the élite (*al-khāṣṣa*) as opposed to the common people (*al-'amma*) sunk in error and blindness.

(b) It is also an erroneous view which traces the origin and development of Shī'ism to the modifications of the ideas in Islam, brought about by the conquest and spread among Iranic nations.

This widespread view is based on an historical misunderstanding, which Wellhausen has overthrown con-

clusively in his essay on the "Religiös-politischen Oppositions-Parteien im alten Islam." The 'Alīite movement started on genuine Arabic soil. It was not till the uprising of al-Mukhtār that it spread among the non-Semitic element of Islam.⁵ The origins of the Imam theory involving the theocratic opposition against the worldly conception of the state; the doctrine of the Messiah into which the Imam theory merges and the belief in the parousia in which it finds an expression, as we have seen, can be traced back to Jewish-Christian influences. Even the exaggerated deification of 'Alī was first proclaimed by 'Abdallāh ibn Sabā, before there could possibly have been a question of the influence of such ideas from Aryan circles, and Arabs joined this movement in great numbers.⁶ Even the most marked consequences of anthropomorphic doctrine of incarnation (see above page 233) owe their origin in part to those who are of indisputable Arabic descent.

Shī'ism as a sectarian doctrine was seized upon as eagerly by orthodox and theocratically minded Arabs as by Iranians. To be sure, the Shī'ite form of opposition was decidedly welcome to the latter, and they readily identified themselves with this form of Moslem thought on whose further development their old inherited ideas of a divine kingship exercised a direct influence. But the primary origins of these ideas within Islam do not depend on such influence; Shī'ism is, in its roots, as genuinely Arabic as Islam itself.

(c) It is likewise a mistaken view that Shī'ism represents the reaction of independent thought against Sunnitic incrustation.

Quite recently Carra de Vaux has advocated the view that the opposition of Shī'ism against Sunnitic Islam is to be regarded as "the reaction of free and liberal thought against narrow and unbending orthodoxy."⁷

This view cannot be accepted as correct by any stu-

dent of Shī'itic doctrines. To be sure, it might be urged that the cult of 'Alī forms to such an extent the centre of religious life among the Shī'ites as to remove all other elements into the background. (See above page 231.) This feature cannot, however, be regarded as characteristic of the principles underlying Shī'itic doctrines, which in no respect are less strict than those of the Sunnites. Nor should we be led astray in the historical appreciation of the principle of Shī'ism by an increasing lack of regard among the Shī'ite Mohammedans of Persia for certain restrictions demanded by the ritual.⁸ "In giving the preference to infallible personal authority as against the force of general public sentiment, the Shī'ites set aside these potential elements of liberal thought, which manifest themselves in the Sunnitic form of Islam."^{8a} It is the spirit of absolutism rather which permeates the Shī'itic conception of religion.

We further recall that broadmindedness and narrowness in religious views are to be judged primarily according to the degree of tolerance exercised towards those having divergent views: it must be admitted that the Shī'ite development of Islam as compared with that of the Sunnite occupies a lower level. What we have in mind are not certain modern manifestations among the Shī'ites, we are concerned only with the definite religious and legal institutions of this branch of Islam, as expressed in its doctrines. These, to be sure, have been considerably modified by the actual demands of life in modern days, and at present are carried out with entire strictness in social intercourse only in the most outlying districts.

If we judge from the legal documents, the interconfessional conception of the law of Shī'ism appears harsher and cruder than that of the Sunnites. Their laws reveal an increasing intolerance toward opponents

in faith. Shī'ite interpretation of the law did not avail itself of the concessions which Sunnitic orthodoxy accepted as against the narrowness of some of the older views. Whereas Sunnitic Islam has practically set aside by its interpretation the harsh statement of the Koran (Sura 9, v. 28), that "non-believers are unclean," Shī'itic law clings to the literal sense, and declares the body of the unbeliever to be unclean in a ritualistic sense, and includes contact with such a person among the things that bring about ritualistic uncleanness.⁹ It is an exact reflection of this view when the Haji Baba of James Morier "regards it as one of the most extraordinary traits of the English that they do not look upon any one as unclean. They would as soon touch an Israelite as one of their own race." From the point of view of Shī'ite law, such an attitude towards those of another faith is not regarded as strange.^{9a} Other examples of this point of view may be found in writings of Europeans who have come into contact with Shī'ites. Let me quote some remarks from the work of a reliable observer of Persian life, Dr. J. E. Polaks, who for many years was the body physician of the Shāh Nāṣir al-dīn. "If by chance a European arrives at the beginning of a meal, the Persian is in a quandary, for decency forbids sending him away, and his presence offers difficulty, because food touched by an unbeliever is unclean."¹⁰ "Anything left-over from the table of a European is scorned by the servants and is given to the dogs." Speaking of his travels in Persia, he says "The European must not fail to take a drinking cup with him; none is ever offered to him, for according to the belief of the Persians every dish becomes unclean as soon as it is used by an unbeliever."¹¹ Of the contemporary minister of foreign affairs, Mirza Seyyid Khān, the same authority says that "at the sight of a European he washes his eyes, to guard them from contamination." This minister was a very

pious Moslem, who consented very unwillingly to take wine as a medicine. This remedy in the course of time became so agreeable that "despite his piety he was never found sober."¹² The Shī'ites show the same intolerance to the Zoroastrians living among them. Professor Browne tells of many experiences he had during his stay in Yezid. A Zoroastrian received a bastinading because his dress by chance touched some fruit which had been exposed for sale in the Bazaar. Because of the touch of an unbeliever the fruit was regarded as unclean and could not be eaten by one of the true faith.¹³

We find this state of things frequently among the uneducated Shī'itic groups outside of Persia. In South Lebanon, between Baalbek and Şafed and eastward toward Coelo-Syria and the Anti-Lebanon, there is a Shī'itic sect to be found among the peasants living in villages, known as Metāwile (sing. Mitwālī=Mutawālī, i. e., "faithful followers of the 'Alī family), and consisting of fifty or sixty thousand adherents. According to an unauthenticated report they are supposed to be descended from Kurdish settlers, who in the time of Saladin were transplanted from Mesopotamia to Syria. If this were true they would be Iranians¹⁴ in origin; but the supposition is entirely without foundation. They are to be found in largest numbers in Baalbek and the surrounding villages. The Emir family of Harfush reckons its descent from them. Now these peasants share with other Shī'ites the above-mentioned feeling against unbelievers. Although they practice the virtue of hospitality toward everyone, they regard any dishes in which they have served food and drink to an unbeliever as infected. On this point the American scholar, Selah Merrill, who traveled through this part of the country for the American Palestine Exploration Society 1875-77, says: "They consider that they are polluted by the touch of Christians. Even a vessel from which a

Christian has drunk, and anything from which he may have eaten, or even handled while eating, they never use again, but destroy at once.’¹⁵

Although we must reject the view that Shī’ism in its rise is the result of Iranic influences on Arab Islam, the relative severity towards those of another faith must be ascribed to Persian influence, but as a secondary development of the ideas of Shī’ism.¹⁶ This severe attitude of Shī’itic law towards those of another faith approaches the regulations in Persian religious writings, which for the most part are regarded by the present Zoroastrians as obsolete, and of which the Shī’ite attitude seems to be an echo.

“A Zoroastrian must purify himself with Nirang after having touched a non-Zoroastrian. A Zoroastrian can partake of no nourishment prepared by a non-Zoroastrian; neither butter, nor honey, not even on a journey.”¹⁷

It is more particularly the acceptance of these Persian regulations that has given rise to ritualistic differences between the branches of Islam. In spite of the specific concession made by the Koran (Sura 5, v. 7), the Shī’ite law forbids the partaking of food prepared by Jew or Christian; what has been slaughtered by them cannot be eaten by a Moslem.¹⁸ The Sunnites adopt the broader view for which the Koran itself offers a justification.¹⁹

In another division of the religious law the Shī’ites do not avail themselves of the freedom given by the Koran, but in contradiction to their sacred writings, draw the consequences of their intolerant views. The Koran permits a Moslem to wed an honorable woman of Jewish or Christian faith (Sura 5, v. 7). From the Sunnitic point of view therefore, according to the theory of ancient Islam, such mixed marriages are considered unobjectionable.²⁰ The Caliph ‘Othmān married the

Christian Nā'ila.²¹ The Shī'ites condemn such marriages, with reference to the law in Sura 2, v. 220, forbidding marriage with polytheists (*mushrikāt*). The Koran verse favoring marriage with monotheists of another faith is deprived of its original meaning, by an interpretation.²²

The intolerance of the true Shī'ite, however, extends not only to non-Moslems, but to Moslems who think differently. Their literature is saturated with this view. The temper of the Shī'ite as an "ecclesia oppressa," fighting against persecution and oppression, and which restricted the free expression of opinion to secret conclaves of followers, is filled with hostility toward its religious opponents. It regards its enforced *takiyya* as a martyrdom, which only serves to nourish its hatred towards those responsible for this condition. We have already seen that its theologians have raised the cursing of the enemy to the rank of a religious duty (above page 229). In their hatred of dissenters many of the theologians go so far as to add to the Koran verse commending alms-giving the qualification that unbelievers and those opposing 'Alī's cause were to be excluded from all deeds of mercy. According to them the prophet said: "He who gives alms to our enemies, is like him who robs the sanctuaries of God."²³ The Sunnites can cite the caliph 'Omar for a more humane interpretation. On entering Syria he commanded that helpless, sick Christians should be aided by the tax (*ṣadaqāt*) raised for the public purposes of the Moslem community.²⁴ The tradition of the Shī'ites are almost more hostile to the other Moslems than to non-Moslems. In one of their sayings the Syrians (i. e., the Sunni opponents) are placed lower than the Christians, and the people of Medina (who accepted the caliphate of Abū Bekr and 'Omar) lower than the Meccan heathen.²⁵ There is no room here for tolerant views, indulgence, and forbear-

ance toward those of another belief. The following detail shows to what an unreasonable degree their contempt for opponents extends. One of their standard authorities teaches that in doubtful cases in which the sources of religious law fail to give a handle for definite decision the best line of procedure is to do the opposite of what the Sunnis would consider right. "That which contradicts the 'āmma (the Sunnitic view) is correct."²⁶ Such is their theology of hate and intolerance.

XVIII. Of the many branches of Shī'ism which, in the course of time, have completely disappeared from the scene, two sects besides the Twelvers have survived: the Zeidites and the Ismā'ilites.

(a) The former deviate with the succession of Imams at the fifth one after the twelve and derive their name from Zeid ibn 'Alī, a great-grandson of Ḥusein. In opposition to Ja'far al Ṣadik, recognized by the general body of Shī'ites as the hereditary Imam, Zeid steps forward in the year 122/940, in Kūfa as the 'Alidic pretender, and dies in battle against the Omayyad caliph. His son, Yahya, continued his father's unsuccessful struggle, and fell in Khorasān in 125/743. As a consequence, the Imamship in the group of those Shī'ites who do not recognize the Twelve, abandons the principle of direct succession from father to son with the efforts of Zeid as the watchword of their schism. The Zeidites, indifferent to line of descent, recognize any 'Alīite as their Imam, who in addition to his qualities as religious leader becomes a warrior for the holy cause, and as such, secures the devotion of the community. Their conception is that of the *active* Imamship, not the *passive* conception of the 'Twelver' Shī'ites which closes with the hidden Mahdī. Even the fables of supernatural wisdom and divine qualities as possessed by the Imam are rejected by them. In place of such phantasies the realistic character of the Imam is emphasized as an active,

openly belligerent leader and teacher of true believers. Following the view of their leader they show themselves tolerant in their judgment of the Sunna caliphates of the beginning of Islam. They do not share in the absolute condemnation of Abū Bakr and 'Omar and the companions of the prophet, who because of their failure to recognize the supernatural qualities of 'Alī, did not accord to him the immediate succession. Such short-sightedness, however, does not stamp the early adherents of Islam as wrong-doers; nor those chosen by them as usurpers. From this point of view they form the most moderate wing of the Shī'ite party opposed to the Sunnite. Like the dynasty of the Idrisites in Northwest Africa (791-926 A. D.), Zeidite rulers arose from the Ḥasanide line of the descendants of 'Alī. In this way was founded the Shī'ite dynasty of Ḥasan ibn 'Alī which in 863-928 A. D. obtained the sovereignty over Ṭabaristān, just as (since the ninth century) the Imamship in South Arabia, although belonging to the line of Ḥasan, bases its justification on Zeiditic claims. This branch of the Shī'ite sect is still to be found in South Arabia and is popularly known as *al-zuyūd*.

(b) The Ismā'ilites derive their name from the fact that in distinction from the 'Twelvers,' they end their line of visible Imams with the seventh. Their Imam, not recognized by the 'Twelvers,' is Ismā'il, son of the sixth Imam Ja'far (d. 762 A. D.) who, however, for one reason or another did not actually accept the dignity of Imam, but allowed it to pass on to his son Mohammed, who then took Ismā'il's place as the true seventh Imam. His descendants follow in unbroken line as hidden, latent Imams, denying themselves publicity until, as a result of long practiced secret propaganda, the true Imam publicly appeared as Mahdī in the person of 'Ubaidallāh, the founder of the Fāṭimide kingdom in North Africa (910 A. D.). The followers of this Shī'ite system, in

contradistinction to the usual Imamites, are therefore called "Seveners."

The merely formal significance of this distinction would not of itself have sufficed to differentiate sharply this sect from the many branches of Shī'ism. The propaganda of the Ismā'ilites, however, furnished the framework for a movement of great importance in the history of Islam. In addition, their secret intrigues resulted in giving to the political history of Sunna noteworthy expression.

Those who were striving for a recognition of the Ismā'ilite form of the doctrine of Imam utilized this aspect of the movement to blend their view with theories which questioned the validity of traditional Islam, even in its Shī'itic form, and led to its complete dissolution.

One of the most potent influences upon the evolution of the Islam idea arose from the neo-Platonic philosophy. The thoughts of this philosophical system influenced the widest circles of Islam, and have even penetrated into documents in which the unquestionably orthodox contents of Islam find expression.¹ We have already called attention to the consequential application of neo-Platonic ideas to Ṣūfiism. In the same way attempts were made in Shī'itic circles to combine Imam and Mahdī theories with the neo-Platonic doctrine of emanation of ideas.² This influence manifested itself more particularly by the use which the Ismā'ilite propaganda made of this doctrine. With this difference, however, that whereas Ṣūfiism aims only at an inner construction of religious life, the influence of neo-Platonic ideas among the Ismā'ilites laid hold of the entire organization of Islam with a view to its modification. The Imam idea is merely the form of this evolutionary activity offering an apparently Islamic point of departure to this movement. The Ismā'ilites start out with the neo-Platonic doctrine of emanation which was developed by a band of so-called

‘faithful’ of Baṣra in the form of a religious systematic encyclopedia, into a religious-philosophical system, the postulates of which led to extreme consequences. As the historical counterpart to the cosmic scope of the neo-Platonic doctrine of emanation, a system of periodic manifestations of the world intellect is constructed, which in Noah, Abraham, Moses, Jesus, Mohammed up to the Imam following upon the sixth in the Shī‘itic order (Ismā‘il and his son ibn Ismā‘il), thus forming a cyclic series of seven “speakers” (*nāṭiq*). The periods intervening between these “speakers” are filled up with series of seven individuals, likewise emanations of the transcendental powers, who confirm the work of the preceding “speaker” and prepare that of the succeeding one. In this way there is established a close, artificially constructed hierarchy, through which, since the beginning of the world, the divine spirit manifests itself to mankind successively in ever more perfect manner. Each successive manifestation completes the work of its predecessor. The divine revelation is not confined to a given moment of time in the history of the world. With the same cyclic regularity the Mahdī follows the Seventh Nateḳ, endowed with the mission to surpass as a still more perfect manifestation of the world spirit, the work of his predecessors, even that of the prophet Mohammed.

By this turn given to their doctrine of the Mahdī, one of the fundamental principles of Islam, which ordinary Shī‘ism had not dared to touch, is set aside. In the eyes of the faithful, Mohammed is the “seal of the prophets”—he himself had given himself this attribute though probably in a different sense (Sura 33, v. 40),—and the Mohammedan Church in its Sunni as well as its Shī‘a form, had interpreted this as meaning that Mohammed ended forever the line of prophets, that he was fulfilling for all times what his predecessors had prepared, that he was the bearer of God’s last message to mankind. The “expected Mahdī” was merely the restorer of the works of the last

prophet spoiled by the corruption of mankind, the prophet in whose path he treads, whose name he bears. He is not himself a prophet, much less the teacher of an evolutionary principle of salvation going beyond the form given to it by Mohammed.³ In the Ismā'ilite system of emanation, Mohammed's prophetic character and the law that he brought in the name of God loses the significance attributed to it by the rest of Islam, even in its Shī'itic form.

Using the flag of the Shī'itic party of the Ismā'ilites as a pretext, these teachings so destructive to Islam spread by means of a secret propaganda, which involved a gradual introduction of its initiates into successive grades within the organization until, when the highest grade was received, the attachment to the religion of Mohammed became an empty form. In its final aim Ismā'ilism is thus the destruction of the positive content of Islam. But even in the preliminary grades the law and tradition of Islam as well as the sacred history of the Koran are interpretations in an allegorical sense. The literal wording is pushed into the background as merely the outward form of the true spiritual significance. "Just as the neo-Platonic doctrines aim to strip off the material cloak, and lead into the heavenly home of the universal soul, so the enlightened person must remove the corporeal form of the law by rising to a constantly higher and purer knowledge and thus attain the world of pure spirituality. Law is merely a pedagogical means of temporary and relative value for the immature"⁴—an allegory the real significance of which is to be found in the spiritual treasure implied in the allegory. The Ismā'ilites go so far as to recognize as true believers only those who follow these destructive doctrines. Those who take the laws and stories of the Koran literally are unbelievers.

This allegorical conception of the law and the invalidity of its literal meaning was indeed anticipated in the

circumstance that Ismā'il who gave the name to the sect was rejected by the opposing Imamites because he was guilty of wine-drinking and thereby rendered himself unworthy of the Imamship. Against this, however, those to whom the name of Ismā'il became the rallying cry, claim that a person, who by birth is singled out for the dignity of the Imamship, must be free from sinfulness. The prohibition of wine, had, therefore, merely allegorical significance for Ismā'il and also for his followers. It was the same with the other laws; fasting, pilgrimage, etc. The opponents of the sect claim that this religious conception was extended to the abolition of moral laws and to the approval of all kinds of shameful practices.⁵ We cannot, however, believe that spiteful pictures of this kind correspond to the actual facts.

This system, so admirably adapted to the grades of initiation to secret propaganda, has with the aid of a clever policy set on foot movements which have had a widespread influence on Mohammedan circles. The foundation of the Fāṭimide kingdom in North Africa and later in Egypt with the territories belonging thereto (909-1171), was the result of an Ismā'ilitic intrigue. Consistent Ismā'ilites could not be satisfied with the last temporal manifestation of the world-intellect in the Fāṭimide Imam. The circle was to be closed. They regarded the year 1017 as the time when the Fāṭimide caliph Ḥākīm should reveal himself as the incarnation of God. When he disappeared in the year 1021, presumably through murder, his few followers refused to believe in his actual death; they declared he was living in hiding, and would return (see above, page 241). The belief in Ḥākīm's divine nature persists among the Druses of the Lebanon up to the present time. The group known in the history of the crusades as Assassins are also a consequence of the Ismā'ilite movement.

The relation of their religious movement to positive

Islam is to be judged by its own central principle, namely, the allegorical interpretation of religious facts. Truth is contained in the inner meaning (*bāṭin*), the outer (*ẓāhir*) is a mere veil for the uninitiated; according to the measure of their preparation, the veil will be drawn aside to allow them to gaze into the face of naked truth. Hence the designation *Bāṭiniyya*, applied among theologians to the adherents of these theories which, by the way, the Ismā'ilites share with the Ṣūfis.

In Ṣūfism also, this doctrine of the "inner meaning," coming from the same neo-Platonic source, has attained central significance. An Ismā'ilite *Bāṭinī* could have written word for word the lines of the mystic poet Jelāl al-dīn al Rūmī, embodying the true significance of all interpretation.

Know, the words of the Koran are simple; nevertheless beyond the external they hide an inner, secret meaning;

By the side of the secret sense there is still a third, which bewilders the finest intellect;

The fourth meaning no one has known but God, the Incomparable and All-sufficient.

Thus can one proceed toward seven meanings, one after the other.

So my son, do not confine thyself to the external meaning, as the demons saw only clay in Adam;

The external meaning of the Koran is like Adam's body; for only his form is visible, his soul is hidden.⁷

These increasingly subtle degrees of the secret inner meaning which are hid by the external cloak of the written word, remind us of what the Ismā'iliyya call *ta'wīl al-ta'wīl*, i. e., the secret interpretation of the secret interpretation. By an ascending scale the mysticism and symbolism of each preceding interpretation advances to a still subtler view of the material substratum, until the complete dissolution of the original Islamic kernel.

Ismā'ilism, with its unlimited excesses in *ta'wīl*, has resulted in some offshoots of minor significance, among which special mention should be made of the secret doctrine of the so-called *Ḥurūfī* (the interpretation of letters of the alphabet founded by Faḍl-Allah of Astarābād in the year 800/1397-8). This system is likewise founded on the construction of the cyclic evolution of the world-spirit, within which Faḍl-Allah regarded himself as the manifestation of the deity, and his message as the most complete revelation of the truth. It was for this that he suffered a martyr's death at the hands of Timur. He joined to his teachings a subtle symbolism of letters and their numerical value, to which he attached cosmic significance and powers. On the basis of this cabalistic method further developed by his adherents, the *Ḥurūfī* people have come to a *ta'wīl* of the Koran, which contains almost nothing of its original intent. Their pantheism offered many points of contact with the teachings of the *Ṣūfis*, among whom the order of the *Bektaşīs* has adopted this system.⁹

In other developments emanating from the Ismā'ilites, the numerical aspects of the system of the Imamship assume a minor significance, although they are compatible with the recognition of the line of the Twelve. The essential thing in these sub-branches of the movement is the rejection of the literal meaning of the Moslem beliefs, and the extreme application of the 'Aliite traditions as bearers of their own Gnostic secrets concerning progressive revelation, and its incarnation in ever renewed manifestations of the divinity.

XIX. The philosophizing trait in the system of the Ismā'ilites has not freed them from the narrow views which are characteristic of the ordinary Shī'ite, especially in two directions.

In the first place the unlimited belief in authority which is closely associated with the Imam theory is

carried by them to an extreme. Ismā'ilism, therefore, bears the name of *ta'līmiyya*, "the being taught," i. e., the absolute dependence upon the doctrinal authority of the Imam, in contradiction to the justification of individual study and the collective force of the Ijmā' (general consent). Al-Ghazālī attacks them in various writings, under the name of *ta'līmiyya*, among others in the form of a Platonic dialogue, which he carries on with one of the representatives of the *ta'līmiyya*.¹ Within the allegorical interpretation of the law of the Koran they find in these laws merely the form embodying the demand for submission to the authority of the Imam.² With this cult of authority is joined the duty of unconditional obedience to superiors, which appears in a particularly terrifying form among the Assassins, a branch, as we have seen of the Ismā'ilite movement.³

Furthermore the Ismā'ilians share with the Shī'ites, the extreme intolerance towards those who differ from them. It will be sufficient to give as a single example a paragraph from an interesting Ismā'ilite work about the poor-tax and its allegorical interpretation, found in a Leiden manuscript: "He who associates (*ashraka*) with his Imam another authority, or doubts him, is like the person who associates someone else with the prophet, and doubts him. Thus he is like the person who recognizes another God besides Allah. He, therefore, who associates (anyone with the Imam), doubts him or denies him, is *najas* (unclean), not clean (*tāhir*); it is forbidden to make use of that which such a man has acquired."⁴

Apart from their connection with the Druses who deify Hākim and who are scattered throughout Middle Syria⁵ and other parts of Islamic territory, the Ismā'ilites are also to be found in Persia and India under the designation of Khojas.⁶ Quite recently, an Ismā'ilite assembly house was erected in Zanzibar.⁷ These modern Ismā'ilites recognize as their head a man with the title Agha

Khān. This office-bearer traces his descent to a branch of the Fāṭimide dynasty (Nizār), as a descendant of the Assassin princes who claim to be descendants from this branch.⁸

The followers of Agha Khān, who at present has his seat in Bombay and other parts of India, pay homage to him through Zakāt-tribute (governmental tax) and rich gifts. The present incumbent of this office is a rather worldly gentleman possessed of modern ideas of culture, having at his disposition large means which he himself is fond of using for extensive travel. He has been to London, Paris, the United States and also to the court in Tokyo. There are few traces in him of the fundamental principles of the system which he is supposed to represent. He gives freely of his possessions for the furtherance of the modern cultural movements in Indian Islam, which we shall have an opportunity of considering, and in the administration of which he takes a leading part.⁹ Quite recently he was chosen president of the All India Moslem League.¹⁰ He is a strong adherent of British rule in India, which he recognizes as a blessing for the Indian peoples. During the latest Swaraji movement he gave a warning to the Moslem Indians, which was meant also for the Hindus. In this he pointed out the folly and immaturity of the desire for independence and showed the necessity and beneficence of British rule as the unifying and mediating principle for the various peoples of the Indian Kingdom, separated from one another by virtue of their varying aims.

XX. Since the Shī'ite form of belief credits 'Alī and his successors with superhuman attributes, these very ideas have served as supports for the remnants of degenerate mythological traditions. Such tales as existed in the traditions of the peoples converted to Islam about superhuman powers, but which with the disappearance of the old religion had lost their hold, could be adapted

to the form of 'Alīitic legends and, thus transformed, continue to flourish. The persons of the 'Alī family appropriate the attributes of mythological figures, and these attributes take their place in the Shī'ite train of thought, without any difficulty. Within Shī'ism few scruples prevent the object of this veneration from being raised above earthly things and made to partake of superhuman strength.

How far the ordinary Shī'ite view goes in this direction, we have already seen. The light-substance of 'Alī and his family form part of the divine throne. According to a legend Ḥasan and Ḥusein wore amulets which were filled with down from the wings of the angel Gabriel.¹ In these circles therefore it was very easy to weave mythological material into the figures of the 'Alīitic family. For example, 'Alī became a god of thunder; he appears in the clouds and produces thunder and lightning; the latter the scourge which he brandishes. Just as the myths explain the glow of sunset as the blood of Adonis killed by a wild boar, there appears in Shī'itic legends the explanation that the sunset is the blood of the slaughtered Ḥusein; there was no such glow before his death.² The cosmographic writer Ḳazwīnī (d. 682/1283) reports that the Turkish people of Baghrāj were ruled by a dynasty which traced their descent from the 'Alīite Yaḥyā ibn Zeid. They treasure a golden book on the outside of which is written a poem on the death of Zeid, and they accord to this book religious adoration. They call Zeid the "king of the Arabs" and 'Alī "The God of the Arabs." When they look toward heaven they open their mouth and with fixed gaze say: "There the God of the Arabs mounts and descends."³

It is more particularly neo-Platonic and gnostic elements in which the Ismā'ilīte sects invested the Moslem conception of belief, that have aided in the preservation of the ruins of the ancient heathen religion. As the

persons of the sacred family had been raised to the sphere of divinity, they could easily serve as substitutes for ancient deities, hidden under a Moslem nomenclature.

Thus in the valleys of the Lebanon ancient Syrian heathenism survives in an external Shi'itic form, in the sect of the Nuṣairiah (between Tripoli and Antioch). In the 'Twelver' cult of this sect unmistakable heathen conceptions predominate. One must take into consideration, that in the districts in which this Shi'itic sect flourishes, the ancient heathenism still prevailed until shortly before the introduction of Islam, and Christianity itself was very late in gaining a foothold.⁴ It is, therefore, natural that the ideas brought by Islam should have been intertwined with old heathenish elements. Islam is merely a surface phenomenon. As a matter of fact the hearts of the people have cherished the heathen traditions of their forefathers, and have carried them over to the new manifest objects of cult. In the amalgamation of heathenism, gnosticism and Islam, the Moslem element is nothing more than a form differing from the heathen nature cult, and merely provides a name for the heathen religious ideas. 'Alī—as they say in a prayer—is "eternal in his divine nature; our God according to his inner being, although our Imam externally."⁵ In the various sects he is identified with various divine forces of nature. To the majority he is the moon god, with the augmentation of a Shi'ite appellation, the "Emīr of the bees," i. e., of the stars. We have already mentioned that Mohammed himself by the side of 'Alī sinks to the subordinate significance of the "veil." With 'Alī and Selmān he rounds out a trinity which, with all that belongs to it, is allied to a heathenish nature cult.

In the worship offered to 'Alī and his family, the persons linked to them by legend and to the Imams, we have, in reality, the worship of heaven, the sun, the moon and other forces of nature. These traditions have

been adapted with the help of gnosticism, which is to be found in all these remains of heathenism. Their true inwardness is revealed to the initiated according to the measure of their graded initiation. If the Islamic law among the Ismā'ilites, who, by the way, are hostile to the Nuṣairiah, has even in the lower grades merely a symbolical significance, for the initiated Nuṣairiah, all positive Islam is completely dissipated. The Koran itself takes a position subordinate to another sacred book, which book, in spite of all attempts at secrecy, has become known through a Christian neophyte in their midst, and which has formed the subject of investigations by European and American scholars.⁶ They themselves set themselves up against the rest of the Moslems as the true "believers in the divine unity" (ahl al tauhīd), as true interpreters of the Shī'itic thought. They regard the general Shī'ite as *Zāhiriyya*, that is, as adherents to an 'external' conception of religion, who have not penetrated into the depths of true monotheism, as *mukāṣṣira*, i. e., those who have not attained the required degree of perfection in their worship of 'Alī.⁷

In reality it is merely a nominal Islam which is represented in these forms of old Asiatic heathenism, embodying in their developed form certain Christian elements such as the consecration of food and wine, a kind of communion meal, and the celebration of holidays peculiar to Christianity. The history of religion often shows that such sect-degenerations lend themselves to syncretism.

We have so far considered those dissenting forms of Islam which exerted an influence on the development of Islam up to the time of the definite establishment of the orthodox phase. But even after this perished the agitation continued. We have now to consider later movements, the results of which reach to our own day.

NOTES.

- I. 1. On this ancient misunderstanding see my "Beiträge zur Litteraturegeschichte der Shī'a and der Sunnitischen Polemik" (Vienna 1874). 9 Sitzungsber der k. Akad. d. Wiss. Phil. Hist. Kl. LXXVIII 445) and "Dénombrement des sectes Musulmanes" in "Revue de l'Histoire des Religions" XXVI, 129 ff., cf. ZDMG LXI, 73 ff.
2. ZDMG LXII 5 note 2. The practical application of this view is reported by al-Hārith al-Muḥāsibī (d. in Baghdād 243/857) (Ḳusheirī, *Risāla* 15, 5), which is all the more remarkable as Hārith belonged to the ascetic division which attaches little importance to dogmatic subtleties. According to other reports (*Kazwīnī* ed. Wüstenfeld II 215, 16; Subkī, *Tabakāt al-Shāfi'īyya* II 38, 12) the father was Rāfiḍī (Shī'ite), which gives a better account of the *disparitas cultus*.
3. Ibn al-Fakīh al-Hamadānī, *Kitāb al-boldān*, ed. de Goeje 44, 18.
- II. 1. "Der Islam im Morgen- und Abendlande," I 283.
2. See especially Wellhausen's treatise "Die Religiös-politischen Oppositionsparteien im alten Islam" (see above p. 141).
3. A classic presentation of the Khārijite views as opposed to those of the other Moslem groups is Aghānī XX, 105 ff.
4. Kremer, "Geschichte der herrschenden Ideen des Islams" 360.
5. Dervish al-Mahrūkī, *Kitāb al-dalā'il fi-l-lawāzim wal-wasā'il* (Cairo 1320) 20. The same thought in moral maxims 'Uyūn al-Akḥbār; 419, 18 ff.
6. Klein "The Religion of Islam" (London 1904), 132.
7. Cf. ZDMG XLI, 31 ff.
- 7a. The leading authority on this literature was the late Motylinski, director of the Medressa in Constantine (Algiers) (d. 1907).
8. Cf. "Revue de l'Histoire des Religions" LII, 232. A practical example is the use of the verse in the Koran Sur. 20, 4 in an Ibadite sermon, preached in Tāhert in the third century after the Hijra. (Actes du XV Congrès des Orientalistes, Algiers 1905—III 126.) The Text published there offers a very clear picture of the inner life of the Ibadite gatherings of that time.
9. Cf. ZDMG LXI 864 note 5.
10. Shahrastānī "Book of religions and philosophical sects" 95, 4 fr. below; 96, 8 fr. below concerning the Meimūniyya.
11. Fakhr al-dīn al-Rāzī, *Mafātīḥ al-ghaib* (Būlūk 1289) I 268 (quoted according to al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī).
12. Cf. for details Sachau "Religiöse Anschauungen der Ibaditschen Muhammedaner in Oman und Ost-Afrika" (Mitteil. d. Seminars f. Orient. Spr. 1898 II 2, 47-82).

13. Zwemer in "The Mohammedan World of to-day" (1906) (p. 102) is mistaken in speaking of the Abadhi sect as of Shi'a origin.
 14. According to a notice of Ibn Ḥazm (d. 456/1064) there were Ibadites in Andalusia in his day. *Kitāb al Milal* (ed. Cairo) IV 179, cf. 191, 8. They probably came over from North Africa, or were in Spain temporarily only, where Ibn Ḥazm came in contact with them.
 15. M. Hartmann, *Zeitschr. f. Assyr.* XIX 355 ff.
- III. 1. *Amālī al-Kāfī* III 173, 3; 198 penult.
2. Muh. Studien II 117. Indeed Ḥadīths of Sunnitic origin are not lacking, in which Mohammed is supposed to have announced his wish concerning his successor (cf. *ibid.* II 99 note 1). These announcements, however, do not appear as definite decisions of the question of succession, and do not have the form of a solemn act of appointment as the Shi'ites claim for 'Alī. In a tradition of Ibn Sa'd III, I 46, 5 ff. we find support for the claim that the prophet himself chose 'Othmān as one of his caliphs; it is interesting to note that this statement goes back to a *maula Othmān* ("client of Othman"), as its source which is indicative of the character of the tradition.
 3. Abū Ja'far Muh. al-Kulīnī (d. 328/939) in Baghdād, *al-Uṣūl min al-Jāmi' al-kāfī* (Bombay 1302) 261.
 4. Van Berchem "Journal Asiatique" 1907 I 297 ff. M. Grünbaum, "Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Sprach- und Sagenkunde" (Berlin 1901) 226.
 5. See the criticism of these assumptions by an 'Alīite Ibn Sa'd V 239, 2 ff.
 6. In a number of very clumsy traditions in which God himself, as well as Khaḍīr and Mohammed, verify by name the line of Imams of the 'Twelvers.' A Jew of the line of Aaron knows of them from the "Book of Hārūn" (for the latter cf. *Zeitschrift f. alttest. Wiss.* XIII 316). These Shiite fables have been collected by Kulīnī, *Uṣūl al-Kāfī* 342-346. The proof of the Imam theories in the Old Testament (just as the Sunni apolo- gists prove from biblical books that Mohammed was an apostle) have been collected by a modern Shi'ite theologian Seyyid 'Alī Muḥammed in a little book known as *Zād kālīl*, which was published in lithographic form by the Ithnā-'ashariyya Press in Lucknow (1290/1873).
 7. This kind of Koran exegesis can be illustrated by the following explanation at the beginning of the 91st Sura: The sun and its light (that is Mohammed); the moon when it follows the sun (i. e. 'Alī), the day when it surrounds the sun (Ḥasan and Ḥusein) the night, when it hides the sun (the Omayyads). This explanation appears in Ḥadīth form as a revelation given by the prophet himself, in Suyūṭī, *al-La'ālī al-Masnū'a fi-l-aḥādīth al-Mawḍū'a* (Cairo, Adabiyya 1317) I 184.

- IV. 1. Ibn Sa'd V 234 below.
2. Ibid. VI 261, 9 ff.
3. From the point of view of a follower of 'Alī, the 'Abbāsīde al-Mansūr, in spite of the claims to legitimacy, is "jā'ir" (usurper); this was said to his face by the pious theologian Abū Du'ēib (Nawawī, *Tahdīb* 112, 6).
4. For the *miḥan* of the Shī'ites see a letter of Abū Bekr al-Khwārizmī to the Shī'ite community in Nīsābūr, *Rasā'il* (Sambul 1297) 130 ff. The traditional saying about the trials of the followers of 'Alī is found in Ya'kūbī, "Historiae" ed. Houtsma II 242.
5. Kenz al-'ummāl VI 81 No. 1271.
6. Ḍahabī, *Taḍkirat al-huffāz* IV 11.
7. Cf. E. G. Browne, "A Catalogue of the Persian Manuscripts in the Library of the University of Cambridge" (Cambridge 1896) 122-142 (where further bibliography will be found). For offshoots of this literature WZKM XV 330-1; later ones in R. Haupt's "Orientalisch. Literaturebericht" I no. 3080-1. The Martyrologies are also called *makātil*.
8. Tha'ālībī, *Yatīmat al-dahr* I 223. Ibn Khallikān ed. Wüstenfeld IX 59, where instead of *ma'āthimunā* we should read *mā'ātimunā*.
9. Meidānī (ed. Būlāk) I 179: arakku.
10. A. F. Bajah Ḥusain, "Ḥusain in the Phil. of Hist." (Lucknow 1905) 20.
11. Ibid. 9. 18. 30.
- V. 1. Kulīnī l. c. 466. The withdrawal of both the guardian angels is also assumed in another instance: as soon as that which is allotted to man by divine fate has been fulfilled (al-muqaddar); they do not try to guard him against it; they must allow the decision a free course, Ibn Sa'd III, I 22, 13.
2. Cf. about *Takīyja* ZDMG LX 213 ff.
3. Commentary of the Imam Ḥasan el-'Askarī to the second Sura verse 17.
4. Kulīnī 105.
- VI. 1. Kulīnī 105.
2. Various teachings about this in Kulīnī 368 ff. chapter; *da'ā'im al-islām*. Therefore the true Shī'ite is *mutawālī*, i. e. "the adherent" (to the 'Alī community) which is the special name of a Syrian branch of the Shī'ite sect.
3. Suyūṭī, *al-La'ālī al-masnū'a* I 184. In this chapter (166 ff.) is included an anthology of the Ḥadīths, which were invented by partisans to support the Shī'ite point of view.
4. Aghānī XX 107, 19 ff.
- VII. 1. 'Alī al-Kārī, *Sharḥ al-Fiḥ al-akbar* (Cairo 1323) 132 above.
2. The 'Abbāsīde caliphate does not lag behind in this respect. It

likes to be called *mīrāth al-nubuwwa* (inheritance of the prophets) (Agh. X 124, 10; XVIII 79, 5 cf. Ibn Jubeir, "Travels"² ed. de Goeje 92, 2); therefore an attribute of the 'Abbāsī caliphate is *al-nabawī* ("going back to the Prophet"), Ibn al-Kalānisi, "History of Damascus" ed. Amedroz 155, 9. 5 fr. below, 165, 5 fr. below, 193, 11; Yākūt, *Mu'jam al-udabā* ed. Margoliouth II 54, 12); however only in the sense of the legitimate descent from the royal dignity of the prophet, to whose family the 'Abbāsides also belong, not as in the case of the 'Alīite Imams and Fātimide caliphs in the sense of recognition as a theological authority. Occasionally we find in Omayyad times also, by way of flattery, the office of caliph designated as an inheritance from the prophet, as in an epistle of the Kātib 'Abdallhamīd ibn Yahyā to his caliph (in *Rasā'il al-bulaghā* I [Cairo 1908] 92, 9). The inheritance here can only be taken in the sense of a claim to legitimacy.

3. Quoted as an utterance of the Imam Ja'far al-ṣādiq by Suhrawardī in Keshkūl (Būlāk 1288) 357, 19.
 4. Cf. more fully in d. Zeitschr. f. Assyr. XXII 325 ff.
 5. Ibn Sa'd V 74, 14.
 6. Ibid. I, I 113, 8 on the basis of Sura 5 v. 71: "God guards thee from men" which is interpreted as referring to the corporeal immunity of the prophet. The eighth chapter of Māwerdī's *A'lām al-nubuwwa* (Cairo 1319) 53-59, deals with this.
 7. Montet, "Le Culte des saints Musulmans dans l'Afrique du Nord" (Geneva University Jubilee 1909) 32; cf. Achille Robert in *Revue des Traditions Populaires* XIX, Feb. (no. 12, 13).
- VIII. 1. Such 'Alī-ilāhi-adherents are to be found, e. g.: among the Turkman peasants of the district of Kars (Ardaghan), since the war of 1877-78 belonging to Russia,—whose conditions Devitzki has lately studied.
2. Friedländer, *The Heterodoxies of the Shiites according to Ibn Ḥazm* (Journal of the Am. Or. Soc. XXIX) 102. Similar doctrines were propounded by the self-deified al-Shalmaghānī who was beheaded in Baghdad 322/934. According to his system of the graded incarnations of the Godhead, Moses and Mohammed are regarded as deceivers, the former because he was unfaithful to the mission entrusted to him by Aaron, the latter because unfaithful to the mission entrusted to him by 'Alī. (Yākūt ed. Margoliouth I 302, 13.)
 3. ZDMG XXXVIII 391. Ibn Sa'd III, I 26, 10 ff.; V 158, 18 ff. cf. Friedländer in "Zeitschr. f. Assyr." XXIII 318 note 3.
 4. Friedländer, *Heterodoxies* (Jour. Amer. Or. Soc. XXVIII) 55 ff.
- IX. 1. Klein 1. c. 73. Even the philosopher Avicenna admits as unassailable that the prophets "are in no way subject to error or for-

- getfulness." ("Die Metaphysik Avicennas," translated and explained by M. Horten, Halle 1907 88, 19.)
2. Nawawī, *Tahdīb* 624, 3. Yahyā ibn Z. is otherwise favored (Ibn Sa'd IV, II 76, 11).
 3. Ibid. VI 32, 5.
 4. 'Alī al-Kārī, *Sharḥ al-Fiḥ al-akbar* 51; a treatise on this Hadith by Subkī, *Tabakat* V 123. The prophet is made to express concern about his future fate: "I know not what will happen to me" (Ibn Sa'd III, I 289 ult.).
 5. Al-Kālī, *Amālī* II 267.
 6. The tradition connects this saying with the Hudeibiya-agreement in the 6th year of the Hijra (Ibn Sa'd II, I 76), which strangely enough it regards as a "victory," while in truth it involved a "humiliation." Even Moslem historians have felt this: 'Omar, they say, would not have made such an agreement (ibid. 74, 5).
 7. For the explanation of the phrase A. Fisher, ZDMG LXII 280.
 8. In *Damirī* II 216, 21, s. v. Ghirniḳ.
 9. 'Alī al-Kārī l. c. 136 below.
 10. Nawawī, *Tahdīb* 113, 7.
 11. "Bajah Husain" l. c. 5.
 12. *Kashf al-ghumma 'an jamī' al-umma* (Cairo 1281) II 62-75, according to Suyūṭī.
 13. As a matter of fact the peculiarities of the prophet brought forward by Sha'rānī are traits given to him by the phantasy of the Shī'ites as e. g. in a popular work on the Shī'ite doctrine published in Turkish by 'Abdalrahīm Khūyī. (Stambul 1327) 10.
- X. 1. Jāhīz, *Tria Opuscula* ed. van Vloten (Leiden 1903) 137, 17 ff. (= *Rasā'il* ed. Cairo 1324, 129 bel.) mentions the Shī'ite view, that the Imams stand higher than the prophets inasmuch as the latter may sin but do not err, while the former neither sin nor err.
2. Asad Allāh al-Kāzimī, *Kashf al-kinā' 'an wujūb ḥujjiyyat al-ijmā'* (lith. Bombay 209).
 3. Ya'kūbī, *Histoiriae*, ed. Houtsma II 525 below. Concerning a book of 'Alī's which reaches down to the deeper meaning of the Koran, see Ibn Sa'd XI 101, 19. The secret attainments ascribed to Ali were scorned by the Kharijites, *Aghānī* XX 107, 16 ff.
 4. They pretend to possess the secret works ascribed to Alī (see previous note), which are sometimes pictured as containing all the religious knowledge of the prophets and again designated as apocalyptic writings in which the occurrences of all times are revealed. They are supposed to have been entrusted to 'Alī by the prophet and are passed on from generation to generation in the line of the legitimate Imams, as the bearers of the

secret knowledge of 'Alī. The most frequently-mentioned of these books are the *Jafr* and the *Jāmi'a*. The old Mu'tazilite Bishr b. al-Mu'tamir of Baghdad (IX Cent.) in one of his didactic poems calls the Shi'ah people "Those who have been deluded by Jafr." (Jāhiz, *Hayawān* VI 94, 1.) Even the outward form of these so-called secret books are described in Shi'ite literature; e. g. the *Jāmi'a* as a roll of 70 lengths (measured by the prophet's arm) (Kulīnī l. c. 146-148, Kāzīmī l. c. 162). See the literature on the subject ZDMG XLI 123 ff. Besides these two secret writings, Kulīnī mentions also the *Mashaf Fāṭima* in the possession of the Imams, which the prophet is said to have entrusted to his daughter before his death; it is supposed to be three times as large as the Koran.

As a consequence, mystical books of prophecy became known everywhere as *Jafr*. This word seems also to be concealed in the Maghribite *lenjefār* (E. Doutté: "Un texte arabe en dialecte oranais," 13, 25 in *Mémoires de la Société de Linguistique*" XIII 347). The treatment and explanation of the Jafr books is a favorite subject of Islamic occultism. Cf. e. g. Cairo catalogue VIII 83. 101. The famous mystic Muhyī al-dīn ibn 'Arabī is largely represented in this literature (ibid. 552). For a Jafr work of Abū Bekr al-Dimishkī (d. 1102/1690) preserved in the treasury of the Turkish Sultan, see Murādi, *Silk al-ḍurar* (Bulāk 1301) I 51.

5. See above note 3, 7.
6. The modern Shi'ite scholar Bajah Husain (l. c. 14) condemns in an entirely Shi'itic spirit the "pseudo-democratic form of government (of the ancient caliph times), based on the consciousness of the general tendency of the people."
- XI. 1. The theologians of the various Shi'ite sub-sects have developed a rich polemic literature against each other. This literature deals not only with their differences about the Imamship, but also with other dogmatic and legal questions, to which the differences between the Shi'ite groups led. At the end of the third and the beginning of the fourth century (Hijra era), the Imamite theologian Ḥasan ibn Muḥammad al-Naubakhtī, a thorough Mutakallim, wrote a *Kitāb fraḡ al-Shi'a* (on the Sects of the Shi'ites); furthermore *al-Radd 'alā fraḡ al-Shi'a mākhālā al-Imāmīyja* (refutation of the sects of the Shi'ites with the exception of the Imamites) cf. Abū-l-'Abbās Aḥmed al-Najāshī, *Kitāb al-rijāl* (Lives of Shi'itic scholars, Bombay 1317) 46. Jāhiz (d. 255/869), who was nearer to the beginning of the sects, wrote a book on the Shi'ites (*Kitāb al-rāfiḍa*), which unfortunately does not appear to have been preserved. He refers to it in a short treatise *fī bayān Maḍāhib al-Shi'a* (Rasā'il ed. Cairo

178-185; the quotation itself p. 181, 3d line from bottom), which however offers less than its title promises.

2. Kāzimī l. c. 80.
 3. Najāshī l. c. 237.
 4. On this belief see now the important treatise above referred to by I. Friedländer on the inner forms of the Shīas: "The Heterodoxies of the Shiites" II 23-30.
 5. On 'Abdallāh ibn S. and the doctrines propounded by him on 'Alī's nature, see now the treatise of I. Friedländer in *Zeitschr. f. Assyrl. XXIII* 296 ff. On the belief in the return of 'Alī, see Jāhiz, *Ḥayawān* V 134. For the *raja* belief cf. Ibn Sa'd III, I 26, 16; VI 159, 13.
- Even in (non-Shī'itic) Ṣūfī circles, in connection with the apotheosis of 'Alī generally accepted by them, the conception of his continuous existence and of his return finds an expression. Sha'rānī tells of the holy 'Alī Wefā that he said: "'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib was raised up (into heaven) as Jesus was; as the latter he will in the future descend.'" To this Sha'rānī adds: "The same thing was taught by (my master) Seyyidī 'Alī al-Khawwās. I heard him say: 'Noah preserved from the ark a board in the name of 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, on which he would one day be raised on high. This board was preserved by divine power, until 'Alī was raised by means of it'" (*Lawākih al-anwār* II 59). This Ṣūfī legend is, by the way, a supplement to the Islamic legend of the building of the ark. God commanded Noah to prepare 124,000 boards for the construction; on each one appeared the name of some prophet from Adam to Noah. It finally developed that four more boards were necessary to complete the ark; these Noah prepared and on them appeared the names of four "companions" (by which are meant the four first Sunnite Caliphs, of whom the fourth is 'Alī). In this way the ark was fitted out against the flood. The legend is told at length in Muḥammed ibn 'Abdalrahmān al-Hamadānī's book on the days of the week (*Kitāb al-Sub'iyyāt fī mawā'iz al-barīy-ḡāt*. Būlāk 1292,—the margin to Fashnī's commentary to the 40 traditions of Nawawī) 8-9.
6. Wellhausen, "Die religiösen Oppositionsparteien" 93. An attempt has also been made to find older sources for this belief. In the "Proceedings of the Society of Biblical Archæology" VII 71, Pinches concluded on the basis of cuneiform texts, that already in ancient Babylon there existed the belief in the return of the ancient king Sargon I, who was to reestablish the ancient power of the kingdom. The interpretation has, however, been rejected by other Assyriologists.
 7. Hilgenfeld "Ketzergeschichte" 158 (according to Origen).

8. See Basset's introduction to "Fekkare Jyasous" (Les Apocryphes éthiopiens XI Paris 1909) 4-12.
9. "Revue des Trad. populaires" 1905 416.
10. Bīrūnī: "Chronology of Ancient Nations," translated by E. Sachau 194. Concerning Bihafriḍ see Houtsma in WZKM 1889, 30 ff.
11. Barhebraeus, "Hist. Dynastiarum" ed. Beirut 218; cf. Zeitschr. f. Assyriol. XXII 337 ff.
12. Bosworth-Smith, "Mohammed and Mohammedanism," 2d ed. (London 1876) 32.
13. Landsdell: "Russian Central Asia." I 572.
14. Muh. Studien II 324.
15. B. Talm. *Sanhedrin* 97^b. On the calculation for the appearance of the Messiah from the numerical value of the words *hastēr astūr* in Deut. 31:18 and from Dan. 12:11. 13, see Bīrūnī "Chronologie orientalischer Völker" ed. Sachau 15-17 (Schreiner ZDMG XLII 600) cf. for this literature the bibliography by Steinschneider ZDMG XXVIII 628 note 2; S. Poznanski "Miscellen über Sā'aja" III (in Monatschr. f. Gesch. u. Wiss. d. Judentums XLIV 1901).
16. *Kaḍaba al-wakātūna*: "those who fix the time lie." The utterances of the Imams on this subject in a special chapter (*bāb karāhiyyat al-taukīt*, on the uselessness of determined time) by Kulīnī l. c. 232-33 and enriched with further material in the Shī'itic work of Dildār 'Alī: *Mir'āt al-'uḳūl fī 'ilm al-uṣūl* (also *Imād al-islām fī 'ilm al-kalām*) I 115 f. (Lucknow 1318-9.) A *Kitāb waqt khurūj al-kā'im* (the time of the appearance of the Mahdī) is mentioned in Tūsi "List of Shī'ah books" no. 617 composed by Muhammed ibn Ḥasan ibn Jumhūr al-Kummī who has a bad reputation as an exaggerator and inventor of false traditions. The same thing applies to the characterization of a Shī'itic theologian as an "exaggerator" *fī-l-wakt*, i. e. with regard to the (calculation of) time, (of the appearance of the Mahdī, Najāshī l. c. 64, 8). Ibn Khaldūn, *Prolegomena* ed. Quatremère Not. et Extr. des Mss. XVII 167, criticises at length a Mahdī calculation of Ibn 'Arabī. Such calculations are rejected by the Hurūfīs (see p. 269), in spite of the fact that from the first such cabalistics were attributed primarily to them (Clement Huart, "Textes persans relatifs à la secte des Houroufis" Leyden-London 1909: Gibb Memorial Series IX, Texte 70 ff.). Related to the calculations of the appearance of the Mahdī are the cabalistic calculations in regard to "sā'a" ("hour" i. e. the end of the world, the resurrection). Referring to Sura 6, 59 ("With him are the keys of the hidden, no one knows them but he") and 7, 186 ("They will ask thee concerning the 'hour,' for what time it is fixed: Say: the knowl-

edge of it is with my God alone; he alone will make it known at the proper time" = Matth. 24, 36), genuine orthodoxy has rejected such computations as opposed to the Koran. The material for this theological subject is to be found in full in Kaṣṭal-lānī's Commentary (Būlāk 1285) on Bukhārī, Ijārāt no. 11 (IV 150); Tafsīr no. 88 (VII 232); no. 335 (ibid. 458 ff.); Rikāḥ no. 39 (IX 323).

The astronomers of Islam have also occupied themselves considerably with calculations, through the constellations of the duration of the Islamic kingdom. The philosopher al-Kindī has a special monograph on this, which O. Loth has published in the "Morgensländische Forschungen" (Fleischer-Festschrift, Leipzig 1875) 263-309. Besides the astrological suppositions, Kindī uses also letter cabalistics and mystic numbers (ibid. 297). He regards it as a merit of the Arabic script that it is admirably adapted to such use (Balawī, *Kitāb Alif-bā* I 99, 6). The *Ikhwān al-ṣafā* (ed. Bombay IV 225) also teach that the appearance of the sāhib al-amr, for whom they carry on a propaganda, is determined by conjunctions.

- XII. 1. In its older religious application the word had not yet the eschatological meaning which was attached to it later on. Jerīr (Naḳā'id ed. Bevan no. 104 v. 29) applies this epithet to Abraham. When Ḥasan ibn Thābit in his lament on the death of Mohammed (Dīwān ed. Tunis 24, 4) praises him as *Mahdī*, he does not mean to attach to it any Messianic conception, but to designate the prophet as a man always taking the right way (cf. also *al-muhtadī* in the fifth verse of the same poem, or *al-murshad* likewise in a dirge on the prophet, Ibn Sa'd XI 94, 9). Among the ancient caliphs, this epithet has often been applied in Sunnitic circles to 'Alī. In a comparative view of the prophet's immediate successors Abū Bekr is designated as a pious ascetic, 'Omar as energetic and sure, 'Alī as *hādīyan mahdiyyan*, "guide and rightly guided" (*Usd al-ghāba* IV 31, 3). Suleimān ibn Ṣurād, Husein's avenger, calls the latter (after his death) *mahdī*, son of the mahdī (Tabarī II 546, 11). The court poets of the Omayyad caliphs also apply this title to their princes. Farazdak bestows it on the Omayyad (Naḳā'id 51 v. 60) precisely as on the prophet (ibid. v. 40). We find the same term very often in Jerīr (Dīwān ed. Cairo 1313, I 58, 16 applied to 'Abdalmalik; II 40, 7 from below to Suleimān; 94, 5 from below to Hishām; cf. *imām al-hudā* above 141). Under the Omayyad princes pious people, however, regarded 'Omar II as the true Mahdī (Ibn Sa'd V 245, 5 ff.). Not till later (576/1180) did a flattering poet, Ibn al-Ta'āwīdī, give this epithet to his caliph in an enlarged sense: The 'Abbāsīde caliph (al-

Nāṣir) whom he is glorifying, is the Mahdī; it is superfluous to await any other messianic Mahdī (Diwān of the R. ed. Margoliouth—Cairo—1904 103 v. 5, 6).

The use of the word to denote Moslem converts is well known (the Turks use the form *Mühtedi*). Two of the rectors of the Azhar mosque were given the surname al-Mahdī, used in this capacity: (1) the Copt Muḥammed (orig. Hibat Allāh) al-Hifnī (1812-1815) and Sheikh Muḥammed al-‘Abbāsī al-Mahdī (in the 7th and 8th decades of the previous century; ZDMG LIII 702 ff.).

2. For the Mahdī doctrine in Islam and its applications see James Darmesteter “Le Mahdi depuis les origines de l’Islam jusqu’à nos jours” (Paris 1885); Snouck Hurgronje in the “Revue coloniale internationale” 1886; van Vloten “Les croyances messianiques” in his “Recherches sur la Domination arabe” etc. (Amsterdam, Academy, 1894) 54 ff.; the same in ZDMG LII 218 ff.; E. Blochet, “Le Messianisme dans l’Hétérodoxie Musulmane” (Paris 1903); I. Friedländer “Die Messiasidee im Islam” (Festschrift. für A. Berliner, Frankfurt a. M. 1903, 116-130).
3. Especially in Maghribite (N. African) Islam have such movements constantly arisen; the Maghribites hold the traditional belief that the Mahdi will appear on Moroccan territory (Doutté, “Les Marabouts,” Paris 1900, 74) for which also certain Ḥadīths are brought forward (ZDMG XLI 116 ff.). There have also appeared in Maghrib from time to time people who claimed to be the reappearing Jesus and under this title stirred up their followers to fight foreign rule (Doutté l. c. 68). While some of these Mahdī movements (as e. g. that which led to the foundation of the Almohad kingdom in Maghrib) exercised little influence after the dissipation of the political events superinduced by them, the traces of such movements among Shī‘itic sects continue to the present day. In the last centuries several such sectarian movements have occurred in various parts of Indic Islam through persons who claimed to be the expected Mahdī, and whose adherents up to the present day believe that the expectation of the Mahdī was fulfilled in such and such a person. Such sects are therefore called *Ghair-Mahdī*, i. e. people who no longer look for the coming of a Mahdī. Some of them (Mahdawī sects) maintain a wildly fanatical attitude toward others. Details about these sects can be found in E. Sell, “The Faith of Islam” (London 1880) 81-83. In the district of Kirmān (Beluchistan) the memory of an Indian Mahdī of the end of the XV century still lingers. As against the orthodox Sunni (Namāzī, so-called because they practice the legal Ṣalāt-rite, known as Namāz) we there find the sect of the *Dikrī* whose adherents belong mostly

to the nomad population and trace their teachings and practices (deviating from orthodox Islam) to a Mahdī, Muhammed of Jaunpūr, who, driven from India, and wandering from place to place died in the valley of Helمند (1505) (*Revue du Monde Musulman* V 142). In the "night of fate" (*leilat al-ḡadr*, 27 Ramaḍān) sacred to orthodox Islam, they erect a circle of stones (*dā'ira*. cf. Herklots *Qanoon-i-Islam* 259) within which they practice their heretical ritual. For this reason this sect is called *Dā'ire wālī*, i. e. "People of the circle." Josef Horowitz, to whom I owe this latter information, is preparing a special publication on these *Dā'ire Wālī*.

4. M. Hartmann, "Der Islamische Orient" III 152.
5. E. g. Brockelmann, "Gesch. d. Arab. Lit." I 431 No. 25.—criticism of the Mahdī-Ḥadīths in Ibn Khaldūn "*Muḡaddima*" (ed. Būlāḡ 1284) 261. The Meccan scholar Shihāb al-dīn Aḥmed Ibn Ḥajar al-Heitamī (d. 973/1565) has gathered together in various writings under the theological authorities of orthodoxy, the Mahdī tradition of Sunnite Islam. He has written a special work on this subject, which is noted by Brockelmann l. c. II 388, No. 6, and in which he refers to a Fetwā (*Fatāwī ḥadīthiyya*. Cairo 1307 27-32), in which he summarizes the Sunni teachings on the Mahdī doctrine, on the occurrences to accompany his appearance as well as on false Mahdis. This Fetwa gave rise to a query "about people, who believe that a man who died forty years before was the Mahdī promised for the end of the world, and who consider those as unbelievers who do not believe in this Mahdī." This belief probably refers to someone who appeared as the Mahdī in the tenth century, to whom we have referred in the above note 3. Ibn Ḥajar has furthermore collected orthodox Mahdī traditions in a discourse against Shiism held by him in Mecca in the year 1543, *Al-Ṣawā'ik al-muḡrika* (Cairo 1312) 97-100.
6. The "Twelvers" weaken this objection by the claim that the text of the tradition confirming the Mahdī has been corrupted. Instead of "and the name of his father agrees with the name of my (i. e. the prophet's) father (abī)" it originally read "with that of my son" (*ibnī*); i. e. the name of the Mahdī's father, Hasan, is like that of the prophet's grandson. That the grandson should be designated as *ibn*, forms no objection. (Introduction to Menīnī's commentary to the pæan of Behā al-dīn al-Amīlī on the Mahdī, in the appendix to the *Keshkūl* 395.)
7. Cf. "Abhandlungen zur Arab. Philol." II, LXII ff.
8. Of certain selected individuals it is believed that they enjoyed personal intercourse with the hidden Imam; examples are to be found in Tūsī, "List of Shī'ah books" 353; Kāzīmī l. c. 230-231. The Egyptian Ṣūfī 'Abd al-Wahhāb al-Sha'rānī (d.

973/1565), who himself had extravagant hallucinations about mystic adventures, tells in his Šūfī biographies that an older Šūfī colleague Ḥasan al-‘Irākī (d. about 930/1522) told him that in his early youth he had entertained the Mahdī under his roof in Damascus for a full week, and was instructed by him in Šūfī practices of devotion. He owed his great age to the blessing of the Mahdī; at the time of this intercourse with Sha‘rānī, Ḥasan is said to have been 127 years old. Fifty years he spent in long journeys to China and India, at the end of which he settled in Cairo, where he suffered much from the jealousy of other Šūfī people. They regarded him probably as a swindling adventurer. (*Lawākiḥ al-anwār fī ṭabaqāt al-akhyar*—Cairo 1299—II 191.) There are also fables about written intercourse with the hidden Mahdī. The father of the famous Shī‘ite theologian Abū Ja‘far Muhammed b. ‘Alī ibn Bābūya al-Kummī (d. 351/991) is said to have sent a written petition to the “master of time” through the mediation of a certain ‘Alī ibn Ja‘far ibn al-Aswad. In this he, having no children, besought his intercession with God to remove this misfortune. Soon after, he received from the Mahdī a written answer in which he was promised the birth of two sons. The first born was Abū Ja‘far himself, who throughout his life boasted of the fact that he owed his existence to the intercession of the *sāḥib al-amr*, (Najāshī, Rijāl 184). Concerning a scholar who corresponded with the hidden Imam about legal questions see *ibid.* 251 below.

9. Such a Kaṣīda to the hidden Imam was composed by the court scholar of the Persian Shāh ‘Abbās, Behā al-dīn al-‘Āmilī (d. 1031/1622) embodied in his *Keshkūl* 87-89; the text of this Kaṣīda and the commentary by Aḥmed (not Muh., Brockelmann I 415, 18) al-Menīnī (d. 1108/1696, whose biography will be found in Murādī, *Silk al-durar* I 133-45), are published in the appendix to this work (Būlāk 1288) 394-435; cf. also “Revue Africaine” 1906, 243.
10. *Revue du Monde musulman*. VI 535. The Fetwā of the ‘Ulemā of Nejef is given in translation in *ibid.* 681. We read there: “All zeal must be used to strengthen the constitution by means of holy war while at the same time holding to the stirrups of the Imam of the age—may our life be his ransom. The slightest contravention of this law, and the slightest carelessness (in the fulfillment of this duty) are equivalent to the desertion and opposition to his Majesty.” The latter title does not refer, as the translator explains, to the prophet Mohammed, but to the “Imam of the age” mentioned in the preceding sentence, i. e. the hidden Mahdī-Imam. The advocates of the anti-constitutional reaction similarly refer in a document, favoring the withdrawal of the constitution, to the fact that this step of the Shah’s

“is inspired by God and the Imam of the age” (Revue du Monde mus. VII 151).

- XIII. 1. Already noticed by Muḥaddasi ed. de Goeje 238, 6.
 2. ZDMG LIII 381.
 3. Muḥammed Bākīr Dāmād, *al-Rawāshih al-samāwiyya fī sharḥ al-aḥādīth al-imāmiyya* (Bombay 1311) 133.
 4. Kāzīmī l. c. 99. The Fāṭimide caliph al-Mustansir says expressly in a little poem ascribed to him, that his profession of faith is *al-tauḥīd wal-‘adl*; Ibn al-Kalānisi, “History of Damascus” ed. Amedroz 95, 11.
 5. For the proof of this fact it may suffice to point to a few of the published theological works of the Shī‘ites which clearly illustrate the method of Shiitic dogmatics in regard to the doctrines of the Imam. A concise presentation of the Imam doctrine is given by Naṣīr al-dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 672/1273) in his *Tajrīd al-‘akā’id*; with the commentary of ‘Alī ibn Muḥammed al-Kūshjī (d. 879/1474, Brockelmann I 509), printed in Bombay 1301 (see page 399 ff.). Naṣīr al-dīn al-Ṭūsī has further briefly illustrated the Imam doctrine in the Shī‘ite sense, in contrast to the Sunni point of view, in his glosses to the *Muḥaṣṣal* of Fakhr al-dīn al-Rāzī (Cairo 1323: *Talkhīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal*, Brockelmann I 507 no. 22) 176 ff. Hasan ibn Yūsuf ibn al-Mutahhar al-Hillī (d. 726/1326); *Kitāb al-alfein al-fārik beina-l-ṣidk wal-mein* (Book of the 2,000 which differentiates between truth and lies, i. e. 1,000 proofs for the truth of the Shī‘ite Imam doctrine and 1,000 refutations of the opposing objections, Bombay 1298); by the same author, *Al-Bāb al-ḥādī‘ashar* (the 11th chapter). Al-Hillī has added this independent compendium of dogmatics as a supplement to his extract from the Miṣbāḥ al-Mutahajid (Brockelmann I 405) of Abū Ja‘far al-Ṭūsī, a work consisting of ten chapters dealing solely with the ritual. It has been published with a commentary of Miḥdād ibn ‘Abdallāh al-Hillī (Brockelmann II 199, Naul-Kashwar Press 1315/1898). Of the later literature the work of Dildār ‘Alī, *Mir‘āt al-‘ukūl fī‘ilm al-usūl*, an admirable treatise on Shī‘itic dogmatism in two volumes (one of them dealing with the *tauḥīd*, the other the ‘*adl*), printed in Lucknow (printing press of Imād al-Islām) 1319, is especially worthy of notice.
- XIV. 1. A thorough insight into such differences is furnished in the book *al-Intiṣār* by the Shī‘ite scholar Alī al-Murtadā ‘Alam al-hudā (d. 436/1044 in Baghdad). In this work, published in a Bombay lithograph of the year 1315 of the Hijra, the ritualistic and legal differences of the Shī‘ites in their relation to the Sunni Maḏāhib are thoroughly examined. It is the best aid for a knowledge of these questions. In European literature Moslem law in its Shī‘ite form is treated by Querry, “Droit Musulman,” (3 vols., Paris 1871).

2. Cf. Nöldeke-Festschrift 323.
3. For this difference we refer to the vivid narrative in the *Autobiographie of 'Umāra al-Jemānī* ed. H. Derenbourg (Paris 1897) 126. It forms the frequent object of Sunna-Shi'ite polemics; e. g. Abū Yahyā al-Jorjānī (Tūsī, "List of Shy'a books" 28, 5) wrote an account of a disputation between a Shi'ite and a Murji (Sunni) on rubbing foot-wear, eating jirri-fish and other questions. The fish mentioned here (also called *inklis* = ἔγχελυς and *jirriṭh*) is a kind of eel (Murāne, see Imm. Löw in Nöldeke-Festschrift 552 below), the eating of which according to the tradition of the Shi'ites, 'Alī is said to have condemned; see interesting details about this in Jāhiz; *Kitāb al-hayawān* I 111 and Kulīnī l. c. 217. The popular belief regards the jirri as well as other kinds of animals as bewitched men, *Jāhiz* l. c. VI 24, 6. Cf. for the identification of this fish name further Imm. Löw and Nöldeke in Zeitschr. f. Assyr. XXII 85-86.
4. E. G. Browne "An abridged translation of the History of Tabaristan by Ibn Isfendiyar" (London 1905, Gibb Memorial series II) 175. The change in the call to prayer in this sense is the public indication of the Shi'itic occupation of a district formerly controlled by the Sunnites (cf. Makrīzī *Khitaṭ* II 270 ff.). In the same manner General Jauhar announced the victory of the Fāṭimide regiment, in the mosque of Ṭūlūn and Amr in the capital of Egypt (Gottheil, in the Journal Americ. Orient. Soc. XXVII 220 note 3). The rebel Basāsirī, in order to testify to the recognition of the Fāṭimide caliphate in Baghdad, has the Shi'itic formula added to the aḏān (Ibn al-Kalānīsī, "History of Damascus," ed. Amedroz 88, 5 fr. below). An example from South Arabia is to be found in Khazraji, "The Pearl-strings" translated by Redhouse (London 1906, Gibb M. S. III) I p. 182. On the other hand the rejection of the Fāṭimide and the return to the 'Abbāside rulership in Damascus and other places in Syria is proclaimed through the abolition of that formula (Fāriḳī in Amedroz l. c. 109, Ibn al-Kalānīsī 301, 14). The same thing was ordered by the crazy Fāṭimide al-Hākim when in one of his fits of madness he allowed the attributes of Sunnism to be reinstated. (*Abulmahāsin* ed. Popper 599, 10.) When in the year 307/919 North Africa was subjected to Shi'itic rule, the new ruler had the tongue of the pious mu'edḏin 'Arūs torn out and executed him under great martyrdom, because witnesses testified that in the call to prayer he did not add the Shi'itic supplement. (*Bayān al-Mughrib* ed. Dozy I 186.) Cf. the order of the Shi'ite conqueror after the fall of the Aghlabides, *ibid.* I, 148; 231.
5. The insignificant character of the ritualistic differences becomes still clearer if we examine the various old formulas of the con-

fession of faith (akā'id) of the Sunnite authorities.¹ A number of such 'Akā'id-formulas have been collected by Duncan B. Macdonald "Development of Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence and Constitutional Theory" (New York 1903) 293 ff. in an English translation. Among the old formulas, that of Abū Ja'far Ahmad al Ṭahāwī (d. 321/933) (printed Kasan 1902 with comments by *Sirāj al-dīn 'Omar al-Hindī*, (d. 773/1371), enjoys great authority. In this same work the chief differences of the two sects (order of caliphs, estimation of the companions) are carefully considered and defined in the Sunnitic sense. Of ritualistic differences, however, only one is taken into consideration, namely, whether the mere rubbing of the foot-wear is permissible in cases where washing the feet before prayer is difficult. The Shi'ites are unwilling to recognize such a substitute. In the *al-Fiḥ al akbar* attributed to Abū-Hanīfa, following upon the command to honor all "companions" and to consider no one as a Kāfir because of his actual sins, the only reference to the ritual is that "the rubbing of foot-wear is Sunna, and the Tarāwih-rite during Ramaḍan nights is Sunna, and praying behind pious and sinning (Imams) is permitted, if otherwise they belong to the true believers (cf. above p. 90). In a treatise known as *Wasiyya*, likewise ascribed to Abū Hanīfa, the rubbing of the foot-wear is also the only reference to the ritual. He who challenges its permissibility is under suspicion of being an unbeliever. In the same sense, Ghazālī quotes the utterance of Du-l-nūn: Three things belong to the characteristics of Sunna, the rubbing of the foot-wear, the careful participation in prayer in public assemblies, and love for ancestors (the "Companions") (*Kitāb al-iktisād fi-l-i'tikād*. Cairo, Ḳabbānī, o. J. 221). It is difficult to see why this particular bagatelle should be given so much weight and be made almost equivalent to dogmatic principles. "He who disapproves of the *mash* (rubbing) has indeed rejected Sunna: such an attitude is the mark of Satan" (Ibn Sa'd VI 192, 5 ff.). This point of view enables us to understand the careful emphasis placed upon permissibility of *mash* in the biographical traditions of Ibn Sa'd VI 34, 20; 75, 10; cf. especially 83, 12; 162, 4; 166, 14; 168, 6. 10. These traditions are intended to justify the Sunnitic concessions, all the more so because in them 'Alī himself is represented as the one who approves of the custom rejected by the Shi'ites.

6. Cf. my "Beiträge zur Literaturgeschichte der Schī'a" 49.

XV. 1. See on this type of marriage E. Westermarck, "The History of Human Marriage" chapter XXIII (2 ed. London 1894) 517 ff.

2. Theodor Gomperz, "Greek Thinkers" III, 123.

3. Robertson Smith, "Kinship and Marriage among the early

Arabians''⁷² 83 ff.; Wellhausen in *Nachrichten Ges. d. Wiss. Göttingen* 1893, 464 ff.; Lammens, *Mo'āwija* 409 (*Mélanges Beyrouth* III 273). The accounts in regard to the abrogation of Muta' marriage in G. A. Wilken, "Het Matriarchaat bei de oude Arabieren" (Amsterdam 1884) 10 ff. On *mut'a* cf. also Caetani's work l. c. 894 ff.

4. Abū-l-'Abbās al-Jorjānī, *al-Muntakhab min ḵināyāt al-udabā* (Cairo 1908) 108.
5. After the enumeration of the degrees of kinship which prevent marriage: "and in addition he has allowed you to obtain (women) through your possessions in honorable estate, not in adultery, and to those whom you have enjoyed (therefore Mut'a), give their reward (dowry) according to law; and it will not be accounted a sin if you agree to give more than the legal amount." This is the text, upheld by a number of traditions, in which the legitimacy of the Mut'a-marriage is set forth. According to a notice in Ḥāzimī, *Kitāb al-i'tibār fī bayān al-nāsikh wal-mansūkh min al-āthār* (Haidarābād 1319) 179; in the original Koran text there stood after the word "enjoyed" the additional words: *ilā ajalīn musamman* (to a fixed limit of time). This addition is specifically handed down as the reading of Ibn 'Abbās; and through it the application of the text to a temporary marriage gains additional support. A concise view of the difference from a Shi'itic point of view is given by Murtaḍā, *Intiṣār* 42.
6. See on such marriages in Persia E. G. Browne, "A Year amongst the Persians" 462. On the looseness of the marriage bond amongst a portion of the Shi'ites a striking remark of Jāhiz is to be found quoted in *Muḥāḍarāt al-udabā* (Cairo 1287) by al-Rāghib al-Isfahānī II 140 (wikāya).
7. Cf. for the Shi'itic standpoint Paul Kitabji Khan, "Droit Musulman Shy'ite. Le mariage et le divorce" (Lausanne-Disseration 1904) 79 ff.

XVI. 1. Kumeit, *Hāshimīyyāt* ed. Horovitz VI. v. 9.

2. On the most important of these sanctuaries we now have a monograph by Arnold Nöldeke "Das Heiligtum al-Husains zu Kerbelā" (Berlin 1909, Türkische Bibliothek XI).

XVII. 1. Not to mention incorrect older statements of ancient times, I will give only two examples of the persistency of this error drawn from the present. Even H. Derenbourg says in his lecture on "La science des Religions et l'Islamisme" (Paris 1886) 76: "La soumma . . . est rejetée par les Schi'ites," while Sir J. W. Redhouse writes in his 417th note to Khazraji's "Pearl string" 71: "the Shi'a and other heterodox Muslims pay little or no regard to tradition." Still more surprising is the fact that a short time ago a Moslem jurist in Cairo committed the

same error in regard to the difference between the Shī'ites and Sunnites with reference to tradition (Dr. Riad Ghali, "De la Tradition considérée comme source du droit musulman." Paris 1909 25-27).

2. *Badā'i' al-badā'ih* (Cairo 1316) I 176 (on the margin of Ma'āhid altansīs).
3. It is reported of 'Ubeidallāh ibn Mūsā (d. in Kufa 213/828) a contemporary of the caliph Ma'mūn, that he handed down Ḥadīths with a Shī'itic bias (Ibn Sa'd VI 279, 13); the same accusation is brought against his contemporary Khālīd ibn Makhlad (ibid. 283, 24).
4. The Shī'ite theologians are divided into two parties on the very question as to whether the decisions made in recognized traditions stand on the same level of authority with other sources of legal deductions. Opposed to the *Akhbāriyyūn*, i. e. those who, drawing their law exclusively from credible traditional reports (akhbār) reject the application of speculative methods, stand the *uṣūliyyūn*, who accept also the *kiyās* (analogy) and similar subjective methods as "sources" (uṣūl). The Shī'ism predominating in Persia belongs to the latter party. The same division of opinion in regard to principles is found also among the Sunnites. Cf. the two parties, the akhbāriyya and kalāmiyya, mentioned by Shahrastānī (131, 7th line from below), fighting one another with the sword.
5. In some instances Shī'ism is introduced into Persian districts (Kumm) by Arab colonists; (Yākūt IV 176, 4 ff.).
6. Tabarī I 3081, 10. 14.
7. Carra de Vaux, "Le Mahométisme; le génie semitique et le génie aryen dans l'Islam" (Paris 1898) 142.
8. The indifference of the Imamites towards ceremonial law is already referred to by the polemic writer Shuhfur ibn Tāhīr al Isfarāīnī (d. 1078)—no doubt to an exaggerated degree. See the excerpt by I. Friedlander: "The Heterodoxies of the Shiites" II 61, 20.
- 8a. Kult. d. Gegenw. 122, 14 fr. below.
9. 'Zahiriten 61 ff., ZDMG LIII 382 cf. Querry l. c. I 44 in the chapter on "Les êtres impurs et les substances impures," no. 10, is L'infidèle . . . "tels sont les sectateurs des ennemis de l'imam 'Alī et les hérétiques."
- 9a. See Vol. I Chap. 16 of James Morier's "The Adventures of Hajji Baba of Ispahan" to which in the Chicago ed. (1895) Professor E. G. Browne has contributed a valuable introduction.
10. J. E. Polak, "Persian. Das Land und sein Bewohner" (Leipzig 1865) I 128, 13.
11. Ibid. II 55; cf. 356, 8.

12. Ibid. II 271, 2.
13. E. G. Browne, "A Year amongst the Persians" 371 below.
14. Renan, "Mission de Phénicie" (Paris 1864) 633; cf. also Lammens "Sur la Frontière nord de la Terre promise" (in the Revue "Les Etudes" Paris 1899, February and March) 5 ff. of the reprint. It is a mistake to count the Metawile among the extreme Shī'ites (like the Nuṣairia); they are regular Imamites; their religious teachers at times receive their training in Persia.
15. "East of the Jordan" (London 1881) 306. Lortet reports the same of them, "La Syrie d'aujourd'hui" (Paris 1884) 115 with the absurd insinuation "à ces minuties intolérantes on reconnaît les pratiques de l'ancien judaïsme." For the older literature we may refer to the description of the characteristics of the Metawile Shī'ites given by Volney, who traveled through Syria in 1783-1785. "Ils se réputent souillé par l'attouchement des étrangers; et contre l'usage general du levant, ils ne boivent ni ne mangent dans le vase qui a servi a une personne qui n'est pas de leur sects; ils ne s'asseyent même pas à la même table." "Voyage en Syrie et en Egypte (Paris 1787) 79. The same is reported of the Shī'itic *Nakhāwla* (more correctly *nawākhila* "date planters") who settled in the surroundings of Medina and who trace their descent to the ancient Anṣārs. "They count both Jew and Christian as unclean, being as scrupulous in this particular as the Persians, whose rules they follow in the discharge of their religious purifications" ("With the Pilgrims to Mecca. The great pilgrimage" by Haji Khan and Wilfrid Sparray 1902, 233).
16. Cf. more fully in my treatise "Islamisme et Parsisme" (Actes du I Congrès d'Histoire des Religions" I [Paris 1901]—119—147).
17. D. Menant in "Revue du Monde Musulman" III, 219.
18. Murtaḍā, *Intiṣār* 155. 157. This question of Shī'itic law is treated also in the treatise, by al-Sheikh al Mufīd, highly regarded by the Imamites (Brockelmann I, 188, 15, who incorrectly describes the treatise as "Concerning sacrificial offerings"; it deals with the ordinary killing of animals). Behā al-dīn al-Āmilī also wrote a special treatise "on the prohibition to eat the meat of animals slaughtered by the ahl al-kitāb." (Mss. Berlin, Petermann 247.) At the court of the Sefewide Shah 'Abbās, the Shī'ite theologians held a disputation with Sheikh Khidr al-Māridīnī, the representative of the Turkish Sultan Aḥmed, on this question (Muḥibbī, *Khulāsat al-athar* II 130). The Shī'ites are intolerant in the matter of the dietary law, even towards Moslems whom they regard as heretics. (Ibn Teymiyya *Rasā'il* I 278, 6.)

19. 'Omar II specifically permitted the eating of animals slaughtered by Samaritans (Ibn Sa'd V 260, 15); but this is not generally accepted. Regarding Sabians cf. ZDMG XXXII 392. In the later dismal development of religious practices, some Sunni teachers have shown the disposition to prohibit meat slaughtered by the ahl al-kitāb (Jews); but they have been opposed by the explicit statement of Sura 5, v. 7 cf. Steinschneider. "Polemische und apologetische Literatur in Arab. Sprache" 151.
 20. The later development in regard to this question appears likewise to have resulted in a more exclusive attitude among the Sunnites; see Th. W. Juynboll, "Handbuch des Islamischen Gesetzes" 221.
 21. Cf. Lammens, "Mo'awiyya" 293 (Mélanges Beyrouth III 157).
 22. Murtaḍā I. c. 45; on marriage with the women of the *Ahl al-kitāb* see Caetani I. c. 787. It may be added that Shī'itic law demands the exclusion of such women only for a normal permanent marriage, for the less binding trial-marriage these women are allowed.
 23. 'Askarī "Kommentar zur Zweiten Sure," 215.
 24. *Balāḍorī* ed. de Goeje, 129.
 25. Kulīnī I. c. 568. The saying has come down from Imam Ja'far al-Šāḍik: "It is better to have one's child nursed by a Jewish or a Christian woman, than to trust it to a nurse belonging to the Nāṣibīyya (enemies of 'Alī)" (Najāshī I. c. 219).
 26. Kulīnī 39; mā khālafa al'amma fafihi al-rashād.
- XVIII. 1. See R. Strothmann "Das Staatsrecht der Zeiditen" (Strassburg 1912).
2. Zeitschr. f. Assyriologie (1908) XXII 317 ff.
 3. The system of Aḥmed ibn al-Kayyāl is especially noteworthy, Shahrastānī ed. Cureton 138.
 4. It is nevertheless worthy of mention that in an old description of the phenomena and results incident to the appearance of the Maḥdī the permission to drink wine at that time is emphasized (Jāhiz, *Ḥayawān* V 75, 4).
 5. Kultur d. Gegenw. 126, 7-32.
 6. A hateful picture in this sense is given by Pseudo-Balkhī, ed. Huart IV, 8.
 7. De Goeje "Mémoire sur les Carmathes du Bahraïn et les Fāṭimides" 2 ed., Leiden 1880, especially 158-170.
 8. Whinfield, "Masnawī" 169.
 9. Mas'ūdī, *Tanbīh* ed. de Goeje 395, 11.
 10. On this system and its literature see the publication by Clément Huart and Dr. Riza Tewfik in E. J. W. Gibb memorial series Vol. IX (1909). G. Jacob, "Die Bektaschijje im Verhältnis zu verwandten Erscheinungen." (Münich 1909.)
- XIX. 1. Ghazālī in his confessions (al-munkid) enumerates the polemic

- writings which he has directed against this sect; one of them bears the name of the caliph, to whom it is dedicated (al-Mustazhiri). The most interesting of these writings, both in form and content, is "the Just Scales" (al-kustās al-mustakīm), the polemic dialogue mentioned in the text, between the author and an Ismā'īlite (ed. Ḳabbānī, Cairo 1318/1900).
2. Cf. de Goeje, *Mémoire* 171.
 3. Concerning the position of the Assassins within the Ismā'īlite movement, see Stanislas Guyard, "Un grand maître des Assassins au temps de Saladin." (*Journ. Asiat.* 1877 I 324 ff.) Cf. Ibn Jubeir, *Travels*, 2 ed. 255, 3 ff.
 4. Cf. my article *Lā Misāsa* in *Revue Africaine* 1908, 25.
 5. About 9,000 individuals. Regarding their settlements in Syria see Lammens, "Au pays de Nosairis" (in "Revue de l'Orient Chrétien" 1900) 54 of the reprint, where further literature is given.
 6. Cf. Freih. v. Oppenheim, "Vom Mittelmeer zum Persischen Ges." (Berlin 1899) I note 133. In the same work he gives a survey of the branches of the Ismā'īliyya. The Khojas, however, do not cling to the "seven-system" of the Ismā'īlite doctrine of Imam; cf. the society of *Khoja ithnā 'asharī jamā'at* i. e. 'Twelver.' "Revue du Monde Musulman" VIII 491.
 7. *Revue du Monde Musulman* II 373.
 8. See the article by Le Chatelier in "Revue du Monde Musulman" I 48-85. On the rank of the Agha khan and its previous history (in Persia, with his seat in Kéhk) see S. Guyard l. c. 378 ff.
 9. Cf. M. Hartmann, "Mitteilungen des Seminars f. Orient. Spr. B. zu Berlin" XI, section II 25. The name of Lady Agha Khan is also to be found among the leaders of the cultural movement among women in India, *Revue du Monde Musulman*. VII 483, 20.
 10. *Revue du Monde Musulman* IV 852.
 11. Tr. *ibid.* VI, 548-551.
- XX. 1. *Aghānī* XIV 163, 20.
2. "Muh. Studien" II 331.
 3. Kazwīnī ed. Wüstenfeld II 390.
 4. Harnack, "Mission und Ausbreitung des Christentums," 429.
 5. Suleimān al-Adanī, *al-Bākūra al-Suleimāniyya* (Beyrouth 1863) 10, 14; René Dussaud, "Histoire et Religion des Nosairis" (Paris 1900) 164, 1.
 6. Dussaud l. c. where a bibliographical survey is also given. Cf. *Archiv. für Religionswiss.* 1900, 85 ff.
 7. *Archiv. f. Religionswiss.* l. c. 90.

CHAPTER VI.

LATER DEVELOPMENTS.

In his work on the "Origin and Development of Moral Ideas,"¹ Eduard Westermarck discusses the influence of conventions on the early development of the aspect of morality and law. "In primitive communities custom replaces law; even after the communal organization has made some progress, it may remain as the only rule of conduct."

With the aid of extensive literary and historical material, the author demonstrates more effectively than his predecessors the large part to be assigned to conventions in the unfolding of culture and law, both as a standard for legality and as the basis of ethical and juridical legislation. Incidentally he touches (page 164) on the views of the Arab and Turkoman nomads, but he has failed to estimate at its full value one of the most important factors, to wit, the idea of the Sunna and its significance in Islam.

From ancient times the most important test by which the Arabs decided whether an act was right and lawful, was to find out whether it corresponded to the norm and custom inherited from their ancestors. That is to be regarded as true and right which has its roots in inherited views and usages alone, and what is accepted as law is Sunna. This was their law and sanctum, the only sources of their right and religion. To pass beyond were to sin against the inviolable rule of sacred custom. That which is true of practices is true for the same reason of inherited ideas. The general body was not to accept anything as new which was not in accord with ancestral views.² This is illustrated by the attitude

of the Meccans, who steadily opposed the position of the prophet announcing paradise, hell and the judgment day, by the assertion that their ancestors had never heard of any of these things, and that they would only follow the path laid out by their ancestors.³ As against the traditions handed down from time immemorial, the doctrine of the prophet is *dīn muḥdath*, an absolutely new gospel, and is therefore to be rejected.⁴

The Sunna-consciousness can be regarded from the point of view of phenomena, which Herbert Spencer calls "representative feelings," that is, organic results gathered by a group of mankind in the course of centuries, and which become concentrated in an inherited instinct, and in the case of the individual forms the subject of inheritance.⁵

The Arabs, while thus abandoning their original Sunna, according to the commands of Islam, carried over the idea of Sunna into this very Islam. It thus became the foundation of Islamic law and religion, to be sure with an important modification. Mohammedanism could not appeal to heathen Sunna. Its starting point, therefore, had to be shifted and carried over to the teachings, views and practices, of the oldest generations of Moslems, who thus became the founders of a Sunna of totally different type from that of the older Arabs. From now on the standard of conduct became, firstly that which could be proved as the custom and views of the prophet, and secondly of that of his Companions. Instead of asking what, under the existing conditions, was good or correct, it was a question of what the prophet and the Companions had said about the matter, how they had acted,⁶ and what in consequence had been passed on as the right view and attitude. The Ḥadīth claims to transmit such standards to later generations by preserving traditions regarding the utterances and examples of those prototypes of truth and law. Where

the Ḥadīth was questionable or in the absence of accredited positive traditions, a large leeway was given in the course of the early development of Islamic law to the conclusions and the judgment of the lawmakers (page 55). No one, however, went so far as to question the right of Sunna, when the indubitable, substantiated tradition was at hand, which rendered further speculation superfluous.

In this sense the need of Sunna in Islam became a "representative feeling." The one care of the pious and faithful was to agree with the Sunna of the Companions, to act only as the Sunna commands, and to avoid anything which contradicted it or which could not be substantiated by it. That which contradicts ancient customs, the Sunna, or according to a stricter acceptance which is not identical with it, they call *bid'a*, innovation, whether bearing on belief, or on the most insignificant relations of everyday life.⁷ The strict observers rejected as *bid'a*, every kind of innovation which could not be established by the opinions and practices of former days.

II. Theoretically such a standard could properly be carried out; in actual practice, however, there was bound to be a collision at every step, with the unquestioned theory. The unfolding of social conditions, and the experiences gathered in various climes and through changes resulting in totally different demands and conditions from those prevailing in the days of the Companions, as well as the manifold foreign antecedents and influences which had to be assimilated, was bound to make a breach in the consistent adherence to the strict Sunna, as the only criterion of right and truth. Concessions had to be made and several distinctions introduced, which legitimized many an innovation that was thus admitted into the domain of the Sunna. Theories arose, under what conditions *bid'a* could be accepted, or indeed could be regarded as dutiful and praiseworthy.

This afforded a large field for the ingenuity of the theologians and casuists, which they have cultivated down to our own days.

In these efforts the conception of *ijma'* (consensus of opinion) became a mediating factor. Any custom that has been sanctioned for a long period becomes by virtue of this fact Sunna. At first the pious theologians rebelled against *bid'a*, but in the course of time it is tolerated as *ijma'*, and finally even at this stage it becomes *bid'a* to oppose the innovation, and he who demands the earlier practices is repudiated as an innovator.

A striking example is to be found in the universal observance of the *maulid al-nabī*, the birthday feast of the prophet at the beginning of Rabī 'al-awwal, sanctioned by the religious authorities. As late as the eighth century of the Hijra, the theologians of Islam challenged its justification as Sunna; many rejected it as an innovation. Fetwās were drawn up for and against it. Since then, on the ground of popular sanction, it has become an essential part of Moslem life. It would not occur to any one to think of it as a *bid'a* in a bad sense.¹ The same is true of other religious festivals and liturgical ordinances, which arose in later centuries, and had to fight for recognition, after they had been for a long time granted as *bid'a*.² The history of Islam shows, that its theologians, however disinclined they themselves were to accept new customs, were not disinclined to give up their opposition to customs that had become established and to declare as *ijma'* what a short time before had been looked upon as *bid'a*.

III. It may be maintained that, on the whole, the leaders of Mohammedanism, despite the pious adherence to the Sunna-concept, did not maintain stubborn opposition toward the changing demands of time and conditions. It is also evident that from this point of view it would

not be correct to regard the strict unchangeableness of Islamic law as a definite characteristic.

Even in the early days of Islam, it was necessary in civic and economic matters to go beyond the usages which were laid down for them in primitive Islam. Consideration for new conditions was not regarded by everyone as incompatible with the spirit of Sunna.

In one of the four orthodox sects, the one linked with the name of Mālik ibn Anas (page 55), the *maṣlaḥa*, "Utilitas publica," or the common interests, was recognized as the normal point of view in the application of the law. It was permitted to deviate from the normal law if it could be shown that the interest of the community demanded a different decision from that given in the law, corresponding to the principle of "corrigere jus propter utilitatem publicam" in Roman law. This liberty, to be sure, is limited to each case as it arises, and does not carry with it a definite setting aside of the law. But the principle involved is in itself an indication of the willingness to make concessions within the law. Significant is an important utterance of the highly esteemed theologian al Zurkānī (d. 1122/1710 in Cairo), who, in a passage in his commentary to the Code (Muwaṭṭa) of Mālik distinctly asserts that decisions may be made in the measure of new circumstances. "There is nothing strange," he concludes, "in that laws must accommodate themselves to circumstances."¹

It follows that for Islam, therefore, the gates of "innovations" and reforms are not closed from the point of view of religious law. Under the protection of this new freedom, new adaptations, borrowed from Western culture, may find an entrance into Moslem life. They have, to be sure, called forth the objections of the obscurantists, but have been finally sanctioned by formal fetwās by recognized authorities, and protected against hyperortho-

dox attacks. It is, to be sure, a somewhat objectionable phenomenon that wholesome innovations of an entirely practical and worldly significance must receive their justification through a fetwā, after they had previously formed the subject of discussion from the point of view of religious permissibility.

Under the protection of such theological dispensations, innovations introduced into Islamic society since the eighteenth century (of which the first was perhaps the establishment of a printing-press in Constantinople in 1729), encounter no opposition. Similarly, within the field of economic conditions those learned in canon law were obliged to exercise their ingenuity to find means of circumventing obstacles that stand in the way of adapting Islam to modern needs. For example, great efforts are being made at present to find subtle distinctions which would permit conscientious Moslems to take out insurance policies, which, in so far as they involve chance, run counter to the spirit of Islam. The same objections had to be overcome through theological subtlety in regard to savings banks. Theoretically this institution would not be permitted in a society, the laws of which forbid every form of interest, not merely usury.² Nevertheless the Egyptian Mufti, Sheikh Muhammed 'Abduh (d. 1905), found the means, in a special fetwā, of making the savings banks and the division of dividends admissible from the point of view of religious law for a Moslem community. In the same way his colleagues at Constantinople had previously issued fetwās to enable the Ottoman government to issue interest-bearing state bonds.³

The same problem arises in the most recent times in regard to matters of statecraft. In the midst of the profound changes in the constitutional governments of Mohammedan states, in orthodox as well as Shi'itic Islam, we have witnessed the efforts of orthodox scholars to find the justification for the legality of parliamentary

government, in the Koran.⁴ Similarly, the Shī'ite Mullahs, in association with the jurists attached to the sacred cities of Nejef and Kerbelā, who play such an important part in the religious life of Persian Shī'ism, base the claims of the revolutionists for a parliamentary form of government on the doctrine of the "hidden Imam" (see above page 247). In numerous theological treatises, authoritative teachers of Islam make the effort to justify demands for modern forms of government through the Koran and Ḥadīth utterances, just as they refer to the religious documents of Islam for the furtherance of cultural progress in civic life, including the woman question and the like.⁵

IV. While these examples are taken from the most recent phases of Islamic conditions, the manifestation itself corresponds to a tendency to be noted in the preceding centuries.

There was, to be sure, this limitation, in that in the past there were always minorities who were less inclined to make concessions on the basis of bid'a, and who endeavored to narrow the boundaries of the good bid'a as much as possible, often with fanatical methods, and also to draw a close circle around orthodox practice, so as to keep Islam pure of any compromise. They condemned as unorthodox and as unwarranted innovations, not only the customs arising in connection with the development of the state, customs which were necessarily unknown in earlier days, but even dogmatic speculations and their formulations, which were equally unknown to former ages. They went so far as to include in this condemnation the 'Asharitic demands which, as we have seen, claimed to be Sunna.

The inner history of Islamic movements thus resolves itself into a fight between Sunna and Bid'a, of the intransigent principle of tradition opposed to the continuous enlargement of its boundaries, and the enlarge-

ment of its original barriers. This opposition runs through the whole history of Islam, through its dogmatic as well as through its legalistic development. And the necessity for this conflict, occasioned by the constant change of circumstances, demonstrates the error involved in the widespread opinion that Islam after a short period of growth became stereotyped.¹ The fact is that the attempt to stereotype Islam involved bloody conflicts in order to be carried out; and after it had partially succeeded, the tendency to keep Islam free from innovations led as late as the middle of the eighteenth century to a strong reactionary movement. (See p. 307.)

V. Among the various tendencies within Moslem theology condemning and prosecuting the Bid'a, there is none actuated by so consistent and energetic a spirit as the one which reveres the celebrated Imam Aḥmed ibn Ḥanbal (see above pages 56, 136), as its patriarch and founder and calls itself after his name. From this circle proceed the most fanatic Sunna zealots, the most blatant opponents of all bid'a in dogma, ritual, and in private life. Had they had their way, the whole of Islam would have been pushed back to the original content as fixed at Medina, and to the form dating from the time of the Companions. It would be an error to attribute this to a possible romantic distinction or to a sentimental longing for a naïve and beautiful past. Such feelings played no part in the case of those who clung to the letter. It is merely the formal consequence drawn from Sunna which calls forth their protest.

There are plenty of occasions for such protests in the course of the centuries. There is first of all, the spiritual dogmatism with its peculiar method of exegesis, which called forth an attack from the followers of ibn Ḥanbal. We have already seen that this dogmatism, even in the form given to it by the 'Asharites, was looked upon as heresy. They were unwilling to move a hair'sbreadth

from the literal wording of the texts. Nothing further was to be read into or out of it. To an even larger extent, religious life furnished occasion for their protests. Instead of going into details, we must content ourselves here with a single example, which, however, penetrates to the very heart of the religious life of Islam.

VI. In consequence of factors, partly psychological, partly historical, a phase of religious cult developed in Islam, which, however, despite its inconsistency with the Islamic conception of Allah and although in antipathy to real Sunna, nevertheless soon spread over the entire large territory of Islam. In some strata of Islamic practice, it assumed an importance larger than the essence of the religion itself and constituted the real form in which the popular religious conscience manifested itself. Allah stands far off from the common people; close to their souls are the local saints (*welī*), who form the genuine object of their religious cult, to whom their fears and their hopes, their respect and their devotion are linked. Graves of saints and other sacred spots associated with such a cult, form their places of worship, in connection with gross fetishistical worship of relics and cult objects. This worship of saints assumes a variety of forms according to geographical and ethnographical conditions, the differentiations being due to the varying antecedents of the people who had adopted Islam. The survival of the older cults, pushed to the wall by Islam, are to be seen to a larger or smaller degree in this worship of saints. By virtue of provincial peculiarities it gives the uniform catholic system of universal Islam, a local coloring due to its popular character.¹

In addition to ethnological considerations, the psychological needs of the people were also favorable to the worship of saints in Islam. In other words, bridging over the chasm, separating the naïve believer with his

daily needs, from the unapproachable, unattainable divinity, favored the worship of saints in Islam; for through this worship the believer was brought into contact with mediators to whom he felt close and who seemed more accessible to him than a divinity enthroned on high, far above everything human and terrestrial. The people recognize and fear the supreme Allah as the world power which controls the great phenomena in the cosmos, but do not attribute to him any interest in the petty needs of a small circle, or still less of the single individual. It is the local saint who is interested in the crops of a particular locality, in the flocks of a tribe, in the recovery of the individual from sickness, or in abundant offspring. To him are brought offerings, and vows are made in his favor to obtain his goodwill—or to use the Islamic phrase—"to obtain his intercession with Allah." He is also the protector and guardian of right and justice among his followers. A false oath in his name or at the place sacred to him is more feared than such an oath in the name of Allah. The saint lives among his faithful and watches over their fortunes and misfortunes, over their rights and their virtues. In many parts of the Moslem world—among the Bedouins of the steppes of Arabia, among the Kabyles of North Africa, the adhesion of the populace to Islam is reduced chiefly to the phases of the local *weli* cult, and the rites and customs connected therewith.

This need was also favorable to the unfolding of those ethnographical aspects which led to the preservation in an endless variety of forms of saint worship, of many elements of the pre-Islamic religion.

One of the most important chapters in the religious history of Islam is the systematic study of the phenomena connected with this aspect of religious history. We can only touch upon the subject here, in order to emphasize that the forms of this worship of saints were tolerated

in principle, by the authorities of official religion, many centuries back. They contented themselves with removing the grossly heathenish elements—a limitation which in practice was never accurately defined. At the beginning, to be sure, the official theology was not so tolerant towards the demands of the popular religious spirit. For there is no sharper break with the old Sunna than the spread of the cult of saints, so contrary to the kernel of Islam, and which the genuine adherent of Sunna was obliged to relegate to the province of *shirk*, and to condemn as the association of divine powers with the one and only Allah. The conception formed of the prophet, who was brought into association with the worship of saints, was also changed from the view taken of him according to the Sunna. He also was drawn into the sphere of hagiology and hagiolatry, and as a consequence, a conception arose of him in absolute contradiction to the human elements given to the founder of Islam in the Koran and Sunna. The spread of the cult of prophet and saints furnished the best possible opportunity to enforce the demand for the abandonment of the Bid'a principle, so entirely contrary to Sunna. But after some opposition official Islam yielded to the prevailing religious views brought about by the force of popular agreement (*ijma'*). With certain doctrinal reservations and some theological restraints, the result of this historical development was embodied as part of the orthodox system.

VII. The zeal of the Hanbalites against innovations, however, admitted of no concessions. They regarded it as their mission to stand up as heralds of the Sunna against all dogmatic, ritualistic and social bid'a, though the little group felt itself to be powerless against the ruling spirit. In the beginning of the fourteenth century, however, there rose a strong defender of their views—a courageous theologian, Takī al-dīn ibn Teimiyya, who in

his sermons and writings subjected historic Islam to a revision from the point of view of Sunna and Bid'a and opposed all innovations which changed the original dogma and practice. He showed the same zeal in opposing the influences of philosophy including the formulas of the 'Asharite Kalām, long since recognized by orthodoxy. As he opposed Sūfīism with its pantheistic doctrines, as well as the cult of prophets and saints, he also condemned as irreligious the great religious estimate put on the pilgrimage to the grave of the prophet, a rite which had long counted with the pious as the completion of the pilgrimage to Mecca. Ruthlessly does he turn against the theological authorities who recognized the legitimate Ijma' to justify abuses in the cult. He goes back to the Sunna, and to Sunna alone.

The results of the Mongol invasion under which the Moslem kingdom of the age was groaning, was a welcome opportunity to arouse the conscience of the people to a regeneration of Islam in the direction of Sunna, the falsification of which had brought on the wrath of God. The worldly rulers as well as the influential theological leaders did not look favorably upon this zealous endeavor. *Quieta non movere*—opposed to ibn Teimiyya's demand to go back to first principles—were the historical results within the domain of faith and practice which were now recognized as Sunna. The final Church authority in Islam was Ghazālī who had found the formula uniting ritualism, rationalism, dogmatism and mysticism, and whose point of view had become the criterion of orthodox Sunni Islam. This Ghazālī was, so to speak, the red rag for the new Ḥanbalites in their determination to combat all historical development.

Ibn Teimiyya did not meet with much success. He was dragged from one religious tribunal to another and died in prison (1328). The theological literature of the succeeding age discussed as a leading thesis the question

whether he was a heretic or a pious champion of the Sunna. His little group of followers has crowned his memory with the halo of saintship, and even his opponents became reconciled to him through the permanent impressions of religious earnestness stamped upon the writings of the dead zealot. His influence, though latent, was felt for a period of four centuries. His works were read and studied and in many circles of Islam exercised a quiet power, which from time to time broke into hostility against bid'a.

It was the influence of his teachings, which towards the middle of the eighteenth century, called forth one of the more recent religious movements, that of the Wahhābites.

VIII. The history of Arab Islam is rich in examples of the combinations in powerful, authoritative personalities, of the traits of the learned theologian with those of the brave warrior. As in heathendom the "lyre and the sword" are united, so in Islam theology and warlike bravery go hand in hand against unbelief and heresy. The ancient history of Islam furnishes many illustrations of this. At all events religious tradition—albeit unhistorical—has been eager to add to the laurel of many a warrior the distinction of possessing divine wisdom.

The oldest type appears in the sword of 'Alī, borne by a man, according to religious legend, who at the same time was regarded as a high authority in all religious questions, the decision of which involved theological learning. But even when we stand on firm historical soil, we often see this combination of warlike and religious virtue in the one standing at the head of the fighting masses. As illustrative of the continuity of this phenomenon down to the latest days, we may take 'Abd al Mu'min in the twelfth century, who passed from the theological halls of instruction to take the leadership of the Almohad movement, which after many heroic engage-

ments, participated in by large masses who flocked to his standard, culminated in the foundation of a large western kingdom; or again, the latest Moslem hero, 'Abdalkādir, who after his brave military opposition to the French conquest of his native Algeria gathered around him in Damascus pupils eager to follow his exposition of Malikite law and other branches of Islamic theology. The Caucasian champion of freedom, Shāmīl, and the warlike Mahdīs of whom we have lately heard so much in the Soudan and Somaliland, are, to be sure, less worthy representatives of the same occurrence in the history of Islam. Nevertheless, these warriors likewise proceed from the circles formed by students of Islamic theology.

One of the most remarkable theological-military movements of the Arabs was inaugurated in modern times in central Arabia by Mohammed ibn 'Abd al Wahhāb (died 1787), who, on the basis of a zealous study of the writings of ibn Teimiyya, aroused his compatriots to a movement of a theological character, which soon burst forth into flames. It carried the warlike people with it, and after remarkable successes on the battlefield, which stretched beyond the peninsula to 'Irak, finally led to the foundation of a state community. This state after many vicissitudes, and though weakened by many rivalries, still exists to-day in Central Arabia, and forms an influential factor in the politics of the Arabian peninsula. While ibn 'Abd al Wahhāb differs from the warlike theologians above referred to, for he himself did not brandish the sword at the head of his followers, it is nevertheless his theology which spurred on his son-in-law, Mohammed ibn Sa'ūd, to protect him, and to undertake the military campaigns for the restoration of Sunna. It would appear, indeed, that he drew his sword in the interests of theological doctrines and for their application to private life.

Quite recently, Professor Euting has furnished us with details of conditions existing in the religious state founded by the Wāhhābites, on the basis of his own experiences in the course of his travels in Arabia.¹

The Wāhhābite movement gave the practical sequence to the Ḥanbalitic protests of ibn Teimiyya against the innovations contrary to Sunna, which had found their way into Islam through general consensus (Ijma'), embracing dogmatical formulations which had arisen in the course of historical development, as well as new practices in every day life. It is sufficient to emphasize the fact that the Wāhhābite doctrine is consistent in extending its protests to every kind of bid'a, e. g., against the use of tobacco and coffee, which, since they cannot be proved to have formed part of the Sunna of the companions, are frowned down upon in Wāhhābite communities as a grievous offense.

And with the sword, the Wāhhābite hordes attacked the most sacred sites in the Sunnitic and Shī'itic cult of saints, but which they regard as the centres of the most reprehensible shirk cult, which together with the customs associated with it was placed on a level with idolatry. It was only with the help of the troops of the Egyptian vassal, Muhammed 'Alī, under the nominal authority of the Turkish government, that the destruction of the graves of saints was checked. Those who were faithful to the teachings of ibn Teymiyya, included in their opposition even the grave of the prophet in Medina. All this in the name of Sunna, and for the purpose of restoring it. In these battles they were inspired by the examples of pious predecessors. The 'Omeyyad ruler, 'Omar II, faithful to Sunna, is said to have purposely not directed the structure at the prophet's grave towards Mecca, "for fear the people should regard this monument as a place of prayer." He wanted to prevent this by not orientating the structure after the

fashion of a mosque.² Besides opposing the worship of graves and relics, the Wahhābites fought also against other innovations in the ritual, more particularly attaching minarets to mosques and the use of the rosary, unknown to early Islam (see above page 171). Divine worship should be an exact copy from conditions prevailing at the time of the Companions.

Daily life, also, was forced back into extreme puritanical simplicity, which is attested by the practice of the Companions and caliphs through hundreds of Ḥadīths. All luxury was frowned upon, and the conditions prevailing in Medina in the seventh century were to be regarded a thousand years later as the model and guide for the Sunna state organized by the Wahhābites.

The attitude of the Wahhābites towards the cult of saints, as the chief object of their opposition, freely justifies the designation of "Tempelstürmer in Hoch Arabien" (destroyers of temples in Central Arabia), which is given to them by Karl von Vincenti in his novel depicting their social life and customs. For this work, in agreement with other accounts, pictures the spirit of hypocrisy and affectation of piety involved as the result of extreme puritanism.

The wide influence of the Wahhābitic tendencies appears also in various affiliated phenomena in remote corners of the Islamic world, which betray the unmistakable influences of the movement in Arabia.

IX. In the further consideration of the relationship of Islam in general to this movement, special attention should be called to a phenomenon significant from the religious and historical point of view. To the critical student of Islamic conditions, the Wahhābites appear to be combatants for the form of religion fixed by Mohammed and his Companions. The restoration of old Islam is their goal and their mission. Theoretically this is fre-

quently conceded by the 'Ulema.¹ Nevertheless, from the practical point of view, the Wahhābites had to be rejected as sectarians by orthodox Moslems, according to whom anyone who separates himself from *Ijma'*, rejects what the general consensus of the Church in its historical development has recognized as proper and true. Older Sunna regulations are of no consequence, for what is recognized by *Ijma'* becomes, *eo ipso*, Sunna. That alone is Sunnitic, that is orthodox, which corresponds to the recognized general belief and general practice. That which is contrary to this *Ijma'* is heterodox. Starting from these premises the orthodox Moslem must conclude that the Wahhābites, though claiming to be faithful to Sunna, through their opposition and rejection of matters which are recognized in the four orthodox sects, in part even demanded by them, are to be excluded from orthodox Islam, precisely as the old Kharijites. Since the twelfth century Ghazālī has been the final authority for orthodox Islam. Against his teachings, the Wahhābites in their literary opposition against Meccan orthodoxy still raging to-day, oppose the doctrines of ibn Teimiyya which have been rejected by the prevailing theology. "Hie Ghazālī, Hie ibn Teimiyya," is the warcry of this struggle. *Ijma'* has accepted Ghazālī and canonized him. Those who differ have broken with *Ijma'* and must be condemned as heterodox, despite their claim of being faithful and consistent followers of Sunna.

X. The movement which arose in the Arabian peninsula and whose aims and effects we have just been considering, has its gaze fixed on the past, denying the justification of the results of historical development, and recognizing Islam only in the petrified form of the seventh century. In contrast to this is a more modern movement within Islam, which recognizes the religious

evolution of mankind, in fact has this belief as its starting point and vital idea. This is the Babi movement which had its rise in Persia.

It arose, it is true, from a form of Shī'ism predominating in that country. In its historical development, however, its fundamental ideas are connected with a principle which we have come to recognize as the guiding thought of the Ismā'ilian sect, namely the self-perfection of the divine revelation through progressive manifestation of the great world-intellect.

In the beginning of the nineteenth century a new branch was grafted on to the Imam doctrine of the Shī'itic "Twelvers," the school of Sheikholes whose adherents cherished a zealous worship of the "hidden Mahdī" and of the Imams preceding him. In a gnostic manner, they hold these persons as hypostases of divine attributes, as creative potentialities. They thus give the Imam mythology of the ordinary Imamiyya a greater area, and in this respect are in line with the extremists (ghulat, see above page 233).

In this group grew up the visionary youth Mirza Muhammed 'Alī of Shiraz (born 1820). On account of his great ability and enthusiasm, he was recognized by his companions as chosen for the highest calling. This recognition of his fellow visionaries acted as a strong suggestion to the spirit of the pensive youth. He finally came to recognize himself as the embodiment and manifestation of a supreme superhuman mission within the development of Islam. From the consciousness of being a *Bāb*, that is "a door" by which the infallible will of the hidden Imam, as the highest source of all truth, reveals itself to the world, he soon came to believe that in the economy of spiritual development he was really the organ of the hidden instructor, the Imam of the age. In other words, he himself was the new Mahdī, whose coming had been foretold at "the end of

the first millennium," after the twelfth Imam (260-1260)* after Mohammed. He is Mahdī, however, no longer as the ordinary Shī'ite conceives of this dignity, but (and here he touches Ismā'ilitic doctrines) as a manifestation of the spirit of the world, as "the point of manifestation," the highest truth, which, having taken on bodily form in him, differs only in appearance, but is identical in being with those previous manifestations of that spiritual substance proceeding from God. He is the reappearance on earth of Moses and Jesus, as well as the embodiment of all other prophets through whose bodily appearance in former aeons the divine world-spirit had manifested itself. He preached to his followers opposition to the Mullahs—in Persia more particularly, the Ulemas are so-called—to their sanctimoniousness and hypocrisy, and their worldly strivings. He even went so far as to raise the revelation of Mohammed, which he interpreted largely in an allegorical sense, to the highest level. The practices of Islam, the minute laws on ritualistic purity, etc., were little considered in his doctrine. Sometimes others were substituted for them. Divine judgment, paradise, hell and the resurrection had other meanings.¹ In this he had predecessors in earlier spiritualistic systems. Resurrection is every new periodic manifestation of the divine spirit in relation to a preceding one. The latter comes to new life through its successor. This is the meaning of the "meeting with God," as the future life is designated in the Koran.

It is, however, not only in dogmatic and legal conceptions that the young Persian visionary opposed the petrified theology of the Mullahs. With his proclamation he attacked the social relationships of his fellow believers. His sympathetic ethics, the brotherhood of all men, were offered in place of the wall of separation between classes. He wished to raise women from the low position in which actual conditions had placed her

* Of the Mohammedan era.

in the name of tradition, to one of equality with man. He begins this task by doing away with the obligatory veil, and by rejecting the coarse conception of marriage as it had developed in Moslem communities, as this development was not a necessary result of religious principles. He connected the nobler conception of the marriage relation with thoughts on the function of the family and the reform of education.

The religious reforms of Bāb, therefore, included in their aim the fundamentals of community life. He is a social as well as a religious reformer, but as at the beginning he started with gnostic and mystic views, the latter element permeates his entire system by which he builds up his view of the world. He combines a distinctively modern point of view with Pythagorean subtleties; like the Ḥurūfīs (page 268) he toys with combinations of the letters of the alphabet, and assigns a numerical value to them. The number 19 possesses the greatest importance and serves him as the point of departure for "Gematria" (i. e., combinations of letters according to their numerical value), which play a great part in his speculation.

In regard to his own person he teaches his identity with the prophets which preceded him, a conception which has its roots in gnosticism, and even found an expression in earlier schismatic movements in Islam. Similarly he announces for the future a constantly renewing manifestation of the divine spirit, embodied for his days in his own person.² Divine revelation is not concluded either with Mohammed or with him. The divine spirit reveals itself in a progressive chain of periodical manifestations, which proclaim the divine will in a steadily increasing maturity, according to the progress of the times. Through such teachings Mīrzā Muhammed 'Alī paved the way for the transformation which took place in his community soon after his death.

He has embodied the substance of his teachings in a religious work regarded as sacred, and known as *Bayan*, i. e., Interpretation. His doctrine, naturally, appeared exceedingly dangerous from a political as well as from a religious point of view. The founder and his followers who gathered around him, among whom the heroine *Kurat al-'Ain* (comfort of the eye) arouses our sympathy, were unsparingly persecuted and proscribed, pursued and turned over to the executioner. Mohammed 'Alī himself was put to death in July, 1850. Those of his followers who escaped the martyr's death, whose enthusiasm was increased by the persecutions which they suffered, found an asylum on Turkish soil.

Soon after the death of the founder a split occurred within the community, according as the followers recognized the one or the other of two pupils singled out by the Bāb, as the authentic interpreter of the will of the late leader. The minority gathered around Subh-i-ezel (dawn of eternity) with headquarters in Famagusta (Cyprus), who proposed to sanction the work of the Bāb in the form given to it by the master. They are the conservative Bābists. The others supported the contention of the other apostle, Behā-Allāh (splendor of God), who in the beginning of the sixties, during the stay of the Bāb-exiles in Adrianople, declared himself on the basis of a cyclic system, to be the more perfect manifestation proclaimed by the master, through which the latter's own work would be raised to a higher level. Mohammed 'Alī was his precursor, his John, as it were. The divine spirit had appeared in him to fulfill the preparation made by the precursor. Behā is greater than Bāb. The latter was the *Kā'im* (the one who rises up), Behā is *Kayyūm* (the permanent one); "He who will appear," the expression used by Bāb with regard to his successor, "is greater than the one who has already appeared."³ By preference he calls himself

maẓhar or *manẓar*, the revelation of God in which the beauty of God is to be seen as in a mirror. He himself is "the beauty of Allah," whose face shines between the heavens and the earth as a precious polished pearl.⁴ Through him alone the being of God can be known, whose emanation he himself is.⁵ His followers actually invest him with divine attributes, as illustrated in the extravagant hymns addressed to him which have been published by E. G. Browne.⁶

On account of the quarrel which broke out between his followers and the conservative Bābists, Behā and his community were transferred to Akka, where he perfected his doctrine into a complete system in opposition not only to the *milet al furkān*, the congregation of the Koran, but also to the *milet al bayān*, i. e., the old Bābists who would not accept his reform, who declined to pass beyond the *Bayān*.

His teachings have been embodied in a number of books and epistles in Arabic and Persian, of which the *Kitāb aḳdas* (Sacred Book) is the most important.⁷ For his written declarations he claims divine origin. "Even this tablet (referred to in one of his epistles), is a hidden writing which has been guarded from eternity among the treasures of divine exemption, and whose characters are written with the fingers of divine power, if you would but know it." Thus he conveys the impression as though he did not reveal the whole wealth of his doctrine of salvation, reserving apparently some esoteric thoughts for the innermost circle. He maintains also that certain teachings ought to be kept secret from opponents. In a certain passage he declares: "We must not discuss this stage in detail, for the ears of our opponents are directed toward us in order to over-hear, while offering opposition to the true and everlasting God. For they do not attain to the mystery of knowledge

and of wisdom of the one who arises from the horizon of the splendor of divine unity.”

This manifestation of the universal spirit in Behā, as the fulfilment of the announcement of the original founder, resulted in the abrogation of the revelation to the Bāb in some essential points. While the latter is at bottom only a reform of Islam, Behā advanced to the larger conception of a world religion which was to unite mankind in a religious brotherhood. As in his political teachings he professes cosmopolitanism—emphasizing that there is “no preference to be given to him who loves his country, but to him who loves the world,”⁸ his religion in this matter was stripped of all narrow sectarianism.

He regards himself as the manifestation of the world spirit to ALL mankind. With this in view he sends his epistles, which form a portion of his book of revelations, to the nations and rulers of Europe and Asia; and he extends his horizon even to “the kings of America, and to the chiefs of the republic”; he proclaims “what the dove coos on the branches of constancy.” In the eyes of his followers he becomes a divine man filled with the prophetic spirit, when in his epistle to Napoleon III he announced, four years before Sedan, the Empire’s approaching downfall.

With his cosmopolitan aims in view, he commanded his followers to prepare themselves, by the study of foreign languages, for the mission of apostles of the world religion which was to unite all mankind and all nations “in order that the interpreter of God’s cause reaching the east and the west should announce it to the states and nations of the world in such a way, that the minds of men should be drawn to it, and mouldering bones should be brought to life.” “By this means, unity is to be brought about and the highest task of civiliza-

tion accomplished.”⁹ The ideal means by which the understanding of the world is to be won is a common world language. He wishes that kings and ministers might unite in recognizing one of the existing languages, or else create a new one as the universal language which should be taught in all the schools of the world.¹⁰

He threw aside all limitations both of Islam and of Bābism. With regard to the latter, it is true, he did not free his proclamation from all mystical speculations, tricks of letters and numbers, which had gathered around early Bābism. His main interest, nevertheless, is directed toward the building up of the ethical and social factors. War is strictly forbidden, only “in case of need” is the use of weapons allowed; slavery also is forbidden, and equality of all men is taught as the nucleus of the new gospel.¹¹ In a revelation entitled *Sūrat al-Mulūk* (Sura of the Kings) he severely reproached the Sultan of Turkey for allowing such great differences in power to exist among his people.¹² In a reforming spirit, he takes up the question of marriage relations already considered by Bāb. His ideal is monogamy, but he makes concessions to bigamy, which, however, is to be regarded as the limit of polygamy. Divorce is recognized, but modified in a humane spirit. The reuniting of those who have separated is allowed, provided they have not married again; in direct contrast therefore to the custom of Islam. The law of Islam is regarded as completely superseded; new forms for prayer and ritual are introduced, public prayer with its liturgical forms (*ṣalāt al-jamāʿ*) is done away with. Each individual prays alone (*furādā*). Common prayer is retained only for prayers over the dead. The *qibla* (the direction of prayer) is not toward Mecca but toward the place where the one is whom God has sent down “as his manifestation.” When he wanders the *qibla* wanders, until he takes up an abode somewhere. Bodily

cleanliness, washing and bathing, are most emphatically ordained, as religious duties, together with a warning against bathing establishments such as those of the Persians which are represented as very unclean.

With a stroke of the pen he strikes out the limitations which Islam had laid upon the believers, without going into any detail except in the case of certain laws of dress. You may do anything which is not opposed to common sense.¹³ Like his predecessor he is tireless in his war against the 'Ulemā who twist and check the will of God. One is, however, to keep clear of disputes with religious opponents. The Behā religion recognizes no professional spiritual position. Every member of this universal church should work toward a productive aim, useful to the community. Those who have the ability should be the spiritual teachers of the community without compensation.¹⁴ The suppression of the corporate business of teaching was demonstrated by the abolishment of the pulpit (minbar) in public gathering places.¹⁵

We will be disappointed if we expect to find Behā in the camp of the liberals in political matters. He surprises us by fighting political freedom—"We see that many men desire freedom and boast of it: they are obviously in error. . . . Freedom brings about confusion whose fire is not extinguished. Know that the origin and appearance of freedom is animalic; man must be under laws which guard him from his own barbarity, and the harms which may be done by those who are false. Indeed freedom removes man from the demands of culture and propriety."—and so on, in undisguised reactionary language.¹⁶ The adherents of the Behā do not even favor the liberal political developments in Turkey and Persia, but look with disfavor on the dethronement of the sultan and the shah.¹⁷

The mission of the Behā Allāh passed after his death (May 16, 1892), with only a few objections by the

“friends” (aḥbāb), to his son and successor ‘Abbās Effendi, called ‘Abd-al Bahā, or *Ghuṣṣn Aẓam* (the Great Branch).¹⁸ He carried the views of his father to a comprehensive development. They are made to conform more and more to the forms and aims of the intellectual thought of the Occident. The fantastic elements which had still clung to the previous stage are made as mild as possible, although not yet completely thrown off. ‘Abbās makes a wide use of the writings of the Old and New Testament which he quotes for his purposes. In this way he strives to extend the influence to still wider circles than those to which the followers of his father had appealed.

Since the appearance of ‘Abd-al Bahā the propaganda has attained very remarkable results. A great number of American ladies (the names of a few can be found in the notes) made a pilgrimage to the Persian prophet at the foot of Mount Carmel in order to bring to their western homes words of healing from his own lips, words which they had heard directly from the holy man. The best presentation of the teaching of ‘Abbās we owe to Miss Laura Clifford Barney, who, living a long time in the vicinity of ‘Abbās, took down his teachings in shorthand in order to bring them to the western world as representing an authentic conception of the new Bahā doctrine.¹⁹

The movement started by the Bāb is no longer to bear the name of its founder. There has developed lately a preference to call this offspring of the doctrine of Mīrzā Mohammed ‘Alī which is constantly spreading and leaving its rivals behind, *Behā’iyya*, a name which the faithful give themselves in opposition to the unimportant remnants of the conservative Bayān-adherents who are gathered under other leaders.

The wide universalistic aim which characterizes it has drawn its adherents not only from mosques, but from

churches, synagogues, and fire temples. A building for public worship has lately been erected in Ashkābād near the Persian boundary in Russian Turkestan. A description of it has been given by an enthusiastic European interpreter of Behā'ism, Hippolyte Dreyfus.²⁰ On the other hand, the designation *Behā'ism* embodies the idea of religious free-thought, of the laying aside of the positive doctrine of Islam. As formerly the term *Zindīk* meant an early Moslem whose religious views were influenced by Parseeism and Manichaeism, and as later the name *Failasūf* (Philosopher), lately also *Farmasūn* (franc-maçon) without regard to a definite kind of back-sliding from true Islam generally refers to a free-thinker, so to-day in Persia, *Behā'ī* is applied not only to this latest development of the Bābi faith, but as Rev. F. M. Jordan has remarked, "many of those who are given this name are really nothing but 'irreligious rationalists.'"²¹ Since the adherents of this form of belief in Persia and also in other Moslem lands still have every reason to hide their completely anti-Mohammedan convictions from publicity and to claim the practice of *taqiyya* (above page 228), it would be difficult to offer even approximately correct statistics as to the followers of Bābiism in both its forms. The statement of Rev. Isaac Adams, one of the latest to picture Bābi conditions, that their number in Persia reaches three millions, would seem to be exaggerated. This would mean almost a third of the whole population of the country. 'Abbās Effendi himself in an interview in New York in July, 1912, said he could not give the number of the followers of Behā'ism.

Bābism, passing over into Behā'ism, has undertaken a serious propaganda. Its teachers and followers have not hesitated to draw the consequences of their conviction that they are not a sect of Islam but the representative of a world-wide doctrine. Its propaganda has

not only spread far among those of Moslem faith (as far as Indo-China) but with remarkable success is going farther and farther beyond the boundaries of Islam. The prophet of 'Akka has found in America and in Europe also, it is claimed, zealous adherents even among Christians.²¹ Through the spread of literature the attempt is made to crystallize American Behā'ism. Its journalistic interpreter is a magazine known as the Star of the West, which has appeared nineteen times every year since 1910 (19 being the sacred number of the Bāb). With Chicago as its center, it covers a wide area in the United States, and it is in this very city that plans are being formed for the erection of a religious gathering place, *mashrak al-Adkat*, for the American Behās. A considerable sum raised by the "Friends" has assured the acquisition of a large piece of land on the banks of Lake Michigan which was dedicated on the first of May, 1912, by 'Abbās Effendi during his tour in the United States.²³ Jewish visionaries also have picked out from the books of the Old Testament prophets the foretelling of the Behā and 'Abbās. According to them, wherever the "glory of Jahweh" is spoken of, the appearance of the Saviour of the world, Behā Allah is meant. They find support in all the references to Mount Carmel, in the neighborhood of which the Light of God shone for all men at the end of the nineteenth century. Nor have they neglected to ferret out from the visions of the Book of Daniel²⁴ the foretelling and even the chronology of the movement beginning with the Bāb. The 2300 year-days (Dan. viii:14) at the end of which "the sanctuary shall be cleansed" corresponds, according to their reckoning, with the year 1844, of our era, the year in which Mīrza Mohammed 'Alī proclaimed himself as Bāb, and at which time the universal spirit (Welt-geist) entered into a new phase of its manifestation.

With the appearance of 'Abbās Effendi, the application of Biblical interpretations went one step farther. According to these he was foretold as "the child who will be born to us, the son who will be given to us," on whose shoulders lie the responsibilities of a prince, and who is the bearer of the wonder epithets in Isaiah 9:5. As I write these pages I listen to these Biblical proofs from the lips of a Behā visionary who for two years has been staying in my town. He was formerly a physician in Teheran, and is endeavoring to find followers for his faith here. He feels in himself a special mission to my country. This fact is one more proof that it is not on American soil alone that the extra-Mohammedan propaganda of the new Behā is directed.

XI. India offers a very special field for the consideration of a historical development of movements in Islam. In this soil they are products of the peculiar ethnographic conditions of this province of Islam, and offer many a fruitful consideration for the historian of religion. We can merely touch upon them here, however.

Although the Ghassanide conquest in the eleventh century seriously maimed ancient Indian culture, the old forms of religion maintain themselves in their primitive form up to the present day in the very midst of ruling Islam. In spite of the great numbers which Islam owed to the numerous converts from the circles of the Brahma community, the Koran was not able actually to supplant the Vedas. Nowhere was Islam forced to show its tolerance to such a degree as in India. The condition of the population forced Islam to go beyond its fundamental law, the law which permits far-reaching tolerance toward monotheistic religions, but on the other hand commands the unsparing destruction of idolaters in conquered lands. In India, in spite of the war and destruction carried on by the energetic and zealous Ghassanide Mahmud against

the idolatrous temples, they remain standing under Moslem rule. The Hindu religions had to be passively recognized as under the protection of the law (Ahl-al-dimma¹).

The kaleidoscopic variety of the religious world of India was bound on the other hand to bring about many reciprocal relations between itself and Islam.² In the mass conversions of the Hindus, many of their social customs were here and there carried over with them into their Moslem life. We find very peculiar cases of this in connection with the religious life. Moslem conceptions are expressed in the manner of Indian thought. An example, surprising and to be sure not conclusive to the ordinary mind, is the form in which the Moslem double credo sometimes appears on the coins of Mohammedan princes of India. "The indefinable is a single one; Mohammed is his avatar."⁴ A wide field for the popular practical proof of Hindu influence on the sacra of Islam is to be found in Moslem saint worship, in which the Indian element has reached a more than ordinarily manifest importance, and in Indian Shī'ism especially shows very remarkable instances. Indian gods become Mohammedan saints, and Indian shrines are arbitrarily clothed in Moslem garb.

In none of its conquered lands does Islam offer such a prominent example of the conservation of heathen elements as in India and the island world attached to it. Here we find examples of a true admixture of heathenism and of Islam. Beside an entirely external worship of Allah and an entirely superficial use of the Koran as well as ignorant practice of Moslem customs there flourishes the continuance of the worship of the dead and of demons as well as other animistic customs. A fruitful field for these syncretisms is to be found in the Moslem forms among the people of the East Indian archipelago. The information about this has come to us in important books by C. Snouck Hurgronje and R. J. Wilkinson.⁵ On

the Indian continent, T. W. Arnold has given a great deal of information about the continuance of the worship of Hindu gods and the practice of Hindu rites among the lower classes of the Moslem population in the various parts of India.⁶ Islam in India is a fruitful field of work for Sunna zealots who, moved by Wahnābite ideas, are eager for the purification of Islam. There is opportunity for widespread work in two directions; that of purifying Islam from the saints, re-interpreted from ancient forms of religions, and the religious customs connected with these cults, and also in missionary activity among the groups of the Indian population, only superficially touched by Islam.

In the last century, Islam in India has experienced movements relating to this. From Arabia, the thoughts of the Wahnābite movement streamed into this Moslem territory also. The emotions and experiences of the Mecca pilgrimage have always proved a powerful means of arousing religious zeal for the adoption of new efforts and their planting in distant lands. After quiet theoretical preparation such uprisings in India found powerful expression through Sayyid Ahmed from Barēli, who in the first quarter of the nineteenth century spread the Wahnābite views to the various parts of Moslem India and joined (with the mission work practiced on the Hindus), the attempt to purify Islam from the *shirk*, arising so crudely in saint worship and idolatrous customs. His work is represented by his followers as entirely successful.

In his zeal for the reestablishment of the primitive modes of Moslem life, he dragged his numerous followers into a religious war (Jihād), which had as its next goal the fight with the Sikh sect, scattered throughout North India, about which we will have a little to say later. During this unsuccessful war he died in 1831. Although this fantastic Jihād undertaking and the polit-

ical attempts connected with it came to an end through Ahmed's death, the religious movement within Islam continued in Indian Islam after this.

Although no longer under the Wahnābite flag, the apostles of Ahmed's doctrine have worked under various names for the complete Islamization of the modern Mohammedans given to Indian customs. They have also won them over to follow Moslem law, gathering together groups of those faithful to Sunna whose branches are increasing the number of Moslem sects in India. A leading circle of this group bears the name characteristic of its efforts—'*Idiyya*, that is, "followers of (Moslem) religious duties."⁷ This reform movement which arose from the Sunna views of the Wahnābites has its literary concentration in the book, still read to-day, of the faithful companion of Ahmed Barēli, Maulawī Ismā'il of Delhi. Under the title of *Takwiyat al-īmān* (strengthening of belief) it maintains an energetic attack against all *shirk* and the return of the Moslem believer to the *tauḥīd* (confession of unity).⁸

XII. Just as Indian Islam was unable to escape the Indian influence of the native religions, so on the other hand, the Moslem conception of God did not remain without some influence on the followers of the Indian caste. In this direction there are everywhere considerable signs of a syncretism, which although of greater importance to the development of Hinduism, cannot be entirely overlooked by the historian of Islam.

It has been noted, that at the end of the fourteenth and the beginning of the fifteenth century Moslem elements entered the religious world of the Hindu. It is especially through the teachings of a weaver of the name of Kabīr, one of the twelve apostles of the Ramanda school, whom Moslems in India as well as his Hindu followers honored as a saint,¹ that such influences have come about. In

connection with this, Moslem Ṣūfī views also go back to the circle which represents one of their original sources.

It should, however, be stated that the closer characterization of these influences is for the present still in dispute. Professor Grierson, one of the most competent connoisseurs of India, explained these events as the influence of Christian views, and rejects the suggestion of Moslem influence as the explanation. We can naturally not take sides in this dispute, which formed the most interesting subject of the annual meeting of the English Royal Asiatic Society, 1907.² In connection with our subject, it is necessary, however, to at least indicate the possibility of an influence of Islam.³

Furthermore, the religion of the Sikhs in North India, founded by Nānak, a pupil of Kabīr (died 1538), is to be regarded as a Hindu-Moslem syncretism. The literature on it has lately been enlarged by M. A. Macauliffe's great work (in six volumes, Clarendon Press Oxford, 1909). Under the influence of Moslem Ṣūfīism which was also combined with Buddhistic elements, the author of the *Adi Granth* conceived a religious view of the world in which Hinduism and Islam were to be united, whereby—as Frederick Pincott represents it—“a means was suggested to span the breach which separates the Hindus from the believers.”⁴ The most important element in it is the replacing of polytheism by the Ṣūfī monotheistic conception of the world. To be sure, the work of Nānak in its social aspects has been obscured by his followers, and in consequence of the bitter struggles⁵ resulting from the mutual relations between the adherents of his system and the followers of Islam, the original purpose of the founder of the Sikh religion, to reconcile contradictory points of view, is no longer discernible.

Even up to a late period, the influence of Islam on

Indian sects is to be noted. In the first part of the eighteenth century a Hindu sect (Ram Sanaki) arose, opposed to the worship of images, and resembling in many respects the cult of Islam.⁶

XIII. All this emphasizes the peculiar position of India which, as a consequence of the multitudinous aspects of religious phenomena in that country, affords an especially fertile field for the student of the comparative history of religions.

These conditions, so favorable for the comparative study of religions, naturally furnish the incentive for producing a constant succession of new religious aspects. From the standpoint of Moslem history there is one more, particularly to be mentioned, which arises directly from the peculiar mental attitude in India, in the contemplation of religious problems.

Its founder is the Indian monarch Abū'l Fath Jelāled-dīn Mohammed, who is known in history by his epithet *Akbar* (the Great). The history of his reign has been set forth by Friedrich August von Schleswig Holstein, Count of Noer (1881), and more recently (1908) in an address at the University of Tübingen by Prof. R. Garbe. Max Müller on one occasion designated the Emperor Akbar as the first representative of the comparative study of religions. The way was paved for Akbar, however, by Abulfaḍl al-'Allāmī, who later became his minister, and who set up a monument to his prince, in a work known as *Akbar-nāmeḥ*. Prior to Akbar, he had devoted himself to the study of the various religious forms, and had meditated on the formation of a religion which would go beyond positive Islam.¹ It remained for Akbar, however, by virtue of his authority to embody the results of his minister's investigations in a state institution. Despite his defective education which was not favorable toward displaying an interest in higher

culture,² the reign of this prince of the family of Tamerlane (Great Moguls) (1525-1707) is associated with one of the most remarkable episodes in the history of Islam toward the close of the sixteenth century. The extent to which the religious emotions of this talented prince were stirred up, is shown by his undertaking a long journey in the disguise of an humble servant to listen to the religious poems of the sweet Hindu singer Haridāsa. As a result of this disguise Akbar was deeply impressed by the rich opportunity afforded him through the manifold religious conditions prevailing in his kingdom. Through the disputations which he organized among theologians of the most varied hues, he acquired the conviction of the relative value of the various views set forth. As a result, his belief in the saving grace of his own religion, Islam, in its Ṣūfī form, began to waver.

While he accorded the followers of the various religions of his extended empire an unchecked freedom of cult (about 1578) he thought out for himself a new form of religion which externally remained attached to Islam, but which in its essence represents the total overthrow of that religion. The servile scholars of his court declared the prince to be a *Mujtahid*, that is to say a theologian who had the authority, in the Islamic sense, of setting up new doctrines. Armed with this privilege he formulated a religious system in which the dogmatic forms of Islam appear to be set aside as entirely worthless. In its place there appears as the central doctrine of "monotheism" (*tauḥīd ilāhī*) as it was designated, an ethical rationalism, leading to the ideal of a mystic union of the soul with the divine. In its ritual this new religion betrays the strong influence of the Zarathustrian counselors of the king who had found a refuge for their religion on Indian soil, from the persecutions it had encountered in its Persian home. The worship of light,

of the sun and of fire, evidently taken over from Zarathustrianism, forms one of the prominent traits of the new religion, whose high priest was the Emperor himself.

The religion of Akbar is not to be looked upon as a reform, but as a denial of Islam. A break with its traditions more decided even than that which manifests itself in the doctrine of Ismā'il. It remained, however, without any decided influence on the development of Islam. Limited to the court circles and to the intellectuals, it did not outlive its founders. Parallel to the reform of the Egyptian religion attempted by Amenophis IV, which after his death yielded to the hereditary cult, so the religious creation of Akbar came to an end with him. Without violent disturbance, orthodox Islam resumed its former control after Akbar's death (1605), and it is not until we come to the latest rationalistic movement among Brahmans and Moslems in Anglo-India that we find Akbar proclaimed as the precursor of the effort to bring Brahmanism, Parseeism and Islam into closer touch.³

XIV. This brings us to a very modern phase of the development of Islam in India.

The close contact with western civilization, the subjection of millions of Moslems to non-Moslem rule brought about by European colonization and conquest, resulted in an active adaptation to modern conditions of life, and exercised a profound influence on the life of the educated classes in their relationship to inherited religious views and customs. As a consequence of the necessity of a compromise with new conditions, a critical differentiation was attempted between fundamental principles, and later supplements to these principles which it was felt could be more easily sacrificed as a concession to modern culture. While anxious, on the one hand to defend the doctrines of Islam from the reproach of being adverse to culture, and endeavoring to prove the adaptability of its

teachings to all conditions and peoples, it became on the other hand all the more necessary, because of these concessions, to protect the cultural value of the fundamentals of Islam from foreign points of view.

It is an inherent defect of such apologetic activity, despite the fact that it is actuated by the honest endeavor to separate the wheat from the chaff, to manifest a rationalistic tendency which frequently fails to do justice to historical considerations. These rationalistic efforts, which aim to adapt Islamic thought and life to the demands of western culture, led in India, on the part of the enlightened of the Moslem faith, to a fruitful social and literary activity. Seid Amīr 'Alī, Sir Seid Ahmed Khān Bahādur, together with other influential figures of the Moslem world, have become the leaders of this spiritual movement of reorganization which is attempting to reform Islam. The results of this effort are shown in the new spiritual life of Indian Islam, which is constantly advancing along the road to culture. Their task is to justify the existence of Islam in its rationalistic formulation in the midst of the currents of modern civilization.

These efforts, which those with a conservative instinct are fond of designating as the new Mu'tazila, have led to a rich literature of theological and historical treatises, books and periodicals both in English and in native tongues. They have led also to the formation of influential Moslem associations in which this reformed Islam finds public expression. They have established numerous schools of all grades, among which the university of Aligarh, made possible by the generosity of Moslem princes, occupied the first place. The above mentioned Agha Khan, the present head of the remnants of the Ismā'ilites, is also one of the patrons of this as well as of many other educational projects. This Moslem modernism first manifesting itself in India under one influence or another, and at first limited in its sphere, has seized

hold of the religious thought of Moslems in other lands, such as Egypt, Algiers, Tunis and more particularly among the Tartars living in provinces under Russian rule.¹

There can be no doubt that these cultural efforts in the various parts of the Islamic world, by virtue of their close contact with the religious life, contain the seeds of a new phase of Islam, and may perhaps even lead in the progress of theology to a scientific and historical study of the sources of the religion.

XV. Out of these intellectual tendencies there has arisen the newest sect of Islam in India, the study of which, however, for the present, still offers considerable difficulty. The founder of the *Aḥmediyya*, as it is called, Mirzā Ghulām Aḥmed, from Kādhiān in Punjab, has connected the movement with his supposed discovery of the authentic grave of Jesus on the Khanjar road in Srīngar near Kashmir, and which is identical with the grave of an otherwise unknown saint Jus-Asaf, probably of Buddhist origin. Jesus is supposed to have escaped his persecutors in Jerusalem and in his wanderings towards the east to have come to this spot, where he died. With this discovery, supported by literary evidence, Ghulām Aḥmed aims to deny the Christian as well as the Islamic tradition about the fate of Jesus. He himself claims to be the Messiah for the seventh millennium "in the spirit and power" of Jesus, and at the same time the Mahdī expected by the Mohammedans. In accord with an Islamic tradition, God is supposed to call a special individual at the beginning of every century, and to renew the religion of Islam. Sunnis and Shī'ites zealously count the men who have been recognized each century as "renewers." The last of these men will be the Mahdī himself. It is this claim which Aḥmed makes as the religious "renewer," sent by God at the beginning of the fourteenth century. With this double claim of being

both the reappearing Jesus and the Mahdī, to whom for the Hindus he associates the character of "avatar," he represents not only the embodiment of the hope of Islam for a world triumph, but also his universal mission for all mankind. His first public appearance was in the year 1880, but it is only since 1889 that he has won followers, and for the strengthening of his prophetic mission has appealed to signs and miracles as well as to fulfilled prophecies. A solar and lunar eclipse in Ramaḍan (1894) served him as a proof of his Mahdī character; since according to Mohammedan tradition, the appearance of the Mahdī was to be announced through such phenomena. But the characteristic distinction of his claim to be the Mahdī from the general Islamic Mahdī doctrine, consists in the peaceful character of his mission. The Mahdī of Islamic orthodoxy is a warrior who fights unbelief with the sword, and whose path is red with blood. The Shī'ites accord him among other titles, "the man of the sword."¹ The new prophet is a prince of peace. He nullified the jihād (crusade) as among the duties of the Moslem, and advocates among his adherents peace and tolerance. He condemns fanaticism and strives to awaken among all his followers a spirit favorable to culture.² In the creed which he has drawn up for his community great stress is laid on the ethical virtues of Moslems. He strives for the regeneration of mankind through the strengthening of belief in God, and through release from the bonds of sin. At the same time, he demands adherence to the chief duties of Mohammedanism. In his declarations he appeals to the Old and New Testaments, to the Koran and to trustworthy Ḥadīths. Outwardly he is anxious to be in accord with the Koran, but on the other hand, is very skeptical about the traditions, which he subjects to a critical test. As a result there are many deviations from the structure of orthodox Islam, in so far as it is built on the Ḥadīth.

Connected with his propaganda is an educational campaign in which even instruction in the Hebrew language has its place. In 1907, the community of the new Mahdī was said to have reached the number of 70,000 adherents. It has drawn especially from the Moslems influenced by European civilization. The Mahdī is himself a voluminous writer, and has explained his doctrine for Moslems, and presented the proofs for the truth of his mission, in more than sixty theological writings in Arabic and Urdu. Through the publication of a monthly periodical, "Review of Religions," Aḥmed tries to reach the non-oriental world.³ This therefore appears to be the latest sect appearing in Islam.⁴ Aḥmed Khadiānā died in Lahore on the 26th of May, 1908; his grave is in Kādhiān (70 miles from Lahore). It bears the inscription "Mirzā Ghulām Aḥmed mau'd" (the Promised One). According to his will, the government of his community was to be in the hands of a person freely chosen by his followers. The choice fell on Mulavi Nūr al-dīn. Successors are to be chosen similarly until, at the end of time, the new Mahdī shall arise from the descendants of the founder.

XVI. In conclusion there is still another tendency within certain circles of Islam that merits attention.

Various efforts have been made in the course of Islamic history to cover the gap between Sunnis and Shi'ites. Owing to many features which these two phases of Islam have in common, the public results of this sectarianism have assumed an importance only where Shi'ism has been organized as the controlling state church. Of such Shi'itic states there have not, however, been many in the history of Islam. In such state organizations (pages 262-3) Shi'ism assumed the character of an extensive church community, as against the Sunnitic constitution of other lands.

The present position of Persia as the leading power

of Shī'ism reverts to the rise of the Sefewī-dynasty (1501-1721), which after earlier unsuccessful attempts,¹ finally raised Shī'ism within its domain to the position of the ruling form of religion, in contrast to the neighboring Turkish state. After the fall of this dynasty, however, the great conqueror, Nādir Shāh, having signed a peace treaty with Turkey, endeavored to bring the two sects together, an undertaking which was frustrated through his death in 1747. In the notes of the Sunni theologian 'Abdāllāh ibn Ḥusein al-Suweidi (b. 1104/1692; d. 1174/1760)² which have recently been published, we possess an interesting contemporary document of a synod of the theologians of both sides, called together by Nādir Shāh, in which a compromise was brought about by adding to the four orthodox rites of Sunni Islam a fifth orthodox *Madhab*³ (rite). According to this compromise there might have been added to the existing chapels or "Places" (Maḵām) in Mecca of the four orthodox ritual a fifth Maḵām for the ritual of the Jafari, now recognized as orthodox, by virtue of being the nearest approach to the orthodox system within the Shī'itic phase of Islam. All this, however, soon turned out to be a visionary Utopia. The mutual inherited hatred of the theologians of the two sects prevented them from carrying out the tolerant efforts of the shah after his death.

Later, in the former half of the last century, we encounter another temporary union of the two sects, united in a struggle for freedom against the oppressor Shāmil (or rather Shamwil, Samuel) and his Murids in the Caucasus. This, however, was a patriotic, not a theological demonstration.

The movement so much spoken of in the last decade, and which under the name of pan-Islamism is sometimes regarded as a danger, and at times a specter, has given rise in Mohammedan circles to the idea of a possible union for the sects. Apart from pan-Islamic tendencies,

and as a consequence, rather, of modern cultural efforts, such suggestions of unity have also arisen in Russian Islamic provinces, concomitant with many indications of a healthy progress within the Islamic population. Sunnites take part in the service in Shī'itic mosques, and in Astrakan listen to the preacher who declares: "There is in reality only one Islam: it was only the unfortunate influence of the philosophers and of Greek customs which brought about the schism through the controversies of the commentators of the time of the 'Abbāsides." In the same service the Imam unites the praise of Ḥasan and Ḥusein, the martyrs of the Shī'ites, with that of the caliphs whose names the genuine Shī'ite was wont to accompany with curses and with thoughts of fanatical hatred.⁴

On August 23, 1906, a Moslem congress in Kasan took up the question of the religious instruction for the young. The conclusion was reached that only one and the same text book should be used for Sunnis and Shī'ites, and that the teachers might be chosen equally from either of the two sects.⁵ The common religious instruction of Shī'ite and Sunni youth has since then been practically carried out. Similar signs of an approach between the two opposing sects have manifested themselves still more recently within the domain of social life in Mesopotamia with the approval of the Shī'itic authorities of Nejef.⁶

Such signs, however, are for the present isolated phenomena, and in view of other phenomena, it is still doubtful whether this marked tendency will extend to larger circles.

NOTES.

- I. 1. Ed. Westermarck, "The Origin and Development of Moral Ideas" I. (London 1907) 161. Further examples are to be found, vol. 2, p. 519, ff., from among primitive people from the standpoint of the worship of the dead.
2. Cf. "Kultur der Gegenwart" 100. This feeling still prevails to-day among these Arabs who have not come under the influence of foreign culture. In various parts of their territory they use the word *silf* (ancestral custom) to denote the conception of Sunna in this sense. See Landberg, "Études sur les Dialectes de l'Arabie Meridionale." II (Leiden 1909) 743.
3. See Goldziher, Muhammedanische Studien I. 9-12.
4. Ibn Sa'd III, I 37, 3; VIII, 29, 10. Mohammed himself designates his warnings as *ḍikr muḥdath* (Sur. 21, v. 2, Sur. 26, v. 4); which, however, the commentators take in the sense of a "repeated warning."
5. Cf. D. B. MacDonald "Moral Education of Young among Muslims." (Int. Journal of Ethics. Phil. 1905, 290.)
6. According to the principle of strict Sunna, even an ordinary polite formula must be legitimized through a traditional substantiation: "Whence has it been taken?" Ibn Sa'd VI 121, 6. In this sense entirely innocent polite phrases are rejected as against Sunna. ZDMG XXVIII, 310, *Kūt al-kulūb* (Cairo 1310) I, 163, cf. also "Revue du Monde Musulman," III, 130.
- II. 1. Cf. the Lit. by Muh. Taufik al-Bekrī, *Beit-Ṣiddīk* (Cairo 1323, 404 ff.).
2. WZKM XV, 33 ff.
- III. 1. To Muwaṭṭa (ed. Cairo) I, 360.
2. Revue du Monde Musulman III, 60.
3. Among the reasons assigned for the deposition of the Moroccan sultan 'Abd al-'Azīz, was his authorization of the "bank which permits interest in money," and "which is a great sin." Revue du Monde Musulman V, 428. See further Hartmann in Mitt. des Semin. f. orient. Sprachen XII, vol. II 101, for the religious problems occasioned by this question for the Moslems of modern India. Cf. Ben 'Alī Fakar, "L'Usure en Droit mus." (Lyon 1908) especially 119, 128. See on the law of usury in Islam, Th. W. Juynboll, Handbuch des Islamischen Gesetzes, 270 ff. lit. ibid. 358, 12th from below ff.
4. On the basis of the term *shūrā* in Sura 42, 6. The speech with which the new Turkish sultan opened a new session of parliament on the 14th of November 1909 began with a reference to "The parliamentary government prescribed by Shar' (religious law)."
5. Modern Mohammedan scholars regard it as an axiom that "dans

ce revêl un retour à l'ancien état de choses établis par le prophète et préconisé par lui" are to be recognized. (Dr. Riad Ghali, "De la Tradition considérée comme source du droit Mus." 5.) This tendency has called forth in late years a great number of apologetic writings by Moslem theologians.

IV. 1. See Kuenen, "National Religions and Universal Religions." 54.

VI. 1. Muh. Studien II, 277 ff. E. Doutté, "Les Marabouts" (Paris 1900; reprint from the Revue de l'Hist. des Relig. XL and XLI). Cf. also my lecture "Die Fortschritte der Islam-Wissenschaft in den letzten drei Jahrzehnten." (Preuss. Jahrb. 1905 CXXI 292-298 = Congress of Arts and Science, Universal Expos. St. Louis 1904, II 508-515.)

VIII. 1. Euting, "Tagebuch einer Reise in Innerarabien," I (Leiden 1896) 157 ff. For further literature on the Wahhābites, see Th. W. Juynboll l. c. 28, note 2. The opposition of the Wahhābites to all innovations not founded on the old uses of Islam has sometimes given rise to the misunderstanding, that their practices are based exclusively on the Koran. This error appears in the otherwise excellent description of Wahhābitic tendencies by Charles Didier, "Ein Aufenthalt bei dem Gross-Scherif von Mekka" (deutsche Übers. Leipzig 1862) 222-255. The same error is made by Baron Ed. Nolde in his "Reise nach Innearabien, Kurdistan und Armenien" (Braunschweig 1895) where he states that the Wahhābites "reject every tradition including also, and primarily, Sunna" whereas just the contrary is the case.

2. Ibn Jubeir, "Travels" ed. Wright-de Goeje 190, 13.

IX. 1. Wetzstein, "Reisebericht über Hauran und die Trachonen" (Berlin 1860) 150.

X. 1. Kult. d. Gegenw. 128, 14-28.

2. Cf. Zeitschrift für Assyriologie XXII 337.

3. "Sendschreiben des Behā Allah" ed. V. Rosen (St. Petersburg, Academy 1908) I 112, 2-5.

4. Ibid. 19, 7; 94, 24.

5. Journ. Roy. As. Soc. 1892, 326-335.

6. Sendschreiben 71, 15; 82, 22; 84 below. The entire epistle no. 34 is devoted to a polemic against the Bayāns.

7. Ed. A. H. Toumansky (Mémoires de l'Académie imp. de St. Petersburg 1899; VIII. Série Vol. III No. 6).

8. Sendschreiben 18, 21; 20, 14 ff.; 94 below; 93, 20.

9. *Kitāb Akdas* No. 212. 276. 468.

10. Miss Ethel Rosenberg, "Behāism, its ethical and social teachings" (in Transactions of the third Internat. Congr. for the History of Religions. Oxford 1908, I 324).

11. *Kitāb Akdas* No. 164, 385.

12. Sendschreiben 54, 21 ff.

13. *Kitāb Akdas* No. 145, 155 ff. 324. 179. 252. 371. 386.
 14. Miss E. Rosenberg l. c. 323.
 15. Hippolyte Dreyfuss, in "Mélanges-Hartwig Derenbourg" (Paris 1909) 421.
 16. *Kitāb Akdas* No. 284-292.
 17. Cf. the account in "Revue du Monde mus." IX 339-341.
 18. The portraits of Behā and 'Abbās, as well as the picture of the tomb of the former in 'Akka are to be found in a publication hostile to Bābīism, bearing the title "Zustände in heutigen Persien, wie sie das Reisebuch Ibrāhīm Beis enthüllt," translated by Walter Schulz (Leipzig 1903). The picture of Ṣubḥ-i-zeil is to be found in E. G. Browne, "The Tārīkh-i-jadīd or New History of . . . the Bāb" (Cambridge 1893).
 19. Cf. on her book and a survey of its contents Oscar Mann in the *Oriental. Literaturzeitung* 1909, 36 ff.
 20. Une Institution Bēha'īe: "Le Machrequou'l-Azkār d'Achqābād" (*Mélanges-Hartwig Derenbourg* 415 ff.).
 21. In the compilation: "The Mohammedan World of to-day" 129.
 22. See now the comprehensive article on Bābism and its history by E. G. Browne in "Hastings' Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics" II 299-308, which appeared after the compilation of my manuscript. In this article will also be found the bibliography of Beha'is in western countries. Hippolyte Dreyfuss, "Essai sur le Behāisme, son histoire, sa portée sociale." Paris (Leroux) 1909, Roemer, die Bābi-Behāi (Potsdam 1911).
 - 22a. The lectures given by 'Abbās Effendi in American cities published in the "Star of the West" No. III 12 (San Francisco). "Wisdom Talks of Abdul Behā" at Chicago, April 30—May 5, 1912—where his dedication address is also given.
 23. Miss Jean Masson in the January number 1909 of the *American Review of Reviews* reports the remarkable progress of Behāism, for which she claims the distinction of being the Ultimate Religion.
 24. E. G. Browne in the *Journ. Roy. As. Soc.* 1892, 701.
- XI. 1. Cf. Ibn Baṭūṭa, "Voyages" (Paris) IV 29; 223 on Indian provinces: "Most of their inhabitants are unbelievers," i. e. heathen (kuffār) under the protection of Moslems, taht al-ḍimma also "ahl al ḍimma" (those standing under protection), as also Jews and Christians who merely pay the jizya are designated. In the fourteenth century, an Islamic prince in India allowed the Chinese to erect a pagoda on Moslem territory in return for the payment of the jizya (Ibn Baṭūṭa IV 2).
2. On the mutual influence of Hinduism on Islam M. C. Westcott published an address in 1908, which is unfortunately inaccessible to me.

3. e. g. For the influence of the caste system see Kohler "Zeitschrift für vergl. Rechtswissenschaft" 1891, X, 83 ff. On the aversion to the remarriage of widows see Muh. Studien II 333; this aversion is also found outside of India in the province of Jorjan *Mukaddasī* ed. de Goeje 370, 9. Cf. further for such phenomena, John Campbell Oman, "The Mystics and Saints of India" (London 1905) 135-136.
 4. T. Block in ZDMG LXII 654 note 2.
 5. C. Snouck Hurgronje, "De Atjèhers" (2 vol.), tr. by A. W. S. Sullivan (2 vol. Leiden 1906). The same "Het. Gayoland en zeyne bewoners" (Batavia 1903). R. J. Wilkinson, "Papers on Malay subjects. Life and Customs" (Kuala Lumpur 1908). Cf. "Revue du M. mus." VII 45 ff. 94 f. 180-197.
 6. T. W. Arnold, "Survivals of Hinduism among the Mohammedans of India" (Transactions of the third internat. Congr. Hist. of Rel. I 314 ff.).
 7. The literature of this widespread movement as well as the data for its extension and the statement of its results are given by Hubert Jansen, "Verbreitung des Islams" (Friedrichshagen 1897) 25-30.
 8. About this work see Journ. Roy. As. Soc. XIII (1852) 310-372: "Translation of the Takwiyat-ul-Islam etc." (About Ahmed see now the article in the Encyclopedia of Islam I 201b.)
- XII.
1. Oman l. c. 126.
 2. Journ. Roy. As. Soc. 1907, 325. 485. Grierson *ibid.* 501-503, cf. *ibid.* 1908, 248.
 3. Oman l. c. also places Kabir's teachings under the influence of Islam.
 4. The same view is held by Oman l. c. 132. M. Bloomfield, in his "Religion of the Veda, the Ancient Religion in India" (American Lectures on the History of Religions, sr. VII 1906-7) 10 characterizes this religious system as "Mohammedanism fused with Hinduism in the hybrid religion of the Sikhs"; against the view, however, see A. Berriedale Keith in Journ. Roy. As. Soc. 1908 884. (Cf. also *Revue du Monde mus.* IV 681 ff. Antoine Cabaton, "Les Sikhs de l'Inde et le Sikhisme" and *ibid.* IX 361-411: J. Vinson, "La Religion des Sikhs.")
 5. Macauliffe in *Actes du XIV^e Congrès des Orientalistes* (Algiers 1905) I 137-63.
 6. Oman l. c. 133.
- XIII.
1. "Encyclopedia of Islam" I 89b. "The penitents of the Lebanon" (*ibid.* line 38) are not the Druses, but Islamic ascetics, who dwell primarily in the Lebanon mountains. "Yākūt" IV 348, I. Especially that part of the mountains (Province of Anti-och and Maṣṣīṣa), known as *al-Lukkām* = (Amanus, see Lammens,

Mo'awiyya I 15), is famous as the dwelling place of great saints: Jāfi'ī, *Raud-al rajāhīn* 49, 5; 54, 14; 156, 1; For Syria as a place of saints and penitents, see ZDMG XXVIII 295.

2. Cf. T. Bloch in ZDMG, LXIII, 101, 22 ff.

3. "Revue de l'Histoire des Religions" LI 153 ff.

XIV. 1. On the last movement see H. Vambéry, "Die Kulturbestrebungen der Tartaren" (Deutsche Rundschau 1907, XXXIII 72-91). Regarding the favorable progress of instruction in these provinces, see Molla Aminoff, "Les Progrès de l'instruction chez les Musulmans russes" (Revue du M. mus. IX 247-263; 295).

XV. 1. Kulīnī, *Uṣūl al Kāfī* 350.

2. Cf. M. Hartmann in "Mitteilungen des Seminars für Orientalische Sprachen" in Berlin, Jahrg. XI vol. II 25, 7 ff.

3. A detailed account of this movement and of its aims as set forth in his own words by a participant is given by Th. Houtsma in the "Revue du Monde musulman" I (February, 1907). "Le mouvement religieux des Ahmadiyya aux Indes anglaises."

4. Reference should also be made to the Tchaherīnje, a sect which arose in the sixties of the former century in connection with the rise of the Mohammedans in their Chinese territory (Kansu). This was started by a certain Ma-hua-long who claimed to be a prophet. However, the notices of the previous history, the character and the tendencies of this Chinese Islamic sect (Sin-Kiao i. e. new religion, in contrast to Lao-Kiao, i. e. old religion), are entirely too uncertain to permit of a comprehensive presentation in this connection. The French *Mission d'Ollone* has lately interested itself in this phenomenon. See "Revue du Monde Mus." V. 93 459 and especially *ibid.* IX 538. 561 ff. Regarding older religious movements in Chinese Islam cf. J. de Groot, "Over de Wahabietenbeweging in Kansoeh" 1781-1789 (Verslagen en Mededeelingen, Akad. d. Wetensch., Amsterdam 1903, Letterkunde IV. Reeks 130-3).

XVI. 1. The following fact is worth mentioning as such an attempt. In the fourteenth century, the governor of the province of Fārs wished to afford the Shiite officials recognition. Owing to the stubborn opposition of the Kādī al-kuḏāt of Shirāz, Mejd al-dīn Abū Ibrāhīm al-Bālī (d. 756/1355 in Shirāz at the age of 94) this effort failed, but for which, however, he had to suffer considerably. As early as his fifteenth year this Mejd al-dīn was appointed chief Kādī. Subsequently deposed, he had as successor the famous Koran commentator and theologian Baiḏāwī. After six months he was reinstated, but soon was again obliged to yield to Baiḏāwī. However, after a second deposition of the latter, he retained the office until his death. Subkī, *Tabakāt al-Shāfi'iyya* VI 83, where the statement that he held the office for 75 years rests upon a scribal error.

2. Cf. in regard to him Mashrik XI 275, where 1170/1756 is given as the date of his death. No reference is made there to this work of Suwaidi.
3. *Kitāb al-ḥujaj al-kaṭ'iyyia li-ttīfāk al-islāmiya* (Cairo, Khānjī, 1323).
4. Revue du Monde mus. I 116, cf. II 389 ff.
5. Ibid. I 160, cf. II 534.
6. Ibid. IX 311 (October 1909).

ERRATA.*

Page 6. 12th line from below: The form Hagada is perhaps preferable for English readers.

Page 15. 4th line from below: Should read as follows: 'disposition of the races. As a matter of fact, Islam' etc.

Page 17. The last sentence of the first paragraph should read as follows: 'to the same teachings, according to Moham-medan tradition, Adam is represented as impressing upon his children just before his death, "As I approached the forbidden tree I felt unrest in my heart," that is, his conscience troubled him.'

Page 23. At the bottom of the page and the first lines of page 24, should read as follows: "Goodly promises hath he made to all, but to the zealous fighters the promise of a rich recompense, above those who sit at home,—there will be gradations in rank and forgiveness and mercy, for God is indulgent, Merciful" (Sura 4, v. 97, 98).

Page 28. 12th line from below. Read 'emphasis' instead of 'importance.'

Page 30. In note II. 2 read "Orientalische Studien" and 'Festschrift.' Under V. 3. The title of Brockelmann's book is 'Geschichte der Arabischen Litteratur.' Under VIII. 2. Read *Gefahr*.

Page 32. Line 1. Read 'perfection.' In the middle of page read *muḍāwāt*.

Page 33. Read Taḍkirat. Also page 34, line 7.

Page 34. Line 11, read Aḍkār. Under XII. 1. The first sentence should read: 'However one may judge of the rhetorical worth of the Koran, even a prejudicial view must admit that the people who were appointed' etc.

Page 35. In the middle of the page, it is better to read 'restriction' instead of 'confinement.' Last sentence of the page should read: 'One cannot overlook the fact that the first words of v. 60, which extends the liberty of eating in company to the blind, the lame and the ill have nothing to do with the subject.'

Page 36. 3rd line from below. Read 'admit' instead of 'submit to.'

Page 44. The second paragraph should begin: 'It had its upshot in giving to every opinion, every party, every advocate

* Owing to a mischance the first ninety-six pages were printed before the translator could embody a number of corrections, chiefly in the spelling of Arabic words, as well as a number of stylistic changes to make the translation read more smoothly.

of any doctrine the form of traditional authority; consequently the most contradictory teachings' etc. Note also that all the proper names at the bottom of this page should be in italics.

Page 46. In the second paragraph. Read 'to seek in the extensive material the divergent sources of which they are composed and to follow the movement of which they constitute the documents.'

Page 51. Last line. Read 'divinely given' instead of 'given.'

Page 54. At the end of the first paragraph, read *maḍāhib*. Sing. *maḍhab*.

Page 60. Line 3, from bottom. Read 'some *maḍāhib*.'

Page 67. Line 10. Read 'deprived of' instead of 'misled in.'

Page 68. Lines 1, 8 and 10. Read 'nabiḍ,' and also on page 69, lines 7 and 18. In line 10 (page 68) and on page 69, line 16, read *Kāḍī*. Line 9 from below, *Du-l-rumma*.

Page 72. Line 3. 'what consequences for family relations such a marriage entailed' etc.; and in the last paragraph read 'marriages' for 'combinations.'

Page 73. Line 2. Read 'we will encounter.' Under note II. 3. Read in Latin quotations 'afferri' and 'ipso'; also 'de Syrie.'

Page 76. II. 7. Insert the words 'it is' before 'a proof.'

Page 80. Note VII. 1. §§ 26-27.

Page 81. Note VIII. 7. The word 'permitted' should come in the following line after *halāl*. Note IX. 3. Read 'glosses to Ibn Hishām.' Note IX. *Kāḍī*.

Page 83. Under X. 6. Read 'page 7 of the reprint from the *Revue des études*' etc.

Page 85. In the third paragraph read 'For the most important religious doctrines we obtain merely general impressions.'

Page 88. At the close of the first paragraph read 'at' instead of 'by' and in the first line of the second paragraph 'begins' instead of 'enters'; line 10 from below, read 'prophet' instead of 'prophets.'

Page 91. Lines 5 and 6 should read 'It was permissible in the interests of peace in the state to perform one's *salāt* (prayer) in the company of the pious and the evil doer.'

Page 93. Line 11. Read 'distinct' instead of 'common.'

Page 94. In the second paragraph, read 'an extraordinarily clear perception of their own beliefs.'

Page 96. Line 7, from below. Read 'the wicked people of *Thamud*' (better than *Thamoud*).

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