Arab-Byzantine Relations in Early Islamic Times

Volume 8

Edited by
Michael Bonner

The Formation of the Classical Islamic World

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General Editor: Lawrence I. Conrad

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

PUBLISHER'S NOTE

The pagination of articles originally published in English has been maintained for this volume. In articles translated into English, the original pagination has been indicated in the text in bold-face type.

GENERAL EDITOR'S PREFACE

Since the days of Ignaz Goldziher (1850–1921), generally regarded as the founder of Islamic studies as a field of modern scholarship, the formative period in Islamic history has remained a prominent theme for research. In Goldziher's time it was possible for scholars to work with the whole of the field and practically all of its available sources, but more recently the increasing sophistication of scholarly methodologies, a broad diversification in research interests, and a phenomenal burgeoning of the catalogued and published source material available for study have combined to generate an increasing "compartmentalisation" of research into very specific areas, each with its own interests, priorities, agendas, methodologies, and controversies. While this has undoubtedly led to a deepening and broadening of our understanding in all of these areas, and hence is to be welcomed, it has also tended to isolate scholarship in one subject from research in other areas, and even more so from colleagues outside of Arab-Islamic studies, not to mention students and others seeking to familiarise themselves with a particular topic for the first time.

The Formation of the Classical Islamic World is a reference series that seeks to address this problem by making available a critical selection of the published research that has served to stimulate and define the way modern scholarship has come to understand the formative period of Islamic history, for these purposes taken to mean approximately AD 600–950. Each of the volumes in the series is edited by an expert on its subject, who has chosen a number of studies that taken together serve as a cogent introduction to the state of current knowledge on the topic, the issues and problems particular to it, and the range of scholarly opinion informing it. Articles originally published in languages other than English have been translated, and editors have provided critical introductions and select bibliographies for further reading.

A variety of criteria, varying by topic and in accordance with the judgements of the editors, have determined the contents of these volumes. In some cases an article has been included because it represents the best of current scholarship, the "cutting edge" work from which future research seems most likely to profit. Other articles—certainly no less valuable contributions— have been taken up for the skillful way in which they synthesise the state of scholarly knowledge. Yet others are older studies that—if in some ways now superseded—nevertheless merit attention for their illustration of thinking or conclusions that have long been important, or for the decisive stimulus

they have provided to scholarly discussion. Some volumes cover themes that have emerged fairly recently, and here it has been necessary to include articles from outside the period covered by the series, as illustrations of paradigms and methodologies that may prove useful as research develops. Chapters from single author monographs have been considered only in very exceptional cases, and a certain emphasis has been encouraged on important studies that are less readily available than others.

In the present state of the field of early Arab-Islamic studies, in which it is routine for heated controversy to rage over what scholars a generation ago would have regarded as matters of simple fact, it is clearly essential for a series such as this to convey some sense of the richness and variety of the approaches and perspectives represented in the available literature. An effort has thus been made to gain broad international participation in editorial capacities, and to secure the collaboration of colleagues representing differing points of view. Throughout the series, however, the range of possible options for inclusion has been very large, and it is of course impossible to accommodate all of the outstanding research that has served to advance a particular subject. A representative selection of such work does, however, appear in the bibliography compiled by the editor of each volume at the end of the introduction.

The interests and priorities of the editors, and indeed, of the General Editor, will doubtless be evident throughout. Hopefully, however, the various volumes will be found to achieve well-rounded and representative syntheses useful not as the definitive word on their subjects—if, in fact, one can speak of such a thing in the present state of research—but as introductions comprising well-considered points of departure for more detailed inquiry.

A series pursued on this scale is only feasible with the good will and cooperation of colleagues in many areas of expertise. The General Editor would like to express his gratitude to the volume editors for the investment of their time and talents in an age when work of this kind is grossly undervalued, to the translators who have taken such care with the articles entrusted to them, and to Dr John Smedley and his staff at Ashgate for their support, assistance and guidance throughout.

Lawrence I. Conrad

INTRODUCTION
Byzantine–Arab Relations

Michael Bonner

THIS VOLUME on Arab–Byzantine relations begins and ends with war. The early Muslims exchanged with the Byzantines, they learned from them and about them, and they respected many of their achievements. Nonetheless, their relations with them tended to be colored by war,[1] and by a sense that in the end, there would only be room enough in the world for one of the two, or as André Miquel has put it: "Where do you come from, who put you in my path, which one of the two of us was created for the ruination of the other?".[2] This view receives poignant expression in the apocalyptic literature (see below). Variations occur in many other places; we may begin with the early fourth/tenth-century Iraqi administrator and geographer Qudāma ibn Ja'far, who opens a long description of the frontiers of Islam as follows:

> Islam is surrounded on all sides and directions by nations and peoples who are hostile to it, some of them near to and others far away from the abode [capital] of its Realm (dār mamlakatihi). The Kings of the Factions (mulūk al-ṭawā'if), over whom Alexander once ruled, paid tribute to the Emperor of the Rūm (Romans) for 511 years, until Ardashīr the son of Bābak united the empire after great exertion. . . . Accordingly, it behooves the Muslims to be most wary and on their guard against the Rūm, from amongst all the ranks of their adversaries. This is, indeed, confirmed by verses [of the Qur'ān], to make evident the truth of what I am saying. . . . Now since the Rūm are as we have said, we must begin our discussion with the [Muslim] frontiers that face them [the Romans], before we go on to discuss any of the other [frontiers]. . . .[3]

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[1] As stated persuasively by Marius Canard in "Les relations politiques et sociales entre Byzance et les arabes", *DOP* 18 (1964), 35–56; = his *Byzance et les musulmans du Proche Orient* (London, 1973), no. 19.

[2] André Miquel, *La géographie humaine du monde musulman* (Paris and the Hague, 1967–88), II, 384: "D'où viens-tu, qui t'as mis sur mon chemin, lequel de nous deux fut créé pour la ruine de l'autre?"

[3] Qudāma ibn Ja'far, *Kitāb al-kharāj wa-ṣinā'at al-kitāba*, ed. Muḥammad Ḥusayn

Qudāma does not say which verses of the Qur'ān support this view of the Rūm, and as we shall soon see, Qudāma here stretches the Qur'ānic evidence.[4] His main argument is Iranocentric, identifying the Realm of Islam as the heir to the Sasanian empire in its perpetual opposition to Rome, and the contest of Muslims against Byzantines as the direct continuation of the ancient struggle between Persia and Rome. On this point he is in agreement with at least some Byzantine intellectuals, as well as with modern scholars, like Wellhausen, who lumped all this together as "the centuries-long conflict between the great powers of West and East".[5]

Looking forward in time, the Arab–Byzantine wars are often treated as precursors to the more familiar Crusades.[6] However, they lasted longer (over three centuries as opposed to the two centuries of Crusader presence in Palestine and Syria) and involved more resources, human and monetary, in aggregate. The Arab–Byzantine wars also brought the major regional powers of the time into direct conflict, unlike the Crusades, which were something of a peripheral affair, at least at their beginning. Yet we pay more attention to the Crusades than to the Arab–Byzantine wars, which often appear to us as ritualized, pointless events involving campaigns and raids, much bloodshed, rapine and enslavement, but never bringing much advantage to either side.

Until around the middle of the twentieth century, scholarship on Arab–Byzantine relations tended to concentrate mainly on the military and diplomatic aspects, and while this emphasis has since been modified and corrected, it was not entirely misplaced.[7] This volume, as already stated, begins

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al-Zubaydī (Baghdad, 1981), 185; ed. and trans. M.J. de Goeje (Leiden, 1889; repr. 1967), 252. See also Paul L. Heck, *The Construction of Knowledge in Islamic Civilization: Qudāma b. Ja'far and his* Kitāb al-kharāj wa-ṣinā'at al-kitāba (Leiden, 2002), 101–102.

[4]Qudāma probably had in mind here the negative references in the Qur'ān to Christians in general. The term *Rūm* was often understood this way. See Nadia M. El Cheikh, art. "Rūm 1. In Arabic Literature", *EI*[2], VIII, 601–602; A.H.M. Shboul, "Arab Attitudes towards Byzantium: Official, Learned, Popular", in J. Chrysostomides, ed., *Kathēgētria: Essays Presented to Joan Hussey* (Camberley, Surrey, 1988), 112.

[5]See beginning of Chapter 2.

[6]As in Carole Hillenbrand's excellent *The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives* (New York, 2000), 15–16.

[7]The "heroic age" of Arab–Byzantine studies produced Julius Wellhausen's "Die Kämpfe der Araber mit den Römäern in der Zeit der Umaijiden", *Nachrichten von der Königlichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen*, Phil.-Hist. Klasse, 4 (1901), 1–34, translated as Chapter 2 of this volume; Alexander Vasiliev's *Vizantsiia i araby* (St. Petersburg, 1900–1902), afterwards translated and expanded by Henri Grégoire, Marius Canard and others as *Byzance et les arabes* (Brussels, 1935–68); and the early work of Marius Canard, beginning in 1926 with "Les expéditions des arabes contre Constantinople

and ends with war, while giving an idea of the most important scholarly positions and controversies regarding Arab–Byzantine relations and their role in the formation of classical Islam. Its main thematic areas are as follows:

1. *War and Diplomacy*: How and why did Islamic and Byzantine governments and individuals devote so much blood and treasure to what seems (now) such a futile task? If their relations were dominated by war, then what was the nature of this war?

2. *Frontiers and Military Organization*: How did the two sides seek affordable, dependable fighting forces? How did the Muslims organize their frontier zone, both physically and conceptually? Did this frontier zone constitute a unique cultural zone?

3. *Polemics and Images of the "Other"*: How did the two sides view each other? What were the characteristics of the Byzantines in the eyes of early Muslims?

4. *Exchange, Influence and Convergence*: Where and how did the two sides come together? What was the nature of their commercial relations? And what became of their shared heritage in the visual arts, architecture, philosophy, historiography, and other things?

5. *Martyrdom, Jihād, Holy War*: Were these also a shared heritage? What was the place of the Byzantine wars in the development of these ideals in Islam?

War and Diplomacy

When Islam first arose in the early seventh century CE, the Arabs already had a long history of contacts with the Greco-Roman world. These contacts grew in intensity in the later years of the Roman Empire and were not at all consistently hostile.[8] When we first find mention in an Islamic context

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dans l'histoire et dans la légende", *Journal asiatique* 208 (1926), 61–121; = his *Byzance et les musulmans*, no. 1.

[8]See Robert G. Hoyland, *Arabia and the Arabs from the Bronze Age to the Coming of Islam* (London, 2001), 102–103, 167–68, and throughout; Glen W. Bowersock, *Roman Arabia* (Cambridge, MA, 1983); and the series of books by Irfan Shahid, *Rome and the Arabs: a Prolegomenon to the Study of Byzantium and the Arabs* (Washington, 1984); *Byzantium and the Arabs in the Fourth Century* (Washington, 1984); *Byzantium and the Arabs in the Fifth Century* (Washington, 1989); *Byzantium and the Arabs in the Sixth Century* (Washington, 1995); and the Variorum selection of articles by him, *Byzantium and the Semitic Orient before the Rise of Islam* (London, 1988).

of *al-Rūm* (the Romans, Byzantines), it is in the *sūra*, or chapter of the Qur'ān known as the "Sūra of the Rūm", where these are favored over their bitter opponents the Sasanians:

> The Rūm have been overcome, in a nearby land. But after their defeat, they shall be victorious, within a few years. God's is the Decision, for what has happened and for what is to come. On that day the believers shall rejoice.[9]

Here and elsewhere in the Qur'ān there is no sense that Byzantium constitutes a special enemy of the community of believers.[10] However, this situation soon changed, as Muslim expeditions began to confront imperial frontier defences toward the end of Muḥammad's life. Then, after the death of Muḥammad in 632 and the two-year inter-Arabian war that followed, Arab fighters attacked the two great empires, for all intents and purposes simultaneously and successfully. It appears, however, that the first goal of the conquests lay in Byzantine Syria and Palestine.[11] Byzantium now took its place as the first and greatest enemy of Islam for this and other reasons, which included its simple survival. For while the Iranian Sasanian empire was overrun and conquered by mid-century, a truncated and transformed Byzantium held on to fight another day.

On the Byzantine side, the main theater of war, Anatolia, had already experienced devastation, especially of its cities, at the hands of Persian invaders in the first two decades of the seventh century, before the Islamic invasions began (as Clive Foss describes in Chapter 1). When the Arab Muslims did arrive in Anatolia, starting in the 640s (see Wellhausen, Chapter 2), they generally did not aim at (or at least did not achieve) the destruction of cities. Nonetheless, they made reconstruction nearly impossible for some time. But unlike the residents of formerly Byzantine provinces such as Syria and Egypt, the Byzantine Anatolians continued to resist. The present-day visitor to Cappadocia can still see their underground hideaways, testimony to the determination of the early medieval villagers, crowded underground in what must have been terrible conditions. A severe decline in urban life and

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[9] Qur'ān 30: 2–4. The context is commonly assumed to be the fall of Palestine and Jerusalem to the Sasanians in 614–15. For the Byzantine–Persian war of the early seventh century, see Chapter 1 of this volume.

[10] Michael Bonner, art. "Byzantines: Historical Context", in *Encyclopedia of the Qur'ān*, I, 265–66.

[11] Fred M. Donner, *The Early Islamic Conquests* (Princeton, 1980), esp. 96–97; idem, *The Arab Conquests*, Volume 5 of this series.

monetary economy accompanied a transformation of the Empire's administrative and military structures. Cities eventually reemerged in Anatolia, but built in a new style. All these long-term processes proved just as important as the more spectacular events such as the great expeditions against Constantinople, most famously that of 717–18, which failed, but just barely, to bring the Empire down.

We might think that the confrontation was less vivid on the Muslim side: a no man's land separated them from their Byzantine neighbors, while fighting or residing in the war zone was a matter of choice for most Muslims, not necessity. Yet despite the thinness of the literary sources available to us now regarding Umayyad Syria, we can perceive anxieties over a Byzantine invasion, visible in the apocalyptic literature, and a preoccupation with Christian doctrine and practice—inseparable from the power of the Empire—visible in the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem and the Umayyad mosque in Damascus (see below).

When the 'Abbāsid dynasty supplanted the Umayyads in 750, the Byzantine frontier zone was already acquiring the characteristics it would have for the following two centuries. Expeditions went out as before, but no more attempts were made against Constantinople, which is to say that no strategic attempts were made to eliminate or defeat the adversary. The yearly raids, by sea and by land, became the main characteristic of the warfare. Meanwhile, the Empire had regrouped and reorganized sufficiently to establish military parity. For many years, victories and defeats were fairly equally distributed between the two sides. Well-publicized expeditions, such as that of the caliph al-Mu'taṣim against Amorion in 838, did not alter this balance. Over time, however, the consolidation and growth of Byzantine power under the dynasties of the Amorians (820–67) and even more so, the Macedonians (867–959) coincided with the decline and fragmentation of the central power of the Caliphate in Iraq. The Muslims found themselves increasingly on the defensive.

In the tenth century, on the Muslim side we see a series of improvisations in the face of looming disaster. Various actors occupy the stage, including politically ambitious local commanders and volunteers arriving from outside. Despite efforts that were often brilliant and valiant, the Byzantine forces could not be stopped. The Empire reconquered Malaṭya (Melitene) in 936, Maṣṣīṣa (Mopsuestia) and Ṭarsūs in 965, and Anṭakya (Antioch) in 969, and created a new imperial province in northern Syria. Then the juggernaut ground to a halt, as the Empire sought to contain its new an-

tagonist, the Fāṭimid caliphate, through an Arab buffer state in Aleppo.[12] In 1071, the Saljuq Turks defeated the Byzantines at Manzikert, and drove the Empire out of most of the Anatolian peninsula. The Crusaders arrived in the following generation, but that is another story.

What did these wars cost? A few indications from fourth/tenth-century budgets show routine expenditures, apparently for support of the garrisons and expeditions.[13] The major campaigns, mounted from time to time, cost a great deal, as our sources tell us (in numbers that may be exaggerated, but often not greatly; see Kennedy in Chapter 6). These expeditions rarely resulted in territorial gains or losses. Such territorial gains as occurred tended to be isolated outposts, inevitably lost over time.[14] The most famous expedition of all, that of al-Mu'taṣim in 838, resulted in much killing and plunder, but then left the devastated countryside and cities in Byzantine hands. Of course these expeditions and raids presented economic opportunity in the form of plunder, especially slaves. However, the enemy could, and frequently did return the compliment. The net result must have been a loss.

Internal quarrels lingered beneath this long-term struggle between two great adversaries. For Byzantium, the age following the early Islamic conquests was a time of slow recovery, culminating in a new assertion of state power and military might in the ninth and tenth centuries.[15] The Islamic world in this period shows nearly the opposite, beginning with the universal (if loosely coordinated) empire of the Umayyads, and ending with a group of states, most of them ruled by military men, perhaps constituting a "commonwealth" in matters of religion and culture, but constantly at odds in politics and war.

[12]Suhayl Zakkar, *The Emirate of Aleppo, 1004–1094* (Beirut, 1971).

[13]These most often take the form of provincial revenues and expenditures for the frontier provinces. For example, the *Kitāb al-masālik wa-l-mamālik* of al-Muhallabī, no longer extant but quoted by Ibn al-'Adīm, *Bughyat al-ṭalab fī ta'rīkh Ḥalab*, ed. Suhayl Zakkār (Damascus, 1988), I, 178, gives 100,000 *dīnārs* as the yearly income from all the frontier provinces (*thughūr*), and 150,000 as the expenditure on them.

[14]Thus Ṭuwāna (Tyana), occupied and built up by the Muslims under al-Ma'mūn but then abandoned by his brother and successor al-Mu'taṣim upon his succession in 833; see al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh al-rusul wa-l-mulūk*, ed. M.J. de Goeje *et al.* (Leiden, 1879–1901), III, 1111–12. The fortress of Lu'lu'a (Loulon), guarding the western approaches to the Cilician Gates, was held for a time by Slavs who had gone over to the Muslim side, but then reverted to Imperial control in 877 (Canard, in *Byzance et les arabes*, II.1, 79–81). See also Chapter 6, nn. 158 and 159.

[15]As described in in older works such as Gustave Schlumberger, *L'épopée byzantine à la fin du dixième siècle* (Paris, 1925); and in Warren T. Treadgold, *The Byzantine Revival, 780–842* (Stanford, 1988); Romilly Jenkins, *Byzantium: the Imperial Centuries, AD 610–1071* (Toronto, 1987); and others listed in the Bibliography below.

In Islamic conceptions of sovereignty, as these became set down in juridical works beginning as early as the late second/eighth century, the conduct of war against the external enemies of Islam is one of the main responsibilities of the Imām, who is here identical to the caliph. Military expeditions cannot set out without his approval; he has responsibility for planning and providing for warfare, both offensive and defensive. But even as the role of the Imām/caliph grew in the theory of state and war, his actual power and authority declined. Beginning in the 860s, for over a century the Ṭūlūnids and then the Ikhshīdids, powerful dynasties based in Egypt, operated intermittently in the Byzantine frontier district. However, although often at odds with Baghdad, they mostly did not challenge the role of the caliphs in the war against Byzantium, and at times contented themselves with sharing the contested space.[16] The Arab dynasty of the Ḥamdānids were another matter. Coming to power in northern Syria in the early to mid-tenth century, when ‘Abbāsid fortunes were at their nadir and the Byzantine juggernaut at its strongest, they staked much of their claim to legitimacy on their frontline role in the Byzantine wars.[17] The Fāṭimid dynasty, in Egypt from 969 onwards, were Ismā‘īlī Shī‘īs who rejected the ‘Abbāsid claim altogether and claimed the universal caliphate for themselves. For this reason they had a freer hand in the matter. However, the Fāṭimids tended to avoid military entanglement with Byzantium; their diplomatic relations with Constantinople were relatively frequent and intense.[18]

Such internal tensions run throughout the entire period. We see them already in the earliest extant works on the *jihād*, originating in the late eighth century (Bonner, in Chapter 14). We see them again at the end of the story, in an episode in the frontier city of Ṭarsūs, on the eve of its being handed over to the Byzantines under Nicephorus Phocas in 354/965. During the last Friday prayer, the time arrived for the *khuṭba*, the sermon in which it was customary to include a prayer for the ruling caliph. The dignitary to whom this task had been assigned refused to be the last preacher on the *minbar* (pulpit) of Ṭarsūs. Thereupon a man named Abū Dharr, a Ḥanafī

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[16]For instance, see Canard in *Byzance et les arabes*, II.1, 100–101; Michael Bonner, *Aristocratic Violence and Holy War* (New Haven, 1996), 153–54, on the "cohabitation" of Ṭūlūnid and caliphal representatives in Ṭarsūs.

[17]Marius Canard, *Histoire de la dynastie des H'amdanides* (Paris, 1953).

[18]Samuel Stern, "An Embassy of the Byzantine Emperor to the Fatimid Caliph al-Mu‘izz", *Byzantion* 20 (1950), 239–58; = his *History and Culture in the Medieval Muslim World* (London, 1984), no. 9; Marius Canard, "Le cérémonial fatimite et le cérémonial byzantin: essai de comparaison", *Byzantion* 21 (1951), 355–420; = his *Byzance et les musulmans du Proche Orient*, no. 16; Abbas Hamdani, "Byzantine–Fatimid Relations before the Battle of Manzikert", *Byzantine Studies* 1 (1974), 169–79.

faqīh and native of the city, stood up and began to preach, reciting the prayer in the name of the ʿAbbāsid caliph al-Muʿtaḍid (r. 892–902), who by this time had been dead for over six decades but who, in his day, had made his power felt in the Byzantine frontier district. He did this, says Canard, "as if [Muʿtaḍid] were the reigning caliph, or rather as if there had been no caliph worthy of the name since his death".[19]

Divided sovereignty is at the heart of the matter also for Qudāma ibn Jaʿfar, who looks back at Iran after Alexander's conquests as a time of subjection and of political fragmentation, summed up in the Qurʾānic phrase *mulūk al-ṭawāʾif*, factional kings, party kings. The disunity lasts until Ardashīr, a strong king—though not an Islamic one!—unites the empire and throws off the Roman tribute. As Parthian history this is inaccurate, but as an appreciation of more recent ʿAbbāsid history it hits the mark. In his description of the frontier regions and elsewhere, Qudāma refers not to the Islamic caliphate, but rather to the Realm of Islam (*mamlakat al-Islām*), an idealized geographical and political unit that notably lacks a head.[20]

This crisis of sovereignty provides a partial answer to the question of why the Muslims devoted so much blood and treasure to their Byzantine wars. The Byzantine onslaught came to a climax at a time when the ʿAbbāsid caliphate in Baghdad was hopelessly weakened and when the real holders of power in Baghdad, the Būyids, showed no interest in the Byzantine wars. Now the frontier zone had from the beginning seen a constant flow of immigrants, volunteers for military service, especially from the Persian-speaking East. In this crisis of the mid-tenth century, popular preachers such as Ibn Nubāta urged the crowds to make their way through mountains and deserts, to volunteer for the fight against the Rūm.[21] At a time when there was no Imām (at least among non-Shīʿīs) able to fulfill the religious obligation of leading the community in its wars against external enemies; and moreover, at a time when armies were professionalized and reduced in size, and recruited largely from alien nations such as the Turks and Daylamis,

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[19]Marius Canard, "Quelques observations sur l'introduction géographique de la *Bughyat aṭ'-ṭ'alab*", *AIEO* 15 (1957), 41–53, esp. 52. The source is Ṭarsūsī's *Siyar al-thughūr*, quoted by Ibn al-ʿAdīm in *Bughyat al-talab*, I, 196–97, and now published on its own: see C.E. Bosworth, "Abū ʿAmr ʿUthmān al-Ṭarsūsī's *Siyar al-thughūr*", *GA* 5 (1993), 183–95. See also Bonner, *Aristocratic Violence*, 155, 176.

[20]See above, n. 3. The *mamlakat al-Islām* is a feature of several tenth-century geographical works. It harkens back to the political conditions of the previous century: see Miquel, *La géographie humaine*, I, 271–75.

[21]*Dīwān khuṭab Ibn Nubāta*, ed. Ṭāhir al-Jazāʾirī (Beirut, 1311/1893–94), esp. 202–207; Marius Canard, *Recueil de textes relatifs à l'émir Sayf al Daula le Ḥamdânide* (Algiers, 1934), 167–73.

volunteering for military duty became more important than ever. In this way the war against Byzantium remained a central activity.

Communication between the adversaries was necessary and no doubt occurred more often than our scattered information regarding diplomatic missions might lead us to think. A recent study by Andreas Kaplony examines the procedures followed in Umayyad–Byzantine diplomatic relations, which Kaplony considers part of the "unwritten rules of intercultural diplomacy", and "the common law of international affairs".[22] Diplomatic relations throughout this period are summarized and discussed by Hugh Kennedy in Chapter 4. Byzantium's diplomatic relations with Islamic states differed from those with its other neighbors (Avars, Franks, Khazars, Rus, etc.), in their reactive, defensive and *ad hoc* character. For the Muslim side, diplomatic relations with Byzantium mainly involved caliphs, whether Umayyad, 'Abbāsid or Fāṭimid.[23] From the point of view of Muslim law, diplomatic contacts could aim only at limited goals, such as ransoming prisoners, and at achieving a truce (*hudna*) of no more than ten years' duration. We must remember that the Islamic law of war itself came into existence during this period, largely in response to conditions on the Byzantine front. Nonetheless, we need to account for the letter sent by Nicholas Mysticus, patriarch in Constantinople in 901–907 and 911–25, to the caliph in Baghdad (perhaps al-Muktafī, r. 902–908):

> All power and all earthly authority depend, O friend, on the authority and power of Him who is on high: there is no power among men, no sovereign who has obtained sovereignty on earth through his own intelligence, unless He who has power in the Heavens, who governs and is the sole sovereign, has conceded it to him....What is the significance of these words for us? It is that two empires, that of the Saracens and that of the Romans, together hold the entirety of power on earth, have preeminence and shine like two great torches in the celestial firmament. For

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[22] Andreas Kaplony, *Konstantinopel und Damaskus: Gesandtschaften und Verträge zwischen Kaisern und Kalifen 639–750. Untersuchungen zum Gewohnheits-Völkerrecht und zur interkulturellen Diplomatie* (Berlin, 1996). Kaplony's detailed argument does not entirely answer the objection that the procedures described may have been retrojected from later times and thus reflect later practice and theory.

[23] The emperor Romanus Lecapenus (r. 920–44) indicated to the Ikhshīd Ibn Ṭughj, the ruler of Egypt, that he was accustomed to corresponding only with caliphs: see al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-a'shā* (Cairo, 1964), VII, 10–18; Marius Canard, "Une lettre de Muhammad ibn Tughj", *AIEO* 2 (1936), 189–209; = his *Byzance et les musulmans*, no. 7; Shboul, "Arab Attitudes towards Byzantium", 118–19.

this reason alone, it is necessary that we have relations of com-
munity and fraternity, and that we absolutely avoid—under the
pretext that we differ in our way of life, our customs and our
religion—maintaining hostile dispositions toward one another;
and that we not deny ourselves the ability to communicate by
letter, unless we should be able actually to meet.[24]

Nicholas then goes on to complain about recent events in Cyprus, citing
the depredations of the renegade Himerius there in 902, and going on to
express the theory that there is "a law in vigor among all peoples, even
those who know no laws, [a law that has now] been violated [in Cyprus]
by the Saracens, who are governed by laws". Now Cyprus did have an
unusual status because of the sharing of its revenues and to some extent,
of sovereignty over it between the rival empires.[25] However, this is not the
way in which the early Muslim jurists understood the matter of Cyprus:
for them the basic premise of God's sovereignty did not lead to any sharing
of earthly sovereignty.[26] We have to conclude that Nicholas' theory of the
"two torches" was, at least in the eyes of Muslim statesmen and jurists,
ultimately unacceptable.

Frontiers and Military Organization

For all the importance of the ideologies of *jihād* and holy war (discussed
below), none of all this could have happened without constant, grueling ef-
fort in recruitment, training, supply, the development of tactics, and other
mundane areas. Each side depended for its survival and prosperity upon an

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[24]Migne, *Patrologia Graeca*, CXI, 27–40, repr. by Sakkelion in *Deltion tēs historikēs kai
ethnologikēs hetairias tēs Hellados* 3 (1889), 108–16; French trans. by Canard in *Byzance
et les arabes*, II.1, 399–411 (403–404 for the passage quoted here). See also R.G.H. Jenkins,
"A Note on the 'Letter to the Emir' of Nicholas Mysticus", *DOP* 17 (1963), 399–401; =
his *Studies on Byzantine History in the 9th and 10th Centuries* (London, 1970), no. 17.
The recipient is the caliph and not the "Amir of Crete".

[25]The unusual position of Cyprus goes back to the agreement between Constantine IV
and 'Abd al-Malik in 685 and renewed in 688–89 with Justinian II; see Wellhausen in
Chapter 2 below; Romilly Jenkins, "Cyprus between Byzantium and Islam, A.D. 688–
965", in George E. Mylonas, ed., *Studies Presented to David Moore Robinson* (St. Louis,
1953), II, 1006–1014 = his *Studies on Byzantine History in the 9th and 10th Centuries*
(London, 1970), no. 22; Walter E. Kaegi, "Changes in Military Organization and Daily
Life on the Eastern Frontier", in Chrysa Maltezou, ed., *Daily Life in Byzantium* (Athens,
1989), 512.

[26]See the discussion in the early 'Abbāsid period regarding the status of Cyprus and
the Cypriots in al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, ed. M.J. de Goeje (Leiden, 1866), 155–58;
Abū 'Ubayd al-Qāsim ibn Sallām, *Kitāb al-amwāl* (Beirut, 1986), 188.

effective and affordable military organization; how to achieve this was a central question, to which each tried several solutions. The modern literature on this question of military organization is more complete for the Byzantine side than for the Arab.[27]

Generations of Byzantine historians thought that a key to understanding this question was in the origins of the imperial military and administrative units known as *themata* or "themes". Although the themes are best known from evidence of the ninth and tenth centuries,[28] their origins have often been located at or soon after the time of the early Islamic conquests.[29] Irfan Shahid has identified a direct, causal relation between the peculiar administrative geography of early Islamic Syria (the *ajnād*) on the one hand, and what on the other hand he identifies as a pre-Islamic Byzantine organization, a direct precursor of the thematic system, which the emperor Heraclius would have initiated in Syria during the few years between his reconquest of that province from the Persians and his loss of it to the Arabs.[30] However, others have argued convincingly that to the extent that there actually was a thematic system, it came as the result of gradual change; Heraclius did institute reforms, but not the ones that eventually prevailed.[31] Chapter

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[27]The problem was stated already for Byzantium by F.I. Uspenskii in "Voennoe ustroistvo Vizantiiskoi imperii", *Izvestiia Russkogo Archeol. Instituta v Konstantinopole* 6 (1900), 154–207. For more recent studies, in addition to Chapters 5 and 6 in this volume, see especially Ralf-Johannes Lilie, *Die byzantinische Reaktion auf die Ausbreitung der Araber* (Munich, 1976); John Haldon, *Recruitment and Conscription in the Byzantine Army c. 550–950: a Study on the Origins of the Stratiōtika Ktēmata* (Vienna, 1979); idem, *Byzantium in the Seventh Century* (Cambridge, 1990); and Warren Treadgold, *Byzantium and its Army* (Stanford, 1995). For early Islamic military organization, see the new synthesis by Hugh Kennedy, *The Armies of the Caliphs: Military and Society in the Early Islamic State* (Cambridge, 2001).

[28]Especially the *De thematibus* by the emperor Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus, ed. and trans. A. Pertusi (Vatican City, 1952); and ed. Gy. Moravcsik, trans. R.J.H. Jenkins (Washington, 1967); and Arabic sources such as the ninth-century Ibn Khurradādhbih, *Kitāb al-masālik wa-l-mamālik*, ed. and trans. M.J. de Goeje (Leiden, 1889; *BGA* 6), esp. 77–81/105–10, as well as the ubiquitous Qudāma ibn Ja'far.

[29]Heinrich Gelzer, "Die Genesis der byzantinischen Themenverfassung", *Abhandlungen der Kgl. Sächs. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften*, Phil.-hist. Kl., 18, Nr. 5 (Leipzig, 1889); Charles Diehl, "L'origine du régime des thèmes dans l'Empire byzantin", *Etudes byzantines* (Paris, 1905), 276–92; Uspenskii, "Voennoe ustroistvo"; E.W. Brooks, "Arabic Lists of the Byzantine Themes", *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 21 (1901), 67–77; and Georg Ostrogorsky, *History of the Byzantine State*, trans. Joan Hussey (New Brunswick, 1969), 96–101.

[30]Irfan Shahid, "Heraclius and the Theme System: New Light from the Arabic", *Byzantion* 57 (1987), 391–403; "Heraclius and the Theme System: Further Observations", *Byzantion* 59 (1989), 208–43; "Heraclius and the Unfinished Themes of Oriens: Some Final Observations", *Byzantion* 64 (1994), 352–76.

[31]Ralf-Johannes Lilie, "Die zweihundertjährige Reform. Zu den Anfängen der The-

5, by John Haldon, provides a definitive study of the entire situation, and shows that we cannot accept Shahid's theory.

The military organization of the Caliphate differed significantly from its Byzantine counterpart. On the Byzantine side, the frontier zone seems to have been nearly coterminous with Byzantine Anatolia itself, at least throughout much of the first two centuries. The Byzantine society and polity that emerged in the ninth and tenth centuries as a military and political success was largely the product of a prolonged crisis on its eastern frontier (see Haldon in Chapter 6). On the Muslim side, the frontier was more truly marginal, in the sense that it constituted a distinct and (at least relative to the entire Caliphate) not-too-large area. Broadly speaking, the military organization of the Caliphate at first involved largely tribally based units, settled in encampments or towns (*amṣār*), enrolled in a central register (*dīwān*), and rewarded according to a system based, at least in its vocabulary, on gift ('*aṭāʾ*) rather than on compensation. From this a gradual transition occurred toward a situation involving the use of slave soldiers, "ethnic" units, and a complex distribution of horizontal and vertical loyalties.[32] The point here is simply that the military organization of the Caliphate is a much broader affair than the frontier armies and garrisons. Nonetheless, the Arab side of the frontier has its own importance and its own fascination.

The Arab–Byzantine frontier, like most pre-modern frontiers, consisted of a wide zone rather than a specific boundary line. Also like other frontiers, it had a particularly strong *imaginaire*, evoking images of forbidding mountain barriers from poets,[33] a range of praises and laments from ge-

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menorganisation im 7. und 8. Jahrhundert", *Byzantinoslavica* 45 (1984), 27–39, 190–201; *idem*, "Araber und Themen. Zum Einfluß der arabischen Expansion auf die byzantinische Militarorganisation", in Averil Cameron, ed., *The Byzantine and Early Islamic Near East*, III: *States, Resources and Armies* (Princeton, 1995), 425–46.

[32] In addition to the synthetic work by Kennedy mentioned above, see Patricia Crone, *Slaves on Horses* (Cambridge, 1980); Daniel Pipes, *Slave Soldiers and Islam: Genesis of a Military System* (New Haven, 1981); David Ayalon, "Preliminary Remarks on the Mamluk Institution in Islam", in V.J. Parry and M.E. Yapp, eds., *War, Technology, and Society in the Middle East* (Oxford, 1975), 44–58; *idem*, "The Military Reforms of al-Muʿtaṣim", in his *Islam and the Abode of War* (Aldershot, 1994), 1–39; Matthew Gordon, *The Breaking of a Thousand Swords: a History of the Turkish Community of Samarra* (Albany, 2001).

[33] Including the panegyricists of the ʿAbbāsids, especially of the caliphs al-Rashīd and al-Muʿtaṣim; the famous Mutanabbî; Abū Firās, the Ḥamdānid prince held captive in Constantinople; and others. See Marius Canard in *Byzance et les arabes*, I, 397–408, II.2, 299–378; *idem*, "Mutanabbî et la guerre byzantino-arabe: intérêt historique de ses poésies", in *Al-Mutanabbi: recueil publié à l'occasion de son millénaire* (Beirut, 1936), 99–114; = Canard's *Byzance et les musulmans*, no. VI; Bonner, *Aristocratic Violence*,

ographers,[34] and endless distinctions from lawyers. At the same time, it truly was a forbidding place, presenting countless practical difficulties that soldiers and civilians had to overcome as best they could.

Although the frontier zone lay not far from some of the major political and cultural centers of the early Islamic world, it was barred from these to some extent. Soon after Heraclius' retreat from Syria in the 630s, a no man's land emerged, known to the Arabs as *al-ḍawāhī*, "the outer lands".[35] Beginning around a century afterwards, when the frontier's center of gravity migrated to the Taurus and anti-Taurus ranges, and when the Muslim authorities began a policy of settling fighters in the region and building up the frontier outposts into towns of some importance,[36] the idea of a protective *cordon sanitaire* remained. Arabic geographers and historians described the frontier zone as divided into a front line called the *thughūr*, "the passageways", behind which (that is, to the east and south of which) lay an intermediate zone of towns and strongholds known as the *'awāṣim*, the "protectresses". These same writers further described the front-line *thughūr* as divided into regions named after and somehow appended to the great provinces behind them: the *thughūr* of Syria and the Jazīra. This division of the frontier district corresponded to reality, in the sense that a broad frontier zone, now called *'awāṣim* instead of *ḍawāhī*, did extend between the front-line strongholds and the main body of the Caliphate. But on the other hand, this division into *thughūr* and *'awāṣim* did not really make sense and did not correspond to the administrative realities of most times.[37] Once again, we cite Qudāma ibn Jaʿfar. In his chapter on the frontiers, Qudāma (like other geographical writers) divides the front-line strongholds of the

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101–104, 134; and Shboul in Chapter 9, section 7, below.

[34]Especially Ibn Ḥawqal, *Ṣūrat al-arḍ*, ed. J.H. Kramers (Leiden, 1938; *BGA* 2), 178–89, 201–202. *Byzance et les arabes*, II.2, 379–428, provides a selection of translated geographical writings.

[35]Described at the beginning of Chapter 2 (Wellhausen). The term *al-ḍawāhī* corresponds to the Greek *ta akra*, "the extremities", according to Kaegi, "The Frontier: Barrier or Bridge?", *The 17th International Byzantine Congress: Major Papers* (New Rochelle, 1986), 286. See also Kaegi, "Changes in Military Organization and Daily Life on the Eastern Frontier", in Chrysa Maltezou, ed., *Daily Life in Byzantium = Ē kathēmerinē zoē sto Vyzantio* (Athens, 1989), 514–17, discussing the devastated zone, of which Heraclius seems to have been the originator.

[36]Kennedy in Chapter 6, below; Bonner, *Aristocratic Violence*, 43–68; C.E. Bosworth, art. "al-Thughūr. 1. In the Arab–Byzantine Frontier Region", *EI* ², X, 446–47.

[37]Michael Bonner, "The Naming of the Frontier: 'Awāṣim, Thughūr, and the Arab Geographers", *BSOAS* 57 (1994), 17–24. Cf. Miquel, *Géographie humaine*, II, 475: "But the concept is more fluid, and the distinction between *'awāṣim* and *thugūr* is often unstable, in the vicissitudes of the frontier".

thughūr into two districts, and he even adds a third district in the north, *al-thughūr al-bakrīya*. However, this dividing of the frontier zone contradicts what Qudāma says elsewhere about the administrative divisions of the Caliphate.[38] Here Qudāma is not describing the lands of the Caliphate, nor of the 'Hamdānids nor any other dynasty, but again, an idealized Realm of Islam (*mamlakat al-Islām*).

There are several reasons why the frontier zone should be so special and contradictory a part of this ideal entity. One of these is that when the frontier zone first emerged (in the second half of the second/eighth century and soon afterwards), a trend was beginning to prevail toward viewing the Islamic land and fiscal regimes as products of the early Islamic conquests. Jurists and historiographers were coming increasingly to view the arrangements of their own day regarding landholding, taxation and intercommunal relations as direct results of what had happened in those old glory days, especially in the 630s and 640s. This applied especially, but not only, to provinces that, like the Jazīra (upper Mesopotamia), were located near the Arab–Byzantine frontier.[39] In this context, the frontier district itself, still a site of warfare, raiding and conquest, presented a test case and an anomaly. When the settling of the frontier towns was underway, the Syrian jurist al-Awzāʿī (d. 157/774), declared that only the caliph could make grants of agricultural lands in these lands. Afterwards, al-Awzāʿī's student and follower Abū Isḥāq al-Fazārī (d. after 185/802) said that because of the uncertainty of that district's previous status, it was best to avoid holding landed property there altogether.[40] Thus the unitary Caliphate comes into question once again, this time through the land regime of the *thughūr*.

This frontier, like others, has been described as a place of mixing and fusion, a region where the residents on both sides had more in common with one another than with the people of their own hinterlands and capitals.[41] This impression certainly comes across in the popular epic, such as the

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[38] Qudāma (ed. Zubaydī), 180–85; (ed. de Goeje), 246–53.

[39] Chase F. Robinson, *Empire and Elites after the Muslim Conquest: the Transformation of Northern Mesopotamia* (Cambridge, 2000), 1–32; Werner Schmucker, *Untersuchungen zu einigen wichtigen bodenrechtlichen Konsequenzen der islamischen Eroberungsbewegung* (Bonn, 1973); Albrecht Noth, *The Early Arabic Historical Tradition*, 2nd ed. in collaboration with Lawrence I. Conrad, trans. Michael Bonner (Princeton, 1994); *idem*, "Zum Verhältnis von kalifaler Zentralgewalt und Provinzen in umayyadischer Zeit. Die Ṣulḥ–ʿAnwa Traditionen für Ägypten und den Iraq", *Die Welt des Islams* 14 (1973), 150–62.

[40] Below, Chapter 14.

[41] A defining characteristic according to Oscar Martinez, *Border People* (Tucson, 1994), 18–20; cf. Linda Darling, "Contested Territory: Ottoman Holy War in Comparative Context", *Studia Islamica* 91 (2000), 137 n. 13.

the *Digenis Akritas* cycle in Greek and the *Delhemma* (*Dhāt al-himma*) in Arabic. We must keep in mind, however, that this literature comes from a later time, at least in the form in which we have it. Certain defining differences between the two sides of the frontier marked it as a real barrier, at least during the three and a half centuries in question here. These differences include the emergence on the Byzantine side of a frontier aristocracy, drawn from the military leadership and imperial service,[42] whereas on the Muslim side, as we have seen, the role of the caliphs and their representatives was often called into question. If certain elite groups eventually prevailed there, their identity is still not clear.[43] This is not to say that local strongmen, "warlords", and their followings did not exist on the Arab side of the frontier. However, our information regarding them is spotty and, significantly, derives at least as much from Syriac as from Arabic sources.[44] In any case, we should take the Arabic sources seriously in their constant portrayal of the frontier district as an ideologically charged place where people came, not to mix with those different from themselves, but rather to fight them and to stake out more securely their own territory of self.

Hard-edged in these ways, the region of the *thughūr* did prove more porous in some others. Older populations mixed with newcomers arriving not only from Syria and Jazīra to the immediate south and east, but also from the more remote Islamic East. It may well be that relations with the Christian Byzantines just across the barrier, though not well documented, were friendly at times and perhaps even intimate, like those described in the

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[42]See Haldon in the first half of Chapter 6. This new aristocracy integrated various ethnic elements, including Arabs: see Jean-Claude Cheynet, "L'apport arabe à l'aristocratie byzantine des Xe–XIe siècles", *Byzantinoslavica* 56 (1995), 137–46.

[43]See Peter Von Sivers, "Taxes and Trade in the 'Abbāsid Thughūr", *JESHO* 25 (1982), 71–99, and the critique in Bonner, *Aristocratic Violence* (New Haven, 1996), 136–37. In this way the frontier region was typical of Islamic society as a whole, in that it did not provide conditions for, and even blocked the progress, of any elite group seeking to establish itself for longer than a few generations. On this question more generally, see Patricia Crone, *Slaves on Horses*; and Michael Chamberlain, *Knowledge and Social Practice in Medieval Damascus, 1190–1350* (Cambridge, 1994).

[44]This does not mean that Syriac sources are inherently untrustworthy, but only indicates the marginal place of this phenomenon in the Arabic sources. This especially applies to the years around the 'Abbāsid revolution. See Bonner, *Aristocratic Violence*, 41–61; Claude Cahen, "Fiscalité, propriété, antagonismes sociaux en Haute-Mésopotamie au temps des premiers 'Abbāsides d'après Denys de Tell-Maḥré", *Arabica* 1 (1954), 136–52; J.M. Fiey, "The Syriac Population of the Thughūr al-Shāmiyya and the 'Awāṣim and its Relations with the Byzantines and the Muslims", in Muhammad Adnan Bakhit and Robert Schick, eds., *Bilād al-Shām in the 'Abbāsid Period: Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on the History of Bilād al-Shām* (Amman, 1991), 45–54.

Spanish *Poem of the Cid* between Don Rodrigo and the Moor Abengalbón
(Ibn Ghalbūn).

Polemics and Images of the "Other"

The images of Muslims and Islam that emerged in early medieval Byzan-
tine polemical writings proved to have enormous lasting power, within and
beyond the Greek-speaking world. To speak of this polemical literature as
"Byzantine" is, of course, to use the term loosely, since much of it orig-
inated in the Islamic lands among Christians living in the protected sta-
tus (*dhimma*) of "people of the Book" (*ahl al-kitāb*), some of them writing
in Syriac, others in Greek, and some eventually in Arabic.[45] Whatever
the provenance of these writings, however, they provided a roughly uni-
fied heritage for medieval and early modern Christian writers against Islam.
Translated into Latin, they formed the foundation for a tenacious Western
European vocabulary of misunderstanding, which included portrayal of the
Saracens as the Scourge of God, sent to punish Christians for their sins; a
leading role for the Saracens in a variety of apocalyptic scenarios; the iden-
tification of Islam as a Christian heresy and of Muḥammad as a heresiarch;
and wide-ranging accusations of fraud, violence and lust, again leveled at
both Muḥammad and his community as a whole. Polemicists in the me-
dieval West expanded this heritage with such elements as the identification
of Islam as a form of paganism, and the revival of the ancient theme of the
flighty, inconstant Oriental.[46] However, the older "Byzantine" vocabulary
continued to resurface, well into the modern period.[47]

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[45]See below, Chapters 8 (Meyendorff) and 12 (Conrad); Daniel Sahas, *John of Dam-
ascus on Islam, the "Heresy of the Ishmaelites"* (Leiden, 1972); *idem*, "Eighth-Century
Byzantine Anti-Islamic Literature", *Byzantinoslavica* 57 (1996), 229–38; Andrew Palmer,
Sebastian Brock and Robert Hoyland, eds. and trans., *The Seventh Century in the West-
Syrian Chronicles* (Liverpool, 1993); Robert Hoyland, *Islam as Others Saw It* (Princeton,
1995); and Bibliography, below.

[46]For a synthesis, see John V. Tolan, *Saracens: Islam in the Medieval European Imag-
ination* (New York, 2002); and Norman Daniel, *Islam and the West: the Making of an
Image* (Edinburgh, 1993). For an even longer view, see Maxime Rodinson, *La fascination
de l'Islam* (Paris, 1980), trans. as *Europe and the Mystique of Islam* (Seattle, 1991).

[47]As in the quarrels between Federalists and Republicans in the early years of the
American republic, where Muḥammad and Islam were taken as paradigms of domestic
and political tyranny, or else of anarchy, depending on the point of view. See Robert
J. Allison, *The Crescent Obscured: the United States and the Muslim World, 1776–1815*
(Chicago, 1995). Of course Montesquieu enters the argument, but see pp. 37–41 on the
Americans' use of Humphrey Prideaux's *The True Nature of Imposture Fully Displayed in
the Life of Mahomet* (London, 1697), a work still largely in the medieval tradition.

Several chapters in this volume (8–11) deal with the question of how the Muslims viewed the Byzantines. Medieval Muslim sources at different times might use the term *Rūm* politically (subjects of the Roman/Byzantine emperor), linguistically (Greek-speakers), geographically (Anatolians), or religiously (Christians in general).[48] Nonetheless, they took a different view of the Christians in the Byzantine empire and those residing in the lands of Islam. Within lands that came under Muslim rule, conquerors and conquered soon agreed on the need for arrangements that would provide mutual guarantees, even if these arrangements sometimes involved a degree of mutual misunderstanding, as the anecdote at the beginning of Chapter 10 illustrates. So on the one hand, the juridical roots of *dhimma* ("protection") were inseparable from those of *jihād*,[49] and those who lived under *dhimma* did not enjoy social and juridical equality with the Muslims; but on the other hand, *dhimma* also lay at the root of what historians of medieval Spain sometimes call *convivencia*, or "getting along together". Accordingly, in early Islam we see the genesis and growth of an internal Other, separate from the external Other personified by the Rūm/Byzantine. This internal Other is the *dhimmī*, the non-Muslim native of the Abode of Islam, most often Christian or Jewish. Because the *dhimmī*'s juridical characteristics included both a long-term contractual relationship with the Muslims and the inability to carry arms, he was destined to participate in a never-ending negotiation with the Muslims over his own status, obligations and rights. Chase Robinson has recently shown the importance of such negotiations and discussions between Muslims and *dhimmīs*, not only in Islamic law, but also in the early development of Islamic historiographical and biographical writing.[50]

Medieval Muslim legal and literary writers often used stereotypes to represent *dhimmīs* and Byzantines. This is not surprising: after all, representations of "Saracens" in Byzantine and Western European literature were at least as stereotypical as these. The point here is simply that for the medieval Muslims, while the internal Other was a figure of constant negotiation, the external Other on the whole was not. We see this in the evidence assembled by Nadia El-Cheikh regarding perceptions of Byzantine women in Arabic literature. These women were associated with immorality and often portrayed as prostitutes, while Byzantine men were singled out for their supposed lack

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[48]See above, n. 4. On the Rūm as "unbelievers", "idolaters" (*mushrikūn, kuffār*), and the ambiguity of those terms, see Shboul, "Arab Attitudes towards Byzantium", 124–25.

[49]Best illustrated by the *Kitāb al-jizya* (not *Kitāb al-jihād*) in al-Shāfiʿī's *Kitāb al-umm* (Beirut, 1980), IV, 167–222, esp. 170–80.

[50]Robinson, *Empire and Elites*, 1–32.

of jealousy. Although some Arabic writers acknowledged other possibilities, these perceptions prevailed, built as they were out of social realities in the Islamic world (domestic slavery and concubinage) and above all, out of projected fears of social and sexual disorder.[51] Chapter 9 in this volume, by Ahmad Shboul, provides a general outline of the image in Arabic literature of the Rūm/Byzantines, including the view of Byzantium as a great power; the identification of its ruler as the paradigmatic tyrant (ṭāghiya); the skill of the Byzantines in various arts and crafts, as well as in administration and warfare; and their alleged lack of generosity. Above all and throughout, the Empire figures as Islam's main antagonist and rival, its archenemy until the end of time. Likewise, when a long chapter of André Miquel's Géographie humaine allows us to view Byzantium through the keen eyes of the Arab geographers, we find constant repetition of the message that in the end the world will only be large enough to contain one of the two rivals.[52] Consistently with this idea, the geographical writers greatly exaggerate (at least in our eyes) the physical extent of the Empire, on occasion drawing Europe as a mere appendage to it. They also tend to be uncharacteristically imprecise regarding such things as the course of the Empire's rivers. They describe its roads, especially those leading to Constantinople, more accurately, no doubt because of the accumulation of military intelligence over many generations. However, the powerful Byzantine state looms large in these descriptions, overwhelming the everyday reality that these writers elsewhere describe with such acuity and grace. The geographers show little interest in Byzantine climate, products and trade; Constantinople for them is a city without people, without daily life.[53] Rather like the frontier district of the thughūr, just described, the image of Byzantium is of something inflexible and unyielding, both at its ideological core and along its hard, practical edges. It is, in fact, precisely the image that Massignon identified over a half century ago, that of the gold coin, the concrete symbol of royal sovereignty, power, brilliance and wealth.[54]

We have seen that in juridical theory and historical writing, the Islamic land and fiscal regime as a whole came to be seen as a direct result of the early conquests of the 630s and 640s. Even if this view was only theo-

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[51]N.M. El-Cheikh, "Describing the Other to Get at the Self: Byzantine Women in Arabic Sources, 8th–11th Centuries", *JESHO* 40 (1997), 239–50.

[52]Above, n. 2.

[53]Miquel, *Géographie humaine*, II, 381–481, esp. 387–88, 408, 462.

[54]Louis Massignon, "Le mirage byzantin dans le miroir bagdadien d'il y a mille ans", *Annuaire de l'Institut de Philologie et d'Histoire Orientales et Slaves* 10 (1950), 429–48, esp. 438–40. See also the end of Chapter 10 in this volume (O. Grabar).

retical, it provided ground for optimism: the community and its resources were bound to expand in God's good time, or at least to remain protected and stable. The major challenge to this comforting view came from the confrontation with Byzantium, with its endless ideological and physical conflict, its rugged frontier life, its peculiar *manière de combattre*, and the grudging respect that it evoked for the perpetual enemy, all of this taking place uncomfortably close to the nerve-center of the Islamic world.

In its origins the Arab–Byzantine confrontation was actually not a direct result of the early conquests, so much as of the period of the Umayyad dynasty (661–750). Medieval Muslims largely understood this, for instance in their interest in the (bad) precedents set by the caliphs Mu'āwiya and 'Abd al-Malik in paying tribute to Byzantine emperors while they were preoccupied with civil strife at home. For us, to understand the Arab–Byzantine confrontation, we need to look at the situation under the Umayyads first of all (Wellhausen and Gibb in Chapters 2 and 3). However, while the archaeological and artistic record for Umayyad Syria and Jazīra (the provinces bordering on Byzantium) is quite rich (Grabar in Chapter 10), the situation is less favorable for historiography. For as Wellhausen already noted (Chapter 2), the extant Arabic historians are mainly interested in Iraq and the East, and for the Byzantine frontier region they often give little more than bare data of commanders, battles and campaigns.

The Arabic apocalyptic literature helps to fill this gap. It is well known that the conquest of Constantinople was a transcendent, religious goal for the Muslims, especially after their failure in 717–18 to accomplish it.[55] Also well known is the prophecy that Constantinople would fall to a ruler who bore the name of a prophet. This in the event turned out to be true, though later than expected (in 1453, under an Ottoman sultan named Muḥammad). Beyond this, the Muslim apocalyptic literature has often been considered marginal and obscure. Recently, however, it has been studied and made better known (Suliman Bashear in Chapter 7).[56] In this apocalyptic liter-

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[55] Canard, "Expéditions des arabes contre Constantinople", 61–121; = his *Byzance et les musulmans*, no. 1.

[56] See also Michael Cook, "The Heraclian Dynasty in Muslim Eschatology", *al-Qantara* 13 (1992), 3–23; *idem*, "Eschatology and the Dating of Traditions", *Princeton Papers in Near Eastern Studies* 1 (1992), 23–47; *idem*, "An Early Islamic Apocalyptic Chronicle", *Journal of Near Eastern Studies* 52 (1993), 25–29; Lawrence I. Conrad, "The Arabs and the Colossus", *JRAS*, Third Series, 6 (1996), 165–87, esp. 181–87; David B. Cook, "Muslim Apocalyptic and *Jihād*", *JSAI* 20 (1996), 66–104; *idem*, "The Apocalyptic Year 200/815–16", in A. Baumgarten, ed., *Apocalyptic Time* (Leiden, 2000), 41–68; *idem*, "An Early Muslim Daniel Apocalypse", *Arabica* 49 (2002), 55–96. Especially important has been the publication of the *Kitāb al-fitan* by the third/ninth-century writer Nu'aym ibn Ḥammād

ature, the "portents of the hour" betray anxiety over a Byzantine invasion by sea of Muslim Syria. This invasion fits into a series of events, varying in the different versions, culminating in the conquest of Constantinople and the end of the world as we know it. Now in fact, a Byzantine naval invasion on such a scale never took place.[57] However, the fear itelf—apparently widespread among Syrian Muslims at what we might have thought was a moment of great success and confidence—seems to have been real, especially in the mid-to-late seventh century, when Umayyad control over the seacoast was still insecure (Wellhausen, Chapter 2). The second half of the seventh century saw great intensity in apocalyptic speculation, among Middle Eastern Jews and Christians as well as Muslims, much of it connected to the rise and expansion of Islam. Then, around 700, this speculation began to cool down, especially since the Arabs and Muslims were clearly there to stay.[58] As the Byzantine threat receded, the malāḥim and faḍā'il literature became objects of interest mainly in local Syrian scholarly environments, at least until the time of the Crusades, when it acquired new relevance and appeal.

How and why this material was transmitted in the 'Abbāsid period is still not entirely clear. In any case, in its literary form, this apocalyptic literature is ḥadīth. Since it refers to real, datable historical events (in addition to imaginary ones), it seems to provide scholars of ḥadīth with an opportunity to realize their dream of dating traditions securely. Moreover, most of the historical events in question took place before the year 100 of the Hijra, which Joseph Schacht declared the earliest limit of datable traditions. Michael Cook has taken up this challenge.[59] More recently, David B. Cook has identified "apocalyptic groups", the presumed audience of these productions, as well as a "leadership". However, the identities of all these still need to be made more precise.[60]

(Mecca, 1991).

[57]This undermines confidence in the theory that medieval apocalypses are prophecies *ex eventu*, or "chronicles written in the future tense": see Paul J. Alexander, "Medieval Apocalypses as Historical Sources", *American Historical Review* 73 (1968), 1018; *idem*, *The Byzantine Apocalyptic Tradition*, ed. D. de F. Abrahamse (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1985); further references in Conrad, "The Arabs and the Colossus", 182 n. 86; see also Cook, "The Heraclian Dynasty in Muslim Eschatology", 3–23. Bashear (in Chapter 7 below) remains loyal, even though the theory seems to go against some of his own findings.

[58]Conrad, "The Arabs and the Colossus", 181–83.

[59]Cook, "Eschatology and the Dating of Traditions", 23–47. The most important statement of Schacht's theory is in *The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence* (Oxford, 1950). Cook finds that the matter is "not as unambiguous and straightforward as one might have hoped", but that basic Schachtian principles, including the "common link", do come into question.

[60]David B. Cook, "Muslim Apocalyptic and *Jihād*", *JSAI* 20 (1996), 66–104.

Regarding theological disputations, Robert Hoyland remarks elsewhere in this series that these tended to be more "gentlemanly" when conducted within the frontiers of Islam than when they took place across the Arab–Byzantine divide.[61] Indeed, a characteristic of the "sectarian milieu" that John Wansbrough described for early Islam was that each monotheist group or sub-group could say its piece, with considerable confidence that its opponents would understand the basic themes, principles and structure of its argument.[62] Arab–Byzantine disputations, on the other hand, politicized and publicized events, often had a highly performative aspect, providing an occasion for rhetorical and poetic display.[63]

Exchange, Influence and Convergence

Diplomatic exchanges have already been discussed. These occurred relatively infrequently and provided opportunities for theatrical display meant to impress domestic audiences as much as visiting delegations. There was considerable borrowing from Byzantine ceremonial at the Fāṭimid court, and likely elsewhere.[64] In general, the language and practice of diplomacy were well understood on both sides.

Trade between the two took place on a large scale. However, we have little hard evidence for this trade in Arabic sources, apart from a short work on trade falsely attributed to al-Jāḥiz.[65] We have already seen the reticence of the Arab geographers on this point; a thorough scouring of *adab* (*belles lettres*) works of the 'Abbāsid period would yield more references. Demand for objects of Byzantine origin was principally for high-prestige items, including the marvelous brocades mentioned often in Arabic texts. The Empire tried to keep secret the techniques of production for some of these expensive goods, which were often made from raw materials originating

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[61] Hoyland, Introduction to Volume 18 of this series, *Muslims and Others*.

[62] John Wansbrough, *The Sectarian Milieu: Content and Composition of Islamic Salvation History* (Oxford, 1978); M.A. Cook, "The Origins of Kalām", *BSOAS* 43 (1980), 32–43.

[63] G.E. Von Grunebaum, "Eine poetische Polemik zwischen Byzanz und Baghdad im 10. Jahrhundert", *Analecta orientalia* 14 (1937), 43–64; = his *Islam and Medieval Hellenism*, no. 19.

[64] Marius Canard, "Le cérémonial fâṭimite et le cérémonial byzantin: Essai de comparaison", *Byzantion* 21 (1951), 355–420; = his *Byzance et les musulmans*, no. 14.

[65] *Kitāb al-tabaṣṣur bi-l-tijāra* (Cairo, 1994); French trans. by Charles Pellat, *Arabica* 1 (1954), 153–65. Walter Kaegi, in "The Frontier: Barrier or Bridge", 293–95, points to Abū Yūsuf's concern in the *Kitāb al-kharāj* (Cairo, 1962), 187–90, that spies can cross the frontier acting or disguised as merchants. Over a century later, a similar possibility is raised in the work attributed (probably incorrectly) to the Byzantine emperor Nicephorus Phocas, *De velitatione bellica* (Bonn, 1828), 196.

in the Islamic world. Byzantium was also a net exporter to the Muslims of coined money, especially gold. The Byzantines, for their part, imported a wide range of goods, especially high-quality raw materials; their balance of trade with the Islamic world was negative. But their role may better be described as that of an intermediary within the global trading network of Islam, or as Maurice Lombard described it, "encysted in the great currents emerging from the Muslim world".[66] Muslim commercial relations with the Balkan and Slavic worlds, the Black Sea, the Caspian, the Russian river routes, the Baltic, and even with much of the Mediterranean (especially with the rise of the Italian merchant republics), often had no choice but to pass through Byzantine territory and Byzantine customs officers.

This raises the question of where this trade took place, or in other words, of markets. Despite the optimistic statements of some modern scholars, the frontier towns of the *thughūr* in Asia Minor and northern Syria—inland and up against the Taurus mountains—were centers of local trade at best. There is no evidence for long-distance trade going through them; their support came from other sources, including the State treasury and revenues from "immobilized" properties back in the Islamic heartlands.[67] But in cities that did have long-distance trade, we may perceive a difference between Byzantium and the Arabs. In early Byzantium, as in the later Roman Empire, the Empire and its fiscal agents had a central and in some ways controlling role in the functioning of the markets, which were, on their own, rather weak.[68] In the Islamic world, after attempts by the Umayyad caliphs (661–750) to create and control markets, at least in Syria, Palestine and the Ḥijāz,[69] the market (both in the concrete and the abstract sense) suffered fewer restrictions.[70] Of course this does not mean that Caliphal

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[66]Maurice Lombard, *L'Islam dans sa première grandeur, VIIIe–XIe siècle* (Paris, 1971), 226–33, esp. 232.

[67]See Chapter 6, n. 107; also Ibn Ḥawqal, *Ṣūrat al-arḍ*, 184 (support for Ṭarsūs).

[68]Haldon discusses this issue regarding Byzantine markets and cities, in the first half of Chapter 6. See also Michael F. Hendy, "Economy and State in Late Rome and Early Byzantium: an Introduction", in his Variorum collection *The Economy, Fiscal Administration and Coinage of Byzantium* (Northampton, 1989), 1–23. The early Islamic counterpart to all this has not yet been written.

[69]The archeological evidence for Umayyad markets has been assembled in a recent Harvard dissertation by Rebecca Foote, which, however, has not been available to me. For the literary evidence, see the controversy over the market in Medina in al-Samhūdī, *Wafā' al-wafā bi-akhbār dār al-Muṣṭafā* (Cairo, 1373/1953), II, 747–56; M.J. Kister, "The Market of the Prophet", *JESHO* 8 (1965), 272–76; = his *Studies in Jāhiliyya and Early Islam* (Ashgate, 1980), no. 9.

[70]See Thierry Bianquis and Pierre Guichard, art. "Sūk: 1. In the Traditional Arab World", *EI* [2], IX, 786–89; Hugh Kennedy, "The Impact of Muslim Rule on the Pattern of

and provincial authorities had no role in the Islamic marketplace; but this role was substantially different from that of their Byzantine counterparts.

The extent and meaning of this difference remain to be spelled out. The difficulty of the task appears in the well-known example of the Islamic office of market inspector or *muḥtasib*. It used to be thought that this office had its origins in the late Roman Empire, but this is no longer clear. The office itself was rather limited in its authority. However, the paucity of direct evidence for some such office in the Islamic lands from the seventh through the tenth centuries does not necessarily mean that it did not then exist.[71] For now, we may simply point to a general pattern or trend. The two sides shared a common Hellenistic and late Roman heritage, and their productions and styles in many areas—economic, artistic, intellectual—had much in common. Nonetheless, each resolutely went its own way, as in this example of the marketplace. Frequent contacts did not bridge the gap.

Commercial and diplomatic contacts required what Islamic law calls the *amān*, or "safe-conduct". Though we know a great deal about the theory of the *amān* from Islamic legal sources,[72] we have no documentary (archival) evidence for it during the period of the Arab–Byzantine encounter. For later periods, where we do have such evidence, we find the *amān* negotiated between a host (such as the Mamlūk sultan) and a group that sends visitors (such as the Venetian commune). This is unlike the situation in Islamic law, where the *amān* is always negotiated between individuals.[73] Trading communities of Muslims resided in Constantinople and other important cities; their status, and especially the mosques built for their use, were negotiated in treaties.[74]

The endless campaigns and raids resulted in large numbers of prisoners on both sides. One result of this was a fascinating, if small literature of captivity narratives, ranging from apparently sober autobiographical accounts

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Rural Settlement in Syria", in Pierre Canivet and Jean-Paul Rey-Coquais, eds., *La Syrie de Byzance à l'Islam, VIIe-VIIe siècles* (Damascus, 1992), 291–97.

[71]Sunayd (al-Ḥusayn ibn Dāwūd, d. 221/836), a scholar resident in al-Maṣṣīṣa in the *thughūr*, was known as "the *muḥtasib*". However, the sources do not describe his function, and the title is just as likely to derive from his Qur'ānic exegesis. See al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, *Ta'rīkh Baghdād* (Cairo, 1931), VIII, 42–44; Bonner, *Aristocratic Violence*, 164.

[72]Willi Heffening, *Das islamische Fremdenrecht* (Hannover, 1925).

[73]John Wansbrough, "The Safe-Conduct in Muslim Chancery Practice", *BSOAS* 34 (1971), 20–35; *idem, Lingua Franca in the Mediterranean* (Richmond, Surrey, 1996), esp. 133–34.

[74]S.W. Reinert, "The Muslim Presence in Constantinople, 9th–15th Centuries: Some Preliminary Observations", in Hélène Ahrweiler and Angeliki E. Laiou, eds., *Studies on the Internal Diaspora of the Byzantine Empire* (Washington, 1998), 125–50.

to framing stories worthy of the *Thousand and One Nights*.[75] Redeeming and/or exchanging prisoners was a main object of Byzantine–Arab diplomacy over long periods of time, and received much attention from Arabic historical writers.[76] The tenth-century historian and geographer al-Mas'ūdī described in detail the ceremony of redeeming prisoners that took place at intervals at the river Lamos, near Ṭarsūs. Significantly, the elaborate ceremony surrounding this event culminated in a market or fair, apparently under close supervision.[77]

Questions of cultural influence are most vivid in the history of art and architecture. Oleg Grabar in Chapter 10 shows how Byzantine forms and motifs taken over in early Islam received new meanings in the process. Byzantine artistic tradition was only one among the many available to the world-conquering Muslims, but an especially important one.[78] Not surprisingly, once Islamic art and architecture had reached maturity, they had considerable prestige and influence in the court and high aristocracy of Byzantium itself.[79]

Gustave von Grunebaum in Chapter 11 explores the vast reaches of Byzantine and Islamic intellectual history. In philosophy, *belles lettres*, and many forms of religious expression, time and again, he finds that "it is similarities rather than influences that we are able to observe". For all the "similarity of atmosphere" between the medieval Greek epic (*Digenis Akritas*) and the Arabic stories of Sayyid Baṭṭāl and 'Umar ibn al-Nu'mān, they do not grow out of a shared development. Above all, the classical heritage had a different fate in the two civilizations. Each had its humanistic and

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[75]For the first type, see the adventures of Hārūn ibn Yaḥyā, in Ibn Rustah, *al-A'lāq al-nafīsa*, ed. M.J. de Goeje (Leiden, 1891; *BGA* 7), 119–30; French trans. by Marius Canard in *Byzance et les arabes*, II.2, 382–94; Eng. trans. by A.A. Vasiliev, in *Seminarium Kondakovianum* 5 (1932), 149–63; see also M. Izeddin, "Un prisonnier arabe à Byzance au IXe siècle", *Revue des études islamiques* 15 (1947), 41–67. For the second type, see Marius Canard, "Les aventures d'un prisonnier arabe et d'un patrice byzantin à l'époque des guerres bulgaro-byzantines", *DOP* 19 (1956), 51–72; = his *Byzance et les musulmans*, no. 16. In general, see Ḥāmid Zayyān Ghānim Zayyān, *al-Asrā al-muslimūn fī bilād al-Rūm* (Cairo, 1989).

[76]See below, Chapter 4 (Kennedy); Canard, "Relations politiques et sociales entre Byzance et les arabes", 35–56; = his *Byzance et les musulmans*, no. 19; L. Simeonova, "In the Depths of Tenth-Century Byzantine Ceremonial: the Treatment of Arab Prisoners of War at Imperial Banquets", *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* 22 (1998), 75–104.

[77]al-Mas'ūdī, *al-Tanbīh wa-l-ishrāf*, ed. M.J. de Goeje (Leiden, 1894; *BGA* 8), 189–96; Chapter 6, below (Haldon and Kennedy).

[78]These themes are developed further in Oleg Grabar's *The Formation of Islamic Art*, 2nd ed. (New Haven, 1987).

[79]André Grabar, "Le succès des arts orientaux à la cour byzantine sous les Macédoniens", *Münchener Jahrbuch der bildenden Kunst*, Dritte Folge, 2 (1951), 32–60.

philosophical traditions; each saw a new resurgence of "elements of popular feeling and popular modes of thought" around the middle of the eleventh century; and each arrived at its own synthesis of all these elements, independently of the other. Von Grunebaum does not dwell on the intellectual contacts that occasionally took place at the highest political level, including royal gifts of manuscripts and "lending" of scholars. However, such episodes did little to change the intellectual and spiritual picture, and are best viewed in the same light as the diplomatic missions and the prestige-laden giftgiving that accompanied them.

By contrast, Lawrence Conrad in Chapter 12 shows that a certain amount of intercultural transmission can be located in historical writing. One reason for this is the presence of an intermediary, Christian Syriac historiography, with its ties to both the Greek and the (emerging) Arabic traditions, together with the peculiar position of Byzantine and early Islamic Syria itself. Conrad's conclusions regarding Theophilus of Edessa and Theophanes' "Eastern Source" have been widely accepted. At the same time, all this does not prove von Grunebaum wrong: the Arabic and Byzantine historiographical traditions still proceeded in the main without significant recognition or even awareness of one another.

The frontier was the site of several dissenting or heretical religious movements and trends, notably the Paulicians.[80] Among the great religious controversies of the age, the Iconoclast crisis in eighth- and ninth-century Byzantium is particularly fascinating, as it involves both high authority and popular feeling. The edict against images by the Umayyad caliph Yazīd II (r. 720–24) clearly had some relation to the subsequent iconoclast legislation of the emperor Leo III (717–41),[81] and there is good reason to think that the crisis was triggered in part by the recent military successes of Islam.[82] At the same time, Byzantine iconoclasm had deep Christian roots, predating the rise of Islam.[83] Patricia Crone in Chapter 13 argues for the role

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[80]Ostrogorsky, *History of the Byzantine State*, 223; Jenkins, *Byzantium*, 223; Nina G. Garsoian, *The Paulician Heresy: a Study of the Origins and Development of Paulicianism in Armenia and the Eastern Provinces of the Byzantine Empire* (The Hague, 1967); Paul Lemerle, "L'histoire des Pauliciens d'Asie Mineure d'après les sources grecques", *Travaux et mémoires* 5 (1973), 1-144.

[81]A.A. Vasiliev, "The Iconoclastic Edict of Yazīd II", *DOP* 9-10 (1955–56), 25–47.

[82]Peter Brown, "A Dark Age Crisis: Aspects of the Iconoclastic Controversy", *English Historical Review* 88 (1973), 1–34, and in his *Society and the Holy in Late Antiquity* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1982), 251–301.

[83]Ernst Kitzinger, "The Cult of Images in the Age before Iconoclasm", *DOP* 8 (1954), 83–149; Paul Speck, *Understanding Byzantium: Studies in Byzantine Historical Studies* (Ashgate, 2003), 17–21, 50–83.

of a Judeo–Christian intermediary. In her view, the Muslims did not show that much interest in the question of images overall. More recent contributions have concentrated on Muslim–Christian polemics regarding crosses and images, both within the Islamic world and across the Muslim–Byzantine divide.[84] There is fertile ground for the study of the Islamic attitude toward figured images in Qurʾānic, *hadīth* and legal studies, as well as in the study of the images themselves.[85]

Martyrdom, *Jihād*, Holy War

Chapter 14, an old article of mine, identifies a span of Arab–Byzantine frontier history, the last decades of the second/eighth century, as critical to the development of the ideology and practice of *jihād*. At issue is the migration, or temporary sojourning, of numerous Islamic religious and legal scholars and ascetics to the Byzantine frontier district, and their participation—whether symbolic or real—in fighting there. This phenomenon had been noticed earlier on by Albrecht Noth and has since been discussed by others, amidst disagreement over its historicity and meaning.[86] Here we may ask briefly what is at stake.

   The activity of these scholars and ascetics, together with their literary production, led me and others to think that the *jihād* did not exist, in its full sense, before this time, the late second/eighth century. This may seem innocuous enough. However, most scholarly and popular accounts of the matter assume deep continuity between the early and later history of the Muslim community in this regard. This assumed continuity works diachronically, in the sense that the actions and motivations of Muslim armies, on the Byzantine frontier and elsewhere, are portrayed as essentially the same (if not always as successful) as those of their predecessors in the early wars of Islam in the early first/seventh century. The continuity also works synchronically, in the sense that *jihād* in the path of God is portrayed as at once spiritual and earthly: even if the spiritual reward (for martyrdom) is valued most, earthly rewards (victory, conquest, spoils) are not rejected.

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[84]G.D.R. King, "Islam, Iconoclasm, and the Declaration of Doctrine", *BSOAS* 48 (1985), 267–77; Sidney H. Griffith, "Images, Islam and Christian Icons", in Canivet and Rey-Coquais, eds., *La Syrie de Byzance à l'Islam*, 121–38.

[85]For the *hadīth*, see Daan van Reenen, "The *Bilderverbot*, a New Survey", *Der Islam* 67 (1990), 27–77. Rudi Paret's work on images is collected in *Schriften zum Islam*, ed. Josef van Ess (Stuttgart, 1981).

[86]Albrecht Noth, *Heiliger Krieg und heiliger Kampf* (Bonn, 1966); *idem*, "Les ulamāʾ en qualité de guerriers", in *Saber religioso y poder politico en el Islam* (Madrid, 1994), 175–95; Jacqueline Chabbi, art. "Ribāṭ", *EI* [2], VIII, 493–506; Houari Touati, *Islam et voyage* (Paris, 2000), 237–58 ("Le séjour dans les marches").

Full continuity is also seen between, on the one hand, the norms of behavior regarding warfare, as these were set out in the early decades of Islam and embodied especially in the exemplum (*sunna*) of the Prophet; and on the other hand, the practice of the community in history.[87] Corollaries of this "continuous" *jihād* include the portrayal of Islam as utterly and essentially warlike; or else the opposite, namely the view that the "real" *jihād* does not involve war at all, but is rather the spiritual struggle against the self, with the result that Islam is portrayed as utterly and essentially unwarlike. For some historians, all this has resulted in a near-divorce between the study of the *jihād* and religious ideology on the one hand, and the study of "real" historical armies and military institutions on the other.

What was it that came into existence in the late second/eighth century? Or in other words, just what do we mean by "*jihād*"? The answer given in Chapter 14 is incomplete; more recent contributions carry the question further, but still do not resolve it. We would do well at this point to look at the controversy that has now gone on for a full century, over the origins of the Ottoman state and the history of fighting and holy war (*ghazā*) in thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century Anatolia. Participants in that controversy have tended either to affirm or deny that the early Ottoman state, or enterprise, was devoted at its very core to warfare in the path of God. Linda Darling has recently suggested that rather than identify such a "foundational essence" for the Ottoman state, we should look for "contestation among groups with different agendas and different concepts of the relevance and value of *ghazā* for their own interests and goals".[88] A similar lesson may apply to the early Caliphate and its presence on the Arab–Byzantine frontier. We must identify the groups in question, bearing in mind that ideological positions (regarding holy war, *jihād* and so on) are not necessarily the expressions or tools of easily identifiable social groups: after all, people engaged in these activities for a variety of reasons, often contradictory ones.[89]

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[87] Alfred Morabia in *Le Ğihâd dans l'Islam médiéval* (Paris, 1993), proceeds smoothly— but not naïvely—from historical narrative to normative and hortatory literature. More problematic in this regard is Reuven Firestone's *Jihād: the Origins of Holy War in Islam* (Oxford, 1999).

[88] Darling, "Contested Territory", 134. The word *ghazā*, which appears throughout the sources for Ottoman origins, is not used in the Arabic texts for the earlier period, which do distinguish between *ghazw* ("raiding") and other types of activity. However, the underlying issues are at least comparable. More is at stake than the precise meaning of words such as *jihād*, *ribāt* and *ghazw*, which sometimes shifted and overlapped.

[89] Darling, "Contested Territory", 134–35. Likewise, see Chabbi, "Ribāt", 497, on the sociological vagueness of such expressions as "the Muslims" in texts relating to *jihād*; and Touati, *Islam et voyage*, 247: "The tension between *murābaṭa* and *mudjāwara* cuts across

The scholar-ascetics of the Arab–Byzantine frontier belonged to the group known (at least later) as the *'ulamā'*, so difficult to identify sociologically.[90] The collected biographies of many of these men[91] emphasize their participation in scholarly activity, especially transmission of *ḥadīth*. Their economic activities rarely appear in the biographical sources, although some of them must have lived from commerce and trade.[92] Some of the best-known ones held official positions, notably *qāḍī* of Ṭarsūs and al-Maṣṣīṣa.[93] But what they stand out for is their association with the frontier. Were they literally fighters? Perhaps not: they lacked the training and gear, and many must have been old or unhealthy. It is later sources—from the fourth/tenth century onward—that embellish these biographies with deeds of derring-do; earlier sources show more sobriety.[94] Their warfare is thus largely symbolic.[95] On the other hand, their identification with the frontier and with fighting in some sense does demonstrably go back to the later second/eighth century, and is not the product of later romantic imagining.[96]

Similar figures and themes appear on the other great frontiers of medieval Islam, especially Central Asia, North Africa and Spain.[97] The scholar-ascetics of the Arab–Byzantine frontier stand out among these in some ways, including their general lack of interest in theological controversy. The antinomian trend of some other Islamic frontier zones has also been found lacking among them.[98] However, we may locate such a trend in some (later) biographies of the famous Ibrāhīm ibn Adham (d. 161/777–78), which portray him as dwelling in the frontier region and obsessed with ritual purity and

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the same groups and the same social environments".

[90] See R. Stephen Humphreys, *Islamic History: a Framework for Interpretation* (Princeton, 1991), 187–208.

[91] Bonner, *Aristocratic Violence*, 156–84.

[92] However, the *thughūr* were not a place of international, long-range trade, see above.

[93] Including the famous Abū 'Ubayd al-Qāsim ibn Sallām (d. 223/837); see Yāqūt, *Irshād al-arīb*, ed. D.S. Margoliouth (Leiden, 1923–31), V, 162; Touati, *Islam et voyage*, 247.

[94] In addition to Chapter 14 below, see Chabbi, "Ribāṭ", 498–99.

[95] Touati, *Islam et voyage*, 256–57, says that Noth and I claimed literal truth for their participation in fighting. I don't think I actually declared for this; I did comment (*Aristocratic Violence*, 158) that in these hundreds of biographical notices of scholars and ascetics of the Byzantine frontier, not a single one of them dies in combat.

[96] Touati, 247–48, against Chabbi's maintaining the contrary.

[97] See Chabbi, "Ribāṭ". For North Africa/Ifrīqiya, see also Heinz Halm, *The Empire of the Mahdi: the Rise of the Fatimids*, trans. Michael Bonner (Leiden, 1996), 221–38; and for the eastern frontier, Bernd Radtke, "Theologen und Mystiker in Ḫurāsān und Transoxanien", *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* 136 (1986), 536–69.

[98] Darling, "Contested Territory", 149–50.

radical ascetic practice. All this corresponds to currents clearly identifiable in Ṭarsūs and the *thughūr* in the fourth/tenth century.[99]

What stands out most regarding the scholar-ascetics is their relation to authority, both caliphal and prophetical, as I discuss in Chapter 14. The new ideology of *jihād* presented a challenge to the rulers, some of whom responded by projecting the *jihād* as part of their own identity, just as the scholar-ascetics had done before them. In this way the caliph Hārūn al-Rashīd (r. 170–93/786–809), a major actor in the Arab–Byzantine wars since his adolescence, became the first "*ghāzī*-caliph".[100] He was followed in this by his son al-Muʿtaṣim, who led the famous expedition against Amorion in 838; by Sayf al-Dawla, the tenth-century Ḥamdānid *amīr*; and others. The point here, much emphasized by the panegyricists, is the ruler's personal participation in the *jihād*, when he is under no constraint to do this. The poet Abū Nuwās says to Hārūn:

> You could, if you liked, resort to some pleasant place
> While others endured hardships instead of you.[101]

Hārūn takes on this role of fighting volunteer in addition to the role assigned to him by the Sacred Law (*sharīʿa*), that of leader, Imām, of the community in its wars.

Volunteering must therefore be at the heart of any working definition of the "new" *jihād* of the late second/eighth century. Volunteers, *muṭṭawwiʿa*, had always been part of the Islamic armies; we see them under the Umayyads, an often despised group serving next to the well-paid regulars (*muqātila*). Legal works on the law of war or *siyar* have a great deal to say about their status and their participation or non-participation in the spoils. Over the long term there is a reinterpretation of this volunteering, which acquires more and more ideological freight. In the *hadīth* ascribed to the Prophet that expresses so much of the ideal of *jihād* as this was current in third/ninth century, we find constant calls to self-sacrifice. At the same time, the jurists, notably the great al-Shāfiʿī (d. 204/819–20), call upon the constituted authority to guard the frontiers by keeping them "stuffed with men" (*sadd aṭrāf al-muslimīn bi-l-rijāl*).[102]

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[99] Bonner, *Aristocratic Violence*, 125–30.

[100] *Ibid.*, 99–106.

[101] Abū Nuwās, *Dīwān* (Beirut, 1962), 641.

[102] On all this, see Michael Bonner, "*Jaʿāʾil* and Holy War in Early Islam", *Der Islam* 68 (1991), 45–64; idem, *Aristocratic Violence*, 11–42, esp. 39–41. On "stuffing the frontiers", compare the panegyric of Hārūn al-Rashīd by Marwān ibn Abī Ḥafṣa, quoted by al-Ṭabarī,

Chapter 15, a recent article by David Woods, casts new light on a pair of important Latin texts describing the martyrdom of the Byzantine garrison of Gaza (and, according to Woods, of the patriarch Sophronius) during the early Islamic conquests.[103] The fact that this episode does not appear in any Islamic texts does not imply that it did not happen. We have no contemporary Arabic accounts of any of these events; and as Woods says here, we simply do not know how Muslim commanders treated their prisoners of war in the 630s. It should be pointed out that commanders on both sides, throughout the Arab–Byzantine wars, could and often did execute their prisoners, just as they could, at discretion, release them, hold them for ransom, or include them among the spoils of war. What is at issue here is the Muslim authorities' attempt to convert the prisoners forcibly, which goes against Islamic law as known to all schools. However, the law of war, together with the *jihād* itself, were still in embryo in the 630s, as I have claimed here. The dating and historicity of the Christian texts is another matter. Delehaye said that the list of names—anything but neat and idealized—at the end of the first text argues for authenticity. On the other hand, the story has several legendary elements.

This Christian martyrdom narrative shows us once again that the ideology and practice of holy war constitute a shared heritage among the monotheist traditions, even if they have mainly employed this heritage in fighting and killing one another. This is especially true of martyrdom: beginning with Stoicism and late antique Judaism (these two converging in the Fourth Book of Maccabees), then forming a foundation stone of the early Christian church, martyrdom went on to constitute a basic element of the practice and ideology of *jihād* in Islam.[104] Martyrdom and holy war could easily be made the focus of another collection of articles dealing, among other things, with resemblances and convergences between the *jihād* and the various types of holy war practiced by the Crusaders as well as by Byzantium

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Ta'rīkh, III, 741: "The thughūr are blocked by Hārūn (*wa-suddat bi-Hārūna l-thughūru*), and through him / the ropes of the Muslim state are firmly plaited".

[103] This article's welcome appearance spared me from including in this volume the influential but long-outdated article by Hippolyte Delehaye, "Passio sanctorum sexaginta martyrum", *Analecta Bollandiana* 28 (1904), 289–307.

[104] A.J. Wensinck, "The Oriental Doctrine of the Martyrs", *Mededeelingen der Koninklijke Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afdeeling Letterkunde*, 53: A (Amsterdam, 1922); Noth, *Heiliger Krieg*; Etan Kohlberg, "Medieval Muslim Views on Martyrdom", *Mededeelingen der Koninklijke Akademie van Wetenschappen*, 60.7 (Amsterdam, 1997), 279–307; idem, art. "Shahīd", *EI²*, IX, 203–207; art. "Märtyrer", in Hans Dieter Betz *et al.*, *Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, 4th ed., V (Tübingen, 2002), 861–78, esp. 871–72, "VII. Islam" (Michael Bonner).

itself.[105] Rather than produce such a volume, however, I conclude by repeating that in the formation of these Islamic ideas and practices, there was no environment more important than the Arab–Byzantine frontier and the centuries-long, tragic encounter between these two civilizations.

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[105] A good beginning is still Canard's "La guerre sainte dans le monde islamique et dans le monde chrétien", *Revue africaine* 79 (1936), 605–23; = his *Byzance et les musulmans*, no. 8. Byzantine notions have been discussed by Paul Lemerle in "Byzance et la Croisade", *Relazioni del X Congresso Internazionale di Scienze Storiche*, 3 (Florence, 1955), 595–620; and now, but not critically, by Geoffrey Regan in *First Crusader: Byzantium's Holy Wars* (New York, 2001). Crusading ideology, including its possible relation to Islamic *jihād* are discussed by Noth in *Heiliger Krieg und heiliger Kampf*; Carl Erdmann, *Die Entstehung des Kreuzzugsgedankens* (Stuttgart, 1935); and Jonathan Riley-Smith, *The First Crusade and the Idea of Crusading* (Philadelphia, 1986).

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War and Diplomacy

1

THE PERSIANS IN ASIA MINOR AND THE END OF ANTIQUITY

Clive Foss

THE provinces of Asia Minor flourished for two centuries after the establishment of the Augustan peace, and came to rank among the richest and most populous of the empire. The plague, invasions and civil wars of the late third century struck them a severe blow, but they were able to recover after settled conditions were restored by Diocletian and his successors. Renewed security encouraged trade and industry and supported the survival and growth of the cities – centres of local administration, trade and industry – which had provided the framework for the development and expansion of classical culture in the region. The Persian and Arab invasions in the seventh century then brought an end to the prosperity of late antique Asia Minor and introduced an obscure period which lasted until the middle of the ninth century. When information again becomes available, all had changed. The cities had for the most part disappeared, and the country was dotted with castles and small towns. This development, when it is recognized at all, is usually attributed to the incursions of the Arabs, who ravaged Asia Minor for two centuries. The Sassanian Persians, however, had already entered the country before them and devastated it for almost twenty years. The Persian invasions and their effects have never been seriously studied, although they were of capital importance for the history of the region. I propose here to investigate their course, and to suggest that the severe destruction which they caused was a mortal blow from which the classical civilization of Asia Minor never recovered. For this purpose, the feeble historical record of the age, provided largely by the monk Theophanes writing two centuries after the events, is inadequate, and we must consult sources of a different nature, notably the evidence provided by numismatics and archaeology. The former has been used occasionally in studies of the period, but the latter very little.[1]

1. The present discussion was to a large extent inspired by the provocative work of Professor Peter Brown, 'A Dark-Age Crisis: aspects of the Iconoclastic controversy', *Ante*, lxxxviii (1973), 1-34. He postulated that the morale of the age which turned to iconoclasm was conditioned by the Arab invasions, which, he believed, had marked the

The events of the last world war of antiquity, a violent struggle between Rome and Persia which lasted for a quarter of a century without respite and left both antagonists exhausted on the eve of the conquests of Islam, need not be narrated here; they may be found, in varying degrees of accuracy, in all standard accounts from Gibbon's to the most recent.[1] The accounts in the literary sources may be briefly summarized. The war began soon after the accession of Focas in 602, when the Roman commander in Mesopotamia revolted and called on the Persians for aid. The Sassanian king, Chosroes II, accepted the invitation; Persian armies soon crossed the frontier and began the slow conquest of the heavily fortified cities of Mesopotamia. By 610, when Heraclius assumed power, Chosroes had reconquered the frontier province which his predecessors had lost four centuries earlier. Soon after, Syria was in Persian hands and Asia Minor directly threatened from the south. Meanwhile, another series of slowly victorious campaigns had brought Armenia under Persian rule and made Theodosiopolis, its capital, a Persian military base. Satala, an ancient legionary headquarters and Nicopolis, which controlled the routes westward, were taken; the road to Asia Minor lay open.[2]

In 611, the famous general Shahin led a Persian army into the interior of Asia Minor for the first time in more than three centuries. He and his successors were to find a rich and peaceful country which had been relatively free from disturbance since the time of Diocletian. Shahin marched to Caesarea in Cappadocia, the most important military base of the plateau. When he arrived, the Christians abandoned the city, and the Jews threw the gates open to the invader.[3]

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end of the ancient world in Asia Minor (p. 26). Although some of this is certainly true – the Arab attacks continued for a tremendously long time – the role of the Persian invasions should not be underestimated. Disaster had already struck, but without bringing iconoclasm in its trail. I am most grateful to Mr Brown for discussions we have had on the subject, as well as to Professor Philip Grierson, who has answered my numerous questions with exemplary patience, and generously provided references from his great store of learning. For city life on the eve of the Persian invasions, see D. Claude, *Die byzantinische Stadt im 6. Jahrhundert* (Munich, 1969).

1. Two modern works narrate the events of this war in some detail; the clear account of N. H. Baynes, 'The Military Operations of the Emperor Heraclius', *United Services Magazine*, xlvi (1912/13), 526-33, 659-66; xlvii (1913), 30-38, 195-201, 318-24, 401-12, 532-41, 665-79 and the complex and detailed treatment of A. Stratos in *Byzantium in the Seventh Century* (Amsterdam, 1968), pp. 58-66, 103-17, 135-248. Stratos faithfully presents the problems arising from the sources without doing much to resolve them; he discusses, often with some vehemence, the theories and errors of his predecessors, and rarely compounds them with new ones of his own making.

2. Sebeos, *Histoire d'Heraclius*, trans. F. Macler (Paris, 1904), p. 61 f.; for the importance and remains of Satala and Nicopolis, see F. and E. Cumont, *Studia Pontica*, ii (Brussels, 1906), 304-12 and 343-51.

3. Sebeos, 63 f. The date of the capture of Caesarea, for which Sebeos gives the twentieth year of Chosroes (June 609-June 610) is determined by a contemporary saint's life; see the next note. Strictly speaking, a Persian army had already entered the country in the reign of Chosroes I. That sovereign in 579 crossed into Anatolia and burned Sebastea in Cappadocia, but his expedition was in the nature of a raid, and had no permanent consequences for the country.

The Persians occupied the city for more than a year. In the meantime, the new government of Heraclius was trying to organize resistance after failing in an attempt to negotiate peace. In 612, a Roman force surrounded the Persians in Caesarea. The great importance attributed to the city was illustrated by the arrival of the emperor himself to supervise the operations; he returned to the capital, however, soon after the birth of his son Heraclius Constantine on 3 May 612. The encircled Persians soon began to suffer from lack of food and fodder. But in the summer, when the fields were ripe with grain, they forced their way through the besieging force, leaving the Byzantines beaten and scattered, and the city in flames behind them.[1]

In 613, the Byzantines suffered such a great defeat that the Persians were free to overrun the whole Orient. Early in that year, Heraclius set out on the military highway across Asia Minor for Antioch. At Syceon, a station on the confines of Bithynia and Galatia, he received the blessing of the local stylite Saint Theodore, but it was inadequate to avert disaster. The Byzantines were beaten at Antioch and again when they attempted to make a stand in the Syrian Gates, near which Alexander and the forces of the West had won a resounding victory a millennium before. The Persians moved on to occupy Tarsus and all Cilicia, leaving their adversaries confined within the Taurus. In the meantime, Shahin had taken Melitene, another of the great fortresses of the frontier.[2] The only obstacle to the swift conquest of Asia Minor was the desire of the Persians to absorb the richer provinces to the south; within a few years Damascus, Jerusalem and Egypt were in the hands of Chosroes.

So far, most of Asia Minor west of Armenia and the Taurus had been spared the pains of invasion. Caesarea alone had fallen, and that temporarily. As late as 609, Saint Theodore of Syceon could predict to the patriarch of Constantinople that great disasters were in store for the empire, without any reference to present troubles. When the Persians took Caesarea, there was great consternation and fear that they might make inroads further west. Theodore, who lived on the main military highway between the capital and the frontier, could reassure his brethren that no such attack would take place during his lifetime. He died on 22 April 613; his prediction was, of course, accurate. The narrative of his life, in fact, illustrates the peaceful condition of the Anatolian countryside – at least of Bithynia, Galatia and parts of Phrygia. The saint and the peasants and villagers of the region, despite their location on the main

1. Sebeos, 65, Nicephorus, *Breviarium*, ed. C. de Boor (Leipzig, 1880), pp. 5-7, *Vita Theodori Syceotae*, ed. Festugière, *Subsidia Hagiographica* xlviii (Brussels, 1970), cap. 153-5; the three sources provide striking confirmation for each other, as well as a precise chronology.

2. Sebeos, pp. 65, 67; *Vita Theod. Syc.* cap. 166.

highway where an invasion would soon have been felt, went about their business normally and in peace.[1]

This happy situation did not long survive the saint. In 615, Shahin and his troops crossed the whole of Asia Minor, invested Chalcedon and took it the following year after a long siege. The Persians camped at Chalcedon and Chrysopolis in full view of the capital, which was protected from their advance by the narrow strait of the Bosphorus. Although they were soon forced to withdraw, the extent and duration of the campaign suggest that the defences of Asia Minor had collapsed.

In 617, attack came from a new direction, when the Persians made a landing on Cyprus, threatening the last remaining outpost of the Empire in the eastern Mediterranean. This event, which has not generally been recognized, deserves some attention. The life of John the Almsgiver, the Cypriot patriarch of Alexandria, records that the saint abandoned his see when it was about to be taken by the Persians and set out for Constantinople. When he arrived at Rhodes, however, John decided to return to Cyprus because of a premonition of his own death. There he found a general named Aspagourios attacking Constantia, the capital of the island; Aspagourios had been sent against the city and begun to attack it after failing to reach an understanding with its inhabitants. The providential arrival of the saint relieved the crisis, for he was able to arrange a peaceful settlement. The narrative evidently describes a Persian attack on the island: the name of the general is Persian and his actions were hostile. It would thus appear that Chosroes, like his ancestors, had equipped a fleet in Phoenicia or Cilicia and used it in an attempt to establish his control of the sea. The saint's life does not indicate whether the Persians had any success, nor does it describe the peaceful settlement which the saint arranged. The subsequent narrative of John's life, which ended soon after, does, however, suggest that Persian occupation, if it took place, did not extend to his native Amathus, to which he retired.[2]

1. Prediction to the patriarch: *Vita Theod. Syc.*, capp. 134, 135; prediction to the brethren: *ibid.* cap. 153; invasions at the beginning of the reign of Focas, *ibid.* cap. 120. The raid of the Lazi into Cappadocia mentioned there is not otherwise known, nor is the revolt of Sergius which appears in the same chapter and with which George of Cappadocia of cap. 125 may have been connected. Prediction to the brethren: cap. 129. In view of this contemporary evidence, the statement often found that the Persians penetrated to Chalcedon during the reign of Focas is to be discounted. It appears in Theophanes *Chronographia*, ed. C. de Boor (1883), p. 296 (Focas, yr. 6 = xi.608–xi. 609) and Michael the Syrian, *Chronicle*, ed. J. B. Chabot (Paris, 1904), ii. 379 (Heraclius, yr. 1 = x.610–x.611), who both report an attack on Armenia, Galatia, Cappadocia and Paphlagonia which reached as far as Chalcedon. Since this would have had to pass through the area where the saint lived and worked, it is incredible that no mention of it should have appeared in his life. The sources have presumably retrojected one of the later sieges of Chalcedon, perhaps because of their hostility to Focas and desire to glorify his successor.

2. Aspagourios at Constantia: H. Delehaye, 'Une vie inédite de Saint Jean l'aumonier', *Anal. Boll.* xlv (1927), 25 cap. 13. The life contains no other mention of the Persians

For the events of the following several years, the sources are exceptionally poor. Syrian and Armenian writers become considerably less informative when their homelands were no longer the main theatre of war and the Greek chronicles are particularly meagre for the years before the epic expeditions of Heraclius into Persia. Consequently, there is little information in the literary sources about Asia Minor for the years in which it lay open to Persian attack. The next recorded event is the capture of Ancyra in 620 or 622. It was soon followed by a more remarkable conquest, that of the island of Rhodes, which the Persians took in 622 or 623.[1] These two events alone suggest that the invasions continued with vigour. Ancyra was an important military base, and its conquest would have given the Persians control over the most important highway between Constantinople and the east. Rhodes, similarly, controlled the passage by sea round southwest Asia Minor. If the Persians had a naval force sufficient to capture it, they might be in a position to menace the rich Ionian coast, or even the capital. The sources do not record how or whence Rhodes was taken. The Persians' nearest naval base would have been in Cilicia; passage from there to Rhodes might imply that they had gained control of, or ravaged, the rich and fertile plain of Pamphylia.

Only the attack on Ancyra is illuminated by contemporary sources. According to the life of Saint Theodore of Syceon, a certain holy man named Leontius lived in a village in western Galatia not far from the military highway. His piety was so great that he received the divine gift of prophecy, by which he could predict the invasion and his own death: Leontius was martyred by the Persians when he refused to leave his cell. This presumably took place when the Persians attacked Ancyra, and may be taken to show that their forces penetrated into the countryside. In the same period, a monk of the Holy Land named Antiochus, a native of Galatia, wrote a book of 130 homilies for his friend Eustathius, abbot of the monastery of Attalina in Ancyra. In the prefatory epistle, he

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in Cyprus. For John's departure from Alexandria and arrival at Rhodes, see *Leontios' von Neapolis Leben des heiligen Johannes des Barmherzigen*, ed. H. Gelzer (1893), 91 cap. 44b. On Aspagourios, see Sir G. Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, i (1940) 281 f., where the curious suggestion is made that he must have been a Byzantine officer because a Persian expedition across the sea would have been unprecedented. But the text may be used as evidence that the Persians did cross the sea, as they must have done a few years later when they captured Rhodes.

1. Theophanes, p. 320 (Ancyra only); *Chronicum miscellaneum ad a.d. 724 pertinens*, ed. I. B. Chabot, C[orpus] S[criptorum] C[hristianorum] O[rientalium], S[criptores] S[yri] iii. 4, *Chronica minora* ii. 3 (Paris, 1903), p. 113; Michael the Syrian, ii. 408; *Chronicum anonymum ad a.d. 1234 pertinens*, ed. I. B. Chabot, CSCO, SS iii, 14 (1937), p. 180; Agapius of Membidj, *Historie universelle*, ed. A. Vasiliev (Paris, 1909), p. 198; Bar Hebraeus, *Chronographia*, ed. W. Budge (Oxford, 1932), p. 89. According to Theophanes, Ankara was taken in 620, while the oriental sources give 622/3. Agapius records that the inhabitants of Ancyra were killed or enslaved, and *Chron. 724* that the Persians captured a Byzantine general in Rhodes and deported part of the population.

explained the circumstances which prompted him to compose the work. The abbot of Ancyra was afflicted with much trouble, being forced to move from place to place for fear of the 'Chaldean storm'. He suffered hunger and thirst, particularly for the word of God, since he could not carry a library with him, nor find books in the places where he was taking refuge. Antiochus, therefore, composed for him a summary of the doctrines of the Old and New Testaments. The work is dated to 620–8; the 'Chaldean storm' is the Persian invasion, and this unique glimpse into the disturbances which it caused is of the highest value.[1]

The next phase of the war was dominated by the remarkable and ultimately successful incursions of Heraclius into the heart of the Persian empire. These epic campaigns focus the attention of the sources and little is heard of Asia Minor. On 5 April 622, the first expedition began when the emperor set sail for Pylae in Bithynia and proceeded to central Asia Minor, perhaps Caesarea. After skirmishes with the Persians, who had taken up winter quarters somewhere in the Pontus, Heraclius won a victory, left his army to winter in Armenia, and returned to the capital.[2] On 15 March 623, he set out on the great series of campaigns which lasted five years and brought total victory to the Byzantines. He spent Easter in Nicomedia, marched to Caesarea, and then into Persian Armenia, which he ravaged during the following year. In 625, a Byzantine army appeared in Mesopotamia for the first time since 609; descending through Martyropolis and Amida, Heraclius crossed the Euphrates at Samosata and moved into Cilicia, where he rested his troops and horses at Adana. The Persian general Shahrbaraz, who had been following the Byzantine force in its attack on territory occupied by the Persians, pitched his camp next to the Sarus river when he saw that the bridge across it with its defending towers were occupied by the Byzantines. The battle which followed seems to have been a draw; Heraclius withdrew to Cappadocia, still followed by Shahrbaraz.[3] In the following year, Heraclius sailed to Lazica to

1. Leontius: *Vita Theod. Syr.* cap. 49; note that the martyrdom of Leontius could equally well have taken place during the Persian attack on Chalcedon in 615, when Shahin presumably passed along the highway through Galatia; the source provides no indication of chronology. Antiochus: Migne, *Patrologia graeca* lxxxix. 1421–8; Antiochus himself was also forced to move continuously by the same 'Chaldaean storm', *ibid.* 1628.

2. For the first campaign, see Theophanes 302–6, mostly paraphrased from the vapid and prolix *Expeditio Persica* of George of Pisidia. It does not appear in Nicephorus or any of the oriental sources. The geographical indications of Theophanes and Pisides are so vague that the ingenuity of the modern commentators has been mostly wasted. The summary indications here are based on discussions with Professor N. Oikonomides of the University of Montreal, who has prepared an analysis of this campaign which will appear shortly. I am grateful to Professor Oikonomides for his generous help.

3. Theophanes, p. 312–14; Sebeos, p. 83. The mention of Adana has given rise to much discussion. In the first place, Theophanes relates that Heraclius passed Adana and came to the Sarus, while the city is in fact west of the river, and the Byzantines were coming from the east. This is merely the carelessness which may be expected from such a mediocre compiler. More serious at first sight is the objection that Adana is far from

raise support among the Khazars; he embarked at Trebizond, the major port of the Black Sea, a place which seems to have escaped Persian attack.[1] At the same time, the Persians again crossed all Asia Minor for a great onslaught on the capital in alliance with the Avars. This attack, which was prosecuted by the Avars alone, since the Persians had no means of crossing the Bosphorus, was a complete failure; Shahrbaraz and the Persians soon withdrew, though they may have spent the winter at Chalcedon.[2] At the time of the last campaign of the war (627–628) in which Heraclius advanced within a few miles of Ctesiphon and gained complete victory, Shahrbaraz and the last Persian forces left Asia Minor, never to return. After revolution in Persia, Shahrbaraz came to a meeting with Heraclius at Arabissus in the Antitaurus in July 629 and made the final agreement for the evacuation of the conquered lands in return for Byzantine assistance in his own attempt to seize the Persian throne.[3] The Persians then crossed the Euphrates and withdrew behind the frontiers of Maurice and Chosroes after twenty-five years of constant warfare.

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any route from Germanicea to Cappadocia, which had been the original goal of Heraclius. His plan is clear from Theophanes, p. 312, which describes the choice of two roads from Lake Van: either through Taranton, a shorter route but with fewer supplies, or the Mesopotamian route actually taken. Both of these would lead more or less directly to Cappadocia. W. M. Ramsay in *The Historical Geography of Asia Minor* (London, 1890), p. 311, proposed with his usual ingenuity to emend the text by replacing the offending Adana with Adata, a place supposedly on the route from Germanicea to Arabissus and Caesarea or Sebaste. This suggestion, which has commanded some following, is to be rejected. In the first place, Adata had not been definitely located in Ramsay's day, as is apparent from his remarks, pp. 277 f. and 301. The town is in fact identical with the al-Ḥadath of the Arabs, located on the road between Germanicea and Melitene, near a pass which gives access to Arabissus: see R. Hartmann, 'Al-Ḥadaṭ al-Ḥamrā', *Istanbuler Forschungen*, xvii (1950), 40–50; *cf.* S. Ory in *Encyclopedia of Islam s.v.* 'al-Ḥadath'. Such a location would be inappropriate for a march between Germanicea and Cappadocia, and lies nowhere near the Sarus. In fact mention of the bridge and its *propyrgia*, evidently an important structure, confirms Adana as the site of the battle. That city was approached from the east by a famous stone bridge over the Sarus. It is therefore necessary to conclude that Heraclius did indeed descend into Cilicia, for reasons which the sources will only allow to be imagined. According to Theophanes, p. 314, the army wintered in the region of Sebastea; Sebeos maintains that they advanced further and took up their winter quarters in what his translator renders as the 'régions des Asiatiques', whatever that means, while Stephen of Taron, trans. H. Gelzer and A. Burckhardt (1907), p. 84, more specifically reveals that Heraclius marched with his whole army through Caesarea to Amasia to give his troops rest. If the army were large and had to be scattered over a large area of the barren hills of Cappadocia, it might be possible to suppose that all the sources are correct.

1. Theophanes, p. 315 f. For Trebizond, see A. A. Vasiliev, 'Notes on the History of Trebizond in the Seventh Century', *Eis Mnemen Spyridonos Lamprou* (Athens, 1935), 29–34 and *cf.* Stratos, p. 365, n. xv.

2. For the siege of Constantinople, see *Chron. Pasch.* 715–27 and the wordy contemporary account of the monk Theodore in L. Sternbach, *Analecta Avarica* (Cracow, 1900) 2–24. According to Theodore, p. 17 f., Shahrbaraz left Chalcedon soon after the Avar defeat, a statement directly contradicted by Theophanes, pp. 316, 319 (Chosroes summoned Shahrbaraz from Chalcedon when he was attacked by Heraclius), and p. 323 (a letter of Chosroes to Kardarigas, the colleague of Shahrbaraz at Chalcedon); *cf.* Stratos, pp. 231–3.

3. Sebeos, p. 88, *Chronicum miscellaneum ad a.d. 724 pertinens*, p. 114.

Such is the evidence of the literary sources, which provide a bare outline. They show that it took the Persians ten years of hard fighting to establish their supremacy on the marches of Asia Minor, although they had already broken through into central Anatolia and occupied Caesarea for a year. After the defeats of Heraclius near Antioch in 613, they were free to overrun Asia Minor, but concentrated their attacks instead on the richer regions to the south. Only in 615 did they cross the peninsula to attack and conquer Chalcedon, an achievement which they repeated in 626. The intervening decade, which would be of the greatest interest for the present question, is the most obscure. During that time, however, it is at least apparent that the Persians were able to advance by land to take Ancyra and ravage Cappadocia and Galatia, and by sea to attack Cyprus and conquer Rhodes. Their forces were in Cappadocia to harass the efforts of Heraclius in 622 and 625, and seem to have been in firm control of Mesopotamia. There is no indication, however, that they planned or accomplished the occupation of the interior or the west of Anatolia; only their capture of Ancyra suggests that they may have desired to retain control over the main military highway across the peninsula.

The incursions into Asia Minor seem to have been raids as much as invasions, but raids of a particularly destructive kind. The Persians are reported to have massacred and enslaved the local populations – Caesarea, Chalcedon, Ancyra, and Rhodes are specifically mentioned – and on occasion to have burned the cities.[1] The isolated indications of such occurrences accord well with the violent and barbaric tone of the war, in which the Persians indulged in slaughter and deportation on a large scale.[2] Nor did the Byzantines behave much differently; when Heraclius entered Persian territory, he burned the cities and villages in his path, and took vast numbers of prisoners.[3] Here, as in the general narrative, the literary sources provide a mere outline which invites much speculation, but use of other kinds of evidence which have rarely been consulted in this context may preclude such an effort of the imagination.

Important supplementary evidence of two kinds is provided by numismatics: the location of Byzantine mints during the Persian

1. Caesarea: *supra*, p. 723; Chalcedon: Michael the Syrian ii. 406 and *supra*, p. 727, n. 2; Ancyra and Rhodes: *supra*, p. 725f.
2. Persian devastations: Sebeos, pp. 58, 63 (deportations in Armenia); *Chronicum anonymum ad a. Chr. 1234 pertinens*, p. 180 (plundering and enslavement in Mesopotamia); Stratos, pp. 109-11 (massacre and pillage in Jerusalem); A. J. Butler, *The Arab Conquest of Egypt* (Oxford, 1902) pp. 71-89 (massacres in Egypt). Naturally, since most of the sources were written by natives of the places which were conquered, a considerable amount of exaggeration may be expected; but some of the deportations are confirmed by the statement of Theophanes, p. 322, that Heraclius found a large multitude of captives from Edessa, Alexandria and other cities when he took Dastagerd, the residence of Chosroes.
3. Theophanes, pp. 307 f., 322.

war, and the existence of hoards of coins and other treasure.[1] Before the war, bronze coinage for use in Asia Minor was struck at three mints: Nicomedia and Cyzicus in the northwest and Antioch in the southeast. Antioch, occupied by the Persians since 610, struck no coins during the reign of Heraclius. The others functioned only briefly: Cyzicus was closed in 616 and Nicomedia in 619; both of them reopened in 625/6.[2] This phenomenon fits well into the pattern of events during the war, and provides some embellishment to the narrative. The two Anatolian mints were closed either because the respective cities fell to the Persians, or because the situation in Asia Minor was so disturbed that the circulation of money was rendered impossible. Both alternatives imply that imperial control of Asia Minor was seriously impaired during the war, but there is no supplementary information to justify a choice between them. The cities may have been taken by the Persians, but the fact that Nicomedia continued to strike coins as late as 619 shows that Shahin's penetration to Chalcedon in 615 was of limited effect. Although he might ostentatiously threaten the capital across a narrow stretch of water, he had left the greatest fortified city of the region unconquered behind him. Similarly, the reopening of both mints in 625/6 shows that imperial control had been re-established in northwest Asia Minor if not elsewhere by that time, and suggests that the campaign of Shahrbaraz to Chalcedon in 626 was an exceptional effort from a distance rather than the natural corollary of the occupation of nearby territories. It would seem that the expeditions of Heraclius had effectively removed the Persian threat from western Asia Minor.

The creation of new mints during the war also casts new light on the war. Coins were struck in Seleucia of Isauria (the modern Silifke on the Mediterranean coast, about seventy miles west of Tarsus) in 616 and 617, and at Isaura, far inland in the Taurus, in 618.[3] Seleucia had been an important military base in late Antiquity, the seat of the count of Isauria who had both civil and military jurisdiction over the area. Yes it had never functioned as a provincial mint, and the striking of coins here, when other mints had been closed, must have been the result of special circumstances. In 613, the Persians had occupied Cilicia. The existence of the mint shows that they had not penetrated as far west along the coast as Seleucia five years later, and suggests that the city had become the centre of Byzantine resistance in the area. The most probable explanation for the creation of such a mint would be one of military necessity; large

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1. Coins found at excavations will be treated below in a discussion of the archaeological evidence.

2. P. Grierson, *Catalogue of the Byzantine Coins in the Dumbarton Oaks Collection*, II. 1 (Washington, 1968), p. 231 (henceforth, '*DO Catalogue*').

3. For what follows, see P. Grierson, 'The Isaurian Coins of Heraclius', *Numismatic Chronicle*, 1951, 56–57 and *DO Catalogue*, pp. 39, 327–31.

numbers of troops were presumably stationed at Seleucia, perhaps because it had a large garrison as the main port and army base in southeast Anatolia, or perhaps because an expedition against the Persians was being prepared there. With its location on the south coast, Seleucia could protect the waterways which led westward to Pamphylia, Rhodes and the Aegean, and serve as a base for maintaining imperial control in Cyprus. The circumstances which caused the mint to close after such a brief operation were probably analogous to those which affected the other Anatolian mints. The city was seriously threatened or taken by the Persians; by 622 or 623, in any case, they were able to take Rhodes, and it is probably not a coincidence that their only recorded expedition against Cyprus took place in the year in which the mint of Seleucia was closed.

The mint of Isaura, which only functioned for one year, appears to have been the successor to that of Seleucia. Its brief activity suggests that the Byzantine headquarters had been withdrawn to the mountains after the failure of their effort on the coast, and that any major enterprise in the area was soon abandoned. This may have been the result of Persian conquest, or of more pressing needs elsewhere. The last ephemeral mint was in Cyprus, presumably at Constantia, the capital. It operated for three years, 626/7–628/9.[1] Its existence also suggests that a major military effort was taking place, either the reconquest of the island (if it had in fact been taken by the Persians), or the strategic use of it as a base against the Persians during the last stages of the war. Here, too, new information is forthcoming, and the mint of Cyprus may show that the great effort of Heraclius in the 620s was not confined to the spectacular campaigns deep into Persia, but also included a naval offensive based on Cyprus.

The other numismatic evidence comes from hoards of coins, with which other treasures may be included. In antique times, valuables were frequently buried for a variety of reasons. In the normal course of events, these would be dug up by their owners, but during a war the owners might be killed or prevented from returning to their land.[2] Under those circumstances, a larger number of hoards than normal would remain in the ground; the presence, therefore, of an exceptional number of hidden treasures may in itself be taken to indicate disturbed conditions. Finds of hoards from the time of Heraclius thus serve to illustrate the conditions which prevailed during the war.

Hoards of coins and other valuables have been found in several parts of Asia Minor. A treasure consisting of a silver candlestick, a

1. DO *Catalogue*, pp. 41, 330 f.
2. P. Grierson, in 'Two Byzantine Coin Hoards of the Seventh and Eighth Centuries at Dumbarton Oaks', *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* xix (1965), 216, n. 10, notes that it is more correct to speak of 'failure to recover' than 'burial' when dealing with coin hoards.

lampdish and two bowls was buried at Lampsacus on the Dardanelles during the reign of Heraclius.[1] Two large hoards of gold coins were hidden about 615 in the region of Aydın in the Maeander valley, far in the west of Asia Minor.[2] Hiding of such treasures so far from the recorded scenes of fighting suggests that insecurity was widespread after the frontier defences had collapsed; the Aydın hoards are contemporary with the capture of Chalcedon, which could in itself have inspired fear throughout the peninsula. It is also possible that the Persians actually ravaged the districts in question.

Other hoards come from areas known to have been involved in the fighting.[3] A group of solidi datable to c. 613 was found near Euchaita, a day west of Amasia on a road which led from the Pontus to Gangra and Ancyra.[4] Euchaita had been established as a city and fortified by Anastasius, and soon rose to become an important centre of the region because of its location on a major highway and especially because of the famous church it contained in which Saint Theodore was buried.[5] The location of the city exposed it to the onslaughts of the enemy, who could have attacked it any time after 613, and may have passed through it in their progress to Chalcedon.

A hoard of copper coins found in the hills north of Germanicea (Marash) above the road which led from there to Arabissus was buried in about 630, at the time of the Persian evacuation of the country. It contains 109 coins, of which the thirty-six of Heraclius form a continuous sequence through the seventh year of his reign (616/7). This is followed by a gap until the latest coin, of 629/30. The absence of coins for the intervening period is to be explained by Persian occupation of the region after 617, and its removal from the

1. The latest object in the treasure can be dated to the period 613–30, but not more precisely, on the basis of imperial stamps; see E. Dodd, *Byzantine Silver Stamps* (1961) nos. 19, 24, 52, 53.

2. S. Mosser, *A Bibliography of Byzantine Coin Hoards, Numismatic Notes and Monographs*, lxvii (New York, 1935), 8, and the detailed study of P. Grierson (*supra* p. 730, n. 2), pp. 207–19).

3. Two gold encolpia of c. 600 found at Adana and presumably part of a larger treasure are perhaps also to be associated with the war, but the lack of detail about the find makes accuracy impossible. They were published by J. Strzygowski in *Das Etschmiadzin-Evangeliar* (Vienna, 1891) pp. 99–112 and dated on stylistic grounds. In this same category may be included a hoard of Byzantine copper coins datable to c. 617, but of uncertain provenance. It was purchased in Izmir, the centre of the antiquities trade in western Asia Minor and is stated only to have come from 'Anatolia'; see R. Bridge and P. Whitting, 'A Hoard of Early Heraclius Folles', *Numismatic Circular*, lxxiv (1966), 131–2, 183.

4. Mosser, p. 53, recorded as being from Medjid Eüsü, Adana Vilayet. The hoard was never published, but only noted on the basis of a communication from Regling. No place named Mecit Özü *vel sim.* exists in the region of Adana; the only place of that name is a fairly large town near Çorum. I have therefore assigned the hoard to the latter and supposed that a simple mistake in recording had taken place.

5. On Euchaita, see J. G. C. Anderson, *Studia Pontica*, i (Brussels, 1903), 7–11, and for its foundation, C. Mango and I. Ševčenko, 'Three Inscriptions of the Reigns of Anastasius and Constantine V', *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, lxv (1972), 379–84.

zone of circulation of Byzantine coins.[1] Such a supposition agrees well with the other evidence. When Heraclius passed through Germanicea in 625, he was making an expedition through enemy territory, and was closely followed by a Persian force. In 629, after Heraclius' victory, Arabissus was chosen as the meeting place between the emperor and Shahrbaraz to arrange for the withdrawal of Persian troops from the occupied territory. The natural place for such a meeting would be a town on the frontier, which may thus be set in the Antitaurus.

Finds from the regions immediately adjacent to Asia Minor also reflect the troubles associated with the Persian war.[2] A treasure of gold jewellery, silver plates, spoons and liturgical objects found in Lesbos also contained thirty-two solidi, twenty-eight of them issued by Heraclius and datable to the time of the war. They were buried next to a church, and may either indicate an immediate Persian threat to the island, or have been hidden, perhaps, by a refugee from the mainland opposite.[3] A large hoard of Byzantine copper datable to about 617 was uncovered at Paphos in Cyprus.[4] The date of its burial coincides with that of the attack mentioned in the life of Saint John the Almsgiver, while the presence of coins of Seleucia shows that contact was maintained between that base and the island, and suggests that the establishment of the mint on the mainland may have been connected with an effort to retain control over Cyprus. Other coin finds from Cyprus seem to show that the island remained within the area of circulation of Byzantine coins, and was therefore probably not occupied by the Persians.[5] The second of the great treasures

1. The hoard, from Sarıgüzel Köy in the district of Suleymanli, vilayet of Maraş, is unpublished. My thanks to Bayan Nekriman Olçay, of the Istanbul Archaeological Museum, for allowing me to inspect the coins. I am indebted to Professor Grierson for their interpretation.

2. For coin finds of the time of Heraclius from Greece, Syria and Palestine, see the references in D. Metcalf, 'The Aegean Coastlands under Threat: some Coins and Coin Hoards from the Reign of Heraclius', *Annual of the British School at Athens*, lvii (1962), 14–23. To them might be added A. R. Bellinger, *Coins from Jerash 1928–1934*, *Numismatic Notes and Monographs*, lxxxi (New York, 1938), p. 116–19; the coins there form a continuous sequence through 612/3, with one of a type struck from 616–23, and no others until Constans II. The finds, which included one dirhem of Chosroes II, reflect the Persian occupation of the area after 613 by their lack of coins of Heraclius.

3. The treasure is published by Z. Vavritsas, 'Anaskafe Krategou Mytilenes', *Praktika tes en Athenais Arkhaiologikes Hetairias* (1954), pp. 317–29. The coins are illustrated in Fig. 2, p. 318, but so poorly that it is difficult to distinguish their type, and therefore their chronology. Most of the Heraclian solidi seem to belong to Class 1 (610–13), IIA (613–*c.* 616) and IIB (616–25 ?; see *DO Catalogue*, pp. 221–3 for the classification), which would suggest a date not much later than 616 for the deposit. The latest silver objects have stamps of Heraclius, 613–30: Dodd, nos. 32, 40–43, 48–50. The treasure was found at Krategos, eight kilometres south of the town of Mitylene, on the coast opposite the Aeolian mainland.

4. P. Donald and P. Whitting, 'A VIIth Century Hoard from Cyprus', *NCirc*, lxxv (1967), 162–5, 204.

5. The coins found at Curium, for example, though limited in number, show a fairly continuous sequence through the reign of Heraclius: D. H. Cox, *Coins from the Excavations at Curium, 1932–1953*, *Numismatic Notes and Monographs*, cxlv (1959), 80 f. Compare

found near Kyrenia on the north coast of Cyprus is possibly also to be associated with the Persian war. It included jewellery, silver plates and liturgical objects, and gold medallions and coins. Stamps on the plates show that the latest objects are datable to the middle of the reign of Heraclius, 613–30. The treasure was probably buried by refugees fleeing from the Persian invasion of Syria or Egypt, or perhaps by local Cypriots who feared the Persian advance on their island. The latter alternative seems less likely because of the richness of the treasure.[1]

Armenia and Georgia both saw heavy fighting during the war, particularly in its early stages when the Persians were establishing their control, and towards the end, when Heraclius marched through the region. Hoards from the Caucasus bear witness to some of these events. Four deposits from the valley of the Araxes, which provides the main passageway between Persia and Armenia, are datable to the reign of Heraclius, probably to the later campaigns; two of them contain Sassanian coins as well.[2] A hoard of 800 silver coins, mostly of Chosroes II and Heraclius, came from Tiflis, a city besieged by Heraclius and the Khazars in 626 and subsequently devastated by the Khazars alone.[3]

Most interesting, perhaps, is the enormous hoard of some 2000 gold coins buried around 613 at the village of Chibati in western

the large hoard from Kharacha, which, though the earliest coin is of 630, contains many pieces overstruck on earlier issues of Heraclius: A. Dikigoropoulos, 'A Byzantine Hoard from Kharacha, Cyprus', *NC* (1956), 255–65. The coins of Heraclius in a hoard from Cyrenia buried in the reign of Constans II begin only in 626; A. Megaw, 'A Seventh Century Byzantine Hoard', *Report of the Department of Antiquities, Cyprus, 1937–1939* (Nicosia, 1951), pp. 210–11. This is probably to be explained by the limited amount of time which coins stayed in circulation, rather than by any supposition of Byzantine reoccupation after a Persian conquest.

1. The bibliography on the Cyprus treasures is extensive. See O. Dalton, 'A Second Silver Treasure from Cyprus', *Archaeologia*, lx (1906), 1–24 and M. Ross, 'A Byzantine Gold Medallion at Dumbarton Oaks', *DOP*, xi (1957), 247–61 with the bibliography, p. 248, n. 10. For discussion of the objects of interest here, see P. Grierson, 'The Kyrenia Girdle of Byzantine Medallions and Solidi', *NC* (1955), 55–70, where the suggestion is made that the treasure may have been buried by refugees during the Persian wars. This theory receives strong support from the sources, which reveal that many people fled with their treasure before the Persian advance. See, for example, 'Vie de saint Jean l'Aumonier' (*supra*, p. 724, n. 2) caps. 6, 11, 12 (refugees from Syria and Palestine to Alexandria), and *Chronicon Anonymum*, ed. I. Guidi, *CSCO, Ser. Syr.* iii. 4 (1903), p. 23 (ships leave Alexandria with the treasures of the church and the leaders of the city, but are blown by an ill wind to the Persian camp). The treasure is apparently to be dated by the stamps on the plates, of which the latest are of Heraclius, 613–30: Dodd, nos. 33, 54, 58–66.

2. V. V. Kropotkin, *Klady Vizantiiskikh Monet na Teritorii SSSR* (Moscow, 1962), nos. 365 from Dvin (136 Sassanian silver coins, 84 Byzantine silver, latest of Heraclius), 366 from Dvin (Byzantine: 31 gold, 115 silver, 18 copper, latest of Heraclius), 370 = Mosser 42 from Iğdir, now in Turkey (17 silver of Heraclius), 388 = Mosser 29 (20–30 silver of Heraclius). Hoards containing silver coins cannot be dated precisely because the coins bore the same type from 613 to 638.

3. Kropotkin, no. 454 = Mosser, p. 88 (700–800 silver of Hormisdas IV, Chosroes II and Heraclius). For Heraclius' activities in the Caucasus, see Stratos, pp. 197–203.

Georgia.[1] The site lies at the southern end of the Colchian plain not far from the road which leads from the coast at Vathys (Batum) to Tiflis. Burial of the coins suggests that danger was felt in this region. In 613, the most probable threat would have been a Persian invasion; the coins do not reveal whether this was a threat or a reality, but their presence may provide new information on the obscure history of Georgia during the Persian war. Like Armenia, Georgia saw the establishment of Roman supremacy under Maurice, when the country was divided and the Persians, who had previously been dominant, were confined to Tiflis and the country to the east. Stephen, prince of Georgia from c. 590 to 627, went over to the Persian side during the war for reasons not stated. The hoard from Chibati may suggest that his adherence to the cause of Chosroes was not entirely voluntary and that the Persians around 613 attacked to the west, towards the sea, as they had done in Armenia.[2]

The evidence of the coins and other treasures may be used to illustrate and supplement the literary sources. In Asia Minor, they show that Seleucia functioned as a centre of Byzantine resistance after the loss of Cilicia, and that when it was itself taken, imperial headquarters for the region were removed to Isaura. After 618, the Persians would appear to have gained supremacy in the Taurus region and along the south coast. The reality of the Persian danger throughout the peninsula may be deduced from the hoards found as far west as the Dardanelles, Lesbos and the Maeander valley, and by the closing of the mints of Cyzicus and Nicomedia. The chronology of the hoards and mint closings shows that the Persian menace was severely felt as early as 615 and that it grew in intensity for the rest of the decade. The danger naturally came earlier in the east; Euchaita was threatened or taken in 613. The threats or conquests, however, were the results of raids. The area north of Marash in the Antitaurus, which seems to have formed the limit of Persian conquest, was not occupied until 617. It was thereafter held continuously until the end of the war. As Heraclius progressed from one victory to another in the Caucasus and Persia, the Byzantines regained their hold on the western provinces and were able to reopen the mints in 625/6.

The finds also provide important information about the surrounding areas which were involved in the war. Cyprus, in spite of its contact with the base at Seleucia, suffered invasion in 617, as

1. Kropotkin, no. 475, from Chibati in the district of Lanchkhuti. Of the original hoard, 124 are preserved in the Tiflis museum and catalogued; the date of the hoard may be determined from them. See T. Abramshvili, *Byzantine Coins in the Georgian National Museum* (Tiflis, 1965, in Georgian), p. 63 and pl. xii.

2. For the history of Georgia in this period, see the chronicle of Juansher, translated by M. Brosset as *Histoire de la Géorgie*, i (St. Petersburg, 1849) 214–26, and the detailed treatment of C. Toumanoff, *Studies in Christian Caucasian History* (Washington, 1963), pp. 383–92. The history of western Georgia at the time seems to be completely unknown.

confirmed by the Paphos hoard. It may not have fallen to the Persians, but have instead functioned as a centre for refugees from other provinces who may have deposited the Kyrenia treasure. By 626, the island was in Byzantine hands and apparently being used as an advance post for the reconquest of the lost provinces, as shown by the establishment of a mint there. Evidence from the Caucasus produces similar results. Several large hoards were buried in areas where fighting took place during the campaigns of Heraclius, while the Chibati hoard may show that the Persians advanced toward the west in Georgia as they had in Armenia.

Even more important than the numismatic evidence is that of the archaeological record. Remains of numerous cities which were inhabited during the war survive, and have in many cases been investigated and even published. It is sometimes possible, usually because of coin finds, to establish a fairly accurate chronology of the remains, and thus to consider the condition of some of the most important cities of Asia Minor during the Persian war. In other cases, the chronology is less certain, but probabilities may be established. The results of an investigation of the archaeological evidence are striking and offer important new information on the extent and nature of the war and provide vivid illustration of the effects which it had on a rich and previously peaceful region. Individual sites will be considered here in approximate order of their importance and the accuracy of the chronology which has been established for their remains.

Ancyra, the metropolis of Galatia and one of the most strategic road centres of the Anatolian plateau, provides the only instance of a clear correlation between the archaeological and literary evidence. Since the site is covered by a large and flourishing modern city – Ankara, the capital of Turkey – its classical and late antique buildings and extent are poorly known. One important structure, however, has been excavated and is of immediate interest, a large bath at the northern edge of the city. The elaborate bathing establishment contained the usual complement of rooms for hot and cold baths and faced onto a large colonnaded palaestra. The buildings, which may have been erected in the time of Caracalla, were in use throughout late Antiquity; in the late third century, after invasions of the Goths and Zenobia, they were included within the circuit of a new city wall, which ran immediately to the north.[1] They were eventually destroyed by fire and left in ruins; layers of ashes and debris were

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1. For the excavations and history of the baths, see N. Dolunay, 'Çankırıkapı Hafriyatı', *Belleten*, v (1941) 261–6; an excellent series of plans may be found in M. Akok, 'Ankara Şehrindeki Roma Hamamı', *Turk Arkeoloji Dergisi*, xvii (1968), 5–37. The walls are known from a series of inscriptions which may be found most conveniently in E. Bosch, *Quellen zur Geschichte der Stadt Ankara in Altertum* (Ankara, 1967), nos. 289–93. For their course near the baths, see M. Akok, 'Ankara şehri içinde rastlanan İlkcağ yerlesmeşinden bazi izler ve üç arastırma yeri', *Belleten*, xix (1955) 316 f.

found over the whole site. Significantly, an agate ring-stone of Sassanian make was discovered in the debris.[1] This provides a hint which is confirmed by the coins from the site. The coins, abundant through the late fourth century, provide thereafter a small but continuous sequence through the second type of follis of Heraclius, last struck in 615/6. Afterwards, the site was abandoned; the following two and a half centuries are represented by only four coins.[2] The conclusion is obvious: the destruction of the baths, and presumably of other parts of the city within the walls, was the result of the Persian capture of Ancyra in about 620.[3] The city eventually rose from its ashes, but in a different form; medieval Ankara consisted of the large and imposing fortress whose walls, made largely from the ruins of the ancient city, dominate the Turkish capital. These fortifications have been attributed to the time of Constans II (641–68) on the grounds of historical probability.[4] The new evidence from the baths may be taken to confirm this dating. Ancyra thus provides the first case of tangible evidence of the destruction wrought by the armies of Chosroes.

The most outstanding archaeological evidence comes from Sardis, the capital of the province of Lydia in western Asia Minor. In late Antiquity, the city was a large and flourishing metropolis, a seat of government and industry as well as a military base and the home of a philosophical school. The prosperity of the age has been well revealed by the recent excavations which have shown that a considerable amount of rebuilding and new construction took place in the fourth and fifth centuries.[5] The city stretched for about two kilo-

1. The debris and ring stone are mentioned by R. Arık in 'Les résultats des fouilles faites à Ankara par la société d'histoire turque', La Turquie kemaliste, xxi/xxii (Dec. 1937), 50 f. The stone is not illustrated.

2. It is possible that the abandonment of a settlement on the outskirts of the city may have been due to the Persian attack. The excavations of Etiyokuşu, a bronze age site five kilometres north of Ankara, revealed a building, or complex of buildings, which contained several connected rooms. One of them was evidently a kitchen; others contained huge storage vases and cisterns. The whole was possibly a villa in the country-side or a small settlement on a hill; the ruins were illustrated but not described: see Ş. Kansu, Etiyokuşu Hafriyatı (Ankara, 1940) pl. xi, figs. 33–37, p. 28. Thirty coins were found in the buildings; of them, two were of the third century and two Ottoman. The rest were late antique, in a sequence which ended with the late sixth or early seventh century; certainly cannot be attained, since the coins were not published in detail: Kansu, pp. 31 f.

3. The coins have not been published, but are on deposit in the Museum of Anatolian Civilizations in Ankara, where I was able to examine them through the courtesy of the director, Bay Raci Temizer and numismatist Musa Kurum. I shall include a tabulation of them in a forthcoming article on 'Ankara in the Byzantine Age'.

4. For the fortifications, see the summary of M. Restle in Reallexikon zur byzantinischen Kunst, s.v. Ankyra, pp. 175 ff, and the detailed treatment of G. de Jerphanion, 'Mélanges d'archéologie anatolienne', Mélanges de l'université Saint Joseph, Beyrouth, xiii (1928), 144–219.

5. Most of the results of the present excavations, a joint expedition of Harvard and Cornell Universities directed by Professor G. M. A. Hanfmann, are so far available only as preliminary reports in the Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research, annually since 1959. In general, reference will be made not to these detailed reports,

metres along a highway which led east and west through the valley
of the Hermus. It also extended southward along the stream of the
Pactolus to the temple of Artemis, abandoned after the triumph of
Christianity.

The excavations have mostly concentrated on the western sections
of the city, near the highway and the Pactolus. Here, among other
remains, they have uncovered a large Roman gymnasium which
included a bath, an open exercise ground, and a hall which was
converted into a synagogue. A row of small shops was added in late
Antiquity to the side of the building which faced the highway. The
discovery of an exceptionally large number of copper coins in these
shops illustrates the commercial activity which took place in them.[1]
Inscriptions and architectural remains show that this gymnasium
complex, like other buildings in the city, was maintained and
restored from the fourth through the sixth centuries. The sequence
of the coins is uninterrupted until it comes to a sudden end with the
issues of 615/6. After that, there is a gap lasting into the reign of
Constans II (641–68).[2] The coins do not speak in isolation, but form
part of an archaeological context. The end of their sequence
coincides with and provides a date for extensive traces of burning
and destruction, which ruined both the gymnasium complex and a
late antique mansion south of the highway. In other parts of the site,
the sequence of coins stops with equal suddenness, even where the
traces of destruction are not evident. At the temple, for example, a
hoard of 216 copper coins, the latest of 615, was hidden in a sack
under a block of marble and never recovered.[3]

The evidence is clear and unambiguous: in 616, parts of the city
were destroyed by violence and others were abandoned. If this had
somehow been the result of a natural disaster, such as an earthquake,
the city could be expected to have recovered and risen from its ruins,
but such was not the case. In about 660, there was renewed activity
at Sardis. The highway through the centre of the city was rebuilt,
paved now with cobblestones instead of marble. It was constructed
directly over the ruins of the old colonnade and shops, and lime for

but to a forthcoming comprehensive survey, C. Foss, *Byzantine and Turkish Sardis,
Sardis Monograph* iv, in press (henceforth, *Byz. Sardis*). For Sardis in Late Antiquity,
see that work, caps. 1–4.

1. Gymnasium complex: *Byz. Sardis*, caps. 5 and 6; synagogue: A. Seager, 'The
building History of the Sardis Synagogue', *AJA*, lxxvi (1972), 425–35; coins: G. Bates,
Byzantine Coins, Sardis Monograph i (Cambridge, Mass., 1971) 149 f. (index of findspots).

2. Sequence of coins: Bates, p. 1 f. and catalogue; Agora: M. Thompson, *The
Athenian Agora* ii; *Coins* (Princeton, 1954), p. 70. For the significance of the coin finds at
Sardis and the methodology to be employed in studying them, as well as a more detailed
treatment of the material presented here, see C. Foss 'The Destruction of Sardis in 616
and the Value of Evidence', *Jahrbuch der Oesterreichischen Byzantinistik* (forthcoming).

3. Evidence of burning and destruction: *BASOR* cliv (1959), 16; clxxiv (1964), 29;
clxxxvii (1967), 57 (gymnasium); clxx (1963), 48; clxxxvii (1967), 14 (synagogue); clvii
(1960), 24 (house); cf. *Byz. Sardis*, cap. 7. Hoard from the temple: H. W. Bell, *Sardis
IX: The Coins* (Leyden, 1916), pp. vii f., 78–94.

its bedding was made in a kiln in one of the abandoned rooms of the gymnasium from the marble decoration of the complex. For over forty years one of the greatest buildings of the Roman and late antique city had lain in ruins, and no attempt was made to restore it.[1] At about the same time and probably as part of the same efforts of restoration, a strong fortress was erected on the steep acropolis of the city. A village subsequently grew up within it, and other settlements flourished over the field of ruins which had been ancient Sardis. The city had received a mortal blow in 616, and soon was transformed from an open, densely populated and prospering metropolis into a town of scattered settlements dominated by a high castle.[2]

The authors of the disaster of 616 are not far to seek. All the evidence suggests that the city was destroyed in war; the Persians are the obvious culprits. Here is visible illustration of the seriousness and savagery of the Persian onslaught. A great city was destroyed, never to recover its ancient glory. The later remains and the abandonment of most of the site suggest that the population had severely declined. Whether this was the result of the massacre and deportation of which the Persians stand accused in the sources, or of the flight of the population from the threatened areas, cannot be determined. The development, however, is clear: the open city of late Antiquity was replaced by a smaller fortified town. The initial impulse for this change came from the Persians.

The greatest city of Roman Asia Minor was Ephesus, the seat of the proconsul of Asia, a thriving port and commercial city. Much of the site has been excavated, but very few coins, which might be used to establish the chronology of the buildings, have been published. Information available, however, suggests that this great city, too, suffered severe damage at the time of the Persian attacks.[3] The centre of late antique Ephesus was a colonnaded street called the Embolos which ran in a depression between two ridges from the main marketplace, the Agora, in the direction of the civic centre, the Upper Agora. The street was lined with monuments and public buildings, shops and private houses. In late Antiquity, it was the favourite place for the erection of commemorative statuary, honorific inscriptions, and decrees. Lavish *insulae* of private houses rose on terraces above the south side of the street. Their interiors were decorated with marble, mosaic and frescoes which were continuously

1. Road-building: *BASOR*, clxvi (1962), 45; clxxxvi (1967), 28 f.; lime-kiln: *BASOR*, ccxi (1973), 28; *cf. Byz. Sardis*, cap. 7.
2. *Byz. Sardis*, caps. 7–9.
3. For the remains of Ephesus, see J. Keil, *Führer durch Ephesos* (Vienna, 1964) and the long article of W. Alzinger, 'Ephesos', in *RE Supp*. xii. 1588–1704; *cf*. H. Vetters, 'Zur byzantinischen Ephesos', *Jahrb. der Oesterreichischen byzantinischen Gesellschaft* xv (1966), 273–87. The material which follows will be treated in more detail in C. Foss, *Byzantine and Turkish Ephesus* (forthcoming, henceforth, *Byz. Ephesus*).

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maintained and renewed through late Antiquity; restorations can be dated from the time of Diocletian through that of Justinian. The lavishness of the decor of these houses conforms with the general impression from other parts of the site of a vital and flourishing late antique metropolis.[1] As at Sardis, this part of Ephesus came to a sudden and violent end. The houses were burned and completely ruined. They were never restored after the disaster, but instead their remains were filled with rubble and used as foundations. Finds of coins date the event to about 614.[2] Eventually, perhaps in the eighth or ninth century, the site was partially occupied by a long building, perhaps a storehouse, and scattered small huts. Other excavated buildings on the Embolos show no trace of later occupation, and the whole area was significantly left outside the new city walls which were a product of the Dark Ages. Similarly, buildings on the Upper Agora, also outside the late walls, seem to have been abandoned about 614.[3] A major transformation thus took place in this part of the city. Late antique buildings were destroyed and abandoned and the whole area given up as Ephesus withdrew to the land near the harbour.[4] It is only natural to associate the initial destruction of *c.* 614 with the Persian wars, and to consider the developments at Ephesus as being closely parallel to those of Sardis.[5]

A small site in central Asia Minor, closer to the known area of the fighting, has yielded similar evidence. The settlement at Alişar Hüyük had been of little consequence since the time of the Phrygians, but it was in a region of some importance for transit. The mound is about five kilometres north of the highway from Ancyra to Sebastea and not far from Basilica Therma, whence a branch road led north to Euchaita and south to Caesarea. Basilica Therma itself, because

1. The houses are described by H. Vetters in 'Zum Stockwerkbau in Ephesos', *Mélanges Mansel*, i (Ankara, 1974), pp. 69–92. For a survey of late antique Ephesus, see *Byz. Ephesus*, caps. 1–4 (historical), 5 (remains), 6 (summary).

2. Coins: *Anzeiger der Oesterreichischen Akademie*, cvii (1970), 12; cviii (1971), 16; *cf.* cv (1968), 84. None of the coins has been published, any more than the two hoards of copper coins of Heraclius mentioned in *Anzeiger*, cii (1965), 101.

3. Alzinger, in *RE* 1634–6. Evidence from the other end of the site may confirm the general picture. J. T. Wood, the first excavator of Ephesus, found six bronze coins of Heraclius. Five of these were issued no later than 616; the latest was of 630. These are followed by a long gap which lasts until the mid-eighth century. Since the find-spots were not recorded, it is not possible to draw precise conclusions from the coins. There is a strong possibility, however, that most of them come from the site of the Artemision, where Wood concentrated his efforts. The coins are summarized in J. G. Milne, 'J. T. Wood's Coins from Ephesos', *NC* (1925), 382–91.

4. For the subsequent history of Ephesus, see *Byz. Ephesus*, cap. 7, and W. Müller-Wiener, 'Mittelalterliche Befestigungen im sudlichen Ionien', *Istanbuler Mitteilungen* xi (1961), 85–112.

5. Note that this interpretation has not found favour with the excavators. Professor H. Vetters, director of the excavation, firmly maintains that the destruction was caused by an earthquake. If that were the case, however, the reasons for the subsequent abandonment of the site would be far from clear. The natural association of the destruction with the known historical circumstances of the time is perhaps therefore to be regarded as tentative. Publication of the coins will do much to illumine this question.

of its hot springs and strategic location, was of some significance under the Romans as late as the time of Justinian.[1] It greatly overshadowed the poor settlement of mudbrick houses clustered behind the ancient Hittite fortification of Alişar. Although it was an unimportant site, too poor even to have produced any of the cut marble pieces – column bases, capitals and the like – which are found all over the region, it underwent a certain revival in late Antiquity. The settlement became denser, and was able to afford imported pottery from the third through the sixth centuries. In the early seventh century, apparently around 613–16, the site was abandoned and not reoccupied until the Seljuk period.[2] The excavators quite reasonably attributed this abandonment to the Persian invasion, a supposition rendered more likely by the location of the site near a main highway. In their marches to Ancyra and the west, the Persians would have passed through the area, which they may have plundered or terrorized so that the inhabitants of a small place like Alişar would abandon their homes.[3]

The evidence from excavations is necessarily scattered, since only relatively few sites have been studied, and at those most attention

1. Roads: W. M. Ramsay, *Historical Geography*, pp. 265, 268; remains: *idem*, 'Unedited Inscriptions of Asia Minor', *BCH*, vii (1883), 303–5 and E. Chantre, *Mission en Cappadoce* (Paris, 1898), pp. 118 f., with illustration of the Roman thermae and of a lead seal of the sixth of seventh century (dating suggested by Professor Oikonomides). Chantre remarks on the large numbers of coins of Justinian found there and mentions the remains of a circuit wall three metres thick and three kilometres long, which may conceivably date from his reign. Note that the identification of Basilica Therma with Terzili Hamam near Alişar is not altogether certain: see K. Bittel, *Kleinasiatische Studien, Istanbuler Mitteilungen*, v (1942), 21–28. Some uninteresting funerary inscriptions of the region were published by G. de Jerphanion: 'Inscriptions grecques de la région d'Alishar', *MUSJ, Beyrouth*, xix (1935), 69–95; only one of them (no. 5 from Ilisu) is as late as the fifth century.

2. For the remains of Alişar see H. H. von der Osten, *The Alishar Hüyük*, ii (Chicago, 1937), 335–8, and, for their history, iii, 460–3. The coins are published *ibid*. iii, 316–22. The lastest of the fourteen coins of Justin I–Heraclius was a copper 40-nummus piece of the type issued from 613–16. Although the sample is small, it is continuous, and the lack of later coins is striking. Only one copper coin of Leo VI represents the whole period between the seventh century and the thirteenth.

3. A similar picture is presented by Arslantepe near Malatya, the site of a rural settlement near Melitene. The site was inhabited under the Romans and in late Antiquity, but was then abandoned until the thirteenth century. Analogies between the objects found at Arslantepe and those of Alişar suggested that the site was abandoned as a result of the Persian invasions: S. Puglisi, *Malatya I* (Rome, 1964), pp. 35–40; *cf.* E. Schneider Equini, *Malatya II* (Rome, 1970), p. 58 and *passim*. Since the material cannot be precisely dated, however, it is not possible to state with certainty that it was abandoned in the first decades of the seventh century. The nearby city of Melitene was burned by Chosroes I in 577, and suffered frequently in the wars between the Byzantines and the Arabs. Without more precise evidence, abandonment of the site cannot be associated with the Persian War. The abandonment seems in any case to have been of long duration, for the palace of the 'VIII–IX' century previously discovered apparently cannot be assigned such an early date on the basis of available evidence. It had significantly been built directly over an Assyrian palace of Sargon II. In the interval, the settlement had moved about an hour to the north, where the Roman camp, and later the city, of Melitene grew up. For the history and topography of the site, with the Islamic palace, see L. Delaporte, 'Malatia', *Revue Hittite et Asianique*, ii (1932/3), 129–54.

has been given to remains of the classical age or earlier. Many sites in Asia Minor, however, were transformed from open prosperous cities with monumental public buildings into smaller settlements crowded behind fortification walls. In most cases, no chronology has been established, but there is some reason to believe, on admittedly limited evidence, that three sites might have been affected by the Persian attacks.

The flourishing city of Aphrodisias in Caria, which produced some of the finest late antique sculpture known, suffered a drastic change in the Dark Ages. The theatre in the centre of the city was fortified, a village grew within it, and the rest of the site seems to have been abandoned.[1] Since the excavations are relatively new, this development has not yet been dated, but preliminary investigation of the coin finds suggest that there may have been some disturbance at the time of the Persian war. Copper coins are relatively abundant through the fourth year of Heraclius (613/4), then become insignificant for the next decade. The site has produced four small hoards from the reign of Heraclius, the latest of which has a gap from 617 to 624. No coins dated between 619 and 624 were found.[2] From the coins, it is possible to conclude that the Persian threat was felt at Aphrodisias, and that the city may have been temporarily removed from imperial control. There is no evidence so far, however, that any part of the site was destroyed; for the moment, it is most reasonable to suppose that the Persian danger was imminent in the region. Without further evidence, it is not possible to determine whether it was instrumental in provoking the subsequent decline of the city.

A further example is provided by the town of Assos at the southern extremity of the Troad. Limited excavations there revealed that the classical and late antique city contracted to the acropolis, where a small fraction of the former city area was enclosed by 'medieval' walls. These were not dated, nor did the published summary report consider the late antique and Byzantine remains in any detail. The sequence of coin finds from the site and surrounding area, however, is of some interest: forty-nine bronzes of the period Diocletian to Arcadius were discovered, and ten from Justin I to Heraclius, the latest struck in 612/3. Subsequently, there were no Byzantine coins until the time of Romanus IV (1067-71): J. T. Clarke, F. Bacon, R. Koldewey, *Investigations at Assos* (London, 1902-21), xiii. 139 (plans), 310 f. (coins, catalogued by H. W. Bell). Here, too, an admittedly small sample may be of significance when seen in a broader context. The interruption at Assos is not far removed in time or space from the deposit of treasure in Lesbos, and is possibly to be considered together with the silver hoard from the Dardanelles and the putative attack on Pergamum. Although the coin sequence cannot be used to date the reduced circuit of walls, it provides further evidence for the danger which was felt even in northwest Asia Minor (*cf.* the work of D. Metcalf, *supra*, p. 732, n. 2). Subsequent coin finds at Assos, because of their limited number and rather casual reporting, provide no further illumination: J. M. Cook, *The Troad* (Oxford, 1973), 247.

1. For the theatre, see K. T. Erim, '1971 Excavations at Aphrodisias in Caria', *Türk Ark. Dergi*, xx (1973), 64 f., and for the remains of the site, the preliminary reports of the same author in that periodical.

2. Information about the coin finds at Aphrodisias was most kindly supplied by Mr Michael Hendy, who is preparing the catalogue.

Pergamum, a great city under the Hellenistic kings and the Roman republic, had already begun to decline in the third century. At that time, perhaps as the result of Gothic attack, it had shrunk to a fraction of its former size and occupied only the top slopes of its acropolis. After some recovery in late Antiquity, the city contracted even more severely in the Dark Ages so that it was reduced to a fortress on the top of the Acropolis, heavily fortified with a wall made from the ruins of the ancient city. The discovery of considerable numbers of coins of Constans II suggests that the castle was built in his day, like that of Sardis, which it closely resembles.[1] It is possible that this was a response to a blow which the city had suffered in the Persian war, but the evidence is not adequate to support a precise statement. If Pergamum had been attacked, the reason for the burial of the treasure on Lesbos, an island just off the coast from Pergamum, would be evident.

Similarly, Magnesia on the Maeander, a city of no great size, was reduced to a small fortress which occupied an area not much larger than its ancient Agora. The construction of the walls, which like those of Sardis and Pergamum are faced with marble reused from ancient buildings, has been assigned to the age of Heraclius.[2] This is a reasonable possibility, especially in view of the two hoards of gold coins from Aydın, but no clear grounds for the dating have been presented.

Evidence from other sites is even vaguer and could only be considered with an undue amount of speculation. The Persian wars affected Asia Minor only for a decade or so. They were followed by the long series of attacks by the Arabs, which were equally or more destructive. The mere fact, therefore, that a city was destroyed or transformed into a small fortress is not to be considered a result of Persian attack unless some specific chronological evidence is forthcoming. This will usually take the form of coins, or sometimes inscriptions, but as the empire sank further into poverty and illiteracy in the Dark Ages, both become considerably rarer. Even with this caveat, however, there is still a good deal of new material from the remains which may be correlated with that of the other sources.

The most important new evidence from archaeology is the revelation of great destruction. The sources were not merely

1. Coins: A. Conze *et al.*, *Pergamon I: Stadt und Landschaft* (Berlin, 1912), p. 359. The 124 coins of Constans II are by far the largest body of coins from the late antique and Byzantine periods: they may be compared with the six of Anastasius, nine of Justinian, ten of Justin II, six of Maurice and seventeen of Heraclius. The large quantity suggests considerable activity, which presumably involved construction of the citadel walls. A similar large number of coins of Constans II accompanied the construction of the new highway at Sardis: *supra*, p. 738 n. 1. At Pergamum, the provenance of the coins was not recorded, but since most of the excavations had by then taken place on the acropolis, it is not unreasonable to associate them with that area.

2. C. Humann, *Magnesia am Maander* (Berlin, 1904) pp. 2, 19, 33.

indulging in rhetoric when they wrote of the violence of the attacks. Parts of Ancyra were burned and left in ruins, Sardis virtually ceased to exist, Ephesus was partly destroyed. The latter were great cities, far in the west in regions where the Persian invasion was not even securely attested. On a smaller scale, Alişar, a settlement which probably lived by agriculture alone, was abandoned for centuries. Aphrodisias, in a remote valley south of the Maeander, seems also to have felt the Persian threat, while Pergamum and Magnesia in the Aegean zone may have undergone considerable destruction. Finally, the splendid fortifications of Ankara may bear witness both to the virulence of the Persian attacks and to the power of the militarized Byzantine state which maintained itself through that crisis and the devastating inroads of the Arabs which followed.

It is now possible to integrate the evidence and to obtain a clearer picture of the Persian invasions in Asia Minor. They began in the last years of Focas with the attacks on Satala and Nicopolis in western Armenia, a phase which culminated in the Persian capture of the important base of Caesarea in Cappadocia in 611. The forces of Chosroes occupied that city for a year, and burned it when they withdrew.

The greatest and most destructive Persian advances took place after the defeats which they inflicted on Heraclius at and near Antioch in 613. For the next decade, Asia Minor was open to their attacks. The Euchaita hoard of that year probably shows that they were already advancing along the northern highway towards the capital, the route they presumably followed in 615, when the attack on Chalcedon was begun. In those years, the ravages inflicted on the rich and peaceful provinces, many of which had not seen a hostile armed force for three centuries, were most severe.[1] The Persian forces crossed the peninsula, leaving a trail of destruction behind them. All the evidence gives an impression of cities destroyed, countryside looted, and populations led into slavery. Chalcedon was captured in 616 by an army which had spent the winter somewhere in the neighbourhood. It was at this time that the mint of Cyzicus was closed. In the same year, Sardis was destroyed. The rich valleys of the Aegean region lay open to the invader. The Aydin hoards of 615 could have been buried as the result of an attack down the Maeander valley, which could have caused severe damage at Magnesia. That the centre of Ephesus was burned about this time is hardly likely to have been a coincidence, any more than the dwindling in the coin supply at Aphrodisias.

Byzantine resistance seems to have centred in the southeast, where

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1. Except for Isaurian raids in the fourth and fifth centuries which mostly affected the south, and an occasional civil war, the interior of Asia Minor had been spared the troubles of war since the third century. The armies were concentrated on the frontier; few major military bases or garrisons were to be found within it.

the mint of Seleucia operated in 616 and 617. It was not sufficient, however, to prevent an attack on Cyprus with which the Isaurian base seems to have been connected. When the mint was closed, probably because of enemy activity, the imperial headquarters moved into the mountains of Isauria, where they remained only a short while. There is no evidence that the Byzantines had any control over Asia Minor for the next five years.

In central Anatolia, Alişar was abandoned about 617. By that year, the region of Germanicea/Maraş was firmly in Persian hands and remained so until the end of the war. The last operating mint in Asia Minor, Nicomedia, was closed in 619, and probably in the following year Ancyra was taken and at least partially destroyed, and the country arround it ravaged. Within a year or two, the progress of the armies seems to have been matched by that of the fleet. Rhodes, which commanded the passage from the eastern Mediterranean to Constantinople, was taken and the inhabitants, as elsewhere, were enslaved. It is to this period of the eclipse of the fortunes of the empire that the burial of the treasures of Lesbos and Lampsacus may be attributed, as well as the probable attack on Pergamum. It is also during these years that the sequence of coins at Aphrodisias stops completely.

When Heraclius began his campaigns against Persia in 622, the enemy was still able to harass his troops in Cappadocia, but the results of the Byzantine victories were soon felt. In 625/6 the two provincial mints of Cyzicus and Nicomedia could be reopened, and imperial control seems once again to have been established in the west. The capture of Chalcedon, with its attendant destruction and attempted siege of the capital, was apparently an isolated last attempt by the Persians to win a victory. Within two years, Chosroes had been defeated in his homeland, the Persian government had surrendered, and plans were being made for the evacuation of the conquered territories. Persian troops left Chalcedon in 626 or 627 and returned most of Asia Minor to Byzantine rule. The occupied territories seem to have extended as far west as the Antitaurus and Cilicia. This is shown by the hoard from Marash and confirmed by the narrative of Heraclius' campaign of 625 in which he passed through Marash and Adana as if it were alien territory, closely followed by the Persian army. When the two great antagonists, Heraclius and Shahrbaraz, met at Arabissus, probably the frontier town, in 629, final arrangements were made for the evacuation of the lands occupied by the Persians. The last Persian troops crossed the Euphrates in 630, never to return.

The war therefore not only lasted a long time, but affected every part of Asia Minor. Persian attacks penetrated the whole peninsula, especially in the decade 613–23. Although there seems to have been no intention of occupying land west of the Antitaurus, these

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expeditions were not mere raids. Fortified cities were captured and in some cases destroyed. The countryside was ravaged and the population terrorized, to judge by the hoards of coins and treasures and the abandonment of a small site like Alişar, The martyrdom of Leontius and the flight of the abbot Eustathius of Ancyra. Some of the population was captured and deported to slavery. The damage inflicted on a rich and peaceful land was tremendous. The cities in particular seem to have suffered. Sardis and Ephesus were two of the greatest centres in Asia Minor; Caesarea, which was burned, and Ancyra, eventually transformed into a fortress, were the most important cities and military bases of the plateau, and in both places the sources record that the population was massacred or enslaved. This does not mean that the whole country was left a pile of smouldering ruins by the Persians. The north coast, for example, seems to have been spared their attacks altogether and to have flourished in the following age when most of the rest of Asia Minor was in decline.[1] Elsewhere, some major centres seem to have survived without diminution into the Middle Byzantine period; notable among them are Nicaea, Smyrna, and Attaleia.[2] But these are also places from which the evidence is extremely limited. Further excavation will fill in the outlines presented here, and perhaps modify them to some extent, but the importance of the Persian attacks will have to be considered.[3]

This picture is necessarily incomplete, for the ruins speak the language of stones, not of people. They tell of fire, destruction, and abandonment, but can give no impression of the human suffering which must have accompanied the events. A somewhat earlier text, however, provides a relevant parallel. The Life of Saint Eutychius, patriarch of Constantinople, gives some impression of the fear and confusion which struck Pontus when the troops of Chosroes I crossed the Antitaurus and moved on Sebastea in Cappadocia in 576.[4] The populations of the cities to the north – Nicopolis,

1. So I am informed by Dr A. A. M. Bryer, whose massive work on the monuments of Trebizond (in collaboration with D. Winfield) will soon be published. Dr Bryer also noted that the evidence for the period before 1204 is scanty.

2. In all three cases, the same city walls continued in use without any reduction: A. M. Schneider and W. Karnapp, *Die Stadtmauer von Iznik* (Berlin, 1938), p. 4 f.; W. Muller-Wiener, 'Die Stadtbefestigungen von Izmir, Siğacık und Çandarlı, '*Ist. Mitt.* xii (1962), 63 f.; K. Lanckoronski, *Städte Pamphliens und Pisidiens*, i (Vienna, 1890), 9 f. Note particularly at Smyrna the inscriptions of Heraclius, in H. Grégoire, *Recueil des inscriptions grecques-chrétiennes d'Asie mineure* (Paris, 1922), nos. 79, 80, from a gate near Basmane station, apparently in the line of the late antique city walls, and possibly indicating a restoration of them. They are, however, merely acclamations.

3. Evidence from other parts of the Near East which suffered the attacks of the Persians presents a similar picture of devastation and destruction. I shall discuss this material, which cannot be presented here, in a future work on the Persians in the Near East.

4. *Vita S. Eutychii patr. CP.*, Migne, *Patrologia Graeca* lxxxvi, col. 2344 f; I am most grateful to Mr Brown for drawing my attention to this passage.

Neocaesarea, Comana, Zela, and other places – panicked and fled for
protection to the heavily-fortified city of Amasia, where they would
be protected by the prayers of the saint as well as the walls. This
influx of refugees naturally caused a great shortage of food, and
famine began to overwhelm the population when enemy attacks as well
as the presence of the Roman armies hindered the normal course of
trade and agriculture. Fortunately for Amasia, the problem was
resolved by a miracle which saint Eutychius performed. This
narrative deals with one Persian raid which affected a corner of
Asia Minor. There is no reason to suppose that the people of
Anatolia were so fortunate during the attacks of Chosroes II, but
the details can only be seen in the imagination. To suppose that the
roads were clogged with streams of panic-stricken refugees as well
as troops, that villages were burned or deserted, that harvests were
ruined or confiscated, and that every walled town was grossly
overcrowded would not be unreasonable. From the evidence, it
would be easy to suspect that the civilian casualties were enormous,
not only from Persian massacre and enslavement, but from the
famine caused by twenty years of war which would have disrupted
trade and agriculture, and from its companion, disease. The in-
vasions reached across Asia Minor from east to west and affected
the coastal zones as much as the interior plateau: They were
constant and vicious; there was hardly any place left to seek
refuge. While Asia was being devastated by the Persians, Europe
was overwhelmed by the hordes of the Avars. Panic and desolation
struck every province of the empire, and those who feared the end
of the world were in a sense justified, for the society which they
and thirty generations of the ancestors had known was never to be
restored.[1]

Heraclius, who presided over the disaster, managed to save the
remnants of his empire, but the Persian invasions were only a first
stage in a long series of disasters which were to continue to afflict
Asia Minor. The war had been over for scarcely more than a decade
when, in 641, the first Arab troops entered the country; by that
time, Syria, Mesopotamia and parts of Armenia were in their hands.
Like the Persians, they occupied Cilicia and the lands east of the
Antitaurus and raided the rest, but instead of two decades, their
attacks lasted for two centuries.[2] The Dark Ages, which for

1. Note the apposite prediction of Theodore of Syceon about barbarian attacks,
bloodshed, destruction, collapse of the Empire, and the imminent arrival of Antichrist:
Vita Theod. Syc. cap. 134, written by a contemporary of the Persian invasion. For fear
that the end of the world was at hand in the days of Focas and Heraclius, see the passages
quoted by A. H. M. Jones in *The Later Roman Empire*, i (Oxford, 1964) 316 f.

2. Two studies consider the Arab invasions in some detail: E. W. Brooks, 'The Arabs
in Asia Minor, from Arabic Sources', *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, xviii (1898), 182–208, a
series of extracts from the sources, and H. Ahrweiler, 'L'Asie Mineure et les invasions
arabes', *Revue historique*, ccxxvii (1962), 1–32, a considerably more theoretical treat-
ment.

Byzantium may be considered to run from the early seventh to the middle of the ninth century, were an age of great change for the empire. City life, as it had been known under the Greeks and Romans, almost entirely disappeared, and the people of Asia Minor came to live instead in small towns and fortresses. The open, and often unfortified cities of late Antiquity which had been adorned with lavish monumental public buildings and had offered all kinds of services for their inhabitants died out almost entirely.[1] The nature and extent of this phenomenon, which is obvious to anyone who examines the remains or the archaeological record, is only beginning to be appreciated. Its causes were probably complex, for the reduction in the area of cities implies a great decline of the population which is not a necessary consequence of war,[2] but there is no doubt that a major transformation took place. A vital urban economy was replaced by one in which castles and villages were dominant features of the landscape. The beginnings of this may be sought in the Persian war, when the country was struck a devastating blow from which it hardly had a chance to recover before the Arabs appeared on the scene to inflict more damage. The Persian war may thus be seen as the first stage in the process which marked the end of Antiquity in Asia Minor. The Arabs continued the work, and by the time their attempts had finally been defeated, a new and quite different state emerges from the darkness.

1. I have discussed this phenomenon at some length in my (unpublished) doctoral dissertation, 'Byzantine Cities of Western Asia Minor' (Harvard University, 1972). The work will ultimately be revised and expanded to become a general treatment of the cities of Asia Minor in late Antiquity and the Byzantine age. For fortresses of the Aegean region, some of them representing larger ancient cities, see Müller-Wiener, *ubi supra*, pp. 5–122.

2. I see no reason to subscribe to the notion sometimes advanced that the sudden contraction in the size of cities indicates not a reduction in the population but a change of fashion by which only the most important parts of the city would be included within the fortification walls. The examples of Sardis, Ephesus and Ancyra are most instructive in this respect. In these cases, new walls built in the Dark Ages left outside their circuit areas of the ancient city which had been completely abandoned, not densely populated residential sections; the remains are unambiguous. Certainly, the new walls or fortresses would serve as places of refuge for the local populations which lived not behind them but scattered in settlements in the environs. In some cases, as at Sardis, these settlements were dotted over an area which had previously been covered with buildings. The obvious conclusion from the remains is that the walled area was smaller because it had fewer people to protect. It has been alleged that the hand of man alone was not adequate to account for extensive depopulation in the Dark Ages: see Rhys Carpenter, *Discontinuity in Greek Civilization* (New York, 1968), pp. 77–80, for some provocative remarks on climatic change which merit detailed consideration and need considerable evidence for their support.

2

ARAB WARS WITH THE BYZANTINES
IN THE UMAYYAD PERIOD

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[414] **1.** UNLIKE THE PERSIAN EMPIRE, the Byzantine Empire was not completely vanquished by the Arabs. Though weakened and driven back, it held together in a narrower and more unified area than before. In this way, the centuries-old conflict between the great powers of West and East continued. The Arabs now took the place of the Persians in their dealings with the Byzantines. They were the attackers. To them it was a vexation that the Cross maintained its dominion, in competition with Allāh; in their conception, the war against the Byzantine emperor was preferable to all others, and they incessantly devoted themselves to this war. At the same time, the Arab rulers in Damascus made themselves popular by directing their troops, while the pious men of Medina had a special predilection for taking part in these wars, so as to fulfill their duty of religious service.

Fighting was in itself sufficient for the Muslims in this case: they were not so intent on conquest. When the opportunity arose, they did indeed hurl themselves into the fray with astonishing zeal, as in their attempt to take Constantinople by storm, in the manner of Gog and Magog. On the whole, however, they allowed the status quo of "Romania"[1] to prevail in actual fact, wherever this had become established after the conquests that had taken place under the caliph 'Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb (r. 13–23/634–44)—or at any rate in the principal theater of war, that of Asia Minor. They did not attempt to extend their own territory step by step and to reduce the territory of the Byzantines; they did not consider it important to establish themselves in the fortified cities that they subdued. As a rule they made only one raid each summer through the Amanus or Taurus ranges; this raid would extend more [415] or less widely and sometimes would also last through the winter.

As a result of this endless series of raids, a rather wide strip of land was laid bare between the two empires, the so-called "outer land",[2] which

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[1] [I.e. the territory of the old Roman Empire.]

[2] Arabic *al-dawāhī*: al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh al-rusul wa-l-mulūk*, ed. M.J. de Goeje *et al.* (Leiden, 1879–1901), II, 1317; Ibn Athīr, *al-Kāmil fī l-ta'rīkh*, ed. C.J. Tornberg (Leiden, 1851–76), IV, 250:23.

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amounted to an abandoned border region. Theophanes (under AM 6178) says that all the cities that in the time of the 'Abbāsids were located on the border and were then in the possession of the Arabs, from Mopsuestia to Armenia IV, had previously been unfortified and uninhabited in the days of the Umayyads. The Arabic writers speak only of a deserted zone between Antioch and Mopsuestia, or else between Alexandretta (on the Gulf of Issus) and Ṭarsūs. According to al-Ṭabarī[3] and al-Balādhurī,[4] when the emperor Heraclius abandoned Syria he destroyed and depopulated the cities of this border region in order to make it more difficult for the Muslims to pass through, since they would be unable to find any agricultural produce. According to Theophanes (AM 6278), the Mardaites[5] took charge, as military frontier troops in Byzantine service, of maintaining this protective desert zone. According to other sources, however, the devastation of this region was initiated by the Arabs, who did not want to have fortified cities at their back when they undertook their raids. They destroyed the cities and expelled the inhabitants, to make sure that they themselves got home. This took place above all under Mu'āwiya ibn Abī Sufyān (r. 41–60/661–80), but also afterwards: for instance, Tyana was razed and evacuated under al-Walīd (I) ibn 'Abd al-Malik (r. 86–96/705–15). The former population of the frontier zone gave way to a colorful hodgepodge of groups that had just arrived or been deported from elsewhere: Mardaites, Christian Arab tribes, gypsies (*zuṭṭ*), Indonesians (*ṣayābija*), Persians and Slavs all lived there. Because of the increasing numbers of lions in the devastated marshlands, the caliph al-Walīd I introduced Indian water buffaloes, herded by gypsies.[6]

The Arabic writers who have come down to us are concerned mainly with Iraq and the East. They deal only in passing with the wars against the Byzantines that originated in the Syro–Mesopotamian frontier.[7] The principal authority for these wars is al-Wāqidī (d. 207/822), who bases his

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[3]al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, I, 2396.

[4]al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, ed. M.J. de Goeje (Leiden, 1866), 163.

[5][On these see below, 16–17.]

[6]al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, 162, [166–67]. The Christian Arabs are mentioned as *musta'riba* at al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, II, 1185, 1194. [The *usd* in al-Balādhurī's text may have been mountain lions or lynxes. Wellhausen describes the water buffalos as a "countermeasure", presumably because they would have disturbed the thickets where the "lions" rested.]

[7]The wars against the Byzantines must have received their due in the historical literature of the Syrian Arabs. However, this literature is relatively unknown to us, although al-Balādhurī does use it—he cites a book on "the *maghāzī* of Mu'āwiya". ["Mesopotamia" here refers to the early Islamic province of al-Jazīra, "the Island", corresponding to much of present-day northern Iraq, eastern Syria and southeastern Turkey.]

Arab Wars with the Byzantines in the Umayyad Period 3

accounts mainly on Abū Ma'shar (d. 170/787); in the abridged form in which we have them, it may be that al-Wāqidī's statements have become even shorter than they were [416] originally. In dry annalistic style, al-Wāqidī reports who led each year's raid, how far and with what success. It is taken for granted that a raid into Byzantine territory occurs every year, even if a temporary truce leads to a pause every now and then. The Byzantine historians do not deal with these campaigns—the greater part of which were insignificant—in such thorough fashion, year by year; however, they do speak about the more important campaigns in a much more complete and accurate way than do the Arabic reporters. Here I shall not enter into a fundamental evaluation of these wars from the political and military points of view, since my talent and perhaps also the available source materials are not sufficient. My basic intention is rather to bring the data of the Byzantine and Arab authors into harmony, paying special attention to chronology regarding both sides.

A difficulty arises here. Theophanes takes the various dates that have been transmitted to him and reduces them to years of the world (AM). These dates fluctuate and do not stand in a fixed relation to the years of the *hijra* (AH), which the Arabs use for their reckoning.[8] Here I do not collate the years of the world directly with the years of the *hijra*; however, I also do not use the Christian era (AD) as the middle term, but rather the Seleucid era (AS). For this era was alive and in use in every time and every region, whereas the Christian era was not. Moreover, the Seleucid year overlaps better with the year of the world, since it also begins in autumn, though in October rather than September. Finally, the Seleucid era is suitable for our purpose because it is systematically compared with the corresponding year of the *hijra* in Elias of Nisibis,[9] whose work on chronology is confirmed by its complete agreement with Wüstenfeld's tables.[10] Fortunately, the relation

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[8]Only the (so to speak, subjective) years of the world in Theophanes can be moved about in groups. This does not apply to years of the *hijra*, any more than to the Seleucid or Christian calendars. A single date according to the Muslim era can be false, but its relation to the Seleucid or Christian era within a series of years does not change and cannot be altered.

[9]Chabot's edition of Michael the Syrian has not yet proceeded far enough for my purpose. [Wellhausen here refers to Michael the Syrian, *Chronique de Michel le Syrien*, ed. and trans. J.-B. Chabot in four volumes (Paris, 1899–1924). The chronological history and tables of Elias bar Shīnāyā, bishop of Nisibis, were available to him in F. Baethgen, ed. and trans., *Fragmente syrischer und arabischer Historiker* (Leipzig, 1884).]

[10][F. Wüstenfeld, *Vergleichungs-Tabellen der muhammedanischen und christlichen Zeitrechnung* (Leipzig, 1854); 2nd ed. E. Mahler (Leipzig, 1926); 3rd ed. B. Spuler (Wiesbaden, 1961).]

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of the world era in Theophanes to the Seleucid and Muslim eras does not
change from year to year, but only periodically, remaining constant over long
series of years. Indeed, during the Umayyad period it fluctuates, for the most
part, between only two numbers, separated only by one unit: namely, year
1 of the Seleucid era corresponds to either AM 5181 or 5182. This applies
[417] at least to questions of synchronizing with the Arabic calendar; if it
applies to other problems beyond that, it is of no concern to us here.

For Mu'āwiya's reign, with which we begin, AM 5181 is equivalent to
AS 1;[11] the difference between the two is therefore 5180. This is clear from
the following dates. According to Theophanes, 'Uthmān ibn 'Affān (r. 23–
35/644–56) acceded to the caliphate in AM 6137, at the beginning of AH
25, that is, late October AS 957. The battle of Ṣiffīn took place, accord-
ing to Theophanes, in AM 6148, and according to the Syriac inscription of
Ḥanash,[12] in AS 968. The earthquake in Syria, which according to Theo-
phanes fell in June AM 6150, took place in June AS 970, according to both
Nöldeke's Syriac writer[13] and Elias. The death of 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib (r. 35–
40/656–61) took place in AM 6151 according to Theophanes, and in AS 971
according to Elias. The great comet appeared in AM 6167 according to Theo-
phanes, and in AS 987 according to Elias. The earthquake that destroyed
the church of Edessa took place in AM 6170 according to Theophanes, and
in AS 990 according to Assemani.[14] Mu'āwiya's death is dated to AM 6171
by Theophanes, and to AS 991 by Elias.[15]

Mu'āwiya succeeded his brother Yazīd ibn Abī Sufyān as governor in
Damascus in AH 18. In AH 19 he also acquired Palestine, once 'Amr ibn al-
'Āṣ had given up his governorship of that province so as to conquer Egypt
for himself. In 25 or soon afterwards the caliph 'Uthmān also established
Mu'āwiya over northern Syria and Mesopotamia, in place of the Anṣārī
'Umayr ibn Sa'd; Mu'āwiya is also said to have previously been in control
of the coastal region as far north as Antioch. Both as governor of Syria and

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[11][Wellhausen refers to how the Seleucid era and the Year of the World correspond for
this time, and of course does not mean to say that Mu'āwiya's reign began in AM 5181/AS
1!]

[12]Published by J.-B. Chabot in *Journal Asiatique*, 9e Série, 16 (1900), 285ff.

[13]Th. Nöldeke, "Zur Geschichte der Araber im 1. Jahrhundert d.H. aus syrischen
Quellen", *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* 29 (1875), 83.

[14]J.S. Assemani, *Bibliotheca Orientalis* (Rome, 1719–28), I, 426.

[15]The eclipse of the sun on Friday 5 November AM 6136 in Theophanes is not mentioned
by the Syrians; it must have been in AS 956 and AD 644. A purported eclipse of the sun
is to be found in al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, II, 92, and Eutychius (Sa'īd ibn al-Biṭrīq, Patriarch
of Alexandria), *Contextia gemmarum sive Eutychii Patriarchae Alexandrini annales*, ed.
and trans. J. Selden and E. Pockocke (Oxford, 1658–59), II, 360.

later as caliph, Mu'āwiya carried on the war against the Byzantines with great zeal. He appears to have been the one who intiated the attacks through the Amanus range in Cilicia. Meanwhile, earlier on during his governorship he had busied himself above all with the cities of the Phoenician coast. These cities—including Antioch—were especially difficult to tear away from the Byzantines, they continued to stay in contact with the Byzantines by sea, and they remained a dangerous possession for the Arabs through the entire Umayyad period. Mu'āwiya conquered these cities in the last days of the caliphate of 'Umar I, and then for a second time under 'Uthmān. He established garrisons in them, at first only for the summer, since during the winter they became inaccessible by sea [418] and the Byzantines posed no threat. Afterwards he let the troops stay there permanently and gave them houses and lands.

Many of the inhabitants of the coastal cities had abandoned their home-land and property, whether by choice or by force. To replace them, foreign elements streamed in from every corner of the world. Mu'āwiya favored this process, as he generally approved of the transfer and mixing of peoples; he settled many Jews in Tripoli, then the most important of the Phoenician cities after Acre. All these efforts, however, were in vain: these cities could not be effectively secured so long as the Byzantines ruled the sea. Mu'āwiya understood this and saw to it that the Arabs ventured out to sea, so as to confront the Byzantines there. In doing this, he had to contend with resistance from the caliphs. 'Umar's reservations could not be overcome, but 'Uthmān finally gave in. Ships and sailors were provided above all by Alexandria; the governor of Egypt, also an Umayyad, made common cause with Mu'āwiya. Only afterwards did Mu'āwiya, in person, establish naval stations on the Palestinian coast.[16] The Arabs were sea-soldiers rather than sailors. A comic poem shows how unfamiliar the water was to them by nature.[17] Despite all this, they made the transition from desert and camel to sea and ship with astonishing speed; and most importantly, bold sea captains were soon found among them. You may remember the [Prussian] saying regarding the Junker of the marches, that if all else fails, he will not hesitate to abandon the command of a squadron in exchange for the command of a frigate.

Mu'āwiya made the first naval expedition against the island of Cyprus, which lay right against the Syrian coast and provided a dangerous base for Byzantine power. He did this in the summer of AM 6140, AS 960, AH 28 = AD

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[16] al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, 117. However, other sources contradict this.

[17] Th. Nöldeke, *Delectus veterum carminum arabicorum* (Berlin, 1890), 62.

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649. This is confirmed by Theophanes,[18] al-Wāqidī,[19] al-Balādhurī,[20] and
Elias of Nisibis. The date given by Abū Ma'shar relates to a later repetition
of the campaign,[21] as according to al-Balādhurī.[22] According to al-Ṭabarī,
the Egyptian fleet under the command of Ibn Abī Sarḥ took Mu'āwiya on
board at the harbor of Acre.[23] The account of the Eastern sources, to the
effect that the archon of the Cypriots paid 7200 *dīnārs* to the Arabs and
the same amount to the Byzantines every year from then on, is not to be
found in Theophanes; according to him, it was not until 38 years later, in
the peace concluded in AM [419] 6178 between Emperor and Caliph, that
the two sides agreed to share the Cypriot tribute equally between them.

On the journey home, Mu'āwiya made a vain attempt to seize Aradus,
according to Theophanes. He succeeded in this the following year, AM 6141.
The Arabic authors are silent regarding this, as they are also regarding the
conquest of Rhodes and the sale of the Colossus to an Edessan Jew in AM
6145. According to al-Ṭabarī and al-Balādhurī, Rhodes was conquered for
the first time in AH 52 (AM 6163).[24]

In AM 6146, according to Theophanes, Mu'āwiya mustered a great fleet in
Phoenician Tripoli for an assault against Constantinople. He gave command
over this fleet to Abū l-A'war, while he himself proceeded by land against
Caesarea in Cappadocia. A great sea battle then took place on the Lycian
coast near a place called Phoenix. The Byzantines under Constans suffered
a defeat and the sea became colored with their blood. Constans changed
clothing and ship, so as to evade the enemy's attacks, and was fortunate
enough to reach Constantinople, thereby leaving the others in the lurch. The
Continuatio Isidori hispana says: "Constans Augustus, proceeding against
[Mu'āwiya], gathered together over a thousand boats, but was unlucky in
the fight and barely managed to escape with a handful of men".[25]

In this way the Arabs annihilated the entire Imperial fleet at the very first
chance they had. Theophanes places the "utter destruction of the Byzan-
tine army and fleet" (*panteles tou Romaikou stratou te kai stolou apoleia*) at

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[18] *Chronographia*, ed. C. de Boor (Leipzig, 1883), 343.

[19] al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, I, 2819, 2826.

[20] *Futūḥ al-buldān*, 152.

[21] al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, I, 2820.

[22] *Futūḥ al-buldān*, 153.

[23] *Ta'rīkh*, I, 2826.

[24] al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, II, 157; al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, 236.

[25] Ed. Th. Mommsen in the *Monumenta germaniae historica, Auctores antiquissimi*,
XI.1 (Berlin, 1895), par. 24: *adversus quem (Moabiam) Constans Augustus mille et am-
plius adgregans rates infeliciter decertavit, vix cum paucis per fugam evasit.*

Phoenix at the same rank as the catastrophe at the Yarmūk.[26] The Arabic authors make nothing out of this enormous event, since the Iraqis had no share in it; and the later compilers of Muslim history follow their example. However, an account of it is preserved in a report of al-Wāqidī.[27] Here too the Byzantine fleet, with 500 ships, is under Constans' command; however, the Arab fleet is not commanded by Abū l-Aʿwar, but rather by [the governor of Egypt] Ibn Abī Sarḥ, because it is Egyptian.[28] The place where the encounter took place is called Dhāt al-Ṣawārī. The ships are bound together in pairs, one Byzantine to one Arab.[29] In the night before the fight, the prayers of Christians and Muslims ring out loud. Next morning, a terrifying [420] hand-to-hand conflict takes place. The Byzantines hold firm until Constans, gravely wounded, gives up the fight. Only the personal participation of Constans proves that al-Wāqidī is speaking of the same naval battle as Theophanes. Nothing stands in the way of the identification of the place name. *Dhāt al-ṣawārī* means "the place with the masts." Al-Wāqidī explains this by saying that the ships were bound to one another for the purposes of the fight. This is probably nonsense, made up for the sake of etymology. From Theophanes and Nicephorus it appears that the place known as Phoenix had a stand of cypress trees and that the Arabs brought wood from there to build their ships.[30] From this we may surmise that Dhāt al-Ṣawārī means nothing more than "the place where masts grow". Since there was no sizeable town in the vicinity, the battle was named in this way, quite common among the ancient Arabs. According to Theophanes the place lay not far from Rhodes.[31]

Theophanes gives the date as AM 6146. This corresponds to AS 966 and to AH 34, which ended on 10 July (= AD 655). Abū Maʿshar, al-Wāqidī's

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[26] *Chronographia*, 332.

[27] al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, I, 2867–68.

[28] Also according to the *Continuatio*, ʿAbd Allāh ibn Abī Sarḥ held the command in the battle, which hung in the balance for a long time.

[29] [Wellhausen describes this arrangement as "by mutual agreement", as if the two sides had agreed to lash their ships together. This does not appear in Theophanes or the *Continuatio*. At al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, I, 2867–68, al-Wāqidī has the Byzantines yoke the adversaries' spars together, for some reason not stated. Then in another account immediately following, the two sides parley over where to fight; the Byzantines opt for the sea, and so "we drew up to them and bound the ships fast to one another". See R.S. Humphreys, *The History of al-Ṭabarī*, XV (Albany, 1990), 74–75.]

[30] Theophanes, *Chronographia*, 385; Nicephorus, *Opuscula historica*, ed. C. de Boor (Leipzig, 1880), 50.

[31] *Chronographia*, 385. G. Weil, *Geschichte der Chalifen* (Mannheim, 1846–62), I, 162, erroneously places the battle on the Egyptian coast, and others have followed him. The error originates in the fact that the Arab fleet was mainly Egyptian.

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predecessor, dates the naval battle of Dhāt al-Ṣawārī to AH 34.[32] Al-Wāqidī himself dates it to AH 31. In so doing, however, he maintains that the two Muḥammads from Egypt,[33] after arriving from Egypt with the Arab fleet, went off on their own with their ships, saying that the true holy war was to be conducted against other enemies altogether. In doing this, they began their rebellion against the caliph 'Uthmān; and since this rebellion first broke out in AH 35, these preliminary events may be assigned to AH 34 and not to 31.

Arabic historical tradition informs us that Mu'āwiya did not take part in the sea battle in person, while Theophanes—and only Theophanes—reports that Mu'āwiya proceeded at the same time against Caesarea in Cappadocia. It seems that he accomplished nothing there, and this may be connected with the fact that the Arabs, despite their splendid victory at sea, did not realize the plan, ascribed to them by Theophanes,[34] of attacking Constantinople.

[421] Soon afterwards Mu'āwiya was forced to withdraw, because of the inner turmoil that broke out in Islam in AH 35. He must have been glad when the Byzantines left him alone. In the end Mu'āwiya had no choice but to buy a humiliating peace agreement from Constans II, so that he could proceed against 'Alī with a free hand.[35] According to this agreement, Mu'āwiya had to pay 1000 *dīnārs* every day, though according to al-Balādhurī, only every week. Mu'āwiya kept this peace until he was rid of 'Alī and had subdued Iraq, in AH 41, AS 972.[36] Once he had won supreme authority over all the empire of Islam, Mu'āwiya resumed the expeditions against the Byzantines with great force. From this point on, these expeditions are regularly noted for each year, with the first of them occurring in the year 42[37] against the Alans and the Byzantines.[38] Theophanes first mentions an Arab attack in Romania under AM 6154; this year (AS 974) overlaps in the summer with

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[32]al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, I, 2865, 2927.

[33][These men were Muḥammad ibn Abī Ḥudhayfa and Muḥammad ibn Abī Sarḥ.]

[34]Cf. *ibid.*, I, 2888.

[35]Cf. Theophanes, *Chronographia*, 347; al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, 159, 160; al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, II, 211; al-Mas'ūdī, *Muruj al-dhahab wa-ma'ādin al-jawhar*, ed. and trans. C. Barbier de Meynard and P. de Courteille (Paris, 1861–77), II, 335; al-Dīnawarī, *al-Akhbār al-ṭiwāl*, ed. V. Guirgass (Leiden, 1888), 168. Theophanes gives the date as AM 6150; this would be AS 970 and 38–39 AH [659 AD]). According to Theophanes, AM 6142 (AS 31/AH 32), Constans requested a truce from Mu'āwiya and observed it for two years; but the truce was broken as early as the following year in Cyprus and Armenia.

[36]Nöldeke, "Zur Geschichte der Araber", 96.

[37]Elias of Nisibis mistakenly sets the beginning, and not the end of the truce, in the year 42.

[38]al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, II, 16.

AH 43 (AD 663). According to al-Wāqidī,[39] al-Yaʻqūbī[40] and Elias, Busr ibn Abī Arṭāt led the Arab expedition in AH 43.

Then follows the great campaign of ʻAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Khālid ibn al-Walīd, who lived in Ḥimṣ in a quite independent situation, on account of his famous father.[41] According to Theophanes, in AM 6156 ʻAbd al-Raḥmān pressed into Romania, stayed there throughout the winter, and devastated many areas. According to al-Ṭabarī,[42] he entered in AH 44, spent the winter of AH 45 in enemy territory, and returned to Ḥimṣ in AH 46.[43] There he was poisoned by the Christian physician Ibn Uthāl, on Muʻāwiya's instigation, because ʻAbd al-Raḥmān seemed to be enjoying too much respect and independence. It is difficult to make this into two separate expeditions.[44] If ʻAbd al-Raḥmān spent the winter of AH 45 in Byzantine territory, then he entered it in the preceding summer, that is in 45 and not 44, since AH 45 began in the spring (24 March AD 655); [422] a return journey in AH 46 can only be connected with an expedition in 45. Theophanes is therefore correct in his dating. The summer of AH 45 overlaps with AM 6156, AS 676; the winter, during which the campaign proceeded without interruption, as also according to Theophanes, falls in AM 6157. The return home followed in early 46 AH, in the spring of AD 666. Several more precise reports are to be found in the Syriac source of Nöldeke.[45]

In AM 6159, according to Theophanes, Saborius, the *strategos* in Byzantine Armenia who had rebelled against the emperor Constans II, entered negotiations with Muʻāwiya and made sure of his support. However, when Arab auxiliary troops commanded by Faḍāla (ibn ʻUbayd) arrived in the Hexapolis,[46] Saborius was already dead and the revolt had been put down by the *patricius* Nicephorus, sent by Constantine IV. Left to his own devices, Faḍāla asked Muʻāwiya for reinforcements, and Muʻāwiya sent his son Yazīd with a large army. Yazīd and Faḍāla marched as far as Chalcedon and took

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[39] *Ibid.*, II, 27.

[40] al-Yaʻqūbī, *Taʼrīkh*, ed. M.Th. Houtsma (Leiden, 1883), II, 285.

[41] We find him there already in AH 33 (al-Ṭabarī, *Taʼrīkh*, I, 2921). Khālid had taken up residence in Ḥimṣ after the death of Abū ʻUbayda (AH 18); he also died there (*ibid.*, I, 2645, 2671). Sayf (*ibid.*, I, 2523, 2525) gives false information.

[42] *Ibid.*, II, 67.

[43] *Ibid.*, II, 82.

[44] Elias repeats the assertion that ʻAbd al-Raḥmān spent the winters of both AH 44 and 46. He plays it safe by including the two outer limits of possibility.

[45] Nöldeke, "Zur Geschichte der Araber", 97.

[46] In Melitene, cf. Eustathius at Dionys. Perieg., 694, in Karl Müller, *Geographi graeci minores* (Paris, 1882), II, 342 (Nöldeke).

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many prisoners of war. They also took Amorium in Phrygia, left 5000 men there, and returned home to Syria. In the following winter, however, the *cubicularius* Andreas made a night attack on Amorium and massacred the Arab garrison.

Theophanes seems to regard Chalcedon as the last objective that the Arabs reached. However, they went beyond Chalcedon, crossed over to Thrace, and besieged Constantinople. The *Continuatio* says, between two accounts of the coming to power of Constans and Constantine IV:

> Mohabia (= Mu'āwiya), the king of the Saracens, sent 100,000 men to subdue Constantinople, ordering them to obey his son Yzit (= Yazīd) like slaves (he had also resolved to make Yazīd the heir to his kingdom). When they had carried on the siege throughout the spring season and could no longer bear the hardships of hunger and pestilence, they abandoned the city. They seized many towns and, laden with booty, they returned after two years and in good health, once again seeing Damascus and the king who had sent them out.[47]

Nöldeke's Syriac source[48] similarly tells of Constantinople besieged by Yazīd. However, he gives only a single scene, in which "the agreeable mixture of absolutism and popular rule" in the imperial city comes forth in lively fashion. Nöldeke fixes the date at AS 974 (= AM 6154).

According to al-Ṭabarī, Yazīd set forth in the year 49 and reached as far as [423] Constantinople; with him were Ibn 'Abbās, Ibn 'Umar, Ibn al-Zubayr and Abū Ayyūb al-Anṣārī.[49] According to Ibn al-Athīr, however, Yazīd does not participate in the campaign from the beginning. It is only when he composes verses expressing his satisfaction at not having to suffer hunger and illness in the Muslim camp near Chalcedon, while staying at home with his lovely wife, that his father sends him forward together with an army accompanied by the cream of the Medinan nobility.[50]

These verses may have been ascribed to Yazīd only to make a tendentious point. In any case, they allow us to ascertain that an Arab army was already

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[47] *Continuatio*, par. 26: *Mohabia Sarracenorum rex centum milia virorum, quae Yzit filio suo cui et regnum decreverat famularentur obsequio, direxit ad Constantinopolim debellandum. Quam dum per omne vernum tempus obsidione cingerent et famis ac pestilentiae laborem non tolerarent, relicta urbe plurima oppida capientes onusti praeda Damascum et regem, a quo directi fuerunt, post biennium salutifere reviserunt.*

[48] Nöldeke, "Zur Geschichte der Araber", 96.

[49] al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, II, 86.

[50] Ibn al-Athīr, *Kāmil*, III, 381.

in Chalcedon, before Yazīd himself arrived there and proceeded to besiege Constantinople. Regarding who held the command before him, the tradition is divided. The one option does not exclude the other; however, Faḍāla ibn 'Ubayd al-Anṣārī seems to have been the one in charge. Theophanes maintains, mistakenly, that Yazīd had already come to Melitene with the army and had then marched to Chalcedon together with Faḍāla. It is quite strange that he says nothing about the siege of Constantinople. On the other hand, Theophanes reports that the enemy took Amorium on the way home, if only for a short time. The Spanish continuator absolutely revels in the Muslims' success on their return journey to Syria, as if he wished in this way to veil their mishap before Constantinople. Strikingly, there is no talk anywhere of an Arab fleet, although there had to be one present to allow them to cross the Bosporus.

It is firmly established from Theophanes and the *Continuatio* that the expedition took place between the reigns of Constans II and Constantine IV Pogonatus. Constantine succeeded to the rule in autumn of AM 6160 (AS 980, AD 668), and before AH 49, which began in February AD 669. In the last summer of Constans' reign (AM 6159) [424] Faḍāla had already marched out; it was after Constans' death that he arrived at Chalcedon.[51] Faḍāla camped there in the winter of 6160 and had to contend with enormous hardship. After the winter, at the beginning of 49 AH (AD 669), Yazīd joined him at Chalcedon and proceeded to the attack on Constantinople. According to the *Continuatio*, the city was besieged "for the entire spring season" (*per omne vernum tempus*). The journey home through Asia Minor to Syria must have taken place in the summer of the same year, if it allowed opportunities for so many deeds of martial valor. "After two years" (*post biennium*), according to the same source, the Arabs were happily at home again; we may understand this to mean that they had been in the field for two summers and one winter. The main action, Yazīd's siege of Constantinople, fell in the year AH 49, as al-Ṭabarī and Ibn al-Athīr report.[52] Theophanes, as so often, places the entire sequence of events together under the year in which the drama began, namely the revolt of Saborius against Constans II, regarding which the Arab writers know nothing.

The Byzantine naval diversion against the Syrian coastal cities in AH 49 was a return visit.[53]

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[51]Theophanes, *Chronographia*, 350:18.

[52]The various dates given, namely AH 43 (Nöldeke's Syriac source), 45 (al-Mas'ūdī, *Murūj al-dhahab*, V, 62), 56 (al-Ya'qūbī, *Ta'rīkh*, II, 285), and 57 (Elias) are worthless and built on errors. Elias and al-Ya'qūbī assign Faḍāla's campaign to the year 49.

[53]al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, 117.

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Toward the end of his life, Mu'āwiya made another powerful attack against the Byzantines, which also failed to accomplish its goal. According to Theophanes, in AM 6166, in the fifth year of Constantine Pogonatus, the Saracens undertook a large expedition against Byzantium with a fleet that had already been deployed the previous year; its *amīr* was named Khālid.[54] They laid anchor at the Hebdomon near Constantinople. Pogonatus had mustered a fleet of his own; battles took place at sea every day, from spring through autumn. In winter the enemy returned with their ships to the island of Cyzicus;[55] in the spring they again appeared before the capital and began the game anew. The Arabs went on in this way for seven years without success, suffering heavy losses. "Grecian fire", which had been invented by the Syrian Callinicus, was used against them. Then [425] they retreated. On their journey home their fleet was destroyed near the promontory of Syllaeus. According to Nicephorus, as a consequence of this catastrophe Mu'āwiya entered into negotiations with Pogonatus and bought peace from him.[56] Theophanes gives, as he often likes to do, a Mardaite revolt as the reason for the Arabs' willingness to accept peace. Mu'āwiya engaged to provide 3000 *dīnār*s, 50 prisoners of war and 50 noble horses every year; according to Nicephorus, the peace was meant to last 30 years.

According to al-Wāqidī[57] and al-Balādhurī,[58] the admiral Junāda ibn Abī Umayya al-Azdī, who had taken Rhodes in AH 52, took possession of the island of Arwād (Cyzicus) near Constantinople. The Muslims stayed there for a long time, reportedly seven years. Tubay', a stepson of the future-telling rabbi Ka'b, told them: "Do you see this step? When it is torn away, it will be time for us to go home." Then a storm arose and tore the step down, and news arrived of Mu'āwiya's death and of Yazīd's order to

[54]Theophanes, *Chronographia*, 353; Nicephorus, *Opuscula historica*, 32. Reiske changes *Khale ton Ameraion* into *Khaled ton Anzeraion* (i.e. al-Anṣārī), so as to make him identical with Abū Ayyūb, whose name was indeed Khālid. This emendation is unfortunate, for Abū Ayyūb had already died before Constantinople in AH 49, and his name, Khālid, was unknown even to those who knew him (al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, I, 3059). How then could the Byzantines have known it? Khālid ibn 'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Khālid is a more likely candidate.

[55][In this paragraph and the following Wellhausen confuses the island of Arwād, which lies off the coast of Syria, with the town of Cyzicus, on the southern shore of the Sea of Marmara. This problem has been resolved in Lawrence I. Conrad, "The Conquest of Arwād: a Source-Critical Study in the Historiography of the Early Medieval Near East", in A. Cameron and L.I. Conrad, eds., *The Byzantine and Early Islamic Near East*, I: *Problems in the Literary Source Material* (Princeton, 1992), 317–401.]

[56]*Opuscula historica*, 32.

[57]al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, II, 163.

[58]*Futūḥ al-buldān*, 236.

return home. The island was no longer garrisoned, its fortifications fell into ruin, and the Byzantines were safe.

The year AH 54 in al-Wāqidī overlaps with AM 6165 in Theophanes, since it began on 16 December AS 985. In the spring of 54/6165 (AD 674), accordingly, the Arab fleet appeared before Constantinople for the first time. Theophanes and Nicephorus are also in agreement with al-Wāqidī, that the war lasted seven years. In further agreement, al-Wāqidī places the conclusion of peace at AH 60/AS 991 = AM 6171 (AD 679–80). Theophanes, however, dates the peace to AM 6169, which assumes that the seven-year period began two years earlier; the Arab fleet was already in action against the Byzantines in AH 52[59] and 53,[60] if not already before Constantinople itself. In any case, Theophanes and Nicephorus are correct in saying that it was Mu'āwiya who opened and concluded the negotiations, and not his successor Yazīd I. Their view is confirmed by al-Mas'ūdī, who mentions a peace with Pogonatus at the end of Mu'āwiya's reign, together with the truce that Mu'āwiya concluded in 38–39.[61]

In addition to Romania, the Arab war against the Empire had another theater of war, namely North Africa. The Arabs' point of departure was Egypt, which had earlier been independent of Mu'āwiya but then, beginning in 38 (AD 658–59), had come under his rule.

'Amr ibn al-'Āṣ had already conquered the Pentapolis and had at least attacked Tripoli. [426] However, the caliph 'Umar prevented him from pressing forward. In AH 27, the caliph 'Uthmān replaced 'Amr with 'Abd Allāh ibn Abī Sarḥ as governor of Egypt and gave him permission to attack Africa (Ifrīqiya),[62] where at that time the *patricius* Gregorius maintained himself as independent ruler. According to Theophanes, in AM 6139 the Saracens put Gregorius to flight and drove him out of Africa; however, they withdrew from the country once the Africans had committed themselves to paying tribute. The year of the world 6139 (AS 959) was year 27 of the *hijra*, which began in October AD 647; al-Balādhurī gives a choice of AH 27, 28 or 29.[63] The Arabs' leader was, in any case, 'Abd Allāh ibn Abī Sarḥ; it is not at all improbable that he would have undertaken this campaign during his very first year as governor of Egypt. From the detailed report of the

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[59] al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, II, 157; al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, 236.

[60] Theophanes, *Chronographia*, AM 6164.

[61] al-Mas'ūdī, *Murūj al-dhahab*, II, 335.

[62] "Africa" here means the old, Roman province of Africa, the capital of which was Carthage. [This is the early Islamic province of Ifrīqiya, corresponding to modern-day Tunisia and parts of coastal Algeria and Libya.]

[63] *Futūḥ al-buldān*, 226.

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Continuatio, which is set in the wrong place, it becomes clear that he first took Tripoli and then attacked Africa/Ifrīqiya:

> Many fortunate things were accomplished by the commander Habedella (= 'Abd Allāh) in the West. He came to Tripoli, entered Cida and Helemtia[64] by fighting and then, having inflicted great damage, and after conquering and devastating the provinces, he agreed on terms with them. From there he immediately went on to Africa, thirsting for blood. When battle was offered,[65] the battle line of the Moors was overthrown, and all the flower of the African nobility, together with Count Gregory, was utterly destroyed. Laden with rich spoils, Habedella then returned and arrived in Egypt with all his companions.[66]

According to al-Wāqidī, the *patricius*, whose rule extended from Tripoli to Tangiers, was defeated at 'Aqūba and killed by Ibn al-Zubayr; thereupon the nobles of Ifrīqiya took upon themselves the payment of 300 talents of gold, on condition that he leave, and he agreed.[67]

We have already spoken about the participation of Ibn Abī Sarḥ and the Egyptian fleet in Mu'āwiya's wars against the Byzantines. [427] Ibn Abī Sarḥ remained governor of Egypt until 'Uthmān was murdered and conflict broke out between 'Alī and his rivals. Under Mu'āwiya's rule Egypt again became the province of the old 'Amr ibn al-'Āṣ; after his death (in AH 43) it was inherited by his son. After a while, however, the caliph put Mu'āwiya ibn Ḥudayj in his place, reportedly in AH 47.[68] Ibn Ḥudayj, after

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[64] I cannot identify these two toponyms. Helemptie may derive from Leptis.

[65] *praeparata igitur certamina*, accusative in place of ablative absolute.

[66] *Continuatio*, par. 24. The following indication of dates belongs to the beginning of par. 25, rather than the end of par. 24. [The Latin text, cited by Wellhausen without translation, is: *Per ducem Habedella in Occidentem prospera multa acta sunt. Tripolim venit, Cidam quoque et Helemtien bellando adgressus est et post multas desolationes effectas victas vastatasque provincias in fidem accepit. Et mox Africam adhuc sanguinem sitiens adventavit. Praeparata igitur certamina illico in fugam Maurorum acies versa est et omnis decoritas Africae cum Gregorio comite usque ad internicionem deleta est. Habedella quoque, honestus beneficio largo, cum omnibus suis cohortibus remeando Aegyptum pervenit.*]

[67] In al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, 227. Another, different report of al-Wāqidī regarding the *patricius* Gregorius is in al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, I, 2818. There is little to be gained, historically speaking, from Ibn al-Athīr, *Kāmil*, III, 68, or from Abū l-Faraj al-Iṣfahānī, *Kitāb al-aghānī* (Būlāq, AH 1285), VI, 58.

[68] al-Ṭabarī, II, 28, 84, 93; al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, 228. W. Roth, *Nafi ibn Uqba* (Gottingen, 1859), 29, remarks: "Mu'āwiya ibn Ḥudayj was never governor of Egypt. After 'Amr's death in AH 43, after a short transitional administration led by his son, he

a long pause, undertook yet another westward expedition that brought him as far as Sicily. "Idols" taken there as spoils were forwarded to the caliph Mu'āwiya, who then sold them to India.[69] Theophanes dates this first Arab incursion in Sicily, where the emperor Constans was then residing, to AM 6155 (AS 975); this would correspond to the summer of AH 44 (AD 664). For Ibn Ḥudayj was not yet governor when he campaigned in Sicily.[70] During his governorship, it was not Ibn Ḥudayj who won fame in Ifrīqiya, but rather 'Uqba ibn Nāfi' al-Fihrī. 'Uqba was a nephew of 'Amr ibn al-'Āṣ and had conquered Barqa and Zawīla under his rule (in AH 38–43), and ever since then had been in charge of this country. From there, on orders of the caliph Mu'āwiya and with his support, 'Uqba made his famous campaign against Ifrīqiya. With help from the Berbers, he led the first serious strike against the rule of Christianity in that region and gave Islam a strong central point in the fortified camp town of al-Qayrawān, which he founded and which had the same import for Ifrīqiya that al-Kūfa and al-Baṣra had for Iraq. In AM 6161, Theophanes says, the Saracens overran Africa and led away 80,000 people as prisoners. The old Arabic tradition gives the same year, namely AH 50 (AS 981, AD 670), for 'Uqba's expedition.[71] This agreement is completely decisive. Soon afterwards 'Uqba was recalled and replaced by Abū l-Muhājir, a freeman of Maslama ibn Mukhallad al-Anṣārī. In AH 50, Maslama had indeed [428] come to Egypt as governor, replacing Ibn Ḥudayj. He remained in office until Mu'āwiya's death, as did Abū l-Muhājir under his command.[72]

2. After the death of Mu'āwiya the Muslims, as a consequence of their inner conflict, made a long pause in their wars against the Byzantines. Yazīd I is said to have withdrawn the Arab garrison from Rhodes and even from Cyprus.[73] Nonetheless, Yazīd does not seem to have been so completely

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was succeeded by 'Uqba ibn 'Āmir, who was then replaced in the year 47 by Maslama ibn Mukhallad." 'Utba did not die in AH 44 and was never governor of Egypt. Instead, he held responsibility, in alternation with his brother 'Anbasa, for leading the *ḥajj* from Damascus in those years. Regarding 'Uqba ibn 'Āmir al-Juhanī (not Jumaḥī), see al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, 217–18. Maslama ibn Mukhallad became governor in AH 50. Here we see the limited value of Ibn 'Abd al-Ḥakam, whom Roth follows as his source.

[69] al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, 235.

[70] The report in al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, II, 84, that he arrived as governor in AH 47, contradicts the report (*ibid.*, II, 28) according to which only two years elapsed between his accession and the death of 'Amr in AH 43.

[71] al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, 227; al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, II, 93.

[72] al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, II, 94, 185; al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, 228. The reports that Ibn al-Athīr (*Kāmil*, III, 387) ascribes to al-Wāqidī are completely wrong and cannot be attributed to him.

[73] al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, II, 157 (II, 196:6 is an error); al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, 153.

unwarlike as he has been portrayed. Mar'ash (Germanicia) was not given up until after his death.[74]

In AM 6176 (AS 996) = AH 65 (AD 684–85) the peace was renewed. The Arabs' tribute was now raised from the paltry sum that had been agreed upon with Mu'āwiya in AM 6169 to a higher amount, the same to which he had had to consent in AM 6150, namely, 360,000 *dīnārs*, 360 slaves and 360 noble horses every year.[75] According to Theophanes it was 'Abd al-Malik ibn Marwān (r. 65–86/685–705) who contracted the arrangement with Pogonatus, while according to the *Continuatio* it was Marwān ibn al-Ḥakam (r. 64–65/684–85).[76] The year 65 AH allows for either possibility. However, the date that Elias of Nisibis gives, based on Syriac sources, decides the question in favor of 'Abd al-Malik: the peace with the Emperor, who had advanced against Mopsuestia, was concluded on 78 July 996 AS, that is, in Dhū l-Qa'da 65 (AD 685). At that time the caliph Marwān had already died and 'Abd al-Malik had succeeded him to the throne. The truce was meant to last three years according to Brooks' Syriac source,[77] for nine years according to the *Continuatio*, and ten according to Michael the Syrian. These diverging dates seem to have been reckoned after the event, in different ways, most strikingly in the case of the *Continuatio*.

Constantine IV Pogonatus died at the beginning of AM 6177, September AD 684, and was succeeded by his 16–year-old son Justinian II Rhinotmetus. 'Abd al-Malik renewed the peace with him. According to the Arabs, this took place in AH 69–70 = AD 688–89.[78] Theophanes discusses the same thing under two years, AM 6178 and 6179; the summer of the latter corresponds to AH 69. In addition to the old conditions it was now stipulated that the contracting parties would share in the tribute of Cyprus, Armenia and Iberia. Under the circumstances, since this meant necessarily that the Arabs had to pay out additional revenues, it must be the case that until this time they alone had received the tribute of Armenia and Cyprus, [429] or else had merely laid claim to it. For this reason, the statement that Yazīd I gave up Cyprus is untenable. Regarding Armenia, we hear that the general Leontius advanced in AM 6178 on Justinian's orders, and killed the Saracens there.[79]

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[74]al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, 188.

[75]According to the *Continuatio*, 1000 *dīnārs*, one slave, one horse and one silk garment (*villosa serica*) for every day.

[76]*Continuatio*, par. 29.

[77]E.W. Brooks, "A Syriac Chronicle of the Year 846", *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* 51 (1897), 580.

[78]al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, II, 796; al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, 160.

[79]Theophanes, *Chronographia*, 363.

According to al-Balādhurī, during the schism between 'Abd al-Malik and Ibn al-Zubayr the Armenians themselves revolted against the Arabs. At first the Byzantines supported this revolt, but then they found it more advantageous to come to an understanding with the Arabs over the country and its spoils.[80] It is striking that 'Abd al-Malik did not then remove his hand entirely from Armenia, even though Mesopotamia and Mosul were not yet in his power.

The pressing reason why 'Abd al-Malik had to keep the Byzantines at bay at any cost was that during his great struggle with Iraq in the year 69–70, he found himself threatened simultaneously in Syria itself by the Mardaites. Who were they?

Reports about the Mardaites are to be found in al-Balādhurī, Theophanes and Nicephorus; the others[81] are either dependent on these three, or else unreliable. The Mardaites lived in the Amanus on the Black Mountain,[82] which is called Ūkāma in Aramaic and, slightly changed, al-Lukām in Arabic.[83] There they had a city, al-Jurjūma, near the sulfur pits between Bayyās and Būqa; from this the Arabs knew them as the Jarājima. The notion that they lived in the Lebanon, deriving from Theophanes and Nicephorus[84] and now commonly accepted, is wrong.[85] It was only through military invasion that they advanced to the Lebanon and gradually settled there. Their origins are unknown; they were different from the old inhabitants of the country. They were Christians and acted in the Byzantine service as guards of the Cilician border zone, which ever since Heraclius' reign had divided the domains of the Emperor from those of the Caliph.[86] According to al-Balādhurī, they entered into the same relationship with the Arabs as early as the reign of 'Umar I.[87] However, this is not correct in light of what came next. It was not until the reign of al-Walīd I, in AH 89, that the Mardaites [430] were taken into Arab service as frontier guardsmen, after their town of al-Jurjūma had been captured and destroyed. They were

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[80]al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, 205.

[81]Ibn al-Athīr, *Kāmil*, II, 386; IV, 250–51; Yāqūt, *Mu'jam al-buldān*, ed. F. Wüstenfeld (Leipzig, 1866–73), II, 55–56; *Aghānī*, XVI, 76; Assemani, *Bibliotheca orientalis*, I, 501ff.; Bar Hebraeus, *Chronicon syriacum*, ed. P. Bedjan (Leipzig, 1890), 109.

[82]Theophanes, *Chronographia*, 355.

[83]al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, 159. There is mention of a White Mountain next to it (*ibid.*, 161).

[84]Theophanes, *Chronographia*, 364; Nicephorus, *Opuscula historica*, 36.

[85]This misunderstanding has led to their being confused with the Maronites, with whom they have nothing to do. Cf. J.K.L. Gieseler, *Lehrbuch der Kirchengeschichte*, 2nd ed. (Bonn, 1827–57), I.2, 483–84. Anquetil du Perron (cited by Gieseler) connects them with martens [the weasel-like mammal!].

[86]Theophanes, *Chronographia*, 363.

[87]al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, 159.

allowed to remain Christian and did not have to pay any subject tax. How-
ever, they had to remain under arms, in return for which they received, in
addition to their pay and support for their families, the spoils of their de-
feated enemies. Things remained this way into the 'Abbāsid period. Similar
relationships are to be found elsewhere among non-Muslim military frontier
populations in Muslim service.

At the time of the earliest Arab attacks in Cilicia, the Mardaites receive
no mention. However, we may suppose that they did their part in making
the passage so dangerous for Mu'āwiya and his *amīrs*, especially on the
return journey. They are first mentioned by Theophanes for AM 6169, and
then again in 6176, with regard to the agreements between Mu'āwiya and
'Abd al-Malik and Pogonatus. On the other hand, they are not mentioned
by the Arabs any earlier than the time of 'Abd al-Malik's agreement with
Justinian II in AM 6179, for which they provided the occasion. On the other
two occasions they were no more than part of the picture; Theophanes,
however, can often bring them mechanically back and forth.

At the time of Ibn al-Zubayr, as we are told by al-Balādhurī,[88] while 'Abd
al-Malik was engaged in war with the Iraqis a Byzantine officer pushed into
the Lebanon with the Jarājima and their followers, who consisted of Ara-
maean peasants and runaway slaves. As a result of this, and of the uprising
of 'Amr ibn Sa'īd, which took place at the same time in Damascus, 'Abd al-
Malik saw no choice but to make peace with the Emperor, under conditions
similar to those made earlier on by Mu'āwiya, while he was constrained to
fight with the Iraqis. He then sent Suḥaym ibn al-Muhājir to the Greek offi-
cer. Suḥaym made his way secretly to his presence and killed him, together
with all the Byzantines who were with him. He promised clemency to the
rest. Now the Jarājima scattered, some to the villages of Ḥimṣ and Dam-
ascus, most of them returning to their town on the mountain of al-Lukām.
The peasants went back to their villages and the slaves to their masters.

According to Theophanes, the Mardaites pushed down from the Black
Mountain into the Lebanon, forced the towns there to submit, and ventured
as far as Jerusalem.[89] The Arabs now asked the Emperor to see to it that the
Mardaites ceased their raids from the Lebanon. Justinian, complying with
this request, brought 12,000 Mardaites away and settled them elsewhere. As
a result, the Cilician borderland [431] became depopulated. The beginning
of this report agrees with al-Balādhurī's, its end does not. It is certain

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[88] *Ibid.*, 160.

[89] Here we may understand the accounts reported for AM 6169 and 6176 as applying to
AM 6179.

that the Mardaites were still living on the Amanus in the reign of al-Walīd I, and that it was only then that the Muslims subdued and tamed them. There is, in fact, no reason to cast doubt on the account transmitted by Theophanes. However, the resettling of the Mardaites can only have been partial, and the question remains whether it has been placed in the right temporal and causal context.[90] If the Emperor called the Mardaites back from the Lebanon, he also did something more: according to al-Balādhurī, all that he did was to allow the caliph a free hand in proceeding against them. It can hardly be believed that Justinian would have rid the border area of the Mardaites *for the sake of the Arabs*. According to Nicephorus,[91] he took this measure much more in his own interest, as again afterwards, so as to add the Mardaites as reinforcements to his own army—not when he was making peace with the Arabs, but rather when he was breaking it.

Justinian was formally the breaker of the peace on this later occasion, and Theophanes brands him as such. However, it cannot be concealed that the Arabs' bragging about their faithful observance of the agreement was hypocrisy and that in reality they welcomed war.[92] It was only the Arabs, and not the Byzantines, who found the peace oppressive and humiliating, since they had to pay for it. So long as they were tearing one another limb from limb, they maintained the peace out of necessity. But with the restoration of the unity of the empire and the defeat of Ibn al-Zubayr (AH 72, 73), the time came, after a long hiatus, when they could again take up arms against external foes.

Justinian suffered a decisive defeat at Sebastopolis or Sebaste[93] in Cilicia. Al-Wāqidī places the renewal of hostilities in the year 73 of the *hijra*,[94] the summer of which fell in AS 1003 (692 AD). Elias also dates the battle of Sebaste to the same year. According to Theophanes it took place in AM 6184. According to the rule observed thus far, this should have been AS 1004. [432] However, at this point the relation between the two calendars changes for a time. For the following year as well, the difference between AM

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[90] Comparison of Theophanes, *Chronographia*, 367, with Nicephorus, *Opuscula historica*, 37, shows how Theophanes occasionally rearranges the material that he has received.

[91] *Opuscula historica*, 36.

[92] Theophanes, *Chronographia*, 365: "Justinian believed that the Arabs' request (that he not break the peace agreement) was caused by fear. He did not consider that their intention was only to put an end to the inroads of the Mardaites, and then to break the peace with a plausible pretext". The subject of the verbs παῦσαι and λῦσαι is the Arabs, not Justinian, as Anastasius maintains.

[93] Elias of Nisibis; cf. the note to al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, II, 1236.

[94] In al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, II, 853.

and AS is not, as previously, 5180, but rather 5181.[95] The Arab commander at Sebaste was Muḥammad ibn Marwān, who in the previous autumn had triumphed over Muṣʿab ibn al-Zubayr at Maskin. His brother, the caliph ʿAbd al-Malik, entrusted him with Mesopotamia and Armenia together with the Mesopotamian and Syrian mountain passes, and together with the latter, the conduct of the war against the Byzantines.

Theophanes places the revolt of the Armenians against the Arabs in AM 6185, following the Emperor's defeat at Sebaste in AM 6184; he gives the name Sabbatius to their leader Sumbāṭ. According to al-Balādhurī, Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad lured them into a trap.[96]

In AM 6186, according to Theophanes, Muḥammad ibn Marwān made war against the Byzantines, again successfully. For this Elias gives AS 1005; the relation between AM and AS is the same as for the battle of Sebaste. According to the Muslim sources, fights took place in AH 75 at Marʿash (Germanicia);[97] the summer of 75 fell in AS 1005 (AD 694). An eclipse of the sun, which according to Theophanes occurred on 5 October AM 6186, is important for fixing the chronology. Elias sets this eclipse both in AH 74 and in AH 75. However, he gives the day of the month as 29 Jumādā I. In AH 74, 27 Jumādā I fell on 5 October, and since in the Arabic script it is easy to confuse 9 with 7, this is Theophanes' date. In this way the eclipse of the sun (5 October AD 693) is established, and with it the correspondence between AM 6186, AS 105, AH 74–75, and AD 693–94.

In AM 6187, the year in which Justinian II was forced to yield the throne to Leontius, Muḥammad ibn Marwān made an assault on Armenia IV, according to Theophanes. This is identical to the attack on Melitene in AH 76 attributed to him by Ibn al-Athīr;[98] the summer of 76 (AD 695) fell in AS 1006, AM 6187.

In the year AM 6188, according to Theophanes, Leontius had some time to breathe. Elias and al-Ṭabarī[99] assign an expedition of al-Walīd (I) ibn ʿAbd al-Malik to AH 77. In order to fulfill a duty of conscience, a raid was conducted every year and, whenever possible, placed under the nominal command of a son of the reigning caliph (like the leadership of the *ḥajj*).

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[95] On this point, it makes no difference if we arrive at a decision regarding the question of when ʿAbd al-Malik began to mint gold coins with Muslim inscriptions. It is stated that one of the reasons for the breaking of the peace was Justinian's refusal to accept the newly minted gold coins.

[96] *Futūḥ al-buldān*, 205.

[97] al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, 188; al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, II, 863; al-Yaʿqūbī, *Taʾrīkh*, II, 336.

[98] *Kāmil*, IV, 338.

[99] *Taʾrīkh*, II, 1032.

In AM 6189, according to Theophanes, Alidos (al-Walīd?) overran [433] Romania and returned home with many prisoners. At the same time, Sergius rebelled in Lazica and handed the country over to the Arabs. In al-Ṭabarī an expedition is led by Yaḥyā ibn al-Ḥakam in AH 78;[100] al-Yaʿqūbī places it in AH 76.[101]

In AM 6190 Leontius was deposed and Apsimarus, that is, Tiberius III, took his place. His brother Heraclius assumed command of the army in the eastern frontier region. In this year, according to Theophanes, the plague raged in Constantinople. From this it can be established that AM 6190 = AS 1009, AH 79 (which began at the end of March AD 698). For according to Elias, the plague raged in Syria in AH 79, and according to al-Ṭabarī in AH 79 the Arabs did not perform any raid at all, because of the plague.[102] On the other hand, in this year the Byzantines attacked Antioch from the sea;[103] Theophanes is silent about this.

For AH 80, al-Ṭabarī mentions a raid by al-Walīd ibn ʿAbd al-Malik,[104] and for AH 81 a raid by ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿAbd al-Malik,[105] to Qālīqala.[106]

According to Theophanes, in AM 6192 the Byzantines took advantage of the absence of Muḥammad ibn Marwān, who was on campaign against ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad ibn al-Ashʿath, to press forward to Samosata. Muḥammad's campaign against ʿAbd al-Raḥmān fell in the first half of AH 82, which began on 15 February of the Seleucid year 1012 (AD 701). The earlier relationship between AM and AS is thus reestablished, with the difference between them fixed at 5180. It remains this way for a while longer.

In AM 6193, according to Theophanes, ʿAbd Allāh invaded Romania. However, after an unsuccessful siege of Ṭuranda, he turned back and besieged Mopsuestia. According to al-Balādhurī,[107] ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿAbd al-Malik appeared before Ṭuranda (in Melitene) and forced it to yield in AH 83 (= AS 1013, AD 702). Al-Yaʿqūbī also places the siege of Mopsuestia in the same year,[108] while al-Wāqidī[109] and Elias place it in the following. In

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[100] *Ibid.*, II, 1035.

[101] *Taʾrīkh*, II, 337.

[102] al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, II, 1035.

[103] Elias; al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, II, 1036.

[104] al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, II, 1047.

[105] [The name should be ʿUbayd Allāh ibn ʿAbd al-Malik. See the Ibrahim ed. of al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, VI, 331 (Cairo, 1971).]

[106] Also at II, 1047.

[107] *Futūḥ al-buldān*, 185.

[108] *Taʾrīkh*, II, 337.

[109] al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, II, 1127.

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any case, the Ṭuranda campaign and the building of a citadel in Mopsuestia have no relation to one another.

In AM 6194, Baanes handed over Armenia IV to the Arabs. In AM 6195, a revolt in Armenia itself was put down by Muḥammad ibn Marwān. There is nothing in the Arabic writers corresponding to these two reports of Theophanes.[110]

In AM 6196, Αζιδος ὸ τοῦ Χουνει ["Yazid, the son of Khounei] invaded Cilicia and besieged Sis. Heraclius, the Emperor's brother, then arrived and inflicted [434] a severe defeat on the Arabs.[111] This "Azidos" must refer to Yazīd ibn Jubayr, of whom it is related that he clashed with a large Byzantine army at Sūsana, near Mopsuestia.[112] However, al-Ṭabarī does not place the affair in the last year of ʿAbd al-Malik (AH 86 = AS 1016, AM 6196), but rather in the first year of al-Walīd (AH 87).

The expeditions into Romania under ʿAbd al-Malik are not at all comparable to those of Muʿāwiya's reign. They never went far beyond the frontier and barely lasted through the summer. Far more important things were done in Ifrīqiya under ʿAbd al-Malik's rule.

Yazīd I put ʿUqba ibn Nāfiʿ in charge there once again. He pushed forward to the farthest west, but is said to have perished while fighting against the Berbers (under Kusayla).[113] At the beginning the Berbers had established friendly relations with the Arabs, but upon closer acquaintance they changed their minds. ʿUqba's successor, Qays ibn Zuhayr al-Balawī, was appointed by ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz ibn Marwān, brother of the caliph ʿAbd al-Malik, who had ruled over Egypt since the end of AH 65. Qays took Tunis, after which he led the Muslims out of Ifrīqiya, back to Barqa. There he was killed while rushing with a small group of horsemen against a large force of Byzantines who had disembarked from their ships to campaign along the coast. For many years afterwards, his grave was pointed out and visited. This is what is related by al-Balādhurī, by far the most reliable among those who have reported on these events. The result of all these enormous efforts was that the Arabs had to abandon al-Qayrawān and Ifrīqiya around AH 65, and even found themselves threatened in Barqa. Throughout the entire time of the Civil War, they gave no thought to regaining what they had lost. Therefore, when we find reports about expeditions to Ifrīqiya during

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[110]See, however, Ibn al-Athīr, *Kāmil*, IV, 399, 411.

[111]Theophanes relates the fact twice, at the end of AM 6195 and at the beginning of 6196. The second version, unclear in its construction, needs to be understood according to the first. The first version has Αζαρ instead of Αζιδ, which explains the repetition.

[112]al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, II, 1185.

[113]al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, 229, says nothing about this version of ʿUqba's death.

this time,[114] these are based on false chronology. These expeditions cannot have commenced before the defeat of Ibn al-Zubayr.

After Ibn al-Zubayr's fall, according to Ibn al-Athīr,[115] 'Abd al-Malik sent a large army to Ifrīqiya, under Ḥassān ibn al-Nu'mān al-Ghassānī. He marched from al-Qayrawān to Carthage, which until then had never been assailed. The garrison fled [435] by ship to Sicily and Spain, and Ḥassān forced his way in and devastated the city. Once again he besieged the united Byzantines and Berbers at Ṣatfūra[116] and Bizerta; the Byzantines fled to Vaga, the Berbers to Bona. Then, after pausing for a while in al-Qayrawān, to let the wounded recover, he marched against the Kāhina ("the Seeress"). Since the defeat of the Kusayla she had held supreme power among the Berbers. She lived on the Awrās mountains. The two sides met at the river Nīnī. Ḥassān suffered a severe defeat and was forced to withdraw from Ifrīqiya. He went to Barqa, where the Fortresses of Ḥassān are named for him, and stayed there for five years.[117] After this time, he renewed the attack against Ifrīqiya, at the command of 'Abd al-Malik. When the Kāhina heard of his intention, she had the cities and fortresses laid waste with their treasures, since the Arabs' only goal was to take booty of this kind, whereas the Berbers could make do with fields and pastures. In doing this, however, she aroused the displeasure of the Byzantines, and could no longer rely on those around her. She was defeated by Ḥassān in a fierce battle and fled, only to be taken prisoner and executed. At that point the Berbers came to an understanding with the Arabs and contributed a contingent to their army, which was commanded by the Kāhina's sons.[118] Ḥassān was able to go on to al-Qayrawān, where he remained as governor until the reign of al-Walīd I.

Ibn al-Athīr gives only general indications of chronology, and we have to look elsewhere for precise dates. Success can be achieved most securely in the case of the conquest of Carthage. According to Theophanes and Nicephorus,[119] the Arabs took Carthage during the summer. They did not hold on throughout the winter, but in the following summer they drove the Greeks out once again: the latter event took place in AM 6190 and led

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[114]For instance, the report attributed to al-Wāqidī in Ibn al-Athīr, *Kāmil*, IV, 302.

[115]*Ibid.*, IV, 300.

[116]Yāqūt, *Mu'jam al-buldān*, III, 387.

[117]al-Balādhurī also relates that Ḥassān, defeated by the Kāhina, settled down in Barqa and lived in a complex of fortresses, the construction of which is described.

[118]The union of the Berbers with the Arabs is an important moment for understanding the astonishingly swift disappearence of Latin-Christian civilization from North Africa.

[119]Theophanes, *Chronographia*, 370; Nicephorus, *Opuscula historica*, 39.

to the deposition of the emperor Leontius and the accession of Apsimarus in the same year. AM 6189 overlaps in the summer with AH 78 (AD 697) and 6190 overlaps with AH 79. If Ḥassān was able to proceed to conquer Carthage in AH 78, he must already have had possession of al-Qayrawān. He may therefore [436] have gone to Ifrīqiya in AH 77, as al-Yaʿqūbī says;[120] before that he would have needed a considerable amount of time in order to reestablish Arab rule in Barqa and Tripolis. His defeat at the hands of the Kāhina cannot have taken place as early as AH 78, as Elias maintains, but rather only after the repeated conquest of Carthage, thus AH 79 at the earliest. Then he had to abandon Ifrīqiya and return to Barqa. He stayed there for five years, thus until 84.[121] In fact, Elias has him repeat his campaign to Ifrīqiya in AH 84 (AD 703), when he defeats the Kāhina and puts her to death. Ḥassān remained governor in al-Qayrawān until the reign of al-Walīd I. According to Ibn Athīr,[122] his successor arrived in AH 89 (AD 708); on this Elias is in agreement.[123]

3. Under al-Walīd I the Muslims' military undertakings took on a new character. He acceded on 14 Shawwāl 86 (9 October 705), that is, the beginning of AM 6197 (AS 1017), as Theophanes claims. Not much later in Byzantium, Justinian II Rhinotmetus arrived again on the throne, after ten years of banishment. As chief commander against the Byzantines under al-Walīd I, his brother Maslama ibn ʿAbd al-Malik appears from the beginning. However, Muḥammad ibn Marwān remained for a while as governor of Mespotamia, until being replaced in that office by Maslama in AH 91.[124]

The great event in the Byzantine theater of war under al-Walīd is the conquest of Tyana by Maslama and ʿAbbās ibn al-Walīd. According to Nicephorus and Theophanes, the Arabs seized Tyana to avenge the destruction of an Arab army commanded by Maiuma ["Maymūn"] at the hands of Marianus. They also spent the winter in the siege of the city. After the winter, Justinian sent an army of reinforcements, quickly thrown together, poorly armed and led: this army was cut down with great losses in dead

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[120] *Taʾrīkh*, II, 337.

[121] The one known coin of his with an Arabic legend from the year AH 80 must have been struck in Barqa, not Ifrīqiya. This is also likely for non-chronological reasons; cf. G. Stickel, "Lavoix's *Catalogue des monnaies musulmanes* (review article)", *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* 43 (1889), 685.

[122] *Kāmil*, IV, 302, 427.

[123] A. Müller, *Der Islam im Morgen- und Abendland* (Berlin, 1885–87), I, 419ff., gives the correct chronology overall, probably following the precedent of H.J. Fournel, whose book on the Berbers [*Les Berbers: étude sur le conquête de l'Afrique par les arabes*] (Paris, 1875–81) is not available to me.

[124] Ibn al-Athīr, *Kāmil*, IV, 439; Brooks, "Syriac Chronicle," 582, under AS 1021, 1022.

and prisoners. Enormous provisions fell into the Arabs' hands, making it possible for them to continue the siege, which they would otherwise have given up for lack of food. The city had to surrender and was evacuated; it remained wasted and empty. According to Theophanes this happened in AM 6201.

[437] Tyana was conquered in AH 89 by Maslama and 'Abbās according to al-Wāqidī[125] and Elias. The month is given by al-Ṭabarī as Jumādā II,[126] corresponding to May; the report that the siege lasted throughout the winter is also to be found here. The matter thus extends over two years; this explains why it is also placed under the year AH 88.[127] According to Theophanes, the defeat of Maimuma (= Maymūn for the Arabs), which also happened at Tyana, took place previously; accordingly, this event is moved ahead into AH 87 by al-Wāqidī.[128]

AM 6201 here corresponds to AH 89 (AD 708), AS 1019. The difference between the Seleucid and the world eras thus increases to 5182. This increase is exceptional, but seems to carry through the two following years. According to Theophanes: "Abbas made a campaign into Romania in 6202"; according to al-Wāqidī: "'Abbās made a raid into Isauria in AH 90".[129] According to Theophanes, 'Uthmān made a raid into Cilicia and Commagene in AM 6203; according to Elias, 'Uthmān made a raid into Romania in AH 91.

At AM 6204 the difference is reduced again to 5181, where it remains henceforth. According to Theophanes, the renowned fortress of Amasia was captured by Maslama. According to al-Ṭabarī and al-Ya'qūbī this happened in AH 93, AS 1023 (AD 712).[130] At the beginning of this year in December 711/AS 1023, Justianian was murdered; this was followed by a swift series of changes in rulers, until Leo the Isaurian ascended the throne.

In AM 6205, according to Theophanes, Pisidian Antioch was conquered by 'Abbās. According to al-Ṭabarī[131] and Elias, this took place in AH 94/AS

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[125] In al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, II, 1197.

[126] *Ibid.*, II, 1191.

[127] In *ibid.*, II, 1191–92.

[128] In *ibid.*, II, 1185. Al-Wāqidī presents matters as if "Maymūn the Jurjumī" were a partisan of the Emperor. This is false. Theophanes' statement that he fought and fell on the Arab side is confirmed by al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, 160–61. Maymūn was a Mardaite and had already entered into Arab service before the year AH 89, in which the Mardaites collectively capitulated.

[129] al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, II, 1200.

[130] *Ibid.*, II, 1236; al-Ya'qūbī, *Ta'rīkh*, II, 350.

[131] *Ta'rīkh*, II, 1255.

1024 (AD 713). In February of the same year, a great earthquake took place in Syria, according to Theophanes, Elias and the Syriac source of Brooks.[132]

According to Theophanes, in AM 6206 Maslama reached Galatia. Elias mentions for AH 95 (AS 1025) a campaign of Maslama [438] to Armenia: Maslama may have pressed through Armenia IV into Galatia. In al-Ṭabarī all that is mentioned for this year is a raid of ʿAbbās ibn al-Walīd.[133] Perhaps, however, Maslama actually held the leadership.[134]

The North African–Spanish wars under al-Walīd do not actually belong here any longer, since the Byzantines no longer took part in them. In order to come to a conclusion, however, I shall put briefly put together all the ancient reports.

Mūsā ibn Nuṣayr came to Ifrīqiya in AH 89 as Ḥassān ibn al-Nuʿmān's successor, as we have already seen. Under his command, Ṭāriq ibn Ziyād crossed over into Spain with 12,000 men. King Lodrigo fell in a great battle in AH 92 (AD 711), as al-Wāqidī reports.[135] According to the *Continuatio*, the battle took place at the Transductine foothills, which are mentioned again subsequently.[136] Mūsā, jealous of Ṭāriq, came to Spain himself in the following year.[137] In the year AH 95 he was forced to withdraw,[138] after fifteen months;[139] his son ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, whom he had left behind in Spain, was killed in AH 97.[140]

Another statement of al-Wāqidī belongs together with these reports.[141] According to this, the first to undertake a campaign to Spain was Ṭāriq ibn Ziyād,[142] in the year 92. The ships were provided to him by the Spanish

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[132] Brooks, "Syriac Chronicle," 582–83. According to al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, II, 1256, the raid of al-Walīd ibn Hishām al-Muʿayṭ (= ibn ʿUqba ibn Abī Muʿayṭ) also took place in the year 94. According to Elias, this took place previously, in 93; Marj al-Shahm is a scribal error for Burj al-Ḥammām, or else the other way around. Cf. al-Yaʿqūbī, *Ta'rīkh*, II, 337, where, however, the reading is not certain.

[133] al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, II, 1266–67.

[134] As in *ibid.*, II, 1217.

[135] In *ibid.*, II, 1235.

[136] *Continuatio*, par. 68, 110. This is the only trustworthy indication of the place, which, however, has not been brought to consideration before this. In the new map by H. Kiepert, *Formae urbis Romae antiquae* (Berlin, 1896), the name Traducta is located near Calpe (Gibraltar).

[137] al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, II, 1254.

[138] *Ibid.*, II, 1267.

[139] *Coninuatio*, par. 73.

[140] al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, II, 1306.

[141] In al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, 230–31.

[142] According to al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, II, 1217, Ṭarīf Abū Zurʿa is supposed to have undertaken a raid against Spain before Ṭāriq, in AH 91. However, according to the *Continuatio*, par. 68, Ṭāriq himself was Abū Zara. To me it does not seem settled that this is an

official who held authority over the straits (in Sebta), named Ulyān; Ṭāriq had concluded peace with him on these conditions.

This testimony of al-Wāqidī, which has been overlooked by the modern historians and also by Dozy, is important, because it confirms the existence of Ulyān, even if the later Arabic and Spanish reports about Count Julian have no historical value. The *Continuatio* speaks of a noble African named Urban, raised in the Catholic religion, who accompanied Mūsā ibn Nuṣayr throughout all the Spanish lands and then went with him, when Nuṣayr was dismissed from his post, [439] to al-Walīd I.[143] Dozy corrects Urban to Julian and makes him the Greek exarch in Sebta at the same time, by changing *exorti* in the Latin text into *exarchi*. Naturally, this cannot be allowed.[144] On the other hand, Ulyān could be transformed into Ulbān (= Urban) very easily; the letters y/ī and b are distinguished in the Arabic script only by one diacritical point, which did not originally belong; l and r are often switched in foreign proper names.[145] At any event, the statements about Urbanus in the *Continuatio* and about Ulyān (Ulbān) in al-Wāqidī coincide only in so far as both of them have to do with a noble Christian from North Africa, gone over to the service of Islam. However, this similarity does point to the simple possibility that the two names may be reduced to one.

4. According to Theophanes, al-Walīd I was already planning a great attack against Constantinople at the end of his reign. However, he died in AM 6207, on 14 Jumādā II 96, end of February AS 1026 (AD 715). His brother and successor Sulaymān (r. 96–99/715–17) took up the task that he had left unfinished; it was overhauling the navy that required the most preparation. In spring or summer of AH 6207 the emperor Anastasius II sent a fleet to Rhodes to prevent the Arabs from felling trees for ship's timber at Phoenix on the Lycian coast. However, the army mutinied in Rhodes,

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error, especially since al-Wāqidī knows nothing of Ṭarīf. The authority of al-Wāqidī and the *Continuatio* is far greater than that of the later Spanish–North African tradition, the origin of which remains obscure.

[143] *Continuatio*, par. 76. Mūsā agreed to pay the enormous amount of gold that al-Walīd had imposed on him: *accepto consilio nobilissimi viri Urbani Africanae regionis sub dogma catholicae fidei exorti, qui cum eo cunctas Spaniae adventaverat patrias.*

[144] Dozy handles the Continuator very freely and even sees rhymed prose coming from a barbarian who can only speak mangled Latin with difficulty. His interpretations can also be ingenious on occasion, as for instance, for *in tomi indice* (*Recherches sur l'histoire et la littérature de l'Espagne pendant le moyen âge* [Paris, 1881], II, 93 n. 3). It must have looked Spanish to have the Goths use the thumb—that is the meaning of *tomus* according to Dozy—as a forefinger.

[145] For instance, Lodrigo for Rodrigo, Radmilo for Radmiro, and the other way around, Nakoria (al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, III, 504) for Nakolia (Theophanes, *Chronographia*, 456).

went back, and compelled a tax official in Adramytion named Theodosius to allow himself to be made Emperor.

Regarding the siege of Constantinople in the reign of Sulaymān, and the preceding course of events in Asia Minor, Theophanes provides full and lively detail but does not put it into an entirely clear context. Nicephorus tells the story better. In the *Continuatio* there is hardly anything that is not to be found in the two of them.[146] The Arabic tradition is to be used only for names and numbers, as usual. The length of the entire campaign is commonly agreed to be two years; the *Continuatio* erroneously [440] assigns this time to the siege of Constantinople itself, which actually took up only a year. The siege began in late summer. Previously the Arabs besieged Pergamus and captured it. They had already spent the previous winter in Asia Minor, and had forced their way in even before the winter. Events are to be set within this general framework.

AM 6208/AS 1027/AH 97 was the first year of the war. In this year, according to al-Wāqidī[147] and Elias, Maslama went into Romania. According to al-Wāqidī, 'Umar ibn Hubayra al-Fazārī set out simultaneously with the fleet and made an incursion into Roman territory. The year 97 began on 5 September 715; perhaps Maslama and 'Umar set out somewhat earlier, in any case before winter.[148] According to Theophanes, the first important event of AM 6208 was the Arab siege of Amorium. The city was rescued from them through the guile of the Anatolian commander Leo. The *amīr* besieging Amorium is named by Theophanes as a certain Sulaymān, by al-Wāqidī[149] as 'Umar ibn Hubayra, who first appears later on in Theophanes.[150] According to al-Wāqidī,[151] 'Umar spent the winter in Asia Minor, while according to Theophanes[152] Maslama did so as well. Action resumed in early summer, as Maslama conquered Pergamus and Sardes.[153] Meanwhile Leo, deceiving the Arabs, went to Constantinople as Emperor and prepared the city for the imminent siege.

AM 6209/AS 1028/AH 98 (which began on 25 August 716) was taken up by the siege of Constantinople. This began somewhat before the beginning

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[146] *Continuatio*, par. 36.

[147] al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, II, 1306.

[148] The change of year splits the summer. The action of AH 97 is closely connected with the preparation of the fleet, which was undertaken in the same summer, but in the previous solar year (AM 6207).

[149] al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, II, 1315.

[150] *Chronographia*, 390.

[151] al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, II, 1301.

[152] *Chronographia*, 390.

[153] Brooks, "Syriac Chronicle," 583, under AS 1027.

of the year. According to Theophanes, Maslama appeared before the city on 15 August 6208; Sulaymān followed with the fleet fourteen days later, on 1 September 6209. Sulaymān died, according to Theophanes, on 8 October, and 'Umar ibn Hubayra took his place.[154] The winter was severe and the Arabs suffered much from it. In spring they received reinforcements with an Egyptian fleet under Sufyān, and then again with [441] another fleet under Yazīd. They also got support by land through an army that appeared on the Peratic coast, commanded by Merdasan (that is, Mardanshāh).[155] However, all this was to no avail. The Arabs could not provision themselves, and hunger raged among them. Their Christian sailors deserted, thus enabling their enemies to deal a harsh blow against their fleet. Merdasan's corps fell into an ambush and was wiped out. Another army was beaten back by the Bulgars, with heavy loss.[156]

In AM 6210, according to Theophanes, AS 1029, on 24 December according to Brook's Syriac source,[157] AH 99 on 15 Jumādā I,[158] according to Elias, an earthquake struck Mesopotamia. In the second month of the year 99, which began on 14 August of AD 717, the caliph Sulaymān died. At around the same time, the siege of Constantinople was raised. According to Nicephorus,[159] it had lasted for thirteen months. According to Theophanes, it lasted precisely a year, from 15 August 6208 to 15 August 6209. Afterwards Theophanes says that Maslama was recalled during the reign of the caliph 'Umar II in AM 6210, and that the Arab fleet was annihilated by a storm on its return journey.[160] In giving these dates he is in overall agreement with the Arabic tradition. However, it need not be supposed that

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[154] J.B. Bury, *History of the Later Roman Empire* (London and New York, 1889), II, 402, is right regarding this statement of Theophanes (*Chronographia*, 396). Theophanes cannot have entered the change in caliphs almost a year too early, by placing it at the beginning rather than at the end of the siege. The day and month also do not fit. Besides, at 399 he knows the true state of affairs.

[155] All these names are to be sought in vain in the Arabic tradition, which only knows about Maslama and 'Umar.

[156] Theophanes, *Chronographia*, 397. However, the Bulgars did not come to the Emperor's aid, but instead attacked the Arabs in their own country (where they had gone seeking forage?). According to Brooks, "Syriac Chronicle", 583, under AS 1028, 'Ubayda ('Umar ibn Hubayra is meant, as Brooks correctly recognized) pressed into the land of the Bulgars and suffered a severe defeat at their hands.

[157] Brooks, "Syriac Chronicle", 583.

[158] 15 Jumādā I fell on 24 December, and not 15 Jumādā II, as is erroneously stated in the manuscript and in Baethgen's edition [of Elias].

[159] *Opuscula historica*, 53.

[160] Theophanes, *Chronographia*, 399.

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the change of caliphs was the occasion for the abandonment of the futile enterprise.

If one compares the Byzantine and the Arab chronicles, the contents of AM 6207 (death of al-Walīd I and military preparations of Sulaymān) coincide with those of AS 1026. AH 96 and AM 6208 (campaign in Asia Minor) coincide with AS 1027. AH 97, AM 6209 (siege of Constantinople) coincide with AS 1028; AH 98 and AM 6210 (raising of the siege, accession of 'Umar II, plague in Syria) coincide with AS 1029. The years 714–15 to 717–18 of the Christian era correspond to the years AS 1026–29 and AH 96–99. [442] The accession of the emperor Leo in the beginning of AM 6208/AS 1027/AH 97 would accordingly have fallen in AD 716. It is therefore usually placed under AD 717.

Proceeding from this starting point, modern historians believe that the other synchronisms between the Arabic and Syriac annalists are also a year too early, as the events that they assign to AS 1026–29 and AH 96–99 actually fall, in reality, in AS 1027–30, AH 97–100 = AD 715–16 to 718–19. If so, then the change of reign between al-Walīd and Sulaymān would have occurred in AH 97 rather than in 96, and the change between Sulaymān and 'Umar (II) ibn 'Abd al-'Azīz (r. 99–101/717–20) would have happened in AH 100 rather than in 99. Ranke indeed has al-Walīd die in February 716,[161] that is, in the month of Jumādā II, AH 97; Weil and Müller are less uninhibited and evade the consequences at which they have nonetheless been forced to arrive.

In fact, we ought not to call into question the entirely reliable and precisely transmitted dates for the years of the deaths of the caliphs. For the same reason, it is impossible to displace the other events that are firmly fixed among these dates. The statements regarding Leo's year of accession are contradictory. This event is nowhere near so well attested as those regarding Sulaymān and 'Umar; it is truly not attested, but rather merely conjectured.[162] In sum, the siege of Constantinople began in 716 and ended in 717; the riddle of the contradiction between the Byzantine and the Eastern chronology, as discussed by Weil[163] and, following him, Müller,[164] does not exist in reality. The relationship AM 5182 = AS 1 continues further, as it has already done since AM 6204.

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[161] Leopold von Ranke, *Weltgeschichte* (Leipzig, 1881–88), I, 234.

[162] *Ibid.*, I, 239–40.

[163] *Geschichte der Chalifen*, II, 569.

[164] *Islam*, I, 417.

'Umar II appointed 'Umar ibn Hubayra in Maslama's place over Meso-potamia.[165] He withdrew the garrison that 'Abd al-Malik had stationed at Ṭuranda,[166] without giving up the raids into Byzantine territory.[167] During his caliphate the Byzantines made a surprise attack on Laodicea.[168] 'Umar II died in AM 6212, AS 1031, AH 101 on 25 Rajab = 9 February 720, and was succeeded by Yazīd (II) ibn 'Abd al-Malik (r. 101–105/720–24).

In AH 102 Ibn Hubayra attacked the Byzantines in Armenia, with suc-cessful results.[169] In AH 103 'Abbās [443] ibn al-Walīd made a raid into Romania and took the town of Rasala (?).[170]

In AM 6216, AS 1035, AH 105 on 24 Sha'bān (26 January 724), Yazīd II died and was succeeded by his brother Hishām (r. 105–25/724–43). The disastrous campaign into Romania during Hishām's reign[171] is that of Sa'īd ibn 'Abd al-Malik, assigned to both AH 105 and 106.[172] Indeed, the summer of AD 724 falls in AH 105 until 28 May, and then continues into 106.

In AM 6218, according to Theophanes,[173] the plague raged in Syria. According to al-Ṭabarī[174] and Elias, this occurred in the year 107 of the *hijra*, which begins on 19 May 725 AD and extends into the autumn of AM 6218 and AS 1037. The simultaneous campaigns of Maslama and Mu'āwiya ibn Hishām, mentioned by Theophanes under AM 6218, are divided into two years of the *hijra*, 107 and 108, in al-Ṭabarī,[175] and again at Elias; the two campaigns became united in the summer of 726. Maslama went by land and seized Caesarea in Cappadocia, while Mu'āwiya went by sea by way of Cyprus. Ibrāhīm ibn Hishām (the well-known Makhzumī) in al-Ṭabarī[176] is a simple misidentification for Mu'āwiya ibn Hishām, as shown by Theophanes,[177] Elias[178] and al-Ṭabarī.[179]

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[165]al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, II, 1349. Yazīd ibn 'Aqīl, mentioned by Elias for AH 100, does not exist; this must be a case of mistaken identity, Abū 'Aqīl being the ancestor of the family of al-Ḥajjāj.

[166]al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, 186.

[167]al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, II, 1349.

[168]al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, 133.

[169]al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, II, 1434.

[170]*Ibid.*, II, 1437.

[171]Theophanes, *Chronographia*, 403.

[172]In al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, II, 1462, 1472.

[173]*Chronographia*, 404.

[174]*Ta'rīkh*, II, 1488.

[175]*Ibid.*, II, 1487–88, 1491.

[176]*Ibid.*, II, 1491.

[177]*Chronographia*, 404.

[178]Baethgen, *Fragmente*, AH 108.

[179]*Ta'rīkh*, II, 1487.

In AM 6219, Muʿāwiya ibn Hishām seized τὸ κάστρον Ατεους ["the fortress of Ateous"]. According to al-Ṭabarī,[180] in AH 109 (which begins on 28 April 727 and joins with AM 6219 on 1 September) he took the castle Ṭayba (?). He went by land, while ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿUqba ibn Nāfiʿ traveled nearby by sea. According to al-Ṭabarī,[181] however, this took place in the year 110, which overlaps in the summer better with AM 6219. Instead of ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿUqba, al-Wāqidī mentions ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Muʿāwiya ibn Ḥudayj.

In AH 111 (which begins on 6 April 729), Muʿāwiya ibn Hishām made the "left" summer expedition and his brother Saʿīd made the "right" expedition, reaching as far as Caesarea. According to al-Wāqidī, the fleet was commanded by ʿAbd Allāh ibn Abī Maryam.[182]

In AM 6222, AH 112 (which begins on 26 March 730, AS 1041 = AM 6222), τὸ Χαρσιανὸν κάστρον ["the fortress of Charsianon"] in Cappadocia was taken, by Maslama according to Theophanes, and by Muʿāwiya ibn Hishām according to al-Ṭabarī.[183] In the same year, according to Elias and al-Ṭabarī,[184] al-Jarrāḥ fell in combat against the (western) Turks; according to Theophanes, this had already occurred in AM 6220 (AH 110).

In AM 6223, AH 113 (which begins on 15 March 731, AS 1042), Maslama fought against the Turks and reached as far as the [444] Caucasian Gate, which he restored. In AH 114 he returned.[185] There is mention in al-Ṭabarī of an incursion into Byzantine territory by al-Baṭṭāl in AH 113.[186]

In AM 6224 Muʿāwiya ibn Hishām pressed forward as far as Paphlagonia. According to al-Ṭabarī, in AH 114 (which begins on 3 March 731) he made the left campaign, which brought him as far as Akroinos,[187] and his brother Sulaymān performed the right campaign, in the course of which he reached Caesarea; al-Baṭṭāl distinguished himself.[188]

In AM 6225, AH 115 (which begins on 21 February 732, AS 1044), the plague raged in Syria.[189] According to al-Ṭabarī, Muʿāwiya commanded that year's expedition.[190]

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[180] *Ibid.*, II, 1495.

[181] *Ibid.*, II, 1506–1507.

[182] *Ibid.*, II, 1526.

[183] *Ibid.*, II, 1530.

[184] *Ibid.*, II, 1530–31.

[185] Theophanes, Elias, and al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, II, 1560, 1562.

[186] al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, II, 1559–60.

[187] E.W. Brooks, "The Arabs in Asia Minor (641–750) from Arabic Sources", *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 18 (1898), 200.

[188] al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, II, 1561.

[189] Theophanes, and al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, II, 1563.

[190] *Ta'rīkh*, II, 1562.

In AM 6226, AH 116 (which begins on 10 February 733, AS 1045), Muʻā-wiya performed the expedition.[191]

In AM 6227, AH 117 (which began on 31 January 735, AS 1046), Sulaymān ibn Hishām conducted a campaign against Armenia.[192]

In AM 6228, during a campaign in Romania, Muʻāwiya ibn Hishām fell from his horse and died. Acccording to Elias, this took place in AH 119. Al-Ṭabarī mentions a campaign by Muʻāwiya in AH 118, but not his death.[193] However, Muʻāwiya no longer appears in the theater of war. He was the ancestor of the Umayyads of Spain. His place as commander against the Byzantines was assumed by his brother Sulaymān ibn Hishām, an impassioned soldier. The military formation of the Waḍḍāḥīya was in his service; they took their name from their captain al-Waḍḍāḥ, who had created the unit.

In AM 6229, according to Theophanes, Sulaymān brought back with him a captive from Pergamon, who gave himself out to be Tiberius the son of Justinian. He was shown in the cities of Syria, with imperial trappings. Is it possible to combine with this al-Ṭabarī's report, with different dating, according to which al-Baṭṭāl took Constantine (Kopronymos) prisoner?[194] In al-Ṭabarī Sulaymān does not appear as leader of the raid of AH 119.[195]

In AM 6230, AH 120 (which begins on 29 December 737, AS 1049), Sulaymān laid waste τὸ λεγόμενον Σιδηροῦν κάστρον ["the fortress called Sideroun"]. In al-Ṭabarī, "Sandara" is written mistakenly for "Sīdara";[196] elsewhere in al-Ṭabarī it is called, in translation, Ḥiṣn al-Ḥadīd, "the iron fortress".[197]

In May of AM 6231 the Arabs invaded with a powerful force consisting of an army under Ghamr[198] in Asiatis, another army under Malik and al-Baṭṭāl in the region of Akroinos, and a third under Sulaymān himself, the supreme commander, in Cappadocia. [445] Malik and al-Baṭṭāl were annihilated by Leo and Constantine in Akroinos. According to al-Ṭabarī, al-Baṭṭāl's

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[191]Theophanes, and al-Ṭabarī, *Taʼrīkh*, II, 1564.

[192]Theophanes, *Chronographia*, 410; al-Ṭabarī, *Taʼrīkh*, II, 1573. [This is correct regarding Theophanes' account, but not regarding al-Ṭabarī's account, where Sulaymān ibn Hishām conducts the "right expedition" into Roman territory from al-Jazīra.]

[193]al-Ṭabarī, *Taʼrīkh*, II, 1588.

[194]*Ibid.*, II, 1561.

[195]*Ibid.*, II, 1593.

[196]*Ibid.*, II, 1635.

[197]*Ibid.*, II, 1236.

[198]Son of Yazīd II; compare Theophanes, *Chronographia*, 416, with al-Ṭabarī, *Taʼrīkh*, II, 1769.

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catastrophe fell in AH 122 (begins on 7 December 739, AS 1051).[199] Here it is no longer AS 1050, but rather 1051, which corresponds to AM 6231. This is confirmed by the fact that Kulthūm's defeat in Ifrīqiya is similarly placed by Theophanes in AM 6231, and by al-Ṭabarī (2: 1716) in AH 122.[200] This relationship then continues afterwards.

In AM 6232, several urban quarters of Damascus were burned down by Iraqis. The matter is mentioned in al-Ṭabarī, but without any dating.[201]

In AM 6233, AH 124 (which begins on 15 November 741, AS 1053), Su-laymān led the campaign, according to al-Ṭabarī against Leo,[202] according to Theophanes and Elias against Leo's son Constantine, who had come to the throne a year previously.

In AM 6234, AH 125, the caliph Hishām died on 6 Rabīʿ II = 6 February 743, AS 1054. He was succeeded by al-Walīd (II) ibn Yazīd (r. 125–26/743–44). The summer campaign fell in the reign of al-Walīd and was led by his brother Ghamr.[203] At the same time, al-Walīd deported the Cypriots to Syria.[204]

In AH 126, the year of al-Walīd's death, another campaign by Ghamr in Byzantine territory, and a campaign of Marwān ibn Muḥammad in Armenia, are mentioned.[205] Then the externally directed attacks cease during the time of the Civil War,[206] to be resumed only once the ʿAbbāsids have established themselves securely in their rule.[207]

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[199] *Taʾrīkh*, II, 1716.

[200] *Ibid.*, II, 1716.

[201] *Ibid.*, II, 1814–15.

[202] *Ibid.*, II, 1727.

[203] Theophanes, and al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, II, 1769.

[204] Theophanes; al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, II, 1769; al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, 154.

[205] al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, II, 1870, 1876.

[206] Theophanes, *Chronographia*, AM 6237; Nicephorus, *Opuscula historica*, 62.

[207] [The last part of the article, pp. 445–47, omitted here, consists of philological remarks on the transcriptions of Arabic names in the Greek chronicler Theophanes.]

3

ARAB-BYZANTINE RELATIONS UNDER THE UMAYYAD CALIPHATE

H.A.R. Gibb

The wars between Islam and Byzantium occupy so prominent, indeed almost exclusive, a place in our history books and in the chronicles on which they draw, that the student of medieval history may be excused for taking the rubric "Arab-Byzantine Relations" as a record of little more than continual warfare. The record is not untrue, for in fact frontier warfare lasted almost unbrokenly for a period of centuries. It is not, however, the whole truth. The proof of this statement is not easy, for direct references to relations of any other kind in the medieval sources, if we exclude those that arise out of warfare, such as truces and embassies, can almost be counted on the fingers. Fortunately, however, there are, to supplement these scanty materials, a few other facts or details that can be exploited.

In dealing with any subject of this kind there are two general considerations to be borne in mind. Medieval chronicles, whatever their merits (and they are many), suffer from one almost universal defect. They present a narrowly focused view of events. Those, the majority, written around the activities of some ruling institution, caliphs, emperors, or sultans, concentrate on the political affairs undertaken by or relevant to the history of that particular institution, and rarely note things that happened or activities that were going on elsewhere. Their standard of reference is what may be called the "official level," the level of matters that interested official circles or affected their working, even if they might be the most trivial news items from the capital. The affairs of the provinces are seldom mentioned except insofar as they were reflected in events at the capital, such as the calling to account of some too enterprising provincial taxmaster.

To compensate for this in part there survive a few local chronicles, histories of provinces or cities, such as Egypt or Bokh-

ara, which take the political history of the caliphate or empire
for granted and concentrate on their own local affairs. But these
are even more narrowly focused, and in a certain degree even
more concentrated at the official or scholastic level. It is a local
history of Egypt, for example, that furnishes almost all our early
information about the Andalusian adventurers who captured
Crete in 827. But this information is incidental only to the trouble
which they gave to the governors of Egypt during their occupation
of Alexandria, and the local chronicler is interested neither in how
they came to be in Alexandria nor, after their departure to Crete,
in what happened to them there. Any attempt, then, to present an
over-all picture must proceed by fitting together odd bits and
pieces, and filling in the gaps by reasonable deduction.

The second general consideration links up with this. In a
society as loosely articulated as were all medieval societies, and not
least in the East, it is completely unrealistic to assume that the
interests and activities of all sections of any one society were the
same as those of the official class, or were even controlled in more
than a general fashion by the governing institution. The complex
of society was made up of a mosaic of small communities that lived
their own lives, carried on their own affairs and fended for them-
selves, often in isolation from the other communities, and almost
always without much notice being taken of what they were doing
or whether it was in agreement with official policy.

The major problem therefore remains—to find the data
which may serve as clues to Byzantine-Arab relations, other than
warfare, during one century of Islamic history, the century of the
Umayyad Caliphate of Damascus, 661-750.

The pre-Islamic relations of the Arabs with the Byzantine
Empire are sufficiently well known, if not yet explored in full
detail.[1] Under Islam regular or official relations, if they may be so
termed, begin with the establishment of the Umayyad Caliphate.
Before then, the Greeks, the *Rum*, are simply the enemy whom the
Arab generals drove out of Syria and Egypt, finally began to harry
at sea, in Cyprus and Rhodes, and even succeeded in defeating in
the first naval battle of an Arab fleet. With the establishment of
the Umayyads, the situation begins to alter subtly. To be sure, the
Greeks are still the enemy, and Arab armies and fleets push their

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way through to the gates of Constantinople once, twice, and yet a
third time; and in between these massive culminating enterprises,
and after the failure of the last, maintain a program of annual
incursions in winter and spring. All this is the formal and indis-
pensable public duty of the caliphs, the commanders of the faith-
ful who are bound by the conditions of their office to pursue the
Holy War against the unbelievers, and who must justify their
claim to be the successors of the Prophet in the eyes of their
Muslim subjects by visibly striving for the extension of Islam.
At the same time, it serves to maintain the discipline and fighting
qualities of their Syrian troops, for on this depends their ability to
control the open or suppressed insubordination of the Arab tribes-
men in the other provinces.

The public policy of the Umayyads, then, remains the same
as that of their predecessors. Byzantium is the enemy, and that is
all there is to it. In reality, however, the Umayyad relations with
Byzantium were by no means confined to simple national or re-
ligious hostility, but were governed by more ambivalent attitudes
of both attraction and opposition.

Since the Syrian troops were of crucial importance for the
maintenance of the Umayyads, the origins and distribution of the
Syrian army are of some significance. It was grouped in five divi-
sions, two in the south, two in the center, and one in the north.
The southern divisions were composed mainly of southern and
western Arabian tribes, some of whom were established there well
before the Islamic conquest and in relations with the Byzantine
governors, and some of whom had come in with the Islamic armies.
The central divisions were formed almost solidly of old, established
tribes, who had in pre-Islamic days been enrolled as auxiliaries of
the Greeks in the wars with Persia, and whose chiefs had held
Byzantine titles and had long been familiar with Constantinople
and its government. The northern division, on the other hand,
was composed chiefly of north Arabian tribes who had come in at
the time of the conquests and had known no relations with Byzan-
tium except in warfare.

It was the central divisions and tribesmen, those of Damascus
and Emesa, with which the Umayyad Caliphs were most closely
associated, both by geography and by marriage relations, and who

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were their most devoted supporters. There can be little doubt that this connection played some part in familiarizing the caliphs with the former Byzantine institutions, but it must obviously not be exaggerated. Nor must even the influence of the ex-Byzantine officials who continued largely to staff the administrative services in Syria be overstressed. Nevertheless, the increasing tendency of the Umayyads to adopt Byzantine usages and to emulate the Greek emperors is a patent fact. The remarkable care shown by the caliphs for the upkeep of roads, even to the extent of imitating the Roman milestones, was certainly not inspired by Arabian custom or tradition; and the further facts that the Latin *veredus* and *millia* were transposed into Arabic as *barid* and *mil* show where the idea came from. The earliest gold coinage of the Caliph Abd al-Malik was Byzantine in design, even to the extent of bearing an effigy of the caliph, until it was withdrawn and replaced by a more orthodox Muslim design in deference to the religious feeling of his subjects. In ceremonial also, although it continued on the whole to be governed by Arab and Islamic usage (again in deference to the traditions of the subjects), there was a slow process of small adjustments to Byzantine practice; and, as is well known, the ex-Byzantine provinces retained their Byzantine systems of revenue administration.

In addition to these adaptations or adoptions of the outward usages of Byzantium, recent research has revealed a more subtle way in which the caliphs were imitating Byzantine usage, by the practice of defining legal norms by administrative rescript. Islamic law was in its first century still fluid or inchoate in detail, and left open a wide field for regulation on specific points. Although few of the Umayyad rescripts have survived in their original form, the traces of them have been discovered both positively, in a number of rulings of the later law schools, and negatively, in the declared opposition of these schools to some of the Umayyad rulings and to the principle of definition of law by rescript in general.[2]

The most striking legacy of the imperial heritage, however, is furnished by the Umayyad policy of erecting imperial religious monuments. The Byzantine inspiration of this policy is beyond doubt, and is made more unmistakable by the fact that this policy was *not* followed by the Abbasid Caliphs of Baghdad in their

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capital provinces, although they did enlarge the mosques of Mecca and Medina. Certain Muslim historians, of much later date, and not generally sympathetic to the Umayyads (besides being based on Iraqi traditions, and therefore ignorant of the Byzantine example), surmise that the object of the Umayyad Caliphs was to replace Mecca and Medina as religious shrines by Jerusalem and Damascus. This is a fantastic idea, even though it is still echoed by western historians, and obviously belied by the fact that the mosque of Medina was one of the three imperial monuments built or rebuilt by the Umayyads.[3] An echo—belated, but nevertheless authentic—of the native Syrian tradition has survived in the work of the tenth-century geographer al-Maqdisi, a native of Jerusalem. He cites a local tradition that the Umayyad Caliphs Abd al-Malik and al-Walid were moved to build the Dome of the Rock and the Great Mosque at Damascus by fear lest the Muslims be tempted away from their faith by the magnificence of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre and other Christian edifices in Syria.[4] The tradition may possibly reflect rather too narrowly the outlook of Jerusalem, but it very probably preserves a trace of the true motives of the Umayyads: not simply to rival the Christian edifices in Syria, but also (as the reconstruction of the Prophet's Mosque at Medina shows even more clearly) to emulate the imperial example. That this was a leading motive is made still more certain by a particular circumstance relating to the construction of at least two of the three mosques, to which most of this paper will be devoted.

   The Dome of the Rock was built by Abd al-Malik about 690; the mosques of Damascus and Medina (as well as the Aqsa Mosque at Jerusalem) by his son al-Walid I, between 705 and 712. The circumstance in question is the tradition current in later Muslim sources that the caliph requested and obtained the aid of the Greek emperor for the decoration of the Prophet's Mosque at Medina and the Great Mosque at Damascus. The discussion of this tradition involves entering into somewhat complicated detail, since a fresh study of the sources has led the present writer to disagree with some of the arguments put forward by the most recent and authoritative writers on these three monuments, Professor K. A. C. Creswell, Mlle. Marguerite van Berchem, and the late French historian, Jean Sauvaget.

The tradition on which all discussion has hitherto centered is one contained in the great chronicle of al-Tabari (d. A.D. 923):

> Muhammad says: Musa b. Abu Bakr told me that Salih b. Kaisan said: "We began to pull down the mosque of the Prophet in Safar 88 (i.e. January 707). Al-Walid had sent to inform the lord of the Greeks (*Sahib al-Rum*) that he had ordered the demolition of the Mosque of the Prophet, and that he should aid him in this work. The latter sent him 100,000 *mithqals* of gold, and sent also 100 workmen, and sent him 40 loads of mosaic cubes; he gave orders also to search for mosaic cubes in ruined cities and sent them to al-Walid, who sent them to [his governor in Medina] Omar b. Abd al-Aziz."[5]

Further, in regard to the mosque of Damascus, the geographer al-Maqdisi, already cited for the Syrian tradition, says: "The implements and mosaics for the mosque were sent by the king of the Greeks."[6] The developments of this tradition in the later Arabic works, progressively elaborating the story with imaginative detail, such as al-Walid's threat to the emperor to devastate his eastern provinces if he refused the request, need not be taken into consideration. So far as is known at present, no similar statement is found in regard to the construction of the Dome of the Rock at Jerusalem. This omission may itself be significant, as an indication that the two traditions quoted are specific and independent, and do not rest upon what may be called a "general hypothesis."

In Creswell's great survey of Umayyad architecture, Mlle. van Berchem attempts to discredit the tradition cited by al-Tabari.[7] She points out first that it is not included in the earlier historical chronicle of al-Baladhuri, and proceeds to question al-Tabari's complete veracity, adding: "Moreover, Tabari was a Persian and he lived (in Persia or in Iraq) at an epoch when legends concerning the first great Khalifs had already blossomed in a very luxuriant fashion." Now this, with all due respect, is a preposterous assertion. To begin with, al-Tabari has no responsibility for the tradition beyond reporting it. Here, as in the whole of his history, he simply quotes what he regards as the most reliable sources, and there has never been any question of his veracity in quoting these sources. Any criticism must therefore be directed to the report itself and its sources.

"Muhammad says." As many other passages make clear, this

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is Muhammad b. Omar al-Waqidi, who died in 823—a truly prodi-
gious figure in Arabic historiography, the first systematic collector
of the materials for the early history of Islam. That this report was
really transmitted from him is certain from brief allusions to it in
other surviving works prior to al-Tabari,[8] even though al-Balad-
huri (who also based his chronicles largely on al-Waqidi) omits it
in his summary chronicle; but in this, it should be noted, he
devotes only five lines or so to this reconstruction. Now, as Sauva-
get points out, al-Tabari, in selecting from the mass of documents
at his disposal relating to this event, chose four which were *"d'une
qualité exceptionelle."* What is remarkable is that all four are
taken from materials collected from al-Waqidi, that all four relate
the statements of eyewitnesses on the evidence of *one* intermediate
link (a different one in each narrative), and that two of them (of
which this particular report is one) are statements of Salih b.
Kaisan, who was the officer actually in charge of the work of
demolition and reconstruction of the mosque. We should need to
discover extraordinarily strong arguments to disprove the authen-
ticity of this narrative; it is indeed difficult to see any way of doing
so except by demolishing the entire foundations on which early
Islamic history rests. Sauvaget himself, as will be seen presently,
makes no attempt to deny or disprove the statement, but tries only
to change its interpretation.

   To return to Mlle. van Berchem. After a long and methodi-
cally rather confused analysis of this and other texts, she is finally
compelled, in face of the formal statement quoted above from
al-Maqdisi—that the emperor sent implements and mosaics for
the work on the mosque of Damascus—to concede that the texts
are "not absolutely conclusive" on the subject of Byzantine as-
sistance. And so she falls back on the final argument, that "political
conditions under the reigns of Abd al-Malik and al-Walid were
scarcely favourable to friendly exchanges between the court of
Byzantium and that of Damascus," adding as a final fling: "Would
not so patriotic a monarch as al-Walid have experienced some
reluctance in asking a favour from Constantinople?" (pp. 163-164).

   These final arguments may be set aside for the moment with
the remark that the attitude of mind that they presuppose is too
much a modern one to be applied without a good deal of shading

to any period of medieval history. To sum up, Mlle. van Berchem's arguments on historical grounds are entirely unconvincing. When, on the other hand, she comes to the archaeological evidence from the monuments themselves, it is impossible for the layman to question her conclusions that the mosaic decorations are almost wholly Syrian in workmanship, although she explicitly adds: "without denying the possibility of one or even several master-mosaicists having come from Constantinople."

It is much more surprising, however, to find such a careful historian as was Jean Sauvaget practically accepting the whole of Mlle. van Berchem's conclusions. Indeed, he goes even further, to deny as a "tradition of legendary character" the participation of workmen from Byzantium.[9] To be sure, he cannot wave aside as airily as she does the tradition reported by al-Tabari through al-Waqidi from Salih b. Kaisan, which he has already described as a tradition "of exceptional quality." This would seem to involve him in a dilemma, but the dilemma is ingeniously resolved by a reinterpretation of the tradition. The fact that the mosaics of Damascus and Jerusalem are "more probably" (*plutôt*) the work of Syrian Christians gives the clue, he says, to the origin of the tradition which represents the Byzantine emperor as taking a hand in the construction of the Umayyad monuments: "the Arabic word *Rum* (properly "Romans") having been used indifferently to denote the Byzantines and the Christians of the Melkite [i.e., Orthodox] Greek rite who lived in Muslim territory, there has been a misunderstanding of the meaning to be given to it in historical narratives relating to the construction of these monuments." *Sahib al-Rum,* he explains in a footnote, may mean either the Byzantine emperor or "the head (spiritual or lay) of the Greek Melkites." The misunderstanding in the original tradition relating to the Mosque of Medina, he adds, "was no doubt perfectly innocent, and it is permissible to see in it a more or less conscious alteration of the true meaning under the influence of political afterthoughts." These, he explains, were due to the attempt, in pious or anti-Umayyad circles, to cast discredit on the Umayyads by representing al-Walid's purpose in reconstructing the mosque, "laudable in itself, as a blameworthy initiative, because it led to having the Prophet's own mosque rebuilt by infidel subjects of a monarch who was the enemy of Islam."

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This last argument is even more surprising, coming from the pen of such an authority; in fact he produces little evidence to support it beyond quoting certain pietistic traditions against the decoration of mosques *in general*. If there had really been any widespread, or even factitious, resentment of al-Walid's initiative, one would expect to find it expressed in much more open terms, without having to guess at an anti-Umayyad implication. In the later elaboration, at least, the tone is clearly one rather of exultation that the emperor was in some sense contrained to do this service on behalf of the rival faith. And finally, although *Sahib al-Rum* may possibly, in certain contexts, mean "the chief of the Orthodox Melkite community,", it would be desirable to find other instances of its use in this sense and in such a context. On all grounds, therefore, it is evident that the efforts to discredit or reinterpret the tradition transmitted by al-Waqidi carry no conviction. The most that might be admitted (but that readily) would be that the figures may be suspected of having grown a little even in the course of *one* transmission.

But the most surprising feature in all this discussion is that the most massive testimony of all has been entirely overlooked. A certain scholar of Medina, Ibn Zabala, composed in 814 a *History of Medina,* which is known so far to have survived only in extracts cited in later works. What Sauvaget has to say of Ibn Zabala's *History* is highly relevant here. "This work is for us of capital importance. Its interest lies (1) in the personality of the author, a disciple of the great *Medinian* doctor Malik b. Anas. . . . Ibn Zabala was in a position to assemble *on the spot,* in the best conditions for both transmission and criticism, the local tradition relating to the ancient history of the mosque; (2) in his date. This gives us the assurance that the evidence of contemporaries could have been noted down without an excessive number of intermediaries, the composition of the work being *just one century later* than the execution of the operations of al-Walid. To the extent that it is known to us, Ibn Zabala's work remains the best authority on which to support an attempt to reconstitute the Umayyad mosque."[10]

In the extracts preserved from Ibn Zabala's *History* in the historical work of al-Samhudi (d. 1506)—itself a work of extraordinary erudition[11]—there is the following statement, supported

not by a single tradition, but by an imposing list of excellent authorities:

> They report: [12]Al-Walid b. Abd al-Malik wrote to the king [*N.B.*] of the Greeks: "We purpose to restore the greatest mosque of our Prophet; aid us therefore to do so by workers and mosaic cubes." And he sent him loads of mosaic cubes and some twenty-odd workmen—but some say ten workmen, adding "I have sent to you ten who are equal to a hundred"—and (sent also) 80,000 dinars as a subvention for them."[13]

In view of this statement, supplementing the statements already cited, there seems to remain no possible doubt that the Greek emperor did in fact supply some workmen in mosaics, along with mosaic cubes, for both the mosques of Medina and Damascus, and sent also money or gold for the work on the mosque of Medina at least.[14]

Nevertheless, this participation of the emperor does raise certain questions, both in itself and in its implications. How did it come about that the Umayyads, officially engaged in almost continuous warfare with the Greeks (indeed the very next item in al-Tabari's chronicle after the tradition discussed above is the report of a series of successes by Arab armies in Anatolia), were yet able to make this request, on at least two occasions, and that it was granted on each occasion? How, to begin with, were the requests transmitted? It is precisely here that the deficiencies of the chronicles—with their laconic "he wrote"—become most apparent. The chronicles were composed in Iraq, largely on the basis of Iraqi materials, more than a century later. Apart from the official public actions of the caliphs, they supply absolutely no information about Syria in the Umayyad period. For the century during which Damascus was the capital of an empire extending from Central Asia to Spain, we remain almost ignorant of its own history, except for such scraps and crumbs as can be gathered from archaeology and by fragmentary materials from other sources.

As a result of this absence of data relative to the internal conditions in Syria, it is very commonly supposed that its conquest by the Arabs brought about the complete suspension of its former commercial relations with the Greek territories. Certainly, they were severely curtailed; but it would be an anachronistic proceeding to read back into medieval life the common phenomena of

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modern political relations. A state of official war did not neces-
sarily involve the suspension of all commercial or courtesy rela-
tions. We have the indisputable evidence of the flourishing com-
mercial intercourse between the Muslim cities of Syria and the
crusaders' ports of Tyre and Acre during the crusades,[16] which was
almost completely unaffected by the military operations between
the opposing princes and their armies.

By lucky chance, however, we are not reduced entirely to
conjecture in regard to the continuance of a certain amount of
commercial intercourse between Byzantium and Syria—and (or)
Egypt—in the Umayyad period. Several fragmentary references
survive in the Arabic sources:

1. A certain Abu Ubaid al-Qasim b. Sallam compiled, about
840, an extensive and valuable corpus of traditions relating to the
fiscal institutions of the Muslim state, which, unlike the better-
known Iraqi works on the subject, preserves a number of Syrian
traditions. On the subject of the tolls to be exacted from merchants
at the frontier, he cites a regulation ascribed to Omar I (634-644)
—whether accurately may be doubted, inasmuch as it was a com-
monplace of Muslim tradition to represent rules established after
the time of Muhammad as ordinances of Omar—which lays down
the rates as 2½ per cent on the merchandise of Muslim traders,
5 per cent on that of non-Muslims resident in Muslim territory
(i.e., *Dhimmis*), and 10 per cent on the merchandise of foreign
traders. As justification for the last rate it is added: "because they
were taking the same percentage from the Muslim merchants when
these entered their territory." A few lines later, the identity of
these foreign traders is defined unambiguously: "the *Rum*—they
used to come to Syria."[16]

2. In a rescript of Omar II (717-720), the caliph prohibits
the placing of obstacles in the way of those who trade by sea. This
is puzzling, since there seems to be no record of obstacles placed
by Arab governors to trading by sea in the first Islamic century,
and in fact Basra was already developing by that time a flourishing
overseas trade through the Persian Gulf. The most probable ex-
planation, although admittedly inferential, is that this too must
refer to Syria, and to trade between the Syrian ports and the
Byzantine territories. From the very little and mostly indirect

evidence we have about such places as Antioch and Latakia, they seem to have continued to flourish after the Arab conquest, and they can hardly have done so except by commerce.[17]

3. In the Arabic traditions relating to the striking of gold dinars by Abd al-Malik, it is stated that "Papyrus used to be exported to the land of the *Rum* from the land of the Arabs, and dinars to be received from their side."[18]

4. The fourth passage is still more decisive, and throws wide open a window into the subject of this discussion. It is found in a local history of Egypt, by the ninth-century Ibn Abd al-Hakam (the same writer who transcribed, in another work, the rescript of Omar II quoted above). In dealing with the settlements of the Arabs in Fustat (Old Cairo), he relates at some length a dispute in regard to the possession of an establishment called "the Pepper House" *(Dar al-Fulful)*.[19] This dispute is, of course, his main interest, but in a note he adds: "Why it was called the Pepper House was because, when Usama b. Zaid al-Tanukhi was director of taxes in Egypt, he purchased from Musa b. Wardan pepper to the value of 20,000 dinars, on instructions from [the Caliph] al-Walid, who purposed to send that as a gift to the *Sahib al-Rum*, and he stored that pepper in this house."

There can be no doubt that the *Sahib al-Rum* here has its normal significance of the emperor of Byzantium. And this little note seems to supply a clue to the whole transaction. There is no question at all of al-Walid either threatening the emperor with dire destruction, or sacrificing his patriotic feelings (whatever that may mean) to beg a favor. If such a present was made once, there is no reason to regard it as an isolated instance; it just happens that this one record has survived, and it is enough to show that, even while the two empires were at war, the continuance of commercial relations permitted the exchange of courtesies between the two courts.

To return finally to the public sphere, it has sometimes been remarked that the government of the Umayyad Caliphs was in several respects that of a "succession state" to the East Roman Empire, notwithstanding the ideological oppositions involved in the sphere of religion. At the Byzantine court, one may suspect, a formal pretense was maintained that the caliphs were just another

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group of barbarian invaders who had seized some of the provinces of the empire, and were disregarding their proper status as vassal princes. Hence the indignation of Justinian II when Abd al-Malik infringed the imperial privilege of striking gold coinage. The Umayyad Caliphate, however, in its attitude to the empire, was much more than a provincial succession-state. The two facets of its policy, the military assault and the administrative adaptation, point clearly to the real ambition of the first-century caliphs, which was nothing less than to establish their own imperial dynasty at Constantinople. Seen in this light, their administrative imitations and adaptations take on a different character; they are not merely the tribute paid by raw and parvenu princes to the achievements of their predecessors, but an almost deliberate effort to learn the ropes and fit themselves to assume the imperial destiny.

But after the catastrophe (or victory) of 718, there follows a sudden and complete reversal. The whole policy of the Umayyad caliphs swings decisively away from the Byzantine tradition and becomes oriented in the true sense, i.e., towards the East. This change, which has not as yet been fully appreciated by students of Arab history, is clearly marked in the reign of the Caliph Hisham (725-743), a brother of the Caliphs al-Walid and Sulaiman who mounted the last, and fatal, assault on Constantinople, but the first signs can be seen immediately after its failure, in the reforming Islamizing policies of their cousin, the pious Caliph Omar II.

It is tempting to bring this reversal into relation with the crushing disappointment of the hopes and dreams of the Umayyad Caliphs, and to see in it a kind of Freudian compensation—a deliberate rejection of the Byzantine tradition, motivated by resentment, and the search for some more compliant and attractive substitute. But it was almost certainly much more than that. After a century of Arab empire in Western Asia, the over-all structure of the empire was beginning to solidify, and the relative weight of its constituent provinces to tell. In the balance of forces, Syria still held a military preponderance, but one which became increasingly precarious, as first Iraq and then one province after another had to be held to obedience by Syrian garrisons. Ideologically, however (as we should say now), the center of Muslim culture and thought was already located in Iraq, and the imperial background and

determinants of the Arabs of Iraq were not Byzantine, but Persian and hostile to Byzantium. It was the Caliph Hisham who first grasped the implications of the growing weight of Iraq and the East, and who deliberately broke away from the ambitions of his predecessors to organize the Arab empire as the future heir of Byzantium. So far as we can reconstruct, on direct or indirect evidence, the fiscal and administrative policies of Hisham, they appear consistently directed to establishing the Arab empire as the heir of the oriental tradition and the successor of the Persian Sasanid empire. It was he, too, who began the process by which the administrative center was gradually moved eastwards, a process which was continued by the last Umayyad Caliph Marwan II, and finally consolidated by the foundation of Baghdad under the succeeding Abbasid Caliphate.

NOTES

[1] Recent studies include A. A. Vasiliev, "Notes on some Episodes concerning the Relations between the Arabs and the Byzantine Empire from the fourth to the sixth Century," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, 9-10 (Cambridge, Mass., 1955-1956), 306-316; and I. Kawar, "The Arabs in the Peace Treaty of A.D. 561" in *Arabica*, III, fasc. 2 (Leyden, 1956), 181-213. See also M. Canard, "Quelques 'à-côté' de l'histoire des relations entre Byzance et les Arabes" in *Studi Orientalistici in onore di G. Levi della Vida*, I (Rome, 1956), 98-119, for later Arab-Byzantine relations.

[2] See J. Schacht, *The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence* (Oxford, 1950).

[3] Al-Walid is said to have embellished also the Sanctuary at Mecca with mosaics.

[4] *Bibl. Geographorum Arabicorum*, III, 159. See also E. Lambert, "Les Origines de la Mosquée et l'architecture religieuse des Omeiyades" in *Studia Islamica*, VI (Paris, 1956), esp. 16.

[5] II, 1194, Musa b. Abu Bakr is again quoted as intermediate authority for a tradition from Salih b. Kaisan relating the visit of inspection of the Caliph al-Walid to the mosque at Medina in A.H. 93: II, 1232-3.

[6] *B.G.A.*, III, 158.

[7] K. A. C. Creswell, *Early Muslim Architecture*, I (Oxford, 1932), 156-157.

[8] J. Sauvaget, *La Mosquée omeyyade de Médine* (Paris, 1947), 10-11.

[9] *Op. cit.*, 111-112.

[10] *Op. cit.*, 26.

[11] See Sauvaget's remarks, *ibid.*, 27-28.

[12] Al-Samhudi, *Wafa al-Wafa*, I (Cairo, 1336h), 367 (the chain of authorities, which cites not less than seven sources, is on p. 364 *infra*). I am indebted for this reference, and for that from Ibn Abd-al-Hakam cited below, to Dr. S. A. El-Ali.

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[13] This quotation is followed by several other reports collected by al-Samhudi from other sources. These give differing figures for the number of workmen, and specifically mention Syrians and Copts among them. One report adds that the Emperor sent also chains for the mosque lamps.

[14] Mr. John Parker has drawn my attention to the story of Theophanes (A.M. 6183, ed. de Boor, p. 365) which relates that Abd al-Malik, wishing to build "the temple at Mecca" was on the point of taking columns from a church at Jerusalem, but was dissuaded by local Christians who told him that they could persuade Justinian II to supply other columns, "which was done." There appears to be no confirmation of this story in the known Arabic sources.

[15] Ibn Jubair (Wright-de Goeje), 298; trans. R. J. C. Broadhurst (London, 1952), 313.

[16] Abu Ubaid ibn Sallam, *Kitab al-Amwal* (Cairo, n.d.), nos. 1651 and 1655.

[17] See H. A. R. Gibb, "The Fiscal Rescript of Umar II" in *Arabica*, II, fasc. 1 (Leiden, 1955), 6, 11.

[18] Ibn Qutaiba, *Uyun al-Akhbar*, I (Cairo, 1925), 198. Cf. J. Walker, *Catalogue of the Muhammadan Coins in the British Museum. Arab-Byzantine and Post-Reform Umaiyad Coins* (London, 1956), liv: "An exchange of letters between the emperor and caliph led to a breach of diplomatic and trade relations."

[19] Ibn Abd al-Hakam, *Futuh. Misr*, ed. C. C. Torrey (New Haven, 1922), 98-99.

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BYZANTINE-ARAB DIPLOMACY IN THE NEAR EAST FROM THE ISLAMIC CONQUESTS TO THE MID ELEVENTH CENTURY[1]

Hugh Kennedy

The Moslem caliphates and successor states of the Near East were in many ways the most dangerous foes the Byzantine empire faced, since they had both an ideology of conquest in the *jihad* and the technology and organization requisite for mounting naval expeditions and conducting sieges. At the same time the Moslems, alone among the neighbours of the Byzantines, had a developed bureaucratic government, run by trained professionals, and accustomed to conducting government by written order and correspondence. It would seem that this was the ideal field for the Byzantines to develop those diplomatic skills for which they are, rightly or wrongly, famous. And yet Byzantine diplomatic links with the Moslem world were irregular and unsophisticated and the diplomacy essentially 'reactive' and 'prophylactic'. It was reactive in the sense that it responded to changing events rather than attempting to initiate them, and prophylactic in the sense that it was designed to ward off the immediate threat of attack rather than to create the conditions for longer term security or the expansion between Byzantine interests.

Despite the state of permanent confrontation between Byzantine and Moslem worlds, changes did occur and four distinct phases can be observed. The first begins shortly after the Moslem conquest of Syria and continues until the last great Moslem attack on Constantinople in 717 and is a period of irregular contacts whose timing was largely dictated by internal crises on one side or another. In the second phase, from 717 onwards, diplomatic contacts were virtually non-existent, so

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[1] This paper depends very heavily on the Arabic sources for the period. For the non-Arabist, these are conveniently translated as follows: E.W. Brooks, 'Byzantines and Arabs in the time of the Early Abbasids', *English Historical Review* 15 (1900), 728–47. From 820 A.D. to 959 the Arabic materials in French translation are collected in A.A. Vasiliev, *Byzance et les Arabes* I-II (Brussels, 1935–6). Byzantinists should also be aware of the new, complete English translation of al-Tabari's *History of the Prophets and Kings* edited by E. Yar-Shater (38 vols, Albany, 1985–). This is still in course of publication but where it is available, I shall give references to volume and page numbers.

far as we can tell. The third phase begins in the 780s when direct links were developed between the Byzantine court and the Abbasid caliphs. The third phase continues through the ninth century and into the tenth with increasingly formal contacts between the two courts, the main issue now being not prevention of invasion but exchange of prisoners. The Byzantine advances into Syria in the mid-tenth century and the establishment of a permanent Byzantine presence there after the fall of Antioch in 969 led to a new phase of what might be called 'province of Syria diplomacy' when the emphasis was not so much on relations between the Byzantine and Moslem world as a whole but on securing the frontiers of this exposed part of the Byzantine empire and this remained the main concern down to the middle of the eleventh century.

It was not long after the fall of Syria to the Moslems that the Byzantines attempted to make contact with the new rulers. We know little about the first contacts from Moslem sources; the Arab chroniclers and poets in this period portray a world of unremitting *jihad*. We are better informed by the eastern Christian tradition, generally located in Edessa or elsewhere in northern Mesopotamia which comes down to us in Greek through Theophanes,[2] in Arabic through Agapius of Manbij[3] and in Syriac in the chronicles of 1234[4] and Michael the Syrian.[5]

The first direct contact seems to have occurred in 650-1 when Constans II, faced by trouble in the Balkans and by Arab naval attacks sent the *stratēgos* Procopius to Damascus to request peace from Mu'awiyah, later to be the first Umayyad caliph but at this stage only governor of Syria. Presumably money was paid and the Byzantines left a hostage, Gregory, the emperor's cousin. Apparently Gregory died the next year and the truce was annulled but, no doubt as a gesture of good-will, his embalmed body was sent back to Constantinople.[6]

This set the pattern for subsequent contacts: a state of war was considered to be the normal relationship between the two powers, peace very much the exception but from time to time a truce was granted. In the next recorded diplomatic exchange, the Moslems were the suppliants. In 658-9 Mu'awiyah had rebuffed the forces of 'Ali b. Ali Talib at

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[2] Theophanes, *Chronographia*, ed. C. de Boor I (Leipzig, 1883); tr. H. Turtledove (Philadelphia, 1982).

[3] *Kitab al-'Unwan*, ed. with French tr. A.A. Vasiliev, *PO* 8 (1911).

[4] *Anonymi auctoris chronicon ad annum Christi 1234 pertinens*, ed. with Latin tr. J.-B. Chabot (Paris, 1920). I have used the new translation of the seventh-century material by A. Palmer, *In the Shadow of the Moon: the Seventh Century in Syriac Chronicles* (forthcoming).

[5] *Chronique*, ed. with French tr. J.-B. Chabot I-III (Paris, 1899-1906).

[6] A.N. Stratos, *Byzantium in the Seventh Century*, tr. H.T. Hionides III (Amsterdam, 1975), 42-3.

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Siffin but 'Ali still enjoyed extensive support in Iraq. In order to avoid a war on two fronts, Mu'awiyah sent an emissary to Constantinople, one Fanaq (Phanakis) al-Rumi, his surname denoting his Greek origin. This time it was the turn of the Moslems to offer a financial payment in exchange for a truce.[7] It was not until 663 that Mu'awiyah was in a strong enough position to begin raiding again.

The balance of diplomatic power continued to swing. In 667-8 both Saborius, a rebel commander, and Constantine IV, acting for his father Constans II who was then in Sicily, sent diplomats to try to engage Mu'awiyah's support. Mu'awiyah came down on the side of Saborius who seems to have offered more substantial concessions but the rebel died before this support was of any use to him.[8] From 677 to 687 diplomatic activity was concerned with attempts by both Mu'awiyah (died 680) and 'Abd al-Malik (685-705) to secure the removal of the Christian Mardaites from the mountains of Lebanon and after several diplomatic missions and substantial payments Justinian II was finally persuaded to relocate these troublesome warriors elsewhere in the empire.[9]

There is also a tradition of cultural diplomacy in this period. Arab sources say that mosaic workers and materials were sent by the Byzantine emperors to help in the decoration of mosques in Medina and Damascus, where the surviving eighth-century mosaics may be the tangible proof of this cultural interchange. Van Berchem studied these texts and concluded that they were late and unreliable[10] but more recently Gibb has suggested that there are good reasons for accepting the genuineness of the evidence.[11] Further support is lent by the much better documented despatch of Byzantine mosaicists to help in the decoration of the great mosque at Cordova during a time of diplomatic rapprochement and, once again, the results of this ancient diplomacy are still visible today.[12]

The last mission in this period of diplomatic activity seems to have been in 714-15 when the short-lived emperor Anastasius II sent Daniel of Sinope to ask al-Walid (705-15) for peace but also, it is said, to spy on preparations for war.[13] In the end his mission was unsuccessful and the

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[7] Stratos, *Byzantium* III, 188-9.

[8] Stratos, *Byzantium* III, 236-8 and n.xviii.

[9] Stratos, *Byzantium* IV, 40-50.

[10] In K.A.C. Creswell, *Early Moslem Architecture* II (Oxford, 1932), 154-65.

[11] H.A.R. Gibb, 'Arab-Byzantine relations under the Umayyad Caliphate', *DOP* 12 (1958), 219-33.

[12] For the history of Byzantine diplomatic relations with Cordova see E. Levi-Provencal, *Histoire de l'Espagne musulmane* II (Paris, 1950), 143-53; III (Paris, 1967), 393.

[13] Theoph. I, pp. 383-4, tr. Turtledove, 79-80.

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great Arab invasion of 717 put an end to contacts.

The period from 717 to the late eighth century saw contacts reduced to a minimum, though there are occasional missions to ask for truces. The reason for this does not seem to be a higher level of hostility between the two powers: not much seems to have changed there. The upheavals in the Islamic world at the time of the Abbasid revolution in 747–50 and the transfer of power to Iraq were an important factor. It is possible that the ending of the use of Greek as an administrative language in the caliphate after the administrative reform of 'Abd al-Malik (685–705) made contacts more difficult. It is noticeable too, that caliphs did not participate in the *jihad* during these years; it may be therefore that there were exchanges of envoys between local leaders in the frontier zone which are simply not reported because they did not involve the caliph or his entourage. It is interesting to note that we start hearing about diplomatic exchanges again only when Harun al-Rashid becomes personally involved in the *jihad*.

The campaign of 781–2 seems to have led to the resumption of direct contacts. In this year Harun, sent by his father the Caliph al-Mahdi, led a major expedition to the sea of Marmara. The raid nearly ended in disaster for the Moslems but Harun negotiated an agreement with Irene which included the payment of tribute by the Byzantines, a three year truce and the setting up of markets so that the Moslems could buy food during their retreat.[14] The Byzantines made further attempts to dissuade Harun from launching damaging raids. In 798 Irene sent Euthymius, bishop of Sardis, to try and buy off Harun's forthcoming attack, and diplomacy was also conducted by letter; the earliest surviving text seems to be the letter of Nicephorus I to Harun in 803 when he wrote to break off the treaty which Irene, 'by the weakness of women and their foolishness' had negotiated. Harun's reply was short and rude,[15] invasion followed and in 806 we find Nicephorus not only agreeing to pay tribute but also accepting that both he and his son should pay a personal poll-tax to the caliph.[16]

Harun's death in 809 led to a prolonged civil war in the caliphate which again interrupted both the *jihad* and the diplomacy which accompanied it; no doubt local treaties and arrangements were made, indeed the frontier zone seems to have been one of the few peaceful areas of the Moslem world at this time, but these are not recorded. The

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[14] Al-Tabari, Muhammad b. Jarir, *Ta'rikh al-Rusul wa'l-Muluk*, ed. M.J. de Goeje *et al.* III (Leiden, 1879–1901), 503–05; tr. Yar-Shater XIX, 220–1; tr. Brooks, 'Byzantines and Arabs', 736–9.

[15] Al-Tabari, *Ta'rikh* III, 695–6.

[16] Al-Tabari, *Ta'rikh* III, 710.

early ninth century saw rebels on both sides seeking cross-frontier support for their causes. Thomas the Slav (active 821–5) was patronized by the Caliph al-Ma'mun who permitted him to be crowned in Antioch by the patriarch of that city.[17] From 812 to 824–5 the area of northern Syria around the great bend of the Euphrates was taken over by a chief of the 'Uqayl tribe, Nasr b. Shabath.[18] When al-Ma'mun's forces approached, he contemplated seeking Byzantine support but his followers made it quite clear that they felt this was unacceptable and he was obliged to make his peace with the caliph's forces. Religious solidarity was still a very powerful force on the Moslem side.

The ninth century saw the development of a new form of diplomatic activity. Until this time negotiations had been basically concerned with issues of war and peace. By the ninth century, however, the balance of power between Christian and Moslems was fairly even and it seems that the Byzantine forces were taking as many Moslem captives as the Moslems were Christians. Against this background, exchanges and ransoming of prisoners became the main focus of diplomatic activity.

There are a number of incidental references to such ransomings in the Arabic sources but an extensive list is given by al-Mas'udi in his *Tanbih wa'l-Ishraf.*[19] He lists twelve meetings between 805 and 946. Numbers of those ransomed varied between 2,000 and 6,000 on each occasion. It seems likely that the Moslems paid cash for the return of prisoners, although this is only specified in the accounts of the first and last meeting. There is no mention of the return of Byzantine prisoners in Moslem hands, either because none were returned or because they did not concern the writer.

Though the meetings were irregular, they followed a very similar format. They mostly took place in September or October, although two of the early ones happened in the spring. The venue was always the same, the plain where the river Lamis flowed into the Mediterranean, the Moslems being on the east bank, the Byzantines on the west. Al-Mas'udi is careful to specify how long the meeting took in each case: usually the two sides met for between seven and ten days but the first meeting in 805 lasted forty days. The whole performance became a show of strength on each side. In the account of the first (805) meeting, al-Mas'udi claims that 500,000 or more people from the frontier

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[17] For the diplomacy surrounding the rebellion of Thomas the Slav, see W. Treadgold, *The Byzantine Revival* (Stanford, 1988), 229–48.

[18] On Nasr b. Shabath, see H. Kennedy, *The Early Abbasid Caliphate* (London, 1981), 168–9.

[19] Al-Mas'udi, 'Ali b. al-Husayn, *Al-Tanbih wa'l-Ishraf* (Beirut, 1961), 176–82. No complete translation of this text exists but sections are included in Vasiliev, *Byzance et les Arabes* I, 336–7.

provinces came and there was not enough room for them all on the plain between the sea and the mountains. The Byzantines arrived by sea: 'the Byzantine warships came looking magnificent bringing with them the Moslem prisoners'.

The account also introduces us to some of the characters on the Moslem side. In most cases the operation was led by the local governor of the *thughur* (frontier province) though sometimes outsiders came as well. In the third meeting in 845, the chief *qadi* (judge), Ahmad b. Adi Du'ad, sent an agent called Abu Ramlah. This was at a stage when the government of the Caliph al-Wathiq was attempting to impose its own religious orthodoxy on the Moslem community by insisting that all officials accepted the doctrine of the createdness of the Qur'an. Any prisoners who refused to do so were returned to the Byzantines.

In addition to these officials, we also hear of a number of individuals who seem to have acted as intermediaries of one sort or another between the two sides. For example in 845 one Muslim b. Abi Muslim al-Jurami from Zibatra was released: 'he was possessed of great skill in frontier matters and knowledge about the people of Rum. He wrote works on the affairs of the Byzantines, their kings and people of rank, their towns and their roads and their routes, the best times for raids and attacks on them and about the neighbouring states, the Burjan, the Avars, the Bulgars, the Slavs, the Khazars and others'. As well as the governor of the Syrian frontier, 'Ali b. Yahya al-Armani (the Armenian), there was an ambassador (*murasil*) from the Caliph al-Mutawwakil, Nasr b. Azhar al-Ta'i. In 921 there is mention of an intermediary between Moslems and Byzantines, Abu 'Umayr 'Adi b. Ahmad b. 'Abd al-Baqi al-Tamimi from Adana.

In 946 Abu 'Umayr figures again in a more complicated diplomatic exchange. By this time the caliphs in Baghdad had lost all real control over the frontier region so when the same Abu 'Umayr, described as *shaykh* and supervisor (*manzur*) of the frontier wanted to arrange another ransoming, he approached the leading figure of the day on the Moslem side, Muhammad b. Tughj, known as the Ikhshid, in Damascus. Abu 'Umayr is here said to have been 'full of understanding about the affairs of the Greek kings [al-Mas'udi uses the term *Yunani* here, which specifically means Greek rather than the more usual *Rumi* meaning Byzantine] and the Byzantine (*Rumi*) empire and their philosophers and knowledgeable about their thought'. He brought with him the emissary (*rasul*) of the Byzantine ambassador who is called Yuannis al-Ansibtus al-Batriqius (*patrikios*) al-Musdaqus (*mystikos*) al-Mutarahhib (monk). The Ikhshid died before the business could be finished and it was left to his successor Kafur to arrange the payment.

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He handed over 30,000 *dinars* to pay for the ransoming of 2,482 men and women. Abu 'Umayr and Yuannis then took a ship from Tyre to Tarsus with the money and the transaction was completed.

According to al-Mas'udi, who says he was in Damascus at the time, this was the last of the old-style ransomings to take place and, as we shall see, the focus of diplomatic activity soon changed. While they continued, these meetings were probably the closest Byzantines and Moslems came to regular diplomatic activity and we can perhaps see in such figures as Muslim b. Abi Muslim and Abu 'Umayr the nearest thing to a professional diplomat in that age.

The ninth century also saw an increased number of direct communications between emperors and caliphs. In 829 John the Grammarian was sent to try to persuade the renegade Manuel the Armenian to return to Byzantine service, which he did the next year.[20] According to al-Ya'qubi, Theophilus wrote to al-Ma'mun in 831 offering to return 7,000 prisoners (there had been no ransoming since 808) and pay 100,000 dinars in exchange for fortresses captured the previous year.[21] In 832 Theophilus fearing, quite rightly, that al-Ma'mun was about to launch an attack on him, again sent John to the caliph, who was at that time in Damascus, with a letter, quoted in full by al-Tabari; he urges peace with the benefits of increased trade and the release of prisoners.[22] Neither letter nor ambassador dissuaded the caliph from undertaking a major expedition.

This flurry of diplomatic activity was followed by a pause until 860 or 861 when al-Mutawwakil sent an emissary, Nasr b. al-Azhar, directly to Constantinople to arrange an exchange of prisoners (the fifth ransoming in al-Mas'udi's catalogue). Nasr has left us an interesting if all too brief account of the negotiations for the exchange. He makes it clear that in this case it was a real exchange, the Byzantines releasing 2,000 Arabs while the Arabs released a thousand Byzantines; the actual swap took place on the River Lamis as usual. Some problems arose: for example, what was to be done with those Moslems who had converted to Christianity? It was agreed that they should be given the option of returning or remaining on Byzantine territory. Apart from the gifts of musk, silk, saffron and other unspecified things, there is no mention of any money changing hands. The account also makes it clear that Nasr

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[20] J. Rosser, 'John the Grammarian's embassy to Baghdad and the recall of Manuel', *BSl* 37 (1976), 168–71.

[21] Al-Ya'qubi, Ahmad b. Abi Ya'qub, *Ta'rikh*, ed. M. Houtsma II (Leiden, 1883), 568; tr. Vasiliev, *Byzance et les Arabes* II, 272.

[22] Al-Tabari, *Ta'rikh* III, 1109; tr. Yar-Shater XXXII, 195–7; Vasiliev, *Byzance et les Arabes* I, 289.

spoke no Greek and acted through interpreters, two of whom had been slaves to high ranking Moslem court officials (and had perhaps been ransomed) while the third was an old man called Sarhun (or Sergius). [23]

Further embassies to discuss exchanges of prisoners occurred in the first years of the tenth century. In 903 the two Byzantine emissaries, 'one of them a eunuch and the other not' came to al-Muktafi in Baghdad apparently sent by the emperor because he had Moslem captives to be ransomed. The caliph agreed and this was probably the high-level diplomatic prelude to the seventh ransoming mentioned by al-Mas'udi as taking place on the river Lamis in September/October 905.[24] In 907 two more emissaries were sent by Leo VI, a relative of his and the eunuch Basil. This time there was a mutual exchange of captives; al-Muktafi was to send a messenger to collect the Moslems in Byzantine hands while Basil was to remain in Tarsus, still in Moslem hands at that stage, to collect Byzantine prisoners.[25] This is probably al-Mas'udi's eighth ransoming of July 907, on the Lamis as usual.

The accounts of these embassies give little idea of the sort of reception the Byzantines received but in 917 there was another embassy of which we have a remarkably full record.[26] Two envoys from Byzantium arrived on 25 June 917, escorted by Abu 'Umayr b. 'Abd al-Baqi who also acted as their interpreter throughout the proceedings, since they spoke no Arabic. They were housed in a vacant palace and approached the vizier Ibn al-Furat for an audience with the Caliph al-Muqtadir. The vizier made sure that they were well provided for and stressed that arranging the audience would be difficult; but if they came to see him on a certain day, he would see what he could do. The whole proceedings were elaborately stage-managed: after being led through halls and passage-ways lined with troops, the vizier received them in great splendour and promised that he would secure an audience for them.

When the great day came they were led through streets lined with troops and through a maze of corridors and chambers in the palace itself until they reached the caliph who graciously gave his assent to the deal. The envoys were given presents and, interestingly, the caliph arranged for the purchase of those Byzantine prisoners who were slaves so that they could be released. Then, accompanied by the army

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[23] Al-Tabari, *Ta'rikh* III, 1449–50; tr. Vasiliev, *Byzance et les Arabes* I, 320–2.

[24] Al-Tabari, *Ta'rikh* III, 2236; tr. Yar-Shater XXXVIII, 133.

[25] Al-Tabari, *Ta'rikh* III, 2277; tr. Yar-Shater XXXVIII, 181; tr. Vasiliev, *Byzance et les Arabes* II.1, 20–1.

[26] Miskawaihi, *The Eclipse of the Abbasid Caliphate*, tr. D.S. Margoliouth I (Oxford, 1921), 56–60 gives a full account. Other accounts are translated in Vasiliev, *Byzance et les Arabes* II.1, 61 (Arib); 73 (Ibn al-Khatib).

commander Mu'nis and their dragoman, Abu 'Umayr, they returned. This mission does not seem to relate directly to any of the ransomings listed by al-Mas'udi but in 921 Mu'nis was in charge of an exchange at which Abu 'Umayr is said to have been the intermediary and this may have been a delayed result.

This account has an interest which goes beyond the description of the reception. It clearly emanates from a now lost court chronicle and is widely reported by Arab authors including 'Arib b. Sa'id of Cordova, Ibn Miskawayh, al-Khatib al-Baghdadi and Sibt Ibn al-Jawzi. Not only, therefore, did the Abbasid administration put on a magnificent show, it also made sure that it was well reported. The incident came against a background of political collapse. The administration of the feckless Caliph al-Muqtadir was in complete disarray and the vizier who arranged the whole performance was sacked the next year. Clearly the display was designed to impress the comparatively unimportant envoys, but even more the reception, and the full account of it which was circulated were designed for home consumption, to convince the Moslems that the Abbasid caliphate was still a great power. The soldiers may not have been able to defeat many of their enemies, and indeed their only displays of militarism were in demanding their salaries, but they looked fearsome lining the streets. Diplomatic display, whether in Constantinople or Baghdad, was not aimed solely at foreigners.

There are brief records of other embassies in 924, 927–8, 937–8 and finally in 942–3. Diplomatic contacts cease thereafter, not, presumably, because the Byzantines did not take any more prisoners but because the caliphs were now completely powerless and not worth doing business with. After 945 power in Baghdad and southern Iraq was effectively in the hands of a family of Persian military adventurers, the Buyids, who regarded the Byzantine frontier as an irrelevance and were embarrassed rather than inflamed by the occasional outbreaks of popular enthusiasm for the *jihad*.

A new feature of the last embassy was that the emperor demanded not just money from the hapless Caliph al-Muttaqi but also the *mandil* of Edessa, the famous cloth carrying the imprint of Christ's face, which was brought to Constantinople.[27] Apart from this, purely Christian concerns seem to have played little part in Byzantine diplomacy. The Moslem conquests had caused a break in the succession to all the eastern Melkite patriarchates and, it must be presumed, to most if not all bishoprics.[28] In addition, Heraclius's Monothelitism had been vigor-

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[27] Yahya b. Sa'id al-Antaki, tr. Vasiliev, *Byzance et les Arabes* II.1, 91–3.

[28] For the survival of the Melkite church, H. Kennedy, 'The Melkite church from the

ously rejected by the communities who came under Moslem rule and this intensified the breach with Constantinople. This meant that the Byzantines did not constitute themselves as the protectors of Melkite churches under Christian rule in any systematic way and communication of any sort was rare. When Leo VI wanted to legitimize his fourth marriage in 906 he contacted not only the pope in Rome but also the patriarchs of Antioch, Jerusalem and Alexandria to seek their support, but this was a move forced upon him by domestic pressures rather than foreign policy considerations. Links were reestablished in 937–8 when the patriarch of Constantinople sent gifts to the patriarchs of Alexandria and Antioch so that they would mention him in their prayers, a practice which had been in abeyance since Umayyad times.[29] In the mid-eleventh century, Constantine X showed his concern for the holy places of Jerusalem, the first time a Byzantine emperor had done so since the reign of Heraclius: he sent subsidies for the rebuilding of the church of the Holy Sepulchre.[30] In these sporadic contacts, there is no evidence that the Byzantines were using links with the eastern Christians for diplomatic purposes.

The fourth phase of Byzantine diplomacy shows a marked change. This was a result of the Byzantine conquests of the mid tenth century, above all the conquest of Antioch in 969 and the establishment of a Byzantine province of Syria. The objectives of Byzantine diplomacy were now more specific and continuous – to protect the newly won lands. This diplomatic effort was also aimed in different directions. In the same year that the Byzantines took Antioch, the Fatimids occupied Egypt and it was to Egypt that Byzantine missions were most frequently sent.

Byzantine diplomatic strategy was essentially defensive. The main purpose was to keep Aleppo, ruled by the Hamdanids and from the early eleventh century, the Mirdasids, an Arab dynasty of Bedouin origin, as an independent, tribute-paying, buffer state.[31] The main threat to this was the intermittent attempts of the Fatimids, who ruled Palestine more or less effectively, to take over the city and incorporate it

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Islamic conquest to the Crusades', in *The 17th International Byzantine Congress: Major Papers* (New York, 1986), 325–43.

[29] See the passages of Eutychius translated in Vasiliev, *Byzance et les Arabes* II.1, 25.

[30] C. Couäsnon, *The Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem*, The Schweich Lectures of the British Academy, 1972, (London, 1975).

[31] For the Middle Eastern background see H. Kennedy, *The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates* (London, 1986), 302–06. An important study of Arab-Byzantine relations in this period can be found in J.H. Forsyth, *The Arab-Byzantine Chronicle of Yahya b. Sa'id al-Antaki* (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Michigan, 1977).

in their own dominions. These attempts reached their climax with the campaigns of Manjutakin in 993-5 which were thwarted by the arrival of the Emperor Basil II in person. In 1000 the Caliph al-Hakim sent the patriarch of Jerusalem, Orestes, to Constantinople to negotiate a truce. Despite the caliph's occasional anti-Christian outbursts, peace was effectively maintained for the next fifty years and continuing embassies were sent to keep up contacts. For example, in 1024, after al-Hakim's death, his sister sent Nicephorus of Jerusalem to negotiate about arrangements for the reconstruction of the church of the Holy Sepulchre which her brother had destroyed.

The diplomatic relations were not confined to questions of war and peace. Ibn al-Adim, the historian of Aleppo, gives the full text of a treaty drawn up between Peter Phocas and Qarghawaih, a commander who represented the Hamdanid party in Aleppo.[32] Among its provisions are stipulations that Qarghawaih should offer to pay a poll-tax, give military support to the Byzantines, send back fugitives from justice, allow the rebuilding of churches and facilitate the passage of trading caravans. After 1023 similarly close relations were developed with the Mirdasids. In 1031, for example, Mirdasids and Byzantines conducted a joint campaign against rebels in the Jabal Summaq and in 1041 their combined armies fought against the Fatimid general Anushtagin Dizbari. Relations with the Mirdasids were also marked by the bestowal of Byzantine titles on members of the dynasty, a diplomatic practice common in other areas but not used on Moslems before: in 1041 Thimal b. Salih was made a *magistros* and other members of his family, including his redoutable wife 'Alawiyya were given the titles of *stratēgos* or *patrikios*.[33]

This 'province of Syria diplomacy' marks the last stage of Byzantine-Arab diplomatic activity before the coming of the Seljuk Turks. It was also the only period in which the Byzantines seem to have developed a fully fledged foreign policy, taking advantage of the rivalries and weaknesses on the Moslem side and exploiting them by sustained diplomacy. Before this time, Byzantine diplomacy seems to have been limited to isolated missions to sue for peace or arrange for the release of prisoners. Subtle diplomacy may have saved the Byzantines many times from attacks from the north and west, but there is little evidence that they were able or determined to use the same methods with their Moslem neighbours.

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[32] The truce is translated and discussed in W. Farag, *The Truce of Safar A.H. 359 December-January 969–970* (Birmingham, 1977).

[33] Kennedy, *Age of the Caliphates*, 304–06.

FRONTIERS AND MILITARY ORGANIZATION

5

SEVENTH-CENTURY CONTINUITIES: THE *AJNĀD* AND THE "THEMATIC MYTH"

John Haldon

THE EFFECTS of sudden changes in the political control of an area are often difficult to clarify even with the advantage of plentiful and reliable sources. How much more difficult it is, then, for historians of the late Roman and early Islamic states to understand the processes which followed the Arab Islamic conquests in Syria, Palestine and Iraq, is well-known, in view of the limited and fragmentary source materials from the Greek, Syriac and Arabic traditions. This affects not only our understanding of the actual course of events, but in particular of the structural transformations which resulted, or were exacerbated, as a consequence of these political changes. Administrative and fiscal institutional arrangements are particularly difficult to perceive through the partiality and the rhetoric of the literary sources; and even with the help of material remains – archaeological and epigraphic data, for example – our knowledge of what went on in these respects is extremely vague.

It is clear that the earliest Arab-Islamic administration of Syria, Palestine and Iraq, as well as of Egypt, relied initially on pre-existing institutional patterns and arrangements, both in respect of fiscal practices (methods of assessing and collecting "tribute" i.e. tax, for example) as well as civil administrative structures. In particular, it has usually been accepted that the early Arab *ajnad* or army-districts of Filasṭīn, al-Urdunn, Dimashq and Ḥimṣ reflect pre-Muslim structures. But it has been recently argued

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that these are not the late Roman provinces as they are known from sixth-century sources. On the contrary, they reflect the results of a major reform of the late Roman civil and military administration of Syria and Palestine, a reform which is supposed to have involved the establishment in the period 629-34 of military districts or *themata* (normally associated with the later seventh century and after in Byzantine Asia Minor) by the emperor Heraclius, primarily with the function of countering a future threat from the Sasanid Persian empire in the East.

In this contribution I will accept that some changes in the military and possibly also the civil administrative arrangements of the region were probably introduced at about this time, particularly with respect to the districts later incorporated into the *jund* al-Urdunn; I will also accept that the *ajnād* do not represent late Roman civil provincial boundaries. On the other hand, I will argue that there is no connection with any imagined Heraclian theme system, and that the *ajnād* actually represent nothing more than the regions across which several of the *duces* operating in Palestine I, II and III and Phoenice I and II commanded their troops, together with the associated *ḥāḍirs* or encampments which served as the bases for the numerous Arab federate and allied forces of the late Roman military establishment in the region. Furthermore, it will be argued that it is the *ajnād* and the network of camps and garrisons associated with them which can best explain the absence of substantial new *amṣār* or military bases, and consequently of major new urban foundations, during the post-conquest period in Syria, in contrast in particular to Iraq and Egypt.

Given the difficulties of interpretation presented by the often intractable literary sources, and the problems facing the historian of the period of the early Arab-Islamic conquests and Islamic state formation, the questions raised by this otherwise relatively parochial issue are significant from both a historical methodological and an interpretational – i.e. theoretical – point of view. Assumptions about what is held to have been the nature of preceding late Roman structures, about the very nature of the Islamic conquests and early post-conquest military-fiscal organisation, as well as about what the written sources can supposedly tell us about these matters, all play a crucial role, and must be critically assessed. As will become clear in the following, some traditional assumptions in these respects can be substantially challenged.

I

For those who have argued that major reforms and a major break with the past in respect of the organisation of the imperial armies took place during the reign of Heraclius, important evidence from Arabic sources has been presented in the last few years which appears to throw valuable light on the period immediately before and during the first phase of Islamic expansion and the conquest of the East Roman districts of Syria and Palestine. This material has been used to argue that it is indeed to Heraclius that the origins of the so-called "theme system" should be attributed, thus re-opening the whole question of the beginnings of the structures of military recruitment, payment and provisioning typical of the period from the later seventh into the later tenth century.[1] In the present article I should like to suggest an alternative solution to the questions raised by this Arabic material, while emphasising that it is primarily due to the efforts of Arabists that this alternative explanation has been made possible.

The argument that has been made is as follows: first, according to the most reliable traditions incorporated into the Muslim sources, Syria appears to have been divided into four districts in the period immediately preceding the Arab conquests.[2] Second, immediately after the Arab conquest, the Arab armies of the region appear organised into four districts

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[1] For recent surveys of the previous debate on the origins of the theme system see R.-J. Lillie, "'Die zweihundertjährige Reform, zu den Anfängen der Themenorganisation im 7. und 8 Jahrhundert", *Byzantinoslavica* 45 (1984), 27-39, 190-201, and in this volume; and J.F. Haldon, "Military Service, Military Lands and the Status of Soldiers: Current Problems and Interpretations", *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 47 (1993), 1-67. There are essentially two points of view, (a) that the themes (Gr. *themata*) were the result of a deliberate administrative reform undertaken by the emperor Heraclius or one of his immediate successors; (b) that they are the result of a longer-term development by which military units were distributed across several civil districts for both logistical and strategic reasons after the withdrawal of armies from Syria and Armenia in the 630s. For the argument on the *ajnād*, see I. Shahid, "Heraclius and the Theme-System: New Light from the Arabic", *Byzantion* 57 (1987), 391-406; "Heraclius and the Theme System: Further Observations", *ibid.* 59 (1989), 208-43; and "Heraclius and the Unfinished Themes of Oriens: Some Final Observations", *Byzantion* 64 (1994), 352-76 (henceforth Shahid I, II and III). Shahid believes that Heraclius created the first *themata*. I am indebted to Larry Conrad, Jørgen Nielsen, Michael Ursinus and Chris Wickham for their constructive criticism and helpful suggestions during the process of producing this article.
[2] Shahid I, 394; al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh al-rusul wa-l-mulūk*, ed. M. Ibrāhīm (Cairo, 1961), II, 651; L. Caetani, *Annali dell'Islam*, 10 vols. (Milan, 1905-26), II. 2, 1120-69, with the relevant traditions and an attempt to extract a consistent account from the different narratives.

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or *ajnād* (sing. *jund*), a term which can be rendered as troops or "districts of soldiers" or "armies". The traditions which record some of these details go back to early post-conquest times, and list as well the names of the commanders, the capitals of each district and many other details, and there is no reason to doubt the reliability of the tradition, the argument runs, at least as regards its most general outlines in this respect.[3] Third, it is further argued that the geographical location of these districts, which are said to run from east to west from the Syrian desert to the coast, each with a coastline and ports, suggests a defence against attack from the North, and – given the existence of the desert on the eastern flank – can be specifically related to the dangers presented to these late Roman regions from the Sasanid Persian state.[4] Fourth, it is argued that while these *ajnād* are clearly pre-Muslim in inspiration, the region in question before the Arab conquests had been divided into eleven civil provinces protected by a number of military commands under *duces*. It is therefore concluded that, sometime in the years immediately preceding the conquest, a reform of the administration of these regions took place; and that reform, it is finally argued, must have involved the creation of four *themata*, upon which the post-conquest *ajnād* were based.

The justification for this conclusion is straightforward: the *ajnād* were clearly based on a pre-conquest system, but a system which was different from the late Roman administration for the area. For the thematic system of the Byzantine empire, it is assumed, involved the amalgamation of a number of pre-existing civil regions under military commanders in Asia Minor after the loss of the East, and this system itself, it is then concluded, must have followed an earlier model: namely, a defensive system of "proto-themes" (or "unfinished" themes) established by Heraclius

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[3] Shahid I, 392, 394f.; II, 210f. Cf. *EI*[2] II, 600-601. Al-Ṭabarī, II, 651 notes that his information derives ultimately from "one of the ancient Syrian authorities". There remain a number of difficult problems associated with the early source tradition, as is clear from the analysis of the conquest of Syria in Fred. M. Donner, *The Early Islamic Conquests* (Princeton, 1981), especially 111; G. Strohmaier, "Arabische Quellen", in W. Brandes, F. Winkelmann, eds., *Quellen zur Geschichte des frühen Byzanz*, Berliner Byzantinistische Arbeiten 55 (Berlin, 1990), 234-44, see 240; and in general A. Noth, *Quellenkritische Studien zu Themen, Formen und Tendenzen frühislamischer Geschichtsüberlieferung* (Bonn, 1973) (second revised edition and translation in collaboration with Lawrence I. Conrad = *The Early Arabic Historical Tradition: A Source-Critical Study*, trans. Michael Bonner, Studies in Late Antiquity and Early Islam 2, Princeton, 1994). While there are considerable differences of opinion between these three, the highly problematic nature of the Arabic sources becomes very clear in their expositions.
[4] Shahid I, 395-96; III, 355, 363. In support of this point Shahid also adduces the names of the four *ajnād* – Ḥimṣ (Emesa), Dimashq (Damascus), Filasṭīn (Palestine) and al-Urdunn (Jordan) – as pre-Islamic and therefore of Byzantine/late Roman origin.

after his victory over the Persians, that is, between the years 627 and 632-33, the date of the first Arab raids of significance.[5] Debate on the origins of the thematic system are complex, but there does exist a tenth-century Byzantine tradition that it was under the successors of Heraclius that the larger late Roman provinces were cut up into smaller units. On the strength of this tradition, amongst other arguments, the first *themata* are thus postulated in Oriens, under Heraclius himself, short-lived structures which were quickly absorbed into the administrative structures of the conquerors.[6]

The argument has two key elements. On the one hand, the clear and unequivocal existence from the earliest Islamic times of *ajnād* evidently based on some pre-conquest arrangements of the late Roman state. On the other hand, the proposal that these divisions represent something territorially and qualitatively different from the pre-existing late Roman structure of provinces and military commands under *duces*; and that these are to be identified as army-districts or *themata* (whether or not this was the term actually used, they were militarised provincial groupings). Let us examine these points more closely.

II

Now there is no reason to cast doubt on the bare fact of the existence of the *ajnād* from the earliest days of the conquest, even though there are many problems connected with the Arabic sources and their tradition (for example, they are not always clear on points of detail, so that some mention four and some five original *ajnād*).[7] And it is very unclear as to how

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[5] Shahid I, 397-400; and at greater length, II, 213ff. Shahid argues that his experience in the exarchate of Carthage and its militarised administration, together with his experience in the Persian war and his "crusading" attitude, were the crucial factors in his ideas for the *themata* as militarised provinces, II, 229-35. In respect of the Exarchates, this revives a much older view, as expressed, for example, by G. Ostrogorsky, "L'Exarchat de Ravenne et l'origine des thèmes byzantins", *I Corso di Cultura sull'Arte Ravennate e Bizantina* (1960), 99-110.

[6] The tradition is found in Constantine VII's *De Thematibus* (A. Pertusi, ed. and trans., *Constantino Porfirogenito De Thematibus*, Studi e Testi 160 [Città del Vaticano, 1952]), 12f., 16. In fact, the text is fairly explicit that it was not Heraclius who started the *themata*; rather it was from his time that his successors were forced to change the military structures of the state.

[7] Al-Balādhurī, *Kitāb futūh al-buldān*, trans. P.K. Hitti, *The Origins of the Islamic State* (New York, 1916,1968), 166, 167, 178, 202; al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, II, 651; III, 391; Caetani, *Annali dell'Islam*, II. 2, 1123ff; 1133ff. For a detailed account of the conquest of these regions – wjhich emphasizes the frequent lack of consenses among the different traditions – see Donner, *The Early Islamic Conquests*, esp. 111-55.

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reliable any of the details that are offered in association with the *ajnād* actually are. In the first place, some details may be the result of later accretions and elaborations handed on by story-tellers and transmitters interested in a particular view — stories connected with a given clan, family or tribe, for example, or a particular area. Other details may result from the rationalising and tidying up which the older traditions appear to have suffered in later Umayyad and 'Abbāsid times. In the second place, the later geographers, upon whose works much of the detail for the extent or limits of the *ajnād* is dependent, themselves derived their material for the most part from the same traditions as historical writers like al-Balādhurī and al-Ṭabarī are therefore subject to the same suspicions. Indeed, for the geographers what mattered most was the establishment of a more-or-less coherent description relevant to their own time and concerns, thus of the ninth century and after. Does the simple fact that the *ajnād* appear to be different from the foregoing administrative divisions of the region justify such a wide-ranging theory as that presented by Shahid?

Traditionally, it has been assumed that they merely represent groups of pre-existing civil provinces, although, as we shall see, this is probably not strictly correct, either.[8] But the very use of the term "theme" (*thema*) in this context clouds the issue. We need to ask what exactly is understood by this word, which could bear several meanings, all related, and might mean little more than "army".[9] Is the term useful or even relevant to an examination of the problems facing the late Roman administration in the period in question? For the rest, the assumption that these notional Heraclian *themata* were enlarged, militarized districts with a *de facto* military administration remains hypothetical, and is inferred only from the administration of the *ajnād* themselves (about which virtually nothing concrete is actually known from the early period), and from certain assumptions about the administration of the Byzantine *themata*. But even here there is very little evidence for the themes being military administrative districts in the strict sense until the later eighth century (although this does not preclude a *de facto* militarization of provincial administrative activity and priorities). As I will suggest, therefore, a number of the suggestions made in support of the idea of pre-conquest *themata* in Syria are not really very sound.

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[8] See, for example, G. Le Strange, *Palestine under the Moslems. A Description of Syria and the Holy Land from A.D. 650 to 1500, Translated from the Works of the Medieval Arab Geographers* (London, 1890), 26.
[9] Shahid I, 398; II, 236, 239.

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In addition, it needs to be emphasized that, apart from these references in the later Arabic tradition, there is in fact no evidence at all from the Greek or Syriac sources to say what happened to the provinces occupied by the Persians between about 614 and 626. We know hardly anything at all about their military or civil administration under the Sasanian régime, nor whether or not the older establishment was merely taken over by the conquerors, or whether a Persian administrative structure was established. The contemporary collection of the life and miracles of Anastasius the Persian refers to a Persian military command at Caesarea in Palestine, marked by the presence, for instance, of a *marzbān* and soldiers and a commissariat; but this tells us little about the administration of civil matters. We do not know what happened to the military units stationed in the regions which were overrun – the *limitanei*, for example – and this has obvious consequences for any deductions we might make about the situation in which the Romans re-established imperial rule after 628-29. It is always to be borne in mind, therefore, that the *ajnād* may reflect some Sasanian institutional arrangement of which we know nothing. In spite of the sketchy evidence from the Greek and other sources for the conquests, my own view is that this is unlikely, as I will point out below in respect of what happened in Egypt. But it cannot be positively discounted, and must remain at least a possibility. The silence of the Syriac sources may be particularly significant, in view of the interest they tend to show in respect of institutional and administrative affairs.[10]

The interpretation offered here is intended not so much to solve definitively the problem of the origins of the *ajnād* (although I hope that the solution proposed will at the least be found plausible, within the

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[10] For the development of the Anatolian *themata* and the continued existence of the civil administrative apparatus throughout the seventh and into the eighth century, see J.F. Haldon, *Byzantium in the Seventh Century: the Transformation of a Culture* (Cambridge, 1990), 195-207; 208ff. For the Syriac historical tradition and the dependence of later Byzantine historians upon it, see L.I. Conrad, "Theophanes and the Arabic Historical Tradition: Some Indications of Intercultural Transmission", *Byzantinische Forschungen* 15 (1990), 1-44; *idem*, "The Conquest of Arwād: a Source-Critical Study in the Historiography of the Early Medieval Near East", in Averil Cameron and Lawrence I. Conrad, eds., *The Byzantine and Early Islamic Near East, 1: Problems in the Literary Source Material* (Princeton, 1992), 317-401, esp. 322-24, 386-88. For the Persians at Caesarea: *Acta M. Anastasii Persae*, ed. H. Usener (Bonn, 1894) pp. 5-6 (BHG 84; cf. H.G. Beck, *Kirche und theologische Literatur im byzantinischen Reich* [Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft xii, 2.1 = Byzantinisches Handbuch 2.1, Munich 1959], 461). W.E. Kaegi,Jr., *Byzantium and the Early Islamic Conquests* (Cambridge, 1992), 272, notes a later Arab tradition that former Byzantine soldiers joined the Muslim forces in the conquest of Egypt. Although the tradition is uncorroborated, it is in itself not unlikely that some soldiers did change sides; possibly there were similar occurrences during the Persian occupation of Palestine and Syria.

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constraints imposed by the evidence), but rather to suggest that the answer certainly does not lie in some mythical thematic reform of the Emperor Heraclius. In the following, therefore, it is suggested that while the traditional view (that the *ajnād* in some way reflect a degree of continuity from late Roman institutional arrangements) is not entirely to be dismissed, there may nevertheless have taken place some changes in the late Roman provincial civil and military establishment for the areas in question which the *ajnād* also reflect. The context, purpose and form of those changes remain to be clarified.

I shall begin by looking more closely at the geographical identity of these districts. The Arabic sources name the *ajnād*, from south to north, as Filasṭīn, al-Urdunn, Dimashq and Ḥimṣ. These are the targets against which Abū Bakr is reported to have sent four different armies in the attack on Syria. The fact that al-Balādhurī refers to only three districts and three commanders may reflect merely the priority given to the initial attacks on the southernmost districts, as Shahid argues.[11] These districts represent, in order, Palestine, Jordan, Damascus and Emesa; and Shahid points out that these do not appear to coincide with the late Roman provinces into which the region was divided, or the commands of the *duces* assigned to them. If we accept the tradition that four commanders were supposedly despatched by Abū Bakr, this may well suggest that "Syria" was already divided into four major regions. But whether these were four military districts or the regions assigned to four *duces*, or (as seems most likely) four strategically separate and extremely loosely defined zones from the point of view of the Arab forces, remains quite uncertain. As we have seen, however, the Arab traditions are not entirely to be taken at face value, being often mutually contradictory in this respect, as well as representing the interests and rationalisations of a much later generation of compilers. Thus the four

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[11] For the four commanders, their districts and their armies, see al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, III, 390-392. On al-Balādhurī and his three districts (he excluded Ḥimṣ), see *Futūḥ al-buldān*, 165, 167 (Hitti); and Shahid I, 394 n. 6. An alternative tradition originating in the eighth century attributes these four commanders with more wide-ranging objectives, adding a certain legendary element (Palestine, Egypt, Persia and the non-Muslim Arabs), Agapius, *Kitāb al-'Unvān*, ed. and trans. A.A. Vasiliev, PO VII.4 (Paris, 1911), 468, ultimately from Theophilus of Edessa; followed by the "Anonymous Chronicle to 1234" (*Anonymi auctoris Chronicon ad annum Domini 1234 pertinens*, trans. J.B. Chabot [pt. 1], CSCO Scriptores Syri 56), 241 (Eng. trans. A. Palmer, *The Seventh Century in the West Syrian Chronicles* [Liverpool 1993]), 146 (cap. 48). But this tradition should not be dismissed too lightly, since it pre-dates the composition of (if not necessarily the reports included in) the ninth-century Arab historiography. Shahid III, 357, correctly notes that the *duces* did not have administrative authority over a province as such, although at II, 213 he refers to the civil and the military governors (*duces*) who had run the eleven provinces in question.

regions and the four attacking armies very probably reflect simply a tidying-up of earlier and less compatible oral and written accounts. Indeed, the very idea that Abū Bakr sent armies out according to some strategically coherent plan has increasingly been questioned. In the first place, it seems much more likely that small, Muslim-led parties set out on raids and, in the process of their march, collected increasing numbers of adherents according to the prospects for success, the amount of booty expected, supposed weakness or strength of the opposing forces, and so on. In the second place, the later Umayyad and 'Abbāsid desire to embed the early heroes and martyrs of the faith by name firmly in specific events – whether battles, marches, sieges or disputations – make these reports extremely suspect. In the last analysis, therefore, such arguments can neither prove nor disprove the notion that Syria was already divided territorially into four regions at the time of the conquest.[12]

    What areas were included within the four *ajnād*? Shahid presents a map showing "four provinces parallel to one another running from East to West, from the desert to the Mediterranean...."[13] According to this scheme,

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[12] See Shahid I, 394, following al-Ṭabarī, *loc. cit.*; cf. the "Anonymous Chronicle to 1234", 239-240 (Palmer, *West-Syrian Chronicles*, 144 [cap. 46]). On the reliability of the relevant historiographical traditions, and the question of the form of the first raids and the problem of "central strategic planning", see the remarks of Donner, *The Early Islamic Conquests*, 111; *idem*, "The Problem of Early Arabic Historiography in Syria", in *Proceedings of the Second Symposium on the History of Bilād al-Shām* I (Amman, 1985), 1-27. Caetani, *Annali dell'Islam*, II. 2, 1168-69, thought the armies sent represented four strategic zones. It is worth noting, incidentally, that the ninth-century account of Ibn A'tham differs from the majority tradition, insofar as Abū 'Ubayda is described as waiting near the Roman frontier region for his numbers to increase (presumably as word spread among local tribesmen of his planned raid), Ibn A'tham al-Kūfī, *Kitāb al-futūh*, ed. Muḥammad 'Abd al-Mu'īd Khān (Hyderabad, 1968-75/1388-95), I, 142-43. According to Ibn A'tham, it was Khālid ibn al-Walīd (and not Abū Bakr) who despatched six (rather than four) *amīrs* from his camp near Damascus (not Medina) to (the districts of) al-Balqā' (i.e. the eastern parts of al-Urdunn), Palestine, Bostra, Baalbek, Emesa and the Ḥawrān. I am grateful to Lawrence Conrad for this reference; and on Ibn A'tham, see Conrad, "The Conquest of Arwād", 348-50. A similar account of the initial campaign against Iraq under Khālid ibn al-Walīd occurs in the late eighth-century *Kitāb al-kharāj* of Abū Yūsuf Ya'qūb: see E. Fagnan, trans. and comm., *Abou Yousouf Ya'koub, le livre de l'impot foncier (Kitāb al-Kharāj)* (Paris, 1921), 219; the English translation in A. Ben Shemesh, *Taxation in Islam III: Abū Yūsuf's* Kitāb al-Kharāj (Leiden-London, 1969), concentrates on the fiscal material and excludes much of the historical material. Noth, *The Early Arabic Historical Tradition*, 196-97, emphasizes the process of systematization which resulted in many of these accounts: the division of territories not yet conquered into a number of "provinces" and the allocation to them of their commanders/conquerors in advance (which occurs in the case of Syria as well as that of the eastern Sasanian provinces, for example), is characteristic. To assume that the regions in question were already so divided before their conquest is in consequence highly questionable.

[13] Shahid I, 395 and map III; II, 226 and map III (following that of P.K. Hitti, *History of Syria* [London, 1957], 413); III, 355, 363 and map II.

the *ajnād* are all bounded in the East by the Syrian desert and when comparison is made with Shahid's maps of the Roman provinces (map I in all three articles), it would indeed appear quite clear that there is no relationship between the two. The approximate boundaries and districts covered by the various military commands of the area under their *duces* are not included, however; and having accepted that the *ajnād* are themselves a reflection of a pre-conquest and Roman arrangement, the conclusion that this new structure reflects a radical departure from previous provincial boundaries is unavoidable. But I would like to suggest that, if we review the Arab evidence for the geography of the *ajnād* – problematic though it is – we will come to somewhat different conclusions.

Map II (p. xiii above) shows the approximate boundaries of the *ajnād* primarily according to the reports of the Arab chroniclers and geographers of the period from the ninth to the twelfth century. The reliability of this information for the early period – from the conquests until well into the eighth century – is very difficult to assess in respect of details since, as I have pointed out already, the geographers of the ninth century and after were interested in describing the situation, as far as they knew it and as far as they possessed the relevant information, of their own day. Material relevant to the earliest period of Arab-Islamic rule had to be fitted into this tradition; and this meant in turn that they showed little concern for the evolution of districts or institutions unless they constituted a particular issue for them. It also meant that a good deal of tidying-up went on in order to make conflicting information somehow more coherent (in the views of the writers in question, at any rate). On the other hand, there is some corroboration for the broad outlines of the information incorporated into the ninth-century tradition and later, chiefly of a numismatic nature, which would suggest that the approximate shape of the *ajnād* as given in the traditions of both historians and geographers can be accepted. But I must emphasise that this information is the only information on these regions, so that any conclusions we may draw from it must rely to a large extent on whether or not they make sense in the light of what is known about the general situation prevailing during the period in question.

As can be seen, and in agreement with Shahid's Map III, the *jund* of Ḥimṣ is the most northerly, having a border with that of Dimashq to the South running inland from the coast just north of Tripoli in a more-or-less easterly direction. As I have mentioned, there are some problems associated with the original extent of this district, which will be dealt with

below. The *jund* of Dimashq has a littoral reaching down as far as Tyre, at
which point it meets the boundary of al-Urdunn. But it is important to
note that, according to the sources, it actually encloses the area of the *jund*
al-Urdunn on the desert side, including, for example, the cities of Bostra
and 'Ammān, before stretching down to meet the border of Filasṭīn, which
covers the districts to the South, stretching into the Negev, and west as far
as the coast. Even with the tidying-up carried out by the later geographers,
these descriptions may reasonably be presumed to reflect the approximate
extent of the *ajnād* in the seventh century, since the evidence of the early
Umayyad mints for the region fits in with these areas, with a few minor
exceptions (discussed below).[14] But all this evidence is in flat contradiction
with Shahid's map, and hardly supports the notion of a radical
restructuring of the strategic defences of the area. But it does suggest the
possibility of a somewhat different conclusion in respect of the origins and
function of the putative late Roman districts purportedly underlying the
later *ajnād*.

We may now usefully compare these four regions with the known late
Roman pattern of provincial administration and the area covered by the

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[14] For the cities and the extent of the *jund* of al-Urdunn, see al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-
buldān*, 178-180. As well as the major towns of Tiberias, Scythopolis, Hippos (Sūsiya),
the district of Gaulanitis, Diocaesarea (Sepphoris/Saffuriya), and Pella (Fiḥl), it included
also the coast from Tyre down to Carmel, with the city of Acre; and the city of Gerasa
(Jarash) (al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, 179). To the north, east and south-east lay the
jund of Dimashq, with both Bostra and 'Ammān (see al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, 173,
193) and to the south and south-west that of Filasṭīn (although the Arab sources do not
always agree on the boundary between Dimashq and Filasṭīn − see below and n. 56). See
*EI*¹, IV, 1030. For a detailed account from the Arab geographers of the extent of each *jund*,
see the texts translated in Le Strange, *Palestine under the Moslems*, 28-30 (al-Urdunn); 32-
35 (Dimashq); 35-37 (Ḥimṣ and Qinnasrīn); also Caetani, *Annali dell'Islam*, II. 2, 1126
and n. 1. The most recent modern historical map, the *Tübinger Atlas des Vorderen Orients*
(Wiesbaden) (hereafter *TAVO*) map B VII 2 (*Das islamische Reich unter den vier ersten
Kalifen 632-66 n. Chr./11-40h.*) gives no detailed account. I have not been able to consult
Alan Walmsley, *The Islamic Cities of Palestine and Jordan: an Historical Geography, A.H.
20-375/A.D. 640-985* (Irbid, Yarmouk University, forthcoming).The extent of al-Urdunn
and its borders with both Filasṭīn and Dimashq are correctly noted in N.G. Goussous and
Kh.F. Tarawneh, *Coinage of the Ancient and Islamic World* (Amman, 1991), maps at pp.
55 and 56, based on the evidence for early Umayyad mints in the various *ajnād* during the
later seventh century. See J. Walker, *A Catalogue of the Arab-Byzantine and Post-Reform
Umaiyad Coins* (London, 1956), lxx ff. and the discussion in nn. 27 and 45 below. For
the purposes, politics and sources of the Arab geographers, see A. Miquel, *La géographie
humaine du monde musulmane jusqu'au milieu du XIe siècle*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1967, 1975),
intro. to vol. 2.

various military commanders or *duces* under the supervision of the *magister militum per Orientem.*

It seems clear enough that the pattern of provincial civil districts is not reflected directly in the *ajnād* – one of the fundamental points upon which the argument of Shahid is based. But if we look at the districts across which the local *duces* exercised their military and policing authority, regions representing a grouping together of a number of civil provinces, some significant points emerge (Map III, p. xiv). First, it is important to stress that the *duces* of the region had no civil authority over an administrative district as such;[15] but they, and officials connected with the calculation and distribution of the supplies levied in kind or in cash from the population for the maintenance of the soldiers, did have some limited administrative authority. Moreover, it is known that military officers often bullied provincial and diocesan officials, a state of affairs that is reflected from time to time in imperial legislation.[16] The sphere of influence of the various *duces* extended over a territory loosely defined by the outer boundaries of the several provinces which they were to protect and police, so that the military circumscriptions under the *duces* seem to have

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[15] If this is what is meant by "the eleven provinces had been run by both civil and military governors", or "the duces...were in charge of provinces lying along the limes Orientalis...", Shahid II, 213; the notion that the eleven provinces had been "run by civil and military governors" is repeated at III.359, as is the assumption that the command of a *dux* was a "province". Yet in III, 357-58, in contrast, Shahid is at pains to stress that (a) *ducatus* was a technical term for the office of *dux*, rather than the region over which his military authority was exercised; and that (b) the terms appears in the footnote in question (Haldon, *Byzantium in the Seventh Century*, 215, n.27) to refer to a *civil* administrative region. In fact, while the term is used rather loosely in that note, there is no implication either that *duces* were military governors, as Shahid seems to think, or that they exercised anything other than a military command and the associated jurisdictional authority. The exception in the later fourth-early fifth century was Arabia, when the *dux et praeses* was one and the same officer; see A.H.M. Jones, *The Later Roman Empire 284-602. A Social, Economic and Administrative Survey* (Oxford, 1964), 101. In Justinian's time the civil governor was a *moderator* (Jones, *LRE*, 281 with n. 28; 282; also A. von Domaszewski, R.E. Brünnow, *Die Provincia Arabia* III [Strasburg, 1909], 283-84). While nominally in charge of the civil administration alone, however, such officials (in Palestine I and in Phoenice also) were in addition given authority over one military unit in their provinces by Justinian, who also awarded them supreme authority over both civil and military affairs under certain extraordinary conditions (to be confirmed by the emperor himself as the situation arose). See Jones, *LRE*, 282; P. Mayerson, "Justinian's Novel 103 and the Reorganisation of Palestine", *BASOR* 269 (1988), 65-71. The evidence cited by Kaegi, *Byzantium and the Early Islamic Conquests*, 167f. and "Changes in Military Organization and Daily Life on the Eastern Frontier", in Ἡ καθημερινὴ ζωὴ στὸ Βυζάντιο (Athens, 1989), 507-21, see 511-13 for emergency civil and military powers in the hands of a military commander proves at best that Heraclius was attempting to maintain some semblance of military and administrative cohesion using perfectly traditional means.

[16] See Jones, *LRE*, 376; and E. Patlagean, "L'impôt payé par les soldats au VIe siècle", in *Armées et fiscalité dans le monde antique*, Colloques nationaux CNRS, Paris, 1977), 303-309.

corresponded very roughly with those civil provincial boundaries which marked their outer limits. Thus the *dux Arabiae* appears to have lost responsibility for the region from the Wādī Mūjib down to the Wādī l-Ḥasā after this had ceased in the later fifth century to be the boundary between the civil provinces of Palestine III and Arabia. The soldiers at the legionary fortress of Baetarus/Betthoro, at Areopolis (Rabbath Moab), "Naarsafari" (in the Wādī Zifire), in posts along the Wādī l-Ḥafīr, at "Ainauatha" and Mu'ta ("Motha"), settlements which now all fell within the civil province of Palestine III, were from this time under the command of the *dux Palaestinae*.[17] Of course, some of these posts and forts were no longer garrisoned, but the *dux* was still nominally responsible for the defence of the region. There must have been some overlap of authority along this fluid and open "frontier" region, however, and there is some indirect evidence to suggest that this was the case. But the main point is that the *duces* were in no way governors, merely regional commanders of field troops and units, under the general supervision and authority of the *magister militum per Orientem*. That they often operated together, and outside the group of provinces over which their soldiers were based, is of course quite clear. The titles they held, with their clearly territorial associations, nevertheless demonstrate the connection between military authority and the areas over which it was exercised.[18]

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[17] See *Not.Dig.*, *Or.* XXXVII, 14.17.22.23 (O. Seeck, ed., *Notitia Dignitatum Utriusque Imperii [Orientalis]* [Leipzig, 1876]); and A.H.M. Jones, *The Cities of the Eastern Roman Provinces* (Oxford, 1937, rev. 1971) (hereafter *CERP*), Appendix IV, tables XXXIX and XLI. For Baetarus/Betthoro/al-Lajjūn, see Domaszewski, Brünnow, *Die Provincia Arabia* I, 470. On the other sites see also Abel, *Géographie de la Palestine* II, 177, 187, 190-191. For the civil provincial boundary changes, see especially A.Alt, "Die letzte Grenzverschiebung zwischen den römischen Provinzen Arabia und Palaestina", *Zeitschrift des deutschen Palästina-Vereins* 65 (1942), 68-76; L. Casson, "The Administration of Byzantine and Early Arab Palestine", *Aegyptus* 32 (1952), 54-60; M. Sartre, *Trois études sur l'Arabie romaine et byzantine* (Brussels, 1982), map 4; Y. Tsafrir, "The Transfer of the Negev, Sinai and Southern Transjordan from Arabia to Palaestina", *IEJ* 36 (1986), 77-86. Note that sixth-century documents confirm that the region around Karak (Characmoba) and southwards through Petra and down to Ayla/Aqaba fell within the authority of the *dux Palaestinae*, see the five fragments of the Beersheba inscriptions (ranging in date from the first half of the fourth to the early sixth century) published together by A. Alt, *Die griechischen Inschriften der Palaestina Tertia westlich der Araba* (Berlin-Leipzig, 1921), 4-13 (inscr. 1-4), especially inscr. 2. 1-7; and F.-M. Abel, *RB* 29 (1920), 260-66 (inscr. no. 5); and the mid-sixth-century papyrus document from Nessana in, H. Dunscombe-Holt, ed., *Excavations at Nessana* III, *Non-Literary Papyri*, by C.J. Kraemer (Princeton, 1958), no. 39, 124-25 and commentary, 119ff. It is most likely that Petra was the official capital of the province, although it is unclear how this affected the military arrangements for the area, see Y. Dan, "Palaestina Salutaris (Tertia) and its Capital", *IEJ* 32 (1982), 134-37.

[18] On the "frontier" in the later sixth and seventh century, see below and nn. 38-40. For *duces* under the authority of the *magistri militum* see *C.Th.* VII.17.1 (412); *Nov. Theod.* II,4 (438); 24 (443). While it cannot be proved, the *vicarius* who met and defeated the

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The regions in which the soldiers they commanded were based are thus relatively clear from the sources: the *dux Palaestinae* commanded troops based in the civil provinces of Palestine I, II, and III; the *dux Arabiae* commanded troops in the province of the same name and in the border areas of neighbouring civil provinces; the *dux Phoenicis* was in command of those units based in Phoenice and Phoenice Libanensis.[19] To the north, based at Chalkis and Antioch, the *dux Syriae et Euphratensis* controlled units based across these regions. But the military command of Phoenice actually had at least two *duces* (like certain other military command areas), one based at Emesa (but operating also from Palmyra for a while in the first half of the sixth century), one at Damascus – Malalas refers to them, significantly, as the *dux* of Damascus and the *dux* of Emesa.[20] These regions, and the civil provinces they covered, are illustrated in Map III.

If we compare the two maps, it will be seen that the districts covered by three of the four *ajnād* (Ḥimṣ, Dimashq and Filasṭīn) correspond very closely with those previously protected by the troops of certain of the older *duces*. The *jund* of Dimashq is coterminous with the southern portion of the command of Phoenice (based around Damascus), but with the addition of the territory of the *dux Arabiae*; that of Ḥimṣ with the northern portion, based around Emesa (and perhaps also including the ducate of Syria with Euphratensis). Each of these commands had had its own *dux*. The *jund* of Filasṭīn corresponds to the command of Palestine, but without Palestine II; only that of al-Urdunn is anomalous, corresponding in effect with the civil province of Palestine II, but including in addition the coastal cities of Tyre

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Islamic troops at Mu'ta may well have belonged to the establishment of the *dux Arabiae*, rather than that of the *dux Palaestinae;* when Islamic forces moved on the Gaza region in 634, the nearest forces were under the *dux Palaestinae*, who had to march down from Caesarea Maritima to meet them (see below, n. 35). A military commander with troops fought the Muslim forces outside Bostra – perhaps the *dux*, perhaps a lesser officer. See al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, 173. The later seventh-century Armenian historian Sebêos may well reflect the accuracy of his sources when, in recounting the defeat of the Roman forces at Areopolis/Rabbath Moab in 633-34, a district which came nominally under the *dux Palaestinae*, he states that the Byzantine army "was in Arabia". While not a particularly strong piece of evidence in itself, this may suggest the fluidity of the military administrative arrangements at the time.

[19] See *Not.Dig., Or.* xxxii (Phoenice); xxxiv (Palestina); xxxvii (Arabia). Thus Shahid, III, 358-59, is quite wrong to suggest that the *duces* were based only "in provinces close to the oriental *limes*". Their command covered all the provinces they were assigned to defend, as is obvious from the example cited in n. 18 above.

[20] See Procopius, *Wars* I.13.5; II.8.2; 16.17; 19.33, and for the *duces* at Damascus and Emesa and the responsibility of the *dux* at Emesa for the Palmyra base, Malalas, 426 Bonn, Eng. trans. E. Jeffreys, M. Jeffreys, R. Scott et al., *The Chronicle of John Malalas* (Melbourne, 1986), 245, 246.

and Acre belonging to Phoenice; together with the western portion of the old civil province of Arabia and a part of Palestine I.[21] And while the origins of the *jund* al-Urdunn remain unclear, some of the districts under the protection of the *duces* of Palestine and Arabia seem already to have been referred to in part during the early seventh century as "Jordan", according to the early ninth-century *Chronographia* of Theophanes (who in this respect was certainly following the Syriac chronicle of Theophilus of Edessa).[22] Thus the names of three ducal commands which were later to correspond in extent more or less with three of the four post-conquest *ajnād* and their names can probably be taken back to the mid-sixth century at least, if not earlier, whether this was in popular or local usage (as in Malalas' reference to the *duces* of Emesa and Damascus), or in official language (Palestine). As for the district of Jordan, it seems possible, although it cannot be proven, that parts of Arabia and Palestine II were thus called in popular usage in the early seventh century. To what extent it

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[21] For the extent of the *jund* of al-Urdunn, as well as of the remaining *ajnād*, see n. 14 above. For the provincial cities in the period up to the fifth century, see M. Avi-Yonah, "Map of Roman Palestine", *Quarterly of the Department of Antiquities in Palestine* 5 (1935), 139-93 (repr. Oxford, 1940) for a detailed gazetteer of each province. See 143-46 (Phoenice Maritima); 145-67 (Palaestina I); 167-176 (Palaestina II); 176ff. (Palaestina III); and see F.-M. Abel, *Géographie de la Palestine*, 3 vols. (Paris, 1938). On Palaestina III see K.C. Gutwein, *Third Palestine: a Regional Study in Byzantine Urbanization* (Washington D.C., 1981). For the sixth century see Jones, *CERP*, Appendix IV, tables XXXI-XLI, with map IV.

[22] Theophanes, *Chron.*, ed. C. de Boor, 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1883, 1885), 300.30-31. The reference to the Jordan region occurs also in the chronicle of Michael the Syrian (13th-century); and both clearly depend upon an earlier source, see *La Chronique de Michel le Syrien, Patriarche Jacobite d'Antioche*, ed. et trad. J.B. Chabot, II (Paris, 1901), 400 (the Persians take "Galilee and the region of the Jordan"); and cf. P. Speck, *Das geteilte Dossier. Beobachtungen zu den Nachrichten über die Regierungen des Kaisers Herakleios und seiner Söhne bei Theophanes und Nikephoros*, Poikila Byzantina 9 (Bonn, 1988), 66f. Note that in his account of the Arab conquest of the region Theophanes refers to it by its institutional name, Arabia, whereas the Syriac sources also use the term Jordan, as well as referring to the regions of Damascus and Emesa; see the Anonymous Chronicle to A.D. 1234, following the earlier History of Dionysius of Tell-Mahre (*Anonymi Chronicon ad annum Domini 1234 pertinens* [pt. 1], tr. J.B. Chabot [CSCO Scriptores Syri 56, Paris, 1912], 248-49, Eng. tr. Palmer, *West-Syrian Chronicles*, 155 [cap. 64]). Underlying all these is the history of Theophilus of Edessa, compiled during the eighth century, and transmitted directly to Agapius of Manbij and indirectly to Theophanes, on the one hand, and the Anonymous Chronicle to 1234 and Michael the Syrian, on the other (via Dionysius of Tel-Mahré); see Conrad, "The Conquest of Arwād" (n. 10). To what extent Theophilus of Edessa used earlier seventh-century sources and, therefore, to what extent the appellation "district of Jordan" might reflect pre-Muslim usage as opposed to a translation of the post-conquest *jund* al-Urdunn is impossible to say. Caetani, *Annali dell'Islam*, III.2, 810 argues that the term al-Urdunn was used of the region later identified with the *jund* of the same name before the conquest, but adduces only the later geographers' accounts in support of his contention.

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is possible to argue that this correspondence reflects an Arab adoption of late Roman organisational structures remains to be seen.

III

There are three problems which must be resolved if any argument for such a continuity is to be made: the fact that the *dux* of Arabia is no longer represented; the fact that the district of al-Urdunn has appeared; and the exact extent and origins of the *jund* of Ḥimṣ shall deal with the last point first.

    The original extent of the *jund* of Ḥimṣ is important because Shahid has argued that it was, during the earliest period of the conquest, a very large region, and that this reflects some pre-conquest military-administrative restructuring and the creation of a large "theme" of Emesa. Al-Ṭabarī and al-Balādhurī distinguish the four *ajnād*, which al-Tabari groups together as the *ajnād* of Sūrīya from the region to the north, which he calls Sha'm and which appears also to include territory beyond this.[23] The Arabic sources seem to agree that for a time after the initial conquest Ḥimṣ was administered jointly with the district later known as the *jund* of Qinnasrīn, that is to say, the former Roman provinces of Syria I and II and Euphratensis, corresponding in fact to the regions covered by the *dux Syriae et Euphratensis* (see Map III), with headquarters at Chalkis. But there is also a tradition that this unification was the work of the first conquerors themselves, with the implication that in the late Roman period Emesa and Chalkis (with Antioch) were separately administered.[24] Qinnasrīn was established as an independent entity once more shortly after

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[23] Al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, II, 651. I do not think the passage is necessarily corrupt, as Shahid I, 394, n. 5 suggests (although it may well reflect a confused tradition). Al-Ṭabarī makes a clear distinction between Sūrīya, where the *ajnād* were established, and the region to the north. From a Syrian standpoint (and his source seems to be such) this would make sense – Sha'm means "north", which from Syria suggests North Syria and the Anatolian regions beyond it. See *EI*[1] IV, 292ff.

[24] See *Futūḥ al-buldān*, 202, where it is noted that after Abū 'Ubayda had conquered the towns on the route from Ḥimṣ (including Epiphaneia, Larissa and Apamea) "thus was the question of Ḥimṣ brought to an end, and Ḥimṣ and Qinnasrīn became parts of one whole"; see also 211 and 229, where the "land" (or "province") of "Qinnasrīn and Antioch" is referred to as a single entity. But for the clearly separate identities of Ḥimṣ and Qinnasrīn, see Caetani, *Annali dell'Islam*, III.2, 803-804 (Ḥimṣ and Qinnasrīn were placed under a single governor during the Caliphate of 'Umar, i.e. they had been distinct), where all the relevant authorities are collected; IV, 29.

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the conquest, some authorities attributing its creation to Mu'āwiya in 643; others to his son Yazīd. In later times its northern regions formed the 'Awāsim or district of fortresses.[25]

But Shahid suggests that the northernmost *jund*, Ḥims, is to be understood as including all the regions to its north and east, thus not only the late Roman civil provinces of Syria I and II with Euphratensis, but also Osrhoene and Mesopotamia, an enormous region (see Map III). Shahid's explanation and justification for this supposed strategic unification is the potential threat which Heraclius recognised from the Persians, in view of the progress of the Persian occupation of Syria and Palestine at the beginning of his reign.[26] Yet for the period of the conquest itself al-Balādhurī and the other traditions clearly take Qinnasrīn and its capital, Antioch, as a separate province under the Roman administration; while there is no solid evidence that the provinces of Osrhoene and Mesopotamia, known to the Arabs as al-Jazīra, formed a part of this *jund* from the beginning. Even if there were, would this necessarily imply that the late Roman provinces had been similarly unified under a single authority?[27]

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[25] See *EI*[2] II, 600-601 with sources for both the 'Awāsim and Qinnasrīn as an original part of Ḥims; and VI, 124-25 for Qinnasrīn and its history in particular. For the tradition that Yazīd created the *jund* of Qinnasrīn, see al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, 202; and for the 'Awāsim, *ibid.*, 202-203. See Caetani, *Annali dell'Islam*, III.2, 803-805. For the pre-eminence of the *jund* of Ḥims (facing the Byzantines) see al-Azdī, *Futūḥ al-Shām*, ed. W.N. Lees (Calcutta, 1854) 94; 218f. (new edn. A. 'Āmir, Al-Azdī, *Ta'rīkh futūḥ al-Shām* [Cairo, 1970], but on this see L.I.Conrad,"Al-Azdī's History of the Arab Conquests in Bilād al-Shām: Some Historiographical Observations", in M. Bakhit, ed., *Proceedings of the Second Symposium on the History of Bilād al-Shām During the Early Islamic Period up to 40 A.H./640 A.D.*, [Amman, 1987], 28-62, at 29-31).

[26] Shahid II, 215; III, 356-57, 368-69.

[27] See al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, esp. 211, 213, 214 and 223ff. (and the references in n. 24 above) for "the provinces of Qinnasrīn" during the period of conquest as a clearly separate entity from that of Emesa or Damascus. Once more, however, caution in the interpretation of these later traditions is in order, and there is no way of knowing to what extent al-Balādhurī's accounts have unified and rationalised earlier, less coherent descriptions of these events. It is possible that some of the confusion about the association of al-Jazīra (Mesopotamia and Osrhoene) with Qinnasrīn may have derived from the fact that one of the chief military commanders in the Mesopotamia conquest was 'Iyāḍ ibn Ghanm, who was made governor of Ḥims, Qinnasrīn and Mesopotamia upon Abū 'Ubayda's death (al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, 270), unifying the resources and command of the western assault in the hands of one man. The conquest was completed in 638-40 (see n. 29 below). This appears to have been a temporary expedient, however, and thereafter al-Jazīra had its own governor, the first of whom was appointed by 'Umar (d. 644) (al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, 276 – various traditions; and Caetani, *Annali dell'Islam* III.2, 803-804; IV, 176). This confusion may likewise have been exacerbated because of the fact that the Mesopotamian troops were to begin with (until the time of 'Abd al-Malik, according to al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, 202) paid from the *kharāj* of Qinnasrīn (just as, for example, the *kharāj* of several districts in Azerbaijan belonged for a

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In fact, it is quite clear from the accounts in both al-Ṭabarī and al-Balādhurī that Syria I and II, with Euphratensis, on the one hand, as well as each of Osrhoene and Mesopotamia, on the other, were separately administered, both from each other, and from Phoenice Libanensis, in immediately pre-conquest times. Not only this, but as we have seen al-Balādhurī , implies clearly that it was only immediately after the conquest of Qinnasrīn that its region was amalgamated within a single Muslim administration with Ḥimṣ. Indeed, in the same passage in which al-Balādhurī notes that "Qinnasrīn and its districts" were included in the province of Ḥimṣ up until the time of Yazīd he also notes that each of Palestine, Damascus, Jordan, Ḥimṣ and Qinnasrīn were originally separate *ajnād*.[28] There is no pre-conquest evidence to suggest that a reformed late Roman administration, whether military or civil, had included all these regions together. If they were institutionally and territorially linked, it will have been only in the loosest sense, which we should expect since, for military purposes, the respective *duces* who held command in the area all fell within the remit of the *magister militum per Orientem*. On the contrary, it is evident from the accounts of Eutychius, of Michael the Syrian and Theophanes (based on Theophilus of Edessa), as well as from the Arab tradition, that Mesopotamia and Osrhoene retained their older

short while to the district of al-Mawṣil in Iraq, since it was from the latter region that they were first conquered, see M.G. Morony, *Iraq after the Muslim Conquest* [Princeton, 1984], 134f.). This in its turn may be reflected also in the later evidence of the earliest Islamic coins (of the 680s and after), which may suggest a purely fiscal connection between Qinnasrīn and parts of al-Jazīra, since on stylistic grounds the coins from the several mints in these two areas have a number of elements in common. But there are no similar associations with coins from the various mints in the *jund* of Ḥimṣ, to the south; and this is in any case by no means a conclusive connection. See J. Walker, *A Catalogue of the Arab-Byzantine and Post-reform Umaiyad Coins* (London, 1956) xciii-xciv (the mints of Qinnasrīn and al-Jazīra in question being: Qūrus/Cyrrhus, Ḥalab/Beroea, Maʿarrat Misrīn, Qinnasrīn/Chalkis, Sarmīn, Manbij/Hierapolis [all in the *jund* Qinnasrīn, see, e.g., al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, 202], al-Ruhā/Urfa/Edessa, Ḥarrān/Carrhae [in al-Jazīra]). Note that Walker's conclusion about the date of the earliest issues of "Arab-Byzantine" coin types (from the 640s) has now been radically revised (to the 690s) by M. Bates, "History, Geography and Numismatics in the First Century of Islamic Coinage", *Revue suisse de la numismatique* 65 (1986), 231-61; followed by A. Oddy, "Arab Imagery on Early Umayyad Coins in Syria and Palestine: Evidence for Falconry", *The Numismatic Chronicle* 151 (1991), 59-66 (to the 680s); see further discussion and literature in n. 45 below. Finally, it is worth noting that al-Jazīra traditionally was held to include also a strip of territory along the west bank of the Euphrates, see *EI*[2] II, 523. It is not impossible that this also reflects the shape of the late Roman civil province of Euphratensis, see *TAVO* B VI 5, *Östlicher Mittelmeerraum. Das frühbyzantinische Reich (527-565 n. Chr.)*.

[28] *Futūḥ al-buldān*, 202. A variant on the same tradition is repeated quite independently in the treatise on taxation by Abū Yūsuf Yaʿqūb, trans. Fagnan, 62, which makes it clear that the region of Ḥimṣ was distinct, both as a strategic target and as an organizational entity, from that of Qinnasrīn to the north, which was in turn distinct from Mesopotamia.

civil administration at this point, and that they still had each a military establishment separate from that of Syria with Euphratensis. There is no suggestion in any source that they were in any way independent of the armies of the two *magistri militum* operating in Syria at this time, nor that they were grouped together institutionally with Syria I and II and Euphratensis. Indeed, the Arab commanders in north and central Syria, 'Iyāḍ ibn Ghanm and Abū 'Ubayda, are reported to have come to terms both with the Byzantine commander at Chalkis, possibly the *dux* of Syria and Euphratensis, on the one hand, and shortly after with the civil governor of Osrhoene, in either 637 or 638. The latter arrangement was abrogated by Heraclius, who replaced the official in question, a certain John Kateas, with a military officer, an act which led immediately to the Arabs crossing the Euphrates and occupying both Osrhoene and Mesopotamia. But in both cases we have clear evidence for independent and separate administrations fully in accordance with the traditional pattern. By the same token, Khālid ibn al-Walīd's approach (according to one of the conflicting traditions) to Circesium was blocked by the "chief" of that city "with a large host", which may suggest the *dux* based there, or a similar officer, with the troops at his disposal. It is also worth pointing out that the conquest of greater Syria up to the Amanus mountains was more or less completed, and the *ajnād* already formed, by the time of the al-Jābiya meeting of 638, at which 'Umar decided the key issues of fiscal and military administration of the new lands. Only then was Mesopotamia attacked from the west and east simultaneously, from Ḥimṣ and Mosul. Finally, we may note that 'Umar appointed governors to administer not only Ḥimṣ and Qinnasrīn together, but also Dimashq and al-Urdunn; yet there is no argument here that the last-named districts were ever part of a single, pre-existing late Roman administrative or military region, even though the Islamic sources are no clearer on their origins than they are for Ḥimṣ, Qinnasrīn and al-Jazīra.[29]

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[29] For the campaign against Mesopotamia, see R.-J. Lilie, *Die byzantinische Reaktion auf die Ausbreitung der Araber* , Miscellanea Byzantina Monacensia 22 (Munich, 1976), 45-47; Kaegi, *Byzantium and the Early Islamic Conquests*, 147-49. For the arrangements with the *patricius* at Chalkis and with the *curator/epitropos* of Mesopotamia, and the *magister militum (stratelates)* who replaced him in 638-39, see Eutychius (M. Breydy, ed. and trans., *Das Annalenwerk des Eutychios von Alexandrien*, CSCO Script. Arab. t. 44-45, Louvain, 1985), 120f. (trans.); Michael Syr. , ed. Chabot, II (Paris, 1901), 426; Agapius, ed. A.A.Vasiliev II, PO VIII.3 (Paris, 1912), 476f.; Theophanes, *Chron.*, 340 de Boor. See the detailed discussion of Kaegi, *Byzantium and the Early Islamic Conquests*, 159-61; Lilie, *Die byzantinische Reaktion auf die Ausbreitung der Araber*, 42-43 and notes. For Khālid ibn al-Walīd and Circesium, see al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, 171; and Donner,

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It must also be doubted whether the proposition that the large *jund* of Ḥimṣ based on an expanded command of Emesa together with Syria I and II, Euphratensis, Osrhoene and Mesopotamia, in order to serve as a defence against Persian attack, actually accords with the strategic history of the region. Of course, major (and successful) Sasanian attacks on Syria and Palestine had followed this route: in 359 the Great King Shāpūr invaded the province of Mesopotamia, capturing Amida but failing to take Edessa; in 441 a similar strategy was again defeated; in 502-503 Persian forces again attacked Mesopotamia and Osrhoene, taking Theodosiopolis in Armenia, along with Martyropolis and Amida. Yet again, a firm Roman response put a stop to this progress, and resulted in 503 in the construction of the fortress at Dara. In 540, Khusro I invaded Mesopotamia where, due to Justinian's weakening of the eastern forces for his western wars, he was able to take, or exact tribute from, Sura, Hierapolis, Beroea, Chalkis, Edessa, Apamea and Antioch. The Persians moved to the Armenian front in 541; to Mesopotamia again in 542 and in 543. In 573 Persian troops invaded Syria by way of Mesopotamia, taking both Dara and Apamea.[30]

The Early Islamic Conquests, 119-21, with P. Crone in *EI*[2] IV, 928-29 on the conflicting stories of Khālid's route. In respect of Mesopotamia it is perhaps worth noting that the treaty arrangements supposedly involved the Byzantines paying a yearly tribute of 100,000 *nomismata*. This is a very considerable sum indeed. Not only did the *dux Mesopotamiae* draw his pay and expenses from the local *commercium*, however, to which he thus had regular access (see H. Antoniadis-Bibicou, *Recherches sur les douanes à Byzance, l'"octava", le "kommerkion""et les commerciaires* [Paris, 1963], 87 and 159; M. Sartre, *Inscriptions grecques et latines de la Syrie* XIII, 1. *Bostra: des origines à l'Islam* [Paris, 1985], no. 9046, an edict of Anastasius, see the commentary at 115); the post of imperial *curator*, which might also be held together with that of *commerciarius*, had on occasion in this region been combined with that of military commander. See the case of Magnus in the late sixth century discussed by M. Kaplan, "Quelques aspects des maisons divines du VIe siècle", *Aphieroma ston Niko Svorono* (Rethymno, 1986), 70-96, at 88-91. Even the combination of military with either fiscal and/or civil authority is therefore quite unremarkable at this time. Again, there is no evidence here for anything other than the traditional arrangements. And it is highly likely that, if the *epitropos/curator* in question, John Kateas, was responsible also for military affairs in the region, then his replacement by a *stratelates* did not involve the appointment of a military officer at the expense of a civilian administration at all, a point which would substantially weaken Kaegi's argument that Heraclius introduced a series of "emergency measures" at this time. He merely appointed the people he thought the most trustworthy and capable in his own eyes. It is in this light that we should interpret statements such as that quoted by Kaegi, *Byzantium and the Early Islamic Conquests*, 77, of al-Azdī that Heraclius appointed commanders from his army "over the cities of Syria" – a statement which probably means little more than that new appointments to the various ducates were made. See also Kaegi, *Byzantium and the Early Islamic Conquests*, 167f. For the joint governorships of Dimashq and al-Urdunn, see Caetani, *Annali dell'Islam*, IV, 29, and cf. III.2, 307; a similar tradition is repeated in Abū Yūsuf Yaʿqūb, trans. Fagnan, 62-63.
[30] For a succinct account of these wars, see Jones, *LRE*, 117, 123-24, 193, 231-32, 288 and 305-306.

Over a period of some 240 years, therefore, Persian attacks on Roman Syria had been directed through Mesopotamia and Osrhoene. Some were more successful than others, but none of them called forth any more than minor adjustments in the system of defence – the distribution of troops and the command structure. Only Justinian intervened on a larger scale, creating a separate *magister militum* for Armenia, further ducates beyond the Euphrates and an extra *dux* based at Circesium (although some of the troops at his disposition appear to have been transferred elsewhere by the 580s. Whether or not they are simply replaced – perhaps by Arab troops – and whether or not he was still there remains unclear).[31] Of course, the Persian occupation of Syria, Palestine and Egypt was quite unprecedented, but its causes were exceptional, as Heraclius himself must also have known. Under such conditions, a re-organisation on a "thematic" basis would have been of no more assistance than the traditional system, especially in view of the fact that the Persian kingdom was in no state to pose any threat to the empire in the then foreseeable future. And so I would argue that it is difficult to postulate the Persian war as the reason for such a supposed major institutional reform. Indeed, the four "inner lines of defence" to which Shahid makes reference already existed in the form of the ducal commands of the late Roman military administration. As I will suggest in a moment, the re-organisation of provincial boundaries and ducal responsibilities which may actually have occurred fits better the notion of internal security requirements rather than external threat.

IV

So far, then, I have argued that, while it is clear that the four *ajnād* in Syria may have followed pre-existing late Roman structures, at least as they operated and could be observed to operate at the time of the conquest, there is no reason to think that this reflected anything other than the groupings of civil provinces across which the various *duces* operated. This impression is reinforced when we recall that until the conquest itself all the evidence, archaeological as well as literary and epigraphic, points to the maintenance of the traditional establishment: *magistri militum, duces, vicarii, limitanei,*

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[31] *Ibid.*, 271, 656, 661.

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and *comitatenses*.[32] Three inscriptions at Diyarbakir (Amida), in the Roman province of Mesopotamia, dating almost certainly to 628, commemorate the refurbishing of the walls of the city by Theodore, *stratelates*, possibly the brother of the emperor Heraclius, entrusted with the repossession of cities previously held by the Persians. If the date is correct, this is yet a further confirmation of the continuing use of the traditional military titulature.[33] The Arab sources mention Heraclius' appointment of military commanders for Palestine and at Damascus, Emesa and Antioch, and there is no reason to assume that these were other than *duces* of the traditional establishment (i.e. for Palestine, based at Caesarea Maritima, for Phoenice, based at Damascus and Emesa, and for Syria/Euphratensis, based at Antioch [with Chalkis]). The Arab sources regularly mention Byzantine commanders and their soldiers just where we should expect to find officers of the traditional establishment, at Antioch, Chalkis, Emesa, Circesium, Bostra and Caesarea Maritima. Possibly – as Kaegi has suggested – they were endowed with extended authority for the duration of the Arab threat. This would be entirely in keeping with known Roman practice in such situations; but either way, there is no specific evidence that this was the case. As we have seen, they remained under the authority of the *magister militum per Orientem*.[34] At the battle of Mu'ta,

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[32] This hardly needs to be demonstrated here, although it is dismissed by Shahid (III, 371) as merely "matters of detail which do not affect the significance" of the changes in the reign of Heraclius. See the contribution by Michael Whitby in this volume, with J.F. Haldon, "Some Remarks on the Background to the Iconoclast Controversy", *Byzantinoslavica* 38 (1977), 161-84, at 166-68; *idem, Recruitment and Conscription in the Byzantine Army c. 550-950: a Study on the Origins of the Stratiotika Ktemata*, Sitzungsber. d. österr. Akad. d. Wiss., phil.-hist. Kl. Band 357 (Vienna, 1979) 31-35; and "Administrative Continuities and Structural Transformations in East Roman Military Organisation ca. 580-640", in F. Vallet, M. Kazanski, eds., *L'Armée romaine et les barbares du IIIe au VIIe siècle*, Association française d'archéologie mérovingienne (Paris, 1993), 45-53, with 465-66; W.E. Kaegi, "Notes on Hagiographic Sources for Some Institutional Changes and Continuities in the Early Seventh Century", *Byzantina* 7 (1975) 58-70; Lilie, *Die byzantinische Reaktion auf die Ausbreitung der Araber*, 292-93; M. Speidel, "The Roman Army in Arabia", in *idem, Roman Army Studies* I (Amsterdam, 1984), 229-72, see esp. 269-70 (orig. publ. in *ANRW* II.8 [1977] 687-730). Note that the *epitropos* of Osrhoene, John Kateas (whether or not he held military as well as civil authority – see n. 29 above) was replaced by a *stratelates*, Ptolemaios (Theophanes, *Chron.*, 340), and there is no reason to think that this was not an ad hoc *magister militum*; similarly Nicephorus' account mentions Heraclius' appointment of the *strategos Anatoles* (i.e. *magister militum per Orientem*) Theodore Trithurios in 636 (ed. C. de Boor [Leipzig, 1880], 20; ed. and trans. C. Mango, *Nicephorus, Patriarch of Constantinople. Short History* [Washington D.C., 1990], 68-69).

[33] See C. and M. M. Mango, "Inscriptions de la Mésopotamie du Nord", *Travaux et Mémoires* 11 (1991), 465-71, see nos. 5-7 (470); and Theophanes, *Chron.*, 327.

[34] For the commanders and their troops, see e.g. al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, 168 (the "patrician" of Gaza); 171 (the "chief" of Circesium "with a large host"); 173 (the "patrician"

won by the Romans, and that of Dāthin, won by the Arabs, officers of the traditional establishment commanded the Roman and allied soldiers.[35] Most importantly, the armies which withdrew from the east and were quartered in Anatolia retained their original divisional names: if Heraclius had converted the army of the *magister militum per Orientem* into four *themata* (or theme-like divisions), how is it that elements of this army not only fight at the Yarmūk but survive to be withdrawn in 637 and after and quartered in a region which took its name from their original formation – Anatolikos/Orientalis?[36] On the contrary, the older divisions clearly fight through the war and continue to exist, with their new Hellenized names, thereafter. Similar considerations apply to other aspects of Roman administration. Although there is little direct evidence from Syria for the continuity of civil and fiscal administrative structures, that from Egypt – which was also under direct Persian administrative authority for a number of years (619-29) before its recovery – demonstrates that the traditional Roman arrangements were re-established in their entirety after 626. The Persians themselves seem to have been most concerned with the economic exploitation of the conquered territories, and it seems most likely that they left much of the pre-existing machinery of government in place. Whatever

of Bostra "with his armed men"); 226 (Byzantine troops from Qinnasrīn [Chalkis] garrison Antioch). For Kaegi's suggestion, see *Byzantium and the Early Arab Conquests*, 99; 104-105 with nn. 52 and 53, based on al-Azdī. For the *magistri militum* see n. 32 above.

[35] Mu'ta, Theophanes, *Chron.*, 335 (the *vicarius* Theodore); Dāthin (in 634), *ibid.*, 335-336; Nicephorus, 20 (ed. Mango, 68ff.); *Doctrina Iacobi nuper baptizati*, ed. N. Bonwetsch (Abh. d. königl. Gesellschaft d. Wiss. zu Göttingen, phil.-hist. Kl. xii, 3 [Berlin, 1910]), see 86.12-15 (new edn., G. Dagron, V. Déroche, "Juifs et chrétiens dans l'Orient du VIIe siècle", *Travaux et Mémoires* 11 (1991), 17-273 [edn. at 70-71, 218-19; index pp. 220-29; comm. 230-73]), see IV, 16.4-6 (209), Sergios, the *doux* and *kandidatos* (it must be said, however, that the fact there was no change of titulature does not necessarily mean that there was no change in administrative functions or territorial boundaries. On the other hand, those who argue for a Heraclian reform, such as Ostrogorsky, have tried to prove it precisely by drawing attention to one or two isolated cases of "new" titles which "must" reflect a new institutional arrangement. On their own grounds, this argument cannot work for the late Roman Near- and Middle-East at this time. In fact, the so-called "new" titles [such as *logothete* or *drouggarios*] are not new at all, see Haldon, *Byzantine Praetorians*, 111 and n. 103; *idem, Recruitment and Conscription*, 31f.). For the sources concerning the battle of Mu'ta, see Conrad, "Theophanes and the Arabic Historical Tradition", 21-26.

[36] Their names are merely Greek translations of the Latin titles of the different divisional armies of the *magistri militum (per Orientem, per Armeniam, per Thracias, praesentalis/obsequii* = Anatolikon, Armeniakon, Thrakesion, Opsikion). See Ch. Diehl, "L'origine du régime des thèmes dans l'empire byzantin", in *idem, Études byzantines* (Paris 1905), 276-92, see 290-92; Haldon, *Byzantium in the Seventh Century*, 212ff. for a summary of the debate and further literature; and most recently, J. Koder, "Zur Bedeutungsentwicklung des byzantinischen Terminus Thema", *Jahrb.d. österr. Byzantinistik* 40 (1990), 55-165, and esp. 162 n. 33, where the fallacies in Shahid's assumptions about the *themata* are noted.

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the changes they did introduce to the military and fiscal organisation they
found, they appear to have been more or less entirely eradicated when the
Romans recovered the territories in question. There seems no good reason
for assuming that Syria was any different.[37]

The continued separate identity of the various ducal commands in
Syria and Palestine which the sources, Greek, Arabic and Syriac thus
suggest, seems to me to argue against any simple take-over by the Muslim
administration of the late Roman arrangements unchanged. Instead, I would
argue for a more patchy inheritance, adopted and adapted according to the
needs of specific military or administrative moments. But I would in no
sense query the notion that, where they were adopted, those arrangements
had a considerable influence on those of the conquerors. The complexity of
the process can be seen, I suggest, particularly in the case of the *jund* of
Qinnasrīn: initially separate, then administered following its conquest
jointly with the *jund* of Ḥimṣ, it appears quite soon after the conquest was
consolidated to have been given a separate geographical identity again, an
identity which corresponds more-or-less exactly with the former command
of the *dux* of Syria and Euphratensis, which had been based at either
Antioch or Chalkis/Qinnasrīn itself.

But there is still the problem of the disappearance of the ducate of
Arabia and the appearance of a district of "the Jordan". For the latter
seems genuinely to reflect a break with the traditional structures, being
imposed on the province of Palestine II with parts of Arabia and Palestine
I, along with the coastal cities of Tyre and Acre from Phoenice. If we
accept, as I would agree with Shahid, that the Arabs were heavily

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[37] For the Persian occupation see the discussion, with literature and sources, in F.
Winkelmann, "Ägypten und Byzanz vor der arabischen Eroberung", *Byzantinoslavica* 40
(1970), 161-82, esp. 169-70 (repr. in W. Brandes, J.F. Haldon, eds., *Friedhelm
Winkelmann. Studien zu Konstantin dem Grossen und zur byzantinischen
Kirchengeschichte. Ausgewählte Aufsätze* [Birmingham, 1993], IV). The evidence for the
post-conquest fiscal administration of Egypt provides a striking example of the ways in
which late Roman administrative structures were adapted to a new political environment,
for it is clear, at least until the reforms of the last decade of the seventh century, that both
the forms, the technical vocabulary and the fundamental mode of assessment, collection
and distribution of tax revenues continued to be operated virtually unchanged. See in
particular H.I. Bell, ed., *Greek Papyri in the British Museum Catalogue, with Texts
IV.The Aphrodito Papyri* (London 1910), xxv-xxxii, esp. xxvi, xxix; G. Rouillard,
L'administration civile de l'Égypte byzantine (Paris, 1928), 79-81; and J.F. Haldon,
"*Synônê*, Re-Considering a Problematic Term of Middle Byzantine Fiscal
Administration", *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* 18 (1994), 116-53 at 131-32.

influenced by, or adopted, some aspects of late Roman administrative
arrangements to the extent that identifiable military organizational regions
re-appear under Islamic rule, however confused and rationalised the ninth-
to twelfth-century Arab historical and geographical sources may be, and
however tenuous the demonstrable link between the seventh-century
situation and these later representations of it might be, then the creation of
a district of the Jordan very probably also reflects some sort of pre-
conquest administrative change. This becomes the more likely when we
recall that, whereas the physical shape of the other *ajnād* would appear to
correspond closely with regions known in the pre-conquest period to have
been under specific ducal commands, that of al-Urdunn is really quite
anomalous.

In order to offer a solution to this problem, I should like at this point
to look at the general context of the regions in question, by drawing
attention to the known changes in frontier strategy in the later sixth and
seventh century; and to suggest that a reorganisation of the ducates
themselves provides the most likely explanation for the anomalies we have
noted.

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The changes in question concerned in particular the increased importance
of Arab federates during the first half of the sixth century, and especially
the Ghassānids, who came during Justinian's reign to exercise an
imperially-backed hegemony over a substantial number of other clans in
the area. While the archaeological and literary record cannot prove that
there was a marked decline in imperial involvement in the frontier regions
adjacent to the Syrian desert southwards before the middle of the sixth
century, approximately, it does suggest a considerable decrease in such
involvement over the sixth century, as the Ghassānids or other allied clans
took over responsibility for both defence and, in some cases, fortress-
maintenance. A parallel reduction in imperial administrative involvement
throughout the frontier regions also took place; and, as several scholars
have pointed out, these shifts are connected with longer-term demographic

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changes in the area.[38] The Ghassānid confederacy dominated the steppe bordering the Syrian desert, but were also employed to control other

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[38]   See in particular H. Kennedy, "The Last Century of Byzantine Syria: a Reinterpretation", *Byzantinische Forschungen* 10 (1985), 141-83 for an excellent survey of the process of change, and the brief summary of Kaegi, *Byzantium and the Early Islamic Conquests*, 52ff. For a general survey, see S.T. Parker, *Roman and Saracens. A History of the Arabian Frontier*, American Schools of Oriental Research, dissertation series 6. (Winona Lake, 1986), esp. 149-55; note also *idem*, "The Limes Arabicus Project: The 1987 Campaign", *Annual of the Department of Antiquities of Jordan* 32 (1988), 171-87 (with earlier and later reports in the appropriate volumes); *idem*, "The Roman Limes in Jordan", in A. Hadidi, ed., *Studies in the History and Archaeology of Jordan* III (Amman/London, 1987), 151-64 with extensive literature; and "El-Lejjūn et le Limes Arabicus", *RB* 93 (1986), 256-61, see 260-61 for the beginning of a supposed orderly withdrawal from the frontier-region forts from ca. 530 A.D. with the comment of D. Kennedy, "The Roman Frontier in Arabia (Jordanian Section)", *Journal of Roman Archaeology* 5 (1992), 473-89. Note also the evidence from the Nessana documents (H. Dunscombe-Holt, ed., *Excavations at Nessana III, Non-Literary Papyri*, by C.J. Kraemer [Princeton, 1958]), which might suggest the withdrawal of the unit based there some time before the Arab conquest: see Kraemer, *op. cit*, 5-6, 24; followed by Gutwein, *Third Palestine*, 93-95, both of whom argue for a withdrawal by 590, although I do not think the documents necessarily support such a definite conclusion. For an approach arguing for much greater fluidity of movement and integration of social and economic life between desert and settled regions than is often assumed, see P. Mayerson, "Saracens and Romans: Micro-Macro Relationships", *Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research* 274 (1989), 71-79 with reference to the preceding debate on this theme (and more recently his comments in "Towards a Comparative Study of a Frontier", *Israel Exploration Journal* 40 [1990], 267-79); and note also Mayerson's discussion, "The First Muslim Attacks on Southern Palestine (A.D. 633-634)", *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Society* 95 (1964), 155-99, see 188-90. According to a pilgrim who travelled via Nessana to Sinai in the 570s, the fort had no military character at all, having been turned to use as a hospice for travellers: P. Geyer, ed., *Itineraria Hierosolymitana saeculi IIII-VIII*, CSEL 39 (Vienna, 1898), 181-82; and P. Mayerson, "The Desert of Southern Palestine According to Byzantine Sources", *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 107 (1963), 170-71.
   In general on the history of both the Palestinian and the Arabian frontier regions, see Parker, *Romans and Saracens*; G.W. Bowersock, "Limes Arabicus", *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 80 (1976), 219-29 (with his revisions in his *Roman Arabia* [Cambridge, Mass., 1983], 104 and n. 41); *idem*, "A Report on Arabia Provincia", *JRS* 61 (1971), 219-42; D. Graf, "The Saracens and the Defense of the Arabian Frontier", *Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research* 229 (1978), 1-26; P. Mayerson, "The Saracens and the Limes", *ibid*. 262 (1986), 35-47; *idem*, "The Meaning of the Word Limes (limiton) in the Papyri", *ZPE* 77 (1989), 287-91; and esp. Sartre, *Trois études*, 121-203 for a good survey of Roman-Arab frontier relations in the period from the fifth to seventh centuries. It seems generally accepted now that *limes* in both the Greek and Latin sources of the fifth and sixth centuries refers to a border region, rather than a system of linear defence. Mayerson has argued that the term "inner" *limes* refers to the regions further from clearly defined Roman territory, and should be associated with a notion of depth -- the further away from Roman territory one travelled, the further "into" the liminal zone one went. See P. Mayerson, "A Note on the Roman Limes, 'Inner' versus 'Outer'", *IEJ* 38 (1988), 181-83. On Palestine, see esp. M. Gichon, "The Origins of the Limes Palaestinae and the Major Phases of its Development", in *Studien zu den Militärgrenzen Roms*.

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nomad groups who inhabited these eastern provinces. Relations with their leaders were always tricky, and failures of diplomacy on the Roman side could have direct consequences. After the rupture between the emperors and the Ghassānid leader in the 580s, which must be understood in the context of Ghassānid support for Monophysite Christianity, especially in the Hawrān region, their hegemony appears to have been weakened or broken; but they and other allied group remained crucial to the Roman government in the East, both for frontier and internal security.[39] Shahid has noted that Ghassānid troops are reported to have been based in the immediately pre-conquest years in the area of the Jordan itself according to a ninth-century tradition; and it was the Ghassānids who helped crush the Samaritan revolt of 529. A Ghassānid "phylarch" may have had on at least one occasion a general military authority in Palestine II and Arabia; while the importance of the Arab allies and federates as support for the *duces* was clearly indispensable. During the period of the Persian war imperial reliance upon beduin allies seems to have increased, although the rôle of the Ghassānids in this respect remains uncertain. A later tradition notes that other allied or federated troops were established in the region to the west of the Jordan and the Dead Sea in the 630s; and although the evidence is ambiguous, Arabic sources give the impression that, by the time of the Byzantine victory over the Muslims at Mu'ta, which lies to the east of the Wādī 'Araba (running in a northerly direction to the Dead Sea), midway between Arindela and Zoara, in 629, the Ghassānids and a range of other tribal groups were once more close supporters of the Roman establishment

Vorträge des 6. Internationalen Limeskongresses in Süddeutschland (Köln/Graz, 1967), 175-93; Gutwein, *Third Palestine*, 309-314; P. Mayerson, "'Palestina' vs. 'Arabia' in the Byzantine Sources", *ZPE* 56 (1984), 223-30; "The Saracens and the Limes", *Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research* 262 (1986), 44-45; and B. Isaac, "The Meaning of the Terms Limes and Limitanei", *JRS* 78 (1988), 215-47; *idem, The Limits of Empire. The Roman Army in the East* (Oxford, 1990), 208-10.

[39] See *Iohannis Ephesini Historiae Ecclesiasticae pars tertia*, ed. and trans. E.W. Brooks, in CSCO Script. Syri 54 (Louvain, 1952), 132, for example, for the Ghassānid "revolt" and the conflict between their leader al-Mundhir and the *dux Arabiae* at Bostra in 581, a result of the imperial withdrawal of subsidies and allowances. On the Ghassānids in connection with their Monophysitism, see I. Shahid, s.v. "Ghassānids", in *EI²*, II; Donner, *The Early Islamic Conquests*, 43f.; and especially Sartre, *Trois études*, 189ff. In general on Roman-Arab relations, see I. Shahid, *Byzantium and the Arabs in the Fourth Century* (Washington D.C., 1984) and *Byzantium and the Arabs in the Fifth Century* (Washington D.C., 1988); *Byzantium and the Arabs in the Sixth Century* (1995) had not appeared at the time this article went to press.

in these regions.[40] Members of other clans fought on the Byzantine side during that battle; and it is well-known that early Muslim strategy was aimed specifically at detaching such groups from their Byzantine allegiance, by diplomacy, conversion or coercion.[41]

Shahid and others have noted that the Sasanian occupation of Syria and Palestine over the period from 613-14 to 628 must have affected the late Roman tradition of administration. As I have suggested, there is no way of knowing to what extent this was actually the case; and if the example of Egypt is anything to go by, the effects in this sphere were probably minimal. On the other hand, the continuity of Roman occupation and the loyalties and political-cultural identities of the population of the areas concerned must have been affected. Mayerson and Donner have stressed that, by the time of the Roman re-occupation, there will have existed a whole generation who will have had no experience or only the dimmest memory of Roman authority. The Ghassānid phylarchate itself may have ceased to exist; and real Byzantine Ghassānid authority seems to have reached only to the most north-easterly regions of Palestine III, although representatives of Roman political and ecclesiastical organisation were established in towns such as Ayla (Eilat), and Ma'ān, near Petra. In

[40] Shahid II, 217 n. 27 (the late ninth- or early tenth-century historian al-Ya'qūbī refers also to the district of al-Urdunn before the conquest as being the base for Ghassānid federate troops); 218-19; Kaegi, *Byzantium and the Early Islamic Conquests*, 53-54 with literature. On the phylarchs and their role and on the "over-phylarchate" established by Justinian, see I. Shahid, "The Patriciate of Arethas", *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 52 (1959), 321-43, esp. 339ff.; *idem*, "Arethas, son of Jabalah", *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 75 (1955), 205-16; Gutwein, *Third Palestine*, 314ff. Cf. Procopius, *BP* I.19.8-13; II.3.41, ed. Haury/Wirth, Leipzig 1962-64]); and Malalas, 446 (Eng. trans., eds. Jeffreys, Jeffreys and Scott, 261) for the "phylarch of Palestine" in the suppression of the revolt of 529. Mayerson, "The First Muslim Attacks", 189, n. 109, does not believe that the phylarchs had any authority over territory within the empire itself. But neither the sources nor Shahid suggest this – merely that, as military commanders of allied troops, they were employed within the empire. Like the *duces*, and whether or not they also occupied bases or camps on Byzantine territory (according to al-Balādhurī, *Futūh al-buldān*, 223, 224, there existed such camps near Qinnasrīn and Aleppo in the pre-conquest period; see Shahid, *Byzantium and the Arabs in the Fourth Century*, 401ff., followed by Kaegi, *Byzantium and the Early Islamic Conquests*, 55, 91-92 for similar encampments near other towns, for example), they were responsible only for military or policing affairs, and had no civil administrative jurisdiction. On the other hand Shahid argues that the title phylarch was an officially recognised, formal appellation, which Mayerson rejects, proposing rather that it was an unofficial, descriptive term. See P. Mayerson, "The Use of the Term Phylarchos in the Roman-Byzantine East", *ZPE* 88 (1991), 291-95. For other groups in the area west of the Jordan, see Donner, *The Early Islamic Conquests*, 105; and for the battle of Mu'ta, *ibid*. 101, 103, 105 (and Kaegi, *Byzantium and the Early Islamic Conquests*, 71ff.); on the Ghassānids, *ibid*. 107f. See the literature cited in n. 52 below.

[41] See, for example, Hugh Kennedy, *The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphs* (London, 1986), 60; N. Hasan, *The Role of the Arab Tribes in the East During the Period of the Umayyads, 40/660-132/749* (Baghdad, 1978), 59-62.

these conditions, a re-organization of the military commands and possibly of some civil districts may well have occurred, and this may well be that reflected through the Arab *ajnād*. The passage of Theophanes in which a *vicarius* named Theodore together with Arab allies defeated the Muslim raid at Mu'ta shows that Roman military authority continued to be exercised in this region and northwards; but all the evidence points to the fact that no defensive arrangements for Palestine III were restored – reliance on subsidies and peaceful co-existence, together with the threat of military reprisals from the *dux* at Caesarea, some distance away (or possibly Petra), and allied beduin troops, were assumed to be adequate. For, as Mayerson has pointed out, the Romans assumed that they would have the continued support of the population of towns such as Ayla, which guarded the entrance to the "back door" of Palestine and the routes to Gaza from the Arabian peninsula; when such towns accepted Muslim overlordship, of course, as occurred in 630, this strategy was fatally compromised. And this seems to have been the principle on which the security of this region had been based since the 570s or 580s.[42]

The pattern of administration reflected through the later Arab *ajnād* must also reflect these developments. The fact that the *jund* of Dimashq came to include most of the older province of Arabia, including its capital at Bostra, as al-Balādhurī's description makes clear, as well as the area to the south including 'Ammān,[43] suggests the close relationship of the two military commands of Damascus (as Malalas refers to it, i.e. the southern section of the command of the *dux Phoenicis*) and Arabia in strategic terms – between them, they covered the whole central and south-eastern quadrants of the frontier. Perhaps the command of the *dux* of Arabia was amalgamated with, or placed under the authority of, that of Damascus before or even in the opening phases of the Muslim conquests.[44] Bostra

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[42] For the "Roman" presence at Ayla, see Donner, *The Early Islamic Conquests*, 109 with nn. 90, 91; Mayerson, "The First Islamic Attacks", 175-76; and al-Balādhurī, *Futūh al-buldān*, 92-93. See also Gutwein, *Third Palestine*, 137-40, 339; A. Alt, "Aila und Adroa im spätrömischen Grenzschützsystem", *Zeitschrift des deutschen Palästina-Vereins* 59 (1936), 92-111. For the effects of the Sasanid occupation, and the re-establishment of Byzantine authority, Donner, *The Early Islamic Conquests*, 99-101; Mayerson, "The First Muslim Attacks", 174-75; and for Ayla and the Gaza route, *ibid.* 162-164; 169-77; and 192-94, 197-99 for Heraclius' possible strategy after 628, with Kaegi's critical remarks, *Byzantium and the Early Islamic Conquests*, 93 and n. 21.

[43] But see also n. 56 below.

[44] Al-Balādhurī, *Futūh al-buldān*, 173, preserves a tradition that Bostra "lay within the district of Damascus". This seems to refer to the post-conquest situation and, therefore, the territory of the *jund* of Dimashq; but it might just refer to the situation the Arabs found, and

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appears to have remained the seat of a military leader at the time of its conquest, and so it may be that the *ducatus* of Arabia still existed at that time. And it may well be the case that the later Arab arrangement, just as in the case of Ḥimṣ where parts of two separate ducates were, at least initially, united in a single post-conquest entity, reflects both the actual process of the conquest as well as Arab strategic and administrative priorities. Whether the later establishment of a large number of mints (albeit often at sites where older, pre-fifth-century mints had existed) from the 680s illustrates their new fiscal priorities and the fact that they did not simply follow the pre-existing arrangements without modifying them to suit their own requirements must remain uncertain.[45]

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imply that Bostra and its military commander had been placed under the command of the *dux* at Damascus.

[45] An inscription at Zizia in Arabia dating to 580 refers to the *dux*, see P.-L. Gatier, *IGLS 21.ii. Inscriptions de la Jordanie*, t.2, *région centrale*, (Paris, 1986), no. 155. For the Roman (military) leader at Bostra see al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, 173 (a "patricius", the usual Arab term for the Roman commanders – whether he was a *dux* is not known, of course, but it must remain a possibility). For the mints, see Walker, *Catalogue*, xxiii-xxxiii, xciii. Apart from Antioch (which was anyway closed during the Heraclian rearrangement of mint administration in 628-29), none of the sites in question had had a mint for well over a century, see M.F. Hendy, *Studies in the Byzantine Monetary Economy c. 300-1450* (Cambridge, 1985), 417f. with literature. That the stabilisation of administrative and fiscal relations was a priority for the new administration is suggested by a number of factors. The new mints at Emesa and Antaradus, for example, began very soon after their official recognition by the Islamic authorities (in the late 670s at the earliest, see the discussions of Bates, "History, Geography and Numismatics" and Oddy, "Arab Imagery on Early Umayyad Coins", cited in n. 27 above) to issue coins based on Byzantine types, but with the additional inscription in Greek and sometimes Arabic also of the word *kalon/tayyib* (Emesa) or *kalôn* (sic) (Tartus/Antaradus), i.e. "good"; or, as at Dimashq, *jā'iz*, i.e. "correct", a valuable pointer to the degree of importance attached by the conquerors to maintaining a stable small- and middle-denomination coinage, and which highlights the fiscal needs of the new state particularly with regard to its military operations. See Walker, *Catalogue*, xcvi, and nos. 27-34, 55-72. The very fact that so many mints were brought into operation must also reflect this need, since the maintenance of exchange-relationships based on the use of coin was essential to the efficient extraction of surplus wealth required to maintain the armies and the continuation of the traditional economic life of the conquered districts. The importance of producing an acceptable coinage is emphasised by a statement in the anonymous Maronite Chronicle, which reported that, upon his election as Caliph, Mu'āwiya minted a gold and silver coinage, "but it was not accepted, because it had no cross on it", *Chronicon Maroniticum*, ed. E.W. Brooks, tr. J.B. Chabot, CSCO Script. Syri, ser. 3, t.4, *Chronica minora pars* ii, 3, 43-74, see 71 (Eng. trans. Palmer, *West-Syrian Chronicles*, 32); Walker, *Catalogue*, xxiv-xxv. The evidence of the coins themselves shows that metropolitan copper from Constantinople continued to reach Syria in large quantities until the 18th year of Constans II (i.e. 657-58), when production for the empire as a whole was drastically curtailed (see Hendy, *Studies*, 640-41; and especially C. Morrisson, "La monnaie en Syrie byzantine", in J.-M. Dentzer, C. Orthmann, eds., *Archéologie et histoire de la Syrie* II [Saarbruck, 1989], 191-200; S. Album, *A Checklist of Popular Islamic Coins* [Santa Rosa, 1993], 9), although there is some evidence that the supply continued until *ca.* 660: see M. Mackensen, in *Resafa* I (Mainz, 1983), 29-30, n. 98. The local populations and the Islamic authorities appear to have continued to use this Byzantine coinage until it became necessary, perhaps

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The *jund* of Jordan represented an expanded province of Palestine II, with the anomalous stretch of Phoenice extending in a narrow strip along the coast south of the river Laitah (Leontes), and with the westernmost section of Arabia and part of north-east Palestine I. If we assume that its territory reflects some Heraclian administrative re-arrangement, then the precise reasons for this change, if it does not reflect a Sasanid administrative innovation, remain shrouded in mystery. The sources are silent on the subject. But such adjustments of boundaries are not in the least unusual in the history of Roman provincial administration.[46] Internal security together with the efficacy – which appears to have been take for granted – of the Ghassānids or their equivalent along the frontier steppe may well have played a role: the "new" district of the Jordan included north Samaria and Galilee both areas of strong anti-Roman sentiment. Their populations clearly supported and welcomed the Persians for a while during the wars of the reign of Heraclius; and it is notable that the area offered virtually no resistance to the Arabs – the capital, Tiberias, capitulated (the first time, at least) without a struggle.[47]

One political moment does suggest itself as a possible context. In the period between 629 and 634, and in spite of Heraclius' initially conciliatory approach to the problem, suspicion of and hostility to the Jews in Palestine in particular appears to have increased dramatically as a consequence of their supposed role in the Persian wars, a role which was emphasised and condemned in the strongest terms by the monks and clergy of the Holy Land. This culminated in 632 in a general order compelling all Jews to be baptized.[48] It is not impossible that a *ducatus* of Jordan, for that is, in

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in the later 660s or 670s, to produce increasing numbers of imitations (mostly of coins of Heraclius and Constans II up to his 18th year), which have been found only in Syria, and in very considerable numbers, especially in the north, probably from privately-controlled mints. Only in the 680s does it seem that the authorities stepped in to regulate and control the production of coin, a move which resulted in the earliest so-called Arab-Byzantine coinage. For the imitative series, see W.A. Oddy, "The 'Constans II' Bust Type of Arab-Byzantine Coins of Hims", *Revue numismatique* 6ᵉ sér. 29 (1987), 192-97; A. Goodwin, "Imitations of the Folles of Constans II", *Oxford Numismatic Society, Occasional Paper* 28 (1993). I am indebted to Stephen Album and Marcus Phillips for much helpful advice on this numismatic material.

[46] As reference to Jones, *LRE* will quickly demonstrate.

[47] Al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, 179; Shahid II, 217-219.

[48] See the remarks of C. Laga, "Judaism and Jews in Maximus Confessor's Works: Theoretical Controversy and Practical Attitude", *Byzantinoslavica* 51 (1990), 177-88, who comments in particular on the increasingly virulent anti-Jewish sentiment of the early 630s, as illustrated in the writing and preaching of leading Churchmen such as Maximus Confessor and Sophronius – see esp. 183ff. – and concludes that the repression and forced baptism of 632 were connected closely with internal political anxieties. See Robert Schick, *The Christian Communities of Palestine from Byzantine to Islamic Rule. An Historical and*

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effect, what may have underlain the later *jund* al-Urdunn, was brought into being as a means of coercing and controlling a potentially dangerous and hostile population. The fact that the later tradition already referred to mentions that Jordan was occupied by Ghassānid federates in the years before the Arab conquest is not insignificant in this respect.

It is very clear that the constant threat posed by Jewish and Samaritan hostility to Roman rule had not been resolved by the traditional civil and military arrangements. The Samaritan revolt of 578, the Jewish revolt in Syria and Mesopotamia in 610, Jewish military support for the Persians in the period 612-615, all underlined the problematic nature of this region.[49] It is notable that the Persians may have encouraged the Jewish troops to attack Acre and Tyre either just before or after the capture of Jerusalem in 614; and since both these ports were later incorporated into the *jund* al-Urdunn, this may also reflect an awareness of the strategic requirements of an internally-orientated, security-conscious reorganisation of these districts, heightened perhaps by the possibility that, at some point after the Persians had taken Jerusalem, the Jews of the region may have been permitted to make preparations for the re-establishment of the Temple and all that such a move entailed.[50] And it is certain that the later Jewish tradition remembers Heraclius:persecution of Jews as the great persecutor of the Jews of Palestine: even synagogue services were controlled by imperial officials and soldiers in order to ensure that no prayer or recitation which might imply an anti-imperial view or set of beliefs could be declaimed. It is difficult to see how this harassment and surveillance could have been carried out under the traditional civil administrative arrangements. There were certainly regular units in Palestine II in the late 620s and early 630s, for a contemporary collection of the miracles of S. Anastasius the Persian includes the story of an *optio*

Archaeological Study, Studies in Late Antiquity and Early Islam 2 (Princeton, 1995), 50-52, with 20-48 on the Sasanian conquest and occupation of Palestine.

[49] For Jewish and Samaritan revolts and their later support for the Persians, see P. Schäfer, *Geschichte der Juden in der Antike* (Stuttgart, 1983), 206-209; S.W. Baron, *A Social and Religious History of the Jews* (New York, 1957), 3, 18-20; and for the Arabs, Stefan Leder, "The Attitudes of the Population, especially the Jews, towards the Arab-Islamic Conquest of Bilâd al-Shâm and the Question of their Role therein", *Die Welt des Orients* 18 (1987), 64-71. Shahid II, 217-19 is clear that the security aspect of the putative late Roman district of the Jordan must have been significant, and also offers this as a main ground for the creation of what he wishes to see as the "theme" of Jordan. For Heraclius' order of 632, see n. 51 below and Schick, *The Christian Communities*, 26-31.

[50] See the discussion of G. Dagron, "Introduction historique: entre histoire et apocalypse", *Travaux et Mémoires* 11 (1991), at 26-28 (G. Dagron, V. Déroche, "Juifs et chrétiens dans l'Orient du VIIe siècle", *ibid.*, 17-273); Schick, *The Christian Communities*, 26-31.

(paymaster) of a unit in Samaria, billeted on a local household and purportedly poisoned by his host, illustrative both of the military presence and the hostility of the local populace to Roman soldiers, as well as of references to field army units (cavalry) based at or near Caesarea in Palestine.[51]

Important corroboration for this point of view comes from the archaeological and historical evidence for the distribution and pattern of Jewish settlement. By the sixth century, Jewish rural settlement appears to have been limited almost entirely to Galilee, except for the Jewish population of the various cities in Palestine, where the majority of town were inhabited by mixed populations of Christians, Samaritans and Jews. Substantial Samaritan communities existed in southern Galilee and Samaria also. But in both cases, the main zones of Jewish and Samaritan habitation were clearly delimited and, excluding a few dispersed groups, were confined precisely to those areas of Palestine represented in the later *jund* of al-Urdunn: Palestine II, the north-eastern quadrant of Palestine I, with the westernmost strip of Arabia and the coastal strip of Tyre and Acre.[52]

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[51] On the Jews, see especially Dagron, "Introduction historique", 18-28; J. Starr, "Byzantine Jewry on the Eve of the Arab Conquest (565-638)", *Journal of the Palestine Oriental Society* 15 (1935), 280-93; A. Sharf, "Byzantine Jewry in the Seventh Century", *Byz. Zeitschrift* 48 (1955), 103-115. See further M. Avi-Yonah, *The Jews of Palestine. A Political History from the Bar-Kokhba War to the Arab Conquest* (Oxford, 1976), 242-73; Schäfer, *Geschichte der Juden in der Antike* , 206ff.; A. Sharf, *Byzantine Jewry from Justinian to the Fourth Crusade* (London, 1971), esp. 51ff. For Heraclius' order of 632 for the forced baptism of all Jews in the empire, see F. Dölger, *Regesten der Kaiserurkunden des oströmischen Reiches von 565-1025* (Munich/Berlin, 1924, 1925, 1932), I, 206 (wrongly placed in the year 634) and Dagron, "Introduction historique", 30-32, with literature. For the poisoned *optio* in Samaria, see *Acta Anastasii Persae*, p.25. Kaegi notes in this connection that Samaritan soldiers are supposed to have fought alongside the Byzantines at the Yarmūk (*Byzantium and the Early Islamic Conquests*, 63 n. 41); but this does not contradict the actuality of real conflict and suspicion between the oppressed Jewish and Samaritan populations and the Roman authorities and their representatives. On the soldiers at Caesarea, see W.E. Kaegi, "Notes on Hagiographic Sources for some Institutional Changes and Continuities in the Early Seventh Century", *Byzantina* 7 (1975) 59-70, see 65-66.

[52] For Acre (Ptolemaïs/Akka) and the Jewish suburbs nearby, and Tiberias (a traditional and important centre of Judaism), see Abel, *Géographie de la Palestine*, 235-37; 483; Avi-Yonah, *The Jews of Palestine*, 237. For the density and distribution of Jewish and Samaritan settlement, see esp. M. Avi-Yonah, *The Holy Land: from the Persian to the Arab Conquests* (Grand Rapids, 1966), esp. 215-18; S. Safrai, in *A History of the Jewish People*, ed. H.H. Ben-Sasson (London, 1976), 333-36; Baron, *A Social and Religious History of the Jews*, 20-21; Jones, *Later Roman Empire*, 944; Zvi U. Ma'oz, "Comments on Jewish and Christian Communities in Byzantine Palestine", *Palestine Exploration Quarterly* 117 (1985), 59-68; and Y. Ben-Zvi, *Sefer Hashômerônim* (Jerusalem, 1976) 57-59 on Samaritan settlement regions, centred on Neapolis/Nablus. For a cartographic summary, see *TAVO* B VI 17, *Israel, Synagogen, Lehrhäuser und Gerichtshôfe (1.-7. Jahrhundert)*.

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It can hardly be a coincidence that the area in which Jewish settlement was most dense, in which the great Samaritan revolt of 529 had begun, in which lay the heart of the hostility to Roman rule, which represented the core of Jewish support for the Persians in 614 and after, and from which the Jewish forces which attacked Tyre and Acre in 613-14 were drawn, overlaps more or less exactly with the *jund* of al-Urdunn and, in consequence, with a hypothetical military command for Jordan. And it is worth adding that both Tyre and Acre had substantial Jewish populations. In addition, we may note that the *jund* included also the district of Gaulanitis which, as has been several times pointed out, had a substantial beduin – Ghassānid – population and included the major Ghassānid encampment at al-Jābiya. In view of the previous history of relations between these two groups, again noted by Shahid, the establishment by Heraclius of an additional *dux* (or some similar appointment), which did not affect the pre-existing civil provincial boundaries, with the specific intention of controlling and policing the Jewish and Samaritan populations of the region, hypothetical though it must remain, is also very logical.[53] This might appear the more likely in view of the fact that the traditional measures had not worked: Justinian, for example, had given the civil governors of Phoenice Libanensis, Arabia and Palestine I authority over certain military units, in the latter case primarily out of concern for internal security.[54] Yet, as we have seen, this did not prevent major disturbances thereafter; and he was careful in his legislation to retain the clear demarcation between the civil and military spheres.

In all these respects, of course, Shahid's arguments remain important and valid; and he makes a number of observations on the ideological and symbolic import of the term "Jordan".[55] But none of this need have

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[53] For the geographical extent of al-Urdunn, see n. 14 above; for the Ghassānid presence (and their role in the suppression of the Samaritan revolt of 529) see Shahid II, 217f.; and *idem*, "Arethas, Son of Jabala", *JAOS* 75 (1955), 205-16. Note especially Sartre, *Trois études*, 177-88; also E.A. Knauf, "Umm al-Jimal, an Arab Town in Late Antiquity", *RB* 91 (1984), 578-86, see 579. On the Ghassānid camp on the Golan at al-Jābiya, see Sartre, *Trois études*, 189ff.; H.I. Macadam, "Some Notes on the Umayyad Occupation of North East Jordan", in P. Freeman, D. Kennedy, eds., *The Defence of the Roman and Byzantine East* I, BAR Int. Ser. 29.1 (Oxford, 1986), 531-47, at 532-33; and the later tradition reported by al-Mas'ūdī (Maçoudi, *Les prairies d'or*, ed. and trans. Barbier de Maynard, Pavet de Courteille [Paris, 1864], III, 220).
[54] For Justinian's changes in Palestine, Arabia and Phoenice, see Jones, *Later Roman Empire*, 281-82, 661 with n. 124; Speidel, "The Roman Army in Arabia", 270.
[55] Shahid II, 222ff. On the symbolic significance of the river, see also *Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium* II (New York-Oxford, 1991), 1071-72. It is impossible to say whether these points were taken into account at the time; but either way they do not affect Shahid's point,

anything to do with *themata*, which, as I have argued elsewhere, represented the temporally and geographically specific institutional response to circumstances quite different from those which the Persian wars produced.

Territorially, it is important to emphasise the fact that Jordan/al-Urdunn was entirely enclosed by other districts, the territories included within the *jund* of Dimashq (or under the protection of the *duces* of Damascus and Bostra) extending down to the border with Palestine III. Thus there can be no way in which these districts can be seen simply as lines of defence against Persian attack from the north. Much more likely is it that they represent the cumulative results of increased imperial reliance on Arab allies and increased hostility to, and need to control, the Jewish and Samaritan populations of Samaria and Galilee.

Finally, it is equally clear that the Arab tradition itself was uncertain about the exact line of the boundaries between the various *ajnād*. Thus Tyre, which lay on the border between al-Urdunn and Dimashq, possessed a mosque which belonged to the latter, although its *kharāj* was paid to the former; while it is reported to belong to either *jund* according to different geographers. The town of Adhri'āt (classical Adrea, mod. Dera'a), the chief settlement of the Bathanīya, district between Bostra and the Jordan itself is described as belonging to either al-Urdunn or Dimashq; the district of al-Sharā (the mountain of Moab), the southernmost part of the old province of Arabia, and belonging presumably to Dimashq, is likewise attributed by some writers to Filasṭīn, as is 'Ammān/Philadelphia from the point of view of its mint.[56]

Now this uncertainty is very suggestive. In the first place, whereas the provincial boundaries of the late Roman civil provinces were fairly clearly demarcated (based upon the *territoria* known to belong to each community or *polis*),[57] those of the ducates, as we have seen (and by reason

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accepted here, regarding the problem which the Byzantines faced in dealing with the Jewish population of the region.

[56] See the sources cited by Le Strange, *Palestine under the Moslems*, 28, 29, 30-32; 40 (al-Ya'qūbī, Ibn Ḥawqal, Ibn al-Faqīh, al-Iṣṭakhrī, Yāqūt); only Yāqūt (thirteenth century) places 'Ammān in Palestine – it is otherwise generally attributed to Dimashq. See Caetani, *Annali dell'Islam*, II. 2, 1121 and n. 2. In al-Balādhurī's account of the conquest of the 'Ammān region, however, it is implied that it lay in Palestine (*Futūh al-buldān*, 193). See also *EI*[1] IV, 1030; *EI*[2] II, 911, where it is assumed that these inconsistencies reflect deliberate administrative changes of the tenth century, although there is no clear evidence for this. For the mint at 'Ammān, which has been attributed to the *jund* of Filasṭīn, see Walker, *Catalogue*, lxxii; lxxiv; xciv, V.

[57] See, for example, H.E. Mierow, *The Roman Provincial Governor as He Appears in the Digest and Code of Justinian* (Colorado, 1926); Jones, *CERP*, introduction.

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of military necessity), were fairly fluid and vague. In the second place, this vagueness is reflected in a similar vagueness in the Arabic sources, and I would suggest that this is precisely because the *ajnād* were based on the erstwhile ducal commands, broad military circumscriptions with which the conquerors would first have come into contact (rather than with the civil provinces themselves). This is made the more likely when it is recalled that the total number of Arabs in the conquering armies was relatively small, and a convenient pattern of military commands, the extent of whose defence and policing responsibilities were each roughly co-terminous with the territorial coverage of a number of civil provinces, would most readily have suited their initial requirements in respect of security as well as the collection and distribution of tribute or tax. The vagueness of the Arabic tradition in all probability thus reflects the vagueness of the "boundaries" between the authority of the different *duces*.

VI

There remains the question of why the term *jund* was applied to territorial entities, which brings us to another element in the discussion which has, on the whole, been overlooked. Shahid prefers to see in the word a translation of a Roman/Byzantine term such as *exercitus, stratos, strateuma* or *thema*. An alternative has been suggested by Haase and preferred by Lilie, namely that the term *jund* refers simply to the fact that it was in the Syrian regions that the great expeditionary camps were established, from which the war against Byzantium could be prosecuted; and hence that the term *jund*, for military corps, came to be applied to the areas in which the corps were based. Shahid rejects this, on the grounds that similar camps were established in Iraq and Egypt, but the districts around them were not called *ajnād*. This appears to be a reasonable enough objection, but in fact there is some evidence that the term *jund* was used in Iraq, albeit very briefly: a ninth-century tradition records that al-Jazīra was regarded as a *jund*, and that the district of Arḍ al-Mawṣil, equivalent to the older Sasanian regions of Nōdh-Ardashīrakān and Garmēkan and stretching from the area north of the Greater Zāb southwards along the Tigris to the Diyālā, was regarded during the time of 'Umar as a *jund*, in contrast to the *amṣār* at al-Kūfa, al-Baṣra and Iṣṭakhr. From 'Uthmān (644-56) it was detached from the administration of Iraq and placed under direct Caliphal authority. It

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remains unclear what exactly the significance of this report – assuming it can be trusted – might be, except that it appears to suggest an administrative contrast between concentrations of Muslim tribal troops, in *amṣār*, and their distribution or cantonment over a wider area, a *jund*. If this is the case, then it does not conflict with the interpretation offered here, except to emphasise the fact that the Arabs clearly often adopted the military-administrative structures of other states where they found them useful.[58] I will return to the possible significance of this tradition below.

It has often been remarked that, in contrast to other regions of the conquered lands, Syria saw virtually no new urban foundations by the Arabs in the early post-conquest period. It is true that elsewhere, urban regions were selected for military settlement, so that the great *amṣār* or garrison camps were established near, and to a degree often replaced, pre-existing centres, as at al-Kūfa and al-Baṣra in Iraq or al-Fusṭāṭ on the Nile delta. New urban developments seem, therefore, always to have been in origin military garrison camps which, by virtue of the presence of the soldiers' families, and their attractiveness to merchants and traders, rapidly developed an important non-military aspect. Al-Jābiya, the old centre of Ghassānid power, served as such a centre until it was eclipsed, first during the reign of Muʿāwiya, then in the early eighth century by Dābiq, north of Aleppo, reflecting the needs of the war with Byzantium. Al-Ramla in Palestine, which also served as a military centre, was founded some time after the period of conquest.

In Syria, the original intention of the conquerors had been that the land should be divided up among the invading tribesmen. But this would certainly have led to conflicts among those whose immediate origins lay outside Syria, and those Arabs from Syria who had converted to Islam, or had at least sided with the invaders, before or during the conquest. For what makes Syria so different from either Egypt or Iraq is precisely the

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[58] See Shahid II, 239; R.-J. Lilie, cited by Shahid II, 239 (personal communication), and C.-P. Haase, *Untersuchungen zur Landschaftsgeschichte Nordsyriens in der Umayyadenzeit* (Hamburg, 1972). On the military camps (s. *miṣr*/pl.*amṣār*) outside Syria, see for a traditional view Ira M. Lapidus, "The Evolution of Muslim Urban Society", *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 15 (1973), 21-50; C.E. Bosworth, art. *Miṣr*, in *EI²*, VII, 146; and the chapters by A. Northedge, "Archaeology and New Urban Settlement in early Islamic Syria and Iraq", and D. Whitcomb, "The *Miṣr* of Ayla: Settlement at Aqaba in the Early Islamic Period", in G.R.D. King and Averil Cameron, eds., *The Byzantine and Early Islamic Near East II. Land Use and Settlement Patterns* (Princeton, 1994), 231-66, 155-70. For al-Mawṣil, see the discussion, with n. 62, below. Morony, *Iraq After the Muslim Conquest*, 136-38, notes that the Arabs appear on the whole to have taken over the administrative circumscriptions they found for district and sub-district boundaries, but not for provinces, or at least not as frequently.

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fact that substantial Arab settlements already existed near a number of cities; and that prior to the conquest, very considerable numbers of Arabs, Christian and non-Christian, were based at these sites, serving the Romans as federate or allied troops. By the third decade of the seventh century they were, as we have seen, by far the most important element in the forces at the disposal of the *duces* based in Palestine, Arabia, Phoenice and Syria. Indeed, Syria already possessed a considerable population of seasonal Arab pastoralists and transhumants, closely related by dint of both language and tribal connections, real or imagined, to both the beduin and the settled populations of the Arabian peninsula. Their regular presence in their summer camps meant that they were well-integrated into the rural and urban economic networks of Syria through trading and other forms of exchange relationships. In many inland regions this Arab element was as numerous as the native Aramaean population. There is good evidence of both a considerable influx of Arabs into "Roman" regions of southern Syria and Transjordan in the later sixth and early seventh century, accompanied also by a process of sedentarization. And large numbers of these "Syrian" Arabs adopted Islam or were assimilated into the military effort of the new Arab Islamic power in the opening phases of the conquests.[59]

The tradition has it that, in consequence of this, it was decided that the native Arabs who converted to Islam would also be included in the arrangement and, strengthened by an influx of tribesmen from the Arabian peninsula (since some of the former left rather than stay and accept Islam, including the leader of the Ghassānids and many of his followers), were

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[59] M.A. Shaban, *Islamic History A.D. 600-750 (A.H. 132): a New Interpretation* (Cambridge, 1971), 41; Hassan, *The Role of the Arab Tribes in the East*, 61-62; and especially the discussion of Donner, *The Early Islamic Conquests*, 94-96; Caetani, *Annali dell'Islam*, II. 2, 1180. On the tribal pattern of settlement and the various tribal affiliations represented in the Roman provinces of Syria, Phoenice and Palestine: P. Crone, *Slaves on Horses. The Evolution of the Islamic Polity* (Cambridge, 1980), 30; Shaban, *Islamic History*, 40-42; Donner, *The Early Islamic Conquests*, 101-10; on specific tribal groups, see also *EI*[1], IV, 113-114 (Ṣāliḥ); 623-624 (Ṭayy); *EI*[2].I, 436 ('Āmila); 938 (Bahrā); II, 573 (Judhām); 1020-1021 (Ghassān); IV, 289 ('Iyāḍ); 492 (Banū Kalb); 819-20 (Banū l-Qayn); V, 118-120 (Kinda); 632 (Lakhm); Shahid, *Byzantium and the Arabs in the Fourth Century*, 383-85, 455-57 (Tanūkh, Banū Ṣāliḥ, Balī). See also R. Dussaud, *La pénétration des Arabes en Syrie avant l'Islam* (Paris, 1955); H. Gaube, "Arabs in Sixth-Century Syria: Some Archaeological Observations", *Bulletin of the British Society for Middle Eastern Studies* 8/2 (1981), 93-98; and, covering the southern part only of our area, *TAVO* B VII 1, *Das islamische Arabien bis zum Tode des Propheten (632/11h.)*. For the influx of Arab populations and their sedentarisation, see esp. Sartre, *Bostra*, 132-34; T. Fahd, "Le Hawrān à la veille de la conquête Islamique", in *La Siria araba da Roma a Bisanzio*, XXXV Corso di Cultura sull'Arte Ravennate e Bizantina (Ravenna, 1988), 35-43.

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distributed in pre-existing settlements, both within and next to towns as well as in smaller rural communities and locations – organised, as we have seen, into the four or five *ajnād* which form the subject of this paper.[60]

It is presumably no accident that there were such camps near each of the headquarters of the Roman commanders. For the existence of these bases or encampments – in Palestine II at al-Jābiya, some 80 km. south of Damascus; in Palestine I near Gaza; in Phoenice near Emesa and Damascus, in Syria near Qinnasrīn, Anasartha and Aleppo, and at other sites – reflected not only the gravitation of these nomads and pastoralists to centres of urban production and exchange, but in addition the military requirements of the *duces* under whose military authority they would have come.[61] Indeed, the pre-existing distribution of tribal groups inherited by the Muslim conquerors, although modified as new groups arrived in Syria and old groups were either strengthened or weakened, was suited extremely well both to the maintenance of the Islamic armies and to the preservation of internal security, the latter having been precisely one of the functions of those who had served the Roman military establishment in pre-conquest times. The established pattern of permanent or semi-permanent

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[60] For late Roman Syria and its cities, see H. Kennedy, "The Last Century of Byzantine Syria: a Reinterpretation", *Byzantinische Forschungen* 10 (1985) (= *Perspectives in Byzantine History and Culture*, eds. J.F. Haldon, J.T.A. Koumoulides), 141-83; with the discussion of Roger Paret, "Les villes de Syrie du Sud et les routes commerciales d'Arabie à la fin du VIe siècle", in *Akten des XI. Internat. Byzantinisten-Kongresses* (Munich, 1960), 438-44, who notes (on the basis of the archaeological material) the apparently flourishing economic situation of towns such as Bostra, for example, which lay on trade routes between the Arabian peninsula and the North, and which acted as centres of exchange for the substantial and growing Arab population of the region. On Islamic cities and Syria, see, for example, *Cambridge History of Islam* II, 512; with E. Pauty, "Villes spontanées et villes créées en Islam", *Annales de l'Institut d'Études Orientales* 9(1951), 52-75; H. Djait, *Al-Kufa: naissance de la ville islamique* (Paris, 1986); for al-Jābiya, see al-Balādhurī, *Futūh al-buldān*, 220-21; Donner, *The Early Islamic Conquests*, 245. For Jabala ibn al-Ayham, the Ghassānid leader, see al-Balādhurī, *Futūh al-buldān*, 208-10; and Kaegi, *Byzantium and the Early Islamic Conquests*, 248-49, 171-72 for this and the question of the movement of Arab population groups into Byzantine-territory away from Muslim power. For the distribution of the newcomers across Syria, see Donner, *The Early Islamic Conquests*, 247.

[61] For the evidence for and identification of the sites of these camps, see especially Shahid, *Byzantium and the Arabs in the Fourth Century*, 402-407, 469; note also that there was a Ghassānid camp at Marj Rāhiṭ, near Damascus, where Khālid ibn al-Walīd attacked the non-Muslim Arab forces on Easter day in 634, see al-Balādhurī, *Futūh al-buldān*, 172; and 223, 224 for camps associated with other tribal groups near Qinnasrīn and Aleppo; for the camp near Gaza, see Kaegi, *Byzantium and the Early Islamic Conquests*, 90. An encampment for Christian Saracens was established near Jerusalem in the early fifth century by Euthymius (Cyril of Scythopolis, *Vita Euthymii*, ed. E. Schwartz, TU 49. 2 [1939], 15.25). See also Hitti, *History of Syria*, 424 for known post-conquest camps (near Lydda, Emesa, Tiberias and Emmaus, for example). It is highly likely that these predated the conquest.

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settlements and camps of the Arab tribes scattered along the border regions and deeper inland, in what was more clearly "Roman" territory, across Syria, reflected already a marked segregation of the nomadic or transhumant beduin from the more permanently established population, whether or not some elements thereof were thought of or regarded themselves as Arab.

The very fact of this situation both pre-figured and pre-empted the main purpose of the garrison settlements in Iraq and Egypt already mentioned, whose foundation was intended precisely to maintain and promote both military security and a distinction between the Arab conquerors and the non-Arab subject population. In pre-conquest Iraq, for example, the population was predominantly Aramaean, with a small Persian element. Except in the north-west (see below), the Arab population was both physically and culturally marginalised by Sasanian policy, which confined sedentary groups to the desert fringe, excluding them from the rich alluvial regions. The nomadic tribes were kept at arm's length through the maintenance (until the early seventh century only, however) of the client-kingdom of the Lakhmids, partly by virtue of providing a Persian garrison at al-Ḥīra to shore up Lakhmid authority. After the conquest, the conquerors were established in the new garrison cities or other urban administrative centres, thus promoting a clear divide between the Arab-Islamic cities and the non-Arab countryside.

In Syria, in contrast, precisely because of the very different situation described above, I would suggest that there was no need for new garrison settlements, and no need to establish *de novo* a pattern of segregation of Arab from non-Arab; for the Arab camps attached to the military forces of each *dux* perfectly fulfilled both functions. Apart from the supposed 20,000 or so newcomers, based for the most part in the district of Ḥimṣ, the Arabs of Syria had long been in regular contact with Syrian rural and urban culture and were quite intimate with the previous, late Roman, military arrangements.[62]

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[62] In addition, we should note that the distribution of resources appropriated as tax or levies from the indigenous non-Muslim population in Syria to the troops based at such camps, evenly spread as they were across the territory, was particularly suited to the conquerors' military requirements, especially since they appear to have taken over the pre-existing Roman fiscal administrative structures for the non-Muslim populations more-or-less wholesale (compare the situation in this respect in Egypt – see n. 37 above). The pattern of early Islamic mint production must similarly be tied in with these arrangements – see n. 45 above, and Shaban, *Islamic History*, 43f. For Sasanid policy towards the Arabs, see Morony, *Iraq After the Muslim Conquests*, 215-22; Donner, *The Early Islamic Conquests*, 167-72, with 45-48 on the Lakhmid kingdom, and M.J. Kister, "Al-Ḥīra:

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The relationship between *ajnād* and the existence in pre-conquest times of a substantial Arab population settled in both camps and in urban centres on the one hand, and between *amṣār* and the sharp distinction between Arab conquerors and non-Arab subjects, on the other hand, becomes more compelling when we look at the two areas outside Syria in which *ajnād* were also, according to tradition, initially established by 'Umar, namely al-Jazīra and Arḍ al-Mawṣil. The former also possessed a substantial population of Arab pastoralists (and their encampments, or *ḥāḍirs*), in the period before the Islamic conquest, both on the Roman and the Persian sides of the "frontier", the Iranian element of that region which had been within the Sasanian kingdom being confined to soldiers and administrators. Arḍ al-Mawṣil covered the former Sasanid districts between the Diyālā and the area north of the Greater Zāb, and again there appears to have been a substantial Arab population, both sedentary and nomadic, along the northern and western margins of this region.[63]

What was more natural, then, than that this pre-existing military-administrative infrastructure in Syria and Palestine, with its well-established and well-known territorial divisions and associated garrison camps, on the one hand, in the context of a long-established pattern of permanent encampments and of separation between Arab and non-Arab population groups on the other, should have been adapted to the purposes

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Some Notes on its Relations with Arabia", *Arabica* 15 (1968), 143-69 (repr. in *idem.*, *Studies in Jāhiliyya and Early Islam* [London, 1980], III); *Cambridge History of Iran* IV, 2-4. For the policy of separation of Arab troops and their families from the indigenous population in Iraq, see *ibid.* 227-29; Morony, *Iraq After the Muslim Conquest*, 236-38, 251-53 (with 239-50 on al-Kūfa and al-Baṣra); Shaban, *Islamic History*, 51-53; *Cambridge History of Islam* I, 65-66; and for the exceptional situation in Syria, see Crone, *Slaves on Horses*, 29-31.

[63] 'Umar was traditionally credited with the creation of the seven original *amṣār* and the first *ajnād* (Filasṭīn, al-Jazīra, al-Mawṣil, Qinnasrīn): the latter are all areas in which substantial *ḥāḍirs* and Arab populations already existed. See Caetani, *Annali dell'Islam* IV. 176. For the Arab population of al-Jazīra before the conquest, see Morony, *Iraq After the Muslim Conquest*, 215-18. The information on al-Mawṣil is not easily built into this picture, however, partly because there is clearly not the substantial Arab population of other regions which became *ajnād*; while the former provincial capital, Nineveh, was abandoned for the new foundation of al-Mawṣil on the western side of the Tigris, a foundation which supposedly took place in 641 and was referred to as a *miṣr*, see Morony, *Iraq After the Muslim Conquest*, 131-37; for its *jund*, see al-Ya'qūbī, *Ta'rīkh*, ed. M. Houtsma [Leiden, 1883]), II, 176, with Morony, *ibid.*, 135 and n. 48, also al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, 277. Note the presence in the late 620s or early 630s of Arab encampments and an Arab *phylarchos*, friendly to the Byzantines, active in the Syrian desert (around Palmyra) and western Iraq as far as the Diyālā river, and thus as far as the Persian regions of Nōdh-Ardashīrakān and Garmēkan, the (reportedly) later *jund* of Arḍ al-Mawṣil: *Acta Anastasii Persae*, 31-33 and Kaegi's comment, *Byzantium and the Early Islamic Conquests*, 55f.

of the new Islamic polity?[64] I would suggest that both the relative absence of *amṣār* in   Syria in the immediately post-conquest period and the existence of the *ajnād* can, at least to a certain extent,[65] be explained by the fact that the already-existing system was simply taken over and adapted to the new circumstances.   The word *jund* was used thus to refer to the territories covered by the military commands of the various *duces* as they had existed when the Muslim Arabs conquered them, along with the Arab federate and allied forces which had been so closely associated with them. It is itself a perfectly reasonable translation, as Shahid has pointed out, for any one of several Greek or Latin terms for "troops" or "army", which is just what each *dux* commanded.[66]

It seems to me, therefore, that there are no compelling grounds for postulating a Heraclian theme system in the Orient upon which the *ajnād* were based, indeed, quite the reverse. What evidence there is shows that the traditional arrangement of provinces and ducal commands survives into the early period of the conquests. And the pre-existing pattern of military commands under the various *duces* provides a perfectly adequate model for the early *ajnād*. While adjustments of boundaries and competences which affected Palestine II and the old province of Arabia especially remain

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[64] That these camps – *ḥādirs* – continued to be occupied is clear from al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, 223-24, referring to the regions of Aleppo and Qinnasrīn.

[65] That this suggestion can go only part of the way to providing an answer to the question is apparent from the fact that the Nabatean and Roman site of Ayla, for example, clearly situated in an entirely "Arab" milieu, appears to have been abandoned in the 650s for the *miṣr* constructed just to its south-east (see Whitcomb, *art.cit.*, n. 59). But immigration from the Arabian peninsula probably stimulated the construction of this new site, which eventually replaced its more ancient neighbour. See E. Reitmeyer, *Die Städtegründungen der Araber im Islam nach den arabischen Historikern und Geographen* (Munich, 1912). Insofar as the existence of pre-existing camps there, and the departure of many of the indigenous inhabitants of the larger towns (such as Damascus, for example) after or during the period of conquest, made the construction of new sites less necessary, however, this does fit with the pattern for Syria.

[66] The word may be Aramaic (Morony, *Iraq after the Muslim Conquest*, 135) or Iranian in origin (Shahid I, 392; II, 239-240). At the time of the Islamic conquests, Sasanid military units were referred to by this term, and were commanded by officers entitled *jundsālārs* – see A. Christensen, *L'Iran sous les Sassanides* (Copenhagen, 1936), 210f. But it would appear that Sassanid military administration knew no such commands as the ducates of the Roman world. From the time of Khusro, for example, Iraq and the related western regions of the empire were under the authority of a single *spābadh*, who held supreme civil and military authority. Frontier regions were placed under a *marzbān*, subdivided into local districts with their garrisons. Defence was based on a linear principle. See Morony, *Iraq After the Muslim Conquest*, 28f.; Christensen, *L'Iran sous les Sassanides*, 130-32, 136-40 and esp. 370.

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hypothetical, they fit an already evolving pattern of military administration in this region quite well.

Furthermore, the argument from *themata* is somewhat circular. It assumes that themes had from the start a geographical identity, when in fact it is clear that they were simply the armies of the *magistri militum*. The result of their being quartered permanently across Asia Minor led to the name of each corps being then applied to the group of provinces in which it was present. The traditional administration of civil and, to a lesser degree, fiscal affairs continued to operate at the provincial level, well into the eighth century and in some respects into the ninth. Indeed, I would suggest that there never was a "theme system" in anything but the minds of modern historians – and it is worth stressing yet again that Constantine VII does not credit Heraclius with their creation: he merely notes that it was from his time, and in the time of his successors, that the empire was cut up into smaller administrative divisions.[67] The model of the exarchates may be relevant; but the exarchates were themselves little more than praetorian prefectures in which the prefect was subordinated to a military officer, specifically in order to cope with the logistical and strategic problems presented by the fragmentation of imperial authority by the Lombards in Italy, and by the constant guerilla raids of the Berber peoples in North Africa. And this model has proved of little or no help in understanding the origins of the Anatolian themes. It seems quite inappropriate for Syria. Had there already existed *themata* in Oriens before the Arab conquest, however "unfinished", there would have been no need to "evolve" a thematic structure in Asia Minor, and later the Balkans, over the following 150 years: we should remember that it took at least this long for the pattern of administration familiar from the tenth century finally to emerge in the first half of the ninth century.[68]

The weaknesses of the defences in the East are certainly revealed in the history of first the Persian and then the Arab attacks during the first half of the seventh century. Heraclius' supposed thematic reorganisation

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[67] See n. 6 above. The Byzantines certainly never had the concept of a "theme system", *pace* Shahid's implication, II 236, n. 64. His ruminations on the role of "military lands" in III, 365-66, for which there is not a shred of evidence earlier than the ninth century, merely confuse the issue, while the eccentric notion that there is evidence in al-Balādhurī for the Armeniak *thema* as early as the 620s is simply not borne out either by the three references in the text (*Futūh al-buldān*, 305, 309, 310), or by Kaegi's more plausible and cautious suggestion which is cited in support: see W.E. Kaegi Jr., "Al-Baladhuri and the Armeniac Theme", *Byzantion* 38 (1968), 273-77; and see his *Byzantium and the Early Islamic Conquests*, 201.

[68] See Haldon, *Byzantium in the Seventh Century*, 201-204.

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had no obvious results. Shahid is aware of this, and points out that the
themes supposedly established by Heraclius had no chance before the Arab
conquest to develop beyond their "primitive" stage. But this is not very
plausible: either the soldiers were there, and the command structure
revised, to enable the better integration of civil and military structures, or
they were not. Further, although the Arab attacks happened very quickly
(once they were properly under way), the Byzantines did actually have a
good five years in which to set up the "new" system. The whole hypothesis
begs far too many questions. It seems to me more plausible, because
simpler and more in keeping with the available, albeit scanty, evidence, to
suggest as I have done here that while the *ajnād* of Syria *might* represent
late Roman structures, and that these in their turn may signal certain
changes in the pattern of military, and possibly also civil (in the case of
"Jordan") administration, these structures are in essence those familiar
from the pre-existing order, and need have no connection with any putative
themata.

   It remains the case that the evidence for these developments is, for
the most part, of a somewhat equivocal nature. The scarcity of
documentary material from the later years of Byzantine administration in
Syria, and the patchy nature of the non-Greek sources thereafter, is
problematic. The doubtful authenticity or accuracy of many of the accounts
found in the Arabic tradition – reflecting as they do the interests and
priorities, both political and cultural, of the ninth century and after –
makes it very difficult to say with any certainty whether or not the details
handed down can be trusted. As I have noted, the Arab geographers were
more interested in establishing and justifying the administrative and fiscal
circumscriptions of their own time to do justice to details which may have
seemed to them either irrelevant or awkward. Similar considerations apply
to the historical traditions, particularly where named commanders involved
in specific campaigns or expeditions to particular districts of the East
Roman state were concerned. Even the existence of four regions in Syria
before the conquest is open to doubt. These ambiguities and contradictions
are well-known, and have been stressed by several scholars,[69] but the point
needs to be re-iterated here. Just as importantly, many Arabs who joined
the armies of the Muslims in the opening phases of the conquest probably
had quite a good general knowledge of the Roman military arrangements

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[69] Most recently by Lawrence.I. Conrad, "Historical Evidence and the Archaeology of
Early Islam", in S. Seikaly, R. Baalbaki, P. Dodd, eds., *Quest for Understanding. Arabic
and Islamic Studies in Memory of Malcolm H. Kerr* (Beirut 1991) 263-82.

for defence and security. But it is most unlikely that anyone knew or cared about the exact extent and limits of the authority of the different *duces*, at least during the period of conquest and perhaps not until the 660s, when the administrative establishment of Umayyad rule might have made a more careful cataloguing of lands, titles and boundaries necessary. But this is also the context in which conflicting claims and traditions would have come to the fore.

In spite of these problems, I have attempted to survey this material as fairly as possible. If we are prepared to place some reliance upon it, then the evidence seems to me to point, however vaguely, both to the re-establishment of the traditional late Roman strategical and command structures after the victory over the Persians in the late 620s (however weak their form, and however flimsy Roman authority may in reality have been),[70] and their existence well into the period of the Islamic conquests in Syria, and beyond this in the rest of the Byzantine empire. It is these structures which are reflected in the *ajnād*. While the vagueness of most of the sources with regard to technical words, titles and geographical boundaries makes definite answers to specific questions impossible, there are enough references to make this much fairly clear. But in perpetuating the myth of a "theme system" introduced by Heraclius, Shahid has, I believe, directed attention away from his most important point.

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[70] See also Schick, *The Christian Communities*, 54-55.

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THE ARAB–BYZANTINE FRONTIER IN THE EIGHTH AND NINTH CENTURIES: MILITARY ORGANISATION AND SOCIETY IN THE BORDERLANDS*

J.F. Haldon and H. Kennedy

The nature of the conflict and the contacts which developed between the Muslim Caliphate and the Christian Byzantine empire after the middle of the seventh century has been the subject of many studies. The following paper will examine one aspect of these contacts which has hitherto received only scanty attention, that of the Byzantine-Arab borderlands, the society which they produced on both sides of the "frontier", and the military organisation which developed to defend their respective hinterlands.

In the first section, we will look at the Byzantine frontier districts; the following section will examine some of the chief aspects of the Muslim frontier regions in north Syria and Mesopotamia, and the course of their development during the first one hundred years of Abbasid rule.

I

A great deal has been written about the general effects of Arab raiding on the Byzantine military organisation and the Byzantine economy from the 650s to the beginning of the ninth century; and so rather than repeat what has already been said, we propose here to look at some more specific features of the period c. 700—950 A. D: which areas were most radically affected by the Muslim raiding; and how these were affected — in terms of economic and social life and the effects of a constant military presence among the population. Just as the Byzantine frontier played an important part in the life of the Abbasid state, so did the constant presence — whether warlike or peaceful — of a powerful Muslim state bordering Asia Minor play a key role in the life both of the Byzantine state and of those who dwelt in proximity to this Myslim world.[1]

It will be convenient to deal first of all with the general background, the military situation of the empire at the end of the seventh century. The

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* The following is based broadly upon two papers delivered by the authors at the eleventh Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies in Birmingham, March 1977.

[1] For a general review of cross-cultural influences between Byzantium and the Caliphate, see especially the collected papers of G. von Grunebaum, *Islam and Medieval Hellenism: Social and Cultural Perspectives* (London, Variorum Reprints, 1976); M. Canard, 'Les relations politiques et sociales entre Byzance et les Arabes', *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*

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second half of this century was without doubt the most crucial period of readjustment for the imperial armies. The regular, large-scale attacks of a highly-motivated enemy, together with the innumerable smaller raiding- and booty-collecting expeditions, the disrupted communications and the difficulties of supply, contributed to a progressive worsening of a military situation in which a system of defence organised along quite unsuitable lines was forced to adapt itself to a totally new environment.

When well-organised and co-ordinated, large armies were certainly mustered and successful campaigns were undertaken.[2] But on the whole, the divisions which had once formed the armies of the *magistri militum per Armeniam* and *per Orientem* had been withdrawn to a line along the Taurus — Anti-Taurus ranges — a result of the loss of Syria and Mesopotamia and the strategic outflanking which followed from the Arab conquest of the Sassanid state — and were subsequently scattered among local strongpoints and walled towns or cities, able only slowly to unit and confront invaders as they entered imperial territory. This reflected in part a deliberate policy of avoidance, combined with a guerilla strategy aimed at preventing wide-spread pillaging of districts through which the enemy might pass.[3] But such a policy was to a large extent forced upon the imperial forces, which must have been considerably affected by the decline in population and by the bad communications promoted by the nature of the Arab attacks referred to already, which took the form of a more or less constant harassment of the defensive forces of the empire and the civil population. Such widely dispersed but frequent attacks overloaded by far the defensive capacity of the available forces: when cities and fortresses had been adequately garrisoned there were few troops left over for offensive operations.[4] A dispersal of the forces over

18 (1964), 35—36; *idem*, in *Cambridge Medieval History* iv, 1 (Cambridge, 1966), pp. 696—7, 735—5; H. Ahrweiler, 'L'Asie Mineure et les invasions arabes', *Revue Historique* 227 (1962), 1—32, esp. 13—19. More generally, D. Obolensky, 'Byzantine Frontier Zones and Cultural Exchanges', *XIVᵉ Congrés Int. d'Études Byzantines*, Actes i, Bucharest 303—313, see 308 f. For a comment on the concept of frontier and its application in historical studies, see Th. Papadopoulos, 'The Byzantine Model in Frontier History: a Comparative Approach', in *XIVᵉ Congrès International d'Études Byzantines, Actes* ii (Bucharest 1975), 415—419; H. Ahrweiler, 'La frontière et les frontières de Byzance en Orient,' *ibid.* i, 209—211, 225—6.

[2] Cf. the campaigns of Constantine IV in 679/80 (*Theophanes*, 358, 16) and that of Justinian II in 686/7 (*Theoph.*, 364, 7⁻9; Nicephorus, *Opuscula Historica* [De Boor], 36, 17sq.).

[3] For the dispersal of the Byzantine force, see the *De Velitatione Bellica* (in *Leonis Diaconi. . . Historiae*, ed. Hase [CSHB] 215, 1⁻6, 229, 22 sq. For the policy of avoidance see R.-J. Lilie, *Die byzantinische Reaktion auf die Ausbreitung der Araber* (Miscellanea Byzantine Monacensia 22, München 1976), p. 92f. and my comments in *Byzantinoslavica* 39 (1978) 230f. (review of Lilie).

[4] For population decline, see P. Charanis, 'The Transfer of Population as a Policy in the Byzantine Empire', *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 3/2 (The Hague, 1961), 143f; P. Lemerle, 'Esquisse pour un histoire agraire de Byzance', i, *Revue Historique* 219 (1958), 32—74, 254—84; ii, *ibid.*, 220 (1958), 42—94, see i, 63f. Certainly by the early eighth century the troops from each provincial army were scattered over the whole province, and assembled only to carry out ambushes or to harrass enemy troops on the march. Cf. *Theoph.* [De Boor], 397, 15⁻19, where Byzantine troops and Mardaites ambush and rout an Arab force in 717. The troops of the *stratègos* Leo, before he became emperor, were scattered in garrisons, and in 716 were in no condition to effectively oppose the enemy. See *Theoph.*, 388f. In 726 an Arab force reached Nicaea, which was garrisoned. They failed to take the city, but suffered no opposition from the countryside. *Theoph.*, 405, 25sq. See J. F. Haldon, 'Some Remarks on the Background to the Iconoclast Controversy', *Byzantinoslavica* 38 (1977), 161—184, esp. 171f.

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wide areas and a reliance upon local recruitment were in the circumstances the only practical answer. Thus regular but scattered units could be maintained at little direct expense to the provincial administration, forces which were reasonably effective in their purely defensive capacity, but which needed considerable advance planning before they were ready to go over to the offensive.[5] The establishment of a military or militarised form of provincial government developed regionally for local ends, reflects the course of the changes which occurred.[6]

The picture which emerges of Byzantine military activity before the 730s is thus one of an intensely localised response to the Arab strategy. Yet it was precisely this form of localised military action which was required by the situation, and it is indeed hard to see how the older system — with its consolidated, regular forces — could possibly have registered any success against the rapid, hard-hitting and punishing raids of the Arabs.[7]

From the 660s to the end of the second siege of Constantinople in 717/8 — except for a short period between 680 and 693, when the Caliphate was hindered by internal troubles — Byzantine forces were stretched to the point of collapse, or so it would seem from the accounts of both Muslim and Byzantine historians.[8]

Within this period we should also note a change in the Arab attacking strategy after 693. The large, longdistance expeditions of Muawiya's day, which cut deep into Byzantine territory, were no longer the norm. Instead, Arab forces now concentrated very heavily on the border regions, Cilicia and Armenia IV. Lilie has recently shown that Arab strategy was based essentially on one principal at this time — to systematically weaken and destroy Byzantine border defences and open the way to the capture of Constantinople, or at least, the permanent incorporation of much of the devastated region into the Caliphate.[9] During much of the eighth century, in contrast, and partly a result of the defeat of the great siege of 717/8, military activity was marked by the establishment of a balance along the border, and the beginnings of a Byzantine counter-offensive, although of a limited nature.[10] This sets in already in the 720s, and whereas in the years before 717 Arab defeats were a rarity, they became considerably less unusual afterwards. Between 720 and 740 Arab forces suffered six defeats, one of them a major set-back. It would seem that the Byzantine defences in western Anatolia and at sea had stiffened considerably, although in the latter case this has to do with

    [5] For a more detailed discussion of these developments and of the nature of the Arab attacks, see Haldon, *Some Remarks*, 166f.

    [6] See the comments of Lilie, *op. cit.*, pp. 306—308.

    [7] The general bibliography on these developments is considerable. See W. E. Kaegi, jr., 'Some Reconsiderations on the Themes (Seventh-Ninth Centuries), *Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Byzantinistik* 16 (1967), 39—53; H. Ahrweiler, *l'Asie Mineure* (*art. cit.*, note 1 above), 1—32; and also Lilie, *loc. cit.*; Haldon, *Some Remarks, loc. cit.*, and *idem, Recruitment and Conscription in the Byzantine Army c. 550—950: a study on the origins of the stratiōtika ktēmata*, forthcoming in the *Sitzungsberichte der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, 1979.

    [8] See Haldon, *Some Remarks*, 169.

    [9] Lilie, *op. cit.*, pp. 133, 137—9.

    [10] *Ibid.*, p. 162.

increased Arab naval activity in the western Mediterranean, at the expense of the eastern regions. In addition, it is clear that raiding was directed almost entirely at the border districts of the empire and their hinterland — Cappadocia, the Byzantine part of Armenia and Isauria/Cilicia. Between 720 and 750, for example, Arab forces raided the Armeniak theme at the very least eleven times, but seem to have reached the northern, Pontic region only twice. The Opsikion district suffered only one invasion, in 727, when Nicaea was for a short time besieged. There were of course many expeditions whose target we do not know, and which may alter this picture; although later developments bear out the trend. Byzantine activity was meanwhile quite clearly directed at forming a buffer zone of almost uninhabited land, destroying captured strong-points rather than garrisoning them; while the Arab forces now began to concentrate on establishing a defensive border and protecting the territory which lay behind.[11] As Lilie remarks, Constantine V's policy of population transfer away from this area can be viewed not only as a means of strengthening the population of Thrace, but of deliberately depopulating the south-eastern border zones, tending to create a no-man's land behind which Byzantine Asia Minor was relatively safe.[12]

While large Muslim forces did strike deep into Byzantine territory — witness the raid of Hārūn al-Rashid as far as Chrysoupolis in 782 — such attacks were aimed chiefly at the collection of booty and at damaging Byzantine morale, rather than forming part of any grand general strategy, as had been the case up to 718.[13] Thus the situation reached by the middle of the eighth century was not substantially altered until the tenth, when the great reconquests under Kourkouas, the Phokades and Tzimiskes took place; and while both Arabs and Byzantines engaged in major campaigns during this "middle period" of stability, the real conflict was fought out at a much more local level, between the border lords and their forces on both sides.[14]

But before looking in greater detail at these frontier regions and their organisation, a short word on the organisation of frontier defences after Heraclius.

Already in the 640s the forces of the various *magistri militum* who had been operating in Syria and Armenia had to be withdrawn into Anatolia proper.[15] It appears indeed that Heraclius attempted to forestall further withdrawals by turning Cilicia into a sort of no-man's land after his final departure from Syria; and establishing in the mountains to the north a defensive

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[11] For Arab concentration on the border regions, Lilie, pp. 138—9, and cf. his list of raids, pp. 112—122. For raids between 720 and 750 A. D., *ibid.*, pp. 143—155; and for Byzantine activities in the border regions, *ibid.*, p. 140f. See Honigmann, *Die Ostgrenze des byzantinischen Reiches* (Bruxelles, 1935), pp. 40—43.

[12] *Op. cit.*, p. 161; such a policy had already been initiated by the Byzantines during Heraclius' withdrawal from Cilicia. Cf. *La Chronique de Michel le Syrien, Patriarche Jacobite d'Antioch*, ed. et trad. J. B. Chabot (Paris, 1899—1905), ii, 424; *al-Balādhuri, Kitāb Futūḥ al-Buldān* (The Origins of the Islamic State), trans. P. K. Hitti (London 1916/Beirut 1966), 252; text ed. S. Munajjid, *al-Balādhuri, Futūh al-Buldān* (Cairo, 1957), 194.

[13] See the second part of this article. For Hārūn's raid, see Lilie, pp. 173—4.

[14] For Byzantine-Arab military activity in the ninth century, see A. A. Vasiliev, *Byzance et les Arabes*, i (Bruxelles, 1935), esp. pp. 89f.

[15] Haldon, *Some Remarks*, 166; W. E. Kaegi, jr., 'Al-Balādhurī and the Armeniak Theme', *Byzantion* 38 (1968), 273—7; *idem*, 'The First Arab Expedition against Amorion', *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* 3 (1977), 19—22.

region or Cilician *Kleisoura* — so the reports of Michael the Syrian and Balad-huri would suggest.[16] Such a re-orientation of the fundamental defensive strategy of the empire in this region may well be partly responsible for later Byzantine beliefs that it was Heraclius who was responsible for setting up the original themes; but it is quite clear that this attempt to establish a firm frontier was a total failure. Throughout the 650s, but especially during the 660s and 670s, Arab armies, large and small, had little direct opposition in this area and were able to march almost at will through the Taurus and north-wards into Asia Minor. The regular field armies proved quite incapable of effectively meeting the numerous raids which faced them from all sides, and the result appears to have been, in the first place, the fortifying and holding of strategically situated strong-points, both on the frontier and deeper inland. What has been referred to as a militarisation of the towns and cities of Asia Minor took place, evident in the building or re-building of defences, and in the reduction in the area occupied by individual settlements, thus facilitating defence. Towns such as Miletos, Akroinon, Pergamon, Sardis, Ankara, Kotyaion, Seleukia, Sision, Mopsuestia and many more, took on a new aspect, more like the closed and defended towns familiar from the contemporary West than the spacious hellenistic cities of the East.[17] Accompanying this change, and a result both of the inability of the old, regular field forces to adequately defend the hinterland, and of the need, already referred to, to defend towns and conserve manpower, occurred a change in overall strategy. Defense came to be based not upon the principle of meeting and turning back enemy forces — a strategy which was fundamental to the old organi-sation — but rather upon that of an early-warning system. Troops could no longer be easily concentrated, but were scattered widely over a province, in fortlets, villages, towns, frontier-posts and so on; and so their first duty became now to warn the population of impending attack, which could then secure itself with its livestock and other valuables in safe refuges, in hill or mountain terrain, for example.[18] Both Arab and Byzantine accounts of the first phase of attacks up to the 680s suggest that despite their frequency and

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[16] al-Balādhurī, trans. Hitti, 252 (text, Munajjid, 194); *Michael Syr.*, ii, 422—3. See also Honigmann, *Ostgrenze*, p. 40.

[17] See E. Kirsten, 'Die byzantinische Stadt', *Berichte zum XI. Internationalen By-zantinisten-Kongress* (München, 1958), 20, 28f. Also C. Foss, 'The Fall of Sardis in 616 and the Value of Evidence', *Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Byzantinistik* 24 (1975), 11—22; *idem, Byzantine and Turkish Sardis* (Cambridge, Mass./London, 1976) p. 257f; and most recently, *idem,* 'Late Antique and Byzantine Ankara', *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 31 (1977), 29—87, esp. 74—5.

[18] This is apparent from Muslim rather than Byzantine accounts: cf. *Balādhuri,* 252 (Munajjid, 194); "So, when the Moslems made their raids, they found them (the forts which Heraclius dismantled in Syria) vacant. In certain cases the Greeks would make an ambush by these forts and take by surprise those of the army who were held back or cut off. Thus the leaders of the summer and winter campaigns, on entering the Greek land, would leave heavy troops in these forts until their return". Cf. *Theoph.,* 363, also 452. The strategy followed is admirably described in the treatise *De Velitatione Bellica* ascribed to Nicephorus II Phocas (see note 3 above) in which all these aspects are very clearly depicted. While conceived and compiled in the tenth century, when the situation was rather different, the treatise nevertheless accurately reflects the traditional defensive strategy of the Taurus frontier districts, a strategy which was first developed during the second half of the seventh century. See Haldon, *Some Remarks,* 171f., and especially *De Vel. Bell.,* 215, [7—13], 244, [8]sq., 245, [14]sq. etc.

size, and the damage they did to the countryside, Muslim raiding-forces only rarely succeeded in capturing cities;[19] and that the Byzantine defences came increasingly to rest upon the removal of the threatened population from the path of the invaders and the employment of the famous guerilla tactics exemplified in the tenth-century treatise ascribed to the emperor Nicephorus Phocas. This policy remained the basis of Byzantine defensive strategy until well into the tenth century, and only with the rapid expansion of the empire into formerly Muslim areas was it slowly replaced by a more aggressive approach.[20]

The foregoing, we hope, will have given the reader a general idea of the military conditions prevailing in the Byzantine border territories during the later seventh and eighth centuries, and of the nature of the local conditions which lent to those areas their particular character.

Precisely because these regions were for a period of two hundred years or more "frontier" regions, they developed specific traits, culturally, socially and economically, which are worth more detailed attention than that which has hitherto been devoted to them. It was in these areas rather than elsewhere in the militarised society of the Byzantine empire that the beginnings of the powerful military families are to be found. The border areas gave rise to a particular local feeling, expressed most vocally in the great akritic epics, which demonstrate so clearly the differences felt between the border provinces and the distant capital. In addition, the border regions show a more radical dislocation of economic and social life, a result, of course, of the intensive militarisation of these districts and the Muslim military threat. The hellenistic and Roman city and the whole socio-economic structure which it represented were drastically affected; and it will be the aim of this paper to demonstrate some facets of this complex of changes.

We will begin by defining more closely the area under consideration, the *tourma*, later *kleisourarchia*, of Mikrē Kappadokia, the *kleisourarchia* of Seleukeia, and the district of Charsianon.[21] Together, these districts stretched from the Cilician coast along behind the Taurus range to the borders

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[19] See Lilie's remarks, p. 88, and the first list, upon which they are based, pp. 60—83.

[20] Honigmann, *Ostgrenze*, p. 93.

[21] See Honigmann, *Ostgrenze*, pp. 43—51 for a detailed regional topography; and more recently, A. Pertusi, *De Thematibus*, commentary, p. 120f. On the geography see in addition A. Philippson, *Das byzantinische Reich als geographische Erscheinung* (Leiden, 1939), esp. pp. 150—158; also G. de Jerphanion, *Une nouvelle province de l'art byzantin: les églises rupestres de Cappadoce*, i (Paris, 1925), p. 1f; and for the ecclesiastical geography of the region, *ibid.*, p. li—lxiii. For the communications and roads in Cappadocia, as well as an excellent topographical survey, see now F. Hild, *Das byzantinische Strassensystem in Kappadokien* (Wien, 1977) (Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für die Tabula Imperii Byzantii, 2 [Denkschriften der Österr. Akademie der Wissenschaften, Phil.-Hist. Klasse, 131]). Grégoire's account of travels in Cappadocia is still useful, cf. *Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique* 33 (1909), 3—169.

The *kleisoura* of lesser Kappadokia, formerly a *tourma* of the Anatolikon theme (until the early years of the ninth century) had become a theme by 863 at the latest, possibly as early as the 830s, although it was later very considerably reduced in size. See *Constantine Porphyrogenitus, De Administrando Imperio*, ed. Gy. Moravcsik, trans. R. J. H. Jenkins

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of Armenia. In Cilicia, the river Lamos constituted an approximate borderline with the lands of the Caliphate until the later ninth century, while the region between the Halys and the Taurus itself marked the original extent of lesser Cappadocia.[22] The Taurus marked also the (approximate) dividing line between Christian and Muslim territory. The ecclesiastical districts of Cappadocia I, II and III did not, of course, correspond with the boundaries of the *kleisourarchia* of lesser Cappadocia, whose extent we can define fairly accurately from the description of Constantine VII in the De Thematibus;[23] and from the accounts of Ibn Khurdādhbīh and Ibn al-Fakīh, dating from the 840s (but revised slightly in the 880s) and the year 903 respectively. Thus Ibn Khurdādhbīh refers to the border with the Arabs as being "the mountains of Tarsūs, of Adhana and of al-Massisa (Mopsouestia), and he refers to nineteeen fortresses (husūn), naming thirteen of them. Since the topography of the region has already been intensively researched by scholars such as Bury, Grégoire, Honigmann, Pertusi and most recently Hild, I will for the purposes of this paper rely on their findings in this context.[24]

The military headquarters of Cappadocia was Koron, to the north of Tyana; and we can assume also that this fortress was the administrative capital of the district, for, as a later source confirms, provincial commanders worked

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(Washington D. C., 1967), cap. 50, 9[2]sq. and the commentary, p. 189. See also N. Oikono-mides, *Les listes de préséance byzantines des* IXe et Xe siècles (Paris, 1972), p. 348 and note 343; and J. Ferluga, 'Niže vojno-administrativne jedinice tematskog uređenja', *Zbornik Radova Viz. Inst.* 2 (1953), 61. 94, Eng. summary 95—98; see 82—3; Ahrweiler, *La frontière* (*art. cit.*, note 1 above) 217—8.

Seleukeia was a *kleisoura* from the early ninth century, and became a theme during the reign of Romanus Lecapenus, cf. Honigmann, *Ostgrenze*, pp. 42—3; Pertusi, comm, to *De Thematibus*, pp. 147—8; Oikonomides, *Préséance*, p. 350; and Ferluga, *art. cit.*, 80.

Charsianon, originally a *tourma* of the Armeniakon theme, may have become a *kleisoura* as early as 793/4. By 873 it was a theme. See Honigmann, pp. 49—51; *DAI*, cap. 50, 9[0] and the commentary, pp. 188—9; Ferluga, *art. cit.*, 79—80. The map demonstrates the extent of these areas. Possibly Grégoire (cited above) was correct to suggest that the districts surrounding the fortresses of Loulon, Podandos and Rodendon originally formed separate *kleisourai* (122). But there is little hard evidence to support this. Cf. Hild, *op. cit.*, pp. 55—6, 124—5.

[22] Honigmann, *Ostgrenze*, pp. 44—6.

[23] *De Thematibus*, ed. Pertusi, ii, 39—40; Ibn Khurdādhbīh, *Kitāb al-Masālik wa'l Mamālik*, in Bibliotheca Geographorum Araborum, ed. J.-M. De Goeje (8 vols., Leyden, 1885—1927), vi, 77f; text, 105f, Ibn a-Fakīh, *Description of the Land of the Byzantines*, trans. E. W. Brooks, 'Arabic Lists of Byzantine Themes', *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 21 (1901), 75. On the dates of the Arab geographers, see A. Miquel, *La géographie humaine du monde musulmane jusqua'au milieu du XIe siècle*, i (Paris, 1967), p. xxi; and ii (Paris, 1975), p. 397. For the ecclesiastical districts, see Jerphanion's summary (cited note 21 above) p. liii (after Parthey and Gelzer).

[24] In addition to the work of Honigmann and Pertusi and, more recently, Hild, see also J. B. Bury, 'Matusim's March through Cappadocia in A. D. 838', *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 29 (1909), 120f., and, of course, W. M. Ramsay, *The Historical Geography of Asia Minor* (Royal Geographical Society, Supplementary Papers, iv, London, 1890), pp. 281ff., and esp. pp. 349—356 for the Taurus passes (note Honigmann, Ostgrenze, p. 80f., for corrections to Ramsay, *loc. cit.*). See also N. Oikonomides, 'L'Organisation de la frontière orientale de Byzance aux Xe—XIe siècles et le taktikon de l'Escorial', *XIVe Congrès Int. des Études Byzantines*, Actes i, 285—302, see 287f. for the identity of some of these sites.

closely with the civil officials attached to their staff and placed under their partial suppervision.[25]

Two important points arise from this: first, one might expect Caesarea, the old capital and *metropolis* of Cappadocia I, to fulfil the role of admimistrative centre; or if not Caesarea, then perhaps Tyana, the second city of Cappadocia from hellenistic times down to the seventh century, and *metropolis* of Cappadocia II.[26] Second, Koron is listed not only by Constantine VII but also by both Ibn Khurdāhbīh and Ibn al-Fakīh as a fortress (hisn), along with the other named places in that region. The two points can effectively be treated as one — why were the older *metropoleis* not selected as military/administrative centres? Alternatively, what was the fate of the cities of this region.

The problem of the Byzantine city, which is to say, that of the nature of the Byzantine economy as a whole, has produced a good deal of literature. Two basic positions have developed, amounting essentially to a denial of the continued existence of an "urban economy" in Byzantium after the middle of the seventh century; and on the other hand to an assertion that this "urban economy" continued, although on a reduced basis, during the period from the seventh to the tenth century, followed by an economic recovery.[27]

Before expressing any opinion, one point should immediately be stressed: the continued physical existence and occupation of urban sites tells us little about the changes in economic and social relations which developed during the seventh century and after. The bulding of city fortifications, the disappearance of extra-mural suburbs and the reduction in size of urban settlements is only to be expected in the conditions prevailing in the seventh century.[28] That these urban settlements continued to exist in a physical form shows only that (1) part of the local population continued to regard a defended area as safer than the open countryside; (2) fortified settlements continued to act as administrative and ecclesiastical centres — which we should expect.

The hellenistic and Roman city had never been a centre of production. Commerical and industrial centres certainly existed, but they were comparatively few in number and were even then entirely dependent upon their hinterlands for their basic needs. Very few cities could exist on a non-agricultural basis, since the transport of foodstuffs overland was prohibitively

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[25] For Koron, see Ibn al-Fakīh, 75: "and the seat of the *Khisliyug* (kleisourarch) is the fortress of Kura"; and *De Them.* ii, 58—67. See also Honigmann, *Ostgrenze*, p. 45, note 8. For military-civil co-operation, see *De Vel. Bell.*, 250, 8-23.

[26] Cf. Strabo, *Geographica*, xii, 2.7.

[27] The former view has been most forcibly propounded by A. Kazhdan, 'Vizantiiskie Goroda v VII—XIv.', *Sovietskaya Arkheologiya* (Moscow, 1960), esp. p. 261f. Opposition was expressed by G. Ostrogorsky, 'Byzantine Cities', *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 13 (1959), 47—66; R. S. Lopez, 'The Role of Trade in the Economic Re-adjustment of Byzantium in the Seventh Century', *ibid.*, 69—85; E. Lipshitz, 'K Voprosu o Gorode v Vizantii v VII—IX v.', *Vizantiiskii Vremennik* 6 (1953), 113—131. See E. Frančes, 'La ville byzantine et la monnaie aux VIIᵉ—VIIIᵉ siècles', *Byzantinobulgarica* 2 (1966), 3—14, p. 3 and note 2 for a summary of the arguments and for a further bibliography; and most recently Kazhdan's review of Foss, *Byzantine and Turkish Sardis* (see note 17 above) in Βυζαντινά 9 (1977), 478—484.

[28] See D. Abrahamse, *Hagiographic Sources for Byzantine Cities* (University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan 1967), pp. 94—5, 100f., 136—7 and 331—346; and especially E. Kirsten, *Die byzantinische Stadt* (see note 17 above), 20f.

expensive.[29] Only state intervention could suffice in such cases — as with Constantinople, for example. Jones has very plausibly estimated that 90—95% of the tax-income of the later Roman empire was drawn from the land;[30] while of the wealthy merchants, the vast majority were to begin with landowners who could affort to invest in "risky" trading ventures.[31] Commerce was primarily for a wealthy élite, since peasants aimed essentially at self-sufficiency. The empire was in essence an agglomeration of subsistance economies. The peasant was generally forced to rely on his own resources; and for articles he could not himself produce, upon locally-produced wares which he could obtain on an exchange basis. The wealthier landowners could afford to use the surplus produced on their estates to purchase luxuries, but they were of course limited in numbers. Problems of long-distance transport alone thus meant that the provinces of the empire were for the most part economically selfsupporting.[32]

What is important in this respect is the separation of the "commercial" world from the complex circulatory economy of the state, and the transportational activity which accompanied the latter. This was itself restricted more or less to the cities, where it was related to the administrative apparatus and its bureaucratic superstructure — the civil and military officials, the army — and their needs. The transport of foodstuffs on a massive scale served their needs, was carried out by state-controlled transport and was supported by taxes extracted ultimately from the subsistance economy of the peasants.[33] Polanyi's concept of a "redistributive economy", based on a subsistance peasant agriculture of the type described by Chayanov (in which the aim of each producing group is to satisfy needs, and in which there obtains a balance between subsistance requirements and the minimisation of physical labour) describes most accurately the real nature of the late Roman and Byzantine

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[29] A. H. M. Jones, *The Greek City from Alexander to Justinian* (Oxford, 1940), pp. 259—260, 262; *idem*, *The Later Roman Empire* (Oxford, 1964), pp. 841—2, 844—7; Kirsten, *Die byz. Stadt*, 10f; D. Claude, *Die Byzantinische Stadt im 6. Jahrhundert* (Byz. Archiv, 13, München, 1969), 176f. Cf. also R. Latouche, *The Birth of Western Economy* (Eng. trans., London, 1961), p. 5.

[30] For the constantinopolitan supply problem, see Jones, *LRE* p. 695f., p. 734—5; for taxation, *ibid.*, pp. 465, 770.

[31] *LRE*, pp. 770, 771—2; Jones, The Greek City, p. 265.

[32] *LRE*, pp. 712 ff., 847, 855; The Greek City, pp. 260—261; cf. also Kirsten, *Die byz. Stadt* 10 f. For the subsistance nature of the Byzantine/Roman agricultural economy, see *LRE*, pp. 840—841, 855, 810 f., 774 f., and Jones, The economic life of the Roman Empire, in P. A. Brunt, ed., *The Roman Economy. Studies in Ancient Economic and Administrative History* (Oxford 1974), pp. 35—60); also *The Greek City*, p. 266; and M. Crawford, Money and Exchange in the Roman World, *Journal of Roman Studies* 60 (1970), 40—48, see 44. For a definition of "peasant" and "peasant economy" as employed here, see *Pesants and Peasant Societies*, ed. T. Shanin (Penguin Modern Sociology Readings, 1971), pp. 14 f. For the market-role of the towns in which the landowners lived, and to which the surplus extracted from the land consequently flowed, see Jones, The Economic Life in the Roman Towns, *Recueuils de la Société Jean Bodin* 7 (1955) 161—162; repr. in P. A. Brunt, ed., *The Roman Economy. Studies in Ancient Economic and Administrative History* (Oxford 1974), pp. 35—60, esp. p. 37 ff, and *idem*, The Cities of the Roman Empire, *Receuils de la Société Jean Bodin* 6 (1964), 135—173, repr. in Brunt, ed. *op. cit.*, 1—34, see 30—31; also *The Greek City*, pp. 259—260, 263, 268—269; *LRE*, p. 714; Kirsten, *Die byz. Stadt*, loc. cit., and Claude, *Die byz. Stadt im 6. Jhdt.*, 176 f.

[33] Jones *LRE*, pp. 827 f., 839—841.

economic base, given that it was founded upon the predominance of the colonate, or of communities of peasant small-holders, as opposed to slave--worked estates.[34]

Significant also is the role of the gold coinage in the machinery of the state. Coin was issued entirely to serve the purposes of this administrative state structure, to oil its own internal activities. Coins naturally gravitated towards commercial centres, but this was not the aim of their issue. They entered commerce because that already existed; but they were primarily intended to fulfill a monetary, economic role. They were a tool and a symbol of the state: transactions were to be concluded in the state's coin, but any further employment was accidental. The gold issued by the state for these purposes it also expected to receive back in the form of taxes.[35] Thus, while the coins issued were attracted to commercial centres, i. e. towns, the issue had no relation to the commercial demand, but rather to the needs of the administrative machinery of the state — centred, of course, in cities. The smaller denominations in copper and occasionally silver served the needs of local trade, the gold served the needs of the state, and in the process was drawn into the trade in luxury or highly-priced goods. In this respect Ostrogorsky's argument in relation to the Byzantine city must be re-examined, for he admits that the bronze coinage shows a dramatic falling off after the 650s and recovered only in the ninth century, whereas issues of gold show

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[34] K. Polanyi, The Economy as Instituted Process, in *Trade and Market in the Eearly Empires*, edd. K. Polanyi, C. M. Arensburg, H. W. Pearson (Glencoe, 111, 1957), 243—270, esp. 253—4, 256; A. V. Chayanov, *The Theory of Peasant Economy*, ed. D. Thorner, B. Kerblay, R. E. F. Smith (Homewood, Ill., 1966). See on this B. Kerblay, 'Chayanov and the Theory of Peasantry as a Specific Type of Economy', in *Peasants and Peasant Economies* (*op. cit.*, note 32 above), 150—160; E. Patlagean, "'Économie paysanne" et "féodalité byzantine"', *Annales E. S. C.* 30 (1975), 1371—1396, esp. 1372 f. For a methodological critique of Polanyi, see M. Godelier, *Horizon, Trajets Marxistes en Anthopologie* (Paris, 1973), p. 17 f; and S. C. Humphreys, 'History, Economics and Anthropology: the Work of Karl Polanyi', *History and Theory* 8 (1969), 165—212, esp. 183.

[35] Cf. E. Francès, *art. cit.* (note 27 above) 12—13. Note the comment of H. Hunger, *Reich der neuen Mitte* (Graz/Wien, 1965), p. 45. See also on the role of the gold coinage M. Hendy *Coinage and Money in the Byzantine Empire* 1081—1261 (Dumbarton Oaks Studies 12, Washington, 1969), pp. 311—2; *idem*, 'Aspects of Coin Production and Fiscal Administration in the Late Roman and Early Byzantine Period', *Numismatic Chronicle* 7. ser., 12 (1972), 117—139, esp. 135—7; C. M. Cipolla, *Money, Prices and Civillsation in the Mediterranean World* (Princeton, N. J., 1956), p. 26; M. Bloch, 'Le problème de l'or au moyen age', *Annales d'Histoire Écon. et Social* 5 (1933), 1—34. These aspects of the use of a gold coinage were maintained in the successor kingdoms of western Europe, see G. Duby, *Guerriers et Paysans, VIIe—XIIe Siècle: premier essor de l'économie européenne* (Paris, 1973), p. 79 f.

The fact that the agricultural producers were expected to pay their taxes in gold implies, of course, the existence of a market sphere where agricultural produce could be exchanged for gold. But this market was itself drawn into the net of state transactions, for it was predominantly the army and the administration who bought up peasant surpluses (frequently at artificially low prices), and they in turn received their gold direct from the state. Only small amounts of gold, and that confined to élite trade, eluded this redistributive relationship. In general on this aspect, see M. Crawford, *art. cit.* (note 32), 45—6; and for the importance of taxation-policy, G. Ostrogorsky, Agrarian Conditions in the Byzantine Empire in the Middle Ages, *Cambridge Economic History of Europe*, I, (Cambridge, 1952), 205—234.

no such marked fluctuations.[36] In the light of the foregoing this surely argues against his thesis, which does not take into account the central role of the state and its needs in relation to the gold. The issue and use of a copper coinage apparently *did* decline between c. 650 and 800 A. D., which may reflect either a considerable reduction in the demand for these denominations or the failure of the government to issue enough copper to cover needs — in either case, a reduction in the number of transactions using this as a medium of exchange takes place.[37] Since it is precisely this coinage which reflects the fluctuations in small-scale, daily commercial activity, its absence reflects an absence of such money transactions. On the other hand, the fact that issues of gold were maintained, demonstrates the role of the state in regulating the distribution of surplus wealth according to its own requirements. It certainly does not reflect the "preponderant role of a money-economy" and a "developed urban economy".[38]

The question of "money" and "natural" economies is important, but cannot be adequately explored here. As Marc Bloch long ago suggested, the opposition between "natural" and "money", as well as that between "open" and "closed" economies is to a large extent a misunderstanding of the nature of the problem. The opposition "natural — money" is meaningless for the Byzantine case, for here money — coin as a medium of exchange — functioned at two quite different levels. "Money" in coined form was clearly always present where the state was concerned. But local exchange activities could be carried on quite effectively without this medium.[39] By the same token,

[36] For the role of the copper/bronze demoninations, see Jones, *LRE* pp. 443; also idem, Inflation under the Roman Empire, *Economic History Review* 5 (1933), 293—318, repr. in Brunt, ed., *op. cit.* (note 32 above), 187—227; Hendy, *Coinage and Money*, p. 5; Cipolia, *Money, Prices an Civilisation*, pp. 26 ff. A. Piganiol, L'Empire Chrétien (325—395) (Paris, 1947), p. 294 f. The comment of S. Vryonis, *The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamisation* from the Eleventh through the Fifteenth Century (Berkeley-Los Sngeles-London, 1971), p. 7, to the effect that Byzantium would probably not have survived without a "money-economy" and towns where "money-economy" is to be taken in the broadest sense, seems to me uncorrect. For Ostrgorsky's position, see Byzantine Cities (*art. cit.*, note 27) 50 f.

[37] Cipolia, *op. cit.*, pp. 10—11; K. Marx, *Capital*, I (London, 1974), pp. 118—215, See R. S. Lopez, Role of Trade in the Economic Readjustment of Byzantium, 75 and note 1. The lack of bronze coins, if not simply a reflection of their lack of intrinsic value and the choise of collectors, is certainly to be ascribed to a cut-back in the number of coins struck, as Ostrogorsky, *Byzantine Cities*, 50, suggests. But this cut-back in itself may reflect a lack of demand. See also Ph. Grierson, *Catalogue of the Byzantine Coins in the Dumbarton Oaks Collection and the Whittemore Collection, II/1 (Washington 1968)*, pp. 6—7.

[38] *Byzantine Cities*, 65. Cf. also S. Vryonis, An Attic Hoard of Byzantine Gold Coins (668—741) from the Thomas Whittemore Collection and Numismatic Evidence for the Urban History of Byzantium, *Zbornik Radova Vizant. Inst.* 8/1 (1963), 291—300, p. 299, who follows Ostrogorsky's position. There was no marked increase in the amount of gold coined, however, as Ostrogorsky (52) thought — see Ph. Grierson, Coinage and Money in the Byzantine Empire 498 — c. 1090, in *Moneta e Scambi nell'Alto Medioevo* (Settimane di Studi del Centro Italiano di Studi sull'Alto Medioevo VIII, Spoleto, 1960).

[39] See M. Bloch, Economie-nature ou économie-argent: un pseudo-dilemme, *Annales d'Histoire Sociale* 5 (1933), 7—16 (reproduced in *idem*, Mélanges Historiques (2 vols., Paris, 1963), II, p. 868—877; sc. also the earlier work of H. Van Werwerke, Economie-nature et économie-argent une discussion, Annales d'Histoire Economique et Sociale 3 (1931), 428—435 (a review of A. Dopsch, *Naturalwirtschaft und Geledwirtschaft* in der Weltgeschichte (Wien 1930), q. v. Dopsch had also raised this problem in a critique of Max Weber's theories on the medieval "Natural economy". See A. Dopsch, "Frühmittelalterliche und spätantike

an essentially subsistence peasant economy — which is how we must define that of Byzantium — cannot be wholly "closed". Local exchange takes place between limited groups, although limited access to extra-local economic activities also exists, usually indirectly in terms of the transfer to the state (or to the landlord) of surplus produce. At the same time, landowners provide some stimulus towards the maintenance of a trade in luxury goods, but since production for sale and profit was also severely limited, neither does this signify and "open economy" in the absolute sense.[40]

Wirtschaft', in *Verfassungs- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte des Mittelalters. Gesammelte Aufsätze von Alfons Dopsch* (Wien, 1928/Aachen, 1966), 219—234, see 220, 228); more recently, G. Luzzato, 'Economia monetaria e economia naturale in Occidente nell'alto medioevo', in *Moneta e scambi*, 15—32; E. Patlagean, *Pauvreté économique et pauvreté sociale à Byzance* (Paris, 1977), pp. 341—6; and especially C. Wickham, *Economy and Society in eighth-century northern Tuscany* (Oxford D. Phil, thesis, 1975). This problem will be examined by the same author in an article to be published in the near future. See also Polanyi, *The Economy as Instituted Process*, 262, and Duby, *Guerriers et Paysans*, pp. 62 f., and esp. 68—9, who remarks on the importance of the gift as one form of non-commercial (but nevertheless economic) socially determined exchange. See also Piganiol, *L'Empire Chrétien*, pp. 294—300, and Latouche, *Birth of Western Economy*, pp. 15—16. Further Polanyi, *art. cit.*, 256—7.

The presence of gold coins in provincial cities does not evidence a vital market economy, but rather the activities of the state — the administrative bureaucracy and the army. The fact that fines in the Farmer's Law and the Ecloga are reckoned in *nomismata* or fractions thereof does not necessarily reflect the actual use of the coins, *pace* Ostrogorsky, *Byzantine Cities*, 64. A stable gold coinage serves equally as a measure of value in which goods of different sorts can be compared and through which exchange values can be ascertained. See the general comments of Marx, *Capital*, i, pp. 97 f., 100; and *Grundrisse*, Eng. transl. M. Nicolaus (Pelican, 1973), p. 190 f. Money-values were applied in a similar way to Wergeld fines in the Germanic legal codes. See Joachim Werner, 'Fernhandel und Naturalwirtschaft im östlichen Merowingerreich nach archäologischen und numismatischen Zeugnissen', *Moneta e Scambi* (see note 38) 557; also K. Polanyi, 'The Semantics of Money-Uses', in G. Dalton, ed., *Primitive, Archaic and Modern Economies: the Esays of Karl Polanyi* (New York, 1968), 175—203; and Bloch, *Économie-nature*, 11 f.

It is important to stress the distinction between the gold and bronze coinages. The latter was a nominal money of account (cf. Hendy, *Coinage and Money*, p. 5; Jones, *LRE*, p. 444) used at a low level of transaction as a means of exchange, and depending upon the stability of the gold currency for its public acceptability. If the gold currency were debased, this would directly affect the exchange-value of the bronze or copper currency; if, on the other hand, an inflation of the nominal, bronze issues took place, caused, for example, by continued over-issuing, this would not correspondingly reduce the exchange-value of the gold coins, but would rather confuse the rates at which the bronze could be exchanged for the gold, which would in turn affect very greatly the confidence vested in the nominal coinage. See Grierson, *Coinage and Money*, 436—9. Lopez' assumption that the stability of the gold *nomisma* was based on the regular use of the copper coinage in internal trade is not borne out by the evidence (cf. Grierson, *loc. cit.*); while it also omits the important functional difference between the two coinages, which makes analogies between the role of coinage within modern industrial/commercial economic systems and medieval economies somewhat difficult.

[40] See especially Grierson, 'Commerce in the Dark Ages: a Critique of the Evidence', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 5 ser., 9 (1959), 123—140; also Duby, *Guerriers et Paysans*, pp. 58—9; Jones, *The Greek City*, p. 267 f., and *LRE*, p. 763. Apart from the fact that the hellenistic/Roman concept of "profit" was different from that of today (as is clear from what was considered to be a successful farm, cf. Jones, *LRE*, p. 773 f.), conspicuous profit-making in a local social context was difficult. Only a merchant not related to the community he exploits, and therefore free from social sanction, or a landlord in times of dearth, could make a profit by re-selling at inflated prices. See Godelier, *op. cit.* (note 34 above) p. 290 f; also E. Partlagean, *Pauvreté economique* (*op. cit.*, note 39 above), pp. 343—4.

For the moment, then, it will be sufficient to stress the original role of the city or town in the east Roman world. Cities existed before the Roman state, which came, however, to depend upon them as administrative centres. As long as the city continued to be the focus of local society and especially to attract the attention of the wealthy, it continued to have local importance and to be a focus of local exchange.[41] In this respect — because cities provided physical protection and facilities for an administrative apparatus — Byzantine society after the middle of the seventh century and before the tenth century may be qualified in an extremely limited sense, as urbanocentric. But the Byzantine economy was definitely *not* urban-based. The cities "survived" because of local social tradition and administrative needs. Their role as local centres of market-exchange, except insofar as many were pre-existing and convenient points of assembly, was probably much more limited than previously, for as we shall see, the local wealthy were no longer attracted to their towns to the same degree as previously.

The decline in the use of copper denominations points to a decline in their use as an exchange medium; but this should not be taken to mean a decline in exchange as such.[42] As mentioned already, few peasant households can be entirely self-supporting; but while money facilitates exchange between socially unrelated persons (and is therefore necessary at large markets or where luxury goods are exchanged),[43] it is not necessary within a context of localised social relationships, where exchange is regulated by immediate needs and by the interaction of mutually dependent social groups.[44] That this exchange could take place in towns does not affect the fact that the latter continued to be entirely dependent upon their hinterland, and that the majority of local citizens not working within the imperial administrative framework were either owners of or workers upon the land. The surplus which wealthy landowners and curiales of the Principate had invested in their cities because they were socially central were now diverted to obtaining titles and influence at Constantinople.

A fundamental change in the relationship between city and state had occurred, however. The cities were no longer centres of self-governing administrative regions responsible for providing both their own and imperial revenues.[45] This has long been recognised, but it is important to stress this, since much of the civic pride typical of the earlier epoch came from just this role, attracting as a consequence much of the wealth which was evident in classical and hellenistic cities, both from local commercial and industrial activities. By the seventh century, cities were becoming merely the seats of

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[41] For the city as the basic administrative unit, see Jones, *LRE*, pp. 712—3; *Greek City*, pp. 147—8 f. For the city as a social focus, see Kirsten, *Die byz. Stadt*, 10 f., and Claude, *Die byz. Stadt im 6. Jhdt.*, 181, 186—7.

[42] See note 37 above. A difference between "economic" in terms of man's relation to his environment and the provision of his needs; and in terms of commercial/moneysale relationships, should be carefully drawn. Cf. Polanyi, *Economy as Instituted Process*, 243—4.

[43] See Marx, *Capital*, i, pp. 110, 113 f., 116 f.

[44] Duby, *Guerriers et Paysans*, p. 77; Polanyi, *art. cit.*, 258; note also Jones, *The Greek City*, p. 260, and Patlagean, *Pauvreté économique, loc. cit.*

[45] Jones, *The Greek City*, pp. 148 f., 267 f; *LRE*, 758—760; E. Francès, *art. cit.*, 5—10; Kirsten, *Die byz. Stadt*, 23.

administrative establishments which regulated the surrounding regions and which served to transfer revenue extracted from the local population direct to the state or to its military and administrative organs.[46] Cities played no economic role in this relationship. City buildings important to the state were now maintained by the latter, defences being often first on the list.[47] For the cities as corporate bodies lost their lands and henceforth had no claim on the surplus wealth produced, which was appropriated as far as possible by the state or by private landowners. The state simply by-passed them.[48] Thus the administrative/economic ties which had bound the city *formally* to its hinterland were broken, a process which was itself encouraged by the inability of the *curiales* — under increasing pressure from the state — to adequately provide for the imperial revenues.[49] The city as a corporate institution lost its historic role as the foundation of the imperial provincial administrative organisation, being replaced first by a salaried bureaucracy and then by a system of centrally-maintained cadasters or tax-lists.[50] It was to be expected under such circumstances that the wealthier local landowners no longer had an interest in their cities as institutions, for these urban agglomerations were no longer the focal point of social and economic power. True, they were often the seat of local administrative officials, but these were appointed by the central government, or at least by higher officials of that government based locally, and received both their income and their status from this source.[51] The city had thus lost not only its economic and corporative personality, but also much of its social attraction. In the eighth and ninth centuries and after, the local wealthy sent their sons to Constantinople to be educated, strove for titles and honours endowed by the central government, and cultivated patrons within the ruling bureaucracy in order to obtain posts, sinecures and influence. Of course, the presence of an imperial administrative apparatus in a city provided a certain social stimulant, possibly drawing some of the local wealthy, since status and honours were gained through this bureaucracy as a whole. This factor may well have aided many towns, if not economically, in the uncertain climate of the period under consideration, at least in terms of their continued physical existence. But the presence of a few wealthy landowners in a city, while it may have attracted a small degree of luxury trade, remained on the whole a marginal phenomenon that did not effect the regional economy.[52]

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[46] Kirsten, *Die byz. Stadt*, 26; and especially G. L. Kurbatov, *Osnovnye problemy vnutrennego razvitiya vizantiiskogo goroda v IV—VII vv.* (Leningrad, 1971), pp. 154 f.

[47] Kirsten, *Die byz. Stadt*, 20.

[48] Cf. Abrahamse, *op. cit.*, pp. 142—3 f.

[49] Jones, *The Greek City*, pp. 148—151; *LRE*, pp. 758—9. Cf. also W. Liebenam, *Städteverwaltung im römischen Kaiserreiche* (Leipzig, 1900/Amsterdam, 1967), pp. 476 f. for the beginnings of this process; also H. Aubin, 'Vom Absterben antiken Lebens im Frühmittelalter', in *Kulturbruch oder Kulturkontinuität von der Antike zum Mittelalter*, ed. P. E. Hübinger (Darmstadt, 1968), 203—258, see 213—5 (the article appeared originally in *Antike und Abendland* 3 (1948), 88—119).

[50] Kirsten, *Die byz. Stadt*, 26; Z. V. Udal'cova, K. A. Osipova, 'Otličitel'nie čerti feodal'nikh otnoshenii v Vizantii', *Viz. Vrem.*, 36 (1974), 3—31, 3 sp. 20 f.

[51] Cf. Abrahamse, *op. cit.*, p. 145 f., and Kirsten, *Die byz. Stadt*, 26.

[52] For the attraction exercised by Constantinople on the provinces and especially the local wealthy, see Hunger, *Reich der neuen Mitte*, p. 42 f., and F. Winkelmann, in *Byzanz im 7. Jahrhundert: Untersuchungen zur Herausbildung des Feudalismus* (Berlin, 1978), pp. 182—3. Note also Abrahamse, *op. cit.*, p. 193 f., and Kirsten, *Die byz. Stadt*, 23.

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If cities survived physically during the period from c. 650—900 it was because they offered some shelter to both people and their possessions, and provided in addition useful bases for administrative officials.[53] Any economic role they may have played — in terms of a local market, for example — was peripheral to and derived from the economic and social life of the region as a whole, and reflected the degree of exchange activity in the countryside, not vice versa.

This picture is, of course, rather generalised, and leaves out the larger emporia and administrative centres of the empire — Ephesos, Trebizond, Constantinople itself, and so on. Here, the trade in luxury goods overland and maritime commerce (when not placed in a strait-jacket by the state) could flourish, for here were centres where either the administrative bureaucracy was based, or which were less exposed to attack and at the same time situated on international trade-routes.[54] In such centres, local industry had a good market and a limited extension of petty commodity production could take place. But even such centres as these were dependent for foodstuffs either on their agricultural hinterlands, or on state-subsidised imports which the majority of the city population could not otherwise have afforded. Constantinople itself had its local landowning class whose estates were vital to the city's supplies. It must also be borne in mind that the uncertain situation in the countryside, especially in the more exposed frontier regions, probably meant a decline in agricultural production, which would in turn have made the existence of a large, non-productive population in the majority of "cities" very difficult.[55]

The "city" of the eighth and ninth centuries, while it survived physically, cannot be compared with its already declining forbear of the sixth century and earlier. It had become simply an administrative centre and local refuge, which had no legal or economic pesonality in practice. Only in the tenth century, when the situation in the frontier districts became more stable, were the towns granted the possibility of a revival.[56]

For the limited effects of elite trade upon provincial city economies, see Jones, *The Greek City*, pp. 260, 262. Kazhdan, in his review of Foss (see note 27 above), rightly stresses that the decline of Byzantine cities is to be seen in the light of internal social and economic changes, in which external attack acted as a stimulant rather than a cause, see 483—4, and G. L. Kurbatov (*op. cit.*, note 46 above) pp. 154—170 for the loss of municipal functions and property during the sixth and seventh centuries.

[53] Kirsten, *Die byz. Stadt*, 26, 28—9; Abrahamse, *op. cit.*, pp. 100—107; Ahrweiler, *L'Asie Mineure et les invasions arabes* (*art. cit.*, note 1 above), 28—9, is overoptimistic in claiming that the reinforcement of town populations through refugees led to a real upswing in the fortunes of the towns involved.

[54] Cf. Ahrweiler, *L'Asie Mineure et les invasions arabes*, 29—30, who postulates a transfer of the focus of trade to the Black Sea coast and to the west coast of Asia Minor as a result of the disruption caused by the Arab attacks. International luxury trade and commerce became as a result much more centralised, passing through only those cities where a sure market could be found and where a degree of physical security was certain. Cf. also Kirsten's remarks, *Die byz. Stadt*, 31.

[55] *Ibn al-Fakih*, trans. Brooks, 72—3. Cf. J. L. Teall, 'The Grain Supply of the Byzantine Empire', *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* (13 (1959), 87—139, see 124. For depopulation, see note 71 below.

[56] The retention of the word *polis* to describe cities — as opposed to *phrourion/kastron* — pointed out by Abrahamse (*op. cit.*, pp. 92—4), means only that the (Greek-speaking) subjects of the empire were aware of the tradition behind the city, and continued to use the

In view of these developments and the nature of the military situation in the seventh-ninth centuries, it is not surprising that cities which had previously been of importance often fell into insignificance. Both Caesarea and Tyana were taken on various occasions by Muslim forces — Tyana was held and garrisoned by the Arabs during al-Ma'mun's reign, having lain deserted since the early eighth century — and indeed attracted enough attention to make them undesirable as military and administrative headquarters.[57] It is interesting that Koron was not the only theme/kleisourarchy headquarters situated in a well-fortified position and not on the site of any flourishing city settlement. Charsianon kastron and the capital of the Anatolikon theme, Marj aš-Šam (Amorion was abandoned as theme HQ for many years after its destruction in 838) are good examples. The conditions which encouraged this tendency to move administrative centres away from conspicuous or easily-reached sites have already been mentioned — constant raiding and insecurity — and were, of course, even more effective in the border regions.[58] The insecurity which prevailed during the first period of invasions is clearly

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traditional term for such settlements. That fortresses and "cities" cannot be so readily distinguished one from the other physically is clear from the Arab writers. Cf. Ibn Kurdāhdbīh, who describes Cappadocia, for example, as having numerous fortresses (ḥuṣun). Ibn al-Faḳīh likewise mentions the many "strong fortresses". Undoubtedly, we should include many "poleis" under this definition, but the point is that to an outsider towns or cities such as Tyana or Caesarea were reduced to the status of fortresses. It is unfortunately this very use of the word "city", adopted by modern historians from Greek sources, which has confused the issue. See note 60 below. For the tenth-century recovery, see the remarks of Ahrweiler, *La frontière en Orient* (art. cit., note 1 above) 219.

[57] See Lilie, *op. cit.*, pp. 63—178, for a catalogue of raids. Caesarea was taken at least twice (646 and 726) and was the named subject of several other attacks, eg. in 655, 729, 732; its hinterland will almost certainly have been raided far more often than is explicitly mentioned. The same can be said of Tyana, which was attacked on several occasions, having its whole population enslaved and deported to the Caliphate in 707/8. Cf. *Theoph.*, 377, [10-12]. It, or rather the district around it, was once again raided in 739/40 when a vast booty fell into the hands of the raiders. See *Theoph.*, 411, [18]sq. and Lilie, p. 152. For Tya na fortified by Ma'mūn, see Vasiliev, *Byzance et les Arabes*, i, p. 121.

The value of the lists of signatories at the various ecumenical councils for determining which cities were still held by the Byzantines in 680, 692 and 787 is dubious. In the first place, a bishop may not have attended for a variety of reasons, even though his seat was still safe (although it is often the case that a space was left if he were expected); in the second place, bishops were still appointed to dioceses which were no longer part of Byzantine-controlled territory — for example, the representative of the bishop of Tyana was among the signatories of the seventh council at Nicaea in 787, although Tyana lay deserted and abandoned at that time. See Mansi, *Sacrorum Conciliorum nova et amplissima Collectio* (Florence, 1759—98) xiii 136 365. The same probably applies to the bishops of Kiskisos in Cappadocia I, which lay further east in the "no-man's land" between Byzantine and Arab territory. See *Mansi* xiii 141, 368, 385. Kiskisos is to the north-east of Rodendon, which was reinforced foɩ a short time under Leo IV and Constantine VI, but seems afterwards to have lain in Arab-controlled territory. Cf. H. Grégoire, 'Rapport sur un voyage d'exploration dans le Pont et en Cappadoce', *Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique* 33 (1909), 3—169, see 120 f., and note the comment of G. Dagron, 'Le Christianisme dans la ville byzantine', *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 31 (1977), 3—25, see 21 and note 99. The various *Notitiae Episcopatuum* are even less valuable, since they generally included all suffragan seats which the Church still considered within its jurisdiction, regardless of wheather they were actually still inside the empire.

[58] For Marj aš-Sam, see *Ibn al-Fakih*, 74; and Brooks, 'The Campaign of 716—718 from Arabic Sources', *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 19 (1899), 19—33, see 31 and note. For the nature of the warfare which was waged constantly over frontier fortresses and outposts, see Vasiliev, *Byzance et les Arabes*, i, p. 98 f.

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reflected in the Acta of the Quinisext Council of 692, which refers to clerics abandoning their cities, the difficulty of convening diocesan synods, and similar problems;[58a] while the evidence of chronicles and other accounts of the warfare waged between Byzantine and Arab forces in these districts paints a clear picture of devastation and the abandonment of the more exposed urban settlements in favour of less accessible sites. The remnants of the population of Tyana probably moved permanently to the better-fortified Magida (Niḡde); that of Faustinoupolis to the small stronghold of Loulon; while other "cities" in lesser Cappadocia survived only if they were easily defended or infrequently visited by raiding troops. Podandos and Rodendon survived as small, fortress-settlements, as did Kyzistra. Kiskisos was also a small, fortified settlement, but owed its survival more to its out-of-the-way situation (assuming that it remained in Byzantine hands during this period). Nyssa was reduced to a small military establishment only, it would seem, at least by the time its fortifications were razed by a passing Arab force in 838. The list could be continued.[58b]

The comments of the Arab geographers should not be ignored in this connection. Even after the empire had recovered from the worst effects of these raids, a tenth century Persian writer could say of the empire: "In the days of old, cities were numerous in Rūm, but now they have become few. Most of the districts are prosperous and pleasant, and have (each) an extremely strong fortress, on account of the frequency of the raids which the fighters for the faith direct upon them. To each village apertains a castle, where in time of flight (they may take shelter)".[59] Whatever the citizens of the empire thought about their *poleis*, it is clear that an outsider did not regard most of them as cities like Baghdad or Damascus, or even Constantinople and Trebizond, which were centres of commerce and industry. The author in question is only too willing to admit the existence of "numerous towns, villages, castles, fortresses, mountains, running water and amenities".[60] But the "towns" are clearly not cities in the writer's view, merely small defended

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[58a] See *Mansi*, xi, canon viii, 945; can. xviii, 952: τοὺς προφάσει βαρβαρικῆς ἐπιδρομῆς, ἢ ἄλλως πως ἐκ περιστάσεως μετανάστας γενομένους κληρικούς, ἡνίκα ἂν ὁ τρόπος αὐτοῖς ἀποπαύσηται, ἢ αἱ τῶν βαρβάρων ἐπιδρομαί, δι' ἃς τὴν ἀναχώρησιν ἐποιήσαντο, αὖθις ἐν ταῖς οἰκείαις ἐκκλησίαις προστάσσομεν ἐπανέρχεσθαι, καὶ μὴ ἐπὶ πολὺ ταύτας ἀπροφασίστως καταλιμπάνειν.

[58b] For Tyana see Hild, *Das byzantinische Strassensystem in Kappadokien* (cited note 21 above), p. 46; Faustinopolis, *ibid.*, p. 52; Podandos, Rodandos, Kyzistra, pp. 55—6, 121, 124—5. For Kiskisos, see note 57 above; and Hild, *op. cit.*, p. 127; and for Nyssa, see *Michael Syr.* (cited note 21 above), iii, 95 and Vasiliev, *Byzance et les Arabes*, 1, p. 152. The small town of Anemourion appears to have been abandoned by c. 660—670. See C. Williams, A Byzantine Well-Deposit from Anemurium (Rough Cilicia), *Anatolian Studies* 27 (1977), 175—190, esp. 175 and note 3.

[59] *Hudūd al-'Ālam, The Regions of the World*, tr. V. Minorsky (Oxford, 1937), 156—7. Teall, Grain Supply, 127 has, I think mistakenly, tried to minimise the importance of this passage.

[60] *Ibid.* On the diffenrence between "town", "city", and "village" in Muslim terminology, see G. von Grunebaum, 'The Structure of the Muslim Town', in *Islam: Essays in the Nature and Growth of a Cultural Tradition* (London, 1961), 141—158, esp. 141—2 (repr. in *idem, Islam and Medieval History* (cited note 1 above). It is important to note the distinctions. Arab writers are careful to differentiate between "towns" and "fortresses" in Muslim territory. The fact that they refer to Byzantine "cities" as fortresses or castles (husun, qila) deserves to be emphasized, and is indicative of the real nature of these *"poleis"*.

settlements, the word generally used to describe them being ḥiṣn (fortress) as opposed to madīnah (city). The impression is one of a completely rural society with many fortresses and villages, few real cities. This view is reinforced when we read what the geographer Ibn Hawqal has to say: "Rich cities are few in their (ie. the Byzantines') kingdom and country, despite its situation, size and the length of their rule. This is because most of it consists of; mountains, castles (qilā'), fortresses (ḥuṣūn), cave dwellings and villages dug out of the rock or buried under the earth". Ibn Hawqal has a good deal more to say about the poor state of the Byzantine empire. The picture he draws here does not give one the impression of a state full of thriving cities and a "money economy". Here is rather a land of isolated fortresses and villages. Whether this is to be applied to the whole empire or not is difficult to say — but it must certainly be a realistic picture of the borderlands. Ibn Hawqal's reference to the troglodyte villages seems to refer to such settlements in Cappadocia. The comments of Ṭabarī referring to Ankara and Amorion in 838 — "there was nothing in the land of the Byzantines greater than these two cities" — illustrates the real situation, for archaeological surveys show that Ankara was at this time little more than a heavily-defended fortress, hardly a city in the classical (political/economic) sense. Referring to a campaign of 831 in Cappadocia, the same chronicler notes that abū Isḥāq, Ma'mūn's son, took thirty fortresses and maṭmūra or underground grainstores. Hild's recent survey of the Cappadocian road-system describes many such fortresses, small watch-towers or fortresses dotted along the chief routes into imperial territory. But Ṭabarī refers to no cities.[61]

The well-known treatise *De Velitatione Bellica*, dating probably to shortly after the reign of Nicephorus II Phocas, but describing conditions as they were during and before his reign, confirms the picture drawn by Muslim writers. The Byzantine border districts are a land of fortresses and villages, not of cities; and these borderlands are to be seen not simply as a narrow strip behind a theoretical frontier. They comprised a vast area stretching from the real border back north and west into Anatolia.[62] If the situation described were true of the tenth century, after the re-population of considerable stretches of "no-man's land" by Armenian mercenaries and settlers, it can scarcely have been less true of the previous two hundred years; and it will hardly be an exaggeration to claim that a considerable part of Asia Minor was the same, a land of villages and fortresses, with the once-flourishing cities of the previous era reduced for the most part to the status of defended villages and refuges for the administration and local populace in times of danger, or completely abandoned in favour of a safer location.[63] Only those

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[61] Ibn Ḥawqal, *Kitāb Surāt al-Ard, Configuration de la terre*, tr. J. H. Kramer, G. Wiet (Beyrouth/Paris, 1964), 194 (text, ed. J. H. Kramer (Leiden, 1938), 200). The treatise was compiled c. 977 A. D. For Tabari and the archaeological evidence which puts his statement into its proper context, see Foss, *Late Antique and Byzantine Ankara* (*art. cit.* note 17 above), 78; and for Abū Isḥāq, see Vasiliev, *Byzance et les Arabes*, i, p. 289. For Hild's survey, see note 21 above.

[62] The treatise gives a vivid picture of warfare in these regions, and the terrain in which it was waged. See 197, 6sq., 215, 7-13, 244, 8sq. etc.

[63] See Ahrweiler, *L'Asie Mineure et les invasions arabes*, 32. For the effects of constant warfare on the cities, see the acts of the Quinisex, *Mansi*, xi, can. xxxvii, 960. For the Armenians, see N. Oikonomides, *Organisation de la frontière orientale* (*art. cit.*, note 24 above) 295 f. and bibliography.

cities situated on major trade routes in the north and west were excepted, and they were not numerous.

Life in these regions — and indeed in all those districts which were frequently the subject of Muslim raids — was difficult and uncertain. The constant presence of imperial officials, both civil and military, was a reminder that they were still part of a greater empire. But the akritic cycle demonstrates only too clearly the real isolation which existed and the consequent feeling of local self-sufficiency and self-reliance which developed.[64] Likewise the so-called *Strategikon* of Kekaumenos, dating to the last third of the eleventh century, demonstrates a well-developed local self-reliance which was typical of the frontier and especially of the military officers who were at home there.[65]

It was these military commanders who formed an important section of the new Byzantine aristocracy which came into being after the second half of the seventh century, in a situation which gave to local officials with delegated authority a great deal more power and influence than in the preceding period, and made possible the rise of a whole new group of officers to social wealth through imperial service.[66] The reliance of the threatened local populace, both urban and rural, on the military, increased proportionally as the hostile military threat increased and intensified. Military officers controlled fortresses and refuges, the agricultural population had to rely upon them for defence and security, and the soldiers themselves were recruited from this very population. While there is no positive evidence for it, it seems not unlikely that an entrenched system of patronage developed, and it is precisely this — together with the great military expansion of the tenth century, which offered them unprecedented opportunities to increase their property in the conquered zones — which made possible the rise of the later military aristo-

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[64] Cf. H.-G. Beck, *Das byzantinische Jahrtausend* (München, 1978), p. 85; and see the general introduction to J. Mavrogordato, *Digenes Akritas* (Oxford, 1956), esp. pp. lxi f. Most recently see H. F. Graham, Digenis Akritas as a Source for Frontier History, *Actes de XIVᵉ Congrès International des Etudes Byzantines* II, 321—9; and A. Pertusi, Tra storia e leggenda: Akritai e Ghazi sulla frontiera orientale di Bisanzio, *ibid.*, I, 237—283, esp. 250 ff.

[65] See Kekaumenos (ed., trans. and comm, G. G. Litavrin, *Sovieti i rasskazi Kekavmena: Sočinenie vizantilskogo polkovodtsa XI veka* (Moscow, 1972) 166, 7 sq., 168, 21 sq. (*Cecaumeni Strategicon*, edd. V. Wassiliewsky, V. Jernstadt, St. Petersburg 1896, Amsterdam 1965, 24, 22 sq., 26, 10 sq.). See also H. G. Beck, *Vademecum des byzantinischen Aristokraten: — das sog. Strategikon vom Kekaumenos* (Graz, 1956), p. 5 f.

[66] To what extent comparisons can be drawn between these Byzantine aristocrats and their western counterparts is difficult to say. Unlike the westerners, the Byzantine representatives of this class often lived in cities; but that does not mean that they could not fulfil the same social role as western magnates, for in the East the towns were the centres of the administrative and military authority upon which their landed wealth was ultimately founded. These "towns" and "fortresses" could equally occupy the position of estate or manorial centres; although there is evidence of non-administrative centres too: the estates of Eustathios Maleionos in Cappadocia seem not to have been centred around a city (cf. *Cedrenus*, Bonn, ii, 448, 9⁻¹⁶); while even in the fourth century certain senatorial families in Cappadocia possessed fortified villas on their estates. Cf. B. Treucker, *Politische und sozialgeschichtliche Studien zu den Basilius-Briefen* (Frankfurt/München, 1961), p. 15. The rise of the new military aristocracy was also facilitated by the drastic weakening of the older, senatorial and municipal aristocracy, which suffered both politically and economically during the various upheavals of the seventh century, and again economically at the hands of Arab raiders. See Winkelmann, in *Byzanz im 7. Jhdt.* (see note 52 above), pp. 180 f. and Köpstein, *ibid.*, p. 64 f.

cratic families of the later ninth century and after, and which is to some extent reflected in the legislation of the tenth-century emperors.[67]

But there may have been other factors at work, more directly connected with the effects of the Arab raiding, which facilitated the increase of large estates in the hands of these military families. Constant insecurity affects arable farming communities much more drastically than those which rely upon a chiefly pastoral economy. Fields which were regularly burned, crops which were harvested or destroyed by a marauding enemy, cannot have offered a secure income to those living in these regions. Indeed, the example of the population of the town of Sision, who decided to abandon their town for safer districts in 711, while it may not have been generally followed, demonstrates the effects such raiding had on local morale and on the local economy.[68] Even farther inland, the lot of the population of Euchaita was hardly better. Plagued by yearly raids, their city was so badly handled that they decided to abandon it for safer territory. Only the presence of the cult of St. Theodora Tiro (and a timely miracle) dissuaded them.[69] The account of these miracles, which appear to describe events of the later seventh and eighth centuries, provides a vivid account of what life in regularly plundered areas was really like — yearly raids, constant insecurity, and of course the mention of the citadel or fortress attached to the original settlement to which the inhabitants fled when the enemy approached.[70]

The frontier regions, as Ahrweiler has already suggested, were very probably progressively depopulated as life on a reasonably secure basis became more and more difficult.[71] We may assume that considerable areas were thus

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[67] Cf. I. Djuric, 'La famille des Phocas', *Zbornik Radova Viz. Inst.* 17 (1976), 195—291 (French résumé 293—6), who points out that it was precisely in these regions — especially Cappadocia and Charsianon — that the military families had their roots. See also S. Vryonis, 'Byzantium: the Social Basis of Decline', *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 2 (1959), 161. On other families, cf. Jean-F. Vannier, *Familles Byzantines: les Argyroi (IXe—XIIe siècles* (Paris, 1975), pp. 16, 19 f., and W. Seibt, *Die Skleroi: eine prosopographisch-sigillographische Studie* (Wien, 1976), p. 20 f.

From a general reading of Kekaumenos one suspects a considerable degree of patronage on the part of the local magnates in the provinces. The well-known novel of Constantine VII on the military lands (*JGR* [Zepos], i, p. 222 f.) refers to the possibility and the practice of soldiers being illegally exempted from millitary service and serving their officers in another capacity. See Lemerle, *Esquisse*, ii, 48 f.

[68] Cf. *Balādhuri*, 262 (text, Munajjid, 201); and Lilie's comment. *op. cit.*, p. 119, note 50.

[69] See *Vita et Miracula Theodori*, in H. Delehaye, *Les légendes grecques des saints militaires* (Paris, 1909), 198, 28—31: πολλοὶ γοῦν τῶν ἐνταῦθα μετὰ τὴν ἔξοδον τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἐκ τῶν ὀχυρωμάτων ἐλθόντες τήν τε δυσωδείαν καὶ ἐρημίαν τῆς πόλεως θεωρήσαντες μετανάσται τῶν ἰδίων ἐν ἄλλαις πόλεσι γενέσθαι ἠβούλοντο...

[70] See *ibid.*, 199, 23—4, 200, 5. See on this also Abrahamse, *op. cit.*, pp. 347—354.

[71] Ahrweiler, *L'Asie Mineure et les invasion arabes*, 28 f. See also P. Charanis, 'The Linguistic Frontier in Asia Minor towards the End of the Ninth Century', *Actes du XIVe Congrès Int. des Études Byz.*, ii, 315—319, see 316, note 6. The reference to a movement away from the threatened regions in the canons of the Quinisext council already referred to are unmistakeable. See above, notes 58a, 63; and cf. *Mansi*, xi, can. xxxix, 961. For the effects of constant raiding on a comparable region, see G. Gomolka, 'Bemerkungen zur Situation der spätantiken Städte und Siedlungen in Nordbulgarien und ihrem Weiterleben am Ende des 6. Jahrhunderts', in *Studien zum 7. Jahrhundert in Byzanz: Probleme der Herausbildung des Feudalismus*, ed. Helga Köpstein, Friedhelm Winkelmann (Berlin, 1976), pp. 35—42, see esp. 41—42. For the later re-population in the tenth century, see note 63 above.

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affected; and while attempts were made, often on a huge scale, to re-inforce
the population of Asia Minor, it is doubtful that these marginal regions were
affected.[72] The local military establishment, more specifically the leading
officers, was probably the only group which could assert itself and maintain
its interests under such conditions, at least once they had established them-
selves in the districts concerned. They disposed not only of the necessary
resources, but in addition the armed force required to protect the areas con-
cerned. Abandoned land fell theoretically to the imperial government, either
to the general *logothesion* or to the emperor's private estate, once the com-
munity involved was no longer able to pay its taxes collectively (before the
end of the ninth century). But it might equally have come under the protection
of military officials before its final abandonment, or before the agents of
the fisc could register it as deserted. Cheap land in exposed districts can hardly
have been scarce, and there would have been no lack of opportunity for
officials to buy it up — regardless of the theoretical prohibitions on such
activities.[73] This is, of course, hypothetical, but local officials, especially
military commanders, certainly possessed the resources to impose their will
on less fortunate or powerful members of their communities. Possibly they
concentrated upon a less risky form of economic activity, cattle- and sheep-
raising, which requires less expenditure in terms of manpower, and consti-
tuted a more secure exploitation of resources — because herds and flocks

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[72] For re-settlement in parts of Asia Minor, see P. Charanis, 'Ethnic Changes in the
Seventh Century in Byzantium', *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 13 (1959), 23—44; and idem.
The Transfer of Population as a Policy (see note 4 above). For a more recent comment, see
H. Ditten in Byzanz im 7. *Jhdt*, pp. 151—155.
    Compare the *Apokalypse des Ps.-Methodius*, ed. A. Lolos (Köln/Meisenheim, 1976)
{= Beiträge zur klass. Philologie 83) which was written c. 655 and then revised some twenty
years later. It gives a no doubt exaggerated and standardised "apocalyptic", but nevertheless
useful picture of the impact of the Muslim raids, which is in part supported by the references
from the canons of the council of 692. See xi, 9: Καππαδοκία εἰς φθορὰν καὶ εἰς
ἐρήμωσιν, καὶ οἱ ταύτης οἰκήτορες ἐν αἰχμαλωσίᾳ καὶ σφαγῇ καταποθήσονται. Cf. also
xi, 17: λοιμώξουσι καὶ ὀλιγωθήσονται οἱ ἄνθρωποι, [- - -] καὶ ἐρημωθήσονται καὶ πόλεις
καὶ ἔσονται αἱ χῶραι ἄβατοι διὰ τὸ ὀλιγωθῆναι τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα.
    Whatever the economic position of the Anatolian towns may have been in the tenth
century and after (See Vryonis, *Decline of Medieval Hellenism*, pp. 17—22) — when they
were once more safe from raiding and when local trade could be carried on without inter-
ruption — this was hardly the case during late seventh and eighth centuries. The extensive
evidence amassed by Vryonis for the effects of Turkish raiding during the last forty years
of the eleventh century might be usefully employed for comparative purposes, at least to
demonstrate the effects of this sort of hostile military activity on agriculture. See *Decline
of Medieval Hellenism*, p. 144 f.
[73] For the procedure followed in such cases, see Lemerle, *Esquisse*, i, 60—61, 263.
See in addition Ahrweiler, 'Recherches sur l'administration de l'empire byzantin au IXe—XIe
siècles', *Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique* 84 (1960), 1—109, esp. 13 f. For the ways
in which military patronage operated in Syria, for example, during the fourth and fifth
centuries, see R. M. Price, *The Role of Military Men in Syria and Egypt from Constantine
to Theodosius II* (Oxford D. Phil., 1974), esp. pp. 104 f. See also D. Angelov, 'Zur Frage
des Agrargesetzes und der Herausbildung der Feudalverhältnisse in Byzanz', in *Studien zum
7. Jhdt.* (see note 71 above), pp. 3—6, esp. 7—8; and most recently, H. Köpstein in *Byzanz
im 7. Jhdt.* (cited note 52 above), p. 40 f., and esp. 50—53, for the development of social
subordination reflected in the "Farmers' Law". Even in the tenth century, barbarian raids
were regarded officially as a cause of the abandonment of lands. See M. Loos, 'Quelques
remarques sur les communautés rurales et la grande propriété terrienne à Byzance (VIIe—XIe
siècles)', *Byzantinoslavica* 39 (1978), 13.

are more easily brought into safety. There is some very slight evidence that this may have been the case in Cappadocia, for example, and Charsianon. The monk Michael Maleinos distributed his movable possessions to the poor, who appear to be livestock farmers of one sort or another, since this consisted chiefly of flocks of sheep and herds of cattle.[74] These areas were already centres of a pastoral or herding economy, of course, and Cappadocia is well-known from Roman times to have produced horses from the imperial stud-farms there.[75] But it is not impossible that the Arab raids encouraged an extension of this pastoral economy, while at the same time giving the local military officials the opportunity to build up their own landed possessions. As we shall see, much of the conflict along the border may have been focussed around a competition for the best pasture and grazing land, as villagers from both sides drove their flocks up to the summer pastures, and in which the local military will again have been able to play a significant role.[76]

The fairly extensive border regions, then, were characterised above all by a concentration of settlement around refuge-points and fortresses, and by the ruralisation of urban life.[77] The description of Ya'qūbī of the Arab fortress-town in the lowlands surrounded by the Byzantine villages and fortlets in the hills, sums up the whole situation as it had developed during the seventh and eighth centuries.[78] The evidence of the *De Velitatione Bellica* provides a glimpse of these frontier districts from the Byzantine side, and the picture agrees in general with that painted by Muslim writers.

Local defence was organised around the basic territorial and military unit, the *bandon* (referred to in its administrative capacity as a topotērēsia) under a komēs.[79] A number of *banda* were in turn grouped together to form a *tourma*, likewise both a military and administrative division. Depending on the region, a *tourma* could be composed of anything from two to eight *banda*. Since the military strength of a *bandon* also varied considerably (according to earlier texts 300—400 men, according to later texts 50—400 for cavalry units, 200—400 for infantry) a *tourma* might number as many as two thousand men or more.[80] In fact, armies seem on the whole to have been fairly small, and *banda* of 50—100 men were probably usual in the smaller themes. The

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[74] Vie de S. Michel Maleinos, ed. L. Petit, *Revue de l'Orient Chrétien* 7 (1902), 557, [31]sq.

[75] Strabo, *Geographica*, xii, 2. 7—9, describes the areas around Tyana as reasonably fertile, in contrast to the arid, stony plains about Caesarea. He adds, however, that the latter area is good for pasturing. On this see Kirsten, *Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum*, ii (1954), art. "Cappadocia", col. 869 f., and for the stud-farms, Jones, *LRE*, pp. 767—9.

[76] See part II below. Note that the Banu Habīb, a clan of semi-nomadic pastoralists, were absorbed without difficulty into these districts in the tenth century, suggesting the already pastoral nature of the regional economy. See Vasiliev, *Byzance et les Arabes* ii/I, 271—3; 2, 419—421 (Ibn Hawqal).

[77] For evidence of an increase in the population of areas which were relatively safe from casual raids, see for example Kirsten, *art. cit.* "Cappadocia", col. 869 f. For the fortresses and *kataphygia* of the villagers, see *De Vel. Bell.*, 244, [8]sq., 245, [14]sq. Note also 246, [9-11].

[78] See part II below, note 120; and cf. Mutanabbī quoted by Pertusi, *Akritai e Ghāzi* (note 64 above) 253 f.

[79] See the note in *DAI*, commentary, p. 189.

[80] Cf. *Mauricius, Arta Militarā*, ed. H. Mihăescu (Bucureşti, 1970), i, 4.2 for the later sixth century; and for the tenth century, Leo, *Tactica* (in Migne, *PG*, 107), iv, 41; 45; 48; *Sylloge Tacticorum quae olim 'inedita Leonis tactica' dicebatur*, ed. A. Dain (Paris, 1938),

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De Velitatione Bellica refers to a whole theme force as consisting of three thousand men, and indeed regards this as quite large: while larger offensive divisions of between six and twelve thousand, made up of several theme armies, are also mentioned.[81] Another treatise of the later tenth century discusses imperial armies made up of the *tagmata* and "all the *themata*" numbering eleven thousand men.[82] Historians should therefore be wary of accepting the usually inflated figures quoted by Theophanes, for example, and even those of Leo VI in his *Tactica*, where individual thematic armies number as many as 24,000 or more. The same applies to many of the Arab writers — Ibn Khurdādhbīh, for example, gives a total of 120,000 men for the whole Byzantine army, with an average of 10,000 men per theme.[83] It must, of course, be remembered that the *themata* of the tenth century, especially those along the borders, were much smaller than the older military provinces. A figure of about 10,000 altogether for the original Armeniakon or Anatolikon districts is acceptable. But the figures given by Ya'qūbī for the middle of the ninth century, appear on the whole much more reasonable. He mentions a total of 40,000 cavalry soldiers altogether: "*Kh*irshana doit fournir 500 cavaliers; Séleucie 500 cavaliers; la Thrace, 5.000 cavaliers; et la Macédoine, 5.000 cavaliers. Le total de l'armée byzantine, ainsi constituée conformément aux prescriptions militaires imposés aux cantons et aux villages, est de 40.000 cavaliers".[84] If Ya'qūbī's figures are to be accepted, the army of Charsianon in the ninth century was relatively small; that of Cappadocia will not have been very much larger.[85]

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35. 3—5. This anon. treatise actually gives figures for the *banda* or *allagia* of Thrakesion and Charsianon — 320 men for the former, 300—400 for Charsianon (which was, of course, a much larger province at this period — c. 960 — than in the early ninth century, having had extensive areas of the former district of Cappadocia transferred to it. See the references in note 21 above). The *Praecepta Militaria* ascribed to Nicephorus II also refer to cavalry banda of 50 men: see *Nicephori Praecepta Militaria e codice Mosquensi*, ed. J. Kulakovskij, in *Zapiski Imperatorskoj Akademii Nauk*, viii ser., 7 (1908), no. 9, 12, 24–8, 13, 6–9, 27–34.

[81] *De Vel. Bell.*, 227, 21–2, 229, 5sq., and 220, 12 and 22, 1. — although it should be borne in mind that the newly-created themes of the tenth century were smaller than the older "rhomaika themata."

[82] Incerti Scriptoris Byzantini Saeculi X. *Liber De Re Militari*, ed. R. Vari (Leipzig, 1901), 1, 10–15. That "all the *themata*" is to be taken literally seems unlikely. The author probably means all those that are present.

[83] Leo, *Tact*, iv, 41—44; 67—8; *Ibn Khurdādhbih*, 84 (text 111). Leo's figures are simply copied from the *Strategikon* of Maurice (eg. *Strat.*, i, 4.2—3) which deals specifically with the praesental forces of the later sixth century. These did number perhaps 24,000 at times. Note that the figures given by Theophanes depend normally upon his sources. Where this is reliable — in the case of Procopius, for example — they may be accepted. See I. Čičurov, 'Feofan Ispovednik — Kompilyator Prokopiya', *Viz. Vrem.* 37 (1976), 62—73, esp. 62..4.

[84] Al-Ya'qūbī, *Kitāb al-Buldān*, *Le Livre des Pays*, trad. G. Wiet (Le Caire, 1937), 168 (text in *BGA*, vii, 232), a work compiled c. 889 A. D. Note *Hudūd al-'Ālam*, 157: "In each of these provinces lives a commander-in-chief on behalf of the King of Rūm, with numerous troops numbering from 3,000 men to 6,000 horse (sic) and destined to guard the province".

[85] In 911, for example, the theme of Sebasteia consisted of 5 tourmarchs, 10 *drouggarioi*, 8 *komētes* and 965 soldiers. Taking *drouggarioi* and *komētes* as more or less equal in rank (see below, note 91) we may assume *banda* of between 50 and 80 men approximately. Cf. *De Caerimoniis* (Bonn), 656, 13–16. This may not have been the total of troops from Sebasteia, of course, but even if as much as fifty per cent. had remained in their province (which actually seems most unlikely) this hardly speaks for the huge numbers which appear in most contemporary histories and chronicles.

As mentioned, the basic military and administrative unit was the *bandon* or *topotērēsia* headed by a *komēs*. Several *banda* made up a *tourma*, but at the purely military level there existed also *drouggoi* commanded by *drouggarioi*. These consisted of several *banda*, and represented the middle level of the military command structure.[86] No administrative *drouggoi* existed — there was no territorial *drouggos* — although the *drouggarioi* were attached to the permanent staff of the *stratēgos*. They are often referred to as *chiliarchai* in the classical manner, and they belonged to the distinctively military élite which grew up in the provinces of the empire. The *drouggarios* Nikephoros and his son Baanes provide a good example, the former based in Thrace during the middle years of the ninth century. The son followed in his father's footsteps and became likewise a *drouggarios*.[87] The officers who were sent out to call up the theme troops for inspection (the *adnoumion*) seem also to have been headed by a *drouggarios*.[88] Apart from their purely military activities, however, such officers had little to do with administrative matters. During the tenth century, and perhaps connected with the reduction in the number of men making up a *bandon*, we meet *drouggarokomētes*, who seem to be the equivalent of ordinary *kometēs*, perhaps of a slightly higher rank.[89] Indeed, the tenth century appears to have seen a considerable reshuffling of ranks within some of the provincial forces. The *thema* Charpezikion, for example, apart from its *stratēgos*, the *komēs tēs kortēs* and the higher-ranking *tourmarchai* (numbering twenty-five altogether), had a further 47 lesser turmarchs, 205 *drouggarioi* and 428 soldiers![90] The titles as they are here applied demonstrates in fact a specialised organisation and reflect the application of Greek titles to an already existing (Armenian) establishment, which was internally very different from the traditional Byzantine structure. The new "Armenian" *themata* which were probably all very similar structurally to the Charpezikion, as Oikonomides surmises, may in fact reflect the more "feudalised" structure of Armenian society. The older military districts referred to in the same list for 949 retain the traditional structure.[91]

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[86] Such officers were originally titled *moirarchai*, since they commanded a *moira*, but these terms fell out of use — if they were ever used in everyday speech — during the early seventh century. Cf. Maurice, *Strat.*, i, 4.3; Leo, *Tact.*, iv, 9; 42; 43 etc.

[87] See *De S. Maria Iun.* (Acta Sanctorum, Nov. iv, 692—705), 692 E-F, 694 E, 703 F. For another example of a *drouggarios*, ordered by the *stratēgos* to assemble his troops at Malagina, see *La Vita retractata et les miracles postumes de saint Pierre d'Atroa*, ed., trad. V. Laurent (Subsid. Hag. 31, Bruxelles, 1958), 109, 1sq.

[88] See 'La vie de saint Philarète', edd. M.-H. Fourmy, M. Leroy, in *Byzantion* 9 (1934), 125.

[89] *De Caerimoniis*, 663, 6 (for 949).

[90] *De Caer.*, 667, 6-11. See also V. V. Kučma, 'Komandniyi Sostav i Ryadovye Stratioty v Femnon Voiske Vizantii v Konče IX—XV', *Vizantiiskie Očerki* (Moscow, 1971), esp. 95—6.

[91] See Oikonomides, *Les listes de préséance* (see note 21 above), pp. 345—6, who notes also a similar arrangement in south Italy for the same period, where Armenian units were also stationed. Cf. Vera von Falkenhausen, *Untersuchungen über die byzantinische Herrschaft in Süditalien vom 9. bis ins 11. Jhdt.* (Wiesbaden, 1967), pp. 109—111, who, however, considers that the reduction in the status of tourmarchs was generalised. While certain titles were certainly reduced in status — that of *drouggarios* to the level of *komēs*, for example — the figures for Charpezikion demonstrate rather a different internal organisation. The theme of Sebasteia had 5 tourmarchs, 10 *drouggarioi* but only 8 *komētes* during the Cretan expedition of 911, which suggests that the latter two were regarded as more less equivalent.

The turmarch was a key figure in the administration of the theme or the *kleisoura*. Like the *stratēgos*, he was granted legal authority in all military matters — ie. in all affairs in which his soldiers were directly involved — within his *tourma* or *kleisourarchia*. To what extent this authority was preserved into the tenth century is unclear, but the theme *kritēs* came increasingly to the fore in legal and fiscal affairs, as the author of the *De Velitatione Bellica* complains.[92] We may assume that a kleisourarch had the same powers as a turmarch, since most *kleisourarchiai* were ex-*tourmai* separated from the authority of the *stratēgos* to whose theme they had originally belonged;[93] although kleisourarchs could also have their own turmarchs. In the *De Velitatione Bellica*, the turmarch is an important figure on the staff of the kleisourarch or *stratēgos*. He is responsible for ensuring the safety of the local populace by warning them of the approaching enemy.[94] He is also responsible for shadowing enemy raiders with his own detachment until the commander can assemble his troops, and for finding out which routes the enemy forces intend to follow.[95]

The frontier regions were organised along the same lines as the rest of the empire, into military districts in which civil and military authority were (to begin with) united. That these districts were administratively self-contained is clear from a passage of the *De Administrando Imperio*, where a series of transfers of *tourmai* from one theme to another, and *banda* from one *tourma* or theme to another are mentioned.[96]

To what extent these districts were also co-terminous with the fiscal administrative circumscriptions is difficult to say. The complexities of the latter, with its transfers of properties from one owner to another, the parcellisation of estates and the transfer of liabilities from one fiscal *dioikēsis*

The tourmarchs, however, although in charge of very small units (three or four *banda* of about 50 men each) retain their status relative to the *drouggarioi* and *komētes*. Sebaste.a had been a *kleisoura* before 908, and belonged therefore to the older establishment. See *De Caer.*, 656, [13]sq. and Oikonomides, Préséance, p. 349. Note that the *De Velitatione Bellica*, compiled in the 960 s, refers to tourmarchs as μεγάλοι καὶ χρήσιμοι ἄρχοντες 197,[1]. Oikonomides, *Organisation de la frontière orientale (art cit.*, note 24) has discussed the origins of the small *armeniaka themata*, see 295—300; although it is doubtful that the high number of officers in these units has anything directly to do with discipline, as he supposes (298).

[92] *De Vel. Bell.*, 240, [8-23]; for the usurpation of this authority by the kritēs, 240, [4-8]. Cf. Ahrweiler, *Recherches sur l'administration (art. cit.*, note 73 above), 69 f., and von Falkenhausen, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

[93] Cappadocia, for example, had been a *tourma* of the Anatolikon theme until the early ninth century. See *DAI*, commentary, p. 188, and text, cap. 50, [167-8]. On *kleisourarchai*, see Ahrweiler, *Recherches sur l'administration*, 81—2; and Ferluga, *art. cit.*, (note 21 above). 76 f.

[94] *De Vel. Bell.*, 214, [9]sq. We have not dealt here with the system of warning beacons which was operated by the Byzantines during the first half of the ninth century, stretching from Loulon to Constantinople, since this was not an essential part of local defences. See *De Caer.*, 492, [8]sq., *Theophanes continuatus* (Bonn), 197, [11]sq, and *Symeon magister (ibid)*, 681, [21]sq.

[95] *De Vel. Bell.*, 196, [22], 200, [10]sq., 227, [2]. For further details of tactics and strategy in border warfare, see the account of Pertusi, *Akritai e Ghâzi*, 248 f., 251—2.

[96] *DAI*, cap. 50, [92]sq. Note also Mas'ūdī, *Kitâb al-Tanbîh wa'l-Ishraf, le livre de l'avertissement et de la revision*, trad. B. Carra de Vaux (Paris, 1897), 239, who reports that the Byzantine provinces are called bend, ie. *banda*.

to another, will have prevented any neat correspondence between political/military administrative regions on the one hand, and fiscal districts on the other.[97]

Recruitment of soldiers, in contrast, was apparently organised within each *bandon*. Excluding the permanent military staff of the *stratēgos* or kleisourarch — his turmarchs, *drouggarioi* and *komētes*, the *komēs* of the tent, and their various staff (*domestikoi* and *topotērētai*) — the majority of the soldiers were called out only for particular campaigns or when an enemy force approached.[98] They were often widely dispersed in their own communities, and as the *De Velitatione Bellica* makes clear, took some time to assemble.[99] Indeed, the strategy followed was designed explicitly to permit the scattered units to assemble and join the commander and his detachment.[100] Recruitment itself was based on the traditional military service supported by a private property, a system which had developed during the later seventh century.[101] Most of the Arab geographers who make reference to the Byzantine empire mention this system, which was applied only exceptionally in their own land.[102]

Viewed as a whole, the system of frontier defences as it appears in its perfected form in the *De Velitatione Bellica* — after 250 years or more of gradual development — functioned effectively and well. At the cost of the disappearance of the traditional urban society in those regions, and a corresponding extensive "ruralisation", it made the Byzantine borderlands a formidable barrier behind which any attempt to establish a hostile military presence was doomed to fail. The existence of this deep band of frontier lands also stimulated a general militarisation of Byzantine society and the development of a new aristocracy, most clearly in the frontier regions under review, and with this went a corresponding shift in values and outlook. The attitudes of the leading figures of "Digenis Akritas" and of the writer Kekaumenos are typical of this frontier society; and while there never developed within the Byzantine empire, constantly under pressure from all sides, a comparable

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[97] See, for example, N. Svoronos, 'Recherches sur le cadastre byzantin et la fiscalité aux XIe et XIIe siècles: le cadastre de Thèbes', *Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique* 83 (1959), 55—6.

[98] For these staff officers see *De Caer.*, 663, 2sq., 15sq., 667, 6sq. The number of regular, full-time soldiers serving all year round, seems to have been very small, cf. *De Caer.*, 663, 6–11, where the total of soldiers attached to the general of the Thrakesion forces and his officers amounts to 235, referred to as προελευσιμαῖοι. The permanent scouts established along the borders and above the roads leading back into Byzantine territory also belonged to the regular establishment, receiving regular (monthly) pay and supplies. See *De Vel. Bell.*, 188, 16–20.

[99] *De Vel. Bell.*, 215, 1–6: Εἰ δέ γε τῶν πολεμίων ἐξέλευσις ἀθρόα καὶ σύντομος γένηται, οἷα πολλάκις παρ' αὐτῶν εἴωθε γίνεσθαι, μήπω τῶν βασιλικῶν στρατευμάτων ἐπισωρευθέντων ἀλλὰ μόνου τοῦ στρατηγοῦ. Μηδὲ αὐτοῦ δυνηθέντος διὰ τὸ σύντομον τῆς αὐτῶν ἐξελεύσεως τὸν ὀλίγον λαὸν τοῦ ἰδίου θέματος ἐπισυναγαγεῖν ἀλλ' ὀλίγον ἔχῃ καὶ εὐαρίθμητον . . .

[100] The general was to shadow the enemy but not to attack until the latter was on the return march, thus catching him when tired and laden with booty, and also with a stronger force under the Byzantine's command. See *De Vel. Bell.*, 192 19—193, 3.

[101] See Ahrweiler, *Recherches sur l'administration*, 5 f., and Lemerle, *Esquisse*, i, 70—73; ii, 43 f. See also Haldon, *Recruitment (art. cit.*, note 7 above).

[102] See for example, Ya'qūbī, *Les Pays*, 168 (text, *BGA*, vii, 323); Ibn Khurdādhbīh, 85 (text, 111—2).

outlook with regard to its foes and the warfare it waged against them to that which the Arabs possessed, this frontier warfare radically affected the society of the borderlands, promoting tendencies within Byzantine society as a whole which were to play a crucial role during the tenth and eleventh centuries.

II

The Byzantine frontier played a very special part in the life of the Abbasid state. There were practical reasons for this. The Byzantine outposts were often dangerously close to the plains of Cilicia, northern Syria and al-Jazirah and frontier towns were often taken by the enemy. If the defences were weakened, the enemy could strike into the heart of the empire. On the positive side, Byzantine territory provided a fertile field for raiding, for acquiring booty and ransoms. But the Byzantine frontier had an ideological importance which is at least as significant as the practical. The Byzantines were the hereditary enemies of the Islamic state. The Byzantine empire was the only power bordering on the Islamic world which could be considered an equal. It offered a rival ideology and a rival political system. This meant that campaigns against the Byzantines had an importance which campaigns against such unlettered barbarians as the Turks and Berbers never did. These frontier wars were the only military expeditions the Abbasid Caliphs ever joined in personally, and Caliphs like Hārūn and al-Mu'taṣim seem to have used the campaigns very consciously as a way of enhancing their status as leaders of the Muslim community.

Nowhere else along the frontiers of the empire did the Muslims develop such an organised and sophisticated military system. This largely came into being during the first half century of Abbasid rule from 132 (750) on. By the end of the reign of the Caliph Hārūn al-Rashīd (193/809) it was complete in all essentials and remained in existence until the Byzantine reconquests of the second half of the fourth/tenth century. The purpose of this paper is to examine as far as possible, how the system was built up and operated.

The frontier areas (al-thughūr) were divided by the Muslim authorities into two zones,[103] the Syrian frontier to the west in the Cilician plain and the frontier of al-Jazīrah in the more mountainous country to the east. Further to the north-east lay the Armenian principalities which formed a barrier preventing direct confrontation between the armies of Byzantium and the Caliphate.

The Cilician plain forms a distinct geographical unit, separated from the Byzantine lands to the north by the Taurus mountains and from the Muslim areas of northern Syria by the lower but still formidable Amanus range. Potentially it was rich and fertile and had supported considerable cities in antiquity but the Persian and Arab invasions of the seventh century had put an end to this. The early Islamic rulers preferred to keep it as a no-

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[103] For the divisions of the frontier zones, see Ibn Kurdādhbīh, 99, and *Qudāmah b. Ja'far*, Kitāb al-Kharāj (BGA, vi), 253—4; and the comments of Pertusi, *Akrítai e Ghazi*, 249—50. For the historical geography of the area, see Ramsay, *Historical Geography* (cited note 24 above) and the indispensable work of Honigmann, *Ostgrenze* (see note 11 above). For the most recent detailed survey, see E. Wirth, *Syrien: eine geographische Landeskunde* (Darmstadt, 1971).

man's land[104] and it was not until the time of the later Umayyads and early Abbasids that vigorous efforts were made to incorporate the area within the Islamic state. So successful were these efforts that during the prolonged disturbances which followed the death of Hārūn al-Rashīd in 193/809 it was described as a haven of peace and quiet.[105]

The Muslims settled in three large towns in the plains, al-Maṣṣiah (Mopsouestia), Adhanah (Adana) and Ṭarsūs, and a small number of satellite communities. Because of its geographical situation, al-Maṣṣīṣah[106] was the first of these cities to be colonised. As early as 84/703 a mosque had been built and the old walls refortified and by the end of the Umayyad period there was also a *rabaḍ* or suburb outside the fortress which implies that the settlement was more than just an isolated garrison. In 139/756 there was one of the periodic earthquakes which afflicated the area and the Caliph al-Manṣūr ordered that the whole town be rebuilt and repopulated. The town continued to prosper, a new community grew up across the river Jayḥān and the mention of *khāns* there during the reign of al-Ma'mūn demonstrates that it had become a commercial centre[107] as well as a military one.

The same process can be observed in the case of Adhanah.[108] It seems to have been less important or populous than the other two and the first recorded settlement did not come until 141—2/758—60 when a garrison of Khurāsānīs was settled there (Khurāsānīs, from north eastern Iran, formed

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[104] al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-Buldān* (ed. Munajjid, *op. cit.*, note 12 above), 194—5; Honigmann, *Ostgrenze*, 39—40. For the general decline of urban life in seventh-century Anatolia, see C. Foss, 'The Persians in Asia Minor and the End of Antiquity', *English Historical Review* 90 (1975), 721—747, and part one above.

[105] *Michael Syr.*, iii, 26.

[106] For the development of al-Maṣṣīṣah, *al-Balādhurī*, 1945—7; and Yāqūt, *Muc'jam al-Buldān*, ed. F. Wüstenfeld (Leipzig, 1886), iv, 579.

[107] The sources frequently mention markets in connection with frontier towns, but it is not clear how far these served "international" trade and how far they were simply local markets. The whole question of Byzantine trade with the Islamic countries in this period is very obscure. Contemporary sources hardly mention it, although al-Jahiz says that the Muslims imported "gold and silver utensils, dinars of pure gold, herbs, brocades, fiery horses, female slaves, rare brass utensils, unpickable locks, lyres, water-engineers, agricultural experts, marble workers and eunuchs" (*Kitāb al-Tabaṣṣur*. See French transl. by C. Pellat in *Arabica* 1 (1954), 159). It is not clear from this list how large this trade was and whether any of it passed through the frontier towns. Michael the Syrian (iii, 16) describes how Muslims and Byzantine soldiers met and did trade during Harun's campaigns. In the fourth/tenth century Tarsus is said to have imported hunting dogs and falcons from Byzantium (M. Canard, 'Quelques observations sur l'introduction géographique de la Bughyat at't'alab de Kamal ad-Din d'Alep', *Annales de l'Institut des Études Orientales* 15 (1957). The best modern discussion of this trade is still that of W. Heyd, *Histoire du Commerce du Levant au Moyen Age* (Leipzig, 1885—6), i, pp. 43—5. M. Lombard considers the trade to have been considerable, but since neither dates nor references are given, it is difficult to assess this opinion (*L'Islam dans sa première grandeur* (VIII—XI siècles) (Paris, 1971), pp. 226—8). M. A. Shaban assigns a major importance to this trade (*Islamic History: A New Interpretation*, ii, *A. D.* 750—1055 (*A. H.* 132—44) (Cambridge, 1976), pp. 28—9, but the references cited hardly bear this out; while E. Ashtor is much more cautious (*A Social and Economic History of the Near East in the Middle Ages* (London, 1976), p. 100). There is no firm evidence of large-scale trade through the frontier cities in this period and until such evidence emerges, it must be assumed that the markets of these cities dealt most in local products.

[108] For Adhanah: *al-Balādhurī*, 199; *Yāqūt*, i, 179.

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the bulk of the troops in the early Abbasid armies). In 165/781—2 Hārūn
al-Rashīd brought in more colonists from Damascus and al-Urdunn (north-
ern Palestine and Jordan) and the town was strengthened again in 193—
—808—10.

Although it was the last to be founded, Tarsus[109] became the largest
of the cities of the Cilician plain. In 162/779, al-Hasan b. Qahtabā came to
the deserted site while returning from a campaign in Anatolia and established
a settlement of sorts. However, it was not until 171 (787—8) that Hārūn,
fearing that the Byzantines would occupy the site, ordered that a garrison
be settled there. Some 4—5,000 soldiers were drafted in but the outpost remai-
ned very vulnerable. In 189/804—5 they were all captured by the Byzan-
tines[110] and not released until Hārūn conquered Herakleia the next year.
Despite these inauspicious beginnings, the town flourished because it was
the nearest settlement to the Taurus passes and by the fourth/tenth century
it was the commercial and military metropolis of the region.

There were other, smaller outposts in the plain, notably 'Ain Zarbah,
Hārūniyah and al-Kanīsat al-Sawdā,[111] all dating from the reign of Hārūn,
but these seem to have been little more than fortresses and none of them large
centres of population.

To the east of the Cilician plain the border area becomes much more
mountainous and the Muslim outposts in the river valleys more isolated and
vulnerable. The most westerly of these outposts was Mar'aš[112] at the southern
end of an important route over the mountains. The fertile grazing afforded
by the surrounding plains made the area a good base for launching summer
expeditions but the various attempts of Umayyad rulers to establish a per-
manent community there were thwarted by the Byzantines, who took the
city during the disturbed times of the Abbasid Revolution. Sometime bet-
ween 137/754 and 152/769 a garrison was established and this was able to
resist a major Byzantine attack in 161/778.[113] Under Hārūn the population
seems to have increased and a *rabaḍ*, called Hārūniyah, was built outside
Marwān b. Muḥammad's original fortress. As with many other settlements,
the geographers mention the markets, showing that this was a commerical
centre as well as a military outpost.[114]

al-Hadath, further up the valley was less directly exposed to Byzantine
raids. Like Mar'ash it was fortified and settled in the early Abbasid period.
al-Hasan b. Qahtabā began the work in 161/778—9[115] and it was continued
until 169/785—6 when repairs were necessary as the walls had been washed

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[109] For Tarsūs: *al-Balādhurī*, 200—1; for descriptions of the city in the tenth century,
see *Ibn Ḥawqal* (cited note 61 above), 183—4 and Canard, *art. cit.*, (note 107), 46—52.

[110] *Michael Syr.*, iii, 16.

[111] *al-Balādhurī*, 202—3; ibn *Ḥawqal*, 182.

[112] For Mar'aš: al-Balādhurī, 224—5; Yāqūt, iv, 498. *Michael Syr.*, ii, 526, says
that all the original inhabitants were deported in 769 and settled in Syria.

[113] al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh al-rusul wa'l-mulūk*, edd. M.-J. De Goeje *et al.* (Leiden, 1879—
1901), iii, 486.

[114] *al-Idrīsī*, ed. J. Gildemeister (1885), 27.

[115] *al-Ṭabarī*, iii, 493; *al-Balādhurī*, 226; *Michael Syr.*, iii, 2; 8.

away during the winter. A garrison of 6,000 soldiers established.[116] Malaṭyah, further to the north-east, guarding the valley of the Nahr Qubāqib, was originally colonised in late Umayyard times but here again the fall of the dynasty allowed the Byzantines to retake it. The inhabitants were forced to leave and the city entirely destroyed[117] but, typically, the victors did not establish a garrison to hold it and the place was still in ruins when al-Ḥasan b. Qaḥṭabā was sent to rebuild it in 140/757—8. Volunteers arrived from all over northern Syria and al-Jazīrah to help with the work and a garrison of 4,000 settled in the city.[118] The geographers speak of the fertility of the site[119] but there is no mention of commercial activity. In a very interesting comment, al--Ya'qūbī describes the city as lying on level ground surrounded by mountains inhabited by the Byzantines (*Rūm*).[120]

Malaṭyah was the last large scale settlement towards the north-east but there were also a number of small fortresses, called *ḥiṣn* rather than *madīnah* (city). Among these were Ḥiṣn Manṣūr on the road between the Euphrates crossing at Sumaysāt and Malaṭyah,[121] Hisn Zibaṭrah on the road from Malaṭyah to al-Ḥadath,[122] Ḥiṣn Qalawdhiyah guarding the approaches to Malaṭyah from the east[123] and finally the remote Ḥiṣn Kamkh in the upper Euphrates valley.[124] All these fortresses were built or rebuilt under the early Abbasids and must have had garrisons to hold them but we have too little information to say with confidence how this was arranged.

A few general points can be made in connection with these settlements. The first is that they were all in the plains, on fertile sites beside rivers, and the Arab geographers are lyrical about the richness and fertility of many of them, especially in Cilicia.[125] Equally, the Muslims seem to have made very little effort to control the heights and the mountains. It is also worth noting that the Muslim presence was essentially urban in character. The main unit of defense was not the isolated castle but the fortified city. These cities were artificially created to serve a military purpose but they soon came to have an economic role, both as local market towns and as entrepôts for trade with the Byzantines. Finally, it was in the half-century from 132/750 onwards, the first half-century of Abbasid rule, that the frontier was organised and the scorchedearth policy of the early days replaced by one of advancing settlement.

These newly founded or refounded cities needed to be peopled. All the settlements had a number of salaried troops, usually about 4,000, attached to them. About half of these came from Khurāsān in north-east Iran, where the bulk of the Abbasid army was recruited, while the other half came from the provinces nearest the frontier regions, Syria and al-Jazīrah. In 141——2/758—60 Adhanah was colonised by a mixed force of Khurāsānīs and

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[116] *al-Balādhurī*, 226—7.
[117] *Ibid.*, 222.
[118] *Ibid.*, 223.
[119] *Ibn Ḥawqal*, 181; *al-Iṣṭakhrī* (BGA, i), 62.
[120] al-Ya'qūbī, *Buldān* (BGA, vii), 362.
[121] *al-Balādhurī*, 228—9; *ibn Ḥawqal*, 181.
[122] *al-Balādhurī*, 228; *Michael Syr.*, iii, 13.
[123] *al-Balādhurī*, 222, 223.
[124] *Ibid.*, 219—220.
[125] For example, *al-Iṣṭakhrī*, 62, 63; *al-Idrīsī*, 25; Yāqūt, iv, 558.

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Syrians[126] while the colonists of Ṭarsūs came from Khurāsān, al-Maṣṣīṣah and Antioch.[127] Further east in al-Ḥadath the garrison consisted of men from Syria, al-Jazīrah and Khurāsān[128] and 4,000 men from al-Jazīrah were settled in Malaṭyah[129]. In Umayyad times there were sometimes rotating garrisons like the guards who were sent from Antioch to al-Maṣṣīṣah for the winter and returned home in the spring,[130] but this practice seems to have been discontinued under the Abbasids and the troops were intended to be permanent settlers.

In addition to the regular troops there were a number of *muṭṭawiʻah* or volunteers from various parts of the Muslim world who came to the frontier regions to serve the cause of Islam. By the fourth/tenth century this had become a highly organised system. The volunteers, who do not seem to have been paid by the government were, put up at houses in Ṭarsūs owned by their province of origin and maintained by *waqfs* specially endowed for the purpose.[131] There were volunteers in the early period but we know very little about their numbers and organization. In al-Maṣṣīṣah they formed a considerable proportion of the garrison[132] and they are also recorded among the settlers of Hārūniyah[133] but no numbers are given. They also took part in the summer campaigns, when they were fed at government expense.

In addition to these volunteers, both Umayyad and Abbasid Caliphs settled numbers of the mysterious people known as Zuṭṭ. This sort of wholesale transfer of minority groups, though fairly common in the Byzantine empire, was very rare in Islam. The Zuṭṭ, of Indian origin, inhabited the marshes of southern Iraq. In Umayyad times some of them, with their buffaloes, had been moved to Antioch.[134] Later, after the Zuṭṭ rebellion of the time of al-Ma'mun, al-Muʻtaṣim moved more of them to the frontier area and settled them in ʻAin Zarbah, were they were subsequently captured by the Byzantines.[135]

Finally there were those of the local inhabitants who remained. In many cases the Muslims removed the people from the areas they conquered, like the fortress of Ṣamālū and settled them in the interior of the empire, in this case at Baghdad.[136] Only in the case of al-Maṣṣīṣah do we find the local people being given a place in the rebuilt town. Here the *furs* (Persians), *ṣaqālibah* (Slavs) and *nabaṭ* (Nabatean, that is non-Arab, Christians) who had lived in a suburb outside the walls since Umayyad times, were transferred to the city by al-Mansūr and given plots of land and help building their houses.[137]

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[126] *al-Balādhurī*, 199.
[127] *Ibid.*, 201.
[128] *Ibid.*, 226.
[129] *Ibid.*, 223.
[130] *Ibid.*, 196.
[131] *Ibn Ḥawqal*, 184; Canard, *art. cit.*, 46—7.
[132] *al-Balādhurī*, 197, 203.
[133] *Ibid.*, 202.
[134] *Ibid.*, 198; Vasiliev, *Byzance et les Arabes*, i, pp. 223—4.
[135] *al-Ṭabarī*, iii, 1168—9.
[136] al-Balādhurī, 202. Cf. F. Hild, M. Restlé, 'Semaluos Kastron', *Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Byzantinistik* 23 (1974), 263—270.
[137] *al-Balādhurī*, 196—7.

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Throughout the period of Muslim occupation, these towns seem to have remained very military in atmosphere. We have full descriptions of Ṭarsūs in the fourth/tenth century which show that, despite the presence of merchants and a certain amount of local industry, warfare was still the main occupation of the inhabitants. Significantly, two-thirds of the people of the city were single men, engaged in military activities and probably transient, while only one-third were heads of families.[138] The picture must have been similar in the smaller and less prosperous towns further to the east; the cities owed their survival to their position on the frontier, and when the Muslim world was too disturbed by internal rivalries to give them military and financial support and the supply of volunteers dried up, they soon fell victim to the agressive Byzantines.

The leaders of Muslim activity on the frontiers included some of the most eminent men in the Caliphate. All the Caliphs between al-Manṣūr and al-Ma'mūn, with the exception of the short-lived al-Hādī and al-Amīn took an interest in the affairs of the frontier provinces. This was especially true of Hārūn al-Rashīd who devoted a great deal of energy and attention to the strengthening of the Muslim position. Then there were other members of the Abbasid family of whom the most important branch by far were the family of Ṣāliḥ b. 'Alī, especially Ṣāliḥ himself and his son 'Abd al-Malik. They had taken over much of the Umayyad property in Syria where they had settled[139] and they had become, in some ways, leaders of the Syrian interest in the Caliphate. Ṣāliḥ played an important role in the rebuilding of Malaṭyah, Mar'ash, al-Maṣṣīṣah and Adhanah, recruiting Syrians to people the cities,[140] and both he and his son appointed local governors in the area.[141]

Apart from members of the ruling family, the most prominent figure on the frontier was the Khurāsānī general al-Ḥasan b. Qaḥṭabā, son of that Qaḥṭabā who had led the Abbasid armies east from Khurasan against the Umayyads. He played an active part in the rebuilding of Malaṭyah, where he fed the workmen at his own expense and encouraged them by carrying stones himself, al-Ḥadath and Ṭarsūs and he was so feared as a raider by the Byzantines that they put his picture in their churches.[142] However, his interest seems to have been due to personal piety and enthusiasm and his example was not followed by other Khurāsānī leaders. An important part was played by local Syrian families, some of whom had been important under the later Umayyads and continued to flourish under their Abbasid successors. Typical of these was the family of Zufar b. 'Āṣim al-Hilālī, powerful in the region of Aleppo, whose members appear both as governors and leaders of raids. Other examples could be adduced to show that the defence of the frontier

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[138] Canard, art. cit., 46—52.
[139] See for Example, al-Balādhurī, 156, 159, 170; and Ibn al-'Adīm, Zubdat al-ḥalab min ta-'rīkh Ḥalab, ed. S. Dahhan (Damascus, 1951), 59, 60, 62, 63.
[140] al-Ṭabarī, iii, 121—2; al-Balādhurī, 197, 199, 223, 225.
[141] For example Jibrīl b. Yaḥyā al-Bajalī in al-Maṣṣīṣah (al-Balādhurī, 197), Maslamah b. Yaḥyā al-Bajalī and Mālik b. Adham al-Bāhilī in Adhanah (ibid., 199), all appointed by Ṣāliḥ. His son 'Abd al-Malik is known to have appointed Yazīd b. Makhlad al-Fazārī and Abū'l-Fawāris in Ṭarsūs (al-Balādhurī, 201), and Muḥammad b. 'Abd Allah al-Anṣārī in Šimšat.
[142] al-Ṭabarī, iii, 353, 493, 495; al-Balādhurī, 200, 203.

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and the raids on the Byzantines were largely conducted by local leaders from Syria and al-Jazīrah except when the Caliph himself decided to take an interest, and outside troops were drafted in in large numbers.[143]

The payment of the troops in these areas was handled in two ways, by paying them salaries and giving them plots of land. Normally during this period, soldiers in the Abbasid armies were paid salaries by the central treasury and this practice was continued in the frontier settlements. Although we are given figures for the amounts paid in some settlements, it is difficult to interpret them satisfactorily. It can definitely be said, however, that the rates of pay were substantially higher than the 80 *dirhams* per month which was usual elsewhere, which suggests that conditions were arduous and there was a need to offer men extra inducements to serve in the area.[144]

In addition to their salaries, these men were often given *qatā'i'* (sing. *qati'ah*). This term is often misleadingly translated as "fief". In reality it was neither a fief in the western sense of the word nor an *iqta'* as it later developed in Islam but a plot of land given in absolute ownership (*milk*).[145] These lands were not *kharāj* lands either which meant that the owners only paid the lower rate of tax, the *'ushr* or tithe. It seems that in most cases these grants were small. In 'Ain Zarbah and al-Ḥadath they were simply dwelling places,[146] while in Tarsūs they only measured 20 × 20 cubitts (approx. 10 × 10 metres),[147] which would only be enough for a house. In Malaṭyah the houses built for troops are described; there were two rooms up, two rooms down and a stable for a *'arāfah* of 10—15 men, hardly palatial.[148] On the other hand the houses in al-Maṣṣīṣah were described as being like inns (khānāt) and this may mean that the sites had commercial possibilities.[149] Apart from this the only case where the *qata'i'* could have been a means of subsistance was in Malaṭyah where in 140/757—8 the garrison were given *mazāri'* (tenant farms) as well as their salaries.[150] In short, the frontier garrisons were paid by the government, like other parts of the army, though at more generous rates, and were not dependent on their small property holdings as a source of income.

This large salary burden coupled with the low yields of taxation in the frontier areas meant that the government had to give the frontier areas financial support. Almost all the land there was *'ushr* land, paying the lower level of tax, and many areas were *ighār*, which meant that tax-collectors could not enter them. In 243/857—8, the Caliph al-Mutawwakil attempted to reduce

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[143] For Zufar b. 'Aṣim al-Hilālī see *al-Ṭabarī*, iii, 373, 378; al-Ya'qūbī, *Ta'rīkh* (ed. M. Houtsma, Leiden, 1883), ii, 404, 430. For another example of a local leader who played a prominent part in expeditions, see Ma'yūf b. Yaḥyā al-Kindī (*al-Ṭabarī*, iii, 371, 385, 568), who also led naval expeditions (*ibid.*, iii, 711).

[144] For details of payment see *al-Balādhurī*, 197, 199, 201, 223, 225, 226.

[145] For the legal status of qati'ah in this period, see A. Ben Shemesh, *Taxation in Islam* (Leiden, 1967—9), ii, pp. 23, 36, 124; and iii, pp. 73—5. *al-Balādhurī* makes it clear (203) that lands in the *thughūr* paid ᶜushr and not *kharāj* up to the reign of al-Mutawwakil. According to Ibn al-'Adīm, the *'ushr* collected in Ṭarsūs was, from the time of al-Ma'mūn on, paid to deserving members of the local population, so none of it can have reached the government (Canard, *art. cit.*, 48).

[146] *al-Balādhurī*, 202, 226.

[147] *Ibid.*, 201.

[148] *Ibid.*, 223.

[149] *Ibid.*, 197.

[150] *Ibid.*, 223.

the deficit by cancelling all these fiscal privileges[151] but this does not seem to have solved the problem; Qudāmah, writing at the beginning of the fourth/tenth century explains how the revenues of the Syrian and Jazīrah frontier areas amounted to barely half the cost of defence and salaries.[152]

The frontier cities had more than a defensive role. They also served as bases for raids into Byzantine territory. Unlike their Umayyad predecessors, the Abbasids made no effort to capture Constantinople or to annexe Byzantine lands. Nonetheless raids, great and small, remained an almost annual feature of frontier life.[153]

There were two sets of raids, the summer (ṣā'ifah) and the winter (sātiyah). Of these the summer was much the most common and I have only found two examples of winter raids recorded during the century which followed the Abbasid Revolution (750—850).[154] It was not only the intense cold of the Anatolian winter which made raiding difficult but the problem of finding fodder which meant that the raiders had to carry supplies both for themselves and for their mounts.[155] Summer raids were launched almost every year except when disturbances in the Muslim world made this impossible; there were none between 125/743 and 137/754—5, during the civil wars of Marwān b. Muḥammad's reign and the period when the Abbasids were establishing their control in the west, and there was another break between the death of Hārūn in 193/809 and the latter years of his son al-Ma'mūn (215/830 onwards). There were other periods when raids itensified and the size of the forces involved increased. Such periods can be seen during the reign of al-Mahdī (158/785), the last years of Hārūn's reign and the end of al-Ma'mūn's. The reigns of al-Mu'taṣim and al-Wāthiq were compartively quiet except for the great attack on Amorion in 223/838. Small scale activity was resumed in the reign of al-Mutawwakil (232/847—247/861) but the Muslims seem to have been more on the defensive.

The raids were launched from the Muslim bases through the Taurus passes. In the early days of the Abbasids, the Darb al-Ḥadath north of Mar'ash seems to have been the most popular but later when the bases in Cilicia, especially Ṭarsūs, were developed, the Cilician Gates became more popular. There was one recorded raid along the Darb Malatyah[156] and one from Qālī-qala.[157] The Muslims made very little attempt to establish bases beyond the Taurus. Towns like Herakleia in 190/806[158] and forts like Lu'lu'ah might be captured and destroyed but they were not settled and held. The only impor-

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[151] *Ibid.*, 203.
[152] *Qudāmah b. Ja'far*, 254—5. These figures are discussed in Vasiliev, *Byzance et les Arabes*, i, 96—7.
[153] The Muslim raids on Byzantine territory have been more fully discussed than other aspects of frontier activity. See E. W. Brooks, 'Byzantines and Arabes in the Time of the Early Abbasids', *English Historical Review* 15 (1900) and for the period from al-Ma'mun on, Vasiliev, *Byzance et les Arabes*, i. For the best and most recent account, see R.-J. Lilie, *Die byzantinische Reaktion* (*op. cit.*, note 3 above).
[154] In 178/794—5 and 231/845—6 (*al-Ṭabarī*, iii, 637, 1365—7). There may, of course, have been others not considered worth recording.
[155] *Qudāmah b. Ja'far*, 256.
[156] *al-Ṭabarī*, iii, 125. This was in 139/756—7.
[157] *Ibid.*, iii, 493. This was in 162/779.
[158] *Ibid.*, iii, 709—710.

tant exception seems to have been al-Ma'mūn's attempt to fortify Tuwānah (Tyana), when large fortifications were constructed, but when al-Mu'tasim came to the throne the next year, he ordered the project to be abandoned and all the works destroyed.[159] In most cases we have no information about the direction of the raids, and it must be assumed that most of them confined their activities to the frontier regions. However, from 159/776 until the end of the reign of Hārūn, there were periods of larger scale incursions; in this year the raiders reached Ankara[160] and later in the reign of al-Mahdī, Dorylaion[161] and, under the leadership of the young Hārūn, as far as the sea of Marmara itself.[162] Then there was another gap until large scale raids began again in 181/797, when there were expeditions to Ankara and the next year to Ephesus.[163] Thereafter the emphasis was again on local incursions, and the Muslims seem to have made a particular effort to reduce the towns and forts immediately to the north of the Cilician Gates, culminating in the sack of Herakleia by the Caliph himself in 190/806. al-Ma'mūn's campaigns in 215— —8/830—3 had the same objective and with the single exception of al-Mu'-tasim's attack on Amorion, expeditions deep into enemy territory ceased. It should be emphasised that deep penetration did not necessarily mean massive destruction. The accounts of the raids to Dorylaion and Ephesus, for example, make no mention of forts or prisoners captured and one must conclude that the invaders avoided centres of population and encounters with enemy forces.

Only rarely do we have any information about the numbers involved in raids and this is usually because they were exceptional. Since the men involved were paid by the government, it is reasonable to suppose that records were kept and we might expect the figures to be fairly accurate. There is nothing improbable about the 30,000 who raided Dorylaion[164] but the 95,793 who are said to have gone as far as the sea of Marmara in 165/781—2[165] seems extravagant while the 135,000 of 190/806[166] is vastly greater than any other army recorded in the Abbasid period. Probably much more typical were two less successful raids we have records of: the 10,000 who left Ṭarsūs in 191 (807)[167] and the 6,000 who joined the winter raid of 231/845—6. It is hard to imagine that numbers normally exceeded 10,000 mounted men and they must often have been much smaller. Only when the Caliph or some other dignitary was involved and outside troops and volunteers drafted in, did numbers reach these very high totals.

A final point needs to be considered in relation to these raids: what was their purpose? The obvious answers do not seem adequate. Conquest was hardly the object since, as we have seen, almost no attempt was made to occupy captured territory. Nor does it seem likely that the desire for booty

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[159] *Ibid.*, iii, 1111—2; *Michael Syr.*, iii, 84.
[160] *al-Ṭabarī*, iii, 459.
[161] *Ibid.*, iii, 493.
[162] *Ibid.*, iii, 503—5.
[163] *Ibid.*, iii, 646—7.
[164] *Ibid.*, iii, 493.
[165] *Ibid.*, iii, 503—5.
[166] *Ibid.*, iii, 709.
[167] *Ibid.*, iii, 712.

was an important motive. The expeditions were expensive to organise and the remote and war-ravaged frontier provinces of the Byzantine empire could not have provided much compensation. True, there were captives and in some cases these could be ransomed or sold as slaves but Muslims too were often taken prisoner and a considerable proportion of the captives were simply exchanged.[168]

The security of the Muslims living in and near the frontier areas was certainly an important concern as Byzantine raids could be destructive of both Muslim property and prestige. Much of the campaigning around the Cilician Gates should probably be seen as attempts to destroy the raiders' bases and establish a new no-man's land. Purely practical considerations of this sort, however, would hardly justify the effort involved in mounting large scale expeditions or the attention paid to the warfare by Muslim historians. Historians, like al-Ṭabarī, for example, often list the leaders of the summer expedition each year along side the leader of the *hajj*, the pilgrimage to Makkah, and this may provide a clue. To an extent, the raids had a ritual function and were important for internal propaganda. The Byzantines were the traditional foes of Islam. Anyone wishing to establish his position as leader of the Muslim community should lead the people into battle against them, either in person or providing a commander who would. al-Manṣūr does not seem to have been greatly concerned with this but his son al-Mahdī personally supervised the organization of expeditions and twice sent his own son Hārūn against the enemy. Hārūn himself was the most active of all the Caliphs in this respect, supervising frontier defence and leading massive campaigns against the enemy. He in turn set his ill-fated son al-Qāsim on one such raid. When al-Ma'mūn felt his position to be secure, he led expeditions and sent his son al-'Abbās on them as well. The clearest example of the propaganda function of these wars is al-Mu'taṣim's celebrated campaign against Amorion, a campaign which yielded little in the way of territory conquered or booty taken.

The smaller raids present a rather different problem. Usually the sources simply say, "In this year So-and-so led the *ṣa'ifah*." No information is given as to the destination of the raid and in most cases the leaders are local figures. Much of this activity was probably no more than stock rustling and there is also a possibility that they were part of a pattern of militarised transhumance. The Arabs, as has been explained, settled mostly in the plains while the Byzantines held the uplands. In many areas in Anatolia, the local people, be they Byzantine or Turkish, have tended to move flocks and herds up from the plains to find the upland, *yayla*, pastures where grazing can still be had when the plains are torrid and desiccated.[169] Even when the people of the plains and mountains are of the same race and religion, tensions inevitably result; when they are as divided as Muslims and Byzantines, conflict was inevitable. Some

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[168] On one occasion the Byzantines are said to have paid quite high tribute (*al-Ṭabarī*, iii, 504) but this expedition of 165 was exceptional.

[169] For transhumance in the mediterranean area in general, see F. Braudel, *The Mediterranean*, trans. S. Reynolds (London, 1972), i, pp. 85—102. For Anatolia, see Xavier de Planhol, *De la plaine pamphylienne aux lacs pisidiens* (Paris, 1958), pp. 186—222. See also *idem*, 'Geography, Politics and Nomadism in Anatolia', *International Social Science Journal* 11/4 (1959), 525—531.

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support for this can be found in the writings of Qudāmah who explains how the Muslims, having fattened their beasts in their own lands in the early summer, then moved up to the lands of the Byzantines where there was still pasture and they could enjoy a second spring.[170] These beasts would have to be protected by armed guards and the whole could be dignified by the title of an expedition against the infidel.

The picture of the Islamic frontier which appears from the patchy source material is of a number of urban settlements in the plains and valleys of south-east Anatolia. These cities, mostly founded or re-founded in the first half-century of Abbasis rule, were garrisoned by salaried troops from Syria, al-Jazīrah and distant Khurāsān. Although the total number of troops settled can hardly have exceeded thirty thousand, they were supplemented by an unknown number of volunteers who played an active role in frontier warfare, especially in the fourth/tenth century. These cities also provided bases for offensive action against Byzantine outposts in the mountainous country to the north. Sometimes this action took the form of massive expeditions organised and led by the Caliphs or the great men of the state. More often, they were led by local men in the pursuit of local objectives. This at least is the picture which emerges from the literary sources.

The most important conclusion to be drawn from this brief survey of Arab and Byzantine frontier regions is that, while it need not be doubted that they were different in character from the better-protected central territories lying behind them, we still know remarkably little about them. The foregoing does not pretend to be an exhaustive survey of all the literary evidence, still less of the archaeological material which might be applied in this context. But it is clear that what is required above all is a detailed archaeological survey of the area, for only this can give us a clearer impression of the front line of both Islamic and Byzantine worlds. No doubt this will remain a desideratum for many years to come,[171] but accurate knowledge of the sites of fortresses and settlements and the ways in which the frontier — however broadly it may be defined in practice — moved to and fro will be indispensable for any serious attempt to analyse the character of these regions.

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[170] *Qudāmah b. Ja'far*, 259.

[171] The first steps have already been taken in the form of the Tabula Imperii Byzantii. For our area, the recent survey by F. Hild of the Cappadocian road system and the topography of the region is the most significant advance of recent years. See note 21 above; and J. Koder, 'Überlegungen zu Konzept und Methode des "Tabula Imperii Byzantii"', *Österreichische Osthefte* 20 (1978), 254—262. See also the comments of Ahrweiler, *La frontière en Orient* (cited in 1 above) 222 f.

POLEMICS AND IMAGES OF THE "OTHER"

7

APOCALYPTIC AND OTHER MATERIALS ON EARLY MUSLIM–BYZANTINE WARS: A REVIEW OF ARABIC SOURCES

Suliman Bashear

Introduction

The standard criteria for using apocalypses as historical sources were established by the late Byzantinist, Paul J. Alexander. Examining the process of literary embellishment and adjustment of a few Syriac and Greek apocalypses, he arrived at the conclusion that historical apocalypses are in fact "prophecies *ex-eventu*", i.e. having actually already materialised around the time of their circulation. The amount of such material, he argued, may serve as a kind of barometer for measuring the eschatological pressure at a given time in history since apocalypses are written to provide comfort in times of tribulation, particularly during grave military crises.[1]

In the field of Islamic studies some attention has been given to the spread in the late seventh and early eighth centuries of Muslim eschatological speculations concerning the occupation of Constantinople.[2] But all in all, exploring the possible use of apocalyptic traditions for the study of early Muslim history is still a novelty, *bid'a*, though certainly a blessed one.[3] For only recently W. Madelung, L. Conrad and M. Cook have set out to study the rich apocalyptic material in the compilation *Kitāb al-Fitan* by Nu'aym b. Ḥammād (d. 227 H.).[4]

Though note has been taken of a few cases where such use proved futile,[5] it has been established that, on the whole, this material is earlier than the Schachtian method of *isnād* criticism could place it, and reflects historical situations which belong to the early Umayyad period.[6] On the level of content, a few aspects of early Byzantine–Muslim

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[1] Paul J. Alexander, "Medieval apocalypses as historical sources", *AHR* 73 (1968), pp. 998–9, 1002, 1008.

[2] E.g. A. A. Vasiliev, "Medieval ideas of the end of the world: east and west", *Byzantion* 16 (1942–3), pp. 471–6 and the works cited therein; cf. also S. P. Brock, "Syriac views of emergent Islam"; in G. A. H. Juynboll ed., *Studies ...* (Carbondale, 1982), p. 19.

[3] L. Conrad notes how Steinschneider, Goldziher, Casanova and Abbott, though they used and discussed "historical" apocalypses in their writings, "seem to have found little of historical merit in them". "Portents of the hour: hadith and history in the first century A.H.", typescript, p. 11 and nn. 48–51 (forthcoming in *Der Islam*).

[4] W. Madelung, "Abd Allah b. al-Zubayr and the Mahdi", *JNES* 40 (1981), pp. 291–306; *idem* "The Sufyani between tradition and history", *SI* 63 (1986), pp. 4–48; *idem*, "Apocalyptic prophecies in Ḥims in the Umayyad age", *JSS* 31 (1986), pp. 141–86; M. Cook, "Eschatology, history and the dating of traditions", typescript; L. Conrad, *art. cit.* and letter to me on 9 May 1989.

[5] As demonstrated by both L. Conrad, p. 22 and M. Cook, pp. 10–25, concerning the belief that the Byzantine final *malḥama* would be led by Tiberius, son of Justinian II.

[6] W. Madelung, "Apocalyptic prophecies...", *art. cit.*, 180; L. Conrad's letter; and even the usually highly sceptical M. Cook in a concluding note, *art. cit.*, pp. 33–4, concerning the applicability of Schacht's method for dating traditions in this field.

relations have been dealt with as they were reflected in this material.[7] But to my knowledge no thorough attempt has been made so far to examine the issue of continuous military campaigns to recapture Syria: an issue which is extensively covered by this kind of material.[8] This is a task which the present paper aims to accomplish. In doing so I shall try to compare the picture arrived at from this material with the sporadic information provided by a few historiographical sources on the military situation of the coastal towns of Palestine, Lebanon and Syria in early Islam and throughout the Umayyad period. The emergence of traditions promoting the merits (*faḍā'il*) of these towns, considering them as watch-posts (*ribāṭāt*) and urging Muslims to defend and settle them, will also be commented upon as these traditions may reflect the seriousness with which early Islam viewed the menace of a Byzantine re-conquest.

Some limitations, however, must be stated at the outset. The primary aim of the present enquiry is to bring to light the overall picture of early Muslim apocalyptic speculations on the impending conflicts with the Byzantines as expressed in the Arabic sources, and not to study the Syriac and Greek materials on this issue or to conduct a thorough cross-examination of Arab and non-Arab sources. Though crucial, this latter task cannot be fully accomplished before the basic work of amassing the Muslim material is done in a way that is equivalent to the work done on its Syriac and Greek counterparts. Hence, only the main outlines of the problems raised by students of this latter field will be addressed in the course of the present enquiry, leaving the detailed comparative investigation for such future studies as it may stimulate.

Truce and treachery

Apocalyptic reference to some future truce (*hudna*) between the Muslims and the Byzantines (often referred to as *Banū al-Aṣfar*) is made in a complex of traditional sayings which were attributed to the Prophet through several companions and which come in divergent textual formulations. One of them is the tradition of "the six portents of the hour" which, as noted by Conrad, occurs in a few sources as heavily associated with the name of the companion 'Awf b. Mālik through a clear Ḥimṣī line of *isnād*, the commonest link of which is Ṣafwān b. 'Amr (d. 155 H.).[9] The main idea conveyed by this tradition is that the Prophet named six portents (*ashrāṭ*) which can be identified as actual historical events from early Islam and which would occur before the approaching end of the world (*al-sā'a* = the hour). With minor variations these portents were mentioned in the following order: the death of the Prophet, the conquest of Jerusalem, the spread of mortality (*mūtān, mawtān*) possibly as a result of a plague, the proliferation of wealth, a general civil war (*fitna*) and, finally, a truce with and betrayal by the Byzantines who

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[7] E.g. Conrad and Cook on the issue of the final Byzantine *malḥama*, noted above; Conrad on a certain Byzantine–Muslim truce referred to in the tradition on the "six portents of the hour"; and a few other related issues brought up in Madelung's review of Ḥimṣī apocalyptic traditions.

[8] Noted only briefly by M. Cook, *art. cit.*, nn. 63, 93, 116.

[9] L. Conrad, *art. cit.*, 11 nn. 53–6 referring to: Nu'aym b. Ḥammād, *K. al-Fitan*, Ms. British Museum, Or. 9449, fols. 7(b)–8(a), 11(a–b); Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ* (Beirut, 1981), 4/68; Ibn Ḥanbal (d. 241 H.), *Musnad* (Cairo, 1313 H.), 2/174, 5/228, 6/22, 25, 27; Ibn 'Asākir, *Tārīkh* (Damascus, 1951), 1/222–4.

would assemble for the final general war.[10] In what follows, a brief review of the variant contents of this tradition, corresponding to the names of its transmitters from 'Awf, will be made. Likewise I shall discuss similar notions attributed to the Prophet by companions such as Mu'ādh, Dhū Mikhmar, 'Abdullāh b. 'Amr, Abū Hurayra, Ḥudhayfa and possibly others too.

As transmitted by 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. Jubayr b. Nufayr (Ḥimṣī, d. 118 H.) from his father, the 'Awf tradition ends with the statement that at the time of the treacherous Byzantine campaign the Muslims/var. their tent of command (*fusṭāṭ*) would be in a town called Damascus in the Ghūṭa area.[11] From Abū Idrīs al-Khawlānī (Syrian, d. 80 H), 'Abd al-Ḥamīd b. 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. Zayd b. al-Khaṭṭāb (Medinese? Kufan? or Jazarī?, d. *c.* 120 H.), Ḍamra b. Ḥabīb (Ḥimṣī, d. 130 H.), 'Abdullāh b. al-Daylam (Jerusalemite, d. *c.* 100 H.), 'Abdullāh b. 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-'Uqaylī, Zayd b. Rufay', Hishām b. Yūsuf (Ḥimṣī successor who moved to Wāsiṭ) Sha'bī (Kufan, d. 103 H.) and Muḥammad b. Abī Muḥammad, we learn that the Byzantine campaign would be massive and composed of eighty banners (*ghāya, ghāba, rāya*) under each of which would be 12,000 men.[12] The versions of Sha'bī, 'Abd al-Ḥamīd and Makḥūl (the last one being reported either from Khālid b. Ma'dān (Ḥimṣī d. 103 H.) ← Jubayr b. Nufayr (d. 75–80 H.) or else directly from 'Awf) say that the Byzantines will prepare for the length of a woman's pregnancy, i.e. nine months.[13] From the versions of 'Abd al-Ḥamīd, Ibn al-Daylam, Abū Idrīs and Sha'bī we learn that the Prophet made this statement to 'Awf while in Tabūk.[14]

An interesting variant occurring only in two early sources was transmitted by Hishām b. Yūsuf and an unnamed figure on the authority of Ṣafwān b. Sulaym (Medinese d. 124–30 H.). It includes the element of conquering "the city of unbelief" (*madīnat al-kufr*), possibly Constantinople, among the six portents tradition of 'Awf.[15] But most unique is a variant reported through the Egyptian line: 'Abdullāh b. Wahb (Egyptian, d. 197 H.) ← 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. Shurayḥ (Alexandrian, d. 167 H.) ← Rabī'a b. Sayf (Alexandrian, d.

[10] Compare also with Nu'aym, 138(b); Ibn Abī Shayba (d. 235 H.), *Muṣannaf*, (Bombay, 1983), 15/104–5; Abū 'Ubayd (d. 224 H.), *Gharīb al-Ḥadīth* (Haydarabad, 1967), 2/85–7; Ibn Māja (d. 275 H.), *Sunan* (Cairo, 1953), 2/134–2, 1371; Ṭabarānī (d. 360 H.), *al-Mu'jam al-Kabīr* (Baghdad, 1984), 18/40–2, 54–5, 64, 66, 79–81; *idem, al-Mu'jam al-Awsaṭ* (Riyad, 1985), 1/67–8; Ibn Manda (d. 395), *Kitāb al-Īmān* (Beirut, 1985), 2/914–16; al-Ḥākim (d. 405 H.), *Mustadrak*, (Beirut, 1986), 4/419, 422–3, 551–2; Bayhaqī (d. 458 H.), *al-Sunan al-Kubrā*, (Haydarabad, 1356 H.), 9/223, 10/248; Wāsiṭī, *Faḍā'il al-Bayt al-Muqaddas*, (Jerusalem, 1979), 52–3; Ibn al-Murajjā, *Faḍā'il Bayt al-Maqdis*, Ms. Tübingen 27, fol. 17 (a–b); Ḍiyā' al-Dīn (d. 643 H.), *Faḍā'il Bayt al-Maqdis* (Beirut, 1985), 70; al-Muttaqī al-Hindī, *Kanz al-'Ummāl*, in the margin of Ibn Ḥanbal, 6/11; Ibn Kathīr (d. 774 H.), *al-Nihāya* (Cairo, 1980), 1/81–4, 86–9; Qurṭubī (d. 671 H.), *Tadhkira* (Cairo, 1986), 2/312–14, quoting *Marj al-Baḥrayn* by Abū al-Khaṭṭāb b. Dubya (d. 633 H.); Suyūṭī (d. 911 H.), *al-Durr al-Manthūr*, (Cairo, 1314 H.), 6/59; Qasṭalānī, *Irshād al-Sārī* (Cairo, 1293), 5/286–7, Ibn Badrān, *Tahdhīb Tarīkh Ibn 'Asākir* (Damascus, 1329 H.), 1/49–50; Ibn 'Abd al-Hādī (d. 744 H.), *Faḍā'il al-Shām* (Cairo, 1988), 27–8; al-Albānī, *Takhrīj Aḥādīth al-Raba'ī* (Beirut, 1403 H.), 61–3; Barazanjī (d. 1103 H.), *al-Ishā'a li-Ashrāṭ al-Sā'a* (Cairo, 1393 H.), 48.
[11] Nu'aym, 7(b)–8(a); Ṭabarānī, *M. K.* 18/42; Ibn 'Asākir, 1/222–4; Ibn Ḥanbal, 6/25; Wāsiṭī, 52–3; Ibn al-Murajjā, 17(a–b); Ibn Kathīr, 1/83. See also Suyūṭī, 6/59; Qurṭubī, 2/321; Ibn 'Abd al-Hādī, 27–8; Ibn Badrān, 1/49; Albānī, 61–3; and compare with Ibn Manda, 2/915–16.
[12] Nu'aym, 11(a–b); Ṭabarānī, 18/40–1, 54–5, 64, 66, 79–81; Ibn 'Asākir, 1/224; Ibn Ḥanbal, 6/22, 27; Bukhārī, 4/68; Abū 'Ubayd, 2/85–7; Ibn Abī Shayba, 15/104; Ibn Māja, 2/1341–2, 1371; al-Ḥākim, 4/419, 422–3; Bayhaqī, 9/223 (but compare with 10/248); Ḍiyā' al-Dīn, 70, al-Muttaqī, 6/11; Ibn Kathīr, 1/82, Qasṭalānī. 5/286–7; Ibn Manda, 2/914; Ibn al-Jawzī (d. 597 H.), *Gharīb al-Ḥadīth*, Beirut 1985, 2/171.
[13] Nu'aym, 8(a); Ṭabarānī, 18/41–2, 54–5; al-Ḥākim, 4/422; but compare with Ibn Manda, 2/914–15.
[14] Ṭabarānī, 18/54–5, 66; Ibn Māja, 2/1341–2, al-Ḥākim, 4/419, 422–3; Bayhaqī, 9/223; Ibn Kathīr, 1/82.
[15] Nu'aym, 8(a); Ibn Abī Shayba, 15/104.

c. 120 H.) ← Ishāq b. 'Abdullāh. We also notice that the same was attributed to the Prophet by the chain: Makhūl ← Ḥudhayfa, i.e. not through 'Awf. The main idea in both cases is that 'Awf/Ḥudhayfa came to the Prophet after the latter had achieved a conquest (*fī fatḥin lahu*), congratulated him and expressed his hope that war had ended. To this the Prophet said that war would not end until six things had happened and proceeded actually to name the same elements usually occurring in the six portents tradition. The fifth of these, we are told, would commence when a Byzantine prince was born whose daily growth would be like the yearly growth of an ordinary boy. When he reached the age of twelve the Byzantines would crown him king. Then he would incite them to a war of re-conquest, order the manufacture of warships in the islands and on the mainland and transport in these warriors who would land between Antioch and al-'Arīsh (...*fa-ba'atha fī al-jazā'ir wa-l-barriyya bi-ṣan'at al-sufun thumma ḥamala fīhā al-muqātila ḥattā yanzil bayna anṭākya wa-l-'arīsh*).[16] At this stage 'Awf's tradition brings the following addition by Ibn Shurayḥ: "I heard somebody saying that there would be 12 banners under each of which would be 12,000 men. The Muslims would assemble under their leader in Jerusalem and consent to his opinion to move to the city of the Prophet (Ṣ) (= Medina) so that their garrisons (*maṣāliḥuhum*) would be at the Sarḥ and Khaybar. Said Ibn Abī Ja'far: the Prophet (Ṣ) said: They would drive my community to the birth places of wormwood (*manābit al-shīḥ*)". We are also told that one third of the Muslims would be killed and another third would flee while the remainder would be victorious. They would drive the Byzantines as far as Constantinople and even conquer it when hearing that the false messiah (*al-dajjāl*) had appeared, and that would be the sixth portent. From Ḥudhayfa's tradition we also learn that the Byzantines would have 300 ships besides the 80 banners. After the Muslims had regrouped in Medina and received reinforcement from the Arabs, Yemen and the Bedouins (var. also from Syria), they would set out to meet the Byzantines. The latter would request the return of the non-Arabs, but the *mawālī* would refuse to join them and, finally, the war would be fought and won by the Muslims.

Two sources which preserve 'Awf's tradition point to the fact that a similar one was transmitted from Abū Hurayra by a Medinese line the main link in the chain of which was Sa'īd al-Miqbarī (d. 117–26 H.). The only apparent difference between the two traditions is that the Abū Hurayra one speaks about "the construction of Jerusalem", being the second portent, instead of its conquest.[17]

Another similar tradition was reported through Mu'ādh b. Jabal with the *isnād*: Wakī' (d. 197 H.) ← Nahhās b. Qahm (Basran, d. ?) ← Shaddād Abū 'Ammār (Damascene *mawlā* of Mu'āwiya, d. ?). Without speaking about a truce with the Byzantines, it nevertheless reiterates the same six portents of 'Awf and mentions the Byzantines' treachery/invasion (*ghadr/ghazw*) under 12 or 80 banners (using the term *band* instead of *ghāya*).[18]

The elements of truce with and treacherous preparations by the Byzantines for nine months are stated in a tradition of 'Abdullāh b. 'Amr b. al-'Āṣ as the fifth portent, the sixth

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[16] Compare: Nu'aym, 117(a) – 118(a); al-Ḥākim, 4/551–2; Qurṭubī, 2/318 quoting *al-Irshād* by Ibn Burjān.

[17] Al-Ḥākim, 4/419; Bayhaqī, 9/223.

[18] Ibn Abī Shayba, 15/104–5; Ibn Ḥanbal, 5/228; Ṭabarānī, 20/122, 173; Daylamī (d. 509 H.), *al-Firdaws* (Beirut, 1986), 2/237; Diyā' al-Dīn, 70–1; Ibn Kathīr, 1/84–7, Haythamī (d. 807 H.), *Majma' al-Zawā'id* (Cairo and Beirut, 1987), 7/322; Suyūṭī, *al Durr, op. cit.*, 6/59; *idem, al-Jāmi' al-Kabīr* (Cairo, 1978), 1/542.

being the conquest of Constantinople. It was transmitted by Abū Jannāb al-Kalbī (d. 150 H.) ← his father, Abū Ḥayya ← Ibn 'Amr ← the Prophet.[19] According to another tradition transmitted by Abū Firās, *mawlā* of Ibn'Amr, on the authority of Abū Qabīl (Ḥuyayy b. Hāni', Egyptian d. 128 H.), Ibn'Amr is quoted as saying: "you will invade Constantinople three times. In the first one you will face affliction and hardship (*balā' wa-shidda*). In the second there will be a peace pact (*ṣulḥ*) between you and them so that the Muslims will build mosques in it, join them in a raid beyond Constantinople and return to it; and in the third invasion God will open it for you..."[20]

Another group of traditions brings the notion of truce, co-operation, and then treachery by the Byzantines, but outside the context of the six portents. Abū Qabīl is said to have transmitted a tradition from several companions ('*an ghayr wāḥid min aṣḥāb al-rasūl...*) according to which the Prophet said: "there will be a truce between the Muslims and the Byzantines. The Muslims will send an army to Constantinople to help them. An enemy will attack from behind and both Muslims and Byzantines will fight him together. God will give victory and they will defeat and kill the enemy. Then a Byzantine will say 'the cross has won' while a Muslim will say 'God has won'." The tradition goes on to describe how in the heat of debate the Muslim will kill the Byzantine. Returning to Constantinople, the Byzantines will violate the pact and commit a treacherous killing of Muslims there. But knowing that the latter will seek revenge, they will set out for an invasion under 80 banners, etc.[21]

With minor variations, the same tradition was attributed to the Prophet through the companion Dhū Mikhmar (sometimes stated as Dhū Mikhbar), nephew of al-Najāshī. According to one variant, transmitted from him by Khālid b. Ma'dān ← Jubayr b. Nufayr, the struggle over the role of the cross and its breaking by a Muslim would occur after the joint campaigners had encamped in "a plain with ruins" (*marj dhū tulūl*). Then, we are told, the Byzantines would treacherously kill the Muslim group and prepare for the *malḥama*.[22] Note, however, that the place of the joint campaign is not always specified and sometimes is even said to be from behind the Muslims (*min warā'ikum*) rather than the Byzantines (*min warā'ihim*). Note also that the statement "80 banners, under each banner 12,000 men" is dropped from a few sources.

Another variant of this tradition was transmitted by Yaḥyā b. Abī'Amr al-Saybānī (a Ḥimṣī who took part in the campaign against Constantinople under Maslama, d. 148 H.). It says that the pact would initially be meant to last ten years. The Byzantines, however, would soon breach it and prepare the *malḥama* for nine months.[23] Ṭabarānī mentions other successors who transmitted this tradition from Dhū Mikhmar but no variant details are

[19] Ibn Ḥanbal, 2/174, Ibn Kathīr, 1/81-2; Suyūṭī, *Durr* 6/59 and *J. K.* 1/542; Haythamī, 7/321-2.

[20] Nu'aym, 120(a); 131(a), 134(a-b); cf. also al-Muttaqī, 6/21.

[21] Nu'aym, 130(a-b).

[22] Compare: Nu'aym, 120(a); Ibn Abī Shayba, 5/325-6; Ibn Ḥanbal, 4/91, 5/371-2, 409; Abū Dawūd (d. 275 H.), *Sunan* (Beirut, n.d.), 4/109-10; Ibn Māja, 2/1369; Ṭabarānī, 4/235-6; al-Ḥākim, 4/421; Bayhaqī, 9/223-4; Suyūṭī, *Durr* 6/60 and *J. K.* 1/543 quoting also Ibn Ḥibbān, Baghawī, Bārūdī, Ibn Qāni' and al-Ḍiyā'; Qurṭubī, 2/313-14; Ibn Kathīr, 1/86; al-Muttaqī, 6/11; Haythamī, *Mawārid al-Ẓam'ān* (Medina n.d.), 463. See also Barazanjī, 99, where a similar notion was introduced without being attributed to Dhū Mikhmar.

[23] Nu'aym, 136(b); Ṭabarānī, 4/236.

given. They are 'Abdullāh b. Muḥayrīz (a Meccan who settled in Jerusalem, d. 96–9 H.), Rāshid b. Sa'd (Ḥimṣī d. 108 H.) and Yazīd b. Sulayḥ (Ḥimṣī d. ?).[24]

A similar tradition was reported by Khālid b. Ma'dān from the companion 'Abdullāh b. Busr (Ḥimṣī, d. 88 H.) without attributing it to the Prophet. It does not provide sufficient details and was introduced only in the context of Khālid's enquiry about the conquest of Constantinople.[25]

New elements can be found in a tradition attributed to the Prophet by the chain: Abū al-Zāhiriyya (Ḥudayr b. Kurayb, Ḥimṣī d. 129 H.) ← Ḥudhayfa b. al-Yamān. According to this the Byzantines would treacherously break the truce within nine months. They would attack the Muslims under 80 banners on sea and land, camp between Jaffa and Acre and burn their ships allowing no retreat. We also learn that the Muslims would have reinforcements from as far as Ḥaḍramawt of the Yemen.[26]

In another tradition of Ḥudhayfa as well as one of Abū Umāma al-Bāhilī, truce and war with the Byzantines are introduced in the context of other pre-messianic events and the identities of both the Mahdī and the one who would lead the Byzantines in their *malḥama*. One clearly feels the moulding of elements from different currents; e.g. the number of truces, characteristics of the Mahdī, his being a descendant of the Prophet, etc. We also notice that each of the two traditions occurs in only one source and does not enjoy a wide circulation.[27] However, the tradition of Ḥudhayfa in particular contains a few of the elements already known from those of the other companions, reviewed above: the Muslim breaking of the cross, the treacherous Byzantine violation of peace, their secret preparation for war and the invasion of Antioch with 12 banners under each of which would be 12,000 men. We also learn that the Muslims of the east would fail to give support to Damascus which would be overrun by the Byzantines for forty days. Four Arab tribes would apostatise, join the Byzantines and profess Christianity; but, eventually, the Muslims under the Mahdī would be victorious just before hearing that the *dajjāl* had appeared.

A number of traditions brought by Nu'aym were mostly associated with the name of Ka'b or even early to mid-second-century figures. They are interesting because they contain most of the elements known from the prophetical traditions reviewed so far. Two traditions of Arṭāt b. al-Mundhir (Ḥimṣī, d. 162–3 H.), from Abū 'Āmir al-Ilhānī (Damascene, d. 118–21 H.) and Abū al-Zāhiriyya, speak about the besieging of Ḥimṣ, the Byzantine attack on Anṭarsūs (Tortosa), their landing between Jaffa and al-Aqra' river, their defeat by the Muslims, the latter's advancing to besiege Constantinople and the Byzantines' request for peace. At this stage Arṭāt brings a tradition of Ka'b which speaks about a pact of truce and co-operation between the two parties for ten years during which they conduct two joint operations; one beyond Constantinople and the other against Kūfa which would be "flattened like a leather skin" (*tu'rak 'ark al-adīm*). The split over the

[24] Ṭabarānī, 4/235–7.
[25] Nu'aym, 140(b).
[26] Nu'aym, 141(a).
[27] Ṭabarānī, 8/120 and cf. Haythamī, 7/318–19 for Abū Umāma's tradition. The Ḥudhayfa one is recorded by Qurṭubī, 2/315–17.

statement "the cross had won" and the Muslims' breaking of the pact would occur following a third campaign, against the east, when the Muslims would refuse to give the Byzantines their booty share of women and children. The Byzantines' first *malḥama* would then commence with Ḥimṣ as one of their main targets. Its inhabitants would flee to Damascus with thousands of women, old people and children being killed between Ḥimṣ and Thanyat al-'Iqāb. A few Arab tribes would join the Byzantines *en bloc* but the *mawālī* would refuse to do that. Eventually the Muslims would win and Constantinople would be conquered just before the news arrived that the *dajjāl* had appeared.[28]

Another tradition of Ka'b was circulated by al-Ḥakam b. Nāfi' (Ḥimṣī, d. 221 H.) but without specifying the latter's source (*'amman ḥaddathahu*). It says that "the Byzantines would bring into Jerusalem seventy crosses (*sab'ūna ṣalīban*, the number of banners possibly denoting military units, S.B.) and would destroy it". We also learn that they would rule Syria for forty days from the coastline as far as the river Jordan and Baysān. The first coastlands upon which God's rage would descend would be al-Ṣārifiyya, Qīsarya and Beirut which would be swallowed up. The tradition ends by prophesying the eventual triumph of the Muslims and the conclusion of peace with the Byzantines. The reason given for the latters' *malḥama* is again a joint campaign against Kūfa. The Byzantines would provide 10,000 men who would fight on the side of the people of Syria (*ahl al-shām*) on the Euphrates. The reason for this campaign is a rebellion by the people of Iraq and the killing of their Syrian governor (*yakhla' ahl al-'irāq al-ṭā'a wa-yaqtulūna amīrahum min ahl al-shām fa-yaghzūhum ahl al-shām wa-yastamiddūna 'alayhim al-rūm...*). Then come the elements of refusal to grant a share of the booty: the saying: "you have defeated them by the cross" (*innamā ghalabtumūhum bi-l-ṣalīb*), the Muslims' breaking of the pact, the Byzantines' killing of Muslims in Constantinople, their attack on Ḥimṣ, etc.[29]

Arṭāt circulated a similar tradition attributed to Ka'b's step-son, Tubay' (Ḥimṣī, d. in Alexandria, 101 H.) through Ḥakīm b. 'Umayr (Ḥimṣī d. ?). It says that during the peace between the Byzantines and the Muslims, Caesarea Cappadocia would be built and "Kūfa would be flattened like a leather skin". After the battle, both parties would encamp in "a plain with ruins". A spokesman of the Christians would say "you have won by our cross", the Muslims would refuse to grant a share of the booty and the Byzantines would prepare for the *malḥama*.[30]

The destruction of Kūfa is indeed mentioned in another tradition of Ka'b as part of a sequence of pre-messianic events but outside the context of peace and co-operation with the Byzantines. Its *isnād* is: Ṣafwān b. 'Amr ← 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. Jubayr b. Nufayr ← Ka'b. It says "... the *malḥama* would not commence until Kūfa is destroyed; the city of *kufr* (i.e. Constantinople, S.B.) would not be conquered until the *malḥama* has commenced; the *dajjāl* would not come out until the city of *kufr* is conquered".[31]

There is a tradition by an early second-century Ḥimṣī successor, Yūnus b. Sayf

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[28] Nu'aym, 127(a–b).
[29] Nu'aym, 122(b)–123(a).
[30] Nu'aym, 119(b)–120(a). Note, however, that in fol. 135(b) part of this tradition was attributed through Tubay' to Ka'b.
[31] Al-Ḥākim, 4/463.

al-Khawlānī (d. 120 H.) which also speaks about a *ṣulḥ* and a joint campaign. However, the target here is not Kūfa but the Turks and Kirmān. Still, the two parties would split and fight in "a plain with ruins" because of the Byzantines' saying: "the cross had won".[32]

One also learns about a joint campaign against "the Persians" in a tradition attributed to the Prophet by the companion 'Abdullāh b. Mas'ūd. It has the elements of refusal to share the booty of Muslim women and children, a massive invasion originating from Rome under 80 banners etc., the landing on the coasts of Syria and the burning of ships, the occupation of the whole country except Damascus and a mountain on the river Orontes near Ḥimṣ called al-Mu'attaq, the destruction of Jerusalem and the joining of the king of Constantinople by sending 600,000 men to Qinnasrīn. We also learn that the *mawālī* and freedmen of the Arabs (*'atāqatukum*) would come as reinforcements from Persia. Another source of support would be 80 thousand from Yemen (*māddat al-yaman*) including 40 thousand from Ḥimyar. They would drive the Byzantines from Jerusalem all the way to the 'Amq (possibly of Antioch). However, one-third of the Muslims would join the Byzantines and another third would return to bedouin life. Seeing that only one-third remained, the Byzantines would claim that "the cross had won". But, eventually, the Muslims would triumph, driving them to Constantinople, just before receiving news that the *dajjāl* had appeared, etc.[33]

Finally, a tradition which bears no authority beyond Arṭāt speaks about a Byzantine naval attack between Tyre and Acre as part of the pre-messianic events. After the Mahdī had killed the Sufyānī and plundered Banū Kalb, he would make peace with "the tyrant of the Byzantines". His successor would be killed shortly before the Byzantines landed between Tyre and Acre; and that would be the beginning of *malāḥim*.[34]

The *malāḥim* over Syria: courses and consequences

Arabic lexicographies define "*malḥama*" as a term denoting a general, fierce war with much killing and many atrocities.[35] In Muslim eschatology the *malāḥim* are presented as the final wars of trial, being part of the pre-messianic events towards the end of the world.[36] As such, the *malāḥim* were mostly connected with the wars against Byzantium. This connection is so exclusive that "*malāḥim*" became in *ḥadīth* compilations almost synonymous with these wars. In what follows an elaboration of this point will be made. We shall also review more traditions which describe the nature and course of these wars in different parts of Syria. Though such description is given outside the context of the Muslim–Byzantine truce, we shall see how it often includes the basic elements noted in the previous section.

[32] Nu'aym, 136(b).

[33] Nu'aym, 115(b)–117(a). See also al-Ḥā'irī, *Ilzām al-Nāṣib* (Beirut, 1984), 282. More on the *malḥama* of the 'Amq, below. For its identification as "a district near Dābiq, between Ḥalab and Anṭākya" see Yāqūt (d. 626 H.), *Mu'jam al-Buldān* (Beirut, 1955), 1/222.

[34] Nu'aym, 141(b)–142(a).

[35] Al-Khalīl b. Aḥmad al-Farāhīdī (d. 175 H.), *Kitāb al-'Ayn* (Baghdad, 1981), 3/245; Ibn Durayd (d. 321 H.), *Jamhara* (Haydarabad, 1345 H.), 2/190; Azharī (d. 370 H.), *Tahdhīb* (Cairo, 1964–7), 5/104; Ibn Fāris (d. 395 H.), *Mu'jam*, (Cairo, 1369 H.), 5/238; Ibn Sīda (d. 458 H.), *al-Muḥkam* (Cairo, 1958), 3/283; Jawharī, *Tāj* (Cairo, 1282 H.), 2/332; Fayrūzabādī, *al-Qāmūs al-Muḥīṭ* (Cairo, 1935), 4/174.

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A tradition of Ibn Mas'ūd describes how he insisted that the final wars with the Byzantines over Syria would be the one major occurrence preceding "the hour". This was transmitted from him by the chain Abū Qatāda ← Yusayr b. Jābir (Kūfan, d. 85 H.) on the authority of Ḥumayd b. Hilāl (Baṣran, d. c. 120 H.). It says that Ibn Mas'ūd, while in Kūfa, witnessed a red storm which was believed to have been a sign that the hour had come. To such speculation he reacted angrily, assuring his listener that the hour would not commence until the Byzantines mounted a campaign against the Muslims from the direction of Syria. Fighting would be fierce, killing widespread and a sharp *ridda* (apostasy) would then prevail; but the Muslims would eventually conquer Constantinople just before hearing that the *dajjāl* had appeared in their rear, etc.[37]

Another tradition was attributed to the Prophet by the chain: Jābir b. Samura (Kūfan, d. 74–6 H.) ← Nāfi' b. 'Utba. It puts the conquest of Byzantium as the last in a chain of Muslim victories prior to the appearance of *dajjāl* (the others being in the Arabian peninsula and over the Persians).[38] In another prophetical tradition whose *isnād* leads to Mu'ādh, the occurrence of *malḥama* and the conquest of Constantinople were specified as the last major events preceding the appearance of *dajjāl*; the other ones being the construction of Jerusalem and the decay of Medina.[39] To Mu'ādh was attributed also the tradition which says: "the great *malḥama*, the conquest of Constantinople and the appearance of the *dajjāl* (will be) in seven months".[40] However, through 'Abdullāh b. Busr a different agenda was attributed to the Prophet; namely, that six years would elapse between the *malḥama* and the conquest of Constantinople and, in the seventh, the *dajjāl* would appear.[41]

To the Muslim belief in the eventual conquest of Constantinople as the consummation of *malāḥim* against the Byzantines I shall return later. However, it should be noted at this stage that although Byzantium figures as the main enemy of Islam, our apocalyptic

[36] J. Wansbrough, *Quranic Studies* (Oxford, 1977), pp. 4–5 and compare with I. Goldziher, *Muslim Studies* (Eng. tr., London, 1971), p. 77, n. 2; *E. I.*, new ed., s.v. "Djafr" and *Suppl.*, s.v. "Malḥama".

[37] Ṭayālisī (d. 204 H.), *Musnad* (Beirut, 1406 H.), 51–2; 'Abd al-Razzāq (d. 211 H.), *Muṣannaf* (Beirut, 1983), 11/385–7; Ibn Abī Shayba, 15/139–9; Ibn Ḥanbal, *Musnad* 1/384–5, 435; *idem, 'Ilal* (Beirut and Riyad, 1988), 1/382; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ* (Beirut, n.d.), 8/177–8; Abū Ya'lā (d. 307 H.), *Musnad*, (Damascus, 1987), 9/163–5, 259–60; al-Ḥākim, 4/476–7; Qurṭubī 2/314–15, quoting *Marj al-Baḥrayn* by Abū al-Khaṭṭāb b. Duḥya; Ibn Kathīr, 1/87–8; Ibn Ḥajar (d. 852 H.), *al Wuqūf* (Cairo, 1988), p. 87.

[38] Al-Fazārī (d. 186 H.), *K. al-Siyar* (Beirut, 1987), p. 303; Ibn Abī Shayba, 15/146–7; Ibn Ḥanbal, *Musnad* 1/178, 4/337–8; Muslim, 8/178; Ibn Māja, 2/1370; Ṭaḥāwī (d. 321 H.), *Mushkil al-Āthār* (Haydarabad, 1333 H.), 1/216–17; al-Ḥākim, 4/426; Abū Nu'aym (d. 430), *Ḥilya* (Cairo, 1938), 8/256; Daylamī, 2/323; Ibn Kathīr, 1/91; Ibn Ḥajar, *Tahdhīb* (Haydarabad, 1327 H.), 10/408. Compare also with Sakhāwī, *al-Qanā'a* (Cairo, 1987), p. 83.

[39] Ibn Abī Shayba, 15/40–1, 135–6; Ibn Ḥanbal, 5/232, 245; Abū Dawūd, 4/110; Bukhārī, *al-Tārīkh al-Kabīr* (Haydarabad, 1954), 5/193; Ṭaḥāwī, 1/217; Ṭabarānī, 20/108; al-Ḥākim, 4/420–1; Dhahabī, *Talkhīṣ* in the margin of al-Ḥākim, *ibid.*; Wāsiṭī, 54; Ibn al-Murajjā, 76(b); Daylamī, 3/50; al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī (d. 463 H.), *Tārīkh Baghdād* (Beirut, n.d.), 10/223; Diyā' al-Dīn, 71; Qurṭubī, 2/312; Ibn Kathīr, 1/93–4; Suyūṭī, *Durr* 6/60; Sakhāwī, 83.

[40] Compare Nu'aym, 139(a); Ibn Abī Shayba, 15/40; Abū Dawūd, 4/110; Ibn Māja, 2/1370; Tirmidhī, *Ṣaḥīḥ* (Cairo, 1934), 9/90; Ṭabarānī, 20/91; al-Ḥākim, 4/426; Daylamī, 4/231, Qurṭubī, 2/314; Ibn Kathīr, 1/96; Suyūṭī, *Durr*, 6/60; al-Muttaqī, 6/12; Barazanjī, 105; Ibn Ṭawūs (d. 664 H.), *al-Malāḥim wa-l-Fitan*, (Najaf, 1963), 124, quoting *K. al-Fitan* by Abū Ṣāliḥ al-Sulaylī (written in 307 H.). I am indebted to M. J. Kister for this last source.

[41] Abū Dawūd, 4/111; Ibn Māja, 2/1370; Qurṭubī, 2/134; Ibn Kathīr, 1/97; Sakhāwī, p. 83; Suyūṭī, *Durr*, 6/59. Compare also with Nu'aym, 130(a).

material leaves no doubt that the struggle over Syria would be an all-out one with the whole Christian world.

This general nature of the *malāḥim*, at least in their initial stages, is strongly conveyed by a series of traditions. According to one, the Prophet is reported as warning Thawbān, his *mawlā*, that peoples were about to flock together against the Muslims like hungry eaters converging on a bowl. From Thawbān, this tradition was transmitted by 'Amr b. 'Ubayd, Abū Asmā' al-Raḥabī, Abū Hurayra and Abū 'Abd al-Salām (possibly Ṣāliḥ b. Rustum).[42]

Another prophetical tradition, circulated with an *isnād* leading to Ka'b, says that 12 kings will take part in the *malḥama*, the Byzantine king being only the smallest.[43] In the words of Yaḥyā b. Abī 'Amr al-Saybānī: "12 kings will gather under the sycamore trees of Jaffa, the smallest of them being the Byzantine one".[44] Another tradition of Ka'b, circulated by the same Yaḥyā from Jubayr b. Nufayr, describes how "a queen/woman from the west" (*malika/ama bi-l-maghrib*) would convert to Christianity and, without getting any Byzantine support, would come with 350 warships and land at Acre.[45]

There is of course the possibility of some confusion between Constantinople and Rome whenever the term "*rūmya*" occurs. However, in two of our traditions, by Ḍamra b. Ḥabīb and Abū al-Ẓāhiriyya, Rome is probably what is meant. For they speak about 10,000 boats from Rūmya and Rūmānya which will land between Jaffa and Acre.[46] Moreover, a tradition of Ka'b, circulated by al-Ḥakam b. Nāfi' from an unnamed source (*'amman ḥaddathahu*), says that the Byzantines would ask for reinforcements from the peoples of Rome, Constantinople and Armenia, and hence ten kings would come with 180,000 men.[47]

Another tradition of Ka'b was transmitted by 'Āmir b. 'Abdullāh, Abū al-Yamān al-Hawzī. It speaks about "a king from the west called Ḥaml al-Ḍa'n" who would land with 1,000 boats between Acre and the flow of the Orontes, river of Ḥimṣ.[48] From a tradition of 'Abdullāh b. 'Amr we learn that this king would land either between Acre and Tyre or in a district called al-'Amīq.[49] Arṭāt transmitted a tradition of Abū 'Āmir al-Ilhānī which speaks about "the head of camel/lamb" (*ra's al-jamal/al ḥaml*) who would bring from al-Andalus 1,000 boats which would land between Jaffa and al-Aqra' river.[50] In another tradition of Arṭāt it is explicitly said that the Byzantines would receive support from people behind them, namely from al-Andalus.[51]

Though Acre and Tyre figure as the principal targets for naval invasions, there are a few traditions which mention other coastal towns. Two other traditions (one ending with the name of Arṭāt and another by Abū Salama (b. 'Abd al-Raḥmān?) ← Ibn 'Amr) speak about the coastal area between al-'Arīsh and Acre or even specify the conquest of ten miles of the Jaffa coast and warn that the people of this city would take refuge in the inland mountains.[52]

[42] Ṭayālisī, 133; Ibn Ḥanbal, 5/278; Abū Dāwūd, 4/111; Ṭabarānī, 2/102–3; Abū Nu'aym, 1/182; Daylamī, 5/527; Ibn Ṭāwūs, 129, 166–7; Qurṭubī, 2/315; Haythamī, 7/287; Ibn Ḥajar, *Tahdhīb* 8/75.

[43] Nu'aym, 133(b).   [44] Nu'aym, 126(b).
[45] Compare: Nu'aym, 125(b)–126(a), 140(a–b); Hā'irī, 292.   [46] Nu'aym, 136(a–b).
[47] Nu'aym, 123(b)–124(a).   [48] Nu'aym, 130(a).
[49] Compare: Haythamī, *Kashf al-Astār* (Beirut, 1979), 4/134 and al-Muttaqī, 6/26 with 'Abd al-Razzāq, 11/388.   [50] Nu'aym, 126(b)–127(a).
[51] Nu'aym, 122(b).   [52] Nu'aym, 122(a–b), 132(a–b).

Other coastal towns and posts are occasionally mentioned by a few traditions. Yazīd b. Khumayr (Ḥimṣī, d. during Muʿāwiya's reign?) transmitted a tradition of Kaʿb which describes the closure by the Christians of Ḥimṣ of the gates of that city when the Muslims were called upon (*yustanfarūn*) to meet a naval landing on the coast nearby.[53] Ṣafwān b. ʿAmr circulated a tradition from unnamed sources (*ʿan baʿḍ mashāʾikhihi*) specifying a coastal location called Sūsya where the Byzantines would land and burn their ships. This, the tradition says, would occur simultaneously with a mainland invasion on Qinnasrīn while the Muslims' stronghold would be Damascus.[54] Abū Qabīl transmitted from the companion Yazīd b. Ziyād al-Aslamī a tradition which says that Ibn Mūrīq (Maurice?) "King of the Byzantines" would command 300 ships landing in Sirāsya.[55] Khālid b. Maʿdān prophesised that the Byzantines would enter Anṭarsūs (Tortosa) and there kill 300 Muslims.[56]

Though a threat to Egypt was expected to emanate from both North Africa and the sea,[57] I shall limit myself here to prophecies which connect such a threat with the one feared for Syria. Especially noteworthy are two traditions, by Ibn ʿAmr and Abū Dharr ← the Prophet. They warn that an Umayyad/var. from the sons of tyrants, governor of Egypt, after being dismissed, would flee to the Byzantines and bring them to the people of Islam.[58] Another tradition of Ibn ʿAmr says that the sign of Alexandria's battle (*waqʿat al-iskandariyya*) would be the flight of two Arab *dihqāns* to the Byzantines.[59]

A clear connection is sometimes made between the *malāḥim* of Egypt and the general picture drawn for the main arena in Syria. Noteworthy is a tradition of Arṭāt which says that the first naval attack by the Byzantines would be aimed at Alexandria. The Egyptians would ask for help from the Syrians and the latter would come, expel the Byzantines and rule Egypt. Then, the tradition goes on, the Byzantines would organise naval attacks against Jaffa, Acre and finally the ʿAmq of Antioch.[60]

There is of course some divergence concerning the number of *malāḥim* in Syria, their duration and the time which elapses between them. Makḥūl considered the *malāḥim* to be ten in number, the first being that of Qīsārya in Palestine and the last being that of the ʿAmq of Antioch.[61] Tubayʿ says that three years after the entry of the Byzantines into Anṭarsūs "the head of the camel" (*raʾs al-jamal*) would come out between Jaffa and al-Aqraʿ river.[62]

All in all, the picture drawn by this material for Syria is gloomy and one of major disarray. Uthmān b. ʿAṭāʾ transmitted from ʿAbd al-Wāḥid b. Qays al-Dimashqī the saying that during the *malāḥim*, the Byzantines would camp on every water spring on the coast.[63] According to a tradition of Kaʿb, the coastal areas of Syria would be destroyed and towns and villages would weep because of that destruction.[64]

Without doubt, the balance of power would be favourable to the Byzantines during the

[53] Nuʿaym, 141(a–b).
[55] Nuʿaym, 139(a).
[57] Compare Nuʿaym's 131(a–b), 143(b) and 144(a)–145(a).
[56] Nuʿaym, 132(b)–133(a), 134(b)–135(a), 137(a); Haythamī, 7/318 quoting Ṭabarānī's *Awsaṭ*.
[59] Nuʿaym, 144(a–b).
[60] Compare: Nuʿaym, 122(a–b), 139(b), 144(a).
[61] Nuʿaym, 139(a–b).
[63] Nuʿaym, 139(a).

[54] Nuʿaym, 125(b).
[56] Nuʿaym, 140(b).
[62] Nuʿaym, 125(a).
[64] Nuʿaym, 139(b).

initial stages of the *malāḥim*. Especially difficult would be the situation created by the invasion, or rather invasions, landing in Acre. The picture repeated in almost all of the relevant traditions is that the Byzantines would burn their ships there as a sign of no retreat.[65] In the words of Abū Hurayra, transmitted by Abū Ṣāliḥ al-Ghifārī: "the necks of camels in Ḥismā (in the land of) Judhām, would shine at night because of their fire".[66]

Several traditions say explicitly that the Byzantines would initially oust the Muslims from many parts of Syria. Awzā'ī (d. 157 H.) quotes Ḥassān b. 'Aṭiyya as saying: "during the smaller *malḥama* (*al-ṣughrā*) the Byzantines will dominate the Jordan plain and Jerusalem".[67] In another tradition bearing the same *isnād*, it is said that the Byzantines would camp at the plain of Acre and conquer Palestine, inner Jordan (*baṭn al-urdunn*) and Jerusalem, but would not cross the mountain pass of Afīq ('*aqabat afīq*). Eventually, however, the Muslims would meet and defeat them on the plain of Acre. Only a small group would move to Mount Lebanon and from there to the land of the Byzantines (*arḍ al-rūm*).[68]

A tradition transmitted from Ka'b by Jubayr b. Nufayr agrees with that of Awzā'ī, adding that the *imām* of the Muslims would then be in Jerusalem and, failing to rally the support of Egypt and Iraq, he would fight the battle on his own, drive the Byzantines to Lebanon, etc.[69] However, another tradition of Ka'b, transmitted this time on the authority of Yaḥyā b. Abī 'Amr al-Saybānī, says explicitly that the Muslims would initially be defeated on the hill of Acre (*tall 'akkā'*) and the one-third of them who survived would retreat to Jerusalem. But the Byzantines would follow and drive them from there to the al-Mūjib river in the land of Balqā'. It is only at a later stage that the Muslims would force them back to the cleft (*al-ghawr*), defeat them and pursue them to Mount Lebanon and from there to Constantinople, etc.[70]

This picture is confirmed by other traditions. One of Ka'b, though circulated in a *maqṭū'* form by al-Ḥakam b. Nāfi', says that the Byzantines would get 70 crosses into Jerusalem. The first coastal areas upon which God's rage would descend would be al-Ṣārifiyya, Qīsārya and Beirut which would be swallowed up. The Byzantines would rule al-Shām from the coast to Jordan and Baysān, then the Muslims would gain victory, achieve peace, etc.[71] Yaḥyā b. Abī 'Amr al-Saybānī says: "the Byzantines shall ring church bells (*la-taḍribanna al-rūm al-nawāqīs*) in Jerusalem for forty days until the men of Muslims and Byzantines meet on the Mount of Olives. The Muslims will triumph and drive the Byzantines from the Gate of Jericho and then from the Gate of David. They will pursue their killing until they drive them to the sea ..."[72] A tradition of 'Abdullāh b. 'Amr warns that "the quivers of the Byzantines shall beat in the alleys of Jerusalem ..." (*la-takhfiqanna ji'āb al-rūm fī aziqqati 'īlyā' ...*).[73]

Other traditions even speak of a temporary control by the Byzantines of western and

[65] 'Abd al-Razzāq, 11/388; Nu'aym, 120(b), 125(b), 132(a); al-Muttaqī, 6/26.
[66] Nu'aym, 120(b).   [67] Nu'aym, 139(b).
[68] Nu'aym, 119(b).
[69] Nu'aym, 125(b)–126(b). Compare also with 119(b) where the same was transmitted from Ka'b by Awzā'ī
himself in a clearly *maqṭū'* form.   [70] Nu'aym, 140(a–b).
[71] Nu'aym, 122(b).   [72] Nu'aym, 130(a).
[73] Nu'aym, 135(a–b).

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northern Syria. Saʿīd b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz transmitted from Makḥūl the saying: "the Byzantines will move about Syria (*la-tamkhuranna al-rūm al-shām*) for forty days, failing to conquer, only (*lā tamtaniʿ minhā illā*) Damascus and the heights of Balqāʾ".[74] ʿAbdullāh b. al-ʿAlāʾ b. Zabr reported from Abū al-Aʿbas and ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Salmān the saying: "the king of the Byzantines shall overcome the whole of Syria except for Damascus and ʿAmmān, then he will be defeated..."[75] Zuhrī (d. 124 H.) is quoted as saying: "the blue men (*azāriq*) of Rūmya are about to oust the community of Muḥammad (Ṣ) from (the country) where wheat is sought" (*...min manā al-qamḥ*)[76] About ʿUrwa b. al-Zubayr we learn that towards the end of his life (*wa-raʾsuhu wa-liḥyatuhu yawmaʾ-idhin ka-l-thughāma*) he stood on Mount Salʿ and said: "the Byzantines shall drive you out of your Shām and horsemen shall stand on this mountain..."[77]

That Islam would in these circumstances retreat and fall back to the Syrian hinterland south of Damascus, east of the river Jordan, and into the area bordering the desert, is confirmed by another group of traditions. The one of ʿAbdullāh b. ʿAmr transmitted by Abū Salama b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān on the naval attack between al-ʿArīsh and Acre, noted above, says: "then the people of Egypt would get out of Egypt and the people of Syria would get out of Syria till they reach the Arab peninsula. And that would be the day about which Abū Hurayra used to say: 'woe to the Arabs from an evil which has drawn close'. The robe and saddle would then be more beloved to a man than his relatives and property. Then the Arabs would request support from their *aʿrāb* and they will all move to the Aʿmāq of Antioch..." where the Byzantines would be defeated and driven back to Constantinople, etc.[78]

ʿAwf al-Aʿrābī reported from Khālid b. Abī al-Salt the saying: "it will not be long (*lā yadhab al-layl wa-l-nahār*) before the Byzantines expel the people of Syria from Syria so that many dependants die in the desert".[79] A tradition with the *isnād*: Ṣafwān b. ʿAmr ← Abū al-Dardāʾ warns: "the Byzantines will get you out of Syria village by village until they drive you into al-Balqāʾ. That is how life perishes and the aftermath remains".[80] Ṣafwān transmitted also a tradition of Ibn ʿAmr through Ḥātim b. Ḥurayth/Ḥarb, which says: "the Byzantines will drive you out village by village until they bring you into Ḥismā of Judhām and put you in a land like tent robes (*fī ṭunūb min al-arḍ*)".[81] Through Abū Asmāʾ al-Raḥabī we hear of a tradition of Abū Hurayra which says: "Oh people of Syria, the Byzantines shall drive you from it until you reach a land like a rough edge (*fī sunbuk min al-arḍ*). It was asked: which edge is that? He said: Ḥismā of Judhām..."[82] There is one tradition in which Abū Mūsā al-Ashʿarī was even reported to have requested his people to refrain from living in farms and buildings, because these would soon not suit them. Instead, he advised them to acquire blond goats, horses and long spears.[83]

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[74] Nuʿaym, 119(b).
[75] Nuʿaym, 120(b).
[76] Nuʿaym, 132(a-b).
[76] *Ibid.*
[77] *Ibid.*
[79] Ibn ʿAsākir, 1/602-3.
[80] Ibn ʿAsākir, 1/603 and Nuʿaym, 139(a). Compare also with the latter's 136(b) where a similar tradition was reported from Khālid b. Maʿdān.
[81] Ibn ʿAsākir, *ibid*; Nuʿaym, 129(b).
[82] Ibn ʿAsākir, 1/603-4; Abū ʿUbayd, 4/190-1; Zamakhsharī, *al-Fāʾiq*, 2/420. For the location of Ḥismā in the south of Palestine and modern Jordan, see: M. Gil, *Palestine During the First Muslim Period* (Tel Aviv, 1983), 1/15 (in Hebrew).
[83] Nuʿaym, 120(b).

With this picture in the background the numerous traditions which exalt Damascus as the stronghold of the Muslims and the river Jordan as their front line become clear; a point with which I shall deal later. Suffice it to mention at this stage a unique tradition of al-Walīd b. Muslim on a saying current among "the learned authorities" of his Syrian source, Saʿīd b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz. The Byzantines, we are told, would get the people of Egypt out of their country, the peoples of Palestine and Jordan into the heights (*mashārif*) of Balqāʾ and Damascus and the peoples of Jazīra, Qinnasrīn and Ḥimṣ into Damascus. To this al-Walīd adds: "that is why Saʿīd told us from Makḥūl about the Prophet's saying: 'the *fusṭāṭ* of the Muslims on the day of the greater *malḥama* will be in the Ghūṭa in a town called Damascus'".[84]

Another tradition circulated in a *mursal* form by Ḥassān b. ʿAṭiyya says that the Prophet described how the enemy would drive his community from one country to another. "Then", we are told, "(somebody) said: Oh messenger of God, is there anything (to be done then)? He said: yes, the Ghūṭa, a town called Damascus, which is their *fusṭāṭ* and stronghold in the *malāḥim* and to which no enemy can get except from within".[85]

Loss of control over the areas to the north and west of Damascus was expressed by a few traditions in an even clearer form. In one of Kaʿb's circulated by al-Ḥakam b. Nāfiʿ without specifying his source (*ʿamman ḥaddathahu*), we are told that, before the greater *malḥama*, the Byzantines and their allies from the Christian world would camp between Ḥimṣ, with Antioch and the land of Qinnasrīn behind them. The Arabs, on the other hand, would camp between Damascus, Buṣra "and whatever (was) behind them" (*wa-mā warāʾahumā*).[86] In the traditions on the *malḥama* of Ḥimṣ there are instances describing the flight of Muslims to Damascus during the general scare (*al-jafla*). Some tried to raise morale by assuring the Muslims that their retreat was only temporary and that they would eventually win. From Abū al-Zāhiriyya we learn that the Byzantines would reach only Dayr Bahrāʾ.[87] Another tradition, by Abū Baḥriyya (ʿAbdullāh b. Qays, Ḥimṣī d. during the reign of al-Walīd I) says that the Byzantines would camp in Dayr Bahrāʾ and their king would raise his cross and banners on Tall Fahmāyā.[88] The learned authorities of Ibn ʿAyyāsh (Ismāʿīl, Ḥimṣī d. 181 H.) urged the people of Ḥimṣ to remain in their houses (*fa-thbutū fī manāzilikum*), assuring them that the Byzantines would perish in Tall Fahmāyā and would not reach them. They also warned that "whoever remains will survive and whoever flees to Damascus will perish out of thirst".[89]

Still, fleeing to Damascus was expected to be the general reaction. From Shurayḥ b. ʿUbayd we learn that Kaʿb told Muʿāwiya that 70,000 of the fleeing Ḥimṣīs would die between Thanyat al-ʿIqāb and Damascus from thirst.[90] Another tradition of Kaʿb with the *isnād*: Ṣafwān (b. ʿAmr) ← al-Azhar b. Rāshid al-Kindī (Syrian d. ?) ← Sulaym b. ʿĀmir al-Khabāʾirī (Ḥimṣī, d. 130 H.) confirms this and adds a few directions to those who would witness such events. The route recommended is "the eastern way, from Ḥimṣ to Sirbil and from Sirbil to al-Ḥumayra and from al-Ḥumayra to al-Dukhayra and from al-Dukhayra

[84] Ibn ʿAsākir, 1/226–7.
[85] Nuʿaym, 123(b)–124(a).
[86] *Ibid.*
[90] Nuʿaym, 128(a).

[85] Ibn ʿAsākir, 1/228–9.
[87] Nuʿaym, 128(a).
[89] Nuʿaym, 124(b)–125(a).

to al-Nabak and from al-Nabak to al-Qaṭīfa and from al-Qaṭīfa to Damascus. Whoever takes this road (*fa-man akhadha hādhihi al-ṭarīq*) remains in continuous waters (*lam yazal bi-miyāhin muttaṣila*)".[91]

I have come across several instances of praise for the role of the *mawālī* as a whole in the *malāḥim*. To this may be added one tradition which praises the *mawālī* of Damascus in particular. It is a relatively widely circulated statement attributed to the Prophet through the *isnād*: al-Walīd b. Muslim (Damascene, d. 194–6 H.) ← ʿUthmān b. Abī al-ʿĀtika (Damascene, d. c. 155 H.) ← Sulaymān b. Ḥabīb (Damascene, d. 115–26 H.) ← Abū Hurayra. It says: "when the *malāḥim* occur, a (military) contingent of *mawālī* will come out of Damascus. They are among the Arabs best equipped with horses and weapons and with them God will support the religion". With minor variations this tradition was attributed to the Prophet also in a *mursal* form by the chain: Abū Bakr b. Abī Maryam ← ʿAṭiyya b. Qays (Damascene or Ḥimṣī successor, d. 110–21 H.).[92]

The other main direction from which besieged and retreating Islam was expected to seek support was the south, the Yemen and Ḥijāz, already cited on several occasions as the main military and religious reservoir. Actually, almost every traditional account of the *malhama* ends with the assurance that in its critical stage, support for the Muslims would come from the peoples of the Yemen, ʿAdan Abyan, Ḥaḍramawt or the Ḥijāz (sometimes called *ahl qaraẓ*).

A few more traditions are worth noting here. One with the *isnād*: Ibn Sīrīn (d. 110 H.) ← ʿUqba b. Aws al-Thaqafī ← ʿAbdullāh b. ʿAmr says that reinforcement for the believers would be people who would come from ʿAdan Abyan on their young she-camels (ʿalā qalaṣātihim).[93] Ḥassān b. ʿAṭiyya (Damascene, d. 120–30 H.) attributed to Kaʿb the saying: "God has two treasures in the Yemen. One he brought during the Yarmūk (battle) when the Azd were one-third of the people; and the other he will bring on the day of the great *malhama*, seventy thousand whose sword belts are ropes of palm fibre" (*hamāʾil suyūfihim al-masad*).[94] Through ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Salmān (al-Aʿbas, Damascene successor, d. ?) we hear that ʿAbdullāh b. ʿAmr said: "when the idol Dhū al-Khalaṣa is worshipped, the Byzantines will overcome Syria. On that day, they (the Muslims) will send for the people of Qaraẓ asking for reinforcements. They will come on their young she-camels (*qalaṣāt*). Qaraẓ means the Ḥijāz. Al-Walīd (b. Muslim) said: (it meant) the Yemen. Nuʿaym said: I doubt it."[95]

This picture goes well with the traditions which say that in such circumstances of retreat, Islam or belief would fold back and take refuge in the Ḥijāz in general and in Medina in particular. In a tradition of the family of ʿAmr b. ʿAwf al-Muzanī, a statement is said to have been made by the Prophet to ʿAlī on the different stages of the Muslim *malhama* against the Byzantines. It warns that the hour would not come until the closest garrisons (*rābiṭa, masāliḥ*) of the Muslims are located in Būlān (var. Tūlān, Būlāʾ). Successive wars

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[91] *Ibid.*

[92] Compare Nuʿaym, 131(b), 139(a); Ibn Māja, 2/1369–70; al-Basawī, (d. 277 H.), *al-Maʿrifa wa-l-Tārīkh* (Baghdād, 1975), 2/291; al-Ḥākim, 4/548; Ibn ʿAsākir, 1/258–60; al-Albānī, *Takhrīj Aḥādīth al-Rabaʿī*, 59.

[93] Nuʿaym, 114(b).

[94] Nuʿaym, 120(b). Compare also with 129(b)–130(a).

[95] *Ibid.*, 120(b).

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would be fought against them until the pure element of Islam, people of the Ḥijāz (*rūqat al-islām, ahl al-ḥijāz*) fought them and conquered Constantinople. Then the news would arrive that the *dajjāl* had come out, etc.[96]

Another prophetical tradition by Abū Hurayra on the authority of Qabīṣa b. Dhu'ayb (Medinese d. 86–96 H.) and Abū Salama b. 'Abd al-Raḥmān (Medinese, d. 94–104 H.) says: "the furthest of the Muslims' garrisons are about to be in Salāḥ and Salāḥ is in Khaybar".[97] In a second tradition of Abū Hurayra the Prophet says: "people are about to return to Medina so that their garrisons will be stationed in Salāḥ".[98] A third one, on the authority of Ḥafṣ b. 'Āṣim (Medinese successor, d. ?) quotes him as saying: "belief shall fold back (*la-ya'razanna al-'īmān*) to Medina like a snake folds back to its hole".[99]

From Nāfi' (Medinese, d. 117–20 H.) we learn of a tradition of Ibn 'Umar which says: "the Muslims are about to be forced (back) into Medina so that the farthest of their garrisons would be Salāḥ". Abū Dawūd who brings this tradition adds a comment by Zuhrī which puts Salāḥ near Khaybar.[100] Muḥammad al-'Umarī (Abū 'Āṣim) transmitted from Ibn 'Umar a prophetical tradition which says: "Islam has started as a foreigner and will again become a foreigner folding back between the two mosques (Mecca and Medina) like a snake folds into its hole".[101]

This last tradition was attributed to the Prophet by the son of Sa'd b. Abī Waqqāṣ through his father.[102] There is also a similar prophetical tradition with an *isnād* leading to a certain 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. Sana (var. Shayba, Munabbih) on the authority of Isḥāq b. 'Abdullāh b. Abī Farwa (Medinese, Umayyad *mawlā*, d. 136–44 H.). It has the element of Islam folding back to the area between Mecca and Medina like a snake does into its hole. Moreover, it says: "... while they are in that state, the Arabs will ask their bedouins (*a'rāb*) for help. And, like the righteous ones from among their predecessors and the best of the remainder (of believers), they shall meet the Byzantines and engage in fighting."[103] Only Nu'aym carries this tradition beyond this point describing how the Byzantines are defeated and driven back to the 'Amq of Antioch. One-third of the Muslims would be killed, another would return with doubt and, hence, be swallowed up, but the rest would persist. The Byzantines would ask to be left alone with those who originally came from them (*man aṣluhu kāna minhum*), but the non-Arabs ('*ajam*) would refuse to revert back to infidelity. Hence, fighting would resume until the Muslims occupied Constantinople, etc.[104]

A final and decisive stage of *malāḥim* is ascribed to a place called al-'Amq, which was often located near Antioch or associated with it. A prophetical tradition bearing the *isnād*: Suhayl b. Abū Ṣāliḥ Dhakwān (Medinese, d. 138 H.) ← his father, Abū Ṣāliḥ (d. 101 H.)

[96] Compare Ibn Māja, 2/1370–1; Ṭabarānī, 17/21–2, al-Ḥākim, 4/483; Daylamī, 5/82; Qurṭubī, 2/352; Ibn Kathīr, 1/90–1, 93; Haythamī, 6/219–20; Suyūṭī, *J. K.*, 1/904; idem, *Durr*, 6/60; al-Muttaqī, 6/10.
[97] Ṭabarānī, *al-Mu'jam al-Ṣaghīr*, 1/231.
[98] Haythamī, 4/15.
[99] Bukhārī. 2/222; Muslim, 1/90–1. Compare also with the variant *isnād* from Ibn 'Umar given by Ibn Ḥibbān in Haythamī, *Mawārid*, 255.
[100] Abū Dawūd, 4/97, 111. See also Ṭabarānī, *M. S.* 2/40, where he says that Salāḥ is the border between Medina and Khaybar.
[101] Muslim, 1/90.
[102] Ibn Ḥanbal, 1/184; Abū Ya'lā, 2/99; Haythamī, 7/277 quoting Buzzār too.
[103] Compare Haythamī, 7/278, 318; Suyūṭī, *J. K.*, 1/675.
[104] Nu'aym, 137(a–b).

← Abū Hurayra says: "the hour shall not come until the Byzantines have camped in the A'māq or Dābiq". The tradition goes on to describe how, then, "an army from the best on earth" goes out to meet them. The Byzantines would ask to be left alone with those who have been captured from among them (i.e. the *mawālī*) but the Muslims would refuse and fighting would be resumed. One-third would flee, another third would be killed and the remainder would triumph. Driving the Byzantines to Constantinople, the Muslims would conquer it just before hearing that the *dajjāl* has emerged in their rear, etc.[105]

The *malḥama* of al-A'maq is mentioned by other traditions which Nu'aym brings in different contexts. 'Abdullāh b. 'Amr is reported to have said: "the *malāḥim* are five; two have elapsed and there remain three: the *malḥama* of the Turks in the Jazīra, the *malḥama* of the A'māq and the *malāḥim* of al-dajjāl to be followed by no other *malḥama*."[106] Ka'b said: "God has three slaughters (*dhabāyiḥ*) among the Byzantines: the first is Yarmūk, the second is Fīnīqis, meaning 'the date' (*al-tamra*), which is Ḥimṣ and the third is al-A'māq."[107] Tubay' said: "the one who will defeat the Byzantines on the Day of al-A'māq is the caliph of the *mawālī*".[108] From the fifth Shī'ite Imām, Muḥammad al-Bāqir (d. 114–18 H.) a family tradition was reported attributing to the Prophet the saying: "people have three strongholds (*ma'āqil*). Their stronghold in the greater *malḥama* which will be in the 'Amq of Antioch is Damascus...".[109] Through Ibn 'Abbās another tradition was attributed to the Prophet, saying: "from 'Adan will come out twelve thousand who will support God and His Messenger. They are the best among those who are between me and them". To this, al-Mu'tamir b. Sulaymān (d. 187 H.), who apparently circulated this tradition, added that he thought he heard the man he reported it from saying: "in the A'māq" (*qāla al-Mu'tamir, aẓunnuhuqāl: fī al-a'māq*).[110] There is also the tradition of 'Abdullāh b. 'Amr which counts the martyrs of the *malāḥim* of A'māq Antioch among the best ones in the eyes of God.[111]

The *malḥama* of al-A'māq is mentioned also in the context of the belief concerning Tiberius son of Justinian or Ibn Ḥaml al-Da'n (the son of a sheep's pregnancy) as leaders of the Byzantines.[112] Here it was said that the Byzantines would be helped by the Christians of Syria and the Jazīra while support for the Muslims would come "from farthest Yemen" (*min aqāṣī al-yaman*)/var. "from 'Adan Abyan". This would be a time of severe apostasy (*ridda shadīda*), whole tribes would join the Byzantines, others would retreat to bedouin life, one-third of the Muslims would die, but the remainder would eventually triumph and conquer Constantinople just before the news that the *dajjāl* had appeared.[113]

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[105] Muslim, 8/175–6; al-Ḥākim, 4/482; Qurṭubī, 2/352; Nawawī, 10/418–19; Ibn Kathīr, 1/89–90; Suyūṭī, *Durr*, 6/59; al-Muttaqī, 6/9. See also Ibn 'Arabī (d. 543 H.), *Sharḥ* in the margin of Timidhī, 9/83; Sakhāwī, 84; Barazanjī, pp. 100–1.

[106] Nu'aym, 132(a).

[107] Nu'aym, 138(a).

[108] Nu'aym, 135(b).

[109] Ibn 'Asākir, 1/228; Ibn Badrān, *Tahdhīb* (Damascus, 1329 H.), 1/51; al-Muttaqī, 6/25.

[110] Haythamī, 10/55 quoting Abū Ya'lā and Ṭabarānī.

[111] Nu'aym, 137(b).

[112] Nu'aym, 130(b).

[113] Nu'aym, 115(a–b), 117(a), 121(a–b), 131(b), 133(b)–134(a). See also Haythamī, 7/319, quoting Bazzār.

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Muslim belief throughout the first century that the eventual conquest of Constantinople would be the last major eschatological event before the end of the world seems indeed to have been so strong that almost every tradition which spoke about the Byzantine *malḥama* ended with the prophecy that the city would be conquered. Besides, there are numerous traditions which state that such conquest would be the sign of "the hour" or even gave detailed descriptions of its circumstances.

A tradition of Anas attributes to the Prophet simply the saying that the conquest of Constantinople would occur with the arrival of the hour.[114] To Abū Hurayra was attributed the saying that the hour would not commence before the city of *hiraql/qayṣar* was conquered; then the news that the *dajjāl* had appeared would arrive, etc.[115] Another tradition of Abū Hurayra points indirectly to Constantinople when speaking about a city with one side to the sea and another to the mainland, which would be invaded by seventy thousand from among the sons of Isḥāq.[116] 'Abdullāh b. 'Amr, when asked which one of the two cities, Constantinople or Rome, would be conquered first, confirmed hearing from the Prophet that it would be the former.[117]

Nu'aym brings several traditions which specify the order of conquering Constantinople, other Byzantine cities and Rome.[118] Others state that it would be the Mahdī or else give the messianic titles and exalt the merits of the Muslim commander who would occupy Constantinople.[119]

This last issue deserves special attention because of a few other traditions which refer to people who were actually involved in the historical campaigns against Constantinople. In one, the Prophet is quoted by Umm Ḥarām, wife of 'Ubāda b. al-Ṣāmit, as saying that the sins of those who would invade the city of *qayṣar* would be forgiven. To her question whether she would be one of them, the Prophet's answer was negative although he assured her that she would take part in the first Muslim naval raid.[120]

One tradition of 'Abdullāh b. 'Amr attributes to the Prophet the saying that the *malāḥim* would occur in the time of two *'atīqs*, one over the Arabs (a title usually given to Abū Bakr) and one over the Byzantines.[121] However, the prophecy on the conquest of Constantinople was indirectly connected with the name of Mu'āwiya, who indeed conducted a campaign against it. According to one tradition, Abū Tha'laba al-Khushanī said in the presence of Mu'āwiya: "when you see that Syria has become a table of one man

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[114] Tirmidhī, 9/90–1; Qurṭubī, 2/353; Ibn Kathīr, 1/97; Suyūṭī, *Durr*, 6/95.

[115] Ibn Abī Shayba, 15/157; cf. also al-Muttaqī, 6/20–1; and compare with Ṭabarānī, *al-Awsaṭ*, 1/365–6; Daylamī, 2/62.

[116] Muslim, 8/188; Nawawī, *Sharḥ Muslim*, in the margin of Qasṭalānī. *Irshād*, (Cairo, 1293 H.), 10/444; Sakhāwī, p. 82; Suyūṭī, *Durr*, 6/59; al-Ḥākim, 4/476; Ibn Kathīr, 1/90; Qurṭubī, 2/352–3; al-Hā'irī, 2/287. Compare, however, with the tradition of Ka'b brought by Nu'aym, 129(b), 138(b), according to which Constantinople would be conquered by the sons of Saba' and Qāḍhar.

[117] Ibn Abī Shayba, 5/329–30; Nu'aym, 133(a); Ibn Ḥanbal, 2/176; Dārimī (d. 255 H.), *Sunan* (Cairo, n.d.), 1/126; al-Ḥākim, 4/555; Ibn Kathīr, 1/79–80; Haythamī, 6/219; al-Muttaqī, 6/15; Suyūṭī, *Durr*, 6/60.

[118] Nu'aym, 133(a)–135(a), 138(a).

[119] Nu'aym, 131(a), 133(a), 138(a). Compare also with Daylamī, 5/82; al-Muttaqī, 6/20 quoting Ibn 'Asākir; Ḥalīmī (d. 403 H.), *al-Minhāj Fī Shu'ab al-Īmān* (Beirut, 1979), 1/430; Mar'ī b. Yūsuf al-Maqdisī al-Ḥanbalī, *Bahjat al-Nāzirīn* (MS. Khālidiyya, Jerusalem, 334), fol. 77(b). I am indebted to L. Conrad for putting this last source at my disposal.

[120] Bukhārī, 3/232; al-Ḥākim, 4/556–7.

[121] Nu'aym, 130(b), 134(b), 135(b), 141(b); Haythamī, 7/318.

and his house, then (know that) the conquest of Constantinople will be accomplished".[122] From another, by Bishr al-Ghanawī, we learn that the Prophet said: "Constantinople shall be conquered; praised be its commander and praised be that army". Bishr, we are told, narrated this tradition to Maslama b. ʿAbd al-Malik and the latter decided to attack the city.[123]

The continued failure to conquer Constantinople must have caused some concern to Muslim scholars. This can be gauged from a tradition attributed by Nuʿaym to an unnamed figure who participated in one of the abortive attempts.[124] In another tradition al-Mustawrid b. Shaddād is quoted as telling ʿAmr b. al-ʿĀṣ that he heard the Prophet saying: "the hour will come with the Byzantines (being) more numerous than others" (*taqūm al-sāʿa wa-l-rūm akthar al-nās*).[125] ʿAmr's reaction may create the impression that this tradition aims to praise the Byzantines. However, what seems initially to have been meant is that they would continue to be Islam's main enemy until the end of time; a possibility betrayed by a unique variant recounted by Ibn Ḥanbal. Here the Prophet is quoted as saying: "the Byzantines are severest of all peoples on you, but their perishing will be with (the coming of) the hour". Indeed this notion was more explicitly conveyed in another tradition attributed to the Prophet by Ibn Muḥayrīz (ʿAbdullāh, of Meccan origin who lived in Jerusalem and was considered a Syrian authority, d. 86–99 H.). It says: "Persia is (only a matter of) one or two thrusts and no Persia will ever be after that. But the Byzantines with the horns are people of sea and rock, whenever a horn/generation goes, another replaces it. Alas, they are your associates to the end of time..." (*fāris naṭḥa aw naṭḥatān thumma lā fāris baʿdahā abadan, wa-l-rūm thāt al-qurūn aṣḥāb baḥr wa-ṣakhr, kullamā dhahaba qarn khalafahu qarn makānah, hayhāta ilā ākhir al-dahr hum aṣḥābukum...*).[126]

Defensive *faḍāʾil* traditions

On various occasions we have come across instances in which peoples and places loyal to Islam in the fateful *malāḥim* were exalted. In what follows more of such *faḍāʾil* traditions will be reviewed.

A group of traditions specifies Damascus as a stronghold of the Muslims during the *malāḥim*, a location of their tent of command (*fusṭāṭ*) and related virtues. Jubayr b. Nufayr transmitted from Abū al-Dardāʾ a prophetical tradition which said that the *fusṭāṭ* of Muslims on the day of the greater *malḥama* (would be) in the Ghūṭa near a city called

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[122] Compare Ibn Ḥanbal, 4/193; Ṭabarānī, 22/214; al-Ḥākim, 4/462; Haythamī, 6/219; Suyūṭī, *Durr*, 6/59; Nuʿaym, 133(b). See also the variants in this last source, 138(b) and 141(a), where "*al-shām*" was substituted for the phrase: "between al-Darb and al-ʿArīsh" or "al-ʿArīsh and al-Furāt", respectively.

[123] Ibn Ḥanbal, 4/335; Ṭabarānī, *M. K.*, 2/38; al-Ḥākim, 4/421–2; Daylamī, 5/481; Haythamī, *Majmaʿ*, 6/218–19 quoting Bazzār; *idem, Kashf*, 2/358; Suyūṭī, *al-Jāmiʿ al-Ṣaghīr* (Cairo, 1954), 2/122; *idem, Durr*, 6/60; *idem, J. K.*, 1/635 quoting also Ibn Khuzayma, Baghawī, Bārūdī, Ibn al-Sakan, Ibn Qāniʿ and al-Diyāʾ al-Maqdisī; al-Muttaqī, 6/12; al-Albānī, *al-Aḥādīth al-Ḍaʿīfa* (Beirut, 1399 H.), 2/268–9.

[124] Nuʿaym, 140(b).

[125] Nuʿaym, 133(a–b); Ibn Ḥanbal, 4/230; Muslim, 8/176–7; Ṭabarānī, *M. K.*, 20/319–20; Daylamī, 2/65; Ibn Ḥajar, *al-Wuqūf*, 86–7; al-Muttaqī, 6/11; Ibn Kathīr, 1/91–2; Sakhāwī, 85–6.

[126] Ibn Abī Shayba, 5/298; Ibn Ḥajar, *al-Maṭālib al-ʿĀliya Fī Zawāʾid al-Masānīd al-Thamāniya* (Beirut, 1987), 4/26 quoting the *Musnad* of al-Ḥārith b. Abī Usāma.

Damascus, (which is) one of the best towns in Syria.[127] From an unnamed companion ('*an rajul min aṣḥāb al-rasūl*), Jubayr b. Nufayr transmitted another prophetical tradition which informed the Muslims that Syria would be conquered and recommended them to settle in Damascus, adding that it would be their stronghold (*ma'qil*) during the *malāḥim* and that their *fusṭāṭ* would be in a land called Ghūṭa.[128] Almost the same notion was put forward by a third prophetical tradition, this time through Mu'ādh as transmitted by both Abū Mālik al-Ash'arī and, in a *maqṭū'* form, by Makḥūl too.[129] There is also a tradition carried by a family line of *isnād* from the Shī'ī Imāms al-Ṣādiq and al-Bāqir. Here, however, a new element was added identifying Jerusalem as a refuge from the *dajjāl* and al-Ṭūr as one from Ya'jūj and Ma'jūj.[130]

The idea that Damascus would be one of the three main strongholds towards the end of time appears in a few other traditions with different chains of *isnād*. It was reported as a prophetical one, though in a *mursal* form, by Yaḥyā b. Jābir al-Ṭā'ī (Ḥimṣī, d. 126 H.) and Abū al-Zāhiriyya.[131] With a minor variation, Abū al-Zāhiriyya reported it also as a tradition of Ka'b.[132] And from Shurayḥ b. 'Ubayd we learn that Ka'b, when enquired of by Mu'āwiya, assured him that Damascus was the stronghold of the Muslims against the Byzantines and that it was much more exalted than Ḥimṣ.[133]

Another group of traditions attribute to the Prophet mention of the persistence of a group of his community in its fight for religion against their enemies in spite of all hardships "until ᶜthe matter of God comes to them"/var. "till the day of resurrection"/var. "till the hour comes" (*ḥattā ya'tīhim amr allāh/ilā yawm al-qiyāma/ilā an taqūm al-sā'a*). One tradition by Abū Hurayra specifies that they would do this at the gates of Damascus, Jerusalem and their vicinities (*aknāf*) and that they would not be harmed because of being let down by anyone who does that (*lā yaḍurruhum khudhlān man khadhalahum*). It was transmitted by the chain: 'Āmir al-Aḥwal ← Abū Ṣāliḥ al-Khawlānī.[134] In another, by Kurayb al-Saḥūlī ← the Prophet, it was stated that, being in the surroundings of Jerusalem, this group would be "like a pot among eaters" (*ka-l-inā' bayn al-akala*).[135] And almost the same was transmitted in a third prophetical tradition

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[127] Compare Ibn Ḥanbal, 5/197; Abū Dāwūd, 4/111; Basawī, 2/290; Ibn 'Asākir, 1/219–20, 222; al-Mundhirī (d. 656 H.), *al-Targhīb wa-l-Tarhīb* (Cairo, n.d.), 4/63; Ibn Kathīr, 1/83, 89; Suyūṭī, *Durr*, 6/59; al-Ḥākim, 4/486; Manīnī (d. 1172 H.), *al-I'lām* (Jaffa, n.d.), 56; Albānī, *Takhrīj*, 35–6.

[128] Ibn 'Abd al-Salām (d. 660 H.), *Targhīb Ahl al-Islām* (Jerusalem, 1940), 13; Ibn 'Abd al-Hādī (d. 774 H.), *Faḍā'il al-Shām* (Cairo, 1988), 28; Haythamī, *Majma'*, 7/289, 10/57; Manīnī, 62; Compare also with Ibn 'Asākir, 1/225–6, where a variant of this tradition was reported in *mursal* forms by Makḥūl and Jubayr himself.

[129] Ibn 'Asākir, 1/227.

[130] Ibn al-Murajjā, 78(b); Ibn 'Asākir, 1/228; Ibn Badrān, 1/51. Compare also with Sakhāwī, p. 85, where he quotes al-Raba'ī (d. 444 H.) for the same tradition but attributes it to Ka'b.

[131] Ibn Abī Shayba, 5/324–5, 12/191; Ibn 'Asākir, 1/229; al-Muttaqī, 6/15, 25.

[132] Compare Nu'aym, 66(b); Ibn al-Faqīh, *Mukhtaṣar Kitāb al-Buldān* (Leiden, 1885), 104; Ibn Badrān, 1/51–2.

[133] Nu'aym, 66(b): "*wa-marbiḍ thawr fīhā afḍal min dār 'aẓīma bi-ḥimṣ*" (and a resting place of an ox in it is far better than a great house in Ḥimṣ).

[134] Abū Ya'lā, 11/302; Ibn al-Murajjā, 58(b)–59(a); Haythamī, *Majma'*, 7/288, 10/60–1; Ṭabarānī, *al-Awsaṭ* 1/61; Manīnī, p. 59; Albānī, *Takhrīj*, 60–1; Ibn Ḥajar, *al-Maṭālib* 4/164, 336. Compare, however, with the variant transmitted from Abū Ṣāliḥ by al-Qa'qā' b. Ḥakīm (Medinese, d. 7), where neither Jerusalem nor Damascus are specified. Haythamī, *Kashf al-Astār*, 4/111.

[135] Ibn al-Murajjā, 59(a-b); Basawī, 2/298; Haythamī, *Majma'* 7/288–9; Ṭabarānī, *M. K.*, 20/317–18.

through Abū Umāma al-Bāhilī; the only difference being the statement that this group
would exclusively be "in Jerusalem and its surroundings".[126]

Two other traditions of this group contain the element of Muʿāwiya's inference that the
group meant by the Prophet's statement were the people of Syria (*ahl al-shām*). In one he
is said to have referred to Zayd b. Arqam's transmission of this tradition from the Prophet
adding: "and I think it is you, Oh people of Syria" (*wa-innī arākumūhum/la- aẓunnukum
hum yā ahl al-shām*).[127] Another says that while Muʿāwiya narrated this tradition from the
Prophet, Mālik b. Yukhāmir stood and said that he heard Muʿādh adding that the people
of Syria were the ones meant. Then Muʿāwiya announced Mālik's testimony to his
listeners loudly.[138]

A group of traditions consider the coastal area from al-ʿArīsh to upper Syria, the
Euphrates and Mesopotamia as watch posts (*ribāṭāt*) where fighting, guard duty and even
settling were considered a holy obligation until the end of time. One such tradition is by
Abū Hurayra with the *isnād*: Muqātil b. Ḥayyān (d. c. 150 H) ← Shahr b. Ḥawshab
(Syrian, d. 111–12 H.). It attributes to the Prophet the saying: "My *umma* will conquer
Syria shortly after me. If God opens it and the Muslims settle in it then they and its people
to the end of al-Jazīra together with their men, women, youth, maids and slaves are
(to be considered) *murābiṭūn* until the day of resurrection. Whoever settles on one of the
coasts must consider himself in a state of *jihād*, and whoever settles in Jerusalem and its
surrounds must consider himself in a *ribāṭ*."[139]

A similar tradition has the chain: ʿAbdullāh b. Ghanam ← Muʿādh. According to it the
Prophet said to Muʿādh: "after me (= my death, S.B.) God will open Syria for you from
al-ʿArīsh to the Euphrates. Their (= the conquerors') men, women and maids are (to be
considered) *murābiṭūn* until the day of resurrection. Whoever occupies one of the coasts of
Syria or Jerusalem is in a state of *jihād* until the day of resurrection".[140]

A third, similar tradition bears the name of Abū al-Dardāʾ and seems to have enjoyed
wider circulation. It was transmitted from Abū al-Dardāʾ by Ḥudayr (Abū al-Zāhiriyya)
and Shahr b. Ḥawshab. We notice that Abū al-Zāhiriyya's version, which was circulated
by Arṭāt, often without mentioning his source (*ʿamman ḥaddathahu*), drops the element of
the Jerusalem coasts.[141]

Some reference to fighting the Byzantines (sons of Esau, as they were called) towards
the end of time in the coastal area of Jerusalem, was made in a unique tradition bearing
the *isnād*: Ādam b. Abī Iyās (al-ʿAsqalānī, d. 220–1 H.) ← Abū ʿAmr (more probably
ʿUmar) al-Ṣanʿānī (Syrian, d. 181 H.) ← Jābir.[142] From two early sources we learn that the

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[126] Ibn Ḥanbal, 5/269; Wasiṭī, p. 26; Ibn al-Jawzī (d. 597 H.), *Faḍāʾil al-Quds*, (Beirut, 1980), pp. 93–4; Haythamī, *Majmaʿ*, 7/288; Manīnī, p. 59; Mujīr al-Dīn (d. 928 H.) *al-Uns al-jalīl* (ʿAmmān, 1973), 1/227–8.

[127] Ṭayālisī, p. 94; Ibn Ḥumayd (d. 249 H.), *al-Muntakhab Min al-Musnad* (Cairo, 1988), p. 115; Ibn Ḥanbal, 4/369; Ṭabarānī, *M. K.*, 5/165; Haythamī, *Kashf*, 4/111.

[138] Basawī, 2/297; Ibn ʿAbd al-Salām, p. 12; Manīnī, p. 60; Bukhārī, 4/187. Compare, however, with Muslim, 6/53, where Mālik's testimony was dropped.

[139] Ibn al-Murajjā, 85(a–b).

[140] Ibn al-Murajjā, 85(b); Mujīr al-Dīn, 1/228.

[141] Compare Ibn al-Murajjā, 85(b); Ibn ʿAsākir, 1/269–70; Haythamī, *Majmaʿ*, 10/60; Shams al-Dīn, *Itḥāf al-Akhiṣṣā* (Cairo, 1984), 2/140; Manīnī, p. 62; Albānī, *Takhrīj* 21; al-Mundhirī, 4/63.

[142] Ibn al-Murajjā, 59(a–b).

companion Abū Rayḥāna used to live in Jerusalem and guard "a coastal post" (*maslaḥa bi-l-sāḥil*).[143] One of them, Saʿīd b. Manṣūr (d. 227 H.), mentions how ʿAṭāʾ al-Khurāsānī (settled in Syria, d. 135 H.), upon hearing a prophetical tradition on the merits of those buried in ʿAsqalān, adopted the habit of guarding that town (*an yurābiṭ*) for forty days every year until he died.[144]

To the merits of ʿAsqalān, among other coastal locations specified by some traditions, I shall return shortly. Guarding the coasts in general, making *takbīr*, or even just sitting or moving about there and watching the sea was considered a holy duty by a wide range of traditions. Some of them bear the name of Abū Hurayra who, on one occasion, was also said to have taken actual part in coastal *murābaṭa*. In a tradition of Mujāhid (d. 102–3 H.) we are told that Abū Hurayra was enlisted in such *murābaṭa*. One day they were alerted and went out to the coastal area. Though this proved to be a false alarm and people returned, Abū Hurayra remained standing there. When he was asked why he did that, he recalled the Prophet's saying: "standing (*mawqif*) for one hour in the way of God (*fī sabīl allāh*) is better than standing (in prayer) (*qiyām*) near the Black Stone on the night of al-Qadr".[145]

A similar tradition by Abū Hurayra was transmitted by ʿAṭāʾ al-Khurāsānī. Though it does not have the introductory note on the false coastal alarm, it says: "a *ribāṭ* of one day in the way of God is beloved to me more than spending the night of al-Qadr in one of the two mosques, Mecca and Medina". It also states a sum of three days for a minimal *ribāṭ* and forty days for a full one (*wa-man rābaṭa thalāthat ayyām fī sabīl allāh fa-qad rābaṭa, wa-man rābaṭa arbaʿīna yawm fa-qad istakmal al-ribāṭ*).[146]

The notion of coastal *ribāṭ* for forty days as a standard duty in the first century of Islam is put forward by other traditions of Abū Hurayra as well as other companions. As in the previous case, however, one often notices that the phrase "ʿalā sāḥil al-baḥr" is sometimes replaced by "*fī sabīl allāh*", i.e. without specifying the coastal areas as a location of *ribāṭ*. A few examples may illustrate this point. From ʿAbd al-Razzāq we learn of a tradition of Abū Hurayra transmitted by Yaḥyā b. Abī Sufyān al-Akhnasī (Medinese, d. early second century) which says: "a *ribāṭ* of one night near the sea from behind an exposed point (*ʿawra*) of the Muslims is better for me than spending the night in one of the two mosques, the Kaʿba and Medina". Again it was stated that the minimum annual *ribāṭ* (*ʿadl al-sana*) is for three days, while a full one (*tamām al-ribāṭ*) is for forty days.[147]

Ibn Abī Shayba records two traditions; one by ʿAṭāʾ al-Khurāsānī ← Abū Hurayra and the other by Makḥūl ← Salmān al-Fārisī ← the Prophet. Both say that a *ribāṭ* of one day is better than fasting and praying (*qiyām*) for a whole month, etc. However, while the former specifies such a *ribāṭ* as one on the sea coast (*ʿalā sāḥil al-baḥr*), the latter generally calls it "*ribāṭ* in the way of God".[148] From another source, Ṭabarānī, we learn that Makḥūl

[143] This was reported in a tradition of Ḍamra b. Ḥabīb, *mawlā* of Abū Rayḥāna, (a Ḥimṣī, d. 130 H.) on the authority of Abū Bakr b. Abī Maryam (d. 156 H.). Compare: Saʿīd b. Manṣūr (d. 227 H.), *Sunan* (Beirut, 1985), 2/192–3; Ibn al-Mubārak (d. 181), *al-Zuhd*, 305.
[144] Saʿīd b. Manṣūr, 2/160; cf. also Shams al-Dīn, 2/171.
[145] Mundhirī, 2/152; Haythamī, *Mawārid*, 381; Suyūṭī, *Durr*, 2/115, quoting Ibn Ḥibbān and Bayhaqī.
[146] Saʿīd b. Manṣūr, 2/159; al-Muttaqī (ed. Haydarabad), 2/263.
[147] ʿAbd al-Razzāq, 5/280–1.
[148] Ibn Abī Shayba, 5/327.

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transmitted the tradition of Salmān not directly from him but through a Ḥimṣī figure, Shuraḥbīl b. al-Samṭ al-Kindī. Probably more interesting is the introductory note which say that Shuraḥbīl met Salmān while the latter was *murābiṭ* on the coast of Ḥimṣ and it was there that he heard from him about the Prophet's statement.[149]

In a tradition of al-Qāsim b. 'Abd al-Raḥmān (Damascene, d. 112–18 H.) it is said that Salmān came to Damascus looking for Abū al-Dardā'. He was told that the latter was *murābiṭ*, asked about the location of the watching post of the Damascenes (*wa-ayna marābiṭukum yā ahl dimashq?*), was told that it was Beirut and hence moved there.[150] From another tradition we learn that Ismā'īl b. 'Ubaydullāh (Damascene, d. 131–2 H.) moved to Beirut as a *murābiṭ* during the time of Marwān II.[151]

Makḥūl transmitted another prophetical tradition through Abū Hurayra which says: "whoever fears hell-fire for himself should do *ribāṭ* on the coast for forty days" (*man khāfa 'alā nafsihi al-nār fa-l-yurābiṭ 'alā al-sāḥil arba'īna yawman*). However, this tradition occurs only in *muwḍū'āt* compilations since its circulator, Ibrāhīm b. Hammām, nephew of 'Abd al-Razzāq, was considered a liar (*kadhdhāb*).[152] From Abū Zur'a we learn about another Abū Hurayra ← the Prophet tradition which says: "whoever comes for looking at the sea coast will have one good deed for every drop of it" (*kāna lahu bi-kulli qaṭratin ḥasana*). But this tradition was deemed fabricated because its transmitter, Muḥammad b. Sālim (Abū Sahl al-Kūfī) was considered *matrūk*.[153]

Guarding the sea coast was singled out in another prophetical tradition, this time bearing the name of Anas on the authority of Sa'īd b. Khālid b. Abī al-Ṭawīl (a Syrian from Sidon). Such guarding for one night is better than worshipping among one's people (*fī ahlihī*) for one thousand years.[154] This tradition was also deemed fabricated because of its association with Sa'īd b. Khālid. We also notice that it occurs in Ibn Māja with the same *isnād*, though the phrase "on the sea coast" was again altered to "in the way of God".[155]

A prophetical tradition similar to this latter variant bears the name of 'Uthmān b. 'Affān. "Guarding one night in the way of God", we are told, "is better than one thousand days of prayer and fasting."[156] But the element of specifying the sea coast is present in traditions bearing the names of numerous other companions. To Umm al-Dardā' or her husband was attributed the transmission of a prophetical tradition which equates the *ribāṭ* on a sea coast with a *ribāṭ* anywhere else for a whole year.[157] 'Alī was

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[149] Ṭabarānī, *M. K.*, 6/267. See also Haythamī, *Majma'*, 5/290, where Salmān was said to have been on that occasion "*murābiṭ* on a coast" without specifying Ḥimṣ, and compare with Ibn al-Mubārak, *Kitāb al-Jihād* (Beirut, 1971), 140, where "*fī ḥiṣn*" (in a fortress) was read instead of "*fī ḥimṣ*".

[150] Abū Zur'a (d. 281 H.), *Tārīkh* (Damascus, 1980), 1/222.

[151] *Ibid.*, 1/254.

[152] Ibn Ḥibbān (d. 354 H.), *al-Majrūḥīn* (Cairo, 1402), 1/118; Ibn al-Qaysarānī (d. 507 H.) *Kitāb Ma'rifat al-Tadhkira* (Beirut, 1985), p. 212; Ibn al-Jawzī (d. 597 H.), *Mawḍū'at* (Medina, 1966), 2/227; Dhahabī (d. 748 H.), *Mīzān*, 1/21; Suyūṭī, *al-La'ālī* (Beirut, 1975), 2/136; al-Kinānī (d. 963 H.), *Tanzīh al-Sharī'a* (Beirut, 1979), 2/178; Shawkānī (d. 1250 H.), *al-Fawā'id al-Majmū'a*, (Cairo, 1960), p. 208.

[153] Ibn al-Jawzī, 2/227; Suyūṭī, 2/136; al-Kinānī, 2/178. Compare also with Haythamī, *Majma'*, 5/288, where a similar tradition was reported through Abū al-Dardā'.

[154] Abū Ya'lā, 7/267; 'Uqaylī (d. 322 H.), *al-Ḍu'afā' al-Kabīr* (Beirut, 1984), 2/102–3; Ibn Ḥibbān, 1/313; Daylamī, 2/146, 3/478; Ibn al-Qaysarānī, 211; Dhahabī, 1/378; Haythamī, 5/289.

[155] Ibn Māja, 2/925. See also Mundhirī, 2/154.

[156] Ibn Ḥanbal, 1/61, 65; al-Ḥākim, 2/81.

[157] Compare Suyūṭī, *Durr* 2/114; Haythamī, *Majma'*, 5/289; Ṭabarānī, *M. K.*, 24/254; Ibn Hanbal, 6/362; Mundhirī, 2/150.

quoted as saying that he preferred even to get ill on the sea coast to being healthy, freeing one hundred slaves and providing them and their riding beasts in the way of God.[158] According to a tradition of Nāfi' ← Ibn 'Umar, the Prophet asserted that God would put a great rock in the scales of anybody who merely makes a *takbīra* on the sea coast.[159] In a tradition of Iyās b. Mu'āwiya b. Qurra (Baṣran, d. 122 H.), such *takbīra*, if done loudly on the sea coast at sunset, earns its doer one hundred good deeds...etc., for every sea drop.[160]

Faḍā'il traditions on different cities in Syria as well as on other parts of the Muslim world are a huge branch of literary activity. As noted by a few scholars, part of this literature originated during the Umayyad period in order "to attract volunteers for the perpetual wars against the unbelievers on the Syrian front".[161] In what follows, a review of some of it will be made.

One tradition by al-Qāsim Abū 'Abd al-Raḥmān ← Abū Umāma says: "while we were sitting with the Prophet, Syria was mentioned with the Byzantines who were in it. The Prophet said: you will conquer Syria and hold on its sea a fortress named Anafa. On the day of resurrection, God will set alive twelve thousand martyrs from it".[162]

As for the river Jordan, a tradition of Abū Idris al-Khawlani ← Nuhayk b. Ṣuraym attributes to the Prophet the saying: "you will continue to fight the unbelievers/var. polytheists until the rest of you/var. my *umma* fights the army of *dajjāl* on the river Jordan, yourselves on the east side and themselves on the west side of it".[163] Through Ibn 'Abbās and Ibn 'Umar another prophetical tradition says: "if belief is gone from the earth, it will (still) be found in inner (*lit. baṭn* = the belly of) Jordan".[164]

The merits of Acre are centred around its well, 'Ayn al-Baqar, which is praised by one tradition as one of four holy springs from which the Muslims were recommended to drink.[165] Other merits were put forward by less well known sources, the authenticity of their traditional bases being even more questioned. According to one, the Prophet said: "a town hanging under the (divine) seat (*al-'arsh*), named 'Akkā'; whoever spends the night

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[158] Daylamī, 5/175-6.

[159] Daylamī, 3/521; Ibn al-Jawzī, *Mawḍū'āt*, 2/229; Suyūṭī, *La'ālī*, 2/137; Kinānī, 2/178. The authenticity of this tradition was questioned because the authority on it, Zayd b. Jubayra, was considered "nothing" (*laysa bi-shay'*).

[160] Ṭabarānī, *M. K.*, 19/29; 'Uqaylī, 2/21-2; Abū Nu'aym (d. 430 H.), *Ḥilya* (Cairo, 1933), 3/125; al-Ḥākim 3/587; Albānī, *Silsilat...*, 1/399-400; Dhahabī, *Mīzan*, 1/312; Ibn Ḥajar, *Lisān* (Haydarabad, 1330 H.), 2/407-8; Kinānī, 2/178, quoting Ibn Qāni' for it.

[161] S. D. Goitein, *Studies in Islamic History and Institutions* (Leiden, 1968), p. 146. See also A. Noth, *Heiliger Kriege und heiliger Kampf...* (Bonn, 1966), p. 84 n. 400; M. Gil, 1/83-4, 88-9; M. Sharon "The cities of the Holy Land..." *Cathedra* (40), 1986, p. 90 (Hebrew); A. El'ad, "The coastal cities of Eretz-Israel...", *Cathedra* 8 (1978), pp. 162-3 (Hebrew).

[162] Ṭabarānī, *M. K.*, 8/229; Haythamī, *Majma'*, 10/62; Dhahabī, *Mīzaln*, 2/177; Ibn Ḥajar, *Lisān*, 4/128; Kinānī, 2/58. On the location of Anafa see Yāqūt, 1/271.

[163] This was also reported in a *mursal* form by Yazīd b. Rabī'a. Compare Daylamī, 5/103; Shams al-Dīn, 2/169; Mujīr al-Dīn, 1/234; Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Suyūṭī (wrote in 875 H.), *Faḍā'il al-Shām* (MS. Princeton, Yehuda 1/264), fol. 124(a).

[164] Dhahabī, 1/61; Kinānī, 2/57.

[165] The other three are the well of Zamzam in Mecca, the spring of Silwān in Jerusalem and the spring of al-Fulūs in Baysān. This tradition was either attributed to the Prophet through Abū Hurayra or else reported by Muqātil b. Sulaymān (d. 150 H.) in a *mursal* form. See Ibn al-Murajjā, 95(a); Ibn al-Firkāḥ, *Bā'ith al-Nufūs, JPOS* 15 (1935), pp. 70, 81. On the sanctity of 'Ayn al-Baqar in Yāqūt's time see his 4/176.

in it as a *murābiṭ* and a reckoner (*muḥtasib*), God will write for him the wage of a martyr ... ". In another he was quoted as saying : " the best of coasts is the coast of 'Asqalān.; and (still) better than it is the coast of 'Akkā' ... ". From a tradition of 'Ā'isha we learn that the Prophet also said " whoever spends two nights of *ribāṭ* in 'Akkā' will be like one who strikes with my sword, and whoever spends three nights of *ribāṭ* (there), will be given the wage of a martyr ". An anonymous tradition attributes to him the saying : " whoever fasts the Ramaḍān month in 'Akkā' intending to do *murābaṭa* ('*alā niyyat al-murābaṭa*) and *mujāhada*, God will write for him the wage of one thousand martyrs ". Besides drinking from 'Ayn al-Baqar, other traditions recommend washing for ablution in the nearby river, al-Na'āmayn, walking to a certain location in its vicinity called al-Ramla al-Bayḍā', praying there, etc.[166]

The traditions upholding the merits of 'Asqalān and urging *ribāṭ* and settlement there are by far the most numerous, occurring in a wide variety of sources and hence often noted by scholars.[167] In a tradition by Anas, the Prophet is quoted as referring to it as "one of the two brides" (*iḥdā al-'arūsayn*), the other one implied being Gaza. We also learn from this tradition that on the day of resurrection God would bring to life seventy thousand of its people free from accounting for their deeds. Another fifty thousand martyrs would also be brought to life from it, ordered by God to be washed in the river Bayḍa, so that they would come out completely white and then be allowed to enter Paradise. We also notice that this tradition was sometimes used as a commentary on Quran 3/200 which urges the believers to do *ribāṭ*. But although it was widely circulated, its authenticity was questioned on the ground that Abū 'Iqāl, Hilāl b. Zayd al-'Adawī (an early second century resident of 'Asqalān), who transmitted it from Anas, was considered "weak".[168]

In few other traditions Gaza was explicitly stated as the other "bride". One, a *mursal* by Muṣ'ab b. Thābit (d. 157 H.) ← his grandfather, 'Abdullāh b. al-Zubayr ← the Prophet, says : " blessedness to anybody who lives in one of the two brides/var. towns (*al-qaryatayn*), 'Asqalān and Gaza ".[169] In another, anonymous tradition, the Prophet is quoted as announcing (*ubashshirukum*) the two brides for the Muslims, Gaza and 'Asqalān.[170]

A special notification of the merits of the graveyard (*maqbara*) of 'Asqalān and the martyrs buried there was made by a group of prophetical traditions through Ibn 'Umar/'Umar, 'Ā'isha and 'Abdullāh b. Buḥayna. With minor variations we are usually told that the Prophet prayed once for the people buried in a certain graveyard, admonished it or said that God was praying over it. When his wife or some unnamed person enquired about it, he said that it was the graveyard of 'Asqalān/var., one in the land

[166] Anon., *Faṣl Fī Faḍā'il 'Akkā'* (MS. Princeton, Yehuda, 4183), fols. 38(b)–41(b). The tradition "*ṭūbā li-man ra'ā 'akkā'*" was noted also by Yāqūt, 4/41. On other sources which bring such traditions see a tract by Azharī (wrote in 1172 H.) entitled *al-Raqīm*, which aimed at refuting them. MS. Princeton, Yehuda (5923), 92(a)–94(a).

[167] El'ad, pp. 162–3; Gil, 1/83–4; O. Livne-Kafri, "On Jerusalem in early Islam", *Cathedra* 51 (1989), pp. 43–4, (Hebrew).

[168] Compare Suyūṭī, *Durr*, 2/112 quoting Ibn Abī Ḥātim; *idem*, *La'ālī*, 1/461; *al-Thānī Min al-Fawā'id*, MS. Zāhiriyya, *Majmū'*, 18/168; Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Suyūṭī, 124(a); Ibn Ḥanbal, 3/225; Daylamī, 3/49; Shams al-Dīn, 2/170, quoting Shihāb al-Dīn's *Muthīr*; Kinānī, 2/49; al-Qārī (d. 1014 H.), *al-Asrār al-Marfū'a*, (Beirut, 1985), 159; Ibn al-Jawzī, *Mawḍū'āt* 2/524; Shawkānī, p. 429; Haythamī, *Majma'*, 10/62; Ibn Ḥajar, *al-Nukat 'Alā Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ* (Medina, 1988), 1/451 n. 2.

[169] Daylamī, 2/450; M. b. A. al-Suyūṭī, 124(a); Shams al-Dīn, 2/169; Mujīr al-Dīn, 2/74.

[170] Ibn al-Faqīh, p. 103; Yāqūt, 4/122.

of the enemies, named 'Asqalān, from where God will resurrect seventy thousand to enter paradise, etc. In one or two variants the Prophet preferred it even to the al-Baqī' graveyard in Medina, calling it a *ribāṭ* for the Muslims, from where God would resurrect seventy thousand martyrs, etc.[171]

These traditions were usually questioned on the ground that the authorities on them, Bishr b. Maymūn, Nāfi' b. Hurmuz and al-Musawwar b. Khālid were considered "weak". However, the main theme behind them is clearly to stress the town's importance as a *ribāṭ*. Recall that Sa'īd b. Manṣūr mentions how 'Aṭā', upon hearing such a tradition, decided to make an annual *ribāṭ* of forty days in it.[172]

In fact there are numerous other traditions which put forward the importance of *ribāṭ* and settling down in 'Asqalān. One by Abū Hurayra is attributed to the Prophet, listing it as one of four important border posts/ports (*thughūr*), the other three being Alexandria, Qazwīn and 'Abadān.[173] Another, by Ibn 'Abbās, says that a man came to the Prophet and told him that he wanted to go for *ghazw*. The Prophet, we are told, advised him to go to *al-shām*, for God had guaranteed it for him, and to stick (*wa-l-zam*) to 'Asqalān in particular...[174]

In another, less circulated tradition through Ibn 'Abbas, the Prophet says: "take *jihād* upon you (*'alaykum bi-l-jihād*). The best of your *jihād* is *ribāṭ* and the best of your *ribāṭ* is 'Asqalān".[175] From one through Anas we learn about a prophetical saying that even if a *murābiṭ* in 'Asqalān sleeps all his life (i.e. never prays, S.B.), God will assign angels to pray instead of him so that he will be assembled (*yuḥshar*) with the praying people on the day of resurrection.[176] Another, by Abū Umāma, attributes to the Prophet the saying that if someone does a *ribāṭ* in 'Asqalan for only one day and one night and then he dies, he would be considered as a *martyr* for as long as sixty years after that, even if he dies in the land of polytheism.[177] Finally, a tradition of Ibn 'Umar says: "everything has a summit (*dhurwa*) and the summit of Syria is 'Asqalān".[178]

The historiographical information

Though scanty and sporadic, the information provided by historiographic sources reveals a remarkable resemblance to certain substantial cross-sections of material from apocalyptic traditions; a picture which, on the whole is corroborated by *faḍā'il* traditions too. There

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[171] Compare 'Abd al-Razzāq, 5/287; Basawī, 2/300; Abū Ya'lā, 1/160–1, 2/216–17; M. b. A. al-Suyūṭī, 124(b); Ibn al-Jawzī, Mawḍū'at, 2/52–4; Dhahabī, Mīzān, 3/170 quoting Baghawī's *Tārīkh*; Ibn Ḥajar, *Lisān* 6/36; idem, al-Maṭālib, 4/161–2; Haythamī, *Majma'*, 10/62; idem, *Kashf al-Astār*, 3/324; Kinānī, 2/48–9, quoting Ibn Ḥibbān and Ibn Mardawayh's *Tafsīr*; Shams al-Dīn, 2/169–71; Suyūṭī, La'ālī, 1/460–3, quoting al-Sarrāj's *Fawā'id*; Shawkani, pp. 429–31.

[172] Sa'id b. Manṣūr, 2/160, cited above.

[173] Ibn al-Firkāḥ, p. 70.

[174] Ibn al-Faqīh, p. 103; Ṭabarānī, M. K., 11/92; Ibn 'Asākir, 1/86–7; Shawkānī, 431, quoting Ibn al-Najjār for a similar tradition by Anas too; Ibn al-Murajjā, 109(b); Suyūṭī, La'ālī, 1/461–3, quoting Dūlābī's al-Kunā; Shams al-Dīn, 2/138; Kinānī, 2/49; Haythamī, *Majma'* 10/62, quoting also Ṭabarānī's Awsaṭ; Mujīr al-Dīn, 2/73–4.

[175] Suyūṭī, La'ālī, 1/462; Kinānī, 2/49; Ṭabarānī, M. K., 11/88.

[176] Suyūṭī, ibid.; Kinānī, ibid., quoting Ibn al-Najjār's *Tārīkh*.

[177] Ibn al-Faqīh, 103; Suyūṭī, 1/463; Kinānī, 2/49, quoting Ibn 'Asākir.

[178] Yāqūt, 4/122.

are of course cases where such resemblance is only vague; but all the same it can be argued that the historical information on early Muslim-Byzantine relations is itself often confused or, on certain issues, even lacking. Thus, whatever resemblance is left justifies being presented along the lines drawn by P. Alexander, i.e. the possibility that few cross-sections were prophecies *ex-eventu*, and hence may help to illuminate certain aspects of Muslim–Byzantine relations in the first century. Our main point of departure is that the historical apocalypses reviewed in the course of this study must have associatively appealed to people around the turn of that century, or even have drawn upon patterns of actual historical situations, clearly of the early Muslim conquests of Syria, which were familiar to them.

Anyone who is familiar with the traditional accounts of the early Muslim conquests in Syria knows the extent of the discrepancies caused basically by the fact that such accounts were actually the product of continuous attempts at reconstruction, often motivated by the later need to produce a scheme of sacred history, mixed with sectarian and local tendencies and hindered by the lack of precise, first hand and written documentation. Such is the case concerning the issues of dates, locations, how the conquest of Damascus, Jerusalem, Caesarea, Ḥimṣ occurred: in fact almost every event of the first century.[179] Above all, scholars have not so far dared to deal with the overall picture provided by the much avoided pseudo-Wāqidī which is drastically different from anything else that we "know" about "the Arab conquests".[180] Most significantly, the predominant role played by the local *mawālī* and converts in such *futūḥ*, as well as the "international" composition of the Christian armies led by the Byzantines, have not been addressed by any scholar.[181]

There is also the issue, current in apocalyptic traditions, of the treachery of certain Arab tribes and their joining the Byzantines. Added to the occasional reference to the fighting of Arab Christians (*mutanaṣṣira*) on the side of the Byzantines in some *futūḥ* sources as well as in pseudo-Wāqidī,[182] there is also sporadic information that the whole of Iyād in Upper Mesopotamia moved over to Byzantium and that the B. Taghlib threatened to do so during the reign of 'Umar I.[183]

The issue of Muslim–Byzantine peace pacts and then treachery by the latter has figured centrally in the apocalyptic material reviewed above. The historiographical sources say that such a peace was concluded by Mu'āwiya during his struggle with 'Alī as well as by

[179] A wide coverage of this subject was done by F. M. Donner, *The Early Islamic Conquests* (Princeton, 1983), pp. 91–5. See also M. Sharon, "The military reforms of Abu Muslim..." in M. Sharon, ed., *Studies in Islamic History*... (Jerusalem, 1986), pp. 106–12.

[180] Such avoidance is clear even in the work of Donner as noted by E. Landau-Tasseron's review of it in *JSAI* 6 (1985), p. 511.

[181] Pseudo-Wāqidī, *Futūḥ al-Shām* (Cairo, 1368). From 1/87 we learn that those who reconquered Ḥimṣ were overwhelmingly 'abīd and *mawālī* who numbered four thousand while the 'arab numbered only one thousand under Khālid b. al-Walīd. On the conversion of 'Abdullāh Yūqannā, governor (*biṭrīq/ṣāḥib*) of Ḥalab and his leading role in the conquest of Syria, Mesopotamia and even Egypt, see 1/175. On the kings of the Christian peoples summoned by Heraclius for the battle of Yarmūk, see 1/96–7. On the role of *ṣāḥib rūmya*, Falinṭīnus and his conversion to Islam during the battle over Antioch, as well as the idea that Heraclius himself professed Islam, see 1/195, 198. The present author is currently engaged in a critical edition of this unique source.

[182] Pseudo-Wāqidī on Jabala, King of the Arab *mutanaṣṣira* from B. Ghassān, Lakham and Judhām, in 1/97 and Donner, p. 154 n. 303.

[183] Mas'ūdī (d. 345 H.), *Tanbīh* (Beirut, 1965), 167–8; Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh* (Cairo, 1967), 4/54; Balādhurī, *Futūḥ* (Beirut, 1975), 185–6.

'Abd al-Malik during the "second *fitna*" of Ibn Zubayr. However this information is dubious and, so to speak, is as inadequate as the apocalyptic scheme which probably tried to build on its pattern. A tradition recorded by Ṭayālisī with the *isnād*: Shu'ba ← Abū al-Fayḍ al-Shāmī (Mūsā b. Ayyūb, Ḥimṣī) ← Sulaym b. 'Āmir (al-Khabā'irī, Ḥimṣī, d. 130 H.) says that "Mu'āwiya had '*ahd* with the Byzantines during which he used to go (peacefully?) into their country. But whenever that '*ahd* ended he would raid them."[184]

The date given by Theophanes for the first truce between Mu'āwiya and the Byzantine Emperor Constans is Ann. Mundi 6142 (= A.D. 650–1 = A.H. 30–1). He adds that "peace was concluded for two years and Mu'āwiya received Gregory, son of Theodora as hostage in Damascus".[185] From him we also learn that it was Mu'āwiya who actually violated the peace when, after two years (Ann. Mun. 6145 = A.D. 653–4 = A.H. 33–4) he overran Rhodes.[186] But, "because of disorder (in Ann. Mun. 6150 = A.D. 658–9 = A.H. 38–9) Mu'āwiya agreed to reach an agreement with the Romans (= Byzantines, S.B.) and paid them one thousand nomismata, a horse and a slave per day".[187]

This clear reference to the circumstances of the struggle with 'Alī is similar to what is reported by a few Muslim sources. From two third-century sources we learn that upon the advice of 'Amr b. al-'Āṣ, Mu'āwiya decided to make a truce with Qayṣar just before the battle of Ṣiffīn.[188] A third source, Balādhurī, mentions such advice from 'Amr, but says nothing about 'Alī or Ṣiffīn.[189] Elsewhere, Balādhurī brings a Syrian tradition of Ṣafwān b. 'Amr and Sa'īd b. 'Abd al-'Azīz which only says that Mu'āwiya made peace with the Byzantines, agreed to pay them and took hostages whom he put in Ba'albakk. However, it was the Byzantines who treacherously broke the peace, but Mu'awiya did not kill the hostages.[190]

In itself, the idea reiterated in some apocalypses of Byzantine–Arab military co-operation during the truce interval against a common enemy, is theoretically possible. However, the historical realisation of such co-operation during Mu'āwiya's region or ever, is not confirmed by any Muslim, or indeed Byzantine source. In fact, one early source, the *Tārīkh* of Khalīfa b. Khayyāṭ (d. 240 H.), rather puts Mu'āwiya's peace in what was termed "'*ām al-jamā'a*", the year 41 H.[191] And Theophanes says that two years before Mu'āwiya's death (in Ann. Mun. 6169 = A.D. 677–8 = A.H. 58–9) and under the pressure of the Mardaites' campaign who, he says, "invaded the Lebanon and occupied it from Mount Mauros to the holy city, overpowering its most important centres", he asked for and got a peace treaty with Emperor Constantine. We also learn that the treaty was to last for thirty years and that Mu'āwiya agreed to pay the annual sum of three thousand nomismata, fifty prisoners and fifty high bred horses.[192]

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[184] Ṭayālisī, p. 157; Zaylaʿī (d. 760 H.), *Naṣb al-Rāya* (Cairo, 1938), 3/390–1, quoting Ibn Ḥanbal, Ibn Abī Shayba, Ibn Ḥibbān, Tirmidhī and Ṭabarānī.
[185] Theophanes, *Chronicle* (Eng. tr., Philadelphia, 1982), p. 44.
[186] *Ibid.*   [187] *Ibid.*, p. 46.
[188] Al-Zubayr b. Bakkār, *al-Akhbār al-Muwaffaqiyyāt* (Baghdad, 1980), p. 301; Naṣr b. Muzāḥim (d. 212 H.), *Waqʿat Ṣiffīn* (Cairo, 1981), p. 37.
[189] Balādhurī, *Ansāb* (Jerusalem, 1971), 4(a)/36.
[190] Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, 163.
[191] Khalīfa b. Khayyāṭ, *Tārīkh*, Najaf 1967, 1/189.
[192] Theophanes, pp. 53–4.

Both Byzantine and Muslim sources put the peace treaty reached between 'Abd al-Malik and Justinian II during the *fitna* of Ibn al-Zubayr. However, there is some discrepancy concerning its exact date and circumstances. Theophanes puts it in Ann. Mun. 6176 (= A.D. 684–5 = A.H. 65–6) which, he says, was the first year of 'Abd al-Malik's reign, i.e. during the last year of Constantine's life but ratified by his son, Justinian II.[193] Arab sources in their turn put it in the year A.H. 70/A.D. 689,[194] But both sides agree that 'Abd al-Malik was the one who sent envoys asking for peace. Only Balādhurī gives the *fitna* of Ibn al-Zubayr as a background to such a request. For Theophanes, the reason was the continued raids of Mardaites and a plague in Syria. Ṭabarī and Ibn 'Ibrī basically agree to this, saying that the Byzantine king made an aggressive war on the Muslims in Syria (*istajāsha 'alā man bi-l-shām min al-muslimīn*). In fact, Balādhurī gets even closer to Theophanes' description when he mentions the attack of Byzantine horseman on Mt Lukām, near Antioch, and their progress to the Lebanon being joined by a great number of Jarājima, Anbāṭ and rebellious slaves of the Muslims.

We also notice that both Ṭabarī and Balādhurī say that 'Abd al-Malik was deeply concerned with the threat faced by the Muslims, or even anxious that Justinian might reconquer Syria (*khawfan minhu 'alā al-Muslimīn/wa-takhawufuhu an yakhruj li-l-shām fa-yaghlib 'alayh*). As for the material clauses of the treaty, both sources say that 'Abd al-Malik paid one thousand dinars every week. Ibn 'Ibrī in his turn mentions also the figures recorded by Theophanes: one thousand nomismata/dinar, one slave and one horse per day.

Theophanes adds one kind of co-operation agreed upon: that both parties share equally the tribute from Cyprus, Armenia and Iberia.[195] We also learn that Justinian agreed to seize 12,000 Mardaites from the Lebanon.

The conquest of Constantinople, which in Muslim apocalypses figures as a central chain in pre-messianic events, seems to have constituted a corner-stone in Umayyad policy right from the outset. From the tradition of Sayf b. 'Umar (d. *c.* 180 H.) we learn that the idea of conquering it from the direction of Spain was contemplated as far back as the reign of 'Uthmān in 27 H.[196] Ibn al-Kalbī is quoted by Khalīfa as saying that in the year A.H. 32/A.D. 652, Mu'āwiya invaded the area of the straits near Constantinople.[197] Speaking about the year Ann. Mun. 6146 (= A.D. 654–5 = A.H. 34–5), Theophanes in his turn mentions Mu'āwiya's first attempt to invade Constantinople from Phoenician Tripolis.[198]

The next major attempt made during Mu'āwiya's reign on the city is said by most Muslim sources to have been led by his son, Yazīd in A.H. 49–50/A.D. 669–70.[199] Only Abū Zur'a gives the date as 54 H. which is the closest to the one given by Theophanes, Ann. Mun. 6164–5 (= A.D. 672–4 = A.H. 53–5).[200]

Although the final outcome of this campaign was failure, the Muslims seem to have had

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[193] *Ibid.,* p. 59.
[194] Ṭabarī, 6/150; Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, 164; Ibn al-'Ibrī, *Tārīkh Mukhtaṣar al-Duwal* (Beirut, 1958), 112–13.
[195] Theophanes, p. 61.
[196] Ṭabarī, 4/255; cf. also Qurṭubī, 2/353.
[197] Khalīfa, 1/143.
[198] Theophanes, p. 45.
[199] Compare Khalīfa, 1/196; Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, p. 70; Ṭabarī, 5/232.
[200] Abū Zur'a, 1/188, quoting a tradition by the Syrian Sa'īd b. 'Abd al-'Azīz; Theophanes, pp. 52–3.

some initial success in capturing a few fortresses and laying complete siege to the city. Abū Zur'a speaks about conquering "a fortress called al-Mudā on the bay of Constantinople" and Theophanes describes how the Arabs anchored in the Thracian territory of the European suburbs of the city.[201]

Against this background capturing Constantinople must have looked within reach. Thus attempts were resumed with the outbreak of a new wave of hostilities which continued for the whole three years of Sulaymān's reign. The discrepancy between Theophanes and the Muslim sources is actually very limited. He says that preparations for the campaign against Constantinople started in Ann. Mun. 6206 (= A.D. 714–15 = A.H. 96–7), which was the last year of Walīd's reign, although Emperor Artemios had asked for peace.[202]

The date given by Muslim sources is indeed 97 H., but the one who is said to have initiated the campaign was Sulaymān upon assuming power.[203] From a unique Syrian tradition recorded by Ibn al-Murajjā we learn that Sulaymān decided to invade Constantinople while he was receiving allegiance in Jerusalem and after the news reached him about a Byzantine invasion of the coastal area opposite Ḥimṣ.[204] We also learn that he moved from there to Dābiq near Aleppo in order to be close to conducting the operations. However, with his death in 99 H. and because of the difficulties the besiegers faced, the new caliph, 'Umar II called the whole operation off.

As noted above, Theophanes mentions a Mardaite invasion of the Lebanon in Ann. Mun. 6169 (= A.D. 677–8 = A.H. 58–9), i.e. towards the end of Mu'āwiya's reign. We were also informed that they "conquered it from Mt Mauros to the holy city, overpowering its most important centres"; a fact which led Mu'āwiya to seek a peace treaty with Emperor Constantine.[205]

We do not know what exactly Theophanes meant by "the holy city". One thing is certain, that this invasion was only one in a series of Byzantine raids on Syria's coastal areas upon which Arab historiographical sources give only sporadic information. From Balādhurī we learn that during the war between 'Abd al-Malik and Ibn al-Zubayr, the Byzantines attacked 'Asqalān, destroyed it and expelled its people (... *wa-ajlat 'anhā ahlahā*). We also learned that the same actually happened to Caesarea, "outer Acre" ('*akkā al-khārija*) and Tyre and that 'Abd al-Malik, after stabilizing his power, conducted a policy of reconstructing and resettling *murābiṭa* in these cities, with estates (*qaṭā'i'*) being allocated there.[206] According to another tradition recorded by Balādhurī, 'Asqalān was occupied first by 'Amr b. al-'Āṣ. Receiving reinforcement, most probably naval, from the Byzantines, its people rebelled and Mu'āwiya had to reconquer it. Again we learn that the latter settled *rawābiṭ* and posted guards in it (*wakkala bihā ḥafaẓa*).

The traditions recorded by Balādhurī are undoubtedly authentic ones and reflect local

[201] Theophanes, *ibid.*; Abu Zur'a, 1/346.
[202] Theophanes, p. 80.
[203] Ṭabarī, 6/523; Mas'ūdī, *Tanbīh*, 165–6. Compare also with Khalīfa, 1/326 where the year 98 H. is given for the siege.
[204] Ibn al-Murajjā, 82(b).
[205] Theophanes, pp. 53–4.
[206] Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, pp. 148–9.

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memories transmitted from father to son. On one occasion, Balādhurī's source Muḥammad b. Yūsuf al-Firyābī (lived in Caesarea, d. 212 H.) quoted "old authorities from the people of 'Asqalān" (*mashāyikh min alh'asqalān*). On another, Balādhurī himself quotes Abū Sulaymān al-Ramlī ← his father. He also transmits from Bakr b. al-Haytham who, we are told, met an Arab from 'Asqalān and heard from him that his grandfather was one of those whom'Abd al-Malik settled in 'Asqalān, etc.

We also learn from Balādhurī about the existence in 'Asqalān of certain estates from the times of 'Umar I and 'Uthmān.[307] And on the basis of such information it was suggested that the coastal areas were actually invaded and destroyed during that early period, but recaptured by Mu'āwiya.[308]

It is also plausible to suggest that the need of Mu'āwiya and later Umayyads to protect the coastal areas was at least partially behind the building of a naval force and the move towards a more aggressive policy. A case in point is that of Acre, which we know that Mu'āwiya rebuilt before taking it as a naval base for his action against Cyprus.[309] From Balādhurī we learn that in 49 H. the Byzantines invaded the coastal areas (*kharajat al-rum ilā al-sawāḥil*). To face the new circumstances, Mu'āwiya moved the shipyard craftsmen to coastal towns in Palestine, mainly Acre. We also learn that the shipyards remained in Acre until moved to Tyre by Hishām b. 'Abd al-Malik; though according to one tradition, 'Abd al-Malik had to reconstruct both Acre and Tyre after they were destroyed.[310]

Speaking about the coastal towns of Lebanon (Sidon, 'Arqa, Jubayl and Beirut), a tradition of Sa'īd b. 'Abd al-Azīz ← al-Waḍīn (b. 'Aṭā', Damascene, d. 147–50 H.) says that the Byzantines occupied part of these coastal areas (*ghalabū 'alā ba'ḍ hādhihi al-sawāḥil*) during the later part of 'Umar's reign and the early part of 'Uthmān's. However, these areas were reconquered, rehabilitated and resettled with forces and estates, etc., by Mu'āwiya.[311] Balādhurī quotes also Madā'inī (d. 225 H.) for a tradition of 'Attāb. b. Ibrāhīm which says that the people of Tripoli too rebelled during 'Abd al-Malik's reign and their town was reoccupied. However, according to the Sa'īd ← al-Waḍīn tradition, noted above, the ones who rebelled were a group of Byzantines whom 'Abd al-Malik had previously permitted to settle in the town.[312]

The same observation may be made concerning the lack of actual control throughout the first century over the coastal area of Antioch, the 'Amq of Mar'ash and other areas in the hinterland of Syria. About the situation of Antioch during Mu'āwiya's reign we learn from some traditions preserved by Balādhurī and Khalīfa. One, recorded by the former, bears the *isnād*: Muḥammad b. Sahm al-Anṭākī ← Abū Ṣāliḥ al-Farrā' ← Mukhlad b. al-Ḥusayn (settled in Maṣṣīṣa, d. 191 H.) ← old authorities of the border post/port (*thaghr*, i.e. of Antioch). It describes Mu'āwiya's attempt to resettle the town after a Byzantine naval attack on it in 42 H.[313] Speaking about the years 47–8 H., Khalīfa mentions a winter raid

[307] *Ibid.*

[308] El'ad, pp. 156–8.

[309] Compare: Yāqūt, 4/144; Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, 82.

[310] Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, 124–5; Yāqūt, 4/144.

[311] Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, 133.

[312] *Ibid.*, pp. 133–4.

[313] *Ibid.*, p. 153.

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on the city by Abū 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Qaynī (*was-shaṭṭā abū 'abd al-raḥmān al-qaynī anṭākya*).[214] From another source we learn that these raids occurred between 45 and 48 H.[215]

The reports beyond these dates must be handled cautiously in order not to confuse them with raids on another city bearing the same name but located in Anatolia. As for Anṭarsūs, believed by Yāqūt to be a coastal fortress bordering between the districts of Damascus and Ḥimṣ, it is said that it was occupied first in 17 H. We are also told however, that after its people had left it, Mu'āwiya gave orders to rebuild, fortify and settle *muqātila* with estates in it. And the same was done with Maraqya and Balanyās.[216]

The combined attack of Byzantines and Mardaites/Jarājima which led to a temporary loss of the Lebanon in 70 H. repeated itself in Antioch and Mount Lukām in 89 H.[217] As for 'Amq Mar'ash, Khalīfa quotes two sources which speak about a Byzantine attack on it in 75 H.: one from Muḥammad b. 'Ā'idh (Damascene, d. 233–4 H.) and the other from Ibn al-Kalbī (d. 204 H.).[218]

Very little is said about the Arabian-Ḥijāzī element in the Umayyad struggle with the Byzantines, which, as noted above, figures centrally in apocalyptic literature. From a Syrian tradition of Wāqidī ← Thawr b. Yazīd (Ḥimṣī who possibly died in Jerusalem in 154 H.), we hear about "a conscription of Medina" (*ba'th al-madīna*) which took part in occupying the Ṭuwāna fortress in 88 H. This is supported by another tradition which Wāqidī reports from Medinese sources, with an *isnād* leading from his father to Makhruma b. Sulaymān al-Wālibī (Medinese, d. 130 H.). What we are told here is that the occupation of Ṭuwāna was accomplished by Maslama b. 'Abd al-Malik and 'Abbās b. al-Walīd, with Ibn Muḥayrīz al-Jumaḥī taking part too. Then comes a paragraph which says: "also took part in it 1,500 [men] out of the conscription of two thousand which Walīd had imposed upon the people of Medina" (*wa-shāraka fīhā alf wa-khamsmi'a mimman ḍaraba al-walīdu 'alayhim al-ba'tha min ahl al-madīna, wa-huwa ba'thu alfayn*).[219]

As late as the nineties, the Byzantine threat to northern, coastal and even central Syria was still a real one. From a biographical note transmitted by Abū Zur'a on the well-known reporter of apocalyptic traditions, Ṣafwān b. 'Amr, we learn of a certain alarm march (*zaḥf*) in his hometown, Ḥimṣ, in which he himself took part in 94 H.[220] We have seen above that Sulaymān, while in Jerusalem, heard of a Byzantine invasion of the coast opposite Ḥimṣ (*jā'a al-khabaru anna al-rūma kharajat'alā sāḥili ḥimṣ*), and hence decided on his massive campaign against Constantinople.[221] There is also a tradition recorded by Balādhurī which speaks about a Byzantine naval invasion of the Latakya coastland in the year 100 H. It has two Syrian *isnāds*: one from Abū Ḥafṣ al-Dimashqī ← Sa'īd b. 'Abd al-'Azīz and the other from Mūsā b. Ibrāhīm al-Tanūkhī ← his father ← old authorities (*mashāyikh*) from among the people of Ḥimṣ. From it we learn that the Byzantines destroyed Latakya and took its people prisoners. It is not altogether certain whether it was 'Umar II or Yazīd b. 'Abd al-Malik who in fact recovered it.[222]

[214] Khalīfa, 1/193.
[215] Yāqūt, 1/270.
[216] Khalīfa, 1/269–70. Compare also with Ṭabarī, 6/202.
[219] Ṭabarī, 6/434.
[221] Ibn al-Murajjā, 82(b).

[216] Ibn Ḥajar, *Iṣāba*, 4/128.
[217] Compare Ṭabarī, 6/322; Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 165.
[220] Abū Zur'a, 1/353.
[222] Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, 139.

Concluding notes

Before assessing the value and relevance of the apocalyptic material reviewed above for the study of early Muslim–Byzantine wars, a few points have to be made. First, although *malāḥim* were overwhelmingly associated with Muslim–Byzantine wars in Syria, there are two traditions in which other wars in early Islam are also called "*malāḥim*". One is a family tradition of Kuthayr b. 'Abdullāh b. 'Amr b. 'Awf al-Muzanī who died around the mid-second century (150–60 H.), i.e. in a period which witnessed a great wave of circulating apocalyptic traditions. It attributes to the Prophet the naming of the four rivers, four mountains and four *malāḥim* of paradise on earth. One notices that the four *malāḥim* stated are names of battles known to have been led by the Prophet within the Ḥijāzī *sira* framework. They are Badr, Uḥud, al-Khandaq and Khaybar (var. reading: Ḥunayn).[223] The second tradition was attributed to the Prophet through Abū Hurayra on the authority of Abū Mu'ashshir (Kufan d. 120 H.) and Ismā'īl b. Umayya (Meccan, d. 139–44 H.). It names the *malāḥim* of paradise as: al-Jamal, Ṣiffīn and al-Ḥarra, adding that "he used to conceal the fourth" (*wa-kāna yaktum al-rābi'a*).[224]

Apart from these two isolated late and basically non-Syrian attempts at infiltration, Muslim apocalyptic material is predominantly concerned with the wars against Byzantium. The second note due here is that such predominant interest finds clear support from a Jewish liturgical poem believed to have been composed in Palestine under the impact of the initial Arab victories. It looks favourably on the advent of the armies of the "King of Yuqṭān" and prophesises the end of "the kings of Edom", by whom the Byzantines are clearly meant. It also promises an uprising by the people of Antioch who will make peace, forgiveness to Ma'ozia and Samaria, mercy to Acre and the Galilee, bloody wars between the Ishma'ilites and Edomites (= Byzantines), the stoning of Gaza and finally, that Ashkelon and Ashdod would be struck by fear.[225]

But, above all, there is the remarkable affinity, correlation and even parallelism between apocalyptic, historiographical and *faḍā'il* materials, as well as relevance to major actual events and turning points in Muslim–Byzantine relations throughout the first century. Among these note can be made of Byzantium's naval and land-based attempts to recover Syria, a series of temporary ceasefires and possible co-operations, a renewed outbreak of hostilities, the Byzantines' eventual defeat and a number of Muslim attempts on Constantinople itself.

Such affinity supports the main thesis of P. Alexander and increases the credibility of this material as a means of illuminating certain aspects and events on which no information whatsoever is provided by historiographical sources. A case in point is the unique notion of a military co-operation against a common enemy on the Iraqi–Persian or the Balkan fronts during ceasefire times, which cannot be confirmed by any other kind of material. Of course, it can be argued that taken as a whole our apocalyptic material only expresses

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[223] Ṭabarānī, *M. K.*, 17/18–19; Ibn al-Jawzī, *Mawḍū'āt*, 1/148–9; Haythamī, *Majma'*, 4/14.
[224] Ibn 'Asākir, 1/328.
[225] L. Ginzberg, *Genizah Studies* (New York, 1928), pp. 310–12; B. Lewis, *The Jews of Islam* (Princeton, 1983), pp. 93–4.

the deep insecurity which the new religion and polity in Syria felt about the possibility of a Byzantine reconquest: an insecurity to which the constant Byzantine attacks on the coastal and northern areas gave continuous reinforcement. It is also plausible to suggest that in order to appeal to first and second century-Muslim listeners, these anxieties were expressed in a way that drew upon the lines of existing patterns of past experiences, namely the Arab wars of conquest in Syria. But it is exactly here that the special contribution of our apocalyptic material to the study of early Islam lies. For the whole scheme of the Muslim conquests, though projected forward in the form of a prophecy that things would repeat themselves, carries in it elements which are not reported in any other way. To illustrate this problematic further, one may recall the sequence in which the course of events was presented; namely: peace and military co-operation, then dispute of an iconoclastic nature, treachery by the Byzantines and the wars over Syria, etc. Now, if our apocalypses were describing an actual historical situation of a Byzantine reconquest, then they certainly have valuable material on the advance of the coastal invasions into the Syrian mainland which no other source provides. But if, on the other hand, it was only an anxious projection of old patterns into the future, then such patterns become themselves carriers of historical elements from the period of the early conquests which were also not reported elsewhere. In other words the apocalyptic material reviewed above constitutes not only a new source but also one which may provide an altogether revisionist picture. For what we actually have is a completely different presentation of the circumstances in which the newly born religion and polity survived *vis-à-vis* its main enemy, Byzantium. The swift though temporary loss of and retreat from most of Palestine, Lebanon, northern Syria and Mesopotamia into Damascus and modern Trans-Jordan adjacent to the desert areas meant, at least on the military and social levels, falling back on the Arab element.

It is but reasonable to suggest that in such circumstances the Arabian element gains weight if it does not become actually predominant. And though assessment of the religious implications of these developments lies beyond the scope of this study, they can certainly provide a proper historical framework for the Arabization of whatever Islam existed in Syria in the first century; namely, in the direction of identifying itself with an Arabian-Hijāzī form of monotheism.

Of course some objections can be raised concerning the authenticity of the material reviewed above. However, the *isnād* analysis conducted above leaves no doubt that this is genuinely old material transmitted from people who lived around the turn of the first century. It is also plausible to suggest that the Byzantine menace, so strongly felt by people who lived in coastal and northern Syria, would persist in the memory of local chains throughout the second century, which continued to witness ups and downs in Muslim–Byzantine relations. In order to assess fully the value of this material one may recall how far superior were the Syrian traditions recorded by Balādhurī's *Futuḥ* to those of Ṭabarī or other historiographers on the situation in the coastal areas during the Umayyad period.

With the gradual strengthening of Islam *vis-à-vis* the Byzantines on the one hand and the shift of its centre to Iraq on the other, the Byzantine threat slowly became a nightmare living only in the memory of a number of Syrian scholars. Likewise the coastal towns of

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Syria lost much of their strategic importance as front lines of the caliphate. Hence Syrian *malāḥim* and *faḍā'il* literature gradually became only local fossils of what was once a living reality. Besides, the massive shift of scholarship towards Arabia in search for Islam's new identity throughout the second century effected a further damping of the Syrian scheme of genesis. The greatness of Nu'aym's work lies in its being a collection of such unique material which naturally tended to wither away, though some traces of it could still be found scattered in the chapters on *malāḥim* and *fitan* in traditional compilations and Syrian *faḍā'il* works.

As noted by a few scholars, the front line of the 'Abbasids against the Byzantines became a mainland one on the Anatolian border rather than a maritime one in Palestine and Syria; and the naval attacks on the coasts gradually became fewer after the second century. Once in a while we hear of an 'Abbasid-initiated activity in this or that coastal town: for example, the information provided by Balādhurī on the shipyards of Tyre in the time of Wāqidī.[226] The same source mentions also that al-Mutawakkil decided in 247 H. to organize a naval force in Acre and other ports and to post military forces in them.[227] But on the whole the policy of the Ṭulunids and Ikhshidids towards Palestine and Syria was no match for the one adopted by the Umayyads.[228] And the picture drawn by the local author Muqaddasī of the organization of alarm posts and *ribāṭs* in the coastal cities of Palestine in his own time is one of a local affair.[230]

However, as long as the Byzantines remained the main source of menace to Islam and, relatively, a close one to Syria, their *malāḥim* could find listening ears in that area. In 353 H. the Byzantines occupied Antioch after subjugating the border garrison towns of al-Maṣṣīṣa, Ṭarsūs and Aḍana.[231] And for a whole decade, between A.H. 365–75/A.D. 975–85, the Byzantine armies ravaged the whole of western Syria, Lebanon and most of northern and coastal Palestine, forcing the Turkish ruler of Damascus, Alptakin, to come to terms with them.[232]

Finally one can only expect that during the Crusades Muslim scholarly interest in searching for and commenting upon the same old traditions of *malāḥim* and *faḍā'il* in Syria would receive a new impetus; a task which certainly helped to save this kind of material from withering away. But to follow this point further would carry us beyond the scope of this paper.

[226] Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 125.   [227] *Ibid.*
[228] Cf. El'ad, p. 165, n. 65.   [229] M. Sharon, p. 91.
[230] Translated in G. Le Strange, *Palestine Under the Moslems* (London, 1890), p. 24.
[231] Yāqūt, 1/269.   [232] M. Gil, 1/285–6; M. Sharon, p. 92.

8

BYZANTINE VIEWS OF ISLAM

John Meyendorff

NO knowledge of the Islamic teachings is evident in Byzantine literature before the beginning of the eighth century. We know that the spiritual and intellectual encounter of Muhammad and the first generations of his followers with Christianity involved not the imperial Orthodox Church, but the Monophysite and Nestorian communities which made up the majority of the Christian population in Arabia, Egypt, Syria, and Mesopotamia. Until the end of the Umayyad period, these Syrian or Coptic Christians were the chief, and practically the only, spokesmen for the Christian faith in the Caliphate. And it was through the intermediary of these communities—and often by means of a double translation, from Greek into Syriac, and from Syriac into Arabic—that the Arabs first became acquainted with the works of Aristotle, Plato, Galien, Hippocrates, and Plotinus.[1] Among the Monophysites and Nestorians, the Arabs found many civil servants, diplomats, and businessmen who were willing to help in the building of their Empire, and who often preferred, at least in the beginning, to accomodate themselves to the Moslem yoke, rather than suffer oppression which in the Orthodox Chalcedonian Empire of Byzantium was the fate of all religious dissidents.

The first encounter of Islam with Orthodox Christianity took place on the battlefield, in the wars which since the seventh century have opposed the Arabs to the Greek emperors. Both civilizations thus confronted were, to a large extent, shaped by their respective religious ideologies, and each side interpreted the attitudes and actions of the other as motivated by religion. If the Qurran appealed to a holy war against "those who ascribe partners to God"—i.e., Christians who believe in the Trinity[2]—the Byzantine retaliated, after the example of St. John of Damascus, by considering Islam as a "fore-runner of Antichrist" (πρόδρομος τοῦ 'Αντιχρίστου).[3] But, however abrupt were these statements of mutual intolerance, however fanatical the appeals to a holy war, a better mutual appreciation was gradually brought about by the requirements of diplomacy, the necessity of coexistence in the occupied areas, and the cool reflection of informed minds.

My purpose here is to examine the encounter between Byzantium and Islam in the sphere of religion. Limitations of space do not permit me to do more than offer a few selected examples illustrating various attitudes of the Byzantines towards the Moslem faith. These examples will be drawn from four categories of documents:

1. Polemical literature
2. Canonical and liturgical texts
3. Official letters sent by Byzantine dignitaries to their Moslem counterparts
4. Hagiographical materials.

[1] Cf. L. Gardet, "Théologie musulmane et pensée patristique," in *Revue Thomiste*, 47 (1947), pp. 51–53.   [2] Sura, IX, V, 5.   [3] *De haeresibus*, PG, 94, col. 764 A.

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I

The name of John of Damascus usually heads every list of Christian anti-Moslem polemicists.[4]

According to traditional accounts, John belonged to the wealthy Damascene family of Sergius Mansur, an official of the Byzantine financial administration of Damascus, who negotiated the surrender of the city to the Arabs in 635, preserved his civil functions under the new regime, and transmitted his office to his descendants. John, according to this tradition, was his grandson. After exercising his duties for a while, he retired to the monastery of Saint-Sabbas in Palestine and became one of the most famous theologians and hymnographers of the Greek Church.

If we are to believe this traditional account, the information that John was in the Arab administration of Damascus under the Umayyads and had, therefore, a first-hand knowledge of the Arab Moslem civilization, would, of course, be very valuable. Unfortunately, the story is mainly based upon an eleventh-century Arabic life, which in other respects is full of incredible legends. Earlier sources are much more reserved. Theophanes tells us that John's *father* was a γενικὸς λογοθέτης under the Caliph Abdul-Melek (685–705),[5] which probably means that he was in charge of collecting taxes from the Christian community. Such a post would not necessarily imply deep acquaintance with the Arab civilization. The *Acts* of the Seventh Council seem to suggest that John inherited his father's post, for they compare his retirement to Saint-Sabbas to the conversion of the Apostle Matthew, who, before he became a follower of Christ, was a "publican" i.e., a "tax-collector."[6]

Since the information available to us on John's life is very meager, it is only from his writings that we can form an accurate idea of his thoughts and his views on Islam. Unfortunately, a close examination of his work reveals very few writings connected with Islam.

Johannes M. Hoeck, in his critical analysis of the Damascene's manuscript tradition,[7] mentions four works connected with John's name which deal with Islam:

1. A chapter of the *De haeresibus*,[8] a catalogue of heresies, which is part of John of Damascus' main work, the *Source of Knowledge* (Πηγὴ γνώσεως) and is based on a similar compilation drafted in the fifth century by St. Epiphanius of Cyprus. Islam, rather surprisingly, is treated as a Christian heresy and bears the number 101 in the printed edition. It follows a description of the

[4] On the Byzantine anti-Islamic polemics, see C. Güterbock, *Der Islam im Lichte der Byzantinischen Polemik* (Berlin, 1912); W. Eichner, "Die Nachrichten über den Islam bei den Byzantinern," *Der Islam*, 23 (1936), pp. 133–162, 197–244; and H. G. Beck, "Vorsehung und Vorherbestimmung in der Theologischen Literatur der Byzantiner," *Orientalia Christiana Analecta*, 114 (1937), pp. 32–65. None of these studies goes further than to give a list of authors and to present a selection of their major arguments.

[5] *Chronographia*, Bonn, ed. I, p. 559.

[6] Mansi, *Concilia*, XIII, col. 357 B; cf. Matt. 9:9.

[7] "Stand und Aufgaben der Damaskenos-Forschung," in *Orientalia Christiana Periodica*, 17 (1951), pp. 18, 23–24.

[8] PG, 94, cols. 764–773.

sect of the Αὐτοπροσκόπται (a peculiar deviation of Christian monasticism) and preceeds the paragraph on the Iconoclasts. In some manuscripts Islam figures under No. 100 and follows immediately after the Monothelites (No. 99).

2. *A Dialogue between a Saracen and a Christian*, a combination of two *opuscula*, both of which are to be found also under the name of Theodore Abu-Qurra, an author who will be mentioned later in this paper. The *Dialogue* has been published twice under the name of John of Damascus, once by Lequien and once by Gallandus, both editions being reprinted in Migne.[9] In each of these editions, the two original *opuscula* are in reverse order, which underlines the inconsistency of the Damascene's manuscript tradition on this point and strongly suggests that the *Dialogue* is a compilation of Abu-Qurra's writings, attributed to John of Damascus by later scribes.[10]

3. Another dialogue, formally ascribed to Abu-Qurra in the title, which, however, specifies that Theodore had written διὰ φωνῆς Ἰωάννου Δαμασκηνοῦ. The expression διὰ φωνῆς, an equivalent of ἀπὸ φωνῆς, is a technical expression, recently and convincingly studied by M. Richard[11]: it means "according to the oral teaching" of John of Damascus. The real author here is obviously Abu-Qurra, and, as a matter of fact, the *Dialogue* is also found in some manuscripts under his name, without any mention of John of Damascus.[12]

4. The fourth anti-Islamic writing ascribed to John is an unpublished Arabic *Refutation* which has never been studied.

Out of all these texts, the chapter on Islam in the *De haeresibus* appears, therefore, to be the only reliable one. But even in this instance, doubts have been expressed concerning its authenticity and the quotations from the Qurran are considered by some scholars to be a later interpolation.[13]

Therefore, whatever the result of further critical investigation of the anti-Islamic writings attributed to John of Damascus, it appears that his contribution to the history of Byzantine polemics against Islam is slight. If one admits the authenticity of these writings even in part, it will be seen below that chronologically they were not the earliest to have been written on the subject by a Byzantine author. Theologically, they do not add much to the unquestionable glory of John of Damascus, defender of the veneration of icons, author of the first systematic *Exposition of the Orthodox faith*, and one of the most talented hymnographers of Eastern Christianity. The study of the liturgical texts ascribed to John of Damascus strongly confirms the impression first gained from reading the chapter on Islam in the *De haeresibus*—that of John living in a Christian ghetto which preserves intact the Byzantine political and historical outlook. In his hymns he prays for "the victory

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[9] *Ibid.*, cols. 1585-1596 (Lequien); 96, cols. 1335-1348 (Gallandus). The text corresponds almost verbatim to the *Opuscula*, 35 (*ibid.*, cols. 1587 A-1592 C) and 36 (97, cols. 1592 CD) of Abu-Qurra.

[10] H. G. Beck, while still tending to accept John's authorship, mentions a manuscript where the *Dialogue* is anonymous and another where it is ascribed to Sisinnius the Grammarian (*Kirche und theologische Literatur im byzantinischen Reich* [Munich, 1959], p. 478).

[11] Ἀπὸ φωνῆς, in *Byzantion*, 20 (1950), pp. 191-222.

[12] Cf. PG, 97, col. 1543.

[13] A. Abel, in *Byzantion*, 24 (1954), p. 353, note 2.

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of the Emperor over his enemies";[14] he hopes that through the intercession of
the Theotokos, the *basileus* "will trample under his feet the barbarian nations."[15]
He never fails to mention the "cross-bearing Sovereign (σταυρόφορος ˝Αναξ)"
as the shield protecting Christ's inheritance from the "blasphemous enemies."[16]
And there is no ambiguity concerning the identity of these enemies: they are
"the people of the Ishmaelites, who are fighting against us" and whom the
Theotokos is asked to put under the feet of the piety-loving Emperor ('Ισμα-
ηλίτην λαὸν καθυποτάττων τὸν πολεμοῦντα ἡμᾶς φιλευσεβοῦντι βασιλεῖ).[17]

In mind and in heart John still lives in Byzantium. The fact that the Byzan-
tine Emperor—whose victorious return to the Middle East he is hopefully
expecting—has actually fallen into the iconoclastic heresy is, for him, a matter
of greater concern than are the beliefs of the Arab conquerors. And he is
certainly much better informed about the events in Constantinople than about
Islam.

Even if it is eventually proved that the last part of chapter 101 of the
De haeresibus, which contains quotations from the Qurran, is not a later
interpolation, this would not provide clear evidence that John had, in fact,
read the Qurran.[18] Any knowledge of Islam, direct or indirect, which is betrayed
by John, relates to four suras only—the second, the third, the fourth, and the
fifth—and to the oral Islamic traditions, especially those connected with the
veneration of the *Ka'aba* in Mecca, which give John a pretext to deride the
Islamic legends about Abraham's camel having been attached to the sacred
stone. The knowledge of oral Arab traditions, sometimes more ancient than
Islam, displayed by John and by other Byzantine polemicists is perhaps one
of the most interesting aspects of the type of literature which we are studying;
yet, at the same time, it illustrates the casual and superficial character of their
acquaintance with Islam. Legendary commonplaces about the origins of Islam
are repeated by different authors in different ways. I shall mention but one
example, one which shows that John is neither original nor better informed
than other Greeks in this matter. John refers to a pre-Islamic Meccan cult of
Aphrodite, named Χαβὲρ or Χαβάρ by the Arabs, which survived in the form
of the veneration of a sacred stone, the *Ka'aba*.[19] The same account is also
mentioned by Constantine Porphyrogenitus in the *De administrando imperio*.
This is what Constantine writes: "They pray also to the star of Aphrodite
which they call Κουβάρ, and in their supplication cry out 'Αλλᾶ οὐὰ Κουβάρ, that
is, God and Aphrodite. For they call God 'Αλλᾶ; and οὐὰ they use for the con-
junction *and* and they call the star Κουβάρ. And so they say 'Αλλᾶ οὐὰ Κουβάρ."[20]

[14] *Octoechos*, Sunday Matins, Tone 1, canon 1, ode 9, *Theotokion*.
[15] *Ibid.*, Tone 3, canon 1, ode 9, *Theotokion*.
[16] *Ibid.*, Tone 4, canon 2, ode 9, *Theotokion*.
[17] *Ibid.*, Tone 8, canon 2, ode 9, *Theotokion*.
[18] J. R. Merrill, "On the Tractate of John of Damascus on Islam," *Muslim World*, 41 (1951), p.
97; cf. also P. Khoury, "Jean Damascène et l'Islam," *Proche Orient chrétien*, 7 (1957), pp. 44–63; 8
(1958), pp. 313–339.
[19] PG, 94, cols. 764 B, 769 B.
[20] Constantine Porphyrogenitus, *De administrando imperio*, I, 14, ed. by Moravcsik, trans. by
R. J. H. Jenkins (Budapest, 1949), pp. 78–79.

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It is for the Arabists to inform us how much of this imperial excursion into the field of etymology, which is obviously parallel to, though independant of, the Damascene's text, is of any value. The traditional Islamic invocation *Allahu akbar*—"God is very great"—which is obviously referred to here, puzzled the Byzantine authors from the eighth century onwards. About 725, that is before the time of John of Damascus, Germanus of Constantinople also mentions that "the Saracens, in the desert, address themselves to an inanimate stone and make an invocation to the so-called Χαβάρ (τήν τε λεγο-μένου Χαβάρ ἐπίκλησιν)."[21] John of Damascus identifies Χαβάρ or Χαβέρ (he uses the two forms) with both Aphrodite herself, and with the *Ka'aba*, which according to him represents the head of the pagan goddess.[22] In the ninth century, Nicetas also speaks of the "idol of Χουβάρ" (προσκυνεῖ τῷ Χουβάρ εἰδώλῳ) said to represent Aphrodite.[23] That some cult of the Morning Star existed among the Arabs before the rise of Islam seems certain, and this was known to the Byzantines, who attempted, of course, to find traces of paganism in Islam itself. However, the example of the passage on Aphrodite proves that John of Damascus did not add anything substantial to the information on Islam already available to the Byzantines of his time,[24] and that he merely made use of an accepted argument which conveniently confirmed the Byzantine belief that the Arabs "were devoted to lechery."[25]

We have already noted, on the other hand, that John lists Islam among the Christian heresies. This attitude toward Islam was based on the fact that the Qurran admits the revealed character of both Judaism and Christianity. John and his contemporaries tended, therefore, to apply to Islam the criteria of Christian Orthodoxy and to assimilate Islam with a Christian heresy *already* condemned. Thus Muhammad was an Arian, because he denied the Divinity of the Logos and of the Holy Spirit; hence, probably, the legend of Muhammad being instructed in the Christian religion by an *Arian* monk.[26] In fact, the contact of early Islam with Christianity involved the Monophysite and the Nestorian communities, certainly not the Arians, and the appellation ascribed by John to the Moslems—κόπται τοῦ Θεοῦ ("cutters of God")[27]—because they cut away from God the Logos and the Spirit, is but a reply to the Moslem accusation directed against Christians that they are ἐταιριασταί—"those who admit partners of God."[28]

[21] *Letter to Thomas of Claudiopolis*, PG, 98, col. 168 CD.
[22] *De haeresibus, ed. cit.*, 764 B, 769 B.
[23] *Refutatio Mohamedis*, PG, 105, col. 793 B.
[24] It should be noted, however, that the Damascene gives a *translation* of the word Χαβάρ, and interprets it as meaning "great" in the feminine form (ὅπερ σημαίνει μεγάλη—col. 764 B). This has led G. Sablukov to see the origin of the form used by Nicetas and Constantine (Κουβάρ or Χουβάρ) in the *feminine form* of *akbar–koubra*, and to infer that the Byzantines knew of a pre-Islamic Arab invocation of Aphrodite—*Allata koubra* ("Zametki po voprosu o vizantiiskoi protivomusul'manskoi literature" in *Pravoslavnyi Sobesednik*, 2 [1878], pp. 303–327; cf. also a similar etymological argument put forward by Georgius Hamartolus, ed. by de Boor, II, p. 706).
[25] B. Lewis, in *Constantine Porphyrogenitus, De administrando*, II, *Commentary* (London, 1962), p. 72.
[26] PG, 94, 765 A.
[27] *Ibid.*, 768 D.
[28] *Ibid.*, 760 B.

Together with these polemical arguments dealing with the opposition be-
tween the absolute monotheism of Islam and the Christian doctrine of the
Trinity, John touches upon another acute point of disagreement—the question
of free will and of predestination—and his whole argument is supported by
the most violent epithets which he applies to Muhammad, the "pseudo-
prophet," the "hyprocrite," the "liar," and the "adulterer." All this was, of
course, later taken up at length by other polemicists.

Two names deserve quite special mention in the history of early Byzantine
polemics against Islam. One is that of an Arabic-speaking Bishop, Theodore
Abu-Qurra who lived in Moslem occupied territory, mainly in Syria, in the
second half of the eighth century. The other is that of Nicetas Byzantios,
a scholar from the entourage of Photius. Although they wrote in very different
styles and were involved in different situations, both Theodore and Nicetas
were much better acquainted with Islam than was John of Damascus; Theodore,
because he lived side by side with the Moslems and engaged them in dialogue,
and Nicetas, because he had studied the entire text of the Qurran.

Abu-Qurra wrote in both Greek and Arabic. Of his fifty-two short Greek
treatises, most were composed in the form of dialogues with various heretics
encountered by the author (Nestorians, Monophysites, Origenists) and seven-
teen are directed against Islam. It is from these short *Opuscula*[29] that one can
sense the true nature of the relations which existed between Moslems and
Christians in the eighth century. The dialogues of Theodore maintain, it is
true, a strictly negative attitude towards the faith of Islam and towards the
person of Muhammad, an Arianizing false prophet (1560 A), possessed by an
evil spirit (1545 B–1548 A). But the arguments used are conceived in such a
way as to be understood by the opponents; they correspond to an attempt at
real conversation. Here are some examples: the Arabs refuse to believe in the
Trinitarian doctrine, because it brings division of God?—But the Qurran is
one, even if many copies can be made of it; in the same way, God is One and
Three (1528 C D). A short dialogue is entirely devoted to the Christian doctrine
of the Eucharist, which, of course, was difficult for Moslems to understand;
here Theodore relies on medical images familiar to both sides: the descent of
the Holy Spirit on bread and wine which are thereby changed into the Body
and Blood of Christ is similar to the action of the liver which assimilates food
through the emission of heat (1552 D–1553 C). In a question which was un-
avoidable in any conversation between a Moslem and a Christian, that of
polygamy, Theodore adopts a pragmatic attitude, which he knows will be
better understood by his opponent than any reference to high morality or
to the sacrament of marriage. "A woman," Theodore writes, "marries a man
for the sake of pleasure and childbirth." But can one imagine a greater human
pleasure than that which Adam and Eve enjoyed in Paradise, where, however,
they were under a regime of monogamy? And when the Moslem still maintains
that he prefers polygamy because it secures quicker multiplication of the
human race, Theodore answers that since God did not care for a quick multi-

[29] The Greek treatises of Abu-Qurra are published in PG, 97, cols. 1461–1609.

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plication of men when man was *alone* on earth, he certainly does not desire too great a proliferation today.... And he concludes the argument by reminding the Moslem of the unavoidable quarrels and scenes of jealousy which occur in a harem (1556 A–1558 D).

The pragmatic character of some of Abu-Qurra's dialogues does not preclude the use of more technical theological arguments. Theodore is a trained Aristotelian, and he is well aware of all of the refinements of Byzantine Trinitarian doctrine and Christology. When the Moslem objects to the doctrine of the death of Christ—the person of Christ is made up of a body and a soul, their separation would mean the disappearance of Christ as a person—Theodore answers by referring to the Orthodox doctrine of the hypostatic union which is based upon the unity of Christ's *divine* hypostasis which is and remains, even in death, the unifying factor of all the elements composing the God-man. This is why the body of Christ remained uncorrupted in the grave (1583–1584).

The discussion very often touches on the doctrine of predestination, which was promoted in orthodox Islam and was often discussed in the Moslem world. It is, of course, refuted by Theodore in a series of arguments which reflect actual conversations on a popular level: if Christ had to die voluntarily, says the Moslem, then the Christians must thank the Jews for having contributed to the realization of God's will, since *everything* which happens is in accordance with His will. Theodore replies: since you say that all those who die in the holy war against the infidels go to heaven, you must thank the Romans for killing so many of your brethren (1529 A). But the discussion on predestination runs also on a more philosophical and theological level: Theodore explains the Christian doctrine of the divine creative act, which was completed in the first six days and which, since then, has given to human free will the opportunity to act, to create, and to chose; if any predestination toward good exists, it is derived from baptism, which is a new birth and which should be freely accepted and followed by good works (1587 A–1592 C).[30]

Many of the theological points touched upon by Theodore are also discussed in the lengthy treatise written by Nicetas Byzantinos and dedicated to the Emperor Michael III.[31] Nicetas writes in Constantinople and has probably never spoken to a Moslem, but he has a complete text of the Qurran and gives a systematic criticism of it, with exact quotations of various suras under their titles and numbers. (The latter do not always correspond to those used in the modern editions of the Qurran.) Nicetas' book is in two parts:

1. An apologetic exposition of the Christian faith, concentrated mainly on the doctrine of the Trinity (673–701).

2. A systematic refutation of the Qurran in thirty chapters (701–805). Nicetas' refutation is purely academical and scholarly in character; it is an intellectual exercise of the kind one may expect from the learned circle of scholars gathered around Photius and financed by the Caesar Bardas and the

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[30] This passage on predestination is reproduced verbatim in the *Dialogue* attributed to John of Damascus (PG, 96, cols. 1336–1340).

[31] PG, 105, cols. 669 A–805.

court of Michael III. Basically it reflects the impression produced by the Qurran on a Byzantine intellectual of the ninth century who has been given the assignment of refuting the new faith. He performs his task carefully, but without any real concern for an eventual Moslem auditor or reader.

Comparing the Qurran with Christian Scripture, he speaks of the "most pitiful and the most inept little book of the Arab Muhammad (τὸ οἴκτιστον καὶ ἀλόγιστον τοῦ Ἄραβος Μωάμετ βιβλίδιον), full of blasphemies against the Most High, with all its ugly and vulgar filth," which does not have even the appearance of any of the biblical *genres* and is neither prophetical, nor historical, nor juridical, nor theological, but all confused. How can this, he asks, be sent from heaven? Nicetas does not know Arabic himself and uses several different translations of the Qurran. This is apparent, for example, in his treatment of the famous sura CXII, directed against the Christian trinitarian doctrine, which is thenceforth an inevitable subject in every discussion of faith between Christians and Moslems:

> "Say, 'He is God alone!
> God the Eternal!
> He begets not and is not begotten!
> Nor is there like unto Him any one!'"
>   (*Palmer's translation*)

The Arab word *šamad* which means "solid," "massive," "permanent"—rendered here by the English *eternal*—is at first, at the beginning of Nicetas' book, translated by the Greek ὁλόσφαιρος, i.e., "all-spherical," which gives Nicetas an opportunity of ridiculing such a material conception of the Divinity (708 A). Later, he corrects his translation and renders *šamad* by ὁλόσφυρος, which evokes a solid metallic mass, beaten by a hammer, and which is closer to the concrete image of God given by the Coranic text (776 B).

Another example of a misunderstanding due to a faulty translation: Nicetas accuses the Qurran of teaching that man comes "from a leech" (ἐκ βδέλλης —708 A). In fact, the Arabic text (sura XCVI, 2) speaks of a particle of congealed blood.

I have chosen these examples, among many others in the Nicetas text, because they are repeated by many other Byzantine authors and occupy a central place in later polemics. They illustrate the permanent misunderstanding between the two cultures and the two religious mentalities, but also show the positive knowledge of Coranic texts on the part of some Byzantines. Nicetas Byzantios, for example, had obviously studied the Qurran, even if in faulty translations, which was probably unavoidable at this early stage of Byzantine-Arab relations. On the other hand, it can be asked whether, in some instances, such Byzantine interpretations of Islam doctrine as the alleged belief in the spherical shape of God or the leech as the origin of man, did not, in fact, come from some forms of popular Arab religion—distinct, of course, from orthodox Islam—which were known to the Byzantines.

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A complete survey of the Byzantine literature directed against Islam should, of course, include the study of many Byzantine documents belonging chronologically to later periods which are outside the scope of our paper. It will be sufficient to mention here that, from the eleventh to the fifteenth century, the knowledge of Islam gradually increases in Byzantium. A thirteenth-century writer, Bartholomew of Edessa[32] already shows some knowledge of the role of Othman and Abu-Bakr after the death of Muhammad. In the fourteenth century, the retired Emperor John Cantacuzenus gathers an even richer documentation. He composes four *Apologies* of Christianity directed against the Moslems, and four treatises (λόγοι) refuting the Qurran.[33] In addition to earlier Byzantine sources, he uses the Latin *Refutation of Islam* by a Florentine Dominican monk, Ricaldus de Monte-Croce († 1309), translated by Demetrius Kydones.[34] Cantacuzenus seems to have regarded the publication of his anti-Islamic writings as a major event in his life: in the well-known, beautiful copy of his theological works, ordered for his private library by Cantacuzenus himself and which is now in Paris (*Paris. gr.* 1242), the ex-Emperor had himself represented holding a scroll with an inscription Μέγας ὁ Θεὸς τῶν Χριστιανῶν which is the *Incipit* of his work against Islam. Although his general method of refutation remains rather academic and abstract, there is no doubt that Cantacuzenus is better aware than many of his predecessors of the new situation in which he lives. He faces the Islamic challenge realistically and shows readiness to seek information and arguments in any source, even in the work of a Latin monk (He quotes his source: "a monk of the order of the preachers—τῆς τάξεως τῶν Πρεδικατόρων, ἤτοι τῶν κηρύκων—of the name of Ricaldos, went to Babylon ... and, having worked much, learned the dialect of the Arabs."[35]). And his prayers are not only for the destruction, but also for the conversion of the Moslems:[36] all this proves that he took Islam much more seriously than did the authors of the eighth and the ninth centuries. It is perhaps worth recalling here that a friend of Cantacuzenus, the famous hesychast theologian and Archbishop of Thessalonica, Gregory Palamas, describes in 1354 his journey to Turkish-occupied Asia Minor in a rather optimistic tone, hoping, like Cantacuzenus, for a subsequent conversion of Moslems and implying the acceptance, for the time being, of a friendly coexistence.[37]

II

Byzantine polemical literature has largely determined the official canonical attitude of the Church towards Islam, an attitude which is reflected in the rites of the reception of Moslem converts to Christianity. One such very ancient

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[31] Ἔλεγχος Ἀγαρηνοῦ, PG, 104, cols. 1384–1448; for the date, see Eichner, *op. cit.*, pp. 137–138.

[32] PG, 154, cols. 373–692.

[34] Translation published in PG, 154, cols. 1035–1152.

[35] PG, 154, col. 601.

[34] *Ibid.*, col. 584.

[37] On this episode, see J. Meyendorff, *Introduction à l'étude de Grégoire Palamas* (Paris, 1959), pp. 157–162.

rite contains a series of twenty-two anathemas against Moslem beliefs.[38] The convert is required to anathematize Muhammad, all the relatives of the Prophet (each by name) and all the caliphs until Yezid (680–683). The fact that no later caliph is mentioned has led Fr. Cumont to conclude that the rite dates from the early eighth century. However, since the list lacks any chronological order (the name of Yezid is followed by that of Othman, the third Caliph), the argument does not seem altogether conclusive.

Other anathemas are directed against the Qurran: the Moslem conception of paradise, where all sorts of sins will take place "since God cannot be ashamed"; polygamy; the doctrine of predestination, which leads to the idea that God Himself is the origin of evil; the Moslem interpretation of the Gospel stories and the Qurran's treatment of the Old Testament. The anathemas repeat many of the arguments used by polemicists: the Arab worship of Aphrodite, called Χαβάρ, and the theory that has man issuing from a leech are mentioned, and the convert to Christianity is required to renounce them formally.

The author of the rite obviously knew more about Islam than did John of Damascus. He probably made use of Nicetas' treatise and also of other contemporary sources. It seems reasonable, therefore, to place the composition of the rite in the ninth century, at a time when similar rituals for the admission of Jews and Paulicians were composed. At any rate, this particular rite was still in use in the twelfth century because Nicetas Choniates gives a detailed account of a conflict which opposed the Emperor Manuel I to the Patriarchal Synod and in which Eustathios, metropolitan of Thessalonica, played a leading role.[39] In 1178, Manuel published two decrees, ordering the deletion of the last anathema from the rite, starting with the copy in use at the Great Church of St. Sophia. The anathema, quoted from sura CXII, reads as follows: "I anathematize the God of Muhammad about whom he says: 'He is God alone, God the Eternal [the Greek text reads ὁλόσφυρος—of "hammer-beaten metal"], He begets not and is not begotten, nor is there like unto Him any one.'"

The reason for this measure was that the Emperor was afraid to scandalize the converts by obliging them to anathematize not only the beliefs of Muhammad, but also "the God of Muhammad," for this seemed to imply that Christians and Moslems did not, in fact, believe in one and the same God. The imperial measure provoked strong opposition on the part of the Patriarch and the Synod. Eustathius of Thessalonica, who acted as the Church's spokesman in

[38] This rite has been published by F. Sylburg (Heidelberg, 1595). Sylburg's edition has been reprinted as a part of the *Thesaurus Orthodoxae fidei* of Nicetas Choniates in PG, 140, cols. 123–138. A new edition of the rite has been issued by F. Montet, "Le rituel d'abjuration des Musulmans dans l'Eglise grecque," in the *Revue de l'histoire des religions*, 53 (1906), pp. 145–163, with a French translation of the Anathemas. This new edition does not replace Sylburg's, which is more complete. Cf. observations on Montet's edition in S. Ebersolt, "Un nouveau manuscrit sur le rituel d'abjuration des Musulmans dans l'Eglise grecque" in the same *Revue de l'histoire des religions*, 54 (1906), pp. 231–232; Cf. Clermont-Ganneau, "Ancien rituel grec pour l'abjuration des Musulmans," *Recueil d'archéologie orientale*, 7 (Paris, 1906), pp. 254–257; Fr. Cumont, "L'origine de la formule grecque d'abjuration imposée aux Musulmans," in *Revue de l'histoire des religions*, 64 (1911), pp. 143–150.

[39] Nicetas Choniates, *Historia*, Bonn ed., pp. 278–286; on the whole episode, see C. G. Bonis "Ὁ Θεσσαλονίκης Εὐστάθιος καὶ οἱ δύο «τόμοι» τοῦ αὐτοκράτορος Μανουὴλ Α΄ Κομνηνοῦ (1143/80) ὑπὲρ τῶν εἰς τὴν χριστιανικὴν ὀρθοδοξίαν μεθισταμένων Μωαμεθανῶν," in Ἐπετηρὶς Ἑταιρείας Βυζαντινῶν Σπουδῶν, 19 (1949), pp. 162–169.

this matter, proclaimed that a God believed to be "of hammer-beaten metal" is not the true God, but a material idol, which should be anathematized as such. After some argument between the palace and the patriarchate, a compromise solution was found. The Emperor withdrew his original decree; the twenty-second anathema was retained in the ritual, but now it read simply: "Anathema to Muhammad, to all his teaching and all his inheritance." This text was preserved in the later editions of the *Euchologion*.

The episode is significant inasmuch as it clearly illustrates the existence in Byzantium of two views on Islam: the extreme and "closed" one, which adopted an absolutely negative attitude towards Muhammadanism and considered it a form of paganism, and another, the more moderate one, which tried to avoid burning all bridges and to preserve a measure of common reference, in particular, the recognition of a common allegiance to monotheism.

Manuel I belonged to this second group, and in this respect he followed the tradition which seems always to have been predominant in official governmental circles of Byzantium. One can see this from the next category of documents which we shall examine—the letters addressed by the Byzantine emperors and officials to their Arab colleagues.

III

First, and historically most important, is a letter of Leo III to the Caliph Omar II. Omar II reigned for only three years (717–720), and the letter can, therefore, be dated with relative precision. I cannot discuss here in detail the problem of its authenticity. The fact that there was some correspondence on questions of faith between Leo and Omar is explicitly attested by Theophanes,[40] but the original Greek text of Leo's letter (or letters) is lost. A short Latin version has been published by Champerius, who quite wrongly attributes the letter to Leo VI.[41] This attribution is accepted without question by Krumbacher and Eichner. A much longer Armenian version has been preserved by the Historian Ghevond. It reproduces the original text, possibly with some minor additions.[42]

The document is interesting in more than one respect: 1. It emanates from the first Iconoclastic emperor, but precedes the Iconoclastic controversy itself and thus provides valuable evidence on Leo's views about icon veneration at this early period; this evidence is confirmed, as we shall see later, in other contemporary sources. 2. It is the first known Byzantine text which refutes

[40] *Chronographia*, Bonn ed., II, p. 399.
[41] This version is reproduced in PG, 107, cols. 315–24..
[42] English translation, commentary, and bibliography in A. Jeffery, "Ghevond's Text of the Correspondence between Umar II and Leo III," in the *Harvard Theological Review*, 37 (1944), pp. 269–332. Jeffrey offers a convincing amount of internal and external evidence in favor of the letter's authenticity, in opposition to H. Beck, *Vorsehung und Vorherbestimmung*, pp. 43–46, who thinks that the letter could not be earlier than the late ninth century. Cf. also A. Abel's recent suggestion that Leo the Mathematician is possibly the author (*Byzantion*, 24 [1954], p. 348, note 1). Among earlier believers in the authenticity of the letter, see B. Berthold, "Khalif Omar II i protivorechivyia izvestiia o ego lichnosti," in *Khristianskii Vostok*, VI, 3 (1922), p. 219.

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Islam, and it shows a knowledge of the subject much wider than that of other contemporary polemicists.

Leo's letter is a reply to a solemn appeal by Omar to send him an exposition of the Christian faith. In fact, it was customary for the early Caliphs, at their enthronment, to send such requests to infidel princes, denouncing their beliefs and calling upon them to join Islam. Omar asks Leo to furnish him with the arguments that make Leo prefer Christianity to any other faith, and puts several questions to him: "Why have the Christian peoples, since the death of the disciples of Jesus, split into seventy-two races?... Why do they profess three gods?... Why do they adore the bones of apostles and prophets, and also pictures and the cross?..."[43]

Leo's answers are all based on sound exegesis of both the Bible and the Qurran. For him there is no question of relying on popular legends or mis-representations. He does not feel the need of condemning the alleged cult of Aphrodite in Islam or of having Omar renounce the doctrine which claims that man's origin was the leech. He does not doubt that he and his correspondent believe in the same God, that the latter accepts the Old Testament as revealed truth. Is Omar looking for arguments in support of the true religion? But there are numerous prophets and apostles who affirmed the divinity of Jesus, while Muhammad stands alone.... And how can one say that the Qurran is above all criticism? "We know," Leo writes "that it was 'Umar, Abu Turab and Solman the Persian, who composed [the Qurran], even though the rumour has got round among you that God sent it down from the heavens...." And we know also that "a certain Hajjaj, named by you Governor of Persia, replaced ancient books by others, composed by himself, according to his taste...."[44] And is not Islam, the younger of the two religions, torn apart by schisms, even more serious than those which beset the comparatively ancient Christianity? These divisions occurred in Islam, Leo continues, although it arose among only one people, the Arabs, all of whom spoke the same tongue, while Christianity from the beginning was adopted by Greeks, Latins, Jews, Chaldeans, Syrians, Ethiopians, Indians, Saracens, Persians, Armenians, Georgians, and Albanians: some disputes among them were inevitable![45]

A large part of Leo's letter is devoted to the problems of cult and worship, in reply to Omar's attack on the Christian doctrine of the sacraments. The Byzantine Emperor's criticism of the *Ka'aba* cult has nothing of the mythical exaggeration of the other polemicists. He writes: "The region to which the prophets turned when they made their prayers is not known. It is you alone who are carried away to venerate the pagan altar of sacrifice that you call the House of Abraham. Holy Scripture tells us nothing about Abraham having gone to the place...."[46] And here is an interesting passage concerning the veneration of the Cross and the icons: "We honour the Cross because of the sufferings of that Word of God incarnate.... As for pictures, we do not give

[43] A. Jeffrey, *op. cit.*, pp. 277–278.
[44] *Ibid.*, p. 292.
[45] Cf. *ibid.*, p. 297.
[46] *Ibid.*, p. 310.

them a like respect, not having received in Holy Scripture any commandment whatsoever in this regard. Nevertheless, finding in the Old Testament that divine command which authorized Moses to have executed in the Tabernacle the figures of the Cherubim, and, animated by a sincere attachment for the disciples of the Lord who burned with love for the Saviour Himself, we have always felt a desire to conserve their images, which have come down to us from their times as their living representations. Their presence charms us, and we glorify God who has saved us by the intermediary of His Only-Begotten Son, who appeared in the world in a similar figure, and we glorify the saints. But as for the wood and the colors, we do not give them any reverence."[47]

This text clearly reflects a state of mind which was predominant at the court of Constantinople in the years which preceded the Iconoclastic decree of 726. The images are still a part of the official imperial orthodoxy, but Leo does not attach to them anything more than an educational and sentimental signifi-cance; the veneration of the Cross is more pronounced, and we know that it was preserved even by the Iconoclasts themselves. The use of images is justified explicitly by Old Testament texts, but no reverence is due to the "wood and colors." An attitude similar to that of Leo can be found in contemporary letters of Patriarch Germanus,[48] who, around 720, still represented the official point of view on images. The fact that it is expressed in the text of the letter, as preserved by Ghevond, is a clear indication of its authenticity, for neither the Iconoclasts, nor the Orthodox were capable, at a later date, of adopting towards the images so detached an attitude. The Orthodox, while still condemning the veneration of "wood and colors" in themselves, were to invoke the doctrine of the Incarnation in support of a sacramental—and not purely educational—approach to images, while the Iconoclasts were to condemn any image representing Christ and the saints.

Leo's text represents, therefore, an interesting example of Christian apologe-tics, based upon minimizing the role of images, and one can clearly see the importance of this apologetical attitude towards Islam in the early development of Iconoclasm. The Iconoclastic edict of 726 was merely the next and decisive stage of this development. As André Grabar has pungently remarked,[49] a "cold war" of propaganda and blackmail was carried on, side by side with the armed conflict which permanently opposed Byzantium to the caliphate, throughout the second part of the seventh century and the beginning of the eighth. Sacred images played an important role in this cold war, sometimes as a symbol of Christianity against the Infidel, sometimes as a proof of the Christians' idolatry. And, as in the cold war of today, the opponents often tended to use each other's methods. The correspondence between Leo III and Omar is an inter-esting phenomenon in the gradual emergence of the issues at stake.

The other extant letters of Byzantine officials relevant to our subject belong to the ninth and tenth century and are less important historically. About 850,

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[47] *Ibid.*, p. 322.
[48] Cf., for example, his letter to Thomas of Claudiopolis, PG, 98, col. 173 D.
[49] *L'iconoclasme byzantin; dossier archéologique* (Paris, 1957), p. 47.

the Emperor Michael III received a letter ἐκ τῶν ’Αγαρηνῶν, "from the Arabs," and asked Nicetas Byzantios, the polemicist whose major work we have already examined, to answer them in his name. It is justifiable to suppose that the epistle that Michael III had received from the Caliph was similar to the one that Omar had sent to Leo III; in this case the Caliph would have been Al-Mutawakkil (847–861). The two answers written by Nicetas are concerned entirely with an exposition of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity which, the writer asserts, does not essentially contradict monotheism.[50] In his first refutation Nicetas repeats part of his polemical treatise dedicated to a positive *exposé* of Christian faith, but omits the direct polemics and criticism of the Qurran. We do not know whether Nicetas' writings were actually communicated to the Emperor's correspondent, but one can see at this point that, already in the ninth century, a significant difference existed between the internal use made of polemics and the requirements of diplomatic courtesy.

There is no doubt that the latter was observed in the correspondence between Photius and the Caliph, the existence of which is mentioned by his nephew, the Patriarch Nicholas Mystikos.[51] Nicholas himself corresponded with the Caliph on political matters and three of his letters have been preserved. From them we learn that a good deal of mutual tolerance did, in fact, exist between Moslems and Christians, especially when the opponents were able to exercise retaliation in case of abuse. Since, according to the Patriarch's letter, the Arab prisoners could pray in a mosque in Constantinople without anyone obliging them to embrace Christianity, the Caliph should also cease to persecute Christians.[52] And Nicholas refers to those laws of Muhammad himself that favor religious tolerance.[53] In another letter, he expresses in strong terms the belief in a single God which is shared by both Christians and Moslems: all authority comes from God and it is "from this unique God that we all received the power of government," and "the two powers over all powers on earth, i.e., that of the Arabs and that of the Romans, have preeminence [over all] and shine as the two big lights of the firmament. And this in itself is a sufficient reason for them to live in fraternal fellowship."[54]

One wonders whether, side by side with these official diplomatic letters, one may not justifiably mention here an infamous and tasteless pamphlet composed about 905–906 in Constantinople and wrongly ascribed to Arethas, bishop of Caesarea, a famous scholar and a disciple of Photius. The pamphlet consists essentially of a number of jokes in poor taste about the Moslem conception of Paradise. As Professor R. J. H. Jenkins has recently shown, the real author of the pamphlet is a certain Leo Choirosphactes,[55] whom Arethas

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[50] PG, 105, cols. 807–821, 821–841.
[51] PG, 111, cols. 36 D–37 A.
[52] *Ibid.*, cols. 309 C–316 C.
[54] *Ibid.*, col. 317 A.
[54] *Ibid.*, col. 28 B; on the true nature of this letter, addressed not to an "emir of Crete," as the present superscription states, but to the Caliph himself, see R. J. H. Jenkins, "The Mission of St. Demetrianus of Cyprus to Bagdad," *Annuaire de l'Institut de Phil. et d'Hist. Orient. et Slaves*, 9 (1949), pp. 267–275.
[55] The "letter to Arethas" has been published by J. Compernass, *Denkmäler der griechischen Volks-*

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ridicules in a dialogue entitled Χοιροσφάκτης ἤ Μισογόης.[56] For us, interest in this document resides in the fact that it shows that Byzantine anti-Islamic polemics could be pursued simultaneously at very different levels, and that diplomatic courtesy and intellectual understanding at the Government level did not prevent slander and caricaturization at others.

IV

In the early eighth century, John of Damascus describes with horror the heresy which appeared "in the time of Heraclius": "the deceptive error of the Ishmaelites, a forerunner of Antichrist." And six centuries later, John Canta-cuzenus, in almost the same terms, refers to the same cataclysm "which ap-peared under Heraclius." There was an abyss between the two religions which no amount of polemics, no dialectical argument, no effort at diplomacy, was able to bridge. Insurmountable on the spiritual and the theological level, this opposition from the very beginning also took the shape of a gigantic struggle for world supremacy, because both religions claimed to have a universal mission, and both empires world supremacy. By the very conception of its religion, Islam was unable to draw a distinction between the "political" and "spiritual," but neither did Byzantium ever want to distinguish between the universality of the Gospel and the imperial universality of Christian Rome. This made mutual understanding difficult and led both sides to consider that holy war was, after all, the normal state of relations between the two Empires.

One may, nevertheless, be permitted to ask what the situation was on the popular level. What was the attitude of the average Christian towards the Moslem in their everyday relations both in the occupied lands and inside the limits of the Empire where Arab merchants, diplomats, and prisoners were numerous? Hagiography seems to be the best source for a possible answer to this question. My cursory observations in this area have shown, however, that here, too, the solution cannot be a simple one. On the one hand, we have a great number of the Lives of martyrs with the description of massacres perpetrated by Moslems—that of the monks of Saint Sabbas,[57] that of sixty Greek pilgrims to Jerusalem in 724, whose death marked the end of a seven-year truce between Leo III and the Caliphate,[58] that of the forty-two martyrs of Amorium captured during the reign of Theophilus,[59] that of numerous Christians who, having succumbed to pressure, adopted Islam, but later repented and went back to

sprache, 1 (Bonn, 1911), pp. 1–9; French trans. by A. Abel, "La lettre polémique 'd'Aréthas' à l'émir de Damas," *Byzantion,* 24 (1954), pp. 343–370; another edition by P. Karlin-Hayter in *Byzantion,* 29–30 (1959–1960), pp. 281–302; for the definitive word, see R. J. H. Jenkins, "Leo Choerosphactes and the Saracen Vizier," *Vizant. Institut, Zbornik radova* (Belgrade, 1963), pp. 167–175.

[56] Ed. by J. Compernass, in *Didaskaleion,* 1, fasc. 3 (1912), pp. 295–318.

[57] Ed. by A. Papadopoulos-Kerameus, in *Pravoslavnyi Palestinskii Sbornik* (1907), pp. 1–41.

[58] The two versions of this *Life* were published by A. Papadopoulos-Kerameus, in *Pravoslavnyi Palest. Sbornik* (1892), pp. 1–7 and in *ibid.* (1907), pp. 136–163.

[59] Several versions of their Martyrium in Greek and in Slavonic were published by V. Vasil'evski and P. Nikitin in *Akademiia Nauk, Istoriko-filologicheskoe otdelenie, Zapiski,* 8th ser., VII, 2 (St. Petersburg, 1905).

the Church, as did for example, two eighth-century saints—Bacchus the Young and Elias the New.[60] No wonder then that in popular imagination the Moslem, any Moslem, was a horrible and an odious being: in the life of St. Andrew the *Salos* (the "fool for Christ's sake") Satan himself appears in the guise of an Arab merchant.[61] Furthermore, Arabs who played a role in the Byzantine imperial administration had an extremely bad reputation among the people; such was the case with the "Saracens" who, according to the life of St. Theodore and St. Theophanes the *Graptoi*, were at the service of Emperor Theophilus,[62] or with Samonas, the *parakeimomenos* of Leo VI. In occupied areas Christians often lived in closed *ghettos*, avoiding any intercourse with the Moslem masters of the land: when St. Stephen, who was a monk at Saint-Sabbas and a man of great prestige among both Christians and Moslems, learned that Elias, Patriarch of Jerusalem, had been arrested, he refused to go and intercede for him, because he knew that it would be of no avail.[63]

Occasionally, the Lives of saints reproduce discussions which took place between Christians and Moslems, and in such cases they make use of the polemical literature examined above: in Euodius' account of the martyrdom of the forty-two martyrs of Amorium, the problem of predestination is mentioned as a major issue between the two religions.[64] Among documents of this kind, the richest in content and the most original is an account of a discussion which took place about 850, in which Constantine, imperial ambassador to Samarra and future apostle of the Slavs, was involved. It is recorded in the Slavonic *Vita Constantini*. The attitude of the "Philosopher" Constantine is altogether apologetical: he defends the Christians against the accusation, mentioned above (p. 119), of being "cutters of God,"[65] he quotes the Qurran (sura XIX, 17) in support of the Christian doctrine of the Virgin birth, and, as did Abu-Qurra, refutes the Moslem contention that the division of Christianity into various heresies and sects is proof of its inconsistency.[66] He counterattacks with the accusation of moral laxity among the Moslems—the standard Christian objection to the Islamic pretense of being a God-revealed religion—and, finally, expresses the classical Byzantine claim that "the Empire of the Romans" is the only one blessed by God. He finds even a Biblical basis for this claim: in giving to his disciples the commandment to pay tribute to the emperor and in paying that tax for Himself and for others (Matthew 17:24–27; 22: 19–21), Jesus had in mind the Roman Empire only, not just *any* state; there is, therefore, no obligation for Christians to accept the Caliph's rule. The Arabs have nothing to be proud of, even in the fields of arts or sciences,

[60] Chr. Loparev, "Vizantiiskiia Zhitiia Sviatykh," in *Vizant. Vremmenik*, 19 (1912), pp. 33–35.
[61] PG, 111, col. 688.
[62] PG, 116, cols. 673 C, 676 C.
[63] *Acta Sanctorum, Jul.* III, col. 511.
[64] *Ed. cit.*, pp. 73–74; cf. Abu-Qurra, *Opuscula*, 35, PG, 97, col. 1588 AB; Nicetas Byzantios, *Refutatio Mohammedis*, 30, PG, 105, col. 709; Bartholomew of Edessa, *Confutatio Agareni*, PG, 104, col. 1393 B.
[65] *Vita*, VI, 26, ed. by F. Grivec and F. Tomšič, in *Staroslovenski Institut, Radovi*, 5 (Zagreb, 1960), p. 104.
[66] *Ibid.*, VI, 16, p. 104.

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for they are only the pupils of the Romans. "All arts came from us" (*ot' nas' sout' v'sa khoudozh'stvia ish'la*), Constantine concludes.[67] Fr. Dvornik is certainly right when he sees in this attitude of Constantine a typical Byzantine approach to all "barbarians," Latin or Arab, as expressed in several ninth-century documents issued by Michael III, Basil I, or the Patriarch Photius himself.[68] A cultural and national pride of this kind did not, of course, contribute much to mutual understanding between Christians and Moslems.

However, here and there, in the hagiographical writings, a more positive note is struck. In another passage of the *Life* of St. Stephen we are told that the Saint "received with sympathy and respected everyone, Moslems as well as Christians."[69] The holiness, the hospitality of some Christian saints are said to have favorably impressed the Saracens, who are then described in more generous terms in the Lives. This occurs, for example, in the early tenth century, when the Arabs invading the Peloponnesus are impressed by the holiness of St. Peter of Argos, and at once accept baptism.[70] At approximately the same time a Cypriot bishop, Demetrianos, travelling to Bagdad, is received by the Caliph and obtains the return to Cyprus of a number of Greek prisoners.[71] Another significant story recounts that, under Michael II, after an attack on Nicopolis in Epirus, an Arab of the retreating Moslem army remains in the mountains and lives there for several years in complete isolation, afraid to mingle with the population. During these years, however, he manages to be baptized. One day a hunter kills him by mistake. He then is entered into the local *martyrologium* under the name of St. Barbaros, for even his name was not known. Again, Constantine Akropolis, starting his thirteenth-century account of St. Barbaros' life, begins with a quotation from St. Paul: "there is no Barbarian, nor Greek, but Christ is all in all."[72]

On the other hand, one cannot deny the existence, especially in the later period under discussion, of some communication between Islam and Christianity on the level of spiritual practice and piety. It has been pointed out that a startling similarity exists between the Moslem *dhikr*—the invocation of the name of God connected with breathing—and the practices of the Byzantine hesychasts[73]. Byzantine monasticism continued to flourish in Palestine and on Mount Sinai, while pilgrims continually visited the Holy Land. All this implies the existence of contacts that were other than polemical.

Yet, as we look at the over-all picture of the relations between the two religious worlds, we see that essentially they remained impenetrable by each other. Among all the historical consequences of the Arab conquest of the Middle East, one seems to me to be the *most important*: for *ages* Byzantine Christianity was kept on the defensive. Islam not only obliged the Christians

[67] *Ibid.*, VI, 53, p. 105.
[68] *Les légendes de Constantin et de Méthode vues de Byzance* (Prague, 1933), pp. 110–111.
[69] *Acta Sanctorum*, Jul. III, col. 511.
[70] Mai, *Nova Patrum Bibliotheca*, IX, 3, 1–17.
[71] *Life* of St. Demetrianos, ed. by H. Grégoire in BZ, 16 (1907), pp. 232–233.
[72] Ed. by A. Papadopoulos-Kerameus, in Ἀνάλεκτα Ἱεροσολυμιτικῆς Σταχυολογίας, I, pp. 405–420.
[73] Cf., for example, L. Gardet, "Un problème de mystique comparée," in *Revue Thomiste* (1956), I, pp. 197–200.

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to live in a tiny enclosed world which concentrated on the liturgical cult, it also made them feel that such an existence was a normal one. The old Byzantine instinct for conservatism, which is both the main force and the principal weakness of Eastern Christianity, became the last refuge which could ensure its survival in the face of Islam.

9

BYZANTIUM AND THE ARABS: THE IMAGE OF THE BYZANTINES AS MIRRORED IN ARABIC LITERATURE

Ahmad M.H. Shboul

I

Arab-Byzantine relations have long attracted the interest of scholars. Among these the names of Vasiliev, Grégoire, Honigmann, Canard and Shahïd especially stand out. It is true that military exploits and ransoming of prisoners were the main preoccupation of both Arabs and Byzantines, if we are to judge by the works of Arabic and Greek chroniclers. But it was impossible for two neighbouring societies to deal with each other for several hundred years only on the battlefield, or simply through raids and subsequent truces, even if these two societies remained almost by definition hostile to one another. Modern scholars have long recognised this fact and cultural contacts, influences, cross-fertilizations and parallels have been pointed out as possible lines of research. This has been suggested in the fields of commerce, administration, art and architecture, as well as in the intellectual and religious spheres. Thus it is possible to talk of peaceable and informal contacts between Arabs and Byzantines as has been admirably brought out by Professor Marius Canard.[1] It is also possible to speak of cultural debts between the Christian Roman Empire of the East and the world of Islam;[2] or indeed of the "creative aspects of Byzantine-Islamic relations" as Professor Paul Lemerle has put it.[3]

For the study of any aspect of Byzantine-Islamic relations Arabic sources have considerable material to offer, far more than appears to be found in Byzantine sources.[4] Since literary sources reflect the intellectual outlook of their authors and the cultural milieu and mood of their times, it has seemed to me important to attempt an investigation of the views and attitudes of the Arabs towards the Byzantines as reflected in Arabic literature and within the context of Arab-Byzantine relations. The study of the reflection of one society in the literary mirror of another society is by no means unfamiliar in modern historiography. The works of Richard Southern and Norman Daniel on the image of Islam in the literature of Medieval Europe are well known examples of this genre.[5] Among Byzantinists, an essay by John Meyendorff and two volumes by Adel Theodore Khoury, deal with Byzantine views of Islam as a religion and are almost entirely based on the writings of Byzantine theologians.[6] V. Christides has recently given us some idea of Byzantine perceptions of pre-Islamic Arabs, including glimpses of Arabs portrayed in Byzantine painting.[7]

II

The present paper attempts to sketch the main outlines of the Byzantines' image as reflected in Arabic literature. It is mainly confined to the period between the sixth century *A.D.* (i.e., the century that preceded the rise of Islam) and the late eleventh century *A.D.* when the rise of the Seljuq Turks in the East meant that the

Arabs were no longer the principle bearers of the banner of Islam, and when the ascendancy of the Normans in Europe and the intrusion of the Western Crusaders in the East, deprived Byzantium of her role as the chief adversary of Islam in the eastern and central Mediterranean. As will be seen, however, it is necessary occasionally to pursue certain lines of investigation beyond these chronological limits. In order for this picture to be meaningful it should be set against the cultural and intellectual background of both Byzantium and Islam; and within the framework of the thought-world of the Arabs before and after the rise of Islam. One has also to bear in mind the nature, development and preoccupations of Arabic literature itself during this period.

For a broad view of this aspect of Arab-Byzantine relations there is a wide range of Arabic sources. These include pre-Islamic poetry, the Qur'ān, the Traditions of the Prophet Muḥammad, Qur'ānic exegesis, works of jurisprudence, biographical literature, historical annals and other types of historiography, geographical works, literary essays and anthologies, collections of Islamic Arabic poetry, works of fiction and popular tales, and also certain collections of Friday sermons particularly those delivered in the mosques of the frontier cities. No claim is made here for exhausting all possible material.

Two further points need to be made at this stage. The first concerns the nature of the sources, particularly the pre-Islamic poetry of the Arabs and the *Ḥadīth* literature, i.e. the sayings attributed to the Prophet Muḥammad. The question of authenticity needs to be kept in mind when dealing with these two types of source material. The second point concerns the names given to the Byzantines. The usual name applied to the Byzantines in Arabic sources is *Rūm*, though there are also other appellations and nicknames. In certain categories of later Arabic sources, particularly later poetry, but also later histories, it is not always clear whether the *Rūm* in question are the Byzantines or some others. In some cases it is evident from the context that the word *Rūm* refers simply to the Orthoaox Christian communities in the Islamic world. Sometimes it is applied wrongly to the Crusaders in the East, or even to the Christians of Spain. It was even used later to describe the Seljuqs, the Ottoman Turks or anybody coming from Anatolia.[8] Apart from these later usages, the name *Rūm* is applied in Arabic sources, as a rule, to the Byzantines alone. The appellation *Banū-al-Aṣfar* was used when talking of the Byzantines in the abstract or in a more emotive way, especially in poetry both pre-Islamic and Islamic. It occurs in *Ḥadīth* literature, in works of history, and in such prose works as the celebrated *Maqāmāt* of al-Ḥarīrī (eleventh century *A.D.*) known for his particular style, rich in imagery and rhyming prose, where the name *Banū-al-Aṣfar* affords some interesting puns.[9]

III

Our survey will begin with a consideration of how Byzantine-Arab contacts and Arab views of Byzantium before Islam are reflected in what has survived of the pre-Islamic literary tradition of the Arabs. What is known of Arabic literary tradition before Islam was originally handed down from generation to generation by word of mouth, mostly, though not entirely, in the form of poetry. This was eventually edited and committed to writing in Islamic times, mainly during the second and third centuries of the Islamic era (the eighth and ninth Christian centuries). It has long been recognised that the work of some editors and

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anthologists was not always free from false attribution or even sheer fabrication. And the Arabs' taste for rhyming verse made things easier for early inventive compilers, though more difficult for later critical scholars. Such inventions have led some modern writers to cast doubt on a large amount of what is termed the pre-Islamic poetry of the Arabs. The controversy is perhaps not yet over, but there seems to be sufficient internal evidence to support the authenticity of the best part of such poetry, including the famous Seven Odes.[10] Some other verses can easily be dismissed as later inventions. It is, for example, safe to reject those verses and traditions connected with the legendary history of Southern Arabia, in which the emperor of the *Rūm* and other kings of several nations are depicted as vassals of the ancient Arabian kings of Yemen.[11] These verses and traditions were mostly the product of later tribal propaganda, a fact that was realised by certain Muslim scholars.[12]

For the rest, the image of the Byzantines in pre-Islamic poetry is a more realistic one. Byzantine hegemony over several Arab tribes in Syria,[13] and the constant trade relations between Arabia and Byzantium, provided many Arabs with considerable knowledge of Byzantine society and way of life. Damascus, Gaza, and Antioch not only numbered many Syrian Arabs among their inhabitants, but were also frequented by traders from the Ḥijāz, Najd and other parts of the Arabian peninsula. Some Arabs even ventured as far as Constantinople itself. Glimpses of this are reflected in Arabic poetry and other literary traditions of Arabia in the sixth and early seventh centuries.

In this pre-Islamic literary tradition it is possible to speak of several characteristics of the Byzantines as seen through Arab eyes. There is first of all the image of Byzantium as a great power, and of its emperor *(Qayṣar)* as an overlord of Arab princes in Syria. His greatness is only matched by that of Chosroes *(Kisrā)* of Sāsānid Persia. The great and noble kings of *Banū-al-Aṣfar* become symbols of prestige and worldly might especially in the verses of poets known to have been familiar with manifestations of Byzantine power through their geographical position, travel, and experience, for example, Imru'-l-Qays, 'Adī b. Zayd, and al-A'shā.[14] This is reflected particularly in the poetry of the semi-legendary Imru'-l-Qays, the most famous poet of pre-Islamic Arabia. As a descendant of the royal family of Hujr, Ākil al-Murār of the tribe of Kinda, Imru'-l-Qays, after reportedly leading a somewhat bohemian existence, was faced with the misfortune of having to seek revenge for his royal father, who was murdered by men of another tribe, and to try in vain to regain his lost crown.[15] It is in this context that he is depicted on a journey to Constantinople seeking help from the Byzantine emperor, Justinian I. In his poetry Imru'-l-Qays speaks of his plan in terms which indicate the Arabs' view of Byzantine military strength: "I will conquer you with the help of the Byzantines" he threatens his opponents.[16] In the verses of other poets the image of the Byzantines as a powerful kingdom becomes somewhat more stereotyped.

Then there is the image of Byzantium as a civilized kingdom, possessing great wealth and producing high quality goods, and capable of great achievements in architecture and the crafts. A cultural achievement which is still closely related to the picture of Byzantium as a great power is the Byzantine gold and silver coinage. The high esteem for Byzantine coins was not due simply to the Arabs' undeniable appreciation of their monetary value, but also to their brilliance and beauty, and the purity of their metal, (the "sterling" quality and value as it were). All this

provided impressive imagery for the Arab poet. For example, small clear pools of water formed by scarce rain in the deserts of Arabia are likened to silver coins.[17] A healthy and comely human face is compared to a Byzantine gold coin (Arabic: *dīnār*): "Their faces are like *dīnārs* struck in the country of Caesar" says an ancient Arabian poet.[18] Another poet likens the face of his healthy son to a gold coin from the reign of Heraclius.[19] The imagery of the *dīnār* of Heraclius, the last Byzantine emperor to retain Syria within his empire, continued to be used by Arab poets and men of letters for a considerable time after Byzantine currency was superseded in the Islamic world by Arab coinage.[20]

The Arabs' appreciation of Byzantine cultural achievement is reflected particularly in allusions to Byzantine architecture in pre-Islamic poetry. Byzantine bridges and palaces are referred to in perhaps the most flattering terms which a desert Arab could use. Thus a well-built and elegant she-camel is usually compared to a Byzantine bridge or an arch in a Byzantine palace, for example, by Ṭarafa and al-A'shā.[21] Thus it seems that while the Byzantines thought conventionally of the pre-Islamic Arabs as nomads and tent-dwellers,[22] the Arabs saw the Byzantines as palace-dwellers and as architects and builders *par excellence*.[23] It is important to remember that these Arab poets travelled in northern Arabia and Syria during or shortly after Justinian I's reign.

Byzantine textiles and other commodities are also appreciated by pre-Islamic Arabs. There are references to red silk and stuffs from Antioch being worn by Arab desert beauties, as described by poets such as Imru'-l-Qays, al-A'shā and Zuhayr.[24] Other poets refer to the accomplishments of girl-singers, including some of Byzantine origin, who sang not only in the palaces of the Ghassānid Arab princes of Syria, but also in those of the Lakhmid Arabs of Iraq and in the cities of the Ḥijāz.[25]

Such knowledge of the Byzantines and their wealth and culture was also reflected in pre-Islamic Mecca, the birth-place of the Prophet Muḥammad. The people of Mecca, who were noted for their activity in trade and for their prominent businessmen, do not seem to have had outstanding poets despite their appreciation of poetry. But thanks to the special position which Mecca continued to have in the world of Islam, we do possess many traditions about the history and lore of Mecca before Islam, preserved in Islamic historical and other literary sources. Even allowing for possible later embellishments by the fanciful imagination of later generations, it is possible to find in such traditions evidence of cultural contacts, through trade and diplomacy, between Byzantium and Mecca. Muḥammad's great-grandfather, Hāshim, is said to have negotiated terms for regular Meccan trade with the Byzantine emperor. Indeed he is believed to have died on one of his business trips to Byzantine Syria and to have been buried in Gaza.[26] Another Meccan dignitary, 'Uthmān b. al-Ḥuwayrith, also apparently met the Byzantine emperor in person in an attempt to arrange closer trade links, and perhaps even political ties, between Constantinople and Mecca.[27]

Byzantine contacts with Mecca were not limited to the journeys and experience of Meccan traders in Byzantine Syria, where Muḥammad himself was to journey in his youth. Nor was Byzantine cultural influence on Mecca confined to the availability in its markets of Byzantine commodities, including Byzantine silk and male and female slaves. Byzantine architecture seems to have had its share of influence on the buildings of Mecca, especially on the most venerated temple of the pre-Islamic Arabs, namely the Ka'ba. For we are told by later Muslim

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historians of Mecca that when, in the late sixth century, the Ka'ba was rebuilt, not only was the timber from a wrecked Byzantine ship used by the Meccans, but a Byzantine or Syrian builder and carpenter was employed to supervise and carry out the reconstruction and decoration of the Ka'ba.[28] In fact Byzantine artistic traditions may have been reflected in the painting of human images that reportedly used to adorn the walls of the Ka'ba before Islam.[29]

IV

When we come to the early decades of the seventh century we need to focus even more on Mecca. For it was here, in the year A.D. 610, that Muḥammad's message as the Prophet of Islam was first preached. The pagan merchants of Mecca still carried on their trade with Byzantine Syria. There were in Mecca at that time a few people, slaves or freedmen, of Byzantine origin or with Byzantine connections. One of them later became a prominent Companion of Muḥammad. This was Ṣuhayb al-Rūmī, who not only retained a name which meant the blond or the red-haired Byzantine, but also spoke Arabic with a "Byzantine-Greek accent".[30] One can easily infer from such evidence that to live in Mecca in the late sixth and early seventh centuries could involve some acquaintance not only with Byzantine Syria and its products, but also with individuals of Byzantine background. This is significant, for it illustrates Byzantine-Meccan contacts and possible Byzantine influences on Mecca before Islam. It also gives us an idea of the Meccans' knowledge of Byzantium as a power and as a civilization at the time of Muhammad's mission.

The same period which witnessed the beginning of Muḥammad's mission also saw the last bitter struggle between the two great powers in the Near East, the Romans and the Persians, a struggle which has been described as "the last world-war of antiquity",[31] and which is echoed in the earliest Muslim literary document, namely the Qur'ān itself. During the early Meccan years of the nascent Muslim community Muḥammad and his small band of followers had a sympathetic view of the Christian Roman Empire of Constantinople. One of the early chapters (sūras) of the Qur'ān begins with a direct reference to the Byzantines, and the whole chapter was therefore subsequently entitled al-Rūm. The opening verses of this chapter not only illustrate the awareness among the people of Mecca, both Muslims and pagans, of the struggle between Byzantium and Sāsānid Persia, but also reflect the sympathy and the feeling of spiritual affinity which early Muslims had towards the Christian Byzantines. The relevant verses read: "The Byzantines (al-Rūm) have been defeated in the neighbouring land, [but] after their defeat they will triumph in a few years' time".[32] Then the verses describe the feeling of the Muslim believers at the time of this predicted, one can almost say promised, victory of the Byzantines: "The Believers shall then rejoice at God's support; God helps whomsoever he will".[33] This is not a simple reference to a contemporary event or a mere prophecy. In these verses one can sense a consoling tone. It is also significant that it is the Byzantines and not the Persians who are the centre of attention. The latter of the verses just quoted clearly identify the Muslims with the Byzantine cause, for they will rejoice at their victory.

In fact public opinion in Mecca, where the Muslims were still a persecuted minority, seems to have been sharply divided into two camps vis-à-vis the Byzantine-Persian struggle. The division was along religious lines: the pagans

sympathising with the Persians, and the small group of Muslims championing the cause of the Christian Byzantines. One of the closest Companions of Muhammad, namely Abū Bakr, the future first caliph, went as far as laying a wager on the matter with some pagans who were jubilant over the initial Persian victory and anxious to prove Muhammad wrong. As it turned out Abū Bakr won the bet, having put his stakes on the Byzantines. (This was before the prohibition of gambling was decreed.)[34] Between the defeat of the Byzantines under Phocas (605) and the recovery under Heraclius which culminated in the victories of 629-630, Muhammad's own position had improved greatly. From a spiritual leader of a small persecuted minority, he had now become not only a successful religious leader with thousands of followers, but also a successful military commander and head of a new political community with its centre at Medina, his adopted town, and with Mecca itself and most of Arabia as part of his new Commonwealth.[35]

It is not the place here to deal with the effect on Byzantium and on the world of late antiquity in general, which this unexpected rising power of the Arabs was soon to have. This aspect has long been studied and commented upon from more than one viewpoint. But the attitude to Byzantium of Muhammad and his followers and early successors must be seen within the context of the changing fortunes of the early Muslim community, and the Islamic-Byzantine relations as they now evolved.

In the early years Muhammad and his followers were still engaged in a bitter armed struggle against the pagans of Mecca, and a considerable number of Qur'ānic revelations in this critical period dealt with this struggle. But as the number of Muhammad's followers increased and his position became stronger in Arabia, a wider perspective for the future began to emerge. In later Qur'ānic verses revealed at Medina, Muslims are told to expect other adversaries, described as "formidable". Later Muslim exegetes, citing traditions which they linked with the Prophet's times, found in this description an allusion to the Byzantines, among others.[36] Whether or not the Byzantines are meant here, it is evident that Muhammad and his followers had now come to view the Byzantines not only as a formidable military power, but also as a power with whom they would sooner or later come into conflict.

This development in the Muslim attitude towards Byzantium is reflected in the *Hadīth* literature. The difficulty about this type of tradition lies not only in the possibility of distortion in the process of transmission but also, as serious Muslim scholars soon began to realise with alarm, the more dangerous probability of sheer invention of traditions for political or partisan ends, or simply for moralising purposes. In dealing with such literature caution is therefore called for. Traditions that are relevant to the present investigation, even if not all necessarily authentic, seem on the whole to reflect the mood of the times in the Muslim camp. Some of them, however, and as will be noted later, betray the thinking of later generations. Although further research in the massive *Hadīth* collections is still needed for our purpose, it is possible to outline the general picture emerging from some of this material, and particularly from the many traditions relating to the conquest of Syria in the *History of Damascus* by Ibn 'Asākir (d. 571/1176) who was himself a prominent scholar of *Hadīth*, and whose work has yielded substantial data for the purpose of this paper.

An important theme in the *Hadīth* literature is that of the Byzantines as a symbol of military and political power and as a society of great abundance. This is

a continuation of the pre-Islamic image of Byzantium, and is only natural in those early and transitional days of the Islamic community. This was usually contrasted with the conditions of the simple and poverty-stricken Muslim community in its early years.[37] An interesting corollary of this theme in the *Hadīth* (also encountered in other types of later writings) is the way in which early Muslims saw themselves being viewed by the powerful and wealthy Empire of Constantinople. Muḥammad is often reminded by some of his companions of the might of the Byzantines, which he admits. On more than one occasion, however, he assures his followers of the futility of Byzantine power.[38]

Other traditions attributed to the Prophet, in which there is some allusion to the Byzantines and the future Muslim conquest of Syria, may in part have been invented later and projected back in time. Such traditions promise Muḥammad's followers the conquest of Syria and the treasures of the Byzantines and the Persians. "I have been given the keys of Syria", he is quoted as saying, as well as those of "Persia and Yemen".[39] On other occasions, Muḥammad is quoted as giving further and more explicit promises that his followers will eventually inherit the wealth of the Byzantines and the Persians.[40] Further traditions predict the conquest of Jerusalem by the Muslims, speak of Damascus as a future Muslim stronghold, and of a Muslim-Byzantine truce.[41]

But the Prophet's sayings still reflect the Muslim awareness of Byzantine military strength. Some of the Prophet's companions, on hearing him talk of a Muslim conquest of Syria, asked him, "But how can we possibly gain Syria while it has the 'horned Byzantines' well-established in it?"[42] In other instances Muslims in the times of the Prophet are described as "fearing the Byzantines more than any other adversary; through trading with Syria they could see Byzantine strength for themselves".[43]

As Muḥammad's position became better consolidated in Arabia he had to come into some political contacts, and even have military encounters, with the Byzantines, usually through their tributary Arab chieftains in southern Syria. The details of Muḥammad's political or military activities in this sphere do not in themselves concern the present study. But it is necessary to note those traditions connected with such activities which bear on the Muslim views of Byzantium at the time. Muḥammad's expedition against Syria known as the Tabūk expedition, which only went as far as Tabūk in present-day Saʿūdī Arabia is considered by a number of modern scholars as no more than a demonstration of Muḥammad's new status in Arabia, that is, as a military move for political ends, and perhaps also with the hope of securing some material reward in the form of booty.[44] Most of Muḥammad's followers found this project sorely taxed their means. Some found the whole thing impractical. One half-hearted (or hypocritical) contemporary is quoted as saying, "Does Muḥammad think that fighting the *Banū-al-Aṣfar* (i.e., the Byzantines) is child's play? I can imagine his men soon tied up together in ropes".[45] But this expedition, together with the sending of a small Muslim army as far as Muʾta (in present-day southern Jordan), and the preparing of Usāma's army during the last days of the Prophet, all appear to point to development in the early Islamic community's stance *vis-à-vis* the Byzantine Empire.[46]

On the diplomatic level, mention must be made of Muḥammad's letters to the kings and princes of neighbouring countries, including the Byzantine emperor,

Heraclius. Muslim sources speak of a friendly reply from Heraclius, who is said to have sent a gift to the Prophet, although this gift apparently never reached its destination, the envoy having been robbed *en route* by some desert Arabs.[47] The Byzantine "governor" of Egypt also sent gifts including a Copt slave-girl called Māriya whom Muḥammad took as a wife and who bore him a son. Muslim sources also speak of the sympathy and understanding supposedly shown by Heraclius towards Muḥammad and his faith. Even if Heraclius and his gold *dīnārs* appeared so impressive and grand in pre-Islamic poetry, Heraclius himself now comes out in Arabic Islamic sources as a different man. Here he is depicted as a man of unpredictable moods, of a highly spiritual nature, with a great deal of what we would nowadays call superstition. He is worried about the news of the rise of Muḥammad and hastily summons Arab merchants, especially those coming from Mecca, and asks them about the Arabian Prophet. But we are also told that Heraclius in fact recognised the Prophetic mission of Muḥammad; that he foresaw his coming, and now wished he could meet him. Some say that he even wished to have the chance to wash Muḥammad's feet![48]

Later generations not only attributed to Muḥammad sayings about the future conquest of Syria but also gave an apocalyptic vision of the Byzantines eventually driving the Muslims out of Syria. According to one tradition, the Byzantines would in later days ravage Syria for forty days during which only Damascus and Amman would remain as strongholds of the Muslims.[49] But such traditions may have been invented by some later pious or fatalist Muslim, in the days when Muslim Syria was actually threatened, and even partly occupied, by the Byzantines, for example, in the late-tenth century; or they may even have been inspired partly by the coming of the Crusaders.

Thus early Muslim views of the Byzantines in the days of Muḥammad seem to have developed from sympathy and affinity, reflected in early verses of the Qur'ān, to awe and apprehension of Byzantium's military power, scorn of Byzantine wealth and luxury, and finally anticipation of open antagonism and prolonged warfare.

<div style="text-align:center">V</div>

Historical traditions from the period of the Muslim conquest of Syria reflect a changing image of Byzantium. It is seen at first as a superior power still feared by the Muslims in the early days of the Caliphate. As Arab forces advanced deep into Syria, however, and as direct encounter with the Byzantine forces resulted in Muslim victories, confidence in the Muslim camp increased, and there was yet another, now more drastic, change in the image of the Byzantines in Arab eyes. The extent to which earlier traditions were embellished by later transmitters and writers is difficult to tell. But it is perhaps possible, nevertheless, to capture some of the atmosphere of the conquests and early Arab rule in Syria. Several of the (unofficial) advisers of the first caliph are said to have warned him against sending an army against the Byzantines. Urging him to wait until a suitable number of warriors could be marshalled, one senior Muslim warned Abū Bakr by saying, "It is the *Rūm*, the Banū-al-Aṣfar, an ironside and a strong edifice; I do not see that you should face them directly".[50]

One theme that is evident in certain Arabic sources on the conquest of Syria is that of supposed dialogues between Arab and Byzantine generals or their

delegates. Such dialogues not only reflect what the Arabs thought of the Byzantines, but also show how they thought the Byzantines viewed them. On such occasions the Arabs are impressed with the wealth displayed by the Byzantines: their heavy arms, rich clothes and numerous majestic tents made from silken stuff. In one instance a Muslim delegation refused, on religious grounds, to go into the great tent of a Byzantine general because it was made of silk, and the Byzantines had to come out to see them in a much humbler setting. This, according to Arabic sources, not only puzzled the Byzantine general but caused Heraclius himself to say, on hearing of the incident later: "This is the first sign of our humiliation; now Syria will be lost".[51]

If the manifestation of Byzantine military might and wealth impressed the early Muslims, the morale and performance of Byzantine soldiers on the battlefield was soon regarded by the Muslims as very low indeed. Heraclius is said to have discouraged his generals on many occasions from openly fighting the Arabs, and to have recommended that they should be appeased by offers of money or goods.[52] Byzantine soldiers are depicted as unwilling to fight the Arabs, and as having to be chained together in groups of ten in order to be prevented from fleeing.[53] Other traditions speak of the impression left by Arab warriors on the Byzantines. The Byzantine authorities in Syria are shown as bewildered and unable to understand this new and different upsurge of Arab warriors against Syria. Such inability to understand was met by no small degree of sarcastic retort from Arab spokesmen. A Byzantine patrician is said to have once asked to speak to an Arab leader; it was the shrewd 'Amr b. al-'Āṣ, one of the famous generals, diplomats and wits of the Arabs, and the future conqueror of Egypt, who was given this role. The Byzantine patrician welcomes 'Amr, reminding him that Arabs and Byzantines are cousins, because their great common ancestor was the Patriarch Abraham. Then the Byzantine asks the Arab: "What brings you here now? I thought that our respective forefathers had already divided the land among themselves and you got your share and we got ours. We realise that it is only difficult conditions that have forced you to come out of your country. We will arrange for some grant for you, then you can go away". The Arab general replies by accepting the idea of a common ancestry of the two nations,[54] but retorts that the division of land alluded to had been an unfair division, and that the Arabs had now come to put it right. He agrees about difficult conditions in Arabia, adding that the Arabs, having tasted the bread made from Syrian wheat, would never leave until they had subjugated the Byzantines.[55]

On a similar occasion, a Byzantine general meets another Arab leader; this time it is Khālid b. al-Walīd, the hero of the Yarmūk battle. The two meet on horseback and the Byzantine general, after blaming difficult conditions and high prices which must have forced the Arabs out of their country, offers to give "each man of you an amount of ten *dīnārs* and a camel loaded with food, clothes and leather. You may then go back to your families and live for this year; you can ask us for the same next year and we will send it to you". He then points to the great numbers of Byzantine warriors against whom the Arabs could not possibly stand a chance. Khālid is said to have answered this condescending Byzantine in a tone of mockery: "It was not hunger that brought us here, but we Arabs are in the habit of drinking blood, and we are told that the blood of the Byzantines is the sweetest of its kind, so we came to shed your blood and drink it". At this shocking rejoinder, the attendants of the Byzantine chief turn to one another saying: "That is what we

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have been told about the Arabs and their drinking of blood".[56] This story perhaps reflects one aspect of how the Arabs perceived themselves in the mirror of the Byzantines.

But the Byzantines are said before long to have seen the Muslims in a completely different light, and realised the true nature of this new breed of Arabs. The Byzantines, who are depicted as having a keen interest in practical espionage, had various first-hand reports about the behaviour of these Arabs, and about conditions and morale in their camp. What Byzantine spies had to tell the Byzantine officers made them very uneasy indeed. For all reports pictured these desert warriors as "slim men on thoroughbred horses, who spend their nights praying and chanting from their Holy Book as if they were monks, so that if you were to talk to the man next to you he would not hear you because of the sound of their recitals. But during daylight they behave like real warriors preparing and sharpening their arrows and javelins".[57]

The Byzantines are depicted as reacting with alarm and consternation to this image of Muslim warriors. Later on when Syria was won by the Arabs, an old Byzantine patrician is said to have ascribed this to the piety and good discipline of the Muslims which he contrasted to the irresponsibility, wine-drinking and unruly conduct among the Byzantines. Even Heraclius himself is said to have approved of this explanation of his grave turn of fortune.[58]

After the Arab conquest of Syria, Egypt and North Africa, it must have taken the Byzantine authorities some time to adjust to the new status of the Arabs. The Arabs themselves must have needed some time to adapt to their new role, and their responsibility for a large Islamic empire. But the Arabs clearly saw themselves as the inheritors of the Sāsānids in Iraq and Iran, and of the Byzantines in Syria, Egypt and North Africa.

VI

During the Umayyad period (A.D. 660-750) which witnessed important developments within the new Arab empire, the Arabs had much to learn not only from the Byzantine legacy in the conquered lands, but also from Constantinople itself. Arabic authors acknowledge this debt in various ways. Reporting traditions about Byzantine material and technical help in the building of some of the early great mosques of the Umayyad period is only one aspect of this.[59] This period witnessed Byzantine-Arab contacts at several levels. Apart from the two major but unsuccessful attempts by the Arabs to conquer Constantinople (A.D. 674-78 and 717-18), there were numerous lesser expeditions and annual raids. But there were also diplomatic, commercial and cultural contacts between the two sides. These are in evidence as early as the days of the first Umayyad caliph and even before. We have references to envoys between Byzantium and the Arabs at the time of 'Umar and 'Uthmān.[60]

From the Arabs' viewpoint it seemed natural to deal with the Byzantines at least on equal terms. Whatever the official view of Constantinople may have been in those early days of Arab ascendancy, Arabic authors tell us that the Byzantines, too, adopted the same view as early as the reign of Mu'āwiya. The Byzantine emperor was said to have considered Mu'āwiya the successor of earlier kings of the East, presumably a reference to the Sāsānids. "Previous kings", he was reported to have written to Mu'āwiya, "used to engage in correspondence with my predecessors and both sides used to test each other's worth".[61]

52

But the basic image of the Byzantines reflected in Arabic literature from the establishment of the Arab Empire onwards, was understandably that of the main antagonist and rival —the enemy *par excellence*. This was, of course, more than reciprocated on the Byzantine side. There was, however, one fundamental difference between Arab attitudes to the Byzantines, and Byzantine attitudes to the Arabs and Islam. Byzantine views of the Muslim Arabs were largely derived from, and dictated by, their abhorrence of the new religion — Islam. The Muslims, on the other hand, not only were familiar with Christianity and with Christians in their own society, but, for obvious historical reasons, they adopted a fairly tolerant attitude towards Christianity itself and towards Christians as such. To the Muslim Arabs the rivalry between them and Byzantium was military, political, religious, cultural, and also economic. The religious dimension was not, however, the most prominent in the image of the Byzantines as mirrored in Arabic literature. The preoccupation of the Arabs with Byzantium as the enemy is more evident in official writings, in the works of historians, geographers, poets and other men of letters, in legal texts and in popular literature and far less evident in religious polemics.[62]

Traditions about Byzantine and Arab embassies in this and later periods reflect dealings between two equal rivals, each trying to outwit his opponent.[63] Later diplomatic exchanges under the 'Abbāsids and Fāṭimids reflect a haughtier and more majestic air in the Muslim courts; although the battle of wits is still alive in letters, and in caliphal and imperial courts, Arabic sources depict the Byzantines as more reconciled now to the idea of equality.[64]

Arabic historians, with one or two important exceptions, depict the Byzantines usually only as the enemy, the Byzantine emperor as the unnamed "king of the *Rūm*", the "tyrant of the *Rūm*" (*ṭāghiya*), or even the "dog (*kalb*) of the *Rūm*". His envoys and soldiers are usually described as "barbarians" (*'ilj;* plural, *a'lāj*).[65] Muslim rulers are reported to have addressed Byzantine emperors with insulting letters, in which the latter are "ordered" to comply with the wishes of the caliph or emir. This is especially so at times of relatively intensified warfare, for example during the reigns of Hārūn al-Rashīd, al-Ma'mūn and al-Mu'taṣim (Irene, Nicephorus and Theophilus); at the time of the Fāṭimid al-Mu'izz and the Byzantine expedition against Crete; or in the days of Sayf al-Dawla the Hamdānid (mid 4th / 10th century, the period of the Macedonian dynasty.)[66] At the official level, however, diplomatic expedience must have called for a more realistic and compromising tone.[67]

Muslim geographers, most of whom were state officials, are generally interested in Byzantium mainly for strategic reasons. In fact most of their information on Byzantium seems to have derived from the archives of the Islamic military intelligence department. Qudāma explicitly warns against the danger of the Byzantines and stresses the need to know how to deal with them in warfare.[68] Al-Maqdisī, who was not a state official, is more interested in the Muslim quarter in Constantinople "which is adjoining the palace of the 'dog' of the *Rūm*"; and gives advice on how Muslim prisoners of war should conduct themselves.[69]

VII

The preoccupation with the Byzantines as the Arabs' chief enemy is particularly reflected in Arabic poetry of the late seventh, eighth, ninth and tenth centuries.[70]

This poetry is mainly in praise of Muslim caliphs, emirs or generals who waged war against the Byzantines and restored the prestige of Islam. To a certain extent it may be seen as an interesting illustration of Muslim public opinion, with no small amount of the mass-media flavour, especially when one considers the Arabs' appreciation of poetry. Worthy deeds in the *jihād* against the Byzantines are praised and commemorated in poetry. For example, it was stressed that Hārūn al-Rashīd was the first Muslim caliph ever to lead his army in the battlefield against the Byzantines.[71] So was the initiative of Luhay'a, *qāḍī* of Egypt at the time of al-Ma'mūn, who was the first judge to institute a special fund from the *awqāf* (endowments) towards maintaining regular volunteers *(muṭṭawi'a)* for defending Egyptian ports against surprise Byzantine naval attacks.[72]

Lively glimpses of the atmosphere of the war efforts against the Byzantines are particularly reflected in the work of such poets as Marwān b. Abī Ḥafṣa, al-Khalī' al-Bāhilī, Muslim b. al-Walīd (late eighth and early ninth centuries); and Abū Tammām and al-Buḥturī (both ninth century *A.D.*).[73] In the tenth century the court of Sayf al-Dawla at Aleppo patronised many celebrated poets, of whom two were outstanding and of special relevance to our survey. The first is Abū Firās, himself a Ḥamdānid prince and warrior, and twice prisoner-of-war in Byzantine hands; the other is al-Mutanabbī, the very proud, indeed arrogant, warrior, and aristocrat of Arabic poets.[74] As may be expected, the Byzantines do not come out very well in such poetry, for the poets only commemorate Muslim victories and Byzantine defeats.

A less known Arab poet (from the early tenth century *A.D.)* depicts the Byzantines as so frightened of a Muslim general, who led many campaigns into their territory, "that the *Rūm*, even in times of peace, used to quieten their troublesome children by mentioning his name".[75] It would be misleading however to think that these poets devoted themselves to propaganda warfare against the Byzantines. For on the whole their aim was to praise their patrons. In the case of Abū Firās, most of his so-called "Byzantine" pieces *(Rūmiyyāt)* are more concerned with his own experience as a prisoner-of-war, his yearning for his beloved, and his proud reproaches to Sayf al-Dawla for not ransoming him. For others, including al-Mutanabbī, the Byzantines figure only in a small portion of a massive poetical output.

Nevertheless, the picture of the Byzantines as a real danger looming over Muslim society is reflected by these and other poets, as well as by historians and other prose-writers. This is echoed even in the work of such poets as Abū Nuwās and his like, who are not known to have concerned themselves with war-poetry.[76] In such cases the reference to the Byzantines is not in the context of a particular event, but in a general way, and the fact that the Byzantines were the arch-enemy was assumed to be accepted by the reader or the listener. Occasionally other adversaries, such as the Khazars, are also alluded to in such a manner, but usually only second to the Byzantines.[77]

Towards the end of the ninth century, particularly after the end of the caliphate of al-Mu'taṣim (*A.D.* 833-42), who was the last caliph personally to take the field against the Byzantines, the Muslims' perception of Byzantine military power begins to change. Whereas earlier poets and writers demonstrated a belief in Arab military superiority, and sometimes even in an imminent final victory over the Byzantines,[78] later poets and writers (and also some officials) betray a less optimistic and, indeed, occasionally a gloomy picture of the fortunes on the Arab

side. Constantinople was no longer a realistic target and could no longer be reached by Arab armies — only by the mirage of pious or popular imagination. When the mystic al-Ḥallāj (d. 309/922) was being tortured shortly before his execution, he is said to have asked the police officer in charge to refrain from beating him so that he "might offer the caliph a piece of advice as valuable as the conquering of Constantinople".[79]

The effect on the Muslims of the long term, though not constant, counter-offensive by the Byzantines and the inability, or sometimes unwillingness, of Muslim rulers to halt it, finds its reflection not only in Arabic chronicles but also in personal pronouncements by some historians, men of letters, poets,[80] and even by some weakened caliph, or a hand-tied wazīr.[81] Apprehension of the Byzantine danger is reflected even in a dream, or rather a nightmare, which Sayf al-Dawla himself is reported to have experienced. He saw one night that his house in Aleppo was being encircled by an enormous serpent. One dream-reader, who came from Ḥims, interpreted this as an imminent attack by the Byzantines in which Sayf al-Dawla's own palace would be besieged and taken. The historian of Aleppo, Kamal al-Dīn b. al-ʿAdīm (d. 660/1262), who relates this story, remarks that it so happened that God did cause the Byzantines to advance against Aleppo and to occupy Sayf al-Dawla's residence.[82]

One of the most interesting examples of the effects of Byzantine military victories against Sayf al-Dawla, at the popular level, can be seen in the Friday sermons or orations (singular khuṭba) of the tenth-century jurist ʿAbd al-Raḥīm b. Nubāta. As a contemporary of Sayf al-Dawla, he witnessed the defeats, or setbacks, of the Ḥamdānids at the hands of the Byzantines. In one of his sermons (not dated), he refers to the exploits of the "tyrant of the Rūm... who had overrun a large territory and subjugated several Muslim cities, destroying and killing, so that the Muslims were deeply shaken and Muslim armies hesitated to face up to him. It was by Allāh's grace alone that this scourge was destroyed...for he was killed by his own people in his own country...a mercy from God which was undeserved by us".[83] The Byzantine "tyrant" in question is identified as Nicephorus Phocas.[84] A preacher like Ibn Nubāta was evidently more modest and more truthful than the court poets.

Even in later times when Byzantium no longer represented a danger to the Muslims, one could still find poets and authors referring to the Rūm as the dreaded enemy in the old familiar fashion of earlier centuries. In some of these cases this is a mere confusion between Rūm and Western Crusaders. It seems that the word Rūm continued to be employed by later generations of Muslims as a generic term for any hostile Christian power.[85] A curious case is a long letter in verse addressed to the Ottoman Sultan Bāyazīd II (late fifteenth/early sixteenth century). Although this Sultan was already well established in Constantinople itself, and although the poem-letter was sent from Spain from the last community of Muslims under the Inquisition, nevertheless, the Spanish Christians are described as Rūm.[86]

In certain categories of Arabic literature, especially from the fourth/tenth century, fighting the Byzantines is depicted, not only as a praiseworthy and pious activity, but also as deserving the financial support of the general public. This is particularly reflected in the Maqāmāt and other genres, such as the Qaṣīdas Sāsāniyya of Abū Dulaf and others, where pious zeal is occasionally shown to be exploited by an eloquent speaker pretending to be a warrior for the faith (ghāzī).[87]

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Brief reference can be made to another category of Arabic sources, namely that of the Muslim jurists who, when dealing with international relations, usually give the Byzantines as the "classic" example of the "house of war". This is particularly true of works from the period of the ninth to the eleventh centuries *A.D.*[88]

VIII

But Byzantium was not merely the enemy in the eyes of Muslim intellectuals; it was also a historical reality and a civilization with which the Arabs shared elements in a common cultural legacy. How did Byzantine civilization appear to contemporary Muslims? To answer this question one needs to look, once again, at the development of Muslim society and its evolution into a world civilization. In the early period, when the Muslim Arabs had little administrative experience or cultural sophistication, they acknowledged their debt to the Byzantines and to others. The first generation of puritanical Muslims considered Byzantine political institutions to be too sophisticated and too worldly for their purposes;[89] but later generations thought differently.

As a model in their imperial rule, administration and protocol, the Byzantines in Arab eyes were usually only matched by the ancient Persians, though for obvious historical reasons the defunct Sāsānids of Persia were somehow considered superior in these fields. This view is reflected in works of political wisdom and mirrors for princes, themselves originally largely adopted from pre-Islamic Persian literature. Nevertheless the Byzantine monarch still has a place in such works, and is considered one of the great rulers of the world. He is portrayed as a ruler of a rich country, with enormous revenues, and a highly developed culture.[90] In one story conceived as fiction, but with a political moral, Byzantium is given the role of the "mistress of gold".[91]

Byzantine silk *(dībāj)* and other types of textiles and luxury goods acquire a proverbial status in Arabic literature.[92] Achievement in art and architecture continue to be regarded as a major attribute of the Byzantines, and Byzantine mosaics, artifacts, and buildings receive appreciative mention.[93] In Arabic literary tradition, only the Chinese could excel the Byzantines in painting and other crafts.[94]

The Byzantines as a people were considered as fine examples of physical beauty, and youthful slaves and slave-girls of Byzantine origin were highly valued. This is reflected not only in commercial tracts, but also in poetry, different types of *belles lettres,* and various other genres.[95] The Arabs' appreciation of the Byzantine female has a long history indeed. For the Islamic period, the earliest literary evidence we have is a *ḥadīth* (saying of the Prophet). Muḥammad is said to have addressed a newly converted Arab: "Would you like the girls of *Banū al-Aṣfar?*"[96] Not only were Byzantine slave-girls sought after for caliphal and other palaces (where some became mothers of future caliphs), but they also became the epitome of female physical beauty, home economy, and refined accomplishments.[97] The typical Byzantine maiden who captures the imagination of *littérateurs* and poets, had blond hair, blue or green eyes, a pure, healthy visage, lovely breasts, a delicate waist and a body that is like camphor or a flood of dazzling light. Arabic poetry even in later periods is full of imagery of the ideal female beauty. The Byzantine maiden has an important share of this imagery. It is true that the verses in question, on the whole, have little or no artistic value, but

they have some significance for our purpose. It is interesting that in this tradition the Byzantine female becomes the term of reference. Thus other beautiful or impressive things, e.g. wine, fruit, a clear pool of water, glittering swords, and of course, the stars, the sun and the moon, are compared to one feature or another of a Byzantine maiden.[98] Women of other origins, such as Persian, Turkish, Slav and negroid also figure in such poetry, but the Byzantine female generally retains a special position.

A highly appreciated accomplishment of Byzantine culture in the eyes of the Arabs was music. To some extent this was also related to the fact that a good slave-girl was also an accomplished player of at least one musical instrument. But the Arabs also acknowledged the contributions of the Byzantines in the science of music as well as in its practice.[99] 'Abbāsid princesses learned to play musical instruments described as Byzantine, and caliphs and crown princes showed their admiration for these instruments.[100] In refined circles and among *littérateurs*, where music was highly appreciated, praise for music and singing was supported by stating that the Persians considered it good manners, and the *Rūm* counted it as part of philosophy.[101] Moreover the Arabs' debt to the Byzantines in this respect was generally recognised.[102]

It was, however, pointed out that in architecture, book-making and in calligraphy, the Arabs soon surpassed the Byzantines. It is reported that a sample of Arabic calligraphy sent during the times of the Caliph al-Ma'mūn was still kept as an *objet d'art* by tenth-century Byzantine emperors who displayed it on feast-days and other special occasions.[103]

Byzantine manners and practical wisdom as regards food and diet were appreciated;[104] the Byzantine cuisine was regarded as superior in stuffed food (*al-ḥashw*) whereas the Persian cuisine was considered as excellent in sweets and cold food.[105] It is worth noting that a number of the able cooks in the *Arabian Nights* tales are slave-girls of Byzantine background.[106]

In the realm of poetry and eloquence, the Arabs' pride in their own eloquence and taste for poetry made it difficult for them to admit that other nations might also share these attributes. But the Byzantines were allowed some credit in this respect;[107] it was usually pointed out, however, that the *Rūm* were far inferior to the ancient Greeks in their rhetoric and poetry.[108]

On the negative side the Byzantines were criticised, and sometimes ridiculed, for such habits as castrating their children in order to sell them as slaves or servants,[109] for their alleged carelessness as regards hygiene, for other attributes which the Arabs considered as bad morals, bad manners, or bad taste — for example, adultery and the way Byzantines behaved in public, or chose their topics of conversation.[110] Above all, the Byzantines were considered as among the world's most miserly peoples and as lacking in hospitality.[111] It was even alleged that "the notion of generosity (*jūd*) had no word in the language of the *Rūm*, since people usually coined words for what they were in the habit of using".[112]

When it comes to science, philosophy and literature, the Byzantines do not fare well. Once again, we need to view this against the background of cultural developments in the Islamic world. An important feature of Islamic civilization was the revival of the sciences and other cultural achievements of ancient peoples that Islam had absorbed or inherited. This activity was greatly patronised and encouraged by caliphs, governors and other Muslim officials or scholars. This revival of learning, which was activated in earnest during the reign of Hārūn al-

Rashīd and more particularly during that of al-Ma'mūn, reached its zenith in the third and fourth / ninth and tenth centuries; the latter century has been called the period of the Islamic Renaissance.[113] Science and philosophy of the Greeks and Indians, and literature and wisdom of the Persians were translated into Arabic; Persian, Syriac, Egyptian and Mesopotamian works on astrology and popular traditions were revived. In such a milieu many old works were translated and thousands of new works were composed on every conceivable subject. Most of these were catalogued by the tenth-century Muslim savant of Baghdad, Ibn al-Nadīm in his *Fihrist* which reflects the real scope of the intellectual life of Islam in this period.[114] The Arabs had thus become experts in the fields of science and philosophy; moreover they regarded their own language as unmatched in its richness. It was therefore natural that the Byzantines should now weigh less in the Arabs' new scales.

One important aspect of this is the way in which learned Muslims viewed Byzantium's historical and cultural relationship with the ancient Greeks. Naturally the ancient Greek masters commanded the highest regard among Muslim scholars. Great effort and care, and considerable sums of money were expended in obtaining Greek works, and in translating them into Arabic. The Byzantines themselves supplied many manuscripts of such works on Muslim demand, and sometimes as a token of goodwill.[115] Educated Arabs knew that the language of the Byzantines was Greek, although many thought otherwise.[116] Some, like al-Mas'ūdī for instance, even acknowledged that in tenth-century Byzantium there were some savants who were familiar with the philosophical systems of the ancient Greeks.[117] But on the whole the Byzantines appeared to the Muslims as a later breed, far removed from the Hellenes of old. The language of the Byzantines may have been Greek, but theirs was an inferior dialect, and their writers had no hope of matching the old masters.[118] It was admitted that many Greek manuscripts were obtained by the Arabs from Byzantium, but it was also pointed out that those precious works had been locked away in caves and cellars where people were not permitted to reach them.[119] Long before Gibbon's well-known remarks in the *Decline and Fall*, some tenth-century Arab scholars were convinced that since Christianity prevailed in the land of the *Rūm*, the pursuit of philosophy and allied sciences had been suppressed in that land.[120]

Thus even if the Byzantines were admitted some kinship with the Hellenes, they were regarded as a degenerate offshoot, who turned away from the admirable intellectual path of their ancestors. There were some who even denied any real connection between Byzantines and ancient Greeks, claiming that the latter had long vanished, and that only their sciences had survived; and these were inherited by the Arabs.[121] Soon Arab scholars were able to boast that some of their own works, in mathematics, for example, were marvelled at by the Byzantines.[122] Nevertheless, in the thought-world of the Arabs, the Byzantines were classified among the civilised nations of the world along with the ancient Greeks, Persians, Chinese, Indians and Arabs. The outstanding attributes of the *Rūm* in this portrait of nations is, however, not so much philosophy and science, but religious institutions, administrative ability, warfare and the crafts.[123]

Thus the picture of Byzantium as reflected in Arabic literature is the product of the particular relations and relationship that existed between Byzantines and Arabs. Although it may seem static, or stereotyped at times, nevertheless this picture had undergone considerable change during the period under review, i.e.,

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from pre-Islamic times to the coming of the Crusaders. To the pre-Islamic Arabs the Byzantines represented a formidable imperial power and a highly civilised society. The early Muslims sympathised with the Christian empire of Constantinople but soon came to consider it as a potential enemy. After the Arab conquests Byzantium becomes the house of war *par excellence,* a distinction that was later to be competed for by the Crusaders and others.

At the cultural level the Arabs first saw the Byzantines as a people from whom to learn in administration, architecture and culture generally. But intellectually the Byzantines were soon relegated to an inferior position, mainly in view of the Arabs' own ascending civilization.

In the foregoing I have attempted to indicate the general characteristics of the Arabs' views of the Byzantines as reflected in various genres of Arabic literature. Two points need to be made before concluding. The first point is that in a more comprehensive consideration of this theme one has to take into account not only the classical or refined genres of Arabic literature, but also the popular or folk literature. Here one can only refer in passing to the Arabic epic of *Dhāt al-Himma* which is known to Byzantinists especially through the works of H. Grégoire and M. Canard[124] and which is perhaps reminiscent of the Byzantine epic *Digenis Akritas* in some of its themes, though not its framework. Of more general interest in this context is the more familiar *Thousand and One Nights* which have been cited already in the course of this paper. The *Nights* are perhaps more indicative of the image of the Byzantines in popular Arabic literature, for they are to some extent a mirror of the popular traditions of Arab society. The Byzantines are reflected in several stories of the *Nights*. Byzantine emperors, patricians, warriors, priests, nuns, slave-girls, and singers are mentioned as well as Byzantine silk, wine, food and other products. Byzantium is depicted as the foreign country *par excellence*. It is interesting that the flying horse of Baghdad is supposed to have flown away and landed in the country of the Byzantines. It is well-known that the longest tale in the whole of the *Nights*, the Tale of King 'Umar al-Nu'mān, contains many themes and motifs pertaining to Arab-Byzantine relations, including warfare, intrigue, diplomacy, commerce and marriage relations.[125] It takes Shahrazād no less than one hundred and one nights to tell this particular tale, or rather complex of tales. And this in itself is significant: it demonstrates to us once again the complexity of Arab-Byzantine relations; and the fact that over a considerable period, the Byzantines had a prominent place in the thought-world of the Arabs.

The second point is that in this paper less emphasis is laid on the works of Arabic historians and geographers; these are discussed elsewhere.[126] Some brief mention must, however, be made here of the views of a major historian and geographer, whose works have long been utilised by modern scholars, but whose special importance to the Arabs' knowledge of, and attitude towards, Byzantium has not been hitherto fully recognised; this is the tenth-century Arab humanist scholar and man of letters, al-Mas'ūdī. Al-Mas'ūdī's surviving works strongly demonstrate a genuine interest in Byzantium, not merely as an alien and hostile power, but also more especially as a society and a civilization that was worth knowing. He was anxious to include accounts of Byzantine history to his own day — something which is unknown in the works of other Muslim historians. His own comments on things Byzantine are of special importance. For example, speaking

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of a Byzantine envoy who came to Damascus in *A.D.* 946, he describes him as "a man of understanding, well-versed in the history of the ancient Greeks and the *Rūm* and reasonably familiar with the views of their philosophers".[127] Explaining his own special interest in Byzantine history and contemporary affairs, al-Mas'ūdī has this to say: "the two kingdoms of the ancient Greeks and of the *Rūm* come only next to the ancient Persians in greatness and glory, they are also gifted in various branches of philosophy and sciences and in remarkable crafts and works of art. The empire of the *Rūm* (Byzantium) is, moreover, still in existence in our own times, and in possession of firmly established institutions and highly organised administration, so we did not wish to omit its history from our book".[128]

Professor Marius Canard has on several occasions demonstrated the value of other Arabic literary sources (in addition to historians and geographers) for illuminating aspects of Arab-Byzantine relations. But apart from the contributions of Canard himself, other Arabic literary genres have not been sufficiently utilized for this purpose. Much still needs to be done in this field and the present paper is meant as an outline of a theme which forms the subject of current research and a more detailed survey by the present writer.

Footnotes

Part of the research and thinking on the subject of this paper was undertaken at the Institute of Advanced Studies in the Humanities, University of Edinburgh, during the (northern) summer of 1976. I am grateful to the Institute for giving me the opportunity to do research in a congenial atmosphere.

Works which have been cited more than once in the notes are referred to by author and short title only; publication details of the editions used are listed separately at the end of the notes. References for works cited once only are given in full as they occur.

1.   In several articles, now collected in his *Byzance et les Musulmans du Proche Orient*, Variorum (London, 1973; hereafter, Canard, *Byzance*), especially nos. VII, XII, XIV, XV, XIX.

2.   For example, Joan M. Hussey, "Byzantium and Islam: Some Contacts and Debts in the Early Middle Ages", paper read at the *Conference on Bilād al-Shām (Syria)*, the University of Jordan, Amman, April, 1974; see also G. E. von Grunebaum, "Parallelism, Convergence and Influence in the Relations of Arab and Byzantine Philosophy, Literature and Piety", *DOP*, 18 (1964), 91-111; M. Canard, "Les relations politiques et sociales entre Byzance et les Arabes", *DOP*, 18 (1964), 35-56; O. Grabar, "Islamic Art and Byzantium", *DOP*, 18 (1964), 69-88; H. A. R. Gibb, "Arab-Byzantine Relations under the Umayyad Caliphate", *DOP*, 12 (1958), 221-33.

3.   Quoted by J. M. Hussey, *op. cit.*; cf. P. Lemerle, in *Classicisme et déclin culturel dans l'histoire de l'Islam*, Actes du Symposium . . . organisé par R. Brunschvig et G. E. von Grunebaum (Paris, 1957), 227; see also P. Lemerle, *Le premier humanisme byzantin* (Paris, 1971), especially chapter II, 22 ff.

4.   See in particular, A. A. Vasiliev, *Byzance et les Arabes*, 2 vols. in 3 pts. (Brussels, 1935-68): vol. I includes, and vol. II.ii is entirely devoted to,

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extracts from Arabic sources translated by Canard (hereafter, Vasiliev-Canard); see also M. Canard, *Histoire de la dynastie des Hamdanides* (Alger, 1951); *idem, Sayf ad-Daula, Receuil des textes [arabes] relatifs à l'émir Sayf ad-Daula le Hamdanide* (Alger, 1934; hereafter Canard, *Sayf ad-Daula); idem, Byzance,* especially no. XVII.

5. R. W. Southern, *Western Views of Islam in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge, Mass., 1962); N. Daniel, *Islam and the West — The Making of an Image* (Edinburgh, 1967).

6. J. Meyendorff, "Byzantine Views of Islam", *DOP,* 18 (1964), 115-32; A. Th. Khoury, *Les théologiens byzantins et l'Islam* (Louvain-Paris, 1969); *idem, Polémique byzantine contre l'Islam (VIII s — XIII s)* (Leiden, 1972).

7. V. Christides, "Arabs as 'Barbaroi' before the rise of Islam", *Balkan Studies,* 10 (1969), 315-24; *idem,* "Pre-Islamic Arabs in Byzantine Illuminations", *Le Muséon,* 88 (1970), 167-81; *idem,* "Saracens' prodosia in Byzantine Sources", *Byzantion,* 40 (1970), 11 ff.; *idem,* "The names ΆΡΑΒΕΣ, ΣΑΡΑΚΗΝΟΙ, etc., and their False Byzantine Etymologies", *BZ,* 65 (1972), 329-33.

8. F. Babinger's article "Rūm", in *EI¹* concentrates on the latter sense of the word, and generally ignores Arabic sources; see the next note (9) and p.55 above.

9. Al-Harīrī, *Maqāmāt,* 259-60; trans., II, 48 and notes on 207. For earlier examples of the use of this appellation, see I. Goldziher, *Muslim Studies,* ed. S. M. Stern and C. R. Barber, vol. I (London, 1969), 243-4. (The etymologies of *Banū-al-Aṣfar* and of other names applied to the Byzantines in Arabic, are discussed in a forthcoming study by the present writer.)

10. E.g., Ṭāhā Ḥusain, *Fī al-Adab al-Jāhilī* (Cairo, 1927); R. Blachère, *Histoire de la littérature arabe,* I (Paris, 1952), esp. 162 ff.; Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Asad, *Maṣādir al-Shiʿr al-Jāhilī wa Qīmatuhā al-Tārīkhiyya* (Cairo, 1956), 320 ff.; cf. A. J. Arberry, *The Seven Odes, The First Chapter in Arabic Literature* (London, 1957; hereafter, Arberry, *Seven Odes),* 16 ff. and 228 ff.

11. E.g., Nashwān b. Saʿīd al-Himyarī, *Shams al-ʿUlūm,* ed., in part, by ʿAẓīm al-Dīn Aḥmad (Leiden, 1916), 38, 46, 67, 84 and *passim;* also *Khulāṣat al-Sīra al-Jāmiʿa* (Cairo, n.d.), 61; al-Hamdānī, *Iklīl,* ed. A. M. Karmilī, VIII (Baghdad, 1931), *passim;* Wahb b. Munabbih, *al-Tījān fī Mulūk Himyar,* as transmitted by Ibn al-Kalbī (Hyderabad, 1347 *A.H.),* 79.

12. E.g., al-Masʿūdī, *Murūj,* para. 87, 389, 567, 1086; cf. Ahmad M. H. Shboul, *Al-Masʿūdī and His World: A Muslim Humanist and his Interest in Non-Muslims* (London, 1979; hereafter, Shboul, *Al-Masʿūdī),* 109, 127, 139, 162; see also Diʿbil, *Shiʿr,* 102, 193 ff.

13. For recent studies on Arab-Byzantine relations before Islam, see in particular I. (Kawar) Shahid, "The Arabs in the Peace Treaty of A.D. 561", *Arabica,* 3 (1956), 181-213; *idem,* "The Patriciate of Arethas", *BZ,* 52 (1959), 321-43; *idem,* "Byzantino-Arabica: The Conference of Ramla, A.D. 524", *JNES,* 23 (1964), 115-31; A. A. Vasiliev, "Notes on Some Episodes concerning the Relations between the Arabs and the Byzantine Empire from the Fourth to the Sixth Century", *DOP,* 9-10 (1955-6), 306- 6.

14.   E.g., al-A'shā, *Dīwān*, 38;
Imru'-l-Qays, *Dīwān*, 269; Labīd,
Dīwān, ed. Iḥsān 'Abbās (Kuwait,
1962), 275; 'Adī b. Zayd al-'Ibādī,
Dīwān, ed. A. J. Mu'aybid (Baghdad,
1965), 53, 65, 87, 125; al-Kindī,
quoted in al-Buḥturī's *Ḥamāsa*
(Leiden, 1909), col. 383; see W.
Caskel, "Al-A'shā", *EI²*; F. Gabrieli,
"'Adī b. Zayd", *EI²*.

15.   On this poet see Ṭāhā Ḥusain,
op. cit., 211-13; Blachère, *op. cit.*, II,
261-5; S. Boustany, in *EI²*, III, *s.v.*,
Arberry, *Seven Odes*, 31 ff.

16.   Imru'-l-Qays, *Dīwān*, 279; see
also 65 ff., 213-14, 252.

17.   E.g., 'Antara, *mu'allaqa*, in his
Dīwān, ed. M. S. Mawlawī
(Damascus, 1970), 196; Arberry,
Seven Odes, 180.

18.   Al-Nābigha al-Ja'dī, quoted in
al-Jumaḥī, *Ṭabaqāt*, 104-5.

19.   Uḥayḥa b. al-Julāḥ, quoted in
Yāqūt, *Buldān*, ed. F. Wüstenfeld
(Leipzig, 1866), I, 422 (*s.v.* Ayla).

20.   See, e.g., al-Jāḥiẓ, *Al-Tarbī' wa-
l-Tadwīr*, para. 29; Ibn Qutayba,
'Uyūn al-Akhbār, III, 95 and IV, 25;
Isfahānī, *al-Aghānī*, XI, 52.

21.   Ṭarafa, *mu'allaqa*, in his *Dīwān*,
with al-Shantamarī's commentary,
15; trans. in Arberry, *Seven Odes*, 84;
also in al-Tabrīzī, *Sharḥ al-Qaṣā'id
al-'Ashr*, ed. M. M. Abd al-Ḥamīd
(Cairo, n.d.), 94; Al-A'shā, *Dīwān*,
165.

22.   On Byzantine views of the
Arabs as nomads, see Christides,
"Arabs as 'Barbaroi'" (as in note 7),
especially 321-2.

23.   This is further, and explicitly,
stated by Islamic commentators on
pre-Islamic poetry, e.g. al-
Shantamarī on the *mu'allaqa* of
Ṭarafa, *Dīwān*, 15; al-Qurashī's
commentary on the *mu'allaqa* of al-
A'shā, line 25, see al-Qurashī,

Jamharat Ash'ār al-'Arab, ed. A. M.
Bajāwī, 3 vols. (Cairo, 1969), I, 255;
see also *al-Mufaḍḍaliyyāt*, ed. Lyall,
807, or ed. Hārūn and Shākir, 400
(commentary on verses by 'Alqama
al-Faḥl); cf. *Dīwān 'Alqama al-Faḥl*
(with al-Shantamarī's commentary),
ed. Luṭfī al-Ṣaqqāl and Durriyya al-
Khaṭīb (Aleppo, 1969), 62; Al-A'shā's
allusion to the lock and key
associated with the Byzantine (*al-
Rūmī*) is worth noting in this context,
see his *Dīwān*, 10.

24.   Imru'-l-Qays, *Dīwān*, 43; al-
A'sha, *Dīwān*, 11; Zuhayr, *mu'allaqa*,
line 9, in *Dīwān*, with al-
Shantamarī's commentary (Cairo,
1323 *A.H.*); cf. trans. in Arberry,
Seven Odes, 114.

25.   Several examples: al-A'sha,
Dīwān, 114, 118, 147, 156, 167, 189,
209; al-Iṣfahānī, *al-Aghānī*, XVI, 15
(quoting Ḥassān); see in general
Nāsir al-Dīn al-Asad, *al-Qiyān wa-l-
Ghinā' fī al-'Aṣr al-Jāhilī* (Cairo,
1968).

26.   See, e.g., al-Qālī, *al-Nawādir*,
199, quoting al-'Utbī and Ibn Sallām
al-Jumaḥī, on the authority of Ibn
Durayd; see also Ibn Hishām, *Sīra*,
I, 135-7.

27.   Ibn Hishām, *op. cit.*, I, 224.

28.   Al-Azraqī, *Akhbār Makka*, ed.
F. Wüstenfeld (Leipzig, 1858), 104-
10.

29.   Al-Mas'ūdī, *Murūj*, para. 1454-
57.

30.   Al-Jāḥiz, *al-Bayān*, I, 72; Ibn
Sa'd, *Ṭabaqāt*, III, i, 161-2; Ibn
Qutayba, *Ma'ārif*, 264-5; Ibn 'Abd
Rabbih, *'Iqd*, II, 297; Ibn Ḥajar,
Iṣāba (Cairo, 1323 *A.H.*), III, 235;
cf. also W.M. Watt, *Muhammad at
Mecca* (Oxford, 1953), 89.

31.   See Clive Foss, "The Persians
in Asia Minor and the End of
Antiquity", *EHR*, 90 (1975), 722.

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32. *Qur'ān*, "Sūrat al-Rūm", 30: 2-4.

33. *Ibid.*, 30: 4-5. These verses are generally considered as belonging to the early Meccan period, *A.D.* 610-622; Th. Nöldeke and F. Schwally, *Geschichte des Qorans*, 2nd ed. (Leipzig, 1909-38), I, 70 f., assign them to after *A.H.* 10/*A.D.* 631, but this cannot be accepted; cf. W. M. Watt, *Companion to the Qur'ān* (London, 1967), 184; *idem, Bell's Introduction to the Qur'ān* (Edinburgh, 1970), 3 and 189, note 2; see also R. Blachère, *Le Coran, traduit de l'Arabe* (Paris, 1969), 429-30, notes.

34. Al-Ṭabarī, *Tafsīr*, pt. XXI, 16-21 (commentary on Sūra 30); Ibn 'Asākir, I, 354-62; this tradition is discussed in a different context by F. Rosenthal, *Gambling in Islam* (Leiden, 1975).

35. W. M. Watt, *Muhammad at Medina* (Oxford, 1956), 1-77, and *passim;* M. A. Shaban, *Islamic History — A New Interpretation* (Cambridge, 1970), chap. II.

36. Ibn 'Asākir, I, 383-4; al-Jāḥiz, *al-'Uthmāniyya*, 114; cf. also al-Ṭabarī, *Tafsīr*, pt. XXVI, 82 ff. (commentary on "Sūrat al-Fatḥ", 48:16).

37. Ibn 'Asākir, I, 66-7, 375-6 and *passim;* Sibṭ Ibn al-Jawzī, *Kanz al-Mulūk*, 78-9.

38. *Ibn 'Asākir,* I, 66-7; also *idem, MS.* Ẓāhiriyya Library (Damascus), 3380, vol. V, fol. 346ʳ; cf. Saʿīd al-Afghānī, "Muʿāwiya fī-l-Asāṭīr", *Conference on Bilād al-Shām, Amman, 1974,* Papers in Arabic, (Beirut, 1975), 46.

39. Ibn 'Asākir, I, 377.

40. Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, "Kitāb al-Fitna": no. 52, ḥadīth no. 35; Ibn 'Asākir, I, 66-7, 375-7.

41. Ibn 'Asākir, I, 223-4.

42. *Idem,* I, 66-7; the description "the horned Byzantines" is supposed to refer to their customary long hair; see Ibn Qutayba, *Mukhtalif al-Ḥadīth* (Cairo, A. H. 1328), 155; trans. G. Lecomte, *Le Traité des Divergences du Ḥadīth d'Ibn Qutayba* (Damascus, 1962), 142.

43. Ibn 'Asākir, I, 413.

44. Watt, *Muhammad at Medina,* 105 ff.; Shaban, *op. cit.*, chap. 2.

45. Ibn 'Asākir, I, 415.

46. Cf. Watt, *op. cit.*, 340 ff., and *passim.*

47. Ibn Hishām, *Sīra,* II, 607; Ibn 'Asākir, I, 417-20; cf. Watt, *op. cit.*, 43-4.

48. Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, book I, ḥadīth no. 6; al-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, ser. I, iii, 1566-8; Ibn Saʿd, *Ṭabaqāt*, IV, i, 185; Ibn 'Asākir, I, 471-2, cf. 393; cf. *EI²*, s.v. "Kayṣar".

49. Ibn 'Asākir, I, 220-32, 602-4; II, i, 188-9; cf. M. Canard, "Les expéditions des Arabes contre Constantinople dans l'histoire et dans la légende", *JA*, 208 (1926), 61-121, repr. in *idem, Byzance,* no. I.

50. Ibn 'Asākir, I, 443, also 438, 445-6; cf. also al-Jāḥiz, *al-'Uthmāniyya*, 65, 232, 242 (on the other hand fighting the Byzantines is depicted as easier than fighting the Persians, *ibid.*, 214).

51. Al-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh,* I, iii, 2103; Ibn 'Asākir, I, 474-5.

52. Al-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh,* I, iii, 2102; Ibn 'Asākir, I, 475.

53. Al-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh,* I, iii, 2089, 2099.

54. Arab genealogists usually link the *Rūm* with the biblical Esau, son of Isaac, thus making the Byzantines among the children of Abraham; see, e.g., Ibn Qutayba, *Maʿārif,* 38-9; al-

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Mas'ūdi, *Murūj*, para. 664; Ibn 'Asākir, I, 12-13.

55. Ibn 'Asākir, I, 461-2.

56. *Idem*, I, 533-4.

57. *Idem*, I, 476-7; also 475.

58. *Idem*, I, 477.

59. Al-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, II, ii, 1194; Ibn 'Asākir, II, i, 26-7, 42-3; trans. 40 ff.; Ibn Shaddād, *al-A'lāq al-Khaṭīra*, ed. S. Dahan (Damascus, 1956), II, 58. This problem has frequently been discussed by modern scholars; see especially Gibb, "Arab-Byzantine Relations" (as in note 2) and Grabar, "Islamic Art" (as in note 2), 82-3.

60. Al-Mubarrad, *al-Kāmil*, II, 111-15; al-Mas'ūdī, *Murūj*, para. 756, 2033; al-Jāḥiẓ, *al-Bayān*, I, 126-7; Ibn Qutayba, *Ma'ārif*, 593; for envoys between Constantinople and the Muslims as early as the Caliphate of 'Umar and 'Uthmān, see al-Mas'ūdī, *Tanbīh*, 158; Ibn 'Abd Rabbih, *'Iqd*, I, 293-5; Ibn 'Asākir, I, 595.

61. Al-Mubarrad, *al-Kāmil*, II, 114-15.

62. Cf. Gibb, *op. cit.*, 365; for Byzantine polemics against Islam, see the works of Meyendorff and Khoury cited in note 6 above; for examples from the Islamic side, see al-Jāḥiẓ, *al-Radd 'alā al-Naṣārā*, in *Thalāth Rasā'il*, ed. J. Finkel (Cairo, 1926); see also *idem*, in *JAOS*, 47 (1929); for an exchange of polemics in verse see G. E. von Grunebaum, "Eine poetische Polemik zwischen Byzanz und Baghdad im 10. Jahrhundert", *Analecta Orientalia*, 14 (Rome, 1937), 43-64, repr. in his *Islam and Mediaeval Hellenism*, Variorum (London, 1976), no. XIX.

63. Al-Mubarrad, *al-Kāmil*, II, 111-15, 164; Ibn 'Abd Rabbih, *'Iqd*, II, 71-2; al-Mas'ūdī, *Murūj*, III,

para. 2033; Ibn 'Asākir, II, i, 26 ff.; French trans. 40 ff.

64. For embassies, see al-Jāḥiẓ, *Rasā'il*, II, 269-70; al-Balawī, *Sīrat Ahmad Ibn Ṭūlūn*, 36; Ibn al-Hamadānī, *Takmila*, 138; al-Qāḍī al Nu'mān, *al-Majālis*, *passim*; cf. S. M. Stern, "An Embassy from the Byzantine Emperor to the Fāṭimid Caliph al-Mu'izz", *Byzantion*, 20 (1950), 239-58; F. Dachraoui, "Le Crète dans le conflit entre Byzance et al-Mu'izz", *Cahiers de Tunisie*, 7 (1959), 307-18; *idem*, in *Hawliyyāt al-Jāmi'a al-Tūnisiyya*, 2 (1965), 27-35; Canard, "Les relations politiques" (as in note 2), especially 35-41.

65. Al-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, III, 1917, 2028, 2112; al-Kindī, *Wulāt*, 220; cf. further, Shboul, *Al-Mas'ūdī*, 227, 263 (note 2).

66. Al-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, III, 695-6, 1109; cf. Vasiliev-Canard, I, 289-91; al-Qāḍī al Nu'mān, *al-Majālis*; also reflected in poetry, see al-Buḥturī, *Dīwān*, III, no. 629; al-Mutanabbī, *Dīwān*, III, no. 189, 112 ff.; on poetry see further below.

67. See, e.g., Ibn Sa'īd, *Mughrib*, ed. K. Tallquest (Leiden, 1899), 18-23; Vasiliev-Canard, I, ii, 204 ff.; cf. M. Canard, "Une lettre de Muhammad Ibn Ṭuġj...à l'empéreur Romain Lecapène", *Annales de l'Institut d'Études Orientales* (1936), 189-209; repr. in *idem*, *Byzance*, no. VII; cf. from the Byzantine side, Nicholas I, Patriarch of Constantinople, *Letters*, ed. and trans. R. Jenkins and L. Westerink (Washington, 1973), nos. 1, 2, 102.

68. Qudāma, *Kharāj*, in BGA, VI (Leiden, 1889), 252.

69. Maqdisī, in BGA, III (Leiden, 1876), 147-8; cf. Vasiliev-Canard, II, ii, 422 ff.; cf. further, Shboul, *Al-Mas'ūdī*, 242-3.

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70. From the Umayyad period see, e.g., Jarīr, *Dīwān*, 2 vols., ed. N. Ṭāhā (Cairo, 1969-71), II, 702, 742-5; for the 'Abbāsid period, see notes 72-77, below.

71. Al-Marzubānī, *Muqtabas*, abridged by al-Yaghmūrī, I, ed. R. Sellheim (Wiesbaden, 1964), 133 (quoting a contemporary poet on the authority of al-Aṣmaʿī).

72. Firās al-Murādī, quoted by al-Kindī, *Wulāt*, 419-20.

73. Marwān b. Abī Ḥafṣa, and al-Khalīʿ al-Bāhilī, both quoted by al-Masʿūdī, *Tanbīh*, 170, 190; al-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, III, 706 ff.; al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, ed. S. D. Goitein (Jerusalem, 1936), V, 168; Muslim b. al-Walīd, *Dīwān*, ed. S. Dahan (Cairo, 1961), 8-17, 230-6; al-Ṣūlī, *Akhbār Abī Tammām*, ed. K. 'Asākir and others (Cairo, 1937), 7-8; al-Buḥturī, *Dīwān*, III, no. 629; cf. Vasiliev-Canard, I, 397-403.

74. Abū Firās, *Dīwān*, 3 vols., ed. S. Dahan (Beirut, 1944); cf. Dvorak, *Abū Firās* (Leiden, 1895); cf. H. A. R. Gibb, *EI²*, *s.v.*; al-Mutanabbī, *Dīwān*, III, 112-16, IV, 15-26; cf. Vasiliev-Canard, II, ii, 299-376; M. Canard, "Mutanabbī et la guerre byzantino-arabe", in *Al-Mutanabbī* (Memorial Volume, Beirut, 1936), 99-114.

75. Ibn al-Jayshī (praising Ibn al-Khafīfī, *ca.* 293 *A.H.*) quoted in al-Kindī, *Wulāt*, 260.

76. Abū Nuwās, quoted by al-Jāḥiz, *al-Bayān*, II, 228.

77. Diʿbil, *Shiʿr*, 112; cf. also other examples in al-Jumaḥī, *Ṭabaqāt*, 201; *al-Mufaḍḍaliyyāt*, ed. Lyall, 268; al-Jāḥiz, *al-Ḥayawān*, VII, 162; al-Kindī, *Wulāt*, 219.

78. See, e.g., al-Jāḥiz, *Rasāʾil*, I, 185; see also M. Canard, "Les expéditions des Arabes", as in note 49.

79. 'Arīb, *Ṣilat Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī (Tabari Continuatus)*, ed. M. de Goeje (Leiden, 1897), 195; cf. also L. Massignon, "Le mirage byzantin dans le miroir bagdadien d'il y a mille ans", *AIPHOS*, 10 (1950), 429-48.

80. E.g., pertaining to the tenth century *A.D.*, see al-Masʿūdī, *Murūj*, para. 507 and *passim;* cf. Shboul, *Al-Masʿūdī*, 262; al-Tanūkhī, *Nishwār*, 227-9; al-Kindī, *Wulāt*, 201-2, 218-19; cf. al-Maqrīzī, *Khiṭaṭ*, II, 180.

81. Ibn al-Hamadānī, *Takmila*, 210-11; Miskawayh, *Tajārib*, ed. R. Amedroz (Oxford, 1920), VI, 225; Tanūkhī, *Nishwār*, ed. A. Shaljī, I, 52-3.

82. Ibn al-ʿAdīm, *Zubdat al-Ḥalab*, ed. S. Dahan, vol. I (Damascus, 1951), 139.

83. *Dīwān Khuṭab Ibn Nubāta*, ed. Ṭāhir al-Jazāʾirī, (Beirut, 1311 *A.H.*), 238-40; cf. excerpts in Canard, *Sayf ad-Daula*, 416-17.

84. Murdered *A.D.* 969.

85. E.g., Ibn Qalāqis (d. 567/1172) quoted by al-ʿImād al-Isfahānī, *Kharīda*, section on poets of Egypt, ed. A. Amīn and others (Cairo, 1951), I, 150; Ibn 'Arrām (d. 580/1184), *ibid.*, II, 171; al-Muhadhdhab b. al-Zubayr (d. 561/1164), *ibid.*, I, 205, 207; al-Daqqūn al-Andalusī (d. 921/1515) quoted in al-Maqqarī, *Azhār al-Riyāḍ*, ed. M. Saqqā and others (Cairo, 1939), I, 103 ff.

86. Al-Maqqarī, *op. cit.*, I, 108-15.

87. See, e.g., al-Hamadhānī, *Maqāmāt*, 87-8; cf. the pertinent remarks of C. E. Bosworth, *The Mediaeval Islamic Underworld* (Leiden, 1976), I, 42-3, 86-7; cf. also al-Tanūkhī, *Nishwār*, 227-9.

88. E.g., al-Shāfiʿī, *al-Umm*, ed. M. Z. al-Najjār (Cairo, 1961), IV, 239;

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Ibn 'Aqīl al-Hanbalī, *al-Funūn*, ed.
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Ibn al-Ṭayyib al-Baṣrī, *al-Mu'tamad*,
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(Damascus, 1965), II, 536; cf. also
al-Ḥarīrī, *Maqāmāt*, 259-60.

89.   Al-Jāḥiẓ, *al-'Uthmāniyya*, 211;
al-Qālī, *al-Nawādir*, III, 175; al-
Tawhīdī, *Risālat al-Saqīfa*, in
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Naṣīhat al-Mulūk, trans. F. R. C.
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90.   Al-Jāḥiẓ, *al-Bayān*, I, 137, 384;
Ibn 'Abd Rabbih. *'Iqd*, III, 354-5.

91.   Sibṭ Ibn al-Jawzī, *Kanz al-
Mulūk*, 31-5.

92.   Al-Balawī, *Sīrat Ahmad Ibn
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1960), 215; trans. C. E. Bosworth,
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Layla wa Layla, passim*.

93.   Ibn Faḍl Allāh al-'Umarī,
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193-5; al-Mas'ūdī, *Murūj*, para. 621.

94.   Ibn 'Abd Rabbih, *'Iqd*, III,
272-3.

95.   Al-Jāḥiẓ (attributed), *al-
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154, 250; for an example in other
literary genres, see Hamadhānī,
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II, 266.

96.   Ibn 'Asākir, I, 412.

97.   For example, al-Jāḥiẓ, *Rasā'il*,
I, 215; Tanūkhī, *Nishwār*, 204; al-
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1953), 29; see also *Alf Layla wa
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98.   Examples in the poetry of Ibn
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Na'īm al-Dimashqī, *ibid.*, 116.

99.   Ibn Khurradādhbeh, *al-
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101.   Al-Jāḥiẓ, *Rasā'il*, II, 158.

102.   Al-Mas'ūdī, *Murūj*, para.
3216; al-Iṣfahānī, *al-Aghānī*, III, 84.

103.   Al-Tawhīdī, *Risāla fī 'Ilm al-
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104.   Al-Jāḥiẓ, *al-Bukhalā'*, 179
(194); Ibn Qutayba, *'Uyūn al-Akhbār*,
III, 204, 222; Ibn 'Abd Rabbih, *'Iqd*,
VIII, 11.

105.   Al-Jāḥiẓ, *al-Bukhalā'*, 179
(194); Ibn Qutayba, *'Uyūn al-Akhbār*,
III, 204.

106.   *Alf Layla wa Layla*, I, nos. 6,
42, 61.

107.   Al-Jāḥiẓ, *al-Bayān*, I, 133; al-
Mas'ūdī, *Murūj*, para. 664; Ibn 'Abd
Rabbih, *'Iqd*, III, 356.

108.   Al-Mas'ūdī, *loc. cit.*

109.   Al-Jāḥiẓ, *al-Bayān*, II, 255; al-
Mas'ūdī, *Murūj*, para. 3288.

110.   Al-Jāḥiẓ, *al-Hayawān*, VII, 28;
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111. Al-Jāḥiẓ, al-Bukhalā', 47, 160-1 (49, 174, 212).

112. Al-Jāḥiẓ, op. cit.; cf. F. Rosenthal, The Muslim Concept of Freedom (Leiden, 1960), 98.

113. Adam Mez, Die Renaissance des Islams (Heidelberg, 1922).

114. Ibn al-Nadīm, Fihrist (hereafter, Fihrist); cf. "Ibn al-Nadīm", in EI².

115. Fihrist, 243, 271-2; trans., II, 645-6, 647-9.

116. Al-Masʿūdī, Murūj, para. 664, 822; Ibn ʿAbd Rabbih, 'Iqd, III, 356; Fihrist, 238-9, trans., II, 572-5.

117. Al-Masʿūdī, Tanbīh, 194; cf. Shboul, Al-Masʿūdī, 261.

118. Al-Masʿūdī, Murūj, para. 664.

119. Fihrist, 241-2, 243, 266; trans., II, 579-81, 585-6, 636; al-Qiftī, Tārīkh al-Ḥukamā', ed. J. Lippert (Leipzig, 1903), 66 ff.

120. Al-Masʿūdī, Murūj, para. 741; Fihrist, 241-2, trans., II, 579-81.

121. Al-Jāḥiẓ, al-Bayān, I, 106; idem, al-Tarbī' wa-l-Tadwīr, para. 29;

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122. Fihrist, 247; trans., II, 651-2.

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124. H. Grégoire, Autour de l'épopée byzantine, Variorum (London, 1975), nos. XV and XIX; M. Canard, "Delhemma, épopée arabe des guerres arabo-byzantines", Byzantion, 10 (1935), 283-300; repr. in idem, Byzance, no. III; see also no. II; idem, "Dhu'l-Himma", EI².

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126. Shboul, Al-Masʿūdī, chap. VI; also A. Miquel, Géographie humaine du monde Musulman, II, La terre et l'étranger, (Paris-The Hague, 1975), 381 ff.

127. Al-Masʿūdī, Tanbīh, 194.

128. Ibid., 6-7; cf. Shboul, Al-Masʿūdī, 261-2.

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Exchange, Influence and Confluence

10

ISLAMIC ART AND BYZANTIUM

Oleg Grabar

ACCORDING to Eutychius, a Melkite priest from Alexandria, who died in A.D. 940, the following event is said to have taken place in Qinnasrīn, in northern Syria, sometime in the latter part of the thirties of the seventh century, during the Muslim conquest of Syria. An Arab force, under the celebrated general Abū ʿUbaydah, had signed a truce of one year with the Christians of Qinnasrīn in order to allow those Christians who so desired to leave Syria and to follow Heraclius into Anatolia. A line was established between Christian and Muslim possessions and the line was marked by a column (*ʿamūd*) beyond which the Muslims were not to go. With the agreement of Abū ʿUbaydah, the Christians painted on this column a portrait of Heraclius seated in majesty (*jālis fī mulkihi*). One day, however, an Arab Muslim rider, who had been practicing horsemanship, accidentally defaced the representation of the Byzantine Emperor by planting the point of his spear in its eye. The head of the local Christian community immediately accused the Muslims of having broken the truce. Abū ʿUbaydah agreed that a wrong had been done and asked what reparations could be offered. The Christian answered: "We will not be satisfied until the eyes of your king are put out." Abū ʿUbaydah suggested having an image of himself so mutilated, but to no avail, since the Christians insisted that the likeness should be of the Muslims' highest authority (*malikukum al-akbar*). Finally Abū ʿUbaydah agreed, and the Christians then made an image of ʿUmar, the caliph of the time, whose eye was then duly put out by one of their riders. The Christian *patricius* concluded the whole affair by saying to the Muslim general: "Indeed, you have treated us equitably."[1]

Like most good stories, this one is probably apocryphal, especially in the wealth of its details, since other accounts of the conquest of Qinnasrīn do not mention events which could have made it possible and since it comes from the ecclesiastical milieu of Christian Arabs within the Muslim Empire, among whom a whole body of stories developed tending to minimize the tragedy of the Muslim conquest. Yet the story certainly reflects the spirit of the time and may serve to define our subject by focusing our attention on two central points: the period with which we are primarily going to deal and the type of problem posed by that period.

First, then, it may serve to define the chronological framework of this paper. The event it describes is supposed to have taken place at the very beginning of the Muslim conquest; it identifies a crucial moment in the political and cultural contacts between Byzantium and the Arabs, when the buffer world of pre-Islamic Arabs, who basked at a distance in the glow of high Byzantine culture, was about to become the Islamic Empire, the strongest power of the Near East and the Mediterranean since the days of ancient Rome.

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[1] Eutychius, *Annales*, ed. by L. Cheikho and others, in *Corpus Script. Christ. Orient., Scriptores Arabici*, 3rd Ser., 7 (Beirut, 1909), p. 19.

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Nothing will be said of the period which preceded the Muslim conquest. The monuments which are definitely Ghassânid or Lakhmid are few and do not seem to have developed original styles, techniques, or functions, although further research may some day modify this picture; nor were the artistic contacts which the Arabs of Arabia had with Byzantium through trade and through the Christian church more than secondhand. In greater part, they were fleeting impressions of mediocre objects. Occasional texts do refer to a more profound impact of Christian art, but their usefulness for archaeological purposes is often questionable.[2] Altogether, the relations between Arabs and Byzantium until the formation of the Muslim Empire were not relations of cultural equality. After the seventh century the two empires were to become powerful bastions of two independent cultures confronting each other.

But if the peculiar contact at Qinnasrîn may serve to indicate the upper limit of a study of Byzantine-Arab contacts in the arts, can one also define a lower limit that is equally valid historically? This problem is more complex and requires some elaboration. A crucial phase during which the art of the Arabs and that of Byzantium were closely related to each other was the era of the creation of the first Islamic classicism, that is, the first syntheses between the Near East and the Mediterranean, on the one hand, and, on the other, the new political, social, and religious entities elaborated by the Prophet and his immediate successors. This era is usually associated with the Umayyad and early 'Abbâsid periods (661 to about 800), and it has long been recognized that in monuments of early Islamic art as diverse as the Dome of the Rock, the desert baths of Qaṣayr 'Amrah, or the wooden beams of the Aqṣâ Mosque, considerable direct or indirect Byzantine influences can be detected. In this early period, especially in Syria and Palestine, Byzantium played the part of one of the many parents who brought a new Islamic art to life.

In later centuries a different and more complex series of relationships may be defined. In Cordova, the Muslim Arab caliphs apparently repeated an early Islamic practice and, in the tenth century, called on Byzantine artists to decorate parts of their great mosque.[3] But, in a more general sense, a constant stream of influences flowed in both directions. The Byzantines acquired a taste for Islamic objects and an Orientalized aspect was given both to the court of the Constantinopolitan emperors and to many a church treasure.[4] At the same time, the Arab world continued to seek or to feel the impact of the art of Byzantium. Thus the Fâṭimid caliphs in Cairo, whose ceremonial was closely related to that of the Byzantine emperors, borrowed or imitated Byzantine

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[2] There has not yet been any attempt to put together systematically the information which exists in pre-Islamic poetry concerning Arab knowledge of Christian art, but such knowledge existed (cf. R. Ettinghausen in N. Faris, ed., *The Arab Heritage* [Princeton, 1946], p. 252; C. J. Lyall, *The Mufad-daliyât* [Oxford, 1918], p. 92 ff.).

[3] Several versions of this event exist, and there is a need for a thorough study of the various texts referring to it. The main account is in Ibn Idhâri, *Bayân*, ed. by G. S. Colin et E. Lévi-Provençal (Leiden, 1951), 2, pp. 237–8. It might be added that columns are supposed to have been brought from Byzantium for the palace of Madînah al-Zahra (*ibid.*, pp. 231–2), but this statement is not very credible.

[4] A. Grabar, "Le succès des arts orientaux à la cour byzantine sous les Macédoniens," *Münchner Jahrbuch der bildenden Kunst*, 2 (1951).

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artistic techniques, such as cloisonné enamel.[5] Even later, in the twelfth and
thirteenth centuries, when a new art of book illustration developed among the
bourgeoisie of the Fertile Crescent and Mesopotamia, models directly or in-
directly derived from one of Byzantium's most developed media of artistic
expression were commonly used. The dependence of Arabic Dioscorides manu-
scripts or of the *Automata* of al-Jazari on Byzantine models has often been
shown, especially by Professor Weitzmann,[6] and it has often been pointed out
that many stylistic devices commonly used in the illustration of so purely
Arabic a book as the *Maqāmāt* of Harīri were derived from Byzantine or, at
least Christian, models.[7] After the thirteenth century and, at the high level of
the princes, even much earlier the rule of Turks or Kurds and the taste of Iran
introduced a component into Islamic culture and art which is no longer Arab
and is, therefore, outside our specific concern, even though it is evident that in
the monuments of Seljuq or Ottoman Anatolia or in the Persian miniatures of
the fourteenth century there are numerous features clearly related to By-
zantium.

These few examples are sufficient to show that artistic contacts existed
between the world of Byzantium and the world of Arab Islam, and that these
contacts continued over many centuries, or at least throughout the major
phases of artistic creativity in the Arab world. After the middle of the thir-
teenth century, in the Mamluk art of Egypt or in the late mediaeval art of
Morocco or Spain, Byzantine elements, even though not completely absent,
are quite rare and contribute little to the definition of these artistic traditions.
Similarly, in Byzantine art, after the conquest of Anatolia by the Turks,
Oriental themes, when they exist, are no longer those of the Arab world.

Having thus defined the period within which Byzantine-Arab relations were
meaningful, one could draw up a roster of such mutual influences, study
their frequency at certain times, explain this frequency, and discuss the stylistic
or thematic changes and modifications which one or the other of the two
cultures introduced into the elements they borrowed or used, after that day
in the fourth decade of the seventh century when a first contact was established
between the new Muslim state and Byzantine art. The interest of this type
of investigation is self-evident and coincides with well established practices in
the history of art. This is not, however, the aspect of the subject of Islamic art
and Byzantium which I propose to examine. The story of Abū ʿUbaydah at
Qinnasrīn has more far-reaching implications than merely those of symbolizing
a contact. Its more striking feature is its suggestion that, from the very first
moment of meeting, the two cultures did not quite understand each other. It
is quite obvious that Abū ʿUbaydah, in proposing first to have his own picture

[5] M. Canard, "Le cérémonial fatimite et le cérémonial byzantin," *Byzantion*, 21 (1951). On the
question of cloisonné enamel, see P. Kahle, "Die Schätze der Fatimiden," *Zeitschrift d. deutschen
morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, N.F., 14 (1935), p. 345 and *passim*. Concerning specific works of art, it
is difficult, in the present state of research, to do more than hypothesize that much in the develop-
ment of Fāṭimid imagery reflected direct or indirect Byzantine influences.

[6] K. Weitzmann, "The Greek Sources of Islamic Scientific Illustrations," *Archaeologica Orientalia
in Memoriam Ernst Herzfeld* (Locust Valley, 1952).

[7] H. Buchthal, "'Hellenistic' Miniatures in Early Islamic Manuscripts," *Ars Islamica*, 7 (1940).

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painted and in agreeing then to having instead a likeness of 'Umar, did not take very seriously what seemed to him a peculiarity of the Christians with whom he dealt; conversely, it is also clear that to the Christians the image of Heraclius on a column separating two armies had a meaning far greater than that of a landmark.

But here a problem emerges, for, on the one hand, a continuity of contacts and influences existed, and, on the other, there appears at the very beginning a misunderstanding in regard to the significance of images and objects. Should we assume that this misunderstanding was peculiar to the early period and was later to be repaired? Or should we conclude that, through centuries of demonstrable formal or iconographic relationships, there was a more profound lack of understanding between the two artistic traditions? If there was, can one discover its reasons or the significance of the contacts? Considered from this point of view, our problem becomes less that of identifying specific themes than that of suggesting the ways in which artistic traditions grew in relationship to each other. The problem could be examined either by looking at what Islamic art meant to Byzantium or by studying the significance of Byzantine art to the Arabs. It is to the latter that I should like to direct my attention. I propose to analyze in some detail two questions which bear on the problem with particular force: First, the transformation of a Byzantine-Christian material culture into an Islamic one and the impact of this transformation on art, and, second, the iconography of power in early Islamic art. These two topics differ considerably in kind; while the second concerns the deliberate creation of a set of visual symbols with precise meanings, the first derives from the automatic inheritance by the Muslims of several provinces of the Byzantine Empire. Together they may serve to answer the fundamental questions posed by our story and by the unique historical circumstances in which Islamic art and culture were born: What did the Muslim Arab world know and understand of Byzantine art? How did the Muslims use what they knew? What effect did their use of it have on Islamic art?

As we deal with Islamic art and with Islamic civilization in general, we find that the man-made setting within which the culture grew and from which its art developed is of particular significance in determining the relationship between Byzantium and the Arab world. In Syria and Palestine the Arabs inherited a complete and complex entity with well-known physical, human, economic, and artistic characteristics. To a degree, the same is true of Egypt and of North Africa, but our archaeological information there is much less complete. In northern Mesopotamia also the Muslims took over a Christian province previously ruled by Byzantine emperors, but a considerable difference exists between the mediaeval Jazīrah and the other provinces, for its incorporation into the Muslim world changed its character: what had been a frontier area exclusively was transformed into an important agricultural and commercial center. Only Syria and Palestine became Muslim without immediate alteration in character, with practically no destruction brought about by the

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conquest itself, and with a considerable archaeological documentation. An analysis, then, of the character of the art and culture of the Muslims in Syria and Palestine may serve to illustrate a central aspect of our problem: it may show us how the new civilization used those elements of the Christian Byzantine world which fell into its hands unscathed.

As far as the main cities are concerned, little was changed. A new type of building was introduced, the mosque, which in almost all instances known in Syria was located on the site of some older sanctuary. The most celebrated example is at Damascus where the church of John the Baptist was destroyed and the Great Mosque erected in its stead.[8] It is well known that practically all the elements of construction of this mosque (fig. 1) are characteristic of the architecture prevalent in Syria under Byzantine rule; also that there was a major innovation in the composition of the plan (fig. 2): the peculiar relationship between court, portico, and deeply recessed sanctuary is new and is probably derived from the earlier House of the Prophet in Medina. There is, however, another point which I should like to stress and to which I shall return several times; as one compares this new building with what preceded it, the striking feature is that the new Islamic composition re-established the unity of the classical Roman architectural ensemble which had been abandoned by the intervening Christian church. For the Umayyads used as the foundation of their mosque the shape and the dimensions of the Roman *temenos* and developed their religious structure within the mold created by classical antiquity. On the other hand, the Christian building was of much smaller dimensions and could not use the frame provided by the classical construction.

In Jerusalem the celebrated Dome of the Rock and the Aqṣā Mosque also exhibit techniques of construction and partially of decoration characteristic of Christian art, but what is ultimately the most remarkable feature of the new Muslim creation—the *Ḥaram al-Sharīf*—is again the fact that the Muslims, for political and historical, but especially for ideological, reasons, gave a new holiness to the most ancient sacred spot in the Holy City.[9] In other instances, as at Ḥāmāh, Christian churches were converted into mosques.[10]

Except for mosques, however, very little is known of the physical changes introduced by the new culture into Christian cities that had been taken by treaties, usually with considerable limitations on the freedom of action of the Muslim settlers. One example exists of a new city of the early Muslim period in Syria and Palestine—the city of Ramlah, about whose early state unfortunately almost nothing is known.[11] In all likelihood little change was forced upon these cities. Yet the very fact that there was a new culture altered the character of some of their forms of life. The new masters influenced the sounds

[8] Basic bibliography in K. A. C. Creswell, *Early Muslim Architecture*, I (London, 1932), p. 97 ff.; important interpretations by J. Sauvaget, *La mosquée omeyyade de Médine* (Paris, 1947), p. 95.

[9] O. Grabar, "The Umayyad Dome of the Rock," *Ars Orientalis*, 3 (1959).

[10] The matter has been debated, but K. A. C. Creswell's latest discussion seems to have secured the point ("The Great Mosque of Ḥamā," *Aus der Welt der Islamischen Kunst, Festschrift für Ernst Kühnel* [Berlin, 1959]).

[11] Cf. G. LeStrange, *Palestine under the Moslems* (Cambridge, 1890), pp. 303–8.

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of the city in that most early treaties prohibited the use of the *semantron*
and of religious processions. They affected the ceremonies of the city in that
banners, crosses, and religious symbols had to be kept inside buildings. And,
as for monuments, it is worth noting that minarets, according to the most
plausible traditions, appeared first in the conquered cities of Syria.[12] Their
shape (fig. 3) derived from the Roman *temenos* towers of Damascus or from
church towers, but a new Islamic meaning was given to these high square
towers; not only were they used for calling the faithful to prayer— a function
presumably of equal significance in new and purely Muslim cities— but they
also served the more important purpose of symbolizing the presence of the
new faith in the midst of a predominantly non-Muslim population.

In the cities, then, one may assume a continuation of older patterns of life
and construction, with the addition of only a few new architectural compo-
sitions serving precise new needs but without as yet the use of many new
forms or techniques; it is probably only the mood of the cities which changed,
but this mood cannot be reconstructed with the evidence in our possession.

In the countryside, on the other hand, things seem to have been much more
complicated. What evidence can be reconstructed may be summarized as
follows:[13] During late Hellenistic and Roman times a striking development
took place in the whole of Syria, Palestine, and Transjordan, as enormous
investments in hydraulic equipment (cisterns, canals, dams, aquaducts, water-
works of all type) brought about a tremendous growth of the agricultural
infrastructure of the area. The whole region which extends from the Euphrates
at Ruṣāfah through Palmyra and the Ḥawrān and then straight south to the
gulf of ʿAqabah became as busy agriculturally as it had always been com-
mercially. Under the Christian emperors the development of the area did not
stop; perhaps it even increased, as cults of saints, cenobitic practices, and other
phenomena which have frequently been analyzed created a sort of fashion for
inaccessible places of retreat, most of which required a minimal supply of
water.[14] The financial bases and economic justification of these numerous
settlements are not well known, except in the case of northern Syria, where
G. Tchalenko has shown that the cultivation of olive trees and the manufacture
of olive oil, principally for export, were the major occupations of these
settlements.[15] An additional cause for the growth of agriculture was the
necessity of feeding and caring for the large numbers of local and foreign
pilgrims attracted from the whole of Christendom to the Holy Places of Syria
and Palestine. The architectural typology of this period has not been studied

[12] There is no recent study of the minaret and its origins; the older bibliography is summarized
in Creswell, *Early Muslim Architecture*, I, pp. 38-40.
[13] For a more detailed statement of the problem, see O. Grabar, "Umayyad 'Palace' and 'Abbāsid
Revolution'," *Studia Islamica*, 17 (1963).
[14] Christian Palestine was discussed in some detail at a symposium held at Dumbarton Oaks in
1955. The extraordinary development of Christian Syria and Palestine is made abundantly clear by
the well-known older explorations of de Vogüé, Butler, and others, and, more recently, by the work
of N. Glück (summarized in *Rivers in the Desert* [New York, 1959]) and the explorations of the Francis-
can fathers in Jerusalem (B. Bagatti and S. J. Saller, *The Town of Nebo* [Jerusalem, 1959]).
[15] G. Tchalenko, *Villages antiques de la Syrie du Nord*, 3 vols. (Paris, 1953-8).

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in all of its details, except in the instance of churches and in the small area
studied by Tchalenko, but even a cursory examination of travelers' reports
indicates a tremendous variety of buildings, from churches to simple farm-
houses. It is striking to note, however, that there are almost no extant examples
of true palaces in this whole agricultural area, the single exception being
Qasr ibn Wardan, whose strictly Constantinopolitan inspiration has been
noted more than once.[16] Such palaces as existed were in the cities, where the
larger landowners or the representatives of the government lived.

As the Muslim conquest took place, this whole area fell into the hands of
the Arabs, and, with the creation of the first Muslim Empire, almost all the
identifiable economic reasons for the continued existence of the area began
to disappear. Trade with the outside world dwindled considerably, as far as
cheap commodities were concerned, in spite of several attempts to revivify
it; holy places were no longer visited by Christians as commonly as before;
the wealthy investors from the cities emigrated, as did Byzantine officials.
Yet no destruction took place and, according to the practice of the conquest
and of Islamic law, most of the land thus abandoned by the owners fell into
the category of booty to be distributed by the new state among members of
the ruling family and their allies.[17]

As the new owners took over, a most remarkable change began to affect
the whole area: in a few decades it became covered with palaces or at least
very large and very rich private houses. Some thirty to forty early Islamic
castles remain which were built on land the hydraulic infrastructure of which
was pre-Islamic; the neighboring farm houses and often the very stones of
the palace itself were also pre-Islamic, but the main buildings were new.[18]
What these buildings were can easily be seen in the six examples which can be
analyzed in some detail: Jabal Says and the two Qaṣr al-Ḥayr in Syria,
Khirbat al-Mafjar and Khirbat al-Minyah in Palestine, and Mshatta in Trans-
jordan. All these are square, fort-like structures with strongly emphasized
gateways (fig. 4), small mosques, luxurious baths, and an extraordinary wealth
of mosaics, paintings, stuccoes, stone sculpture, and other symbols of rich life.
Agricultural and ecclesiastical settlements were transformed into manorial
enterprises. At times, the old agricultural exploitation probably continued;
at other times, what had been a site of extensive farming was transformed
into parks, game preserves, and other characteristic features of high princely
living. Altogether the area acquired an aristocratic residential character
developed by and for the major princes of the dynasty. Amenities of high
urban living, such as baths, were introduced into a land which fell, so to speak,
by default into the hands of the Arabs and whose earlier functions could not
be continued in the same fashion. This phenomenon explains, among other

[16] Butler on Qasr ibn Wardan; K. Swoboda, *Römische und Romanische Paläste* (Vienna, 1924),
p. 156 ff.
[17] For references, see the article quoted in note 13.
[18] A complete list of these settlements has not yet been made; the fullest is that compiled by
J. Sauvaget ("Remarques sur les monuments omeyyades," *Journal asiatique*, 231 [1939]); cf. also
O. Grabar, *op. cit. (supra*, note 13).

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things, the constant reference in texts to peregrinations of Umayyad princes.[19] These texts should be interpreted not as expressions of an unproved traditional nomadism, but as references to visits to agricultural enterprises or to estates.

So far our analysis has suggested that the phenomenon of the Umayyad castles in Syria should be explained by the existence of the infrastructure of an agricultural organization which had been carried on, if not always created by, the Byzantine world. It remains to be seen whether the formal characteristics of the castles were as original as their existence.

In a general way they were, like the mosques, a new combination of old forms. The square with round towers and a central porticoed courtyard belongs to a characteristic type of fortress and palace found in the Mediterranean area and in Mesopotamia.[20] This central enclosure was the main residential area in which the princes lived and received. The throne room was often on the second floor, over the entrance, but in most instances has not been preserved. Throne rooms extant on the ground floor exhibit a ubiquitous "basilican" plan, as at Minyah (fig. 5) and Mshatta (fig. 6), although in the latter case the plan was modified by introducing an Oriental relation of covered hall to court and by the addition of a triconch.[21] Baths also became a standard feature of these palaces; the small rooms actually used for bathing (fig. 7) were taken directly from a type of small bath which had developed in Syria and has already been found in Dura-Europos. But the significant feature of the Umayyad bath is the extraordinary transformation of the *apodyterium*; at Quṣayr ʿAmrah it was turned into a throne-room, at Khirbat al-Mafjar into a spectacular centrally planned hall (fig. 4). The architectural origin of the latter is still unclear but, by analogy with Quṣayr ʿAmrah and for reasons to be suggested presently, it can be assumed also to have been an official secular hall. Mosaics, usually without any figurative elements, have been found on ther floors of these palaces, they range from the superb geometric designs of Mafjar and Minyah to the badly preserved and still unpublished ones at Quṣayr ʿAmrah.[22] Rich stucco sculptures and mural paintings not only served decorative purposes, but also depicted various themes of a royal iconography of pleasure and power.[23] This use of the bath as a ceremonially significant part of the palace is not entirely new, since it does find parallels in Roman imperial art and in some of its provincial manifestations, but, within the Umayyad

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[19] The texts have been gathered repeatedly, for instance, by H. Lammens, "La Bâdia et la Ḥira sous les Omeyyades," *Mélanges de la Faculté Orientale, Univ. St. Joseph*, 4 (1910).

[20] H. C. Butler, *Princeton University Expedition, II, Architecture*, 2 vols. (Leyden, 1919–1920), A, p. 145 ff.; B, pp. 47 ff., 63, etc...; A. Poidebard, *La trace de Rome dans le désert de Syrie* (Paris, 1934), *passim*.

[21] Latest discussion in I. Lavin, "The House of the Lord," *The Art Bulletin*, 44 (1962), p. 11, where the appropriate bibliography will be found.

[22] For Mafjar, see R. W. Hamilton, *Khirbat al-Mafjar* (Oxford, 1959), p. 327 ff.; for Minyah, the only publication is that of O. Puttrich-Reignard, "Die Palastanlage von Chirbet el Minje," *Palästina-Hefte des deutschen Vereins vom Heiligen Lande*, Heft 17–20 (1939), with a drawing in color; the Quṣayr ʿAmrah mosaics are to be published by K. Kessler in the forthcoming volume in honor of K. A. C. Creswell.

[23] Cf. *infra* and, for the interpretation of a mosaic at Khirbat al-Mafjar, R. Ettinghausen, *Arab Painting* (Geneva, 1963), p. 38.

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culture, it should be considered as an architectural expression of the *majlis al-lahwah*, that is, a place which was used for a ceremonial entertainment; traditional Arab customs, such as the reading of poetry, were expanded to include official drinking, dancing, and music in the Sasanian manner, as well as various other activities, such as banqueting, which relate the Umayyad practice to practices associated also with Roman *triclinia*.[24]

While most of the architectural components of these palaces and many of the habits of life enjoyed in them find parallels in the Mediterranean tradition, the specific combination of functions illustrated by the palaces cannot be explained as a Byzantine Christian type modified by various characteristics of a new taste. For, except for a few depictions on mosaics in North Africa,[25] there is no evidence that the combinations of forms and purposes which appear in Umayyad palaces were characteristic of secular architecture of the Near East before the Muslim conquest. Even the Tunisian mosaics are over a century earlier, and it is hardly likely that they exerted an impact on early Islamic palaces. Furthermore, the obviously makeshift arrangement of a plan like that of Khirbat al-Mafjar (fig. 4) and the anomalously composite character of a façade like that of Qasr al-Hayr (fig. 8) suggest that the Umayyads were in fact creating something new, that they were searching for some kind of formal entity that would tie together functions which had not, until then, been organized. It is in this fashion that one can explain the progression from Khirbat al-Minyah (fig. 5), with its mosque and official halls bursting the strait-jacket of the fort-like castle, to Mshatta (fig. 6), unfinished but superbly planned as a single entity. The other palaces fit between these two extremes as various steps in the direction of a complete composition. This very progression and the frequently inferior quality of the architecture contribute toward the argument that no real models existed for the Umayyads in Syria and Palestine or, for that matter, in Iraq.

Indeed, the Umayyad palace—when seen in the context of the Byzantine architecture which preceded it in Syria and Palestine—appears as an original creation, made possible by the peculiar combination of four features: a highly developed agricultural infrastructure created several centuries earlier; the emigration of large landowners; the existence of an aristocratic ruling group; and the availability of themes, ideas, tastes, and modes of behavior drawn from the entire breadth of the newly conquered world and amalgamated with older Arabian habits. But, and this point is crucial, what was thus created resembled in many aspects Roman and late antique palace architecture rather than Byzantine. The apparent fortification, the tremendous display of decoration, the comparative seclusion, the relationship to cultivated land, all are features which are close to Spalato, Piazza Armerina, Pliny's villas, especially the *Villa Urbana*, or North African manors.[26]

[24] The demonstration of this point is beyond our immediate subject. It has been treated in my doctoral thesis at Princeton University, *Ceremonies and Art at the Umayyad Court* (1955), and I hope to return soon to some of these problems.

[25] Swoboda, *op. cit.*, pl. v.

[26] This is a point with which I have dealt in papers presented at the Centro Italiano di Studi sull'

However, the significance of the Umayyad palace does not lie merely in the peculiar fashion in which it developed or in the manner in which its function and its architectural characteristics relate it to older types of building. It became also the crucible to which themes and ideas from the whole length and breadth of the newly conquered world were brought; there were borrowings from the past of that world, as in the case of Palmyrene sculpture imitated at Qaṣr al-Ḥayr (fig. 9),[27] or from its far-flung provinces, as in the case of paintings or sculptures inspired by Central Asian art.[28] It is in this crucible that a new Islamic decorative art was created; elements from many areas were mixed together, at times incongruously, as in a fragment from Mafjar (fig. 10) in which a flat frame of interlocking circles serves as a background for strangely projecting busts. In this development of decorative themes Byzantine art played an important part, but only as one of the contributors to a new series of syntheses. For the formation of early Islamic palace art, the conquest of a large world with an immense wealth of styles and objects was as important as—if not more important than—the location of the palaces in an area formerly ruled by Byzantium.

The palaces were doomed before their art had developed to its fullest extent. The fall of the Umayyad dynasty in 750 led to the almost immediate abandonment of the whole agricultural area in which palaces have been found. The cities of Syria and Palestine also declined, but the impact of the Umayyad creations remained for many centuries and in many regions. The persistence of mosaic decoration in Cairo as late as the fourteenth century; the square minarets of Morocco; the fact that so much of the architecture in the Arab world continued for so long to depend on the arch and the column rather than on vaults; the persistence of ornamentation with a clear organization of vegetal forms, such as can be seen in Fatimid Egypt or in Spain; the plan imposed on the mosque of Damascus by the old sanctuary of the city; all these and many others are features which remained Muslim because they were naturalized in Umayyad Syria and Palestine. At the same time, what emerged from the palaces or the city mosques to have a lasting effect on Islamic art was not Byzantine art but a number of techniques and a large number of motifs. However, the brilliance and wealth of Byzantine Syria and Palestine and the peculiar ecology inherited by the Arabs were the principal factors that made possible the brilliance and wealth of the Umayyad art of Syria and Palestine. These are all the more remarkable when compared to the primitive simplicity of Umayyad art in Iraq. Umayyad art was not a province of Byzantine art, but the extraordinary fact that there was an identifiable art sponsored by the Muslim Arabs a few decades after their emergence from Arabia is to

alto Medioevo in Spoleto in April 1964 and at the annual meeting of the College Art Association in Philadelphia in February 1964. The papers will be published in the journals of these two organizations, respectively.

[27] This sculpture was published by D. Schlumberger, "Les fouilles de Qaṣr el-Ḥeir Gharbi," *Syria*, 20 (1939), pl. XLVI, 2.

[28] Many sculptures from Khirbat al-Mafjar (Hamilton, *op. cit.*, pls. XLIV, 4 and LVI) and paintings both from Mafjar and from Qaṣr al-Ḥayr (the latter for the most part unpublished) seem clearly to have been inspired by Central Asian works of art.

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be attributed to the setting which they inherited from Byzantium and which they transformed in ways and for reasons peculiar to them.

From a survey of the setting in which early Islamic art was created, I turn now to my second topic: the consideration of an iconographic theme.

It is only in the past two decades that iconographic studies have begun to revolutionize our knowledge of Islamic art and to replace the romantic conception of a purely decorative art. The task of so changing our vision has been the almost single-handed work of R. Ettinghausen, who, beginning with an article published in 1943,[29] has been continuously pointing out that the most characteristically "decorative" objects and motifs possess also a level of social, intellectual, or even religious meaning hitherto rarely seen.

Without denying the considerable ornamental values developed by Muslim artists, as early as for the mosaics of the Dome of the Rock, it remains true that these artists and their patrons on numerous occasions used works of art to express certain ideas. For our purposes here the interest to be found in an analysis of such a theme is quite evident, since the creation of an iconography imposes on the patron or on the artist a deliberate choice of subject-matter. Furthermore, if we recall that from its Arabian past the new Muslim art could draw almost nothing, it follows that it was from the rich heritage of the Mediterranean and of the Near East that its main themes were borrowed; and thus the question of the conscious uses of Byzantine art is raised. I have chosen the theme of power as expressed in monuments because it was one of the first to be developed, because, due to the high positions of its sponsors, it is one of the better documented themes, and also because it was a theme hardly peculiar to Islamic art, but characteristic of all imperial arts, and it was brought to particularl intensity in the art of Late Antiquity and of Byzantium.

There are two main periods and two groups of monuments around which I should like to develop the theme: the Umayyad period and its palaces and mosques, and the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and their illustrated books. In discussing these monuments, however, I shall stress only their specific relation to Byzantine art, it being assumed that there are other coordinates through which many of them can and should be understood.

The first group of monuments occurs in the Umayyad period, when, in the later part of the seventh century and in the first two decades of the eighth—more particularly under the rules of 'Abd al-Malik and of al-Walīd I—the Muslim princes established the first elements of a characteristically Muslim imperial organization. Together with various administrative and other practices, there appeared also the first elements of a visual symbolic system which will serve to identify the Islamic world. The main purpose of this system was to symbolize power, i.e., to emphasize the existence, the greatness, and the individuality of the new world. Its first characteristic expression occurred on coins. There, as is well known, the Muslims had first used Byzantine and Sasanian types

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[29] R. Ettinghausen, "The Bobrinski Kettle," *Gazette des beaux-arts*, 24 (1943).

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(fig. 11) with very few modifications;[20] then changes began to occur: new inscriptions with the caliph's name, new iconographies, such as a caliph's portrait (fig. 12), a peculiar *orant* (fig. 13), or, in a rare instance, a search for a specifically Muslim iconography. In a celebrated coin (fig. 14) published by G. Miles the main themes were symbols of Islamic power, a *miḥrāb* (or merely a niche of honor) and the *ʿanazah*, the lance of the Prophet. The significant points about this coin, however, are that it remained an extreme rarity and that, for reasons to be suggested presently, its very Islamic symbolism was not continued. In fact, sometime thereafter, probably in 695, a new Muslim coinage (fig. 15) was established in which words alone, the profession of faith and the Koranic verse of the mission of the Prophet to the world, expressed the new culture. This coinage remained standard, with only minor exceptions, almost until today.

At the very same time, in the Dome of the Rock and in the mosque of Damascus, respectively, the imagery created was of crowns suspended around a sanctuary and of an idyllic landscape. This imagery is, again, an expression of power, power of the victory of Islam over its Christian and Sasanian antagonists and power of the idealized complete world ruled over by the Muslims. The proposed justifications for these interpretations have been given elsewhere by R. Ettinghausen and myself,[21] but the point which I should like to stress here is that in none of these instances do we find human or animal representations, even though practically all symbols and images of power in Antiquity tended to center around human or animal symbols.

The exact iconographic themes of Damascus and Jerusalem do not seem to have been used again in the following centuries, and it is not very clear whether their apparent revival in a few instances by early ʿAbbāsid caliphs,[22] and especially under the Mamluks in the late thirteenth century (fig. 16),[23] should be given the same precise meaning or whether these examples of architectural themes in mosaics were mere ornaments, probably imitating Damascus mosaics. Although in the intervening centuries the theme of power did not disappear, it tended to find expression not so much through organized imagery as through epigraphy and architectural compositions.[24]

[20] The basic publications are by J. Walker, *Arab-Sassanian Coins* (London, 1941) and *Arab-Byzantine and Post-Reform Umaiyad Coins* (London, 1956). See also G. C. Miles, "Miḥrāb and ʿAnazah," *Archaeologica Orientalia ...* (Locust Valley, 1952).

[21] R. Ettinghausen, *Arab Painting*, p. 20ff.; O. Grabar in *Ars Orientalis*, 3.

[22] The case in point is that of the crowns and royal insignia of conquered princes of Afghanistan which were hung in Mekkah, al-Azraqī, *K. Akhbār Makkah*, in F. Wüstenfeld, *Die Chroniken der Stadt Mekka*, 1 (Leipzig, 1858), p. 155ff.; O. Grabar, *op. cit.*, pp. 90-1.

[23] These mosaics in the mausoleum of Baybars have often been mentioned, but have not yet been properly published.

[24] This point cannot be demonstrated in the context of this paper, but the highly organized plan of Baghdad—city and palace at one and the same time (cf. O. Grabar, "Mshatta, Wasit, and Baghdad," *The World of Islam*, ed. by R. B. Winder and J. Kritzeck [London, 1959]; and the forthcoming studies by D. J. Lammens)—the very remarkable inscriptions on the mosque of Ibn Tūlūn (E. Combe, J. Sauvaget, G. Wiet, *Répertoire chronologique d'épigraphie arabe* [Cairo, 1931 and ff.], no. 68ff.), or on the so-called Juyūshi mosque (ibid., no. 2753) and O. Grabar, "The Earliest Islamic Mausoleums," *Ars Orientalis* 6, forthcoming), or, finally, the bejewelled axial nave and series of domes built by al-Ḥakam II in Cordova, all of these examples would indicate that very precise architectural practices and official epigraphy served to show the sovereign character of buildings.

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The conclusion, therefore, would be that, after a few essays in coinage, the Muslim world abandoned, at least for a while, an official imagery of power and replaced it with certain monumental symbols and especially with the written word. This change, which has long been recognized, though perhaps not quite in these terms, was usually attributed to Islamic iconoclasm, but the difficulty with this hypothesis is that the evidence, derived from works of art, of opposition to representations of living beings precedes any theoretical statement of an Islamic opposition to images; the latter not being evident before the second half of the eighth century.[35] It can hardly be doubted that the Muslim interpretation of the Koran and perhaps a generally iconoclastic tendency among the Semitic population of the Near East theologically justified the later doctrine and brought about its general acceptance with respect to religious art. It remains true, however, that a conscious refusal to use representations for official purposes and their partial replacement with words had occurred before any systematic formulation of any doctrine took place. An explanation for this phenomenon can be provided if we consider the setting within which the Muslim search for a symbolism of power took place.

However one is to interpret the specific changes in coinage brought about by Justinian II, it is clear that a complex iconography of Christ was used on the new coins, and many recent studies have pointed out in general the intellectual and emotional intricacies of religious art in the sixth and seventh centuries which led to the great iconoclastic quarrel.[36] Furthermore, even though specific styles varied, the basis repertory of iconographic themes and motifs used in the Christian and imperial arts of early Byzantium was one issued from Antiquity and basically common, or at least understandable, to the whole Christian world. The choice confronting 'Abd al-Malik, al-Walid and, even more urgently, al-Ḥajjāj, was either to invent a new iconography (thus the *miḥrāb* and lance of the American Numismatic Society coin, figure 14) whose meaning would miscarry since it would not fit the existing formal vocabulary of the Mediterranean and of the Near East, or to use the formal vocabulary (as on early coins) which, while familiar, would inadequately identify the novelty and uniqueness of the new empire and the new faith, for the Umayyads could hardly in one generation acquire the sophisticated practice of imagery which characterized Byzantium. Faced with this dilemma, the Muslims tried both alternatives, but soon discarded imagery, and, as we have seen, adopted the techniques of Byzantium without its formulas. Thus, to avoid the pitfalls

[35] The problem of the sources of an Islamic opposition to images is still incompletely solved. The latest formal statement on the strictly Islamic side of the subject is by K. A. C. Creswell, "Lawfulness of Painting in Early Islam," *Ars Islamica*, 11–12 (1946); see also R. Paret, "Textbelege zum islamischen Bilderverbot," *Das Werk des Künstlers, Hubert Schrade zum 60. Geburtstag* (Stuttgart, 1961). The problem, however, has to be considered in the light of contemporary Byzantine ideas, on which E. Kitzinger, "The Cult of Images in the Age before Iconoclasm," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, 8 (1954); and A. Grabar, *L'iconoclasme byzantin* (Paris, 1957). There is also the question of the so-called edict of Yazid II, A. A. Vasiliev, "The Iconoclastic Edict of the Caliph Yazid II, A.D. 721," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, 9–10 (1956). On this, see *infra*, note 40.

[36] See the works quoted in the preceding note, and J. Breckenridge, *The Numismatic Iconography of Justinian II* (New York, 1959).

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inherent in the use of a highly developed iconography, the Muslims changed
the rules of the game.

There are two conclusions to be drawn from this analysis. The first is that
Muslim theoretical iconoclasm followed a practical refusal to use represen-
tations for highly official purposes, and perhaps was influenced by this refusal,
although it is possible that philosophical and intellectual iconoclasm developed,
at least in part, indepentently of political and imperial considerations. The
second is that Byzantine art was responsible for this early Muslim attitude;
yet it is not a particular style or iconographic motif of Byzantine art that is
involved here, but rather the fact of that art and of the ideological depth
it had achieved.

It is in this context that I should like to remark upon a very curious phenome-
non, about which much has been written: the phenomenon of the use of
Byzantine workers for the erection of Islamic monuments. I do not refer to the
probably very numerous workers from everywhere—including Byzantium—who
were attracted by the money and employment available in Umayyad times.
I refer, rather, to the specific incident of al-Walīd's request that workers be sent
to him by the Byzantine emperor. The evidence gathered recently by Professor
Gibb[37] has clearly shown that Byzantine workers were brought by al-Walīd
I to help decorate the great mosques of Damascus, Madīnah, and perhaps
Jerusalem. Professor Gibb also noted that for the Byzantines this action had
one meaning and for al-Walīd quite another. To the Byzantines it was an
imperial act granting to "barbarians" the privileged use of highly technical
training which, by its very quality, served to enhance the prestige of the
Byzantine emperor and, presumably too, to bring the "barbarian" into the
imperial fold. To al-Walīd it was partly a way of "learning the ropes," as
Professor Gibb has put it, for the Muslim Caliph was anxious to possess all
the characteristics of an emperor (one of these being the sponsorship of superb
monuments for his own followers) and partly a way to impress the Christians
of the empire. Thus, as in the story of Abū ʿUbaydah at Qinnasrīn, opposite
meanings were given to a single event.

But perhaps we may be able to go a step further. It was not technically
necessary for mosaicists and decorators to come officially from Byzantium,
for the examples of mosaics in the palaces and especially in the Dome of the
Rock are of as fine quality as those of Damascus, yet there is no evidence
that they were done by Byzantine artists sent from Byzantium as part of a
high level treaty agreement. In fact, with regard to the Jerusalem sanctuary
the circumstances of the times and the specific meaning of the building itself
make it highly unlikely that any such artists could have been there. Further-
more, the iconographic program of the mosque of Damascus refers to specifically
Islamic ideas and does not merely copy Byzantine models; and the palace
mosaics, with their highly developed geometric designs (figs. 17 and 18), are
the conscious choice, with modifications, of late antique models rather than

[37] H. A. R. Gibb, "Arab-Byzantine Relations under the Umayyad Caliphate," *Dumbarton Oaks
Papers*, 11 (1958).

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of the latest Byzantine styles. If workers were available in the Muslim Empire and if iconographic ideas had been developed by the Muslims, why did al-Walīd send for artists from Byzantium? Two explanations for his action can be suggested. The first would derive from an element in the early Muslim state which has not yet been sufficiently examined in discussions of Umayyad culture. It may be defined as an almost messianic feeling that the Empire of Rome would surely fall to the Muslims.[36] Military and psychological hopes for this event collapsed after the failure of 717, but the call for artists and artisans up to that date can be understood as having symbolized in fact the subservience to the Muslims of the Byzantine emperor, who, like a vassal, must provide his overlord with artisans. This explanation would be in keeping with the interpretation of the iconography of the mosaics of the Mosque of Damascus suggested by R. Ettinghausen, and with at least some of the texts describing al-Walīd's call for Byzantine artists; texts which emphasize that it was the Muslim prince who gave the "orders." The second explanation is simpler: al-Walīd's request derived from snobbism, the conviction that first-rate works could come only from Byzantium. Whether or not the latter explanation is fully valid for the Caliph may be open to some doubt. It hardly coincides with his truly imperial ideas and construction program. I would rather, therefore, suggest that, like the new Muslim coinage and like the iconography of the mosque of Damascus and of the Dome of the Rock, al-Walīd's call for workers from Byzantium was meant to be a sign of the Muslim prince's accession to universal power, the very theme of the celebrated fresco of the Six Kings at Quṣayr 'Amrah (fig. 19).[39]

But, as the defeat of Byzantium became impossible and as the Muslim world turned eastward, the events of al-Walīd's reign became myths and the *Rūmi*, the Byzantine, became the artist *par excellence*, later to be joined by the Chinese. The myth survived because the buildings of al-Walīd in Jerusalem, Damascus, and Madīnah remained central sanctuaries in the succeeding history of Islam and because the early Muslim dream lingered, however hazily, in later historiography and legend. Thus, once again an important characteristic of the Islamic attitude toward the arts, i.e., the evaluation of the Rūmi artist, derived from the peculiar situation of Byzantine and Arab relations in the early eighth century; in this instance, it was the result of an expression of power by al-Walīd; the Muslim vision of the defeat of Byzantium led eventually to the assumption of the superiority of the Byzantine artist.[40]

[38] M. Canard, "Les expéditions des Arabes contre Constantinople dans l'histoire et dans la légende," *Journal asiatique*, 208 (1926).
[39] O. Grabar, "The Painting of the Six Kings at Quṣayr 'Amrah," *Ars Orientalis*, 1 (1954); R. Ettinghausen, *Arab Painting*. p. 30.
[40] It could be noted that much in our analysis of early Islamic art finds parallels in early Christian art, where a similar dichotomy of opposition and attraction existed between the new faith and Classical Antiquity. The main difference is that Islamic culture did not have the four centuries of incubation of Christianity before emerging as a unique political and cultural entity. It is in the light of these conclusions that I should like to place the edict of Yazīd II, although a full treatment of the subject is beyond the scope of this paper. There is no doubt that political persecution of Christians took place at that time, as is evident from the fact that Christian sources (whether in Arabic, Greek, or Syriac) are primarily responsible for the preservation of the edict. It also stands to reason that anti-iconoclastic

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While coins and the decoration of mosques show an ultimate refusal to use more than Byzantine techniques, and while an attempt at imperial power by al-Walīd led in part to the mythical eminence of the Byzantine artist, palace art reflects a quite different story. There also an art was developed whose aim was to glorify the prince and to emphasize his power. We could not have a clearer illustration of this than the celebrated fresco of the Six Kings at Quṣayr ʿAmrah (fig. 19). Yet an important difference existed between the art of early Islamic palaces and the imagery or symbols on coins and in mosques, for palace art was designed primarily for private audiences. It was no less an art of power than the other, but its uses were more intimate and less accessible to the general public. Basically it revolved around a ceremonial theme much less Byzantine than Oriental, the theme of the royal pastime, in which the life of the prince was expressed through its association with hunting, games, banqueting, dancing, music, scantily clad females, etc.,[41] and it is these very activities that form the major subject matter of the paintings of Quṣayr ʿAmrah and of the sculptures of Qaṣr al-Ḥayr and Khirbat al-Mafjar. The styles in which these themes were executed vary considerably from pseudo-classical to Central Asian and Indian, and each style poses separate problems of influences which cannot concern us here. In one respect, however, they do bear directly on our subject.

In every one of the three buildings I have mentioned there are representations of princes and attendants. In one palace, Qaṣr al-Ḥayr, there are two representations of princes, making a total of four royal images.[42] Two of these princes, one at Qaṣr al-Ḥayr (fig. 20) the other one at Mafjar (fig. 21), are clearly of Sasanian inspiration, and the considerable differences which exist between them suggest that they derived from representations rather than from actual vestimentary practices. The other two princes, from Qaṣr al-Ḥayr (fig. 20)

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milieux, in fighting their own battles in Constantinople, would have tended to assimilate their own enemies to the one caliph who clearly had persecuted them. That Yazīd had become a "scapegoat" can be shown by the passage in Dionysius of Tell-Maḥre which follows the text of the edict (trans. by J. B. Chabot [Paris, 1895], pp. 17–18); there Yazīd is also accused of having created a fearful stench throughout the Muslim world by having ordered the killing of all white dogs, pigeons, and roosters. The absurdity of the accusation suggests a "smear campaign" rather than a factual account. I would, therefore, prefer to consider the edict of Yazīd as reflecting an anti-Christian program, which, because of contemporary Christian problems and later developments in both Byzantium and Islam, took an iconoclastic turn in the sources.

[41] The precise demonstration of this point in Umayyad palaces, the textual evidence for its uses in ceremonies, and its Iranian origins have not so far been put together in print.

[42] All these images have been published. Mafjar: Hamilton, pl. LV, 1 and 5; Qaṣr al-Ḥayr: Schlumberger, op. cit., pl. XLV, and S. ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq, "Iʿādah tashiyīd jimāḥ Qaṣr al-Ḥayr," Annales archéologiques de Syrie, 1 (1951), pl. 9²; Quṣayr ʿAmrah: A. Musil, Kuṣejr ʿAmra (Vienna, 1909), pl. XV. The problem is whether these four figures are correctly interpreted as princes or caliphs. In the case of ʿAmrah, there is absolutely no doubt about it, since the inscription around it refers to an amīr (J. Sauvaget in Journal asiatique [1939], p. 14); in the instances of the Sasanian image at Qaṣr al-Ḥayr and at Mafjar, there is no certainty, but considerable likelihood, because of the position of the statues on major entrances and because of other symbols of power (such as the crown at Qaṣr al-Ḥayr and the lions at Mafjar). The doubtful example is the second one at Qaṣr al-Ḥayr, which, according to the reconstruction in the Damascus Museum (Annales archéologiques de Syrie, pl. 8), was on the inner façade of the main part of the building and not quite in the center of the composition. Yet I fail to see what other meaning could be given to this fragment, inasmuch as the ʿAmrah example makes it quite clear that Byzantine stylistic origins were indeed possible for princely images of Umayyad times.

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and from 'Amrah (fig. 23), just as obviously reflect Byzantine, or at least late classical, art, as do some of the attendants. For us the important points are that, in the more intimate atmosphere of the palaces, an iconography for princes did fully develop, and that its themes were adopted by the Muslims from conquered lands. But it was images of emperors, rather than of just any human figures, that were chosen as models, and this indicates the Muslims' awareness of the meaning of the imagery in the original works. Furthermore, the vestimentary variations of these images serve to illustrate yet another point, to which we have been led before: it is that in the early eighth century a prince could be represented only in Sasanian or Byzantine garb, for the Muslim princely image had not yet acquired proper iconographic values in any other system of clothing. However, in those instances where Muslim identification was essential, devices were found, either through a new kind of headgear as at Qaṣr al-Ḥayr[43] or, most significantly, through an inscription as at Quṣayr 'Amrah, where the written word gives concrete meaning to an abstract icono-graphic *cliché* of a prince.

In any case, in these instances the role of Byzantine art is clear: it was one of the sources from which the new Muslim art chose elements which served to illustrate its own needs and practices. It is particularly unfortunate that, after a considerable documentation for the first half of the eighth century, there is almost no evidence from succeeding centuries which would allow us to trace the growth of an Islamic iconography of power, let alone the precise Byzantine sources of such an iconography. The shift of power toward the east certainly led to an increase in Iranian influences.[44]

It is only in the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries that new documents once again come to light. At that time, in the midst of a sudden and widespread emergence of new techniques, new types of objects, new purposes, and new centers of artistic activity and production, the art of book illustration was created or revived. Two peculiarities of this new art concern us here. First, from what is known about it, by far the greater bulk was in Arabic, and some of its most typical examples consisted of characteristically Arab texts. Second, these books were intended mainly for a sophisticated urban community, a milieu quite different from that of the princes. The quality of the books was often expressed by their frontispieces, and these can be divided into two broad groups. One consists of a series of variations on the author portrait, in which Byzantine models were used almost systematically, as in an example from a Dioscorides manuscript (fig. 24) and in a well-known instance from the Vienna pseudo-Galen (fig. 25);[45] incidentally, some of these instances are related more

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[43] See Schlumberger's remarks in *Syria*, pp. 353–4.

[44] Unfortunately, we are very badly informed concerning 'Abbāsid or Fāṭimid visual symbols of power. It is possible that more thorough searches through texts may uncover interesting instances of the development of an idea which is not likely to have disappeared or to have been entirely sublimated into epigraphy. In the meantime, see M. Canard in *Byzantion* (1951) and D. Sourdel, "Questions de cérémonial 'Abbaside," *Revue des études islamiques* (1960).

[45] The Dioscorides frontispiece was first published by A. Süheyl Unver, *Istanbulda Dioscorides Eserleri* (Istanbul, 1944), figs. 1–2; for the Galen, see R. Ettinghausen, *Arab Painting*, p. 91. See also R. Ettinghausen, "Interaction and Integration in Islamic Art," in *Unity and Variety in Muslim*

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closely to early Byzantine models than to later ones. The second group consists of a well developed princely cycle; in which a tradition much more specifically Islamic, with considerable Turkish and Iranian elements, was depicted. Yet in the composition of frontispieces from an *Aghānī* manuscript (fig. 26) and from the Vienna Galen (fig. 27)[46] there is a striking resemblance to earlier Byzantine compositions, as we know them, for instance, in ivories (fig. 28), in which the upper and lower as well as the side borders—the latter arranged in two rows of figures—framed and enlarged upon the central theme.[47]

It seems apparent, then, that even in the thirteenth century, when the artists of the Arab world renewed the search for iconographic modes to add distinction to the newly created art of book illustration, they once again turned to Byzantine models which, by their presence seemed almost magically to exalt the quality of the book. The practice could be pursued in other areas as well; in architectural decoration particularly a fascinating return to the use of classical themes on façades is apparent. The late D. S. Rice once showed me an extraordinary stone found at Harran in which a perfect fifth-century moulding was dated by an inscription in the thirteenth century, and on the façade of one of the monuments of Nūr al-Dīn in Damascus, a completely classical lintel is surmounted by a very mediaeval *muqarnas* (fig. 29). The same idea was applied to some of the coins minted in Northern Mesopotamia and in Anatolia,[48] on which images of Constantine and other Byzantine or Roman emperors appear.

Obviously the analyses and examples I have gathered for this study do not tell the whole story of the artistic relations between Byzantium and the Arab world; nor can I pretend to have mentioned all the elements in Islamic art that derived from or were fashioned in Byzantium. I have tried, rather, to present an interpretation of the systems of association between forms and functions and between images and needs which Byzantine art, for various historical and geographical reasons, imposed on the new culture. I have focused my attention on the Umayyad period in which documents are particularly plentiful and relations between the cultures especially strong, and in

Civilization, ed. by G. von Grünebaum (Chicago, 1955), p. 119ff., where some relatable examples are discussed.

[46] The *Aghānī* group was published by B. Farès, *Une miniature religieuse de l'Ecole de Baghdad* (Cairo, 1948); a considerable controversy developed around B. Farès' theses, which does not concern our subject, but further literature included an important article by D. S. Rice, "The Aghānī Miniatures," *The Burlington Magazine*, 95 (1953), and a second volume by B. Farès, *Vision chrétienne et signes Musulmans* (Cairo, 1961).

[47] It should be pointed out that this particular arrangement was not peculiar to Byzantine compositions, but existed also in Manichean and Buddhist compositions of Central Asia as well as in those of the Carolingian West, all probably having common roots in Roman art. For examples and relation to a frontispiece of the thirteenth to fourteenth centuries in Istanbul, see now E. Esin, "Two Miniatures from the Collections of Topkapi," *Ars Orientalis*, 5 (1963); for Carolingian examples, see, for instance, Homburger, "L'art carolingien de Metz et l'Ecole de Winchester," *Gazette des beaux-arts*, 62 (1963). A case can indeed be made to the effect that it was in Central Asia that the princes of the thirteenth century acquired a taste for such compositions, and the subject deserves a fuller investigation than it has received so far; however, the very Arab character of the illustrated texts leads me, at least for the time being, to prefer a western Byzantine or Roman background for this type of composition.

[48] R. Lane Poole, *Catalogue of Oriental Coins in the British Museum*, IV (London, 1879), pl. v.

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the use of one illustrative instance I have tried to show that the practice was continued at later periods. The problem of Byzantine-Arab artistic relationships could be extended to deal with such subjects as the palaces of Theophilus in Constantinople and of the 'Abbāsids in Baghdad, or with the uses of architecture evident under the Fāṭimids, or, even more strikingly, with certain very archaic features of the secular architecture of North Africa and Umayyad Spain. Even in a monument as Islamic as the Alhambra there are antecedents which extend to Byzantium and beyond.[49]

Three main conclusions emerge from this analysis. First, by the very nature of the history of the seventh century, certain clearly identifiable ecological practices in Byzantium and Syria created the extraordinary phenomenon of Umayyad palaces. Similarly, in later times the social contacts with Christian populations, the reliance on Greek scientific books, and, in a general sense, the Mediterranean orientation of most Arabic-speaking areas in the Middle Ages made inevitable the Arabs' knowledge of, use of, and reliance upon Byzantine themes.

Second, there are almost no instances of the Muslims having borrowed from Byzantium without there being an identifiable need within their culture, or of their having continued with old traditions without making modifications demanded by the new world. This statement may require some correction as one deals with certain details of ornamental themes, but it can be maintained with regard to official art. Islamic art used Byzantine art when it needed iconographic expressions. Byzantine art thus became an essential ingredient in the formation of Islamic art. However, if we examine the nature of the impact of the former upon the latter, we note that, despite the reputation of Byzantine emperors as patrons of art and possessors of artists and treasure, it was not Byzantine *art* but the *themes* of Byzantine art which were used by the Muslims. In the one instance of religious and imperial symbolism where the Byzantines had developed a complex iconographic and stylistic mode of representation, the Muslims declined to adopt any of it precisely because it was highly developed. What we must conclude, then, is that Byzantine art provided the new culture with a vocabulary and with the rudiments of a grammar, but that the language developed therefrom was a new one. During its development, as the need for new themes and modes occurred, the Muslims turned again and again to the wellspring of Byzantium; much as Renaissance word-makers, partly out of snobbery and partly out of a genuine need for new words, turned to Greek for a vocabulary, from which certain words have since become popular, while others have faded away as artificial and meaningless concoctions. The idea that for the Muslims Byzantine ways were a means, not an end, an essential element in the creation of a symbolic system, not the system itself, is clearly illustrated in a celebrated story concerning Mu'āwiyah.

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[49] The bibliography on all these subjects, though fairly extensive, is not very enlightening from our point of view. Exceptions would be: A. Grabar, *L'iconoclasme byzantin*, pp. 144–5; G. Marçais, *L'architecture musulmane d'Occident* (Paris, 1954), *passim*; and F. Bargebuhr, "The Alhambra Palace of the Eleventh Century," *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes*, 19 (1956), p. 217 ff.

At one time he was upbraided by the Caliph 'Umar for having adopted the foreign ways of the Caesars and the Khosros. Mu'āwiyah answered that Damascus was full of Greeks and that none of them would believe in his power if he did not behave and look like an emperor.[50] To answer, then, the question posed by my original story: the early Muslims never fully understood Byzantine art, but circumstances having forced it on them, they could not but be impressed by its existence.

The evidence I have presented leads us, however, to a third conclusion. One of the striking characteristics of the themes used by Islamic art, brought to it by Byzantine hands, is that so many of them are quite classical. The illusionist style of fragments of the Damascus mosaic decoration, the arch on column, the agricultural structure of Syria, the palace-villas, the compositions of frontispieces—and to these can be added other features not treated here, such as the shapes of mausoleums and vegetal decorative designs—all reflect the art of Antiquity, and almost never did the newer and emotionally deeper Byzantine mode make its appearance. Should we understand from this that, at the time of the formation of Islamic art in Syria and throughout the period of later Byzantine art, the classical mode was so lively that it was more easily adopted? Should Umayyad art be used, then, as a major document in the assessment of Antiquity in Byzantium? Or should we rather feel that the artistic language of Antiquity was wider in spirit, more abstract and more adaptable to new needs than the engaged art of Christian Byzantium? Answers to these questions are beyond the scope of this paper and beyond my competence, but, whatever the answers, the questions illustrate the deeper meaning of Byzantium to Islamic art. Far more than from any other artistic tradition which created Islamic art, it was from the Byzantine that the new culture most consciously—if not necessarily most often—and with due acknowledgement took its vocabulary of forms and images. This was so, in part, because the Byzantine world, more than any other, carefully nurtured the great inheritance it had assumed from Antiquity. It was so also because Byzantium was the one world Early Islam most wanted, and failed, to conquer. But, above all, it was so because, to the Islamic and especially to the Arab Middle Ages—as well as to the Christian and especially to the Carolingian West—Byzantium, even at its lowest and weakest moments, partook of that mysterious aura which at given periods of history has endowed certain cultures and countries with a prestige of artistic genius which, deservedly or not, they alone at that period possessed. Therein, more than in any precise artistic motif, lies what the late Louis Massignon, in an eloquent article,[51] has called the Byzantine mirage in the Arab mirror.

[50] The story has been related often. One of its earliest versions is in Ṭabari, *Annales*, ed. by M. de Goeje and others (Leyden, 1879 ff.), 2, p. 207.

[51] L. Massignon, "Le mirage byzantin dans le miroir baghdadien d'il y a mille ans," *Annuaire de l'Institut de Philologie et d'Histoire Orientale*, 10 (1950).

8. Minaret

1. Court

2. Plan

Damascus, Great Mosque

5. Khisht al-Minyah. Plan

4. Khirbat al-Mafjar. Plan

6. Mshatta. Plan

7. Quṣayr 'Amrah. Plan

10 Khirbat al-Mafjar. Sculpture from Palace Entrance

9 Qasr al-Hayr. Sculpture on Façade

8 Qasr al-Hayr. Façade, as reconstructed in the Damascus Museum

11. Arab-Byzantine Coin

13. Arab-Byzantine Coin

12. Arab-Byzantine Coin

14. Muslim Coin with Niche

15. Post reform Umayyad Gold Coin

16. Damascus, Mausoleum of Baybars. Mosaic Fragment

17. Khirbat al-Mafjar, Mosaic Fragment

18. Khirbat al-Minyah. Mosaic Fragment

19. Qusayr 'Amrah: Fresco of the Six Kings

20. Qasr al-Hayr: Sculpture of Prince

21. Khirbat al-Mafjar: Sculpture of Prince

22. Qasr al-Hayr: Sculpture of Prince

24. Istanbul Topkapı Sarayı Ahmet III, no. 3467. Frontispiece with Portrait of Dioscorides

25. K. al-Aghānī. Frontispiece

26. Quṣayr 'Amrah. Fresco of Prince

97. Frontispiece

26. Authors' Portraits

Vienna, Nationalbibliothek, A. F. 10

29. Damascus, Hospital of Nūr al-Dīn, Façade

28. Ravenna, Museo Nazionale. Ivory Diptych

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11

PARALLELISM, CONVERGENCE AND INFLUENCE IN THE RELATIONS OF ARAB AND BYZANTINE PHILOSOPHY, LITERATURE AND PIETY

Gustave E. von Grunebaum

L IKE Guzmán de Alfarache I should have liked nothing better than to enter directly into my "Discourse; yet I felt constrained to eschew the criticism of some *Sophist* or other, who would have been apt to have accused me of not proceeding *à Definitione ad Definitum*, from the *Definition* to the *Thing Defined*";[1] and this with better reason than the Spanish rogue who merely fears a charge of incompleteness were he to omit an account of his parentage, while I have to explain my use of the key concept of this study, taking, as I must, the term "relations" in a sense not immediately and necessarily associated with it by the English, or in fact, by any Western hearer.

Relations, that is, cultural relations outside of art, to become a meaningful subject of historical investigation, must be consciously maintained; at the very least, a somnolent and uneasy awareness must subsist that there obtains a connection, be it by origin, influence, or interchange, sought or unsought, in any event sufficient to establish a significant similarity or contrast between the entities bracketed together by their postulated relatedness. To Arabs and Byzantines the realization of such relatedness was foreign, a certain number of deliberate borrowings notwithstanding. Their contacts, resulting more often than not in the kinship of a tenacious hostility, were not understood for their cultural creativeness. The developmental similarities, which, paradoxically enough, increased as direct political and intellectual connections lessened, were not perceived. The proud illusion of self-sufficiency persisted undented by the knowledge of, on occasion, solicited loans; each culture surrounded its bearers with an experientially adequate and seemingly complete body of intellectual resources somewhat as, for example, English, French, or German literature and scholarship provide their respective publics with subjectively adequate and complete descriptive statements of their universes. The difference, however, lies in the fact that even the monolingual Occidental of today has been alerted to the illusory character of this autarchy and senses that his life is part of a complementary dramatic exchange, while Arab and Byzantine, or rather the Muslim of the Arabicized world and the Greek-speaking Christian of the Byzantine Empire, recognized kinship only in terms of the other's error and distortion of pristine truth and (on the Muslim side) in the common recourse to an esoteric philosophical tradition.

Purpose and meaning of a study such as ours can therefore only be analytical reconstruction, *kashf al-ghiṭāʾ*, the "lifting of the veil," and not the retracing of experience and judgment of either Arab or Byzantine, protected as both were from a full view of contemporary realities by the language curtain and, more importantly, by an almost exclusive concern for themselves with a corresponding indifference to the other's ways—whenever these were not apt to lead to political complications (which is why the alien religion comes in for a great deal of heated and a bit of informed discussion). The sharing of

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[1] Mateo Alemán, *Guzmán d'Alfarache*, English translation (London, 1707–1708), I, 1–2.

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folk tale themes and the similarity of the atmosphere which has become
condensed in the *Digenes* epic, on the one hand, and in narratives such as
'Umar b. an-Nu'mān in the *Arabian Nights* corpus or the *Sayyid Baṭṭāl*, on
the other—of less weight, incidentally in the Muslim than in the Byzantine
intellectual *oikonomia*—are not to be mistaken for indications of developments
affecting the culture consciousness of one or both of the antagonists. What
common points of reference there were, or could have been but for mechanical
barriers and deliberate blindness, were located in the religious structure, the
motifs that underlay it, the questions they posed, the methods that appeared
suitable in attacking them, and the solutions by which the seeker would
acquiesce. Hence common ground would extend from theology into philosophy
and into science insofar as speculation remained a tool more appropriate than
observation, authority tended to buttress communal safety at the expense
of self-reliance, and the physically and historically impossible continued to
be confused with the logically absurd.

The cleavage between Byzantium and the Arabs, to retain the conveniently
inadequate terms, in philosophy and literature (and beyond) is due essentially
to the different principles of selection applied to the classical heritage. Byzantine
authors may not have done as Greek writers did; but Greek literature was
always there, at least *in potentia*, to counterbalance the Fathers and the monks,
themselves only rarely completely free of its touch, and the Platonic tradition
was ever present under the surface; and with the two was the preparedness
to conceive of an intellectual and ethical universe in which man was, if not
the measure, at any rate the focus of things—an outlook which on the Muslim
side was episodic and confined to conventicles. The relations between the two
culture worlds are further determined by the fact that into the eleventh century
such convergences as occurred or were adumbrated were the work of the
educated, and more particularly of an Islamic *Bildungsschicht* which existed
side by side with the true carriers of the Muslim tradition, the architects and
spokesmen of the *umma Muḥammadiyya* as a socio-political body.[2] After
ca. 1050 or 1100, however, it is on the popular level that convergences come
to the fore. The disintegration of the "standard cultures" (and of the sup-
porting political structures) not only leads to a change in the dominant *Bil-
dungsschichten*, but above all to an integration of elements of popular feeling
and popular modes of thought, religious and aesthetic as well as more speci-
fically "scientific," into the new "standard syntheses" of theology and literary
taste, not to mention the convergences which popular strains common to the
Near East, regardless of the religious and linguistic dominants of the moment,
bring about on attaining by default, as it were, scope and relative independence
upon the breakup of the erstwhile controlling intellectual superstructures.

Yielding to man's inveterate addiction to the triad, one might confront

[2] The parallelism deserves to be noted which endows both Baghdad and Byzantium with a class
of educated laymen that, on occasion, developed into the carriers of a secular, potentially humanist
culture. The West had to wait until the fourteenth century for the development of a comparable
stratum.

Islamic civilization, as grown from the specifically Muslim component, "Arab-ism," and the local traditions encountered on expansion, with Byzantine as analyzable into a Christian component, "Hellenism" (in which the fading Roman-Latin heritage may be included), and again the local traditions of the dominated areas. A Hellenic or Hellenistic element must be discerned, more or less concealed, in what is here designated as the "local traditions" of Syria or Egypt but also of Mesopotamia and Iran, and even, although in attenuated density, of Arabia proper; a Hellenic element, too, is present in both the Muslim and the Christian messages as these had been articulated by their followers. The "Hellenistic" substratum is thus pervasive far beyond the immediately recognizable; besides, there is accessible a store of Greek scientific information, intellectual approaches and techniques, with models of application to alien ideas as manifested in earlier revelations, and dehydrated patterns of self-expression, ready for revival through new contents.

Though profoundly modified through a novel experience of the holy and through Arabization of tenets and phrasing, the Islamic doctrinal impulse, in its resumption of religious motifs which previously had inspired Christian teaching, harbored the same intellectual difficulties which recourse to Greek philosophy had assisted the Fathers in pinpointing and, in terms of the sensi-bilities of the times, resolving. What had been a *skandalon* to the pagan of Greece and Rome, resurged as problem in a world turning Muslim—the creation of the world in time, the resurrection of the flesh, the ethical *aporia* of a God who punishes the evil actions he decrees. But after centuries of Christian debate the shock of the antinomies had worn off and the Muslim community found it easier to become reconciled to the intellectually un-palatable, to Aristotelianizing its teachings (as did the Jews and Zoroastrians of the period), and to acquiesce in an emotionally satisfactory abdication of inquiry into the unfathomable Other. The philosophers, however, whose unrest was not to be stilled by the prejudgment of revelation, and not a few among their theological opponents (like their companions of Greek, Latin, and Jewish scholasticism) gave themselves over to the erection of *cathédrales d'idées* (to use L. Febvre's expression).

Irrelevant to any mastery of the outside world, on which Muslim and Byzantine had but a precarious hold, these scaffoldings of speculations, disciplined and given a semblance of realism by a rigorous formal logic, were intended to glorify God by throwing a protective wall around religious doctrine. The freedom of esoteric groups of *falāsifa* in Islam, as of the uncommitted superficiality of a Psellos, left untouched the basic otherworldliness with its concomitant, the acquiescence in approximate knowledge of reality, and the susceptibility to fears and, in general, the low threshold of collective excitability this in turn entailed.

The use of reason was indicated to prevent its reaching out into zones where reason would endanger the relation between the community and its Lord, for truth and error were more than intellectual positions (with ethical implications); their adoption sacralized or desecrated the community. In this regard, the

cultivation of Hellenic philosophy was more dangerous to the Byzantine than to the Muslim—to him its deprecation meant more of a self-denial and a refusal to accept himself in his heritage. Is it not significant that John Italos was reproached for "following the Greek philosophers instead of merely reading them as a part of education"?[3] And Psellos is careful to point out that the very existence of God posits that of philosophy—if there is God, there must be Providence; if there is Providence, there must be *sophia* (by which God foresees); if there is *sophia*, there must be the desire for it, which is precisely what *philosophia* is.[4] Other than the Muslim *failasūf*, a Psellos could, on the model of the Fathers, consider the Greek thinkers precursors of Christianity; no comparable avenue was open to an Avicenna or an Averroes; once rehabilitated in principle, inasmuch as they adumbrated the perfect teachings of Christianity, Aristotle and Plato could be used as a bridge to that antiquity which never lost its power to tempt—provided of course Scripture and Fathers were kept at hand to point the way where the ancients had stumbled.

The relation to antiquity determined in Byzantium and in Arab Islam (but not in Latin Christendom) the outlook on the sciences, or rather, the range of education and human concern for knowledge as revealed in the classification of the sciences. As categories, but not in terms of their content, the Byzantine *dogmata ta theia* or *logoi kath' hemas* and *logoi hoi thyrathen* or *mathemata ta ektos* correspond to the *'ulūm al-'Arab* and the *'ulūm al-'ajam* (or *al-awā'il*) respectively. The *'ulūm al-'Arab* are, functionally, the sciences required to preserve the Muslim community and, genetically, the sciences developed to comprehend Revelation and Tradition (by explication and interpretation) and carry on the Arab heritage; the *'ulūm al-awā'il*, on the other hand, embrace the contribution of antiquity, with the propaedeutic or methodological sciences maintaining a somewhat uncertain position within or apart. The hard core is furnished by the Arab sciences among which those dealing with language are basic from a practical point of view. For, as in Byzantium, the world of learning (and literature proper) is set apart from everyday life by a linguistic differentiation which increasingly separates "standard" language and vernacular. As already indicated—and it is here that the Arab and the Byzantine outlooks are at variance—the Arab sciences include the religious such as *tafsīr* and *fiqh*; and the identification of "basic" higher education as an *egkyklios paideia* more or less identical with *hoi thyrathen logoi* is in complete contrast with Muslim ideas where at no point could philosophy or physical science have been considered part of a "standard" curriculum.[5] The integration of literature in this program is a feature shared by both civilizations; in fact, however, it tended to set the types of education even further apart, seeing the abyss that separates Homer from pre-Islamic poetry. Similarities in taste will be noticeable to us—such as the common addiction to description which among the Arabs

[3] G. Buckler, *Anna Comnena. A Study* (London, 1929), p. 322. The text of the article which condemns this attitude to "Hellenic studies" in general terms (first in 1076/77 and again in 1082) is translated in P. E. Stephanou, *Jean Italos. Philosophe et humaniste* (Rome, 1949), p. 48.

[4] B. Tatakis, *La philosophie byzantine* (Paris, 1949), p. 206.

[5] Cf., e.g., Buckler, *op. cit.*, pp. 180–181.

is in evidence primarily in poetry, among the Byzantines, in prose, and which goes back in technique and spirit to the *ekphrasis* of Late Antiquity—but will not bridge the gulf between the ideals guiding the educational process. The moral purpose of education was realized on both sides. Psellos' dictum that (theological) study will perfect the soul and help it to return to the highest good[6] has its parallel in the saying of his contemporary, Ibn Ḥazm, that identifies the rank of a science with its ability to draw man near to his Creator.[7] A "secularized" appraisal of the educative process (rather than of education) inspired the endeavors of the *falāsifa* and their sympathisers from Kindī, who realizes that the search for truth ennobles and honors him who undertakes it,[8] to Miskawaih, who views ethics as the noblest of sciences because it aspires to improve the actions of man.[9]

A less programmatic and hence more revealing confrontation of individual and society we should expect from belles-lettres; and this not alone on the strength of the modern tradition. But where, despite reticence, inarticulateness, or adherence to genre convention, we do find the Arab or the Byzantine writer facing experience through description and introspection, it is similarities rather than influences that we are able to observe. A certain preference of the Byzantine for prose, over against the dominance of verse in Arab literature, may deserve notice, as do exclusions not imposed or warranted by the available heritage. The refusal to admit secondary causes and the ultimate irrelevance of human decision and consequently human conflict will account in some measure for the failure of Arab (or, in this context, rather of Sunnite) Islam to develop a drama. The shying away from the dramatic mode shows in the refusal, if this formulation be permitted, to develop the *munāẓara*, the *Rangstreitgedicht*, increasingly popular in Arabic since the ninth century, into full-fledged scenes or theatrical sketches, as was done in Italy from the thirteenth century in the so-called *contrasti*. No explanation of this religious-psychological order would, however, fit the Byzantine scene, and it is difficult to explain why the cento of the *Christos paschon*, a moderately successful *tour de force* datable to the eleventh or twelfth century and spiritually akin, yet inferior in its lifelessness, to the Jesuit school drama of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, was, together with the so-called *Cyprus Passion Cycle* of 1260–1270 (and apart from the continuation beyond the fall of Constantinople of the mime), to remain the only fully tangible attempt to resume or imitate one of the known achievements of the Hellenic past.[10]

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[6] Tatakis, *op. cit.*, p. 167.

[7] *Kitāb al-akhlāq wa's-siyar*, ed. and trans. by N. Tomiche (Beirut, 1961), no. 39.

[8] R. Walzer, *Greek Into Arabic* (Oxford, 1962), p. 12.

[9] Miskawaih, *Kitāb tahdhīb al-akhlāq* (Cairo, 1329), p. 43; quoted by M. Arkoun, *Deux épîtres de Miskawayh*, *Bulletin d'études orientales*, XVII (1961–1962), 7–73, at p. 8. M.-D. Chenu, *La théologie comme science au XIIIᵉ siècle*, 3rd ed. (Paris, 1957), pp. 18–19, has brought together a number of Carolingian quotations which show that, in the West, too, grammar and rhetoric were the first sciences to be applied to the sacred text. Their language, incidentally, like that of the Koran, was held superior to any rules established by grammar.

[10] Cf. E. Wagner, *Die arabische Rangstreitdichtung und ihre Einordnung in die allgemeine Literaturgeschichte*, Akad. d. Wiss. u. d. Lit. (Mainz), Abh. d. geistes- u. sozialwiss. Kl. (1962), No. 8, pp. 31–32. The literature on the Byzantine theater is most conveniently accessible in A. C. Mahr, *The Cyprus*

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Neither in Islam nor in Greek Christendom did the depreciation of this life
lead to indifference to the events which direct and fulfill it. In both milieus
there flourished, independent of political success or calamity, a historiography
of wide scope, more often than not anxiously clinging to the simple scaffolding
of annalistic chronology and almost always oriented toward the personalization
(but not the psychological analysis) of happenings, with the Byzantines holding
the edge in sharp (or at least rhetorically unimpeachable and impressive)
portraiture of the protagonists, but the Muslims outdistancing them in the
development of collective self-representation through biographies whose
copiousness, variety, and accuracy have no rival down to very modern times,
and which constitute a matchless dossier of the "Islamic" personality (as
much of it, that is, as seemed appropriate to record and exhibit) and its
typology. More often than not we have to be content with basic data and a
string of anecdotes; intellectual achievement is apt to be described in terms of
books audited and transmitted and of centers of learning visited; the profile
of the biographee, if it can be reconstructed at all, must be traced by us: there
is no sense of unity and development of the person and hardly any expressed
awareness of his relation to his society; yet the wealth of material is over-
whelming and what may be impossible to accomplish for the individual scholar,
saint, or statesman, becomes possible for the type or the period—to recompose
the mental and behavioral structures insofar as they mattered to the con-
temporaries.

Autobiography is more evenly represented and it is remarkable that in the
self-confrontation of the individual the Latin West, far behind in historiography
and biography proper, by 1100 reached the level of Byzantines and Arabs.
The autobiographical scheme where the path of the writer in search of truth
and God is traced from school to school to final conversion or illumination, and
which can be followed back beyond Saint Augustine at least to Saint Justin
Martyr and to Lucian, does not seem to have been utilized in Byzantium; on
the other hand, it is surprising to see Michael VIII Palaeologos (1261–1282)
employ in his autobiographical sketch a technique barely prefigured in antiq-
uity and only much later taken up in Islam, viz. the presentation of the
writer's accomplishments and successful actions as benefactions from God
(*Gnadengaben, minan*), whereby the most reckless self-glorification will be
justified as a manner of rendering thanks to the Lord for the favors He be-
stowed on the writer. While the attitude may be noted earlier, the first Arab
author to base his autobiography on the alleged divine command to make
public the evidences of divine grace is ash-Sha'rānī (d. 1565).[11]

Passion Cycle (Notre Dame, Ind., 1947). Mahr gives an edition, translation, and analytical discus-
sion of the Passion Plays. Reference may also be made to the recent study by G. La Piana, "The
Byzantine Iconography of the Presentation of the Virgin Mary to the Temple and a Latin Religious
Pageant," *Late Classical and Mediaeval Studies in Honor of A. M. Friend, Jr.*, ed. by K. Weitzmann
(Princeton, 1955), pp. 261–271.

[11] *Laṭā'if al-minan* (various printings); on this work, cf. F. Rosenthal, "Die arabische Autobio-
graphie," *Studia Arabica*, I (Rome, 1937), pp. 1–40, at pp. 37–40. The *Laṭā'if al-minan fī manāqib
Abī 'l-'Abbās al-Mursī wa-shaikhi-hi Abī 'l-Ḥasan* by Aḥmad b. 'Aṭā' Allāh al-Iskandarī (d. 1309),
from which Sha'rānī may have adapted the title of his autobiography, does not organize its bio-

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Since the twelfth century the influx of Eastern literary motifs into the Byzantine novel—not compensated at the time by a corresponding reflux of Byzantine motifs into Arab narrative—does not constitute a helpful analogy. Nor does the structural correspondence between Abū 'l-'Alā' al-Ma'arrī's (d. 1058) Visit to Paradise, with its discussion of Arab literature, the so-called *Risālat al-ghufrān*, and the *Timarion* (middle of twelfth century) help, as both may be derived from a pattern of which Lucian's *Nekyiomanteia* is the best known and most influential representative. (It is perhaps appropriate to note the structural looseness, so typical of Arab literature, of the *Risālat al-ghufrān* in contrast to the strict composition of even as casual and topical a work as the *Timarion*.)[12]

It would seem that revivals within a cultural development, whatever their causes, occasions, and effects, are carried by an increased confidence in man's

graphical materials as *minan* accorded by God to the saints with whom it is concerned. (The book is printed on the margin of Sha'rānī's *Laṭā'if* [Cairo, 1321/1903], accompanying I, 2, to II, 88.)

The latest edition (and translation) of Michael's autobiography is by H. Grégoire, "Imperatoris Michaeli Palaeologi *De Vita sua*," *Byzantion*, XXIX–XXX (1959–1960), pp. 447–476; decisive are chaps. i–xi. Grégoire and before him D. J. Geanakoplos, *Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West. 1258-1282. A Study in Byzantine-Latin Relations* (Cambridge, Mass., 1959), p. 16, note 1, accept the authorship of Michael. The "autobiography" actually is a *typikon*, or monastic rule, for the convent of St. Demetrios in Constantinople, in whose first part the emperor rehearses his life and deeds. G. Misch, *Geschichte der Autobiographie* (Bern-Frankfurt a. Main, 1949ff.), III/ii, pp. 752–755, touches upon the apologetic character of the work but makes no reference to the stylistic pattern it represents. A certain kinship exists between Michael's organization of the major factors and events of his life in terms of God's benefactions to him and Libanios' presentation of much of his autobiography in terms of the favors and hurts prepared for him by his Tyche; see his famous oration on his Life Βίος ἢ περὶ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ τύχης (*Opera*, ed. by R. Foerster [Leipzig, 1903, 1922], I, pp. 79–206). Libanios' self-statement is less stringently organized than the much briefer narrative of Michael's; not all of his experiences are presented from the guiding viewpoint; while at times he endeavors to show how his Tyche balanced the good and the bad, Libanios is on the whole inclined to portray her as benevolent and his life as fortunate. A phrase like that in chap. 146, where he justifies mention of an incident by the desire not to pass over any of her gifts, or at the beginning of chap. 259, where he wishes the *eunoia* of the gods recognized in what he has to report about himself, is fairly close to the attitude which Michael's *bios* bespeaks. Libanios (who wrote the major part of his autobiographical oration in 374, adding to it in 390) was read in the schools throughout the Byzantine period. One has the impression that a good deal of interest was devoted to his writings from the time of Kinnamos (d. after 1185), who patterned his *Ethopoiia* after one of Libanios', to the first half of the fourteenth century, during which period Thomas Magistros (under Andronikos II, 1282–1328), Georgios Lekapenos, and Andreas Lopadiotes made use of his works in various ways, and even as late as the beginning of the fifteenth when Manuel II's (1391–1425) dialogue on marriage appears to reflect the ancient rhetor's Θέσις εἰ γαμητέον (cf. K. Krumbacher, *Geschichte der byzantinischen Literatur*, 2nd ed. [Munich, 1897], pp. 455, 491, 549, 558, and 576; R. R. Bolgar, *The Classical Heritage and Its Beneficiaries* [Cambridge, 1954], pp. 49, 84, and 399). The possibility that Michael was acquainted with Libanios is undeniable. The freedom, not to say the originality, with which Libanios' scheme is used suggests, however, the existence of some intermediary link or links. A competent analysis of Libanios' *Bios* is to be found in K. Malzacher, *Die Tyche bei Libanios*, diss. Strasbourg (Strasbourg, 1918), pp. 53–60; cf. also Misch, *op. cit.*, I, 566–575. (The author wishes to thank Mr. Michael Crosby of the Dumbarton Oaks Center for Byzantine Studies for suggesting the possibility of a connection between the *Bios* of Libanios and Michael VIII.) A faint prefiguration of *minan* as providing the skeletal structure of autobiographical statements may perhaps be found in Paulinus' of Pella (the son-in-law of Ausonius) *Eucharisticos* and Prosper's of Aquitaine (*ca.* 390–*ca.* 463) *Poema coniugis ad uxorem* and *Carmen de providentia divina* (MPL, LI, pp. 611–615, and *ibid.*, 617–638; authorship doubtful). Cf. E. M. Sanford, *Salvianus: On the Government of God* (New York, 1930), Introduction, p. 26.

[13] F. Masai, *Pléthon et le platonisme de Mistra* (Paris, 1956), pp. 288–292, offers an interpretation of the *Timarion* in terms of the intellectual currents to which it lends expression. The *Risālat al-ghufrān* can be examined in the rather uninspired (and abridged) French version of M.-S. Meïssa, *Le message du pardon d'Abou 'l'Ala de Maarra* (Paris, 1932), and the likewise not altogether satisfactory English translation by G. Brackenbury, *The Epistle of Forgiveness* (Cairo, 1943).

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worth and strength, a refinement of introspection, and an extension of the
ability to express hitherto muted contents; whenever possible recourse is had
to identification with a past model; and in the West, or rather, the Medi-
terranean world and its cultural descendants, every revival down to the
seventeenth century has occurred under the sign of Plato. In most cases this
Plato was more a Porphyry or a Proklus, who came to supplant or at least
to supplement an Aristotle, himself apprehended through neo-Platonic eyes. To
pre-modern man, truth is total; it is the opposite of falsehood, error, absurdity.
Hence the problem in Latin and in Greek Christendom as well as in Islam has
been to reconcile the total truths of Aristotle and Plato and the total truth
of either with the (by definition) overriding truth of Revelation. Psellos and
Anna Comnena see Aristotle as a preliminary to Plato. The true philosopher
must have passed the threshold of Aristotelian learning.[13] Muslim thinkers like
Fārābī (d. 950) devoted themselves to demonstrating that there was no contra-
diction between the teachings of the two masters. In case of conflict, the phi-
losopher had to yield to Scripture unless it could be shown—often to the
philosopher's but rarely the theologian's satisfaction—that the disparate
doctrines marked different levels of truth or truth phrased for different levels
of understanding. A certain antirationalism, an inclination toward mystical
intuition, congenial as it is in some measure to the Platonic world view, was
thus of necessity built into every new outreach toward a philosophical,
i.e., reason-based concept of the universe, God, man, and their necessary
relationships.

   Psellos' insistence that there is a mode of perception that is above reason,
in that it accedes to areas where reason, tied as it is to causal argument from
known premises, cannot operate, is in harmony with his Platonism, seeing
that Plato himself went beyond reasoning and demonstration to the realization
of the One. The placing of Plato as a forerunner of Christianity, and the
unqualified readiness to accept Revelation, albeit in a form compatible with
a philosophical frame of reference, did not protect Psellos from being attacked
for Hellenism, any more than submission to prophecy protected the *failasūf*
from suspicion of *kufr*, a suspicion which was perhaps founded less on the
individual tenets he might defend than on the admission of authorities alien
to the Muslim Revelation and the further admission, open or concealed, of
human reason as the touchstone of truth. Psellos observed approvingly that
Aristotle always proceeded by syllogism and did not argue from myths as the
ancient Egyptians had done. His reasoning is *anthropikoteron*, i.e., more after
the manner appropriate to man, who ought to attain to truth on his own
resources by logical means.[14]

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   [13] Cf. Buckler, *op. cit.*, p. 172. In the West, as Chenu, *op. cit.*, pp. 105–106, has pointed out, Augus-
tinianism is another indispensable element in any "renaissance." Its essential constituents Chenu
describes as "sens de l'intériorité, l'appétit de la béatitude, la foi en la souveraineté absolue de la
grâce, la primauté d'une anthropologie surnaturelle sur toute physique, la perception réaliste de
l'économie du salut à travers l'histoire et au delà des cycles du cosmos."
   [14] Cf. Tatakis, *op. cit.*, p. 171. With a time lag of almost two hundred years the Occident recognized
the possibility and accepted the obligation of working toward progress in the search for scientific and

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Abū Sulaimān the Logician (d. 1000), the teacher of Tauḥīdī (d. 1023)—to my knowledge the only Muslim writer who expressly characterizes man as a problem[15]—recognizes the superiority of the prophet over the philosopher, but attempts, perhaps for that very reason, to deal with philosophy and religion as complementary though distinct areas of human endeavor. He objects to the attempt of the Ikhwān aṣ-Ṣafā' to annex the religious law to philosophy. For "if one desires to philosophize one must turn away the glance from religious opinions [practices? *diyānāt*]; but if one wishes to give oneself over to the religious life [religious practice? *tadayyun*], one must free oneself from all philosophical concern."[16] Yet philosophy and religion are tied to one another by sharing the same final cause. To attain the religious goal man must first carry rational investigation as far as possible; intellectual activity must precede contemplation. The reason which Abū Sulaimān—and with him Tauḥīdī (who was, however, more conscious of the implications)—exhorts man to follow is clearly the universal property of humankind, difficult to distinguish from the *ḥikma khālida*, the eternal wisdom, to which Miskawaih, following Iranian trains of thought, devoted one of his works. Tauḥīdī cannot resist deprecating the limitative ethics of the Muslim *fuqahā'*, based though they are (albeit at two removes) on revelation, in favor of the common experience of man regardless of creed or race.[17] Such an attitude could hardly survive in a period when salvaging and revitalizing of Sunnism came to be identified as the true task of the community, which, in the nature of things, could recognize itself only in the (historically speaking) accidental, the distinctively particular.

The upsurge of anthropocentric thought, paralleled by an aspiration to substantive originality in literature, collapsed—in philosophy sooner than in

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philosophical truth after the manner of Rāzī (d. 925 or 935) and the Byzantine Renaissance. Less quoted than Bernard of Chartres (d. *ca.* 1130) is his contemporary Gilbert of Tournai, who declares truth to be open to all; it cannot however be found if we are content with what the predecessors have established; those who came before us are not our masters but our guides; complete truth has not yet been acquired. It is remarkable that the anti-intellectual tendencies of Islamic and Byzantine thought from the eleventh and twelfth centuries on are paralleled, again with a characteristic time lag, for example, in the outlook of a Duns Scotus (1266–1308), a Richard Fitzralph (middle of the fourteenth century), a Jean Gerson (1362–1428) and a Nicolaus of Cues (1401–1464).

[15] Tauḥīdī and Miskawaih, *Kitāb al-hawāmil wa'sh-shawāmil*, ed. by A. Amīn (Cairo, 1951). p. 180, line 5 (*quaestio* 68); cf. M. Arkoun, "L'Humanisme arabe au IVe/Xe siècle," *Studia Islamica*, XIV (1961). pp. 73–108; XV (1961), pp. 63–87, at XIV, p. 98.

[16] *Ibid.*, XIV, pp. 89–90, with reference to Tauḥīdī, *Kitāb al-imtā' wa'l-mu'ānasa*, ed. by A. Amīn and A. Ṣaqr (Cairo, 1939–1944), II, p. 18.

[17] Arkoun, *op. cit.*, XIV, p. 97, note 1, with reference to *Hawāmil*, p. 329. Methodologically close to the Hellenistic gnosis is the use made by Suhrawardī al-Maqtūl (executed 1191) of the idea of Eternal Wisdom as an unbroken chain of mystical tradition carried by Hermes, Aristotle and Plato, Agathodaimon and Empedocles, as well as Indian and Persian sages; access to the literature is most easily obtained through G.-C. Anawati and L. Gardet, *Mystique musulmane* (Paris, 1961), p. 56. With much more vigor and consistency did Plethon draw the conclusions from the doctrine of the *philosophia perennis* which led him to the rejection of the revealed religions in favor of that wisdom which was guaranteed by the common consent of mankind and first preached by Zoroaster to Medes, Persians, and most of the ancient peoples of Asia. The *koinai ennoiai* of humanity constitute the supreme verities; their moral content is binding for all times. In this context the virtue of the intellect emerges as the highest, and the cultivation of the sciences, such as history, geography, philosophy, as a duty (cf. Masai, *op. cit.*, pp. 130–139 and 263–264). Petrarch's *De sui ipsius et aliorum Ignorantia* anticipated not the concept of the *ḥikma khālida*, but the preoccupation with man that underlies it.

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literature—under the weight of the overwhelming urge to safeguard Sunni Islam. Barred from easy recourse to the Greeks and tied in its belles-lettres to a classical age inadequate in thematic scope and degree of sophistication to the existential needs of the day, the incipient, bold, yet never fully stated "humanism" of Baghdad had already vanished when Psellos became *hypatos ton philosophon*; it was an early victim of the socio-political regrouping and the intellectual redefining of the *umma Muḥammadiyya*, which in the second half of the eleventh century was to give Islam its "definitive" face for hundreds of years. To rehabilitate a humanistic philosophy as a prefiguration of Islam and represent the Greek thinkers as Muslims *avant la lettre* (as, *mutatis mutandis*, the Fathers had done and Psellos did once more) was clearly not possible. Allegoresis, the favorite tool of the Christian, would not serve the Sunni. The Fatimid Shī'ī would be able to buttress his religious emanationism by means of an ontological emanationism of Hellenistic origin. But was it not precisely this deviation of the radical Shī'a that the lawyer-theologians and statesmen of the eleventh century knew to be a mortal peril to the True Believers?

The relationship between political and cultural flowering does not appear to be constant. French classicism coincided with an upsurge of French power, Greek tragedy ebbed with the waning of Athenian might, but philosophy survived the corrosion of the city. In general one is left with the impression that continuing political weakness, if accompanied by that insignificance of community concerns which tends to follow relegation to the sidelines, is detrimental to cultural creativeness, but that political disintegration as such, with the concomitant relaxing of public control over the intellect and, on occasion, the need to enlist the intellect in the preparation of a political renascence, will be favorable to an outburst of productivity and a sudden switching to new approaches and experimenting with new aspirations.[17a]

The developments in Eastern Arab Islam and in the Byzantine Empire during the tenth century are cases in point, illustrating the creative force which may be released when there is no longer any surveillance by a prestigious tradition with which the state had become identified. Despite his position as the (nominal) head of the state, Constantine Porphyrogennetos (913–959) symbolizes better than any other personality the *rassemblement* of spiritual forces which succeeded, not without the ever-present regress to antiquity, in liberating Byzantium from the monopolistic pressure of the monastic movement on its intellectual life. The reorganization of a university, the

[17a] What the philosopher J. G. Fichte (d. 1814) noted with regard to Germany could readily be transferred to the Muslim domain. "No German-born prince ever took upon himself to mark out for his subjects as their fatherland ... the territory over which he ruled, and to regard his subjects as bound to the soil. A truth not permitted to find expression in one place might find expression in another, where it might happen that those truths were forbidden which were permitted in the first. So, in spite of the many instances of onesidedness and narrowness of heart in the separate states, there was nevertheless in Germany, considered as a whole, the greatest freedom of investigation and publication that any people has ever possessed." (*Addresses to the German Nation* [1808], trans. by R. F. Jones and G. H. Turnbull [Chicago-London, 1922], p. 148 [Address viii].)

recapturing of Platonism, the readmittance of realism in art,[18] as well as the deepening of mystical piety manifest in Symeon the New Theologian—these are symptoms of the reconquest of an intellectual level which had long been out of reach and which was achieved against a background of provincial magnates whittling away at the imperial power, the Slavs and later the Seljuqs and Normans threatening the core areas of the Empire, and Venice establishing its economic stranglehold on the Byzantine state. Similarly, with the caliphate becoming the helpless and dishonored prize of fractional wars; regional principalities, shortlived for the most part, carving up the Muslim domain; non-Arab rulers establishing themselves in most of the Arabic-speaking territories; and the twin insecurity of financial decay and internal violence becoming a normal part of life, the first summation of Muslim knowledge is achieved by the Ikhwān aṣ-Ṣafā', a Fārābī blends Greek and Islamic political thought, the greatest of the (non-classical) poets is showered with patronage, new ideas in theology as well as poetry, criticism, and *Lebensgestaltung* are arduously debated; there is a great deal of philosophical experimentation, different types of the religious life are locked in vehement combat; the cultural scene is as motley as the political, sects and denominations mingle and fight, and for the first time perhaps in the history of Islamic civilization the taboo against the popular is disregarded.

Al-Jahshiyārī (d. 942) collects the basic corpus of the *Arabian Nights*, Abū Dulaf (d. after 942) describes half-seriously the ways of the underworld with a generous use of *argot*, and Muḥammad al-Azdī (also tenth century)[19] portrays the Baghdādī through his own idiom (it is true that he had, to some extent, a precedent in Jāḥiẓ' fine ear for regional and social differentiations of speech). With all this the upper-class—hence, in a sense, exclusive—character of Arab *Bildung* persists. The realistic interest in the popular subsides, and the Hellenism of scholastic method and philosophical thought, congenial in particular to the sects, maintains that unreflected kinship of outlook of the Arab and Byzantine intelligentsia. Their not infrequent contacts are seriously curtailed only when, after Mantzikert (1071), the Seljuqs interpose their state between the Arabic and the Greek speaking areas. The Seljuq victory, in whose wake the de-Hellenization of Eastern and Central Asia Minor is to begin in earnest, occurs at a time when the consolidation of Sunni Islam is successfully taking shape. Culturally speaking, the essential features of this reaffirmation of orthodoxy are the integration of mystical piety and the acceptance of popular

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[18] The term "realism," which to some may seem ill chosen as an epithet of any phase of Byzantine art, is to be understood as a name for a movement which allowed the resumption of an ancient interest in nature motifs and picturesque detail as well as the loosening of ecclesiastical control over the treatment of traditional themes and the rendering of the human countenance. A. Grabar, *Byzantine Painting* (New York, 1953), speaks of "leanings toward realism" (p. 44) and a tendency "to interpolate realistic motifs and picturesque variations of the time-honored formulas" (p. 138). The realism here noted is, of course, no kin to P. A. Michelis' "transcendental realism" (*An Aesthetic Approach to Byzantine Art* [London, 1955], p. 178); but a reminder of the combination, peculiar to Byzantine hagiography, of "realism and spirituality" (which Michelis describes on p. 114) may not be out of place in our context.

[19] On him, cf. C. Brockelmann, *GAL*, I, p. 156; Suppl., I, p. 254; and F. Gabrieli, "Sulla *Ḥikāyat Abī l-Qāsim* di Abū l-Muṭahhar al-Azdī," *RSO*, XX (1942), pp. 33–45.

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practices as part of "official" religion; a concentration on law and theology with a consequent retrenchment of public concern for the "foreign sciences"; a heightened awareness of the importance of tradition as justification for and the mortar of the attempted synthesis; wider scope for individual religiosity, which tends to organize in fraternities; a personalization of the experience of the holy, which is obtained through the saint recognized by his miracles; and, with all this, a lowering of critical demands, a depreciation of human reason in a voluptuous relaxation into God's inscrutable omnipotence. The borders between the possible and the impossible, the natural and the supernatural are allowed to blur almost to extinction, while religious practice aims at collective self-intoxication with a trance-like, strangely sentimental "loss of self" into the Deity. In brief, the tide has turned against the intellect which is prized only as a regulatory tool for legal organization and theological codification, leading to a conspicuous advance in logical method and logical order as applied to theological reasoning[20]—and the stage has been set for a resurgence of the "popular" into the *Bildungswelt*.

To avoid misunderstandings: popular motifs had always been allowed to penetrate into areas where they did not seem to endanger the total structure. Eschatology, where unsifted traditions from many sources had from the earliest times been admitted, is a case in point. So are Bedouin tales and the sailors' yarns grouped about Sinbâd, or again the sailors' songs to which Ja'far invites Hârûn ar-Rashîd to listen in order to relieve his gloomy mood. But standard theology and standard literature (and in particular, poetry as its most highly valued sector) refused permeation by popular motifs and popular language, or assimilation to the vernacular in thinking and phrasing. The fights between Mu'tazila and "orthodoxy," the Ḥanbalites and their theological opponents, made concrete to the masses by the "uncreate Koran" and the "anthropomorphic" representation of the deity, both, if in varying degree, irksome to the intelligentsia and the theologian sensitized to philosophy, clearly exhibit as one of their aspects the conflict between the popular and the "educated" experience of the Muslim God. The literalism of the masses and their need for a comprehensible and, as it were, tangible deity, championed by the Ḥanbalites and transposed by them into a refusal to modify God's self-statements in Revelation, lost out on the level of credal formulation but won in the Islam as it was actually lived, into which popular sentiment forced, moreover, the veneration of the Prophet, the cult of the saints and the toler-

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[20] This advance in systematic theology is connected with the work of al-Ghazzâlî. W. M. Watt, *Muslim Intellectual. A Study of al-Ghazali* (Edinburgh, 1962), pp. 120–123, has devoted a convincing section to the effect which the consistent utilization of syllogistic logic has had on al-Ghazzâlî's presentation of essentially the same theological *topoi* that his teacher al-Juwainî (d. 1085) had discussed. The simultaneous relaxing of rational scrutiny of data and improving of the technical mastery of rational argument has its parallels elsewhere. Sir Thomas Browne exults, in 1635, in the humiliation of reason by insisting on the ultimate irrelevance of its findings, an attitude not too far removed from that of al-Ghazzâlî: "Yet I do believe all this is true, which my Reason would persuade me to be false; and this I think no vulgar part of Faith, to believe a thing not only above but contrary to Reason, and against the Arguments of our proper Senses." *Religio medici*, ed. by G. Keynes (London, 1928), p. 15; quoted by P. Garai, "Le cartésianisme et le classicisme anglais," *Revue de littérature comparée*, XXXI (1957), pp. 373–387, at p. 387.

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ation of a massive concept of sacredness or *baraka* as a religious source of strength and security tested and handed down by countless generations, pagan, Christian, and Islamicized.

Literature, however, appeared to be able to hold the fort against any opposition to the increasing alienation from life and language of the surrounding reality. The code of admissible forms stood unchallenged, the listing of motifs admissible into poetry maintained the deceptive rigidity of the social register. But the substance proved more flexible than the form. And even the form would suffer itself to be enriched when the Spanish fashion of strophic poetry—long since paralleled by popular song in the East—attracted the attention of Eastern littérateurs who wrote and collected *azjāl* and *mu-washshahāt* and worked out their theory;[21] popular narrative is once again taken note of (to be incorporated into that elastic receptacle, the *Arabian Nights*); even the Shadow Play arouses the interest of at least one intellectual, Ibn Dāniyāl (d. 1310?), who has left us the only specimen of the genre, almost three hundred years after the *khayāl* had first been mentioned by a Spanish writer.[22] The truly popular novel of the type of the *Sīrat 'Antar* or the *Sīrat Baibars* or the tale of the Banū Hilāl enjoyed its golden age, but never achieved acceptance by the *Bildungsschicht*. On the borderline between religion and literature an increasing number of edifying tracts recording the deeds of the saints and the virtues of the Prophet is provided; and the sermon, which since the tenth century has become a genre by itself, takes on a popular tone, as witness the *mau'izāt* of Ibn al-Jauzī (d. 1200) with their generous sprinkling of suggestive love poetry and drastic descriptions of the Hereafter.

More significantly still, the *maqāma*, the narrated dramatic sketch in rhymed prose, the delight of the philologists and barely understandable without a commentary explaining its lexicological and grammatical finesses, its recondite allusions and chiselled structure, chooses popular themes or incidents as the skeleton for its exquisite verbalizations; stylized scenes from "real" life, urban and tribal, are portrayed, manners and mores which would never have been reflected in standard poetry are depicted or touched upon, objects much below the dignity of traditional literature are mentioned or discussed,[23] and the vulgar is kept at bay only by the recherché artistry of expression and by the superiority which the author maintains by means of the discreet humor in which the tale, delicate as a spider's web, is steeped. The greatest master of the *maqāma*, Harīrī of Baṣra (d. 1122), is barely dead when a realistic trend, hardly separable from a plunge into popular taste, makes itself felt in Arab

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[21] Ibn Sanā al-Mulk (d. 1211), Ṣafī ad-Dīn al-Ḥillī (d. probably 1349). The use of *azjāl* in the vernacular for the expression of mystical piety by the Andalusian poet 'Alī ash-Shushtarī (d. in Egypt in 1269) is characteristic for the style of the times; on Shushtarī, cf. L. Massignon, "Recherches sur Shushtari, poète andalou enterré à Damiette," *Mélanges offerts à William Marçais* (Paris, 1950), pp. 251–276 (with further references).

[22] Ibn Ḥazm, *Akhlāq*, no. 83; cf. the note of the editor, p. 30.

[23] Cf., e.g., Hamadānī, *Maqāmāt*, nos. 12 (*Zechprellerei*) and 22 (on which, see F. Gabrieli, "La *maqāma madīriyya* di al-Hamadhānī," Acc. Lincei, Cl. scienze morali, storiche e filologiche, *Rendiconti*, 8th Ser., IV/11–12 [1949], pp. 509–515); Harīrī, *Maqāmāt*, nos. 40, 47, and 49.

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painting. In fact, it is his very *maqāmāt* which for two centuries at least offer attractive subjects to the miniaturist.

It is difficult not to note the simultaneous trend toward realism in Byzantine art that makes itself felt from the late eleventh century on.[24] Although here and there influences may be posited—thus the Eastern Byzantine school of Edessa, Mardin, and Diyārbakir appears to have had its effect on ʿIrāqī book illustration of the thirteenth century[25]—what parallelisms do exist are to be accounted for rather by popular modes of feeling and perception breaking through the cracking shell of the *Bildungstradition*. Decentralization, the victory of the provincial aristocracy, and the rise in the capital of artisans and merchants may have given an impulse to the vernacular (or rather, semi-vernacular) literature so characteristic of the era of the Komnenoi and their successors—the classicism of Anna Komnene notwithstanding. In itself, the "Platonic Renaissance" of a Psellos, who incidentally concerned himself with the proverbs of the people,[26] constituted a far from popular movement; even less did it encourage absorption of popular themes; but as cause and symptom of a loosening of an earlier tradition, this movement may be considered to be in a certain relationship to the advance of popular and foreign modes of expression. *Barlaam and Joasaph, Stephanites and Ichnelates*, the *Syntipas*, but also a tale like the *Ptocholeon* and, in a different manner, *Belthandros and Chrysantza* bespeak a growing community of taste throughout the Byzantine and the Arab Near East to which the *Bildungsschicht* reacted—the translators of Oriental novels were without exception writers of high education—but which was due to the ascendency gained by an aesthetic sensibility essentially unrelated to the classical impulse in either Constantinople or Baghdad.

The development is even more tangible in the religious sphere, where, in addition, a correlation with the Latin West is noted. The focussing of piety on Muḥammad is paralleled by the focussing of piety on Jesus and the dominance gained in Islam by hope and love over fear in man's relation to God recurs in Latin Christendom as does the channeling of the religious life into lay orders of various kinds. For the evolution of Muslim piety consists essentially in a shift of motivation from the *mysterium tremendum*, God's majesty, to the *mysterium fascinosum*, God's grace and loving kindness, or, in the terms favored by the Muslims themselves, from the Lord's *jalāl* to his *jamāl*. The same shift accompanies the revival of enthusiastic piety in Byzantium toward the end of the tenth century and the growth of sacramental mysticism in late mediaeval Catholicism, precisely as it did later the rise of Hassidism among East European Jewry.

This shift in the religious mood conditions a reorientation of Muslim doctrinal thinking where, in the key problems of God's essence and righteousness, the relation of finite man with the transcendental God replaces the integrity of the divine transcendence as the primary concern. In other words, man and

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[24] Cf. H. W. Haussig, *Kulturgeschichte von Byzanz* (Stuttgart, 1959), p. 375.
[25] *Ibid*, p. 373.
[26] Cf. K. Krumbacher, *op. cit.*, p. 905.

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his needs take the place of God and His statutes as the vantage point of theological reasoning.[37]

The basis of this unconscious rapprochement of mood and thought in Islam and Greek Christendom is in the two faiths' concept of man. If one passes from Western Christianity to Greek Christianity and further to Islam, the fundamental outlook on man becomes increasingly optimistic. The man whom Roman (and Protestant) Christianity endeavors to save is corrupted by original sin; only through the mediation of God's self-sacrifice in Jesus is a possibility for reparation, for salvation, restored. The relation between God and man, congenitally sinful and deficient, is above all a legal one. The fulfillment of the law, man's justification before God, is his primary task. God may be apprehended through His love; but this love makes itself felt primarily by His departing from absolute justice. For sin to us is more than anything else a violation of the ordained relationship between God and man. Greek orthodox piety is much less penetrated by the implications of the Fall. Man is created after God's image; this *Ebenbildlichkeit* confers on him an inalienable nobility which sin may tarnish, distort, and diminish, but never completely remove. Sin is like a sickness, a loss of substance; the redemption, a restoration to the original fullness of being. Such restoration is brought about not so much by God's justice as by his unfathomable and infinite love. The confidence in His mercy and His *philanthropia*, His love of man, is without limits; penitence and contrition, service rather than works, will secure God's gladly bestowed pardon. The Eastern Christian will not be justified, he will be sanctified, he will become like the angels while still walking this earth; God's mercy will let him experience here a new spiritual birth from which he will emerge closer and ever closer to the divinity itself. Islam, finally, does not recognize in man any fundamental moral deformation; it does not perceive in him any congenital defilement, only weakness and most of all, ignorance. While man is unable to find the right path for himself, Revelation and Sacred Tradition contain the information which he must heed and apply to assure his rescue. Adam is seen to have accepted a covenant with the Lord that establishes the rights of God over man and constitutes disobedience the crucial failing. But God's commands are capable of execution and, while the realization of his ultimate nothingness before his Maker may fill man with fear of his predestined fate, surrender to God and His Prophet and integration into the community of True Believers more than balance his apprehensions; for has not the Lord Himself assured

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[37] The views suggested in this and the preceding paragraph restate with slight modifications what this writer has proposed in his study "The World of Islam: The Face of the Antagonist" in M. Clagett, G. Post, and R. Reynolds (eds.), *Twelfth-Century Europe and the Foundations of Modern Society* (Madison, Wis., 1961), pp. 189–211, at p. 203. An exposé of the religious significance and function of fear and hope, both included among the "states" (*aḥwāl*) vouchsafed the wanderer on the mystic path in the classical manuals of Ṣūfism, was given by Ghazzālī, *Iḥyāʾ*, bk. XXXIII, now accessible in the English translation by W. McKane, *Al-Ghazālī's Book of Fear and Hope* (Leiden, 1962), who, in his Introduction, attempts to systematize Ghazzālī's views. Note in the text, pp. 6–7, the theologian's statement that "action on account of hope is of a higher order than action on account of fear, because the creatures who are nearest to God are those who love Him most," and love is under the power of hope.

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the faithful that no soul will be made to bear more than it is able to bear? Like
the Western Christian, the Muslim must give God satisfaction; but unlike him,
he faces his Creator unburdened by an inherited rent in his soul and conscious
of his membership in the community to which God has confided Truth at its
most perfect and its most complete.[28]

In restoring its place in religion to man's ability to transcend himself in
the unitive experience (without change of essense or assimilation to the essence
of the deity, as the more cautious of the mystics were careful to explain),
mysticism introduced a more joyful mood into Islamic piety, a mood that is
perhaps characteristic of all mysticism. It is Martin Luther who has described
the fundamental mood of the mystic as *blanda, tranquilla, devota*. The state of
the Perfect is joy. Gnosis creates *chara* and *eschate makariotes*.[29] And this joy
is buttressed by the strengthened confidence in God's willingness to accept
the effort of the believer, to cooperate not only with holiness attained, but
with the earnest strivings for self-sanctification. It remains for man to purify
his soul, to combat sin and despair, to resist Satan in all his disguises; but in
the end he will not have fought in vain. That presumption of victory which
is so conspicuously absent in Augustinian Christianity,[30] and in the early
Muslim ascetics, the Ṣūfī shared with the Fathers of the Greek Church.

With sainthood becoming a possibility not infrequently realized, the Greek
and the Muslim theologians had to concern themselves with its signs and,
so to speak, its technical aspects. How, for instance, is the saint himself and
how are his disciples to know that his visions are not mere fancies, *phantasiai,
auhām*? St. Symeon emphasized the unspeakable joy that accompanied the
optasia, a symptom of genuineness also accepted in some Sufic circles. More
objective was the distinction between imaginative and intellectual illumination,
which alone was the result of communion with the divine. For imagination,
taking many forms, "serves as bridge for the demons, over which these murder-
ous miscreants cross and recross, commune and mix with the soul and make it
a hive for many drones—the abode of barren and passionate thoughts."

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[28] For the concept of man in Byzantine Christianity, cf., e.g., E. Benz, *Geist und Leben der Ostkirche*
(Hamburg, 1957), esp. pp. 21 and 46. In it survives the ancient concept according to which the good
is identified with what conforms to nature, *kata physin*, and the bad with what is contrary to it, *para
physin*. The Monophysite Isaiah (d. 488) has coined from this usage the expressions *he kataphysis*
the good, and *he paraphysis*, the bad, expressions which afford suggestive evidence of the survival of
the concept; cf. I. Hausherr, "L'imitation du Christ chez les Byzantins," *Mélanges offerts au R. P.
Ferdinand Cavallera* (Toulouse, 1948), pp. 231–259, at pp. 238–239. To St. Symeon the goodness of
human nature follows from man's being created in God's image. The mystery of the human condition
is in the fact that, despite this essentially unalterable goodness, man is generally and totally subject
to sin as a consequence of Adam's fall. Adam's primary failing was *oiesis*, arrogancy, an overrating
of his capabilities. The essence of sin, however, is to be found neither in any specific commission nor
omission. It is rather non-participation in the divine nature of Him Who, as Jesus Christ, has
hung for us on the cross. In other words, it is imperfect being rather than an imperfection in the
being of man as such. Cf. H. A. Biedermann, *Das Menschenbild bei Symeon dem Jüngeren dem Theologen*
(949–1022) (Würzburg, 1949), pp. 23–25; 32–33; 37–38; p. 24, note 4, Biedermann recalls the axiom
of Western scholasticism according to which *omne ens in quantum est ens bonum est*.

[29] Euagrios Pontikos, *fl*. 363–392.

[30] Not so much, however, in Thomaean Christianity, in which the Aristotelian and Stoic sense of a
harmonious relation between nature and truth buttresses a more optimistic view of human possibilities
and encourages a wider outreach into the universe by self-confident man.

Therefore "keep your mind empty of colour, image, form, appearance, quality, and quantity."[31]

In words that could have been taken from a Muslim mystic, Niketas Stethatos (wrote 1054), disciple and biographer of St. Symeon, describes the sign, *semeion*, of perfection, *teleiotes*, as the true gnosis of God from which will spring wisdom, insight into the nature of God, and correct action; furthermore, visions unveiling the divine mysteries, the desire for union with Christ, and the vision of the divine light of the glory of God, the *naẓar Allāh* of the Ṣūfī. To overcome the possible limitations of the individual with regard to visionary experience, Hesychasts (the term goes back to Patristic times) or Quietists offered a method of contemplation which was brought to Mount Athos from Mount Sinai by Gregory Sinaita during the reign of Andronikos II (1282–1328). Before him, the monk Nikephoros (*ca.* 1200), in his book on "Sobriety and the Guarding of the Heart" had already endeavored to set forth "the science of the heavenly life, or rather a method, to reach without labor, *akopos*, and without sweat, *anidroti*, the haven of passionlessness, *apatheia*."[32] It is difficult not to take this program as a tacit contradiction of St. Symeon's saying which stands in the old tradition of identifying the ascetic life with effort, labor, pain, and combat.[33] "Inasmuch as God wishes to be known by us, so He reveals Himself [incidentally, a recurrent motif of Muslim mysticism], and inasmuch as He reveals Himself so is He seen and known by those who are

[31] Kallistos and Ignatios, *Directions to Hesychasts*, nos. 64 and 73, in *Writings from the Philokalia on Prayer of the Heart*, trans. by E. Kadloubovsky and G. E. H. Palmer (London, 1951), pp. 234 and 239; cf. Najm al-Dīn Kubrà's (d. 1221) analysis of visual and auditive experience in F. Meier, *Die Fawāʾiḥ al-ǧamāl wa-fawātiḥ al-ǧalāl des Naǧm ad-Dīn al-Kubrā* (Wiesbaden, 1957). pp. 241–243.

Greek orthodox theology considers the grace of the *noera proseuche* accessible to all who take upon themselves the necessary ascetic preparation. The differentiation between the individuals lies in the measure of the gifts of grace which God accords. Consequently, one may say, a psycho-physical technique as a means (but not more) becomes almost indispensable. Cf. G. Wunderle, *Zur Psychologie des hesychastischen Gebets*, 2nd ed. (Würzburg, 1949), pp. 13–14; 20–30 (detailed presentation of the bodily techniques and their psycho-physical basis). Cf. also pp. 63 and 66, the emphasis on the fact that everybody has both the possibility and the duty to develop his mystical experience. For the integration of breathing exercise and religious experience, cf. John Klimakos (d. *ca.* 670–680), *Scala paradisi*, gradus 27: "Let the remembrance of Jesus be united with your breathing; then you will realise the fruit of *hesychia*" (quoted by Wunderle, *op. cit.*, p. 22, from MPG, LXXXVIII, 1112 C).

[33] Trans. *Writings from the Philokalia*, p. 22. The literal translation of Hesychasts as Quietists should not be understood as equating the passivity of Western Quietism with the Hesychastic attitude in which the ascetic is considered as laboring actively in the *noera proseuche*, the *geistige Gebet*, toward readying himself for the experience of "divinizing" grace; cf. Wunderle, *op. cit.*, p. 31. The contrast is made very clear by the formulation of I. Hausherr, "L'imitation....," p. 273: "La grâce diffère la réalisation de la similitude parfaite [after the first assimilation to the divine *apeikonisma* has been granted through baptism], parce qu'elle veut l'opérer avec nous. La spiritualité grecque n'a rien de commun avec le quiétisme. Elle ignore la notion protestante d'un salut par la foi sans les oeuvres. La nécessité de la collaboration humaine s'affirme partout...." Nikolaos Kabasilas, MPG, CL, 720D–721D, clearly distinguishes man's contribution to the attainment of the supernatural life from God's contribution (τὰ μὲν παρὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ / τὰ δὲ παρ' ἡμῶν), even as the Muslim mystics distinguish the "states," *aḥwāl*, descending into the heart from God, from the "stations," *maqāmāt*, that are reached by the exertion of the seekers; cf., e.g., Hujwīrī, *Kashf al-mahjūb*, trans. by R. A. Nicholson (Leiden-London, 1911), pp. 180–183. The "sobriety" of the Hesychastic writers is the state of the soul when it has been purified and "simplified"—one is reminded of the Plotinian *haplosis*—and thus opened to the "intoxicating" enthusiasm of grace. The metaphor goes back to (and beyond) Philo's *nephalios methe, sobria ebrietas*, and to the New Testament as well; cf. I Thess. 5:6–7: γρηγορῶμεν καὶ νήφωμεν... καὶ οἱ μεθυσκόμενοι νυκτὸς μεθύουσιν. For "secular" use, cf. Psellos, *Chronographia*, VI, 40: ὁ σωφρόνως ἐνθουσιάζων νοῦς.

[39] Cf. I Hausherr, "Opus Dei," *Orientalia Christiana Periodica*, XII (1947), pp. 195–216, at p. 206.

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worthy. But no one can be worthy of this experience until he unites with the Holy Spirit, having previously acquired by labor and sweat a heart that is pure, simple, and contrite."[34] In a manner reminiscent of Nikephoros, St. Gregory Palamas (d. 1359) was to explain that the *operatio Spiritus sancti, energeia tou Pneumatos*, is obtained by the "scientific and incessant invocation of the Lord Jesus"—where the designation of the method as "scientific" deserves to be emphasized.

The individualistic method of the Hesychasts to attain the *ḥāl*, the unitive state, which was to develop into the idiorhythmic ("living by one's own rhythm"), as contrasted with the coenobitic ("based on community living") form of monasticism toward the end of the fourteenth century, was preceded in time by the more collectivistic method, *ṭarīqa*, of the Ṣūfī orders, also called *ṭarīqāt*, that began to consolidate in the eleventh century. The techniques developed by these orders—differing from those of the Hesychasts by the absence of the latter's characteristic omphaloscopy—very nearly guaranteed the mystic at least a partial progress toward his goal. The technique stresses the *dhikr*, the incessant remembrance of God through the pronunciation of His name, corresponding to the Hesychastic *mneme Iesou*. The *dhikr*, like the *mneme*, is accompanied by certain bodily movements or postures and controlled breathing.[35] Its development from a preparatory method, a psycho-physical

[34] *Precepts*, no. 159 in *Writings from the Philokalia*, p. 135. St. Symeon concludes from God's will to communicate Himself to man that the beatific vision of God may be attained even in this life; see Biedermann, *op. cit.*, p. 94. While man must cooperate in the *Gnadenwirkung Gottes*, the attainment of the beatific vision is an effect of grace and only of grace; for references, cf. *ibid.*, pp. 58, 72, 89ff., and 94–95. The beatific vision "divinizes" man; St. Symeon has said: "Man I am by nature; god, by grace;" *ibid.*, p. 116. Not much later, Saint Bernard (1090–1153) was to speak of the *deificatio* resulting from the blessedness of internal communion; cf. J. Lindblom, *Prophecy in Ancient Israel* (Philadelphia, 1962), p. 303. Throughout Islam and Christendom the rise of mystical longing entails a certain reserve toward intellectualism and scientific effort to which intuition and approach to the object through love are preferred. Saint Peter Damianus (d. 1072) speaks of the *sancta simplicitas*, that detachment from cognitive knowledge which allows one to use it without becoming its slave; cf. J. Leclercq, F. Vandenbroucke and L. Bouyer, *La spiritualité du moyen âge* (Paris, 1961), p. 145. The saying of 'Abdallaṭīf al-Baghdādī (d. 1231), renowned as physician, scientist, and traveller, that God never yet selected an ignorant saint or a foolish prophet, is understandable only when seen as protest against a powerful trend of his times. [The passage is included, from the unpublished manuscript of 'Abdallaṭīf's *Metaphysics*, in F. Rosenthal, *Texte zum Fortleben der Antike im Islam*, chap. 18 [soon to appear in the *Bibliothek des Morgenlandes*, Zurich].) The fear of intellectualism and "secular" science never did completely die down in Christianity, either Latin or Greek, from Tertullian's (d. *ca.* 220) fight against *curiositas* (for the context of which, cf. now J.-P. Brisson, *Autonomisme et christianisme dans l'Afrique romaine de Septime Sévère à l'invasion vandale* [Paris, 1958], pp. 361 and 362–363) to Saint Gregory Palamas' *Hyper tōn hieros hesychazonton* (written from 1338 to 1341), ed. by J. Meyendorff, *Grégoire Palamas: Défense des saints hésychastes* (Louvain, 1959), esp. Triad I, *Quaestio* 1 (with Reply), vol. I, pp. 4–69 (text and translation)—to suggest examples from East and West.

[35] Cf. Meier, *op. cit.*, pp. 202–205. To Diadochos of Photike (fifth century) the incessant *mneme Theou* is already a guarantee of Jesus' presence; cf. M. Viller and K. Rahner, *Aszese und Mystik in der Väterzeit* (Freiburg i.B., 1939) pp. 192 and 226 (quoted by Wunderle, *op. cit.*, p. 23, note 1). Wunderle, *op. cit.*, p. 47, speaks of the "Verlebendigung der Gegenwart Gottes" which the *mneme Theou* is to bring about. Care must be taken not to attribute the same meaning to what outwardly appears to be the same action. Thus, e.g., the Ibāḍiyya practiced well into the eleventh century the endless recitation of Koranic texts and of pious formulae in their "circles" (*ḥalqa*) without, however, using these *exercitia* as a preparation for mystical experiences; cf. R. Rubinacci, "Un antico documento di vita cenobitica musulmana," Istituto Universitario Orientale di Napoli, *Annali*, N.S., X (1961), pp. 37–78, at p. 52. The time was not yet when, to quote Gibbon's somewhat unsympathetic description, "the lord of nations submitted to fast, and pray, and turn round in endless rotation with the fanatics, who mistook the giddiness of the head for the illumination of the spirit." (*The History of the Decline*

readying of the soul for the divine mercy, to a procedure that carries its effectiveness in itself, is symptomatic of the vulgarization of the mystical movement between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries.[36]

The old idea of continuous prayer is re-expounded almost simultaneously by Niketas Stethatos and Ghazzālī and implemented in the *monologia* of the name Jesus and the ecstasy inducing *dhikr Allāh*. "Remembrance of God or mental prayer," says Gregory Sinaita, "is higher than all other works; as the love of God, it stands at the head of all virtues."[37] "Mechanics" of spiritual progress are established. "Thirst and vigil render the heart contrite and a contrite heart produces tears."[38] And "nothing pleases God more than sufferings or bodily privations for His sake; and nothing attracts His loving kindness more than tears."[39] By this kind of self-control and concentration away from the external world, that purity may be attained "which alone assures the faithful of the great step that makes us pass from understanding after the measure of man to understanding after the measure of God."[40]

In judging the popularity of *dhikr* practice in Islam the absence of sacraments from Muslim doctrine must be remembered. The sacrament provides a regularized means of lessening the distance between divinity and believer without impairing the categorical distinction of their essences. In the words of Nikolaos

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and Fall of the Roman Empire, ed. by J. B. Bury [London-New York, 1896 ff.], VII, p. 140, with reference to Murād II [1421–1451].)

[36] Cf. the study by L. Gardet, "Mystique naturelle et mystique surnaturelle en Islam," *Recherches de science religieuse*, XXXVII (1950), pp. 321–365, esp. at pp. 322–323 and 350–363. The practice of the uninterrupted *mneme Iesou* enters the Russian Church in the early twelfth century; reportedly the first monk to carry out this method of devotion was Nikola-Svyatosha (born as Prince Svyatoslav Davidović of Chernigov), who lived in holy orders from 1106 to his death in 1142/43. Cf. I. Smolitsch, *Russisches Mönchtum. Entstehung, Entwicklung und Wesen*. 988–1917 (Würzburg, 1953), p. 65. It deserves notice that both in Islam and in Latin Christendom the eleventh, and especially the twelfth, century witnessed the rise of religious confraternities; for the Christian developments, cf., e.g., G. Le Bras, "Les confréries chrétiennes. Problèmes et propositions," *Revue historique de droit français et étranger*, XXXIX–XL (1940–1941), pp. 310–363, esp. at p. 317. Rubinacci, *op. cit.*, pp. 40–45, presents an investigation of the growth of *koinobia* in Islam from the end of the eighth through the fourteenth century, and points, p. 39, to the similarities between the typology of asceticism in Christianity and Islam (with refs.).

The growing frequency, in the three communities, but especially in Islam and in Latin Christianity, of ecstatic experiences, visions, and (in the West) private revelations as in Rhenanic mysticism of the fourteenth century, stimulates everywhere a certain separation between the theologian as the specialist of an independent science and the *spiritualis* who cultivates his experience without regard to dogmatics; cf., e.g., *Spiritualité*, pp. 425, 446, and 473–474. Similar experiences give prominence to similar theological problems. The *visio Dei* as a direct and immediate perception exercises Latin mystics as it did Hesychasts and Ṣūfīs. In 1336, Benedict XII, a contemporary of Barlaam and Palamas, finds it necessary to support the "moderates" in a special *constitutio*; cf. *Spiritualité*, p. 481.

[37] *Instructions to Hesychasts*, no. 7, in *Writings from the Philokalia*, p. 80; a summary of Hesychastic technique by Kallistos and Ignatios, *Directions*, no. 95, *ibid.*, pp. 265–266. The *locus classicus* for *hesychia* in Saint John Klimakos, MPG, LXXXVIII, 1112C, cf. *supra*, p. 107, note 31 where it is defined as the incessant cult of God and the continuous presence before Him; the remembrance of Jesus, united with the rhythm of the breath, brings the realization of the value of this *hesychia*. John's spiritual pupil, the abbot Hesychios (not Hesychios of Jerusalem!), offers in the seventh century in his *Centuriae* the first systematic development of the "Prayer of Jesus" (which Hesychios was the first to call by this name). In the West, it seems, the Lotharingian Grimlaic (tenth century) brought back into view the problem of the *oratio continua*; cf. *Spiritualité*, pp. 142, 658–659, and 680–684 (for later developments).

[38] St. John Klimakos as quoted in *Directions*, no. 32, *ibid.*, p. 205.

[39] St. Symeon as quoted in *Directions*, no. 30, *ibid.*, p. 202.

[40] Tatakis, *op. cit.*, p. 276.

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Kabasilas (d. 1371), the sacraments are windows through which the rays of justice enter into the dark room of this world. It is true, however, that the dogmatic regularization of the sacraments, or *mysteria,* as the Greek Church would say, renders them less significant to the religious hero or the religious specialist who will strive for a more immediate, a more "private" path of access to the divinity such as the techniques suggested by the Hesychastic monks.

It is surprising how long Hesychasm managed to stay out of doctrinal controversy. Dogmatic difficulties arose when the monks insisted on the un-createdness of the light which they claimed to see and participate in during their visions, and which they identified with the light on Mount Tabor in which Christ had been transfigured. This uncreated light is strongly reminiscent of the uncreated Word, the Koran, of the Muslims; both doctrines are examples of "emotional" or experiential theology and both touch, in their own way, on the problem of oneness of the divine essence in relation to its qualities or energies. Consequently, where the Muslim orthodox are accused of *shirk,* of "associating" another deity, the eternal uncreated Word, with Allah, Gregory Palamas and his followers were combatted as Ditheists, believers in two Gods. It is characteristic of the underlying attitudes of Western and Eastern piety that, in Islam, the advocates of the uncreated Koran, and, in the Byzantine Church, the advocates of the uncreated Tabor light carried the day, while in the West the consistent application of the distinction between God's essence and His operation—through His word, for instance—seems to remove the difficulty to the satisfaction of the believers. The rejection by the Greek Church of theological considerations of this kind that were actually proffered by the Western-minded, the *Latinophrones,* in its midst, is, however, symptomatic not only of a different basic religiosity, but of national and cultural tensions between the "Latins" and the "Greeks," whose bitterness made compromise of a predominantly Latin cast unacceptable to the Byzantine masses.

Why then, one may ask, did the release of kindred forces fail in the end to lead to a shared outlook on the universe, a common mentality among Byzantine and Muslim? Why were they not like two pillars holding up the same arch? The causes clearly are many, but, from the point of view of this investigation, what may have mattered most in reversing the psychological convergence was the recrystallization of a firmly circumscribed theological and philosophical (also, literary and artistic) culture which the Byzantines achieved not too long before their political collapse at the hands of the Turks. This synthesis was oriented to the West, that is to say, its principal formulations were evolved in dispute with Western theology through what may well be called an intellectual civil war. Once again recourse was had to antiquity; but the scope of community life had become too narrow for this recourse to become effective on its home-ground. The choice between political survival and spiritual survival as Greek Christians had become a permanent *krisis* absorbing what strength could be spared from the struggle for an independent existence. The break with the Christian tradition and the self-identification with paganism proposed by Gemistos Plethon (d. 1452) is, to me, important mostly as a yardstick of

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spiritual uncertainty; granted its boldness and intellectual grandeur, its inappropriateness in terms of a redemptive doctrine for Byzantine Hellenism gives it something of the sound of Nero's fiddling. The Hellenism of Mistra— hostile as it was to the essentials of Byzantine civilization—would serve as the ideology of a cultural and political renewal of peninsular Greece. Its efflorescence was confined to the brief span between a "no more" and a "not yet." It lacked the demographic base and the appeal below the *Bildungsschicht* to stand off the Turks after the emperor in Constantinople had lost control. In retrospect, the true significance of Plethon's teachings lies not in their content, but in the ease with which he offered his postulates, conflicting though they were with what was nearest to his people's heart and what was to hold them together past political extinction.[41] This assertion of human independence, of man's choice of spiritual affiliation, is one of the features of that "Latin" humanism which was to separate Islam and the West for good and all; as long, that is, as the East remained unwilling to restyle and redefine itself more or less disguisedly in the Western image. This attitude was a fitting accompaniment to the enlargement of the physical universe by discovery, geographical and astronomical, and by the determined aspiration toward interpretation and control;[42] an accompaniment also to the willingness to exchange life in an approximately known world for life in an accurately known one (which, oddly enough, also meant the exchange of total for asymptotic truth), to the change from the dominance of aural to the dominance of ocular sensibility, in short, to the hammering out of a universe of ceaseless growth and change, of ceaseless redefinition of man, society, and God, each and all, as it were, both manipulatable in history and complementary absolutes in essence, with man seeking to overpower God for the benefit of society and to yield to Him for the benefit of his soul. The piety of the East would have been meaningless to the apostles of the incipient modern age even had they been able to comprehend it—not least because of the gifts which the exiles from Constantinople turned Turkish (some of them perhaps exiles also from Byzantine civilization) had brought to the enthusiastic adventurers of the Quattrocento.

[41] The flowering of Hellenism in Mistra, as well as the earlier Hellenic revival in the thirteenth century when Constantinople's control had been crushed by the Latins, is an extremely significant phenomenon for the assessment of the relation between political power and cultural rise. F. Masai, to whom we owe the most recent comprehensive analysis of Pletho and his times, has the great merit of being fully aware of the connections which exist between regional autonomy and regional culture as against the requirements of imperial ideology; cf. *Pléthon et le platonisme de Mistra* (Paris, 1956), e.g., pp. 28–37. After the Turkish conquest it was the Orthodox Church, the successor to the Empire, that continued to provide an identity for the Greek-speaking world until the establishment of the Kingdom of Greece made feasible another "kleingriechisches," antiquity-oriented revival.

[42] This aspiration did not stop even at Scripture. Honorius of Autun (early twelfth century) had already asserted: *Saepius mos Ecclesiae mutatus legitur, et secundum tempus variavit stylum suum Spiritus sanctus* (quoted by H. de Lubac, *Exégèse médiévale*, I [Paris, 1959], 17). And Bernard of Chartres (Chancellor of the famous Cathedral School from 1119–1124) declared *veritas* to be a *filia temporis*; cf. J. Le Goff, *Les intellectuels au moyen âge* (Paris, 1962), p. 19. The words which André Malraux, *La tentation de l'Occident* (Paris, 1926), p. 26, has a Chinese write to his French friend well describe the attitude toward the world into which man grew during the Renaissance. "La création sans cesse renouvelée par l'action d'un monde destiné à l'action, voilà ce qui me semblait alors l'âme de l'Europe, dont la soumission à la volonté de l'homme dominait les formes." Cf. also, p. 95, the reference of the Chinese to the Europeans as "une race soumise à la preuve du geste, et promise par là au plus sanglant destin."

THEOPHANES AND THE ARABIC HISTORICAL TRADITION: SOME INDICATIONS OF INTERCULTURAL TRANSMISSION*

Lawrence I. Conrad

The *Chronographia* of the Byzantine monk Theophanes occupies a place of special importance in both the history and historiography of the Near East in the seventh and eighth centuries.[1] From a historical point of view, the first half of the *Chronographia*, from A.D. 284 to 602 (de Boor, pp.3-290), is of limited value since it for the most part reproduces the writings of authors whose works are still extant.[2] But Prokopios and his

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* Versions of this paper were presented at a May 1985 meeting of the informal study group of the History Department at the School of Oriental and African Studies (University of London), and subsequently at the Second International Congress on Greek and Arabic Studies, Delphi (2 July 1985). In addition to the numerous comments and suggestions received on these occasions, I have benefitted from opportunities to discuss various points with Patricia Crone, Cyril Mango, and especially my colleague Vivian Nutton at the Wellcome Institute.

[1] On Theophanes and the *Chronographia*, see Karl Krumbacher, *Geschichte der byzantinischen Litteratur*, 2nd edition in collaboration with A.Ehrhard and H.Gelzer (Munich, 1897), I, 342-47; Maria Elisabetta Colonna, *Gli storia bizantini del IV al XV secolo* (Naples, 1956), pp.131-34; Gyula Moravcsik, *Byzantinoturcica*, 2nd edition (Berlin, 1958), I, 531-37; Herbert Hunger, *Die hochsprachliche profane Literatur der Byzantiner* (Munich, 1978), I, 334-39. For this study I have used Carl de Boor's edition of the Greek text in the Teubner Series, *Theophanis Chronographia*, I (Leipzig, 1883); also the *Chronographia tripertita*, the Latin translation by the pontifical librarian Anastasius (ca. 873-75), edited by de Boor in *Theophanis Chronographia*, II (Leipzig, 1885), pp.31-346. The translation by Harry Turtledove, *The Chronicle of Theophanes: An English Translation of Anni Mundi 6095-6305 (A.D. 603-813), with Introduction and Notes* (Philadelphia, 1982), is often erroneous, imprecise, and overly exegetical in its rendering of the text, and the notes fail to address most of the important historical and historiographical questions that arise in Theophanes' narrative.

[2] If the hypotheses of a number of Byzantinists, particularly L.M.Whitby,

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continuators do not carry the historical narrative beyond the dawn
of the seventh century, after which there is a hiatus in Byzantine
historiography until the time of Theophanes and his
contemporary, the patriarch Nikephoros (d. 828).[3] The latter's
Historia syntomos, however, is an uneven work that suffers
from a major gap for the period 641-68 (including all of the reign
of Constans II), becomes much less informative when the
narrative resumes with the accession of Constantine IV, and often
abbreviates material quoted more fully by Theophanes.[4] The
latter half of the *Chronographia* (de Boor, pp.290-503) is
therefore of special importance by virtue of the fact that it
provides a detailed account of a period for which little
independent evidence survives in other Greek historical sources.

Historiographical considerations are all the more important
where a historical source standing in such isolation is concerned.

prove to be correct, a significant exception would be the work of the so-called
Megas Chronographos, the "great chronographer". On the connections
between this work and the *Chronographia,* see Whitby's "The Great
Chronographer and Theophanes," *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies,* 8
(1982-83), pp.1-20; *idem,* "Theophanes' Chronicle Source for the Reign of
Justin II, Tiberius and Maurice (A.D. 565-602)," *Byzantion,* 53 (1983),
pp.312-45; also the earlier discussions of Edwin Patzig, "Leo Grammaticus
und seine Sippe," *Byzantinische Zeitschrift,* 3 (1894), pp.470-72;
Krumbacher, *Geschichte der byzantinischen Litteratur,* I, 350; Ernst Gerland,
"Die Grundlagen der byzantinischen Geschichtschreibung," *Byzantion,* 8
(1933), pp.100-101; Hunger, *Literatur der Byzantiner,* I, 346-47. This view
has, however, recently been challenged by Cyril Mango, "The *Breviarium* of
the Patriarch Nicephorus," in *Byzantion: aphieroma ston Andrea N.Strato*
(Athens, 1986), II, 545-48.

[3] This lapse in the Byzantine historical tradition has yet to be explained.
Some valuable observations on the matter have been made by Walter Emil
Kaegi, Jr., in his "Initial Byzantine Reactions to the Arab Conquest,"
Church History, 38 (1969), pp.148-49. Cf. also Fred McGraw Donner, *The
Early Islamic Conquests* (Princeton, 1981), pp.144-45.

[4] See Krumbacher, *Geschichte der byzantinischen Litteratur,* I, 349-52;
Colonna, *Storia bizantini,* pp.86-89; Moravcsik, *Byzantinoturcica,* I, 457-
59; Hunger, *Literatur der Byzantiner,* I, 344-47. These accounts are now all
superseded by Mango, "The *Breviarium* of the Patriarch Nicephorus,"
pp.539-52.

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This point has not been missed by historians of the Herakleian and Isaurian periods. In the late 1950s Coronna and Moravcsik could already list almost a hundred scholarly studies of Theophanes and the *Chronographia,* and critical interest in the work has not diminished since that time. The major problems are well known. As a chronicler, the author makes no pretense of embarking on the formal critical historian's task to explain and interpret the past, but rather devotes his energies to determining the order and timing of events. Hence Theophanes provides an elaborate system of comparative chronology within which relatively brief accounts of selected events are listed or noted in annalistic form. But his chronology, the core of the work, is sometimes erroneous or confused.[5] As for the historical notices, he simply strings them together with little editorial concern even for such obvious matters as the standardization of names and the elimination of contradictions. Historical accuracy is not infrequently sacrificed to other concerns. As one might expect in the empassioned furor of the iconoclast controversy, his staunchly iconodule views lead him to accept reports that go to great extremes in maligning the iconoclast emperors of the Isaurian line. Theophanes displays a generally high tolerance for exaggeration, particularly where numbers are involved. And he is a typical example of the medieval fascination with the strange and the marvelous: events such as two-mile-deep chasms opening in the earth (AM 6241; de Boor, p.426:16-26) or icebergs floating down the Bosphorus (AM 6255; de Boor, pp.434-35) are often considered in detail.

The *Chronographia* is thus an important historical text beset by numerous historiographical questions and problems. That we are by no means close to any general and definitive consensus on the work is perhaps best indicated by Cyril Mango's recent theory that the *Chronographia* was actually written by George Synkellos, and that Theophanes' role was simply that of revising

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[5] The troublesome question of chronology seems to have been definitively settled by Georg Ostrogorsky, "Die Chronologie des Theophanes im 7. und 8. Jahrhundert," *Byzantinisch-neugriechische Jahrbücher,* 7 (1928-29), pp.1-56.

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the text for publication after George's death (dated to 810-11 by most scholars, but now revised to after 813 by Mango).[6]

The "Eastern" or "Oriental" Sources of Theophanes

The question I would like to consider in this paper springs from the fact that the author of the *Chronographia,* whoever he was (I will continue to refer to him as Theophanes), primarily acted as a compiler and redactor of already available information. In the Introduction, in fact, Theophanes specifically denies that he has composed anything of his own: even the chronological system, he says, is borrowed from George Synkellos (de Boor, pp.3:9-12, 4:13-24). In other words, the contribution of Theophanes himself was limited to the selection of reports to be included, occasional comments (usually of a pious and judgmental nature), and a certain liberty in his adherence to the literal wording of his accounts.

Since the *Chronographia* can be regarded as a mélange of identifiable and separable extracts from earlier works now lost, scholars have devoted a great deal of attention to the question of Theophanes' sources. It has long been known that not all of these sources were those of the Greek historical tradition. This is in any case implicit from the great deal that the *Chronographia* has to say about events in Syria and elsewhere after these lands were lost by Byzantium during the Arab conquests of the early seventh century. Theophanes simply knows too much about such matters, and about the early history of the caliphate generally, for

[6] See Cyril Mango, "Who Wrote the Chronicle of Theophanes?," *Zbornik Radova Vizantološkog Instituta* (Ostrogorsky Festschrift), 18 (1978), pp.9-17. Mango's thesis has been criticized in I.S. Cicurov, "Feofan Ispovednik: Publikator, Redaktor, Avtor?," *Vizantijskij Vremennik,* New Series, 42 (1981), pp.78-87; also in Turtledove, xi-xii. Nevertheless, the argument raises important questions that still await satisfactory explanations. Cf. Whitby's comments in his "The Great Chronographer and Theophanes," pp.15-17; also Mango's in his collected essays (no.11 is the study cited above), *Byzantium and Its Image* (London, 1984), p.3 of the *Addenda et Corrigenda.*

it to be plausible that his sources were limited to those of the Byzantine Greek tradition.

The question of Theophanes' "Eastern" or "Oriental" sources, as they have commonly been called, has from the first focused upon possible links with the Syriac historical records of eastern Christendom. Byzantium was, after all, a truly international empire in which the languages and cultures of many groups played important roles. Translation was a common activity, and many Syriac-speaking churchmen were very well-versed in Greek. The possibility of Greek-Syriac intertransmission of historical material was thus the logical and most likely choice for primary consideration.

Already in the eighteenth century Reiske had suggested that Theophanes must have had access to information from an Eastern source for his information on Muḥammad and the history of the caliphate.[7] Krumbacher echoed this opinion in his account of Theophanes in his *Geschichte der byzantinischen Litteratur.*[8] De Boor, the author of the Teubner critical edition of the *Chronographia,* raised the issue in connection with the Καρχηδών/Χαλκηδών problem in AM 6107 (de Boor, p.301:12, 15), and noted that the narratives on the Persian and Avar wars revealed affinities with Eastern sources.[9] Mommsen found similar Eastern material when he edited the *Continuatio Isidoriana Byzantia-Arabica,* and suggested that this material, similar to that evident in Theophanes, was of Arab origin.[10] Nöldeke, in a supplementary note to Mommsen's text, developed this point and argued that the Eastern Source, as manifested in the *Continuatio Isidoriana,* was an eighth-century Monophysite

[7] His views are quoted by Krumbacher (see n.8 below). I have not been able to trace the original.

[8] Krumbacher, *Geschichte der byzantinischen Litteratur,* I, 343.

[9] Carl de Boor, "Zur Chronographie des Theophanes," *Hermes,* 25 (1890), pp.301-307.

[10] *Chronica minora saec. IV. V. VI. VII,* edited by Theodor Mommsen in *Monumenta Germaniae Historica: Auctores Antiquissimi,* XI.2 (Berlin, 1894), p.324.

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work from Syria, probably Damascus.[11]

Systematic historiographical description of the Eastern Source was the enduring achievement of E.W.Brooks. In a series of penetrating articles, he established the complex links between the *Chronographia* and the various extant Syriac chronicles, and more importantly, postulated the existence of a series of lost Syrian Christian works, in both Syriac and Greek, beginning as far back as the early eighth century and contributing material to Theophanes and those Syriac chroniclers whose works are now available for study.[12] His work was continued by Baynes, who pointed out the close affinities of the Eastern Source with the authorities used by the Egyptian Arabic historian Agapius,[13] and later by Pigulevskaja, who discussed links of the Eastern Source with the *Zuqnīn Chronicle* of the pseudo-Dionysios.[14] Most recently, Proudfoot has drawn all of the historiographical discussion together into an important (if practically unreadable) assessment of the *Chronographia*'s sources for the history of the Herakleians.[15]

These discussions demonstrated beyond all doubt that the *Chronographia* contains information, most particularly on Islamic history, which came to it from the Syriac sources. Although this meant that the transmission of historical materials that produced the *Chronographia* was a process not limited to either the Greek tradition or the Chalcedonian community, it was

[11]Theodor Nöldeke, "Epimetrum," in *Chronica minora*, pp.368-69.

[12]E.W.Brooks, "The Chronology of Theophanes, 607-775," *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, 8 (1899), pp.82, 86, 87-88, 94-97; *idem*, "The Sources of Theophanes and the Syriac Chroniclers," *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, 15 (1906), pp.578-87; *idem*, "The Sicilian Expedition of Constantine IV," *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, 17 (1908), p.458.

[13]Norman H. Baynes, "The Restoration of the Cross at Jerusalem," *English Historical Review*, 27 (1912), p.294.

[14]Nina Pigulevskaja, "Theophanes' Chronographia and the Syrian Chronicles," *Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Byzantinischen Gesellschaft*, 16 (1967), pp.55-60.

[15]Ann S. Proudfoot, "The Sources of Theophanes for the Heraclian Dynasty," *Byzantion*, 44 (1974), pp.367-439.

not immediately considered that it might have been so broad-ranging as to extend to the Arabic tradition of Islam. And indeed, there was for many years no reason to expect that this might be the case. It was long believed, on the one hand, that the Arab conquests marked a sharp break and discontinuity in the history of what had once been the Classical world. The unity of the Mediterranean was broken by the wars and raids by land and sea between Christendom and Islam; cultural and economic ties were cut, and contacts across the frontiers were reduced to very low levels.[16]

Furthermore, the textual affinities so quickly discovered between the *Chronographia* and the Syriac chronicles were not so readily apparent when the Arabic sources began to appear in critical printed editions. The Syriac historical texts often contained the same kind of brief notices on Islam that Theophanes preferred, so that textual comparison was fairly simple. But in the Arabic sources, the same events were described in page upon page of detailed narrative which simply could not be collated in any meaningful way with the notices in the *Chronographia*. These Arabic narratives also presented more difficult historiographical problems. Islamic historical writing was an emerging discipline in the lifetime of Theophanes, though it was certainly well-developed by the time of his death. Coherent historical narrative on the *sīra,*or biography of the Prophet, can be traced with certainty as far back as the early eighth century A.D., but most of the other Islamic historical events described by Theophanes were by then only beginning to receive systematic historical attention. We do have Arabic reports on these events from Theophanes' own day,[17] but most of these survive only as

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[16]The most famous expression of this notion was of course the Pirenne Thesis, advanced by Henri Pirenne in his *Les Villes du Moyen Âge* (Brussels, 1927), and *Mahomet et Charlemagne* (Brussels, 1937). Cf. the important study of Bryce Lyon, *Henri Pirenne: a Biographical and Intellectual Study* (Ghent, 1974), pp.324-28, 374-75.

[17]The great historians Hishām ibn Muḥammad al-Kalbī (d. 204/819), al-Wāqidī (d. 207/823), and al-Mādaʾinī (d. 225/839), for example, were the

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quotations in later works, and in any case they tend to present the Iraqi versions of events, even of those events that had occurred in Syria.

It is now possible, and indeed essential, to reconsider this question. In recent years it has become clear that the case for the disastrously disruptive effects of the Arab conquests was much overstated.[18] Local traditions continued long after the advent of Islam, and significant contacts of various kinds placed both Byzantium and Islam in constant exposure to the influences of the other. Gibb, for example, convincingly argued for the importance of economic, social, and political contacts in the Umayyad period.[19] More recently, Khouri has shed new light on another possible source of mutual influence, stories and other information from the prisoners taken in the course of the conflicts between the two sides.[20]

We should now at least entertain the possibility that the so-called Eastern Source of Theophanes includes material from the Arab-Islamic tradition. The question is of general importance for the history of relations between Byzantium and Islam in the seventh to ninth centuries A.D., but for purposes of historical reconstruction of the events of this era it is even more significant. For the reasons mentioned above, line-by-line comparison of texts can be of little use for discerning, much less proving,

contemporaries of Theophanes. On them see A.A.Duri, *The Rise of Historical Writing Among the Arabs*, edited and translated by Lawrence I.Conrad (Princeton, 1983), pp.37-39, 48-50, 51-52.

[18]See, for example, Ann Riising, "The Fate of Henri Pirenne's Theses on the Consequences of the Islamic Expansion," *Classica et Mediaevalia*, 13 (1952), pp.87-130; *The Pirenne Thesis: Analysis, Criticism, and Revision*, edited by A.F.Havighurst (Boston, 1958); Richard Hodges and David Whitehouse, *Mohammed, Charlemagne and the Origins of Europe: Archaeology and the Pirenne Thesis* (London, 1983). Cf. also the summary in Lyon, *Henri Pirenne*, pp.441-56.

[19]H.A.R.Gibb, "Arab-Byzantine Relations Under the Umayyad Caliphate," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, 12 (1958), pp.219-33.

[20]Rashad A.Khouri Al Odetallah, *Arabes kai Byzantinoi: to Problema ton Aichmaloton Polemou* (Thessalonica, 1983).

specific instances of intercultural transmission. This is a serious problem; for in such a situation, one might quickly arrive at the conclusion that the agreement between Greek and Arabic accounts of a given point or event is the result of accurate description or interpretation by both sides, which thereafter have transmitted the details independently and accurately in their own historical literatures. That is, their only point of conjunction is the event itself. This was long an important working principle of Orientalist scholarship; and it enabled such pioneering scholars as Wellhausen,[21] de Goeje,[22] and Caetani[23] to offer highly nuanced historical judgments with considerable confidence that definitive solutions had been found.

Though such cases of confirming independent testimony undoubtedly do exist, more recent advances in the study of early Islamic history and historiography now make it clear that in some instances agreement between the *Chronographia* and the Arabic sources arises from the fact that Theophanes is at those points dependent upon the Islamic tradition for his information. This was suspected already by Caetani, and Mayerson also noted the possibility.[24] More recently, Proudfoot has observed that the penetration of Arabic materials into the Greek tradition, through a Syriac intermediary, was "by no means inherently impossible."[25]

[21]E.g., "Theophanes stimmt in der Chronologie gegen Saif mit Baladhuri...," "Theophanes...sagt kurz und gut...," etc. See Julius Wellhausen, *Prolegomena zur ältesten Geschichte des Islams,* in his *Skizzen und Vorarbeiten,* VI (Berlin, 1899), pp.87-88, 110, 127, 133; *idem, Die religiös-politischen Oppositionsparteien im alten Islam* (Göttingen, 1901), pp.4, 13, 21, 50; *idem, The Arab Kingdom and Its Fall,* translated by Margaret Graham Weir (Calcutta, 1927), index.

[22]M.J. de Goeje, *Mémoire sur la conquête de la Syrie,* 2nd edition (Leiden, 1900), pp.5-8, 24, 25, 29, 33-34, 61, 62, 63, 84-85, 88, 106-10, 112-13, 119-20, 135, 136, 158.

[23]Leone Caetani, *Annali dell'Islam* (Milan, 1905-26), with discussions of evidence from the *Chronographia* for events of the Rāshidūn caliphate.

[24]Caetani, *Annali dell'Islam,* III, 64; Philip Mayerson, "The First Muslim Attacks on Southern Palestine (A.D. 633-34)," *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association,* 95 (1964), p.162.

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Donner, who has made use of the Greek and Syriac sources, as well as the extensive Arabic materials, for his study of the Arab conquests in Syria and Iraq, cautions against reliance upon either Theophanes or the Syriac chronicles as independent standards for judging the Arabic evidence for the history of these events.[26]

But one can go beyond this, and for a very simple reason. Like all historical traditions, that of medieval Islam contained much spurious material-specifically, narratives that for various reasons were retouched or fabricated, but transmitted as if they were accurate accounts of events in an earlier era. Reports of this kind describe not the historical events themselves, but the way an evolving Islamic society came to conceptualize or idealize those events as narratives about them developed and passed from one authority or transmitter to another in later times. The point of significance for present purposes is that these narratives *originate* in the historical tradition of Islam and reflect concerns and issues specific to the Islamic community. Hence, if Theophanes has incorporated such narratives into the text of the *Chronographia,* the ultimate source for them can *only* be the Arabic tradition, on which Theophanes is accordingly dependent at those points.

This principle is the working premise of this paper and a hypothesis that obviously has important implications not only for the use of Theophanes as a historical source, but also for the question of cultural contacts between Byzantium and the Islamic world in the early medieval period. These matters cannot receive here the exhaustive consideration they merit: my remarks in this study aim only to establish through a few illustrative examples the phenomenon of intercultural transmission of Arab-Islamic material into the text of the *Chronographia,* to suggest the scope of this influence, and to consider the means by which this transmission occurred.

[25]Proudfoot, "The Sources of Theophanes," p.406.
[26]Donner, *Early Islamic Conquests,* pp.143-45.

11

Genealogies of the Arab Tribes

The *Chronographia's* first statements on Islamic history appear in connection with an historical pattern, rather than with an historical event. In AM 6122, Theophanes gives a short account of the Prophet's ancestry (de Boor, p.333:14-22). Mouamed, he says, came from a noble tribe descended from Ishmael, son of Abraham, Ishmael's descendant Nizaros being proclaimed "the father of them all". Nizaros had two sons, Moudaros and Rhabias, and Moudaros begat Kourasos, Kaisos, Themimes, Asados, and others unknown (i.e., Theophanes cannot specify them by name). All these dwelt in the Madianitis desert as herdsmen living in tents. More remote areas, however, are not inhabited by their tribe, but by Iektan, called the Amanitai, which is to say, the Homeritai. Some of these earn their livelihood raising camels.

The passage is a well-informed summary of Arabic tradition about the ancestry of the major tribes in Arabia and their genealogical interrelationships. Nizaros and his two sons are the Nizār, Muḍar, and Rabī'a of Arab genealogical lore; the four tribes descended from Moudaros represent Quraysh, Qays, Tamīm, and Asad. The relationships between all these, as given in the *Chronographia,* stand in exact agreement with Arab genealogical tradition, which classifies them together in this way as groupings within the northern Arab tribes, the *musta 'riba* (literally, the "assimilated" Arab tribes). Theophanes seems to know that these tribes are regarded as "northern", since he identifies their territory as the Madianitis desert. By this he means the desert of southern Syria and northern Arabia, evoking the Old Testament references to the ancient Midianites in these areas.[27] He also follows Arab tradition in drawing a sharp distinction between these northern tribes, descended from Nizaros, and the

[27]See Genesis 25:1-4, 36:35, 37:28, 36; Exodus 2:15; Numbers 10:29, 22:4-7, 25:16-18, 31:1-12; Joshua 13:21; Judges 6:1-8:35. Note how Theophanes refers to the seventh-century Arab conquests as the work of the new Amalek (AM 6121; de Boor, p.332:10), recalling the depredations of the nomadic Midianite ruler Amalek in the time of Gideon. See Judges 6:3, 33, 7:12.

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Iektan. This latter name derives from Biblical Yoqṭān, which in medieval Islam was usually linked to Qahṭān, the grouping of southern tribes, the 'āriba (literally, the "pure" Arab tribes). That Iektan here means the southern grouping of Qahṭān is confirmed by Theophanes' reference to them as Amanitai, "Yemenites," and Homeritai, "Ḥimyarites," as well as by his geographical placement of them in areas "more remote" than the Madianitis desert, which from a Byzantine perspective would mean southern Arabia.[28]

The accuracy with which Theophanes reproduces the Arabic genealogical tradition is remarkable, as a comparison of the two versions indicates. Schematically represented, Theophanes' genealogy is this:

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
[28] It would be worthwhile to examine how the early Byzantine literary tradition conceived of this most distant and (to them) most exotic region of the peninsula. On the available sources, see Irfan Shahid, "Byzantium in South Arabia," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, 33 (1979), pp.23-94, urging that these works be taken more seriously than has hitherto been the case.

The traditional scheme of the Arab genealogists can be simplified as follows (tribes mentioned by Theophanes are italicized):[29]

Abraham

Ishmael

'Adnān   *Qahṭān*

Ma'add

Nizār

Muḍar   *Rabī'a*

al-Nās   al-Yās

Qays

'Āmir   'Āmir
(Ṭābikha)   (Mudrika)

Udd   Khuzayma

Murr   Kināna   *Asad*

Tamīm   Qays

Mālik al-Ṣalṭ

Quraysh

At first glance it would seem unusual for the Greek historian to state that Nizaros is the "father of them all" (πατὴρ πάντων αὐτῶν), i.e., all the other northern tribes, since Arab genealogical tradition generally regarded 'Adnān as the eponymous ancestor of the northern tribes. But Theophanes' remark is not necessarily mistaken, since northern tribal descent was often traced back only as far as Nizār, especially among the

[29]See Werner Caskel, *Ğamharat an-nasab: Das genealogische Werk des Hišām ibn Muḥammad al-Kalbī* (Leiden, 1966), I, Tables 1, 3, 69; II, 1-30.

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transmitters of historical narratives concerning factional strife under the later Umayyads.

It is difficult to imagine how a Byzantine author could have any knowledge of such accuracy on Arabian tribal genealogies from sources independent of the Arabic tradition of Islam.[30] But we need not rely upon such an unsubstantiable argument to confirm this as a case of intercultural transmission, since positive evidence is at hand, if not immediately apparent, in the text itself. The genealogy reproduced in the *Chronographia* could not have come to Theophanes by any means independent of the Arabic tradition because much of its detail is fictitious and originated in the emerging genealogical studies of early Islam.

The tribes of Arabia in Jāhilīya times had always displayed a strong sense of tribal solidarity (*'aṣabīya*) in their attitudes and actions toward each other; and alliances, rivalries, and estimations of personal status were to a large extent based on considerations of actual or imagined descent. But the importance attached to ancestry manifested itself only in isolated and uncoordinated fragments of genealogical lore. The elaboration of a systematic and comprehensive system of tribal genealogy was a slow process that began only after the rise of Islam. The direction of these studies was much influenced by such factors as intertribal rivalries and their exacerbation in the Second Civil War (A.H. 64-73/A.D. 684-92), circumstances of later common settlement in the provinces rather than original common descent in Arabia, the desire of non-Arabs to claim the prestige of Arab ancestry, and the early Arab administration's allotment of stipends and privileges on the basis of tribal considerations. The outcome of all this was the filling in of vast gaps by an enormous number of genealogical fictions, and ultimately, the emergence of a detailed system describing the relationships between all of the tribes.[31]

[30]See Donner, *Early Islamic Conquests*, p.144.

[31]See Ignaz Goldziher, *Muslim Studies*, edited and translated by S.M.Stern and C.R.Barber (London, 1967-71), I, 45-97, 125-36, 164-90; Caetani, *Annali dell'Islam*, I, 58-90; C.A.Nallino, *Raccolta di scritti editi e inediti*, edited by Maria Nallino (Rome, 1939-48), III, 72-79; Werner Caskel, *Die*

The sketch in the *Chronographia* is fully grounded in this tradition and participates in its most prominent fictions. The notion of the northern and southern Arabs as two distinctly separate and self-conscious entities gradually emerged from factional disputes and rivalries in the decades after the Prophet's death.[32] On the "northern" side, Nizār was practically unknown in the pre-Islamic period, but gradually emerged as an erratic appellation for various tribal groupings, and after the Second Civil War began to stabilize as a prominent label commonly used in genealogical fictions; whether it ever existed as a real historical tribe is a matter of considerable doubt.[33] The tribes supposedly descended from Nizār-Muḍar and Rabī'a-were at least genuine historical entities, but genealogical lore about them developed separately and at differing paces and long presented the two tribes as unrelated; the fraternal connection between them was invented for political reasons in Umayyad times.[34] On the "southern" side, the response to "northern" claims of descent from Abraham and Ishmael, both of whom figure prominently in the Qur'ān, was to lay claim to an ancestor of similar antiquity, the Biblical Yoqṭān, presumed (wrongly) to be identical with Qahṭān.[35]

Bedeutung der Beduinen in der Geschichte der Araber (Köln and Opladen, 1953), pp.13-18; *idem, Ğamharat an-nasab*, I, 19-47; Joseph Henninger, "La Société bédouine ancienne," in *L'Antica società beduina*, edited by Francesco Gabrieli (Rome, 1959), pp.69-93; *idem*, "Altarabische Genealogie," *Anthropos*, 61 (1966), pp.852-70; Manfred Kropp, *Die Geschichte der "reinen Araber" vom Stamme Qahṭān*, 2nd edition (Frankfurt, 1982).

[32]See Goldziher, *Muslim Studies*, I, 78-95, 172; Caskel, *Bedeutung der Beduinen*, pp.7-8, 11; *idem, Ğamharat an-nasab*, I, 19-21, 33-35.

[33]Goldziher, *Muslim Studies*, I, 92, 96; Caetani, *Annali dell'Islam*, I, 82-84; *EI¹*, III, 939-41 (G.Levi della Vida); Caskel, *Bedeutung der Beduinen*, pp.8, 15; *idem, Ğamharat an-nasab*, I, 44; II, 72, 448.

[34]*EI¹*,III, 940; Caskel, *Bedeutung der Beduinen*, p.15; *idem, Ğamharat an-nasab*, I, 31-32, 43; II, 2, 22-23, 417, 481.

[35]Caskel, *Bedeutung der Beduinen*, p.16; *idem, Ğamharat an-nasab*, I, 39; II, 2, 31, 455, 518; *EI²*, IV, 448 (A.Fischer/A.K.Irvine). The objection could be raised that Theophanes or his source would surely have known of the

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Further details could be raised for discussion, but the general pattern would seem to be quite clear. The genealogical scheme given by Theophanes originated and developed in the cultural tradition of Islam; hence, any manifestation of it, as in the *Chronographia,* must ultimately derive from that culture and tradition, regardless of what the immediate source for such information may be.

Chronological Balance of Muḥammad's Career

The chronology of the *sīra,* the Prophet's biography, was an equally vexed issue in early Islamic historiography. Muḥammad's date of birth and his age at various points in his career were obscure,[36] and the ambivalent pre-Islamic attitude toward

Old Testament division of the tribes into the southern Arabian "sons of Yoqṭān" and the descendants of Ishmael more to the north (Genesis 10:24-30, 25:12-18), and hence that much of the *Chronographia*'s genealogy of the Prophet could be attributed to sources independent of the Arabic tradition. Sozomen (wr. ca. 443), for example, includes a few statements on Arab descent from Ishmael in his ecclesiastical history: VI.xxxviii.10; see *Kirchengeschichte,* edited by Joseph Bidez, revised edition by Günther Christian Hansen (Berlin, 1960), p.299:1-5.

In the case of Theophanes, however, this is unlikely. Had his report been an elaboration of ancient Israelite lore, we should expect it to take into account the common descent of Ishmael and Yoqṭān from Shem, and certainly not to claim that the two were unrelated. And while the Biblical narrative refers to different groupings in northern and southern Arabia, it was only with the Arab genealogical studies of the Islamic period that this was promoted into a clear dichotomy of paramount importance for classification of the tribes. If the report in the *Chronographia* reflects knowledge of Old Testament formulations, it is because this lore was not unknown to early Arab scholars (cf. Duri, *Historical Writing,* pp.31, 52, 68, 125, 126). In any case, Theophanes has enough entirely Islamic material in his account of the descent of Muḥammad to justify the conclusion that it was from the Arabic tradition that this report ultimately derived.

[36]This problem was considered in detail in the dated and highly tendentious, but still useful study of Henri Lammens, "L'Âge de Mahomet et la chronologie de la *sīra*," *Journal asiatique,* 10th Series, 17 (1911), pp.209-50. See also my "Abraha and Muḥammad: Some Observations Apropos of Chronology and Literary Topoi in the Early Arabic Historical Tradition," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies,* 50 (1987), pp.225-

chronology meant that at first there was probably little attention paid to the order and timing of events. Hence, when historical writers set out to discuss the career of the Prophet,[37] they found themselves confronted by a vast and complex array of reports producing contradictory chronologies, as well as many accounts bearing no indication of date at all. These difficulties had to be resolved in definitive fashion and in detail, regardless of whether or not sufficient evidence existed to do so, since the subject of the Prophet's life was naturally of the highest importance, not only for general edification, but for such matters as Qur'ānic exegesis and law as well. *Sīra* chronology thus tends to be neat, specific, and comprehensive, yet reveals itself as somewhat arbitrary when examined in detail.[38]

One illustration of this tidy but arbitrary detail is the effort early writers often made to fix the chronology of the Prophet's career according to an overarching principle of balance. We find, for example, statements that Muḥammad was born on a Monday, the twelfth of Rabī' al-Awwal, made the hijra to Medina on a Monday, the twelfth of Rabī' al-Awwal, and died on a Monday, the twelfth of Rabī' al-Awwal[39]--this despite the fact that there was almost no basis for such precise statements.[40] Another case

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[37]See Duri, *Historical Writing*, pp.22-30, 76-121.

[38]This is a prominent theme in Lammens' "L'Âge de Mahomet". For more recent observations, see J.M.B.Jones, "The Chronology of the Maghāzī: a Textual Survey," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, 19 (1957), pp.245-80; John Wansbrough, *Qur'ānic Studies* (Oxford, 1977), pp.38-43; Michael Cook, *Muhammad* (Oxford, 1983), pp.63-64.

[39]This is already present in the *sīra* of Ibn Isḥāq (d.151/761). See Ibn Hishām, *Sīrat Rasūl Allāh*, edited by Ferdinand Wüstenfeld (Göttingen, 1858-60), I.1, 102:9-10, 333:14-15; al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh al-rusul wa-l-mulūk*, edited by Muhammad Abūl-Faḍl Ibrāhīm, 2nd edition (Cairo, 1968-69), III, 215:4-6.

[40]This was a fundamental reason why the renowned Ḥanbalite jurist Ibn Taymīya (d. 728/1328) condemned the celebration of the *mawlid*, the Prophet's birthday: authorities disagreed on the date of Muḥammad's birth, the

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is the attempt to force the *sīra* into patterns of chronological symmetry. We read that ʿĀʾisha, eighteen years old at the time of the Prophet's death, had lived for nine years prior to her marriage to him, then nine more years until his death. Similarly, Muḥammad's career was divided into ten years at Mecca and then ten at Medina, or these twenty plus a prior three, or thirteen in both Mecca and Medina, and so forth.[41] In such cases, the authors wrote with definitely kerygmatic, as opposed to historical, aims in mind. Balance and symmetry in the Prophet's career implied the hand of God at work in the events concerning Muḥammad, which proceeded in accordance with divine will and plan.

As such aspects of *sīra* chronology are uniquely Islamic and reflect the conception of the Prophet developing within the *umma* in the years after his death, it is remarkable that they should manifest themselves in the *Chronographia*'s account of Muḥammad's career. Much of Theophanes' material here is ahistorical and sheer polemic, but at the end of his discussion he makes the interesting statement (AM 6122; de Boor, p.334:16-20) that Islam "finally conquered the district of Ethribos (Yathrib, the pre-Islamic name of Medina) by force of arms. It had first spread secretly for ten years, then through warfare for ten years, then openly for nine years."

There is much confusion here. It was Mecca, not Medina, that was conquered by force near the end of the Prophet's life; Medina

early Muslims (*al-salaf*) neither commended or observed the *mawlid* festival, and in any case it was an imitation of the Christians' Christmas. See Ibn Taymīya, *Majmūʿat fatāwā...Ibn Taymīya* (Cairo, A.H. 1326-29), I, 312:1-10, no.230; *idem, Kitāb iqtiḍāʾ al-ṣirāṭ al-mustaqīm mukhālafat aṣḥāb al-jaḥīm* (Cairo, 1325/1907), pp.141:1-142:4. Cf. also Eugen Mittwoch, "Muhammeds Geburts- und Todestag," *Islamica,* 2 (1926), pp.397-401; Rudolf Sellheim, "Prophet, Chalif, und Geschichte: die Muḥammed-Biographie des Ibn Isḥāq," *Oriens,* 18 (1967), pp.75-78; Conrad, "Abraha and Muḥammad," pp.232-37.

[41] These and other examples are discussed in Lammens, "L'Âge de Mahomet," pp.212-15. Cf. also his *Fāṭima et les filles de Mahomet* (Rome, 1912), p.113.

he entered with the agreement and cooperation of its inhabitants at the time of the hijra. Our earliest Islamic authorities state that the Meccan period did begin with proselytism in secret (*sirran*), but they also state that after three years (not ten) this gave way to open preaching that aroused considerable opposition among the pagan Meccans. The secret/open dichotomy is, in other words, well attested among early Muslim writers,[42] but not in the form that Theophanes has it. Furthermore, a chronology totalling 29 years for Muḥammad's career corresponds to nothing else either explicit in or derivable from any other source; and in this regard we should note that Theophanes attributes his death to the year A.D. 622 (de Boor, pp.332:20-333:1), a full ten years too early, although the *annus mundi* given, 6122 (A.D. 630-31), is only one year off.

Most important of all, how has our author come to know of these details in the first place? If there was confusion over *sīra* chronology in early Islamic society, how much more there must have been among Byzantine authors, who took far less interest in the matter. Indeed, Theophanes himself has nothing to say about Muḥammad until this point in the text. After AM 6121 he abandons the chronology of the Persian kings and in AM 6122 abruptly takes up that of the Arab rulers, beginning with what he says is the ninth year of Muḥammad's nine years as ἀρχηγός of the Arabs (de Boor, p.332:20-24). On points of chronology earlier than this final year of the Prophet's life he would seem to be wholly uninformed. So, again, on what basis does he make his statement about the overall chronology for the spread of Islam in the time of Muḥammad?

It would be impossible to trace precisely the course of transmission that has combined various details in such confusion before us, but on two important points it is feasible to suggest general solutions. The statement in the *Chronographia* indicates awareness of the symmetrical *sīra* chronology of ten years each in Mecca and Medina; and as this is so distinctly part of the

[42]See, for example, Ibn Isḥāq's use of it in Ibn Hishām, I.1, 157:14-15, 161:13-14, 17-18, 166:1-7.

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Islamic image of the Prophet that emerged later, it can only have originated in the Arabic literary tradition. The nine years have been pinned, as it were, onto this element and comprise the source of much of the disorder in the statement. Reference to these nine years was probably added in consideration of and from the same source as the statement made in the chronological table at the head of AM 6122 attributing nine years to Muḥammad as *archegos*. This term was taken in its sense of "ruler" or "chieftain" rather than "founder", and led Theophanes or his source to conclude that the nine years in question could only refer to a period after the twenty years of secret proselytism and warfare had actually ended with Muḥammad emerging as victor and hence *archegos* of the Arabs.[43]

[43]There are several other discussions relevant to this question. In his *Les Théologiens byzantins et l'Islam: textes et auteurs (VIIIe-XIIIes.)*, 2nd edition (Louvain and Paris, 1969), p.109, n.10, Adel-Théodore Khoury explains the reference to nine years of open preaching as an allusion to the period of the conquests. But this is hardly possible, since Theophanes very clearly places the nine years before the death of the Prophet: the conquests began soon thereafter, in the caliphate of Abū Bakr. Patricia Crone and Michael Cook, in their *Hagarism: the Making of the Islamic World* (Cambridge, 1977), pp.24, 28, make Muḥammad the leader of the initial conquests in Syria; but even if we accept this radical revision of the chronology, it only allows for an additional two years, not nine. Astérios Argyriou also sees the nine years as a reference to the conquests, and further suggests that the adverb παvερῶς, "openly," indicates "la propagation de l'Islam hors de la péninsule arabique et du monde 'clos' des Arabes." See his "Éléments biographiques concernant le prophète Muḥammad dans la littérature grecque des trois premiers siècles de l'hégire," in *La Vie du prophète Mahomet*, edited by Toufic Fahd (Paris, 1983), p.170, n.2. The possibility is an intriguing one, but is still, in my view, an unlikely solution to the problem. It does not overcome the objections raised above in reference to Khoury's theory, and adds a further complication in that it is based upon the passage as quoted from Theophanes in Cedrenos, raising the issue of the accuracy of the *Chronographia* text known to us from extant Mss, as compared to the exemplar used by Cedrenos.

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The Battle of Mu'ta

Under AM 6123 (de Boor, p.335:12-23) Theophanes gives an account of an Arab defeat in Syria. This report is decisive evidence for the transmission of historical materials from the Arabic Islamic tradition into that of the Byzantine Greeks, and at the same time raises other complex historiographical problems. These matters are discussed at length elsewhere,[44] and here a summary of the relevant arguments will serve to clarify the question under discussion.

Mu'ta was a battle fought in southern Syria in 629 between Byzantine forces and an expedition sent northward from Arabia by Muḥammad.[45] This expedition included four leading Companions of the Prophet, and in the battle three of them were killed. The Muslim army was defeated, or at least was compelled to return to Medina. Later, in mid-Umayyad times, the unsatisfactory outcome of the confrontation raised the question of how a force sent by the Prophet himself could have been defeated by the unbelieving Greeks. This problem was particularly troublesome in the era when the Umayyad caliphs still considered the destruction of the Byzantine Empire and the capture of Constantinople as important spiritual, political, and military priorities.

The solution, transmitted largely on the authority of 'Urwa ibn al-Zubayr (d. 94/712), was to portray the three slain Companions as commanders; one had been appointed by the Prophet to lead the expedition, and the other two were to succeed him in order should he be killed. In the battle, all three were killed, and in exactly the hierarchy of succession fixed by the Prophet. The defeat was explained by blaming it on the fourth Companion.

[44] See my *The Expedition to Mu'ta: a Study in Comparative Historiography*, forthcoming.

[45] On the battle of Mu'ta, see De Goeje, *Mémoire*, pp.4-8; Frants Buhl, *Muhammeds Liv* (Copenhagen, 1903), pp.297-98; Caetani, *Annali*, II.1, 80-90; *EI*²III, 773-74 (Frants Buhl); W.Montgomery Watt, *Muhammad at Medina* (Oxford, 1956), pp.53-55. Several studies on the battle of Mu'ta were presented at the recent Second Session of the Fourth International Conference for the History of Bilād al-Shām (Amman, 16-22 March 1985), but these have not appeared among the papers published so far.

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This man, the only one of the four to survive, was Khālid ibn al-Walīd, later to gain renown as the greatest general of early Islamic times. But this particular story suggested that, upon assuming command, Khālid failed to show the strength and courage of his fallen predecessors. As a result, the Muslims were denied the victory they otherwise would have won.

This formulation endured for almost a century, but for various reasons it could not prevail. Later writers, overtaken by a growing tendency to idealize the Companions (ṣaḥāba) of the Prophet, and no less by the fact that in reality Khālid had been a brave and talented general, began to rehabilitate him. They insisted that Mu'ta had been a Muslim victory all along, and that the hero of that victory was Khālid. As part of this process of reinterpretation, our authorities begin to refer to Khālid as sayf Allāh, "Sword of God", a title he had never enjoyed in his own lifetime and one unattested until the early second century A.H./eighth century A.D.

Theophanes describes the Mu'ta campaign as follows:

ἦν δὲ προτελευτήσας ὁ Μουάμεδ, ὃς ἦν στήσας τέσσαρας ἀμηραίους τοῦ πολεμεῖν τοὺς ἐξ Ἀράβων γένους Χριστιανούς· καὶ ἦλθον κατέναντι Μουχέων κώμης λεγομένης, ἐν ᾗ ὑπῆρχε Θεόδωρος ὁ βικάριος, θέλοντες ἐπιρρίψαι κατὰ τῶν Ἀράβων τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τῆς εἰδωλοθυσίας αὐτῶν. μαθὼν δὲ τοῦτο ὁ βικάριος παρά τινος χορασηνοῦ, Κουταβᾶ λεγομένου καὶ μισθίου αὐτοῦ γενομένου, συνάγει πάντας τοὺς στρατιώτας τῶν παραφυλάκων τῆς ἐρήμου, καὶ ἀκριβωσάμενος παρὰ τοῦ Σαραχηνοῦ τὴν ἡμέραν καὶ τὴν ὥραν, ἐν ᾗ ἤμελλον ἐπιρρίπτειν αὐτοῖς, αὐτὸς ἐπιρρίψας αὐτοῖς ἐν χωρίῳ ἐπιλεγομένῳ Μόθους ἀποκτέννει τρεῖς ἀμηραίους καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τοῦ λαοῦ. ἐξῆλθε δὲ εἰς ἀμηρᾶς ὁ Χάλεδος, ὃν λέγουσι τὴν μάχαιραν τοῦ θεοῦ.

By this time Mouamed had already died, but had appointed four ameraioi to wage war on the Christians of Arab stock.

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They marched on a place called Mucheon Kome, the seat of the *vikarios* Theodoros, intending to attack the Arabs on the day of their idolatrous sacrifice. But the *vikarios* came to know of this from his Korasenite servant, a man named Koutabas, and assembled all of the troops of the desert guard. From the Saracen he determined the day and hour on which he could expect the assault, and attacked (the invaders) at a place called Mothous, killing three of the *ameraioi* and most of their army. Only one *amer*, Chaledos, called the "Sword of God", escaped.

The terms *ameraios* and *amer*, used erratically in the *Chronographia*, are Theophanes' approximations of the Arabic *amīr*, "leader," here obviously in the sense of a military commander. Of the place-names, Mothous is the Byzantine name for the southern Syrian town of Mu'ta: it appears as Μωθώ in Stephen of Byzantium,[46] Motha in the *Notitia dignitatum*,[47] and Mothus in Anastasius (p.210:18). Mucheon Kome (Anastasius, p.210:13, has Mucheas castellum) is more difficult, but probably refers to the village now known as al-Miḥna and situated on a hill overlooking the plain of Mu'ta.[48] The epithet κώμη (used also by Stephen of Byzantium) indicates that the place was a village, and probably unwalled, hence an ideal target for the surprise attack planned by the raiders. Koutabas is an effort to reproduce an Arabic name, probably either Qutayba or Quṭba. Theophanes describes this man as Κορασηνοῦ, "Korasenite," that is, a tribesman of Quraysh. This reading could

[46]*Fragmenta historicorum graecorum*, edited by Karl Müller (Paris, 1841-70), IV, 524:24. Cf. Pauly/Wissowa, XVI.1, 383.

[47]*Notitia dignitatum*, Or. XXXVII.14; edited by Otto Seeck (Berlin, 1876), p.81. Cf. Pauly/Wissowa, XVI.1, 382.

[48]See Alois Musil, *Arabia Petraea* (Vienna, 1907-1908), I, 77, 152; Ernst Axel Knauf, "Aspects of Historical Topography Relating to the Battles of Mu'ta and the Yarmūk," in *Proceedings of the Second Symposium on the History of Bilād al-Shām During the Early Islamic Period Up to 40 A.H./640 A.D.*, I, edited by Muhammad Adnan Bakhit (Amman, 1987), p.73.

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be a scribal error for Σαρακηνοῦ, "Saracen," which, in light of the very frequent errors by Greek authors in the rendering of Arabic proper names, could appeal for justification to the reference to Koutabas as the Σαρακηνός a few lines further down in the Greek text. On the other hand, the case for emendation finds no support in the manuscript traditions of either Theophanes or Anastasius. Chaledos is of course the famous Khālid ibn al-Walīd.

We can immediately see the relevance of the developments in the Arabic historiographical tradition to our understanding of this report. The *Chronographia* repeats the scenario of four *amīrs*, three of whom perish while the fourth, Khālid, escapes. And this Chaledos is the one called μάχαιρα τοῦ Θεοῦ, the "Sword of God". In these details there is no confirmation of the Arabic tradition, only an offshoot from it.[49]

But the dependence does not end with these points. Let us note Theophanes' statement that the invaders intend to attack "on the day of their idolatrous sacrifice," τῇ ἡμέρα τῆς εἰδωλοθυσίας αὐτῶν. The genitive possessive pronoun αὐτῶν here is ambiguous, in that it is unclear whether it refers to the attacking Muslim Arabs or to the Christian Arabs at Mucheon Kome. That is, does Theophanes mean that the Muslims plan to attack on their own feast day, or that the assault will come on a religious holiday of the Christian Arabs in the town? Our author obviously takes this problematic phrase in the former sense; but, as I discuss elsewhere,[50] this interpretation cannot be the original intent of the passage. The whole point of the sentence is to indicate that the

[49]Theophanes is of course wrong in stating that Mu'ta occurred after the death of the Prophet. This error may stem from confusion between this clash and the second battle of Mu'ta, which did take place shortly after Muhammad's death. It may also reflect the general confusion among Greek and Syriac authors in their presentations of events relating to the Arab conquests.

[50]See n.44 above. Cf. the efforts to explain away this anomaly in De Goeje, *Mémoire sur la conquête de la Syrie*, pp.6-7; Caetani, *Annali dell'Islam*, II.1, 85.

attackers wish to take their victims by surprise, hence the "idolatrous sacrifice" must refer to a festival in the Christian village, which on such an occasion is unlikely to have been as watchful for raiders as would normally be the case.

It is remarkable, to say the least, that such a statement should be found in a work like the *Chronographia*, all the more so since the word εἰδωλοθυσία cannot be explained away. There is no evidence that this term was ever used by Patristic or Byzantine writers as anything but a judgmental word with overwhelmingly negative overtones, similar to those of "heathen" or "blasphemous". And from other references to pagan sacrifices in the *Chronographia* (AM 6208, 6232, 6267, 6305; de Boor, pp.390:26-391:2, 413:22-23, 448:24, 503:10-11), it is clear that Theophanes' attitude in this regard was one of unmitigated horror and disgust; hence it is hardly possible to gloss *eidolothusia* here as an archaism simply meaning "a religious festival". And there is no reason to suspect that our author has deliberately accused the Arabs of Mucheon Kome of idolatry. These Christians would have been Monophysites. Theophanes' quarrel with them over Christology would not warrant so grave a charge; and in any case, differences between the two sides would have been much overshadowed by their agreement on the question of iconoclasm, the religious issue of most immediate concern to Theophanes.

It is therefore impossible that Theophanes himself should have made such a statement, which he cites only because its ambiguity has obscured its true meaning. Hence, the passage must come from his source on the matter, and that source in turn must ultimately belong to the only current literary tradition that would have referred to a Christian festival in this way--the Arabic tradition of Islam.

The presence of such a passage must be viewed in light of Theophanes' general disregard, as already mentioned above, for editorial concerns as he copied material into his text from his sources. This particular oversight, remarkable as it may seem, is in fact surpassed by an extraordinary lapse well known to Byzantinists. Theophanes is extremely hostile to the iconoclast

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emperors, and not least of all to Leo III (r.717-41), whose role as the instigator of imperial iconoclasm earns him endless abuse in the *Chronographia* as a savage blaspheming madman. But in AM 6209 (de Boor, p.396:8, 18) Theophanes carelessly copies into his text a passage from some earlier author in which Leo is twice described as εὐσεβής, "pious".[51] The earlier reference to a Christian religious festival as *eidolothusia* is therefore unusual, but not without parallel elsewhere in the text.

The Scope of Intercultural Transmission

The three examples discussed above are all accounts of events in earliest Islamic times, but it should not be considered that it was only at these points, or only for this period, that Arabic materials made their way into the text of the *Chronographia*. Other cases can be suggested, but for these conclusive evidence is usually lacking.

In his accounts of the Arab conquests, for example, Theophanes on several occasions refers to whether a city was taken λόγῳ, "on terms" (AM 6127, 6141; de Boor, pp.339:16, 344:12-14), or διὰ πολέμου/πολέμῳ, "by force" (AM 6122, 6130; de Boor, pp.334:18-19, 340:22-24). One of these places is Jerusalem, and Theophanes could be expected to know that Sophronios had surrendered the city λόγῳ, i.e., after a period of negotiations. But with regard to the others, it should be noted that the antithesis *logos/polemos* exactly matches the *sulh/'anwa* dichotomy very frequently encountered in the Arabic narratives on the conquests. Noth has argued, and convincingly so, that the *sulh/'anwa* reports are so prominent in the Islamic sources not because contemporary authorities made a point of recording whether a place had been taken "on terms" (*sulhan*) or "by force" (*'anwatan*)-this was a problematic question in any case-but rather because such reports were fabricated and used by both the

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[51]On this anomaly, which in fact raises complex and important historiographical issues, see Stephen Gero, *Byzantine Iconoclasm During the Reign of Leo III* (Louvain, 1973; *CSCO*. CCCXLVI--*Subsidia*, 41), pp.34-36, n.8.

Umayyad regime and provincial interests in their disputes over tenure and rights to lands conquered by the ancestors of the current occupants or landholders. These disputes occurred in the late seventh and the early eighth centuries A.D., and it is to this period that the majority of the *sulh/'anwa* narratives about the conquests are to be attributed.[52] Does Theophanes' use of the *logos/polemos* antithesis reflect the passage of the *sulh/'anwa* dichotomy into the Greek historical tradition? This may be so, but with only four brief passages to consider, a definitive conclusion either way is probably beyond reach.

A further example from a later period raises the ambigious but important question of the extent to which Theophanes had, or could have had, knowledge of the internal affairs of the caliphate independently of the Arabic tradition. In AM 6185 (de Boor, pp.366:25-367:2) he gives a brief account of a rebellion by an adventurer (παράβουλος[53]) named Sabinos, who, as we are told, was so successful that he nearly killed Chagan himself, but in the end drowned in a river. This refers to the Khārijite revolt of Shabīb ibn Yazīd al-Shaybānī in 76-77/695-96; Chagan is Theophanes' usual term for the great Viceroy of the East, al-Ḥajjāj ibn Yūsuf.[54] The report in the *Chronographia* is

[52]See Albrecht Noth, "Zum Verhältnis von kalifaler Zentralgewalt und Provinzen in umayyadischer Zeit. Die *sulh/'anwa* Traditionen für Ägypten und den Iraq," *Die Welt des Islams*, New Series, 14 (1973), pp.150-62; also his "Some Remarks on the 'Nationalization' of Conquered Lands at the Time of the Umayyads," in *Land Tenure and Social Transformation in the Middle East*, edited by Tarif Khalidi (Beirut, 1984), pp.223-28. This problem has now been reconsidered in Wadād al-Qāḍī, "Madkhal ilā dirāsat 'uhūd al-ṣulḥ al-islāmīya zaman al-fatḥ," in *Proceedings of the Second Symposium on the History of Bilād al-Shām*, II, 193-269.

[53]A variant of (or perhaps error for) παράβολος. Theophanes' use of this term will be considered in greater detail below.

[54]Theophanes apparently saw no difficulty in using this as an acceptable reference to al-Ḥajjāj, perhaps because he already knew of the appellation "Chagan" from accounts in his sources of the Avar *khāqān*. In any case, medieval Latin and Greek writers had a great deal of trouble with the transcription of Arabic names and apparently encountered particular difficulty

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awkward and ambiguous, as if it has come to Theophanes in a confused state.[55] But it does agree with the Arabic narratives on these events, even to the detail of Shabīb drowning in the Dujayl.[56] The agreement in this case does not in itself prove anything. But before using this report as independent evidence it should at least be asked how Theophanes had come to know details of this kind concerning an event in Iraq, a region usually of little interest to him. Similar questions arise for the details the text provides on such matters as the Second Civil War, the factional violence among the Umayyad princes in 126/744, and the 'Abbāsid revolution and subsequent internal unrest.

The existence of specific instances of intercultural transmission should also alert us to the potential usefulness of the Arabic tradition for understanding certain features of nomenclature in the *Chronographia,* and to the possibility of this as further indication of the extent to which the Arabic tradition manifests itself in this work. We frequently encounter, for example, names of groups

in rendering the name of al-Ḥajjāj. See, for example, the *Continuatio Isidoriana,* p.347:28, 32, where in the same sentence he appears as both Tahihie and Aiaiae. It is tempting to regard Chagan in Theophanes as an obvious error for Chagag, as suggested by Wellhausen in his "Die Kämpfe der Araber mit den Romäern in der Zeit der Umaijiden," *Nachrichten von der Königliche Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, Philologisch-historische Klasse,* 1901, p.446. However, there is absolutely no evidence that this might have been the case. Theophanes mentions al-Ḥajjāj eight times, always referring to him as either Χαγάν (AM 6181, 6191, 6192; de Boor, pp.364:29, 30, 31, 365:1, 371:21, 25, 26) or Χαγάνος (AM 6185; de Boor, p.366:29), never Χαγάγ or Χαγάγος. Anastasius always has Chagan (pp.231:29, 30, 31, 233:15, 263:33), and the variants in the Greek manuscript tradition show no sign of an original Χαγάγ.

[55] Hence Wellhausen's misunderstanding of the passage in his *Oppositionsparteien,* p.46, n.3: "Auch Theophanes AM 6185 hat davon etwas lauten hören: Schabib trat in Churâsân auf und hätte beinah bewirkt, dass Haggag in einem Fluss ertrunden wäre. Beinah!" As we shall see below, this is a passage of considerable historiographical importance.

[56] For the Arabic sources on this, see Wellhausen, *Oppositionsparteien,* pp.46-47; 'Abd al-Ameer 'Abd Dixon, *The Umayyad Caliphate, 65-86/684-705: a Political Study* (London, 1971), pp.189-90.

that are difficult to identify. In numerous cases Theophanes is calling them by forms derived from their Arabic names, often very old names that had fallen out of use long before his own time. He usually refers to the Khārijites, for example, as the Arouritai (AM 6236, 6239, 6258; de Boor, pp.421:18-20, 424:9, 439:13), from their ancient Arabic name, the Harūrīya, after the Iraqi town of Harūrā' where their movement began. In one unusual case they are called Charourgitai (AM 6151; de Boor, p.347:30-31), a conflation of Harūrīya with the later name by which they are better know, the Khawārij. Again considering Theophanes' lack of attention to editorial matters, we should probably see this as a feature indicative of transmission from a different source at this point.

A similar case is that of his reference to the Umayyad caliph Yazīd ibn al-Walīd as 'Ιζὶδ ὁ Λειψός, "Yazīd the Deficient" (AM 6235: de Boor, p.418:17). This simply renders into Greek the Arabic epithet al-nāqiṣ, given to Yazīd (probably by his enemy Marwān ibn Muḥammad, soon to become the last Umayyad caliph), for his reduction of military stipends upon assuming the caliphate, although earlier he had promised the troops prompt and full payment. The story of this title was being circulated by the Arab historians al-Madā'inī and al-Wāqidī in Theophanes' time,[57] but he probably has it from his own earlier source. It is worth noting, however, that Yazīd ruled for only a few months, and at a time of great turmoil in Syria. Under such circumstances, we should at least question whether a source independent of the Arabic tradition -a Syriac informant, for example, writing from his own knowledge of the period- would have come to know of this epithet. It was, after all, of absolutely no relevance to the non-Muslims, or, for that matter, to anyone not involved in the Umayyad military and the struggle for power within the ruling house. From the Arabic literary tradition, however, it could have been borrowed at any time.

Arabic terminology in the *Chronographia* is not limited to

[57]See the discussion of this epithet in al-Ṭabarī, *Ta 'rīkh*,VII, 261:20-262:5, 299:1-3.

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formal nomenclature and titles. Perhaps the best illustration of this is Theophanes' reference to a place he calls "Ηρα near Gaza in southern Palestine (AM 6124; de Boor, p.336:16). This has for years defied efforts to identify it as a place-name. And in fact, all it represents is the Arabic word *ḥīra,* meaning "a camp". Theophanes uses it in reference to an encampment of Arab tribesmen near Gaza on the eve of the Arab conquest. The usual Greek term for such a tribal bivouac is παρεμβολή, while ἥρα stands alone as a complete anomaly. The *Chronographia* contains the latter not by the specific choice of our author, but because his source contained the word. If Theophanes gave any thought at all to what it might mean, he probably regarded it, as Anastasius after him (p.210:32), as the name of some obscure place.

This particular case provides a striking illustration of how important recognition of the Arabic influence on the *Chronographia* can be, even where apparently minor points of detail are concerned. In his study of the first Arab advances into southern Palestine, Mayerson took *hera* as a scribal blunder for the Sinai town of Pharan, thereby transforming Theophanes' account into evidence for a far more significant campaign than was actually the case.[58]

Means of Intercultural Transmission

If Arabic materials are present in the *Chronographia,* a question of obvious importance is how they passed to Byzantium, and to Theophanes, from the Arabic tradition of Islam. Direct recourse to materials or texts written in Arabic is in any case unlikely, and Theophanes' own efforts to raise points concerning the Arabic language make it clear that he did not know it himself and probably had no direct access to anyone who did. He is not far wide of the mark when he says that the name Manṣūr, "one aided" (i.e., by God), means λελυτρωμένος, "one redeemed"

[58]See Mayerson, "The First Muslim Attacks on Southern Palestine," pp.161-66. This question is considered more fully in my forthcoming study of the Arab conquests in southern Palestine.

(AM 6235; de Boor, p.417:19). But his claim that the name of the Arouritai means Ζηλωταί, "Zealots" (AM 6258; de Boor, p.439:13) is simply wrong, however well it might describe the movement of the Khawārij (especially the Azāriqa); and an absurd statement that Arabic has no numerals to express a unit or a pair (AM 6199; de Boor, p.376:4-7) would seem to indicate a state of complete ignorance. These are statements attributable not to Theophanes, but to his informants. At the same time, however, it is clear that our author has copied from these sources with no idea of whether or not their information was correct.

Our primary concern, then, is not with Theophanes himself, but with the textual tradition underlying the *Chronographia*, and most particularly, with the nature and content of the Eastern Source. This immediately calls to mind the parallel effort by Brooks to elucidate the Eastern Source in terms of materials passed to Theophanes from the Syriac tradition. But the problem must now be viewed somewhat differently. The question has become far more complex, not only in light of the Arabic influences discussed here, but also in consideration of the Greek "great chronographer" whose work transmitted to the *Chronographia* certain accounts that would otherwise seem attributable to the Eastern Source.[59] Further, we must note that Brooks envisages historiographical development in the early medieval Near East as a process in which it could be expected that authors in the various confessional communities would write in their own liturgical languages for the audience of their own sect, and display a general disinterest in or ignorance of what was being produced in other communities. There is some measure of truth to this, especially for early Islamic times. But elevating this assumption to the level of a general working principle, and for a problem for which clear and decisive evidence is so scarce and elusive, is overly simplistic. It fails to take into account the fact that just as other representative features of the pre-Islamic Near East prevailed past the time of the Arab conquest, so also did the

[59]See, for example, Whitby, "The Great Chronographer and Theophanes," pp.11-16.

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polyglot character of society and culture.

This phenomenon was quite pronounced in Syria, which, given the *Chronographia*'s abundance of detailed accounts concerning the history of early Islamic Syria, may be taken as the region from which the Eastern Source originated. We know, for example, that it was common for Melkite authors in the era before Theophanes to make use of languages other than Greek. The late seventh-century apocalypse of the pseudo-Methodios is heavily Melkite in tone, but is written in Syriac.[60] Theophilos of Edessa was a Maronite historian who wrote in Greek, and he also produced what Bar Hebraeus called "a most eloquent translation" of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* into Syriac.[61] Even more important was the rise of Arabic among the Melkites. By the mid-eighth century, Syrian monks and other clerics commonly knew Arabic and used it both in conversation and in their religious writings; by the end of this century the Bible was being translated into Arabic (the extant fragment is from the Psalms, with the Arabic written in Greek characters), while the spread of Arabic among the laity was rapidly propelling the language of the Arab conquerors to a dominant position in the Melkite community.[62]

[60]The Syriac text has now been edited and translated by Francesco Javier Martinez in his "Eastern Christian Apocalyptic in the Early Muslim Period: Pseudo-Methodius and Pseudo-Athanasius," Ph.D. dissertation, Catholic University of America, 1985. Cf. also the observations of S.P.Brock, "Syriac Views of Emergent Islam," in *Studies on the First Century of Islamic Society*, edited by G.H.A.Juynboll (Carbondale and Edwardsville, Illinois, 1983), pp.17-21.

[61]Bar Hebraeus, *Ta'rikh mukhtaṣar al-duwal*, edited by Antoine Salihani (Beirut, 1890), pp.41:2-5, 220:3-4. Cf. also Anton Baumstark, *Geschichte der syrischen Literatur* (Bonn, 1922), p.341.

[62]See Simeon Vailhé, "Le Monastère de Saint Sabas," *Echos d'Orient*, 3 (1900), p.22; Bruno Violet, "Ein zweisprachiges Psalmenfragment aus Damaskus," *Orientalische Literaturzeitung*, 4 (1901), pp.384-403, 425-41, 475-88; Paul Kahle, *Die arabischen Bibelübersetzungen* (Leipzig, 1904), pp.32-35; Paul Peeters, "S. Romain le neomartyr (m. 1 Mai 780) d'après un document géorgien," *Analecta Bollandiana*, 30 (1911), p.406; Gérard Garitte, "La Version géorgienne de la vie de S. Cyriaque par Cyrille de Scythopolis," *Le Muséon*, 75 (1962), pp.402-405; R.P.Blake, "La Littérature grecque en

In the ninth century, the treasures of St.Catherine's and the careers of such figures as Theodore Abū Qurra (d. ca. 825) and Stephen of Ramla (wr. late ninth c.) provide abundant testimony to the activities of bilingual and even trilingual churchmen producing masses of spiritual literature in Arabic, including both translations and original compositions, and obviously with a specific and substantial audience in mind.[63]

In sum, the erosion of language barriers (such as they were) isolating Arabic from the Christian communities was far advanced by the time of Theophanes. Hence, it is simply wrong to postulate

Palestine au VIIIe siècle," *Le Muséon*, 78 (1965, pp.376-78; Daniel J. Sahas, *John of Damascus on Islam* (Leiden, 1972), pp.40, 45-47; Sidney H. Griffith, "The Gospel in Arabic: An Inquiry into Its Appearance in the First 'Abbāsid Century," *Oriens christianus*, 69 (1985), pp.126-97; "Stephen of Ramla and the Christian Kerygma in Arabic in Ninth-Century Palestine," *Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, 36 (1985), pp.23-45. The early emergence of this trend is suggested by an account relating that John of Damascus (d. ca. 132/750) gained a good part of his early education by reading the "books of the Saracens", τὰς τῶν Σαρακηνῶν βίβλους, before being able to take up formal studies in Greek. See Athanasios I.Papadapoulos-Kerameus, *Analekta Hierosolymitikes stachyologias* (St. Petersburg, 1891-98), IV, 273:11. This statement is potentially one of great importance, assuming, of course, that it is accurate. But this may not be the case. If the phrase "books of the Saracens" means "Muslim books", one is led into the controversial problem of what such books would have been in early Umayyad times, when John was a youth. It could be argued that the phrase refers only to Arabic books, and not necessarily to works within the Islamic tradition. But for the mid-seventh century this seems unlikely, and still, one is left with the problem that the report appears only in a late *Vita* of John, and may be nothing more than a manifestation of a common *topos* of Muslim-Christian polemics: i.e., the saint's familiarity with "the books of the Saracens" implies that in his *De haeresibus* Islam is condemned on the basis of its own scripture and religious literature. Sahas considers the implications of the report; and although he does not, in my view, deal directly with the issues outlined above, he does demonstrate that John did know and use the Arabic language.

[63]See Griffith's excellent study, "Stephen of Ramlah," pp.32-45. For an inventory of the surviving Christian Arabic works from this period, see Joshua Blau, *A Grammar of Christian Arabic*, I (Louvain, 1966; *CSCO*, CCLXVII-*Subsidia*, 27), pp.21-36.

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distinctly "Eastern" or "Western" sources for his history, if one presumes the former term to mean exclusively Syriac and the latter exclusively Greek. A comprehensive reinvestigation of the Eastern Source, as representative of the rich cultural variety of late Umayyad and early 'Abbāsid Syria, is therefore a major desideratum, and would require the marshalling of all of the literature potentially related to the text of the *Chronographia*. This of course lies beyond the scope of this paper, but a few preliminary remarks may serve to indicate the broad lines of conclusions that suggest themselves at this point, insofar as the transmission of the Arabic materials is concerned.

The Byzantine historical tradition is unfortunately of no help to us. As mentioned earlier, there is no extant Greek historiography from before the rise of Islam until the era of Theophanes and Nikephoros. The latter cannot assist us, since parallels to the Arabic materials in the *Chronographia* cannot be traced in the *Historia syntomos*.[64] Later Byzantine historians do, however, betray the influence of the Arabic tradition. The genealogy of Muḥammad, for example, is repeated in whole or in part, and in an increasingly garbled form, by numerous authors.[65] The unusual formula for the chronology of the Prophet's career is repeated less frequently,[66] and the Mu'ta narrative not at all; Yazīd ibn al-Walīd's epithet of *ho leipsos* is taken up only by Cedrenos.[67] But these and other resemblances lead us not back to some early and now-lost Byzantine work independent of the

[64]Cf. Proudfoot, "Sources of Theophanes," p.415.

[65].George Hamartolos, *Chronicon*, edited by Carl de Boor (Leipzig, 1904), II, 697:13-698:7; "Theodosios Melitenos," *Chronographia*, edited by T.L.F. Tafel (Munich, 1859; *Monumenta saecularia*, III.1), pp.105:24-106:3; Leo Grammatikos, *Chronographia*, edited by Immanuel Bekker (Bonn, 1827; *CSHB*, XXXIV), p.153:4-8; Constantine VI Porphyrogenitos, *De administrando imperio*, edited and translated by Gyula Moravcsik and R.J.H. Jenkins, 2nd edition (Washington, D.C., 1967; *CFHB*, I), no.14:3-10; George Cedrenos, *Compendium historiarum*, edited by Immanuel Bekker (Bonn, 1838-39; *CSHB*, XXIV), I, 738:12-20.

[66]Cedrenos, I, 739:15-17; *De administrando imperio*, no.17:14-16.

[67]Cedrenos, II, 6:3.

Chronographia, but rather only to Theophanes himself, upon whom, as is well known, these authors frequently depend.

Moving beyond the historical sources, Proudfoot has drawn attention to two anti-Islamic polemical works, an *Elegchos Agarenou*[68] and a *Kata Moamed,*[69] published in Migne's *Patrologia Graeca* under the name of a certain monk, Bartholomaios of Edessa. Theophanes has derived information on the Prophet from the *Kata Moamed,* Proudfoot maintains, but has not used the *Elegchos Agarenou,* which in any case, she continues, is of less certain attribution to Bartholomaios of Edessa.[70]

The *Kata Moamed* does indeed show definite textual affinities with the *Chronographia:* it contains numerous biographical and doctrinal details mentioned by Theophanes and later historians, and of particular interest here is the appearance of a genealogy of Muḥammad clearly related to the genealogy given by Theophanes.[71] On the face of it, then, this text would seem to establish a definite link between the Arabic and Greek traditions in the era before Theophanes, one that could be taken to include the Syriac as well, given the importance of Edessa as a center of Syriac learning and culture.

Unfortunately, this is not the case. Nothing is known about Bartholomaios of Edessa aside from the fact that his name appears on the Ms. of the *Elegchos Agarenou;* the *Kata Moamed* is anonymous, and Migne's assignment of it to Bartholomaios has not been accepted. It is therefore the latter work and not, as Proudfoot states, the former, that is of uncertain attribution. And the issue is a moot one, since both works are later than the *Chronographia* and so could not be sources for Theophanes. Some elements of the *Kata Moamed* may date from the ninth

[68]Edited by J.-P.Migne in *PG,* CIV (Paris, 1860), cols. 1384-1448.

[69]Edited by J.-P.Migne in *PG,* CIV (Paris, 1860), cols. 1448-57.

[70]Proudfoot, "The Sources of Theophanes," p.386. Cf. also p.370, where Bartholomaios of Edessa is introduced.

[71]*Kata Moamed,* col. 1448B-C.

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century; but these passages are later than George Hamartolos, who copies from Theophanes, and the final form of the polemic as a whole belongs to the fourteenth century.[72] The second polemic, the "genuine" Bartholomaios, is also late, being a work of about the thirteenth century.[73] Neither, then, is of any value for elucidating the sources of Theophanes, who is himself the ultimate source for some of the information about Muḥammad in the pseudo-Bartholomaios. This is evident from collation of the parallel passages in the *Chronographia* and the *Kata Moamed*, which reveals important omissions and major corruptions by the polemicist but not by Theophanes, as we would expect if the former had access to the latter through a series of intermediate authors and copyists.

The works of other early Byzantine writers, such as John of Damascus and Theodore Abū Qurra, also fail to provide any

[72]See Wolfgang Eichner, "Die Nachrichten über den Islam bei den Byzantinern," *Der Islam*, 23 (1936), pp.140-42; Hans-Georg Beck, *Kirche und theologische Literatur im byzantinischen Reich* (Munich, 1959), p.531; Adel-Théodore Khoury, *Der theologische Streit der Byzantiner mit dem Islam* (Paderborn, 1969), p.33; idem, *Théologiens byzantins*, pp.194-99; idem, *Polémique byzantine contre l'Islam*, 2nd edition (Leiden, 1972), p.9; Argyriou, "Éléments biographiques," pp.174-77.

[73]See Carl Güterbock, *Der Islam im Lichte der byzantinischen Polemik* (Berlin, 1912), pp.22-23; Eichner, "Nachrichten," pp.137-38; Beck, *loc.cit.*; Khoury, *Theologische Streit*, pp.28-31; idem, *Théologiens byzantins*, pp.259-93; idem, *Polémique byzantine*, p.10; Armand Abel, "La 'Réfutation d'un Agarène' de Barthélémy d'Édesse," *Studia Islamica*, 37 (1973), pp.5-26; Claude Cahen, "À propos du polémiste byzantin antimusulman Barthélémy d'Édesse," in *Recherches d'islamologie* (Louvain, 1977; Anawati-Gardet Festschrift), pp.85-88; Gérard Troupeau, "La Biographie de Mahomet dans l'oeuvre de Barthélemy d'Édesse," in *La Vie du prophète Mahomet*, edited by Toufic Fahd (Paris, 1983), pp.147-57. Beck implied that the text is a work of the tenth century ("Kaum mehr als eine Generation jünger als Photios dürfte der Monch Bartholomaios von Edessa gewesen sein"); Güterbock preferred the eleventh or twelfth centuries, and Eichner the thirteenth. Khoury's careful analysis of the text now makes the first half of the thirteenth century the most likely date for the authorship of this polemic, although Abel may be correct in suggesting that the work developed in three stages, beginning in the tenth or eleventh centuries and ending in the thirteenth.

specific link between the Islamic tradition and the text of the *Chronographia*. This is not surprising, and in any case, disputations and other polemical works could not account for more than a very small portion of the possibly Arabic materials found in the *Chronographia*. These materials cover a broad range of topics and span close to two centuries; hence it is difficult to imagine how they could have been borrowed from the Islamic tradition and preserved in anything but a coherent and continuous tradition of historical writing. There is no evidence for such a tradition in Byzantium in the seventh and eighth centuries, and even the remnants for this period possibly deriving from the "great chronographer" deal only with unusual natural phenomena.[74] It is therefore clear that the *Chronographia* played a decisive role in transmitting material from the Eastern Source into the mainstream Byzantine tradition. And although Theophanes undoubtedly knew only some Greek form of this source, the work itself (assuming that it was only one), must be sought elsewhere. The Syriac historical tradition is the obvious choice -on the one hand, by lack of any alternative, but more directly, because we are concerned with a source probably originating in Syria.

Unfortunately, none of the three examples discussed in detail earlier -the genealogy of the tribes, the chronology for the Prophet's career, or the account of Mu'ta[75]- are to be found in extant Syriac sources. The anonymous *Chronicon 1234*, however, does contain a genealogy of the Prophet that is even more detailed and extensive than that in the *Chronographia*.[76] It specifies not just tribes of Muḥammad's Quraysh ancestry, but

[74]Whitby, "The Great Chronographer and Theophanes," pp.11-13.

[75]There is an account of Mu'ta in Ēliyā bar Shīnāyā, *Opus chronologicum*, edited by E.W.Brooks (Paris, 1905-1909; *CSCO*, LXII--*Scriptores syri*, 21-22), I, 129:6-15, but this narrative is not textually related to that given by Theophanes.

[76]*Chronicon ad annum Christi 1234 pertinens*, edited by J.-B.Chabot (Paris, 1916-20; *CSCO*, LXXXI-LXXXII--*Scriptores syri*, 36-37), I, 239:2-23.

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the names of all of Abraham's descendants through the Hāshimite line to Muḥammad. The chronicler has probably taken this from his main source for this period, the lost history of Dionysios of Tell-Maḥrê (d. 845),[77] whose own sources attest to the kind of information known to and transmitted by Syriac chroniclers in the eighth century.

There are other indications that just as accounts relating to broader aspects of Near Eastern history were transmitted to Theophanes through the Syriac historical tradition, so also were reports more specifically limited to the internal history of Islam. Theophanes' repeated references to the Khawārij as Arouritai, to the 'Abbāsids as Maurophoroi ("Black-Coats"), and to Khurāsān as "Inner Persia", for example, are borrowed from the traditional vocabulary of the Syriac sources. And for one particular cluster of reports there is strong circumstantial evidence of a specific link between the Arabic tradition and the *Chronographia*. I refer here to those accounts comprising Theophanes' remarks about the revolt of Shabīb ibn Yazīd (Sabinos), his description of this rebel as an "adventurer" (*paraboulos*), and his dubious gloss of the Khārijites as "Zealots".

These details have been discussed earlier in this study, but in isolation from possible textual parallels it is difficult to judge the merits of proposed explanations for such passages. Wellhausen, for example, attempts to link *paraboulos* with the verb παραβάλλω. Hence, by analogy with παραβαλλέσθαι τὴν ψυχήν, "sein Leben preisgeben," he sees in the reference to Shabīb as a *paraboulos* a rendering of the Arabic *shārī* (sing.), which would mean that Theophanes, or at least his source, was aware that the Khawārij were called the Shurāt (pl.).[78] If accepted as an explanation for *paraboulos*, this argument would provide us with a significant example of a precise and perhaps not coincidental correspondence in terminology; for a *shārī* is one

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[77]See Rudolf Abramowski, *Dionysius von Tellmahre, jakobitischer Patriarch von 818-845: zur Geschichte der Kirche unter dem Islam* (Leipzig, 1940; *Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, XXV:2), p.48.

[78]Wellhausen, *Oppositionsparteien*, p.16, n.3.

who sells, and the early Khawārij used the term metaphorically in calling themselves the Shurāt, i.e., those who "sell" their lives for the sake of God's cause.[79] But upon closer investigation, Wellhausen's hypothesis appears unlikely. Derivation of *paraboulos* or *parabolos* from *paraballo* is philologically sound; but the sense he seeks is, to my knowledge, attested only in a New Testament passage wherein Paul describes Epaphroditos as παραβουλευσάμενος τῇ ψυχῇ.[80] More relevant to the usage of Theophanes' own time are the sixth-century sermons of Eusebios of Alexandria, who consistently uses *paraboulos* in the negative sense of a reckless and dubiously motivated individual willing to endanger both himself and others.[81] Anastasius (p.233:14) is generally in agreement with this, rendering *paraboulos* as *insidiator*.

Our understanding of the origin and nature of such details can be more sharply focused in light of the Syriac account of Shabīb's rebellion in the *Chronicon 1234*:[82]

> In these days a man of the Ḥrōrāyē -that is to say, of the Rāfeṭē- an Ishmaelite named Shabīb, rose against the authority of Ḥagāg. He committed many wicked deeds and caused much slaughter. He even attempted to kill Ḥagāg, but he cunningly managed to save himself from him. No one could stand against this Ḥrōrī, but in the end Ḥagāg devised a plot against him and

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[79]The term is particularly prominent in Khārijite poetry. See *Dīwān shi'r al-khawārij*, compiled and edited by Iḥsān 'Abbās, 4th edition (Beirut, 1402/1982), pp.56:2, 89:3, 91:1, 98:1, 99:4, 8, 101:2, 129:12, 133:13, 136:1, 138:1, 139:1, 159:2, 233:1, 244:3, 250:1, 264:6, 283:1, 299:3, 300:7, 305:1, 314:3, 331:1. The Arabic *shurāt* is also the term that Jōhannān bar Penkāyē, a contemporary observer (wr. 67/686-87) to the events of the Second Civil War in northern Mesopotamia, has in mind when he refers to the *shurṭē*. See his *Kethābhā dhe-rīsh mellē*, edited by A.Mingana in his *Sources syriaques*, I (Leipzig, 1908), pp.157u, 158:3.

[80]Phillipians 2:30.

[81]See Eusebios of Alexandria, *Sermones*, edited by J.-P.Migne in *PG*, LXXXVI.1 (Paris, 1865), cols, 349D, 352B-C.

[82]*Chronicon 1234*, I, 296:22-28.

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drowned him in the Euphrates.

To this we may compare the text of Theophanes (AM 6185; de Boor, p.366:27-29):

καὶ φύεται ἐκεῖσε παράβουλος ὀνόματι Σαβῖνος, καὶ πολλοὺς τῶν ᾿Αράβων ἀπέκτεινε καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν Χαγάνον παρ᾿ ὀλίγον τελείως ποταμόπνικτον ἐποίει.

And a *paraboulos* named Sabinos rebelled there (i.e., in "Inner Persia") and killed many Arabs, almost killing Chagan himself; but in the end he was drowned in a river.

The two versions reveal significant textual correspondences, and points where they differ suggest strongly that the Greek narrative is derived from the Syriac. The latter is longer, clearer, and more detailed. In the transition to Greek, certain passages have been omitted and others have been abbreviated, perhaps in an effort to circumvent defects or difficulties in the Syriac exemplar. Shabīb's name has been misread, with a *nu* in the Greek replacing the correct Syriac *beth;* the Euphrates has become an unspecified river; and the awkward Greek rendering gives the impression that what it means to say is that Chagan was almost drowned in a river. We may therefore conclude that the version in the *Chronographia* is an abridgment of a Syriac report that eventually made its way into the *Chronicon 1234*.

Most important of all is the Syriac phrase explaining that Shabīb is one of the Ḥrōrāyē, and that these latter are the Rāfeṭē. The first term is the usual approximation of the Arabic Ḥarūrīya, the Arouritai of Theophanes. But Rāfeṭē is meaningless in Syriac: in fact, the root *rēsh-pē-ṭēth* does not even exist in the language.[83] The writer here is simply trying to reproduce the Arabic *rāfiḍa*. The verb *rafaḍa* means "to desert" or "to abandon", and the word *rāfiḍa* is thus a pejorative meaning

[83]Or, if it is, it is not attested in the medieval lexicon of Bar Bahlūl (fl. mid-10th c.) or in the modern compendia of J.Payne Smith or Carl Brockelmann.

"deserters" or "renegades". In early Islamic times, the Rāfiḍa were a dissident group so called by their enemies for reasons still not entirely clear. Use of the term in reference to Shabīb and the Khārijites has important implications for our understanding of its earliest and probably broadest sense, but this question cannot be considered here. We should note, however, that the epithet is abusive, a pejorative term used by Muslims in reference to other Muslims who questioned the legitimacy of the early Imamate, in particular, that of the first two caliphs, Abū Bakr and 'Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb.[84] As this issue was irrelevant to non-Muslims, it is unlikely that anyone but a Muslim would have written a report using an Arabic term from the vocabulary of internal Islamic polemics to explain who the Ḥarūrīya were, and of course doing so in the expectation that this gloss would be understood by the audience for whom he was writing.

Not surprisingly, then, it appears that the gloss was not clear to the Eastern Christian writers who encountered it. The informant of the chronicler of 1234 simply transliterated the Arabic form of the term into Syriac, producing a meaningless neologism for which no root even existed to hint at the meaning. Theophanes' source omits explicit mention of the epithet in the Shabīb account, although it is not unlikely that his reference to the Khārijite as a *paraboulos* was an attempt to guess at what a Rāfiḍī might be. Elsewhere, however, he does use the gloss. In AM 6258 (de Boor, p.439:13), Theophanes mentions a Khārijite revolt near Palmyra in early 'Abbāsid times, and when the name of the Ḥarūrīya appears he explains that they are 'Αρουρῖται ὅ ἑρμηνεύεται ζηλωταί, "the Arouritai, which means 'Zealots'," which is a translation of the Syriac in the *Chronicon 1234*. The error, already noted previously, can now be understood. In the

[84] See A.S.Tritton, *Muslim Theology* (London, 1947), p.20; C. van Arendonk, *Les Debuts de l'imamat zaidite au Yemen*, translated by Jacques Ryckmans (Leiden, 1960), p.32; W.Montgomery Watt, "The Rāfiḍites: a Preliminary Study," *Oriens*, 16 (1963), p.116. Cf. Wilferd Madelung, *Der Imam al-Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm und die Glaubenslehre der Zaiditen* (Berlin, 1965), pp.145-47.

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passage from Arabic through Syriac to Greek, the Islamic polemical term Rāfiḍa has become the meaningless Syriac Rāfeṭê, which Theophanes' informant has restored to Zelotai, probably by sheer conjecture from the context of the kinds of activities usually attributed to the Arouritai. This report has probably come to Theophanes from one of the sources of Dionysios. From Michael Syrus (d. 1199) it is clear that Dionysios had access to a source relating the true reason why the Khārijites were called the Ḥarūriya.[85] That this source should have known of the Rāfiḍa as well is not unlikely.

Aside from providing strong evidence of a specific link between the Arabic tradition and the *Chronographia*, this example also illustrates the vicissitudes of intercultural transmission in a more general sense. As this particular account makes its way from one tradition to another, we can discern clear indications of misinterpretation, condensation, fragmentation, and redistribution in various places in the text ultimately receiving the account. In other words, it must be borne in mind that the process of transmission can be expected to obscure the very fact that such transmission had occurred. This brings us back to a point already stressed above, that elucidation of the nature and original content of the Eastern Source must be based on a comprehensive assessment of the literature potentially bearing on the text of the *Chronographia*.

Conclusion

Although it has not been possible, within the confines of this paper, to do more than touch upon various important issues, it should by now be clear that historiographical consideration of the *Chronographia* of Theophanes must be revised to take into account the presence in the text of materials that ultimately come from the Arabic tradition of Islam. The full extent of this intercultural transmission is as yet uncertain, but is of

[85]Michael Syrus, *Chronique de Michel le Syrien*, edited and translated by J.-B.Chabot (Paris, 1899-1910), IV, 434.ii:40-435.ii:2. Cf. Abramowski, *Dionysios von Tellmahre*, p.54.

considerable importance.

The method by which these materials were transmitted to Theophanes is difficult to demonstrate conclusively. But there are very strong indications that Arabic narratives from the Islamic literary tradition were incorporated into Syrian Christian historical writing in the course of the eighth century. This was the period in which the Arabic language was beginning to assume an important role in the culture and literature of the Melkite community. It is probably among these Christians, increasingly exposed to the language and emerging historical writings of the Arab conquerors, yet still in close contact with the Greek heritage, that we should expect the appearance of the elusive Eastern Source -a Greek version of a history containing materials from both the Christian and Muslim traditions. Brooks suggested that the author was either a certain John, son of Samuel, about whom practically nothing is known, or less likely, Theophilos of Edessa, the Maronite historian and Syriac translator of Homer.[86] In light of evidence in the *Kitāb al-'unwān* of Agapius (d. ca. 950), still unpublished when Brooks wrote, it now appears that Theophilos is the more likely candidate.[87] But this point of authorship, the relationship between Agapius, Theophanes, and the Eastern Source, and the question of the intermediary role of Syriac, remain topics for future investigation.

This phenomenon of intercultural transmission of historical materials raises serious doubts concerning the value of the *Chronographia* as an independent witness for events in Islamic history. But on the other hand, the accounts in question remain of considerable historiographical importance as indications of the content and scope of historical discussions within Islamic circles

[86]Brooks, "Sources of Theophanes," pp.583-87. The various possibilities for the authorship of the Eastern Source are limited, as Dionysios specifically names his informants in his preface, which is preserved in Michael Syrus, *Chronique*, IV, 378:29-36.

[87]See especially Agapius' specific reference to and quotation from Theophilos of Edessa in the *Kitāb al-'unwān*, edited by Louis Cheikho (Paris, 1912; *CSCO*, LXV--*Scriptores arabici*, 10), p.369:2-5.

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in the late Umayyad and early 'Abbāsid periods. And as these narratives are presumably Syrian, the *Chronographia* may be a source of significant value for elucidating the extent and character of early Islamic historical writing in this region.[88]

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[88]See Gernot Rotter, "Abū Zur'a ad-Dimašqī (st. 281/894) und das Problem der frühen arabischen Geschichtsschreibung in Syrien," *Die Welt des Orients,* 6 (1971), pp.80-104; Fred M.Donner, "The Problem of Early Arabic Historiography in Syria," in *Proceedings of the Second Symposium on the History of Bilād al-Shām,* I, 1-27.

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ISLAM, JUDEO–CHRISTIANITY AND BYZANTINE ICONOCLASM

Patricia Crone

The argument of this paper* is that Byzantine Iconoclasm was a response to the rise of Islam. This is an old-fashioned point of view. First advanced by the Byzantines themselves, the theory of Saracen influence was accepted by older scholarship on the subject, and long remained academically respectable. In the last generation, however, it has fallen out of favour. Contemporary literature on the subject, though far from agreed in other respects, is virtually unanimous that, whatever may have been the causes of Iconoclasm, Islam was *not* among them. That the military success of the Arabs impressed the Byzantines is not denied; if anything, it is emphasized. But the assumption that the Byzantines paid attention to what the successful Arabs believed is now deemed unproven, unnecessary or even incredible.

Yet the case for Islam seems so effortless that the determination to exclude it must strike the outsider as an almost wilful exercise of professional scepticism. *A priori*, the theory that Iconoclasm was a Byzantine response to Islam is certainly not implausible, and no serious objection has so far been advanced against it. It can, of course, be argued that, inasmuch as hostility to images is endemic in Christianity, what looks like a pattern of Christian-Muslim interaction is to be dismissed as pure coincidence. But it is considerably simpler to assume that it was the role of Islam to make epidemic what had hitherto been merely endemic — particularly as the search for alternative causes has only led to an alarming accumulation of unsatisfactory theories.[1] All in all, it is hard to avoid the suspicion that if the Byzantines had not themselves been so sure that Iconoclasts and Saracens were somehow related, modern scholars would have been as happy to expend their energies in championing the case for Islam as they currently are to debunk it. But the Byzantines may after all have been right. It is at least worth examining more closely the evidence for the impact of Islam before we persevere in trying to explain it away.

That the evidence for the role of Islam in the genesis of Iconoclasm can, in fact, be refined and extended will be shown in due course. It is, however, helpful to approach the evidence via a more general question: what kind of impact could

    [1] Cf. P. Brown, "A Dark-Age Crisis: Aspects of the Iconoclastic Controversy," *English Historical Review* 88 (1973), p. 3.

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Islam be *expected* to have on Byzantium? We may begin to answer this question by spelling out the implications of a single but basic point. The distinctive feature of the Muslim threat to Byzantium was that it was at once conceptual and political: the Christian faith and the Christian polity were under simultaneous attack.

Now the Byzantines were certainly used to attacks on their faith, not just by heretics within Christianity, but also by the Jews outside it; and the Jews were unquestionably a conceptual menace. Unlike mere heretics or pagans, they rejected Christianity in the name of the monotheist tradition which Jews and Christians share; in other words, they denied Christianity in the name of Christian values. But politically, of course, the Jews were powerless. "For 600 years your temple has lain ruined and burnt," "God has dispersed you over the earth," "God is angry with you," and words to similar effect are staple arguments in anti-Jewish polemic.[2] *Vis-à-vis* the Jews, the Christian possession of power thus provided some assurance that Christianity was God's own religion.

Equally, the Byzantines were very used to attacks on their polity, not just by rebels within Byzantium, but also by the barbarians outside it; and some of these were certainly a political menace. But conceptually the barbarians were insignificant. The Franks might try to emulate Byzantine civilisation and the Avars to destroy it, but either way they merely confirmed the Byzantines in their values. Barbarian success at most demonstrated that the Byzantines had fallen short of their own values: military defeat, like drought and plague and other misfortunes, was a rod with which God punished his believers for their sins.[3] But *vis-à-vis* the barbarians, the Christian possession of truth demonstrated that Byzantium was God's own empire.

What the Byzantines had never experienced before was a monotheist attack on *both* their truth and their power.[4] The Arabs were, so to speak, Jews who had come back with an army, or conversely, barbarians returning with a prophet: they were not just God's rod, but also claimed to be his mouthpiece, and their tremendous success lent some credence to their claim.[5] So far from buttressing Byzantine

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[2] See, for example, G. Bardy (ed. and tr.), *Les Trophées de Damas* in *Patrologia Orientalis*, XV, Paris 1903–, p. 230. Anti-Jewish writings are commonly dated by the number of years God has been angry with the Jews.

[3] This belief was not, of course, specific to the 7th century: compare the pagan and Christian reactions to the various barbarian invasions in W.E. Kaegi, *Byzantium and the Decline of Rome*, Princeton 1968; and the European reaction to the advance of the Turks in J.W. Bohnstedt, "The Infidel Scourge of God," *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society* NS 58 (1968), pp. 25ff.

[4] Zoroastrian Persia, though in some sense monotheist, was too alien to hit where it hurt most.

[5] For Muslim arguments from political success to religious truth see Lévond, *Histoire des guerres des Arabes en Arménie* (tr. G.V. Chahnazarian), Paris 1856, p. 97; D. Sourdel (ed. and tr.), "Un pamphlet musulman anonyme d'époque 'abbaside contre les Chrétiens," *Revue des Etudes Islamiques* 34 (1966), p. 33 = 26 (where references are given in this form, the first figure refers to the text and the second to the translation); cf. also *ibid.*, pp. 10f. Similar arguments recur in later texts (E. Fritsch, *Islam und Christentum im Mittelalter*, Breslau 1930,

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values, the Arabs undermined them.[6] This time it was not just the traditional Christian sins, but also the traditional Christian values which had to be reviewed.

Just how it felt can be seen in the former Byzantine province of Syria. Syria had a local elite of so-called Melkite Christians, that is Christians who, unlike the dissident Monophysites, adhered to the official definition of orthodoxy, wrote in Greek, ran the provincial bureaucracy and identified closely with the fortunes of the empire. Upon the Arab conquest, this elite was politically and religiously disestablished all but overnight, and — reduced to rubbing shoulders with the Jews and the Monophysites in the ghetto — they soon lost their unthinking confidence in Melkite truth. Already at the time of the conquest in 634, the Jews had snidely observed that the Roman empire was suffering diminution,[7] and some thirty years later — when it was clear that the diminution was going to be permanent — Melkites were asking the inevitable question: how do we know that Christianity is really superior to other faiths?[8] That they did not know is clear from the sudden spate of Melkite polemics against Jews[9] and also against Monophysites,[10] and from

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p. 53) and among the Turks (S. Vryonis, *The Decline of Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization from the Eleventh through the Fifteenth Century*, Berkeley 1971, p. 435). Compare also the Spanish argument, that the pagan gods had failed to help the Indians, while the true God had allowed the Spanish to conquer Mexico (R. Ricard, *The Spiritual Conquest of Mexico*, Berkeley 1966, p. 87). And note how the Byzantines have to remind themselves that the victories of the Muslims were *not* a proof of the truth of their religion (A.-T. Khoury, *Les Théologiens Byzantins et l'Islam*, Louvain-Paris 1969, p. 166; similarly their descendants, in Vryonis, *loc. cit.*, and the contemporary Armenians, in Łevond, *loc. cit.*).

[6] The demoralizing effect of the Arab conquests is well brought out by C. Mango, "Historical Introduction," in A. Bryer & J. Herrin (eds.), *Iconoclasm*, Birmingham 1977, pp. 2ff.

[7] A.L. Williams, *Adversus Judaeos. A Bird's-eye View of Christian Apologiae until the Renaissance*, Cambridge 1935, p. 135 (= *Doctrina Iacobi*). Note the Christian's confidence that the empire will rise again.

[8] Pseudo-Athanasius, *Quaestiones ad Antiochum Ducem*, MPG XXVIII,col. 624 (question xliii). The date of the tract is provided by the answer: no Christian emperor has ever been killed by barbarians nor could they destroy his image with the cross on the coinage. This answer can only have been given between Muʿāwiya's unsuccessful attempt to strike coins without crosses and ʿAbd al-Malik's monetary reform (cf. P. Crone & M. Cook, *Hagarism, The Making of the Islamic World*, Cambridge 1977, p. 11; no other barbarians made such attempts). Williams dates it to the 6th century on the grounds that it has no reference to the image controversy and that it was used by 7th (or 8th) century writers such as the author of the dialogue of Papiscus and Philo (Williams, *op. cit.*, pp. 160, 171; cf. below, n. 12), but neither consideration excludes the date proposed here. Despite its Egyptian attribution, it was almost certainly written in Syria: quite apart from the fact that the Egyptians hardly wrote anything in Greek after the Arab conquest, the original is likely to have been in Syriac (cf. below, n. 41).

[9] Williams, *Adversus Judaeos*, pp. 151–80. Add now A.P. Hayman (ed. and tr.), *The Disputation of Sergius the Stylite against a Jew* (CSCO, Scriptores Syri, vols. 152f.), Louvain 1973, which may well have been Melkite (see the editorial introduction, p. *2). That disestablishment at the hands of the Arabs (and also the Persians) adversely affected the polemical balance between Christians and Jews, was also seen by P.J. Alexander, *The Patriarch Nicephorus of Constantinople*, Oxford 1958, p. 31.

[10] Bardy, *Trophées*, p. 177; K. Krumbacher, *Geschichte der byzantinischen Litteratur²*, Munich 1897, pp. 64ff; A. Baumstark, *Geschichte der syrischen Literatur*, Bonn 1922, pp. 269,

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the simultaneous conversions to Monophysitism[11] and, though the evidence here is tenuous, probably also to Islam.[12]

For the Melkites across the border in Byzantium, it was not just an elite but an empire which was threatened with reduction to a ghetto. There were all the signs in the late seventh century that Byzantium was going to go the way of Iran. Syria, Egypt and Mesopotamia had fallen, the conquest of North Africa had begun, the Arab army was annually flooding Anatolia, while at the same time the Arab navy was engaged in a systematic conquest of the Greek islands en route to Constantinople; and in 716 or 717, both army and navy swooped down on Constantinople itself. As it happened, Byzantium survived by the skin of its teeth, but it was anything but clear how long the respite was going to last. "Over Constantinople God has not *yet* given them any power," as a Nestorian chronicler put it.[13] Leo III (717-41) certainly had grounds for thinking that Christianity had gone astray and, unlike the Melkites of Syria, he was still in a position to set about reforming it.

What, then, had gone wrong with Christianity? It is worth going back here to another simple point. Christianity may be defined as the outcome of a syncretic bargain between Jewish missionaries and gentile proselytes. In the course of the bargaining, the missionaries had jettisoned the substance of their Judaic faith. Their converts did not in fact become Jews, or rather they did so only in a spiritual sense:

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336 f. Note the use of the popular dialogue form rather than the learned treatise by one of these authors, and the wanderings among the masses of another.

[11] A. Mingana (ed. and tr.), *Sources syriaques*, Leipzig [1907], p. *147 = *176; cf. Baumstark, *Geschichte*, p. 269, for the lost apology of one of these converts.

[12] The late 7th century Syrian apocalypse of pseudo-Methodius complains of conversions (E. Sackur, *Sibyllinische Texte und Forschungen*, Halle 1898, p. 86), but it is not clear whether the apocalypse originated in a Melkite or sectarian environment, though the very fact that it passed into Greek (and Latin) would indicate the former. A Greek anti-Jewish tract also concedes that some Christians have denied their faith, though more Jews are said to have done so without suffering persecution (A.C. McGiffert (ed.), *Dialogue Between a Christian and a Jew Entitled Antibole Papiskou kai Philonos Ioudaion pros monakhos tina*, Marburg 1889, §13, p. 75). The oldest preserved version of this tract was written shortly before the Arab conquest (we are told that the Christians have been preserved for 600 years, that Christianity is triumphant even in Britain, that the Jewish sanctuaries have become Christian and that the coinage displays the cross, *ibid.*, §9; cf. also the editorial introduction, pp. 42ff). But it contains two or three interpolated passages in defence of image worship (§1, 13, 15f), which must have been added about 670 or 740, since we are now told that the Jews have been deprived of their sanctuary for 600 or 670 years (§16, pp. 78f; on these interpolations see also McGiffert's introduction, p. 38, and Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 172); and it is in one of these interpolations that the reference to apostasy occurs. As far as the Jews are concerned, however, the reference is almost certainly to the biblical past. The case of the Christians is not clear, but the very fact that the interpolator should take up the subject suggests that it was of topical interest, particularly as he doubtless worked in a Muslim province (two MSS hold that the dispute took place in the presence of both Jews and Arabs; the *Trophies* and *Quaestiones* are the two main sources; the later recension was certainly done in the east; cf. Williams, *op. cit.*, pp. 170f, 175). If so, the province must have been Syria (cf. n. 8).

[13] I. Guidi et al. (ed. and tr.), *Chronica Minora* (= CSCO, Scriptores Syri, 3rd series, vol. IV), Louvain 1903-07, p. 38 = 31.

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they were circumcised of the heart, not of the flesh, and they adhered to the inner, not the literal sense of Mosaic law. But in return, the proselytes accepted the Judaic shell. If they did not become Jews, they still ceased to know themselves as Hellenes, and if they did not live by the law, they still retained the Old Testament as part of their scriptures. Mainstream Christianity is not Jewish Christianity, but equally it is not Marcionism; or, to put it in the words of the Iconoclast Council of 754, Christianity strikes a middle course between paganism and Judaism.[14] What this means is that the nature of Christianity is somewhat ill-defined. Christians can both Hellenize and Judaize: as they can have a renaissance so they can have a refor-mation. And what they do in practice depends largely on the location of the magnetic field at any given time.

Now what the rise of Islam represented was precisely a shift of the magnetic field. Islam is no middle course between a monotheist faith and a pagan culture. If Christianity is Judaism gone soft, Islam by contrast is Judaism restated as an Arab faith: like Judaism, it is strictly monotheist where Christianity is trinitarian, it is shaped as an all-embracing holy law where Christianity is antinomian, and it finds its social embodiment in a learned laity where Christianity has priests. Hence, what in the eyes of the Byzantines was a time-hallowed alliance between a pagan tradition and a Jewish God, in those of the Muslims was simply a pagan corruption of the true monotheism, a failure on the part of the Byzantines to take their mono-theism seriously; and everything indicated that God himself saw it the Muslim way. On the Byzantine side, then, one would expect a cultural shift: if before they had been Hellenizing, now they were likely to start Judaizing: and in fact that is pre-cisely what happened.

From the reign of Leo III onwards, there was a spectacular attack on images, saints, relics, intercessors and what other channels of grace had appeared beside the ecclesiastical sacraments, followed by a no less spectacular onslaught on monks, the social incarnation of the saints; and at the same time a biblical orientation came to the fore in law and learning as such.[15] In religious terms, the Iconoclast movement was a monotheist reformation: the Byzantines now took their Judaic God seriously. And in political terms its analogue was greater integration. As the focus of religious loyalties shifted from parochial saints to the supreme God, so that of political loyalties shifted from provincial cities to the imperial metropolis,[16] and the two

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[14] M.V. Anastos, "The Argument for Iconoclasm as presented by the Iconoclastic Council of 754," in K. Weitzmann (ed.), *Late Classical and Mediaeval Studies in Honor of A.M. Frend, Jr.*, Princeton 1955, p. 181.

[15] For a good account, see E. Martin, *A History of the Iconoclastic Controversy*, London [1930]. Note the Calvinist dislike of grace in the *horoi* of 754 and 815: the saints are for imitation rather than adoration and the true image is the virtuous Christian and the eucharist – a terrible blasphemy to Theodore the Studite (M.V. Anastos, "The Ethical Theory of Images as formulated by the Iconoclasts in 754 and 815," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 8 [1954], pp. 153, 159). Compare the rejection of intercession implied in Leo's statement, that God judges every man according to his deeds (below, n. 64).

[16] Brown, "A Dark-Age crisis".

converge in Leo's forced conversion of the Jews: the Jews became "new citizens"[17] and the Byzantines were henceforth "Verus Israel," one nation unto God.[18]

There is thus no doubt that with Iconoclasm Byzantine Christianity became a religion more *like* Islam; and few Byzantines had much doubt that the movement was actually *triggered* by Islam.[19] But is there any specific evidence of interaction?

It can certainly be argued that there is, and that in the three key domains of images, law and the milieu which sparked off the reformation. We may begin with the images.

The Byzantine reformation was, above all, an iconoclast one because on the Christian side images had long been a sore point. The scriptural prohibition of images comes in the one bit of the law that Christians usually considered themselves bound by, the Decalogue, and early Christian writers had certainly taken it seriously.[20] It is true that the brunt of the Patristic attack on art was directed against idols rather than religiously neutral or Christian art, and that in practice Christian artists were less inhibited than one would have assumed from the literary evidence;[21] but in principle figurative art of any kind was something which Christians would do best to dispense with. If it was not condemned outright, it was denigrated as distracting make-believe; it was to be kept out of the churches or, when it could not be kept out, to be tolerated there as visual aids for the illiterate; later it was even encouraged as such,[22] but the perfect, as they hastened to assure themselves, derived no pleasure from it.[23] Christian art, in short, was granted recognition by a series of concessions.[24] Now had the spokesmen of Christianity been

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[17] Michael the Syrian, *Chronique* IV (ed. and tr. J.-B. Chabot), Paris 1899–1910, p. 457 = vol. II, pp. 489f.

[18] Cf. Brown, "A Dark-Age Crisis", p. 24. Brown's characterization of the Iconoclast controversy as a debate on the position of the holy in Byzantine society is very apt (*ibid.*, p. 5).

[19] Note that Theophanes attributes to Arab influence Leo's hostility not only to images, but also to saints and relics (Theophanes, *Chronographia* I [ed. C. de Boor], Leipzig 1883–85, p. 406, A.M. 6218).

[20] H. Koch, *Die altchristliche Bilderfrage nach den literarischen Quellen*, Göttingen 1917, especially p. 86; E. Bevan, *Holy Images*, London 1940, pp. 84ff; cf. also N.H. Baynes, "Idolatry and the Early Church," in his *Byzantine Studies and Other Essays*, London 1955. The early Christians might well have argued that the prohibition was not to be taken literally, as the later Christians were to do (cf. John of Damascus, *Oratio III* in *MPG* XCIV cols. 1325f.), and if they took so long to reach this conclusion, it was doubtless because there were too many pagan idols around to make it safe; compare the hardening of Jewish attitudes to images when Christian idols in their turn became commonplace (below, n. 30).

[21] That much one may grant Sister C. Murray, "Art and the Early Church," *Journal of Theological Studies* NS 28 (1977); but her argument that all attacks on art referred to idolatrous representations, or did not mean what they said, or else were fabricated, is clearly partisan (for the traditional Catholic and Protestant views on the subject, see Bevan, *op. cit.*, pp. 95ff.).

[22] For these positions, see *ibid.*, pp. 85–9, 106–16, 125–7; Baynes, "Idolatry," p. 136.

[23] P.J. Alexander, "Hypatius of Ephesus. A Note on Image Worship in the Sixth Century," *Harvard Theological Review* 44 (1952), pp. 178ff.

[24] In Islam, by contrast, such concessions to practice were staunchly refused.

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asked to concede no more than that, the outbreak of Iconoclasm would hardly have been so easy tb provoke. But by the seventh century it had long been painfully obvious to everyone that representations of holy persons had actually come to be worshipped.[25] That the Christians should thus have relapsed into idolatry is not, of course, entirely accidental. Where the holy law of Judaism or Islam is a concrete feature of everyday reality, divine grace by contrast is a more elusive entity which may have been incarnate in the past and which continues to generate miracles on Sundays, but which stands in need of additional modes of manifestation on Monday mornings: the point about images, saints and relics is precisely that they make the holy and the humdrum meet.[26] But for those who think, it was evidently not a comforting thought that the Christians were engaged in a daily violation of God's will, and bad conscience was never far below the surface.[27] It is just possible that the classical justification of image worship had begun to be elaborated before the Arabs arrived on the scene, though a case can equally be made for placing its beginning after their arrival;[28] and whatever the date of the treatises in question, they only had the classical theory in its embryonic form: long after the Arab conquests, invocations of scriptual precedents for images, appeals to their educational value and *denials* that they were more than reminders of past grace,

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[25] Cf. E. Kitzinger, "The Cult of Images in the Age before Iconoclasm," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 8 (1954), pp. 88ff.

[26] That comes across very well in Michael II's description of popular habits, in his letter to Louis the Pious (Martin, *Iconoclastic Controversy*, p. 30). As far as women were concerned, icons were simply a fancy version of cuddly animals – as Theodora so neatly illustrated when she was caught kissing an icon and pretended it was a doll (*ibid.*, p. 210); the role of women in both iconodule riots and iconodule restorations has often been noted.

[27] Kitzinger, *op. cit.*, p. 113; cf. also Baynes' observation that the anti-Jewish writings were meant to reassure the Christians rather than to persuade the Jews ("The Icons before Iconoclasm," in his *Byzantine Studies and Other Essays*, p. 236).

[28] As applied to statues of the emperor, the theory that the honour paid to an image is referred to the prototype had become sufficiently familiar for Basil of Caesarea and Athanasius of Alexandria to invoke it in illustration of the relationship between the Father and the Son in the fourth century (Basil, *Liber de Spiritu Sancto, MPG* XXXII, col. 149; Athanasius, *Oratio III contra Arianos, ibid.*, XXVI, col. 332); but as an apology for worship or representations of divinities, it was still considered a pagan argument by John Philoponus in the mid-6th century (Alexander, *The Patriarch Nicephorus*, p. 35), and is first met as a Christian argument in the works of Leontius of Neapolis and John of Thessalonica in the early 7th (*ibid.*, p. 33). Now, unlike the Arab conquests, the Persian wars can hardly explain this sudden need to justify the cult of icons: the rapprochement between the Persians and the Jews was very shortlived and, moreover, it was not conceptual. Since Leontius died after 650, he may well have written after the Arab conquests (L. Rydén, *Das Leben des heiligen Symeons von Leontios von Neapolis*, Uppsala 1963, p. 17); and so also may John of Thessalonica. It is true that the person of that name who wrote the discourses on the Life of St. Demetrius was archbishop between 610 and 649 (and that in the earlier rather than the later part of this period); but the grounds for identifying him with the author of the treatise on images are extremely weak (M. Jugie, "La vie et les oeuvres de Jean de Thessalonique," *Echos d'Orient* 21 [1922]). The John of Thessalonica who participated in the Council of 680f. seems at least as plausible a candidate (*ibid.*, p. 293).

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remained the primary method of Christian defence.[29] At the time of the conquest, then, the Christian nerve-end was still completely exposed. All that was required for the *mise-en-scène* of Iconoclasm was someone to come and punch it.

The Arabs were eminently qualified for this role in that from the start they took the Mosaic prohibition seriously.[30] The prohibition is found, not in the Koran which merely condemns idols in general, but in *ḥadīth*, the sayings attributed to the Prophet which make up the oral law of the Muslims.[31] In this literature, which was recorded in the eighth and ninth centuries, representations of animate beings are condemned partly on the old Judaic ground that they are idolatrous,[32] and partly

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[29] So even to Leontius himself (cf. Baynes, "Icons before Iconoclasm," pp. 230ff.). The defence, as Kitzinger notes, lagged behind the attack ("Cult of Images," p. 87).

[30] It is important for the Muslim attitude to images that Islam hived off from Judaism after the permissive attitudes of the Hellenistic Jews had been eroded by the rise of the Christian God. This hardening of Jewish views is not well attested in Jewish literature, but there is ample attestation outside it. On the archaeological side, we have the deliberate destruction of figurative images in the synagogues of Dura-Europos and Palestine (C.H. Kraeling, *The Synagogue* [*The Excavations at Dura Europos, Final Report* VIII, pt. 1], New Haven 1956, p. 338; E.L. Sukenik, *Ancient Synagogues in Palestine and Greece*, London 1934, pp. 62, 65; J.-B. Frey, "La Question des images chez les Juifs à la lumière des récentes découvertes," *Biblica* 15 [1934], p. 298). On the literary side, there is Christian attestation of Jewish (and Samaritan) destruction of Christian images, in the Life of St. Symeon the Younger, the letter of St. Symeon to Justin II, the *Relatio* of Arculf, and Gregory of Tours; and endless accusations of idolatry are levelled at the Christians in anti-Jewish writings (Kitzinger, "Cult of Images," pp. 129f, 130n.). Note also Germanus' statement in 724, that the Jews have *long* accused the Christians of idolatry (*Epistola ad Thomam episcopum Claudiopoleos, MPG* XCVIII, col. 168), and Agobard's observation a century later in the West that the Jews consider the Christians idolatrous and believe miracles to be the work of devils, not of saints (*Epistola de judaicis superstitionibus, MPL* CIV, col. 88).

[31] Christian style arguments for a general relaxation of the prohibition (as opposed to specific dispensations) were not unknown to the Muslims; cf. the stray invocation of the Koranic references to Solomon's statues and Jesus' clay birds; but they are adduced only to be rejected. Christians and Muslims alike held that images had been prohibited because idolatry had once been prevalent, in the days of Moses according to the former, those of Jesus according to the latter. But where the Christians inferred that images were now permitted, the Muslims concluded that the prohibition must still be observed (B. Farès, "Philosophie et jurisprudence illustré par les Arabes: la querelle des images en Islam," in *Mélanges Massignon* II, Damascus 1956f., pp. 100ff.).

[32] R. Paret, "Textbelege zum islamischen Bilderverbot," in *Das Werk des Künstlers, Studien zur Ikonographie und Formgeschichte H. Schrade dargebracht*, Stuttgart 1960. Note the straight carry-over from rabbinical to Islamic rules of desecration by mutilation or disrespect. An image on a Jewish cup is desecrated by water running over it, one on a Muslim chafing-dish by being burnt; the Jews may have animate representations on mosaic floors, and the Muslims may have them on carpets and cushions; and what has been covered by dirt is inoffensive to both (E.E. Urbach, "The Rabbinical Laws of Idolatry in the Second and Third Centuries in the Light of Archaeological and Historical Facts," *Israel Exploration Journal* 9 (1959), pp. 233, 237n.; J. Neusner, *Talmudic Judaism in Sasanian Babylonia*, Leiden 1976, p. 88n.; T.W. Arnold, *Painting in Islam*, Oxford 1928, pp. 7ff; Paret, "Textbelege," pp. 40 ff, 45 ff; *idem.*, "Das Islamische Bilderverbot und die Schia," *Festschrift W. Caskel*, Leiden 1968, pp. 226, 228f; ʿAbd al-Razzāq b. Hammām al-Ṣanʿānī, *al Muṣannaf* (ed. H.-R. al-Aʿẓamī), Beirut 1970–, X (p. 399,

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on the newer ground, which is of more uncertain origin, that they involve a presumptuous attempt to imitate the creative power of God.[33] This second reason is first attested in the ninth century and may not be much earlier,[34] but the fear of idolatry finds eloquent expression in Umayyad and early ʿAbbāsid art. Animate beings are represented wherever they could not be interpreted as idolatrous as, for example, in the secular and usually very private context of royal palaces, though even here the art is basically aniconic.[35] But they are meticulously avoided wherever the suspicion of idolatry might arise, as in most public places and above all in religious contexts.[36] This is not to say that there were no flagrant exceptions.[37] But

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No. 19489). There were, of course, rigorists in both camps who would have none of such concessions, but note that the Jews made figurative mosaic floors as late as the 6th century, long after the reaction against statues and paintings had set in (Sukenik, *Ancient Synagogues*, p. 65).

[33] Paret, "Textbelege," pp. 43ff; compare Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata* VI, 16, 144, where even inanimate representations are condemned on this score. That Clement is here adducing the standard Muslim objection to images was noted by Bevan, who also found a remarkable Talmudic parallel: Joshua b. Levi (ca. AD 250) contrasted the painter's inability to put souls into his pictures with God's power to animate what he shapes, concluding that there is no sculptor like our God (*Berakhoth*, f. 10a; Bevan, *Holy Images*, pp. 83, 87). The point of the comparison, however, is God's grandeur rather than the iniquity of painters, and though the dictum recurs elsewhere, it never seems to be used for a sweeping condemnation of art (cf. Urbach, "The Rabbinical Laws of Idolatry," p. 237; compare the absence of such condemnations in Koran 59:24, where God is also a *muṣawwir*). Clement, moreover, makes a special concession in favour of representations on signet rings, as do also the Muslims (*Paedagogus* III, 12, 1: cf. below, n. 36). It is true that here he is concerned with the frivolity of art rather than the prerogatives of God, and his genuine writings are not known to have enjoyed much circulation in the Christian Middle East; but there seems to be no trace in Islam of the complex rabbinic rulings regarding signet rings (cf. *Avodah Zarah*, f. 43b). On balance, then, the evidence would suggest a Clementine rather than a rabbinic ancestry for this argument.

[34] It was known to Abū Qurra (d. ca. 820) and ʿAbd al-Razzāq (d. 827), and Becker's conjecture that it was of fairly recent origin is to some extent borne out by the fact that it appears only in the *ḥadīth*s attributed to the Prophet: the (presumably earlier) Companion *ḥadīth*s give no reasons for their hostility to images (Becker, *Islamstudien*, Leipzig 1924–32, I, p. 447; ʿAbd al-Razzāq b. Hammām, *Musannaf* X, pp. 396ff, Nos. 19483ff.).

[35] O. Grabar, *The Formation of Islamic Art*, New Haven–London 1973, pp. 91ff; R. Ettinghausen, *Arab Painting*, Cleveland 1962, pp. 29–44; cf. Arnold, *Painting in Islam*, pp. 19f.

[36] O. Grabar, "Islam and Iconoclasm," in Bryer & Herrin, *Iconoclasm*, p. 47; *idem*, *Formation of Islamic Art*, p. 93 (note the elegant example of Mshatta, where the mosque wall is the only one to have no animate decorations). Grabar's own theory (stated, *inter alia*, in Bryer & Herrin, *loc. cit.*, and in his notes appended to M.G.S. Hodgson, "Islam and Image," *History of Religions* 3 [1963f.]) that the Arabs rejected images because they could not create a meaningful iconography without becoming like the Christians thus holds good for secular art alone; and even here it is hardly the *only* explanation. There is indeed a striking example of an unsuccessful search for an Islamic iconography in ʿAbd al-Malik's coinage (O. Grabar, "Islamic Art and Byzantium," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 18 [1964], p. 80), but then ʿAbd al-Malik was a Muslim high-priest and the Muslim rabbis had no doubt that iconic coins might invalidate prayer (Paret, "Das Islamische Bilderverbot und die Schia," pp. 225 ff.; compare *Avodah Zarah*, f. 50a = *Pesaḥim*, f. 104a; given that the concern with iconic coins became largely obsolete with ʿAbd al-Malik's monetary reform, these traditions would appear to be a noteworthy example of

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it is certainly hard to deny that, their black stone apart, the Muslims were almost completely free of pagan sins. Hence they could assault the Christians with impunity.

And so indeed they did. Behaviourally, Arab hostility to pictures and other idolatrous objects such as the cross finds expression in the sporadic removal or destruction of both from the time of the early conquests onwards.[38] Legally, the hostility is endorsed in the demand that crosses be kept out of public sight,[39] and in the permission to break both images and crosses provided that compensation is paid for the raw materials.[40] And polemically, the Arabs can be seen to take up the old arguments of the Jews against the Christians from the mid-Umayyad period onwards.[41] The Jews had, of course, long been in the habit of reminding the

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Shī'ite archaism). The Companion *hadīths* in 'Abd al-Razzāq are hostile to representations of animate beings regardless of context, and even inanimate ones come under attack when they are sculptural (*Muṣannaf* X, pp. 398 ff., Nos. 19487–9, 19493f.). Scholarly endorsement of animate representations is in fact extremely rare, though there is a notable example in the case of signet rings (Ibn Sa'd, *Kitāb al-ṭabaqāt* [ed. E. Sachau] Leiden 1905–40, IV, pp. 96, 146, 210; VII, pt. I, pp. 5, 11, 71).

[37] According to Aslam b. Sahl al-Razzāz al-Wāsiṭī, *Ta'rīkh Wāsiṭ* (ed. G. 'Awwād), Baghdad 1967, p. 76, the newly built *mosque* of Wāsiṭ was graced with a Venus whose breasts served as water spouts. Whether Ḥajjāj had argued, in the style of R. Gamaliel, that there is a difference between making a mosque for Aphrodite and making an Aphrodite as an adornment for the mosque, is not recorded (cf. Mishnah, *Avodah Zarah*, 3:4).

[38] One of the Saracens living in the Church of St. Theodore, shortly after the conquest of Syria, shot an arrow at the image of the saint which immediately began to bleed (F. Nau [tr.], *Les Récits inédits du moine Anastase* [= Extrait de la Revue de l'Institut Catholique de Paris], Paris, 1902, p. 54; the story is repeated by John of Damascus, *Oratio III*, col. 1393). Aṣbagh b. 'Abd al-'Azīz spat at an image of the virgin in Egypt, promising to uproot the Christians from the land (Severus b. al-Muqaffa', *History of the Patriarchs of the Coptic Church of Alexandria* [ed. and tr. B. Evetts], in *Patrologia Orientalis* V, p. 52). The Council of Nicaea knew of a Saracen who knocked out the eye of an image, whereupon his own eyes immediately fell out (Martin, *Iconoclastic Controversy*, p. 29). Crosses were removed in various places soon after the conquest of Syria (Michael the Syrian, *Chronique* IV, pp. 421f = II, pp. 431f; *Chronicon ad annum Christi 1234 pertinens* [ed. J.-B. Chabot and tr. J.-B. Chabot & A. Abouna] [= CSCO, Scriptores Syri, vols. 36–7, 56, 154], Louvain 1920–74, vol. I, pp. 262f. = 205). In Egypt they were destroyed in the 680's (E. Amélineau [ed. and tr.], *Histoire du Patriarche Copte Isaac* [= Publications de l'École des Lettres d'Alger], Paris 1890, p. 43; Severus, *Patriarchs of Alexandria*, p. 25). Maslama promised to break the cross over Leo III's head in 717 and, after the battle of Bagrevan in 772, the Arabs removed the sacred objects and relics from the church and broke the glorious cross of Christ (Łevond, *Histoire* pp. 104, 147).

[39] A.S. Tritton, *The Caliphs and their non-Muslim Subjects*, London 1930, pp. 6f., 9ff., 13f., 102.

[40] Muḥammad b. Idrīs al-Shāfi'ī, *Kitāb al-Umm*, Bulaq 1321–25, IV, pp. 131f., with other casuistic details.

[41] "Dispute that took place between an Arab and a monk of the convent of Bēth Ḥālē," Codex Diyarbekir 95, ff. 5a–6a (for the date of this work see Crone & Cook, *Hagarism*, p. 163, n. 23; the Arab enquires about the Christian worship of the Abgar image, crosses and bones of saints, and refers to the fact that the Israelites received a "sentence of capital punishment" everytime they worshipped things made with human hands; the monk adduces the brazen serpent, the ark of the covenant and other biblical examples [though not the cherubim] and is

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Christians of their sore-spot,[42] but it was only with Arab backing that the Jewish arguments could really hurt. And hurt they clearly did. On the Syrian side, just about *all* the anti-Jewish tracts suddenly deal with images and related objects;[43] and on the Byzantine side there is a case for dating the two major pre-Iconoclast treatises in favour of images to the years following the Arab conquests.[44]

We thus have a situation in which something was very likely to happen on the Christian side. Now in 721 there was a rather unusual outbreak of official iconoclasm among the Arabs, when Yazīd II (720-24) began a systematic destruction of Christian images and crosses, not just in public places, but also in churches and private homes;[45] and it was then that something did happen among the Christians. In 724 there was an outbreak of popular iconoclasm in Anatolia and by 726 it had reached Constantinople.[46] This extraordinary chronological sequence is not likely

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familir with Basil's idea that "we revere the picture of the king for the sake of the king"); Sourdel, "Un pamphlet anonyme," pp. 29 = 17f.; A. Jeffery (tr.), "Ghevond's Text of the Correspondence between ʿUmar II and Leo III," *Harvard Theological Review* 37 (1944), p. 278; ʿAbd al-Jabbār b. Aḥmad al-Hamadhānī, *Tathbīt dalāʾil al-nubuwwa* 1 (ed. ʿA. ʿUthmān), Beirut [1966], p. 167 = S.M. Stern, "ʿAbd al-Jabbār's Account of how Christ's Religion was Falsified by the Adoption of Roman Customs" *Journal of Theological Studies* NS 29(1968), p. 147; cf. Becker, *Islamstudien* I, p. 448. For later attacks on the cult of images, crosses, graves and the Virgin, see Fritsch, *Islam und Christentum im Mittelalter*, pp. 138ff; Vryonis, *The Decline of Hellenism*, p. 434; and note the reappearance in the former work of the old Jewish question why the Christians do not worship asses (Fritsch, *op. cit.*, p. 139, compare Bardy, *Trophées de Damas*, p. 248). In the *Quaestiones*, the Christian has heard this question from Jews and pagans (*Hellēnoi*); and since he had hardly been exposed to genuine pagans, we probably have here a translation of the Syriac *ḥanpē*, a common term for Muslims (*Quaestiones*, cols. 621f, question xl).

    [42] Cf. above, n. 30.

    [43] Thus, the *Doctrina Iacobi* and the *Quaestiones* (cf. Baynes, "The Icons before Iconoclasm", p. 237), the *Trophées de Damas*, the Dialogue of Papiscus and Philo (assuming that it is indeed Syrian), Jérome of Jerusalem, Stephen of Bostra and some Athanasian *spuria* (Williams, *Adversus Judaeos*, pp. 159ff.). Similarly, the *Disputation of Sergius the Stylite*, which goes to town about crosses, images and bones of saints alike (pp. 22ff. = 24ff.).

    [44] Cf. above, n. 31.

    [45] A.A. Vasiliev, "The Iconoclastic Edict of the Caliph Yazid II, A.D. 721," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 9 (1955). The historicity of the decree is not in doubt. It is attested in Greek, Syriac, Egyptian and Armenian sources, and of these both the Syriac and the Egyptian traditions are clearly local (cf. the Syrian recollection that it was Maslama who was responsible for the enforcement of the decree, and Kindī's detail on the statue in the bath of Zabbān b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz); there is excellent archaeological evidence of deliberate excision of animate figures from Christian pictures in Syria and Egypt; and the insistence of the Syriac and Greek traditions that Jews were called in to do the job certainly lends credibility to the accounts (compare the use of Jews to remove crosses from churches in Jerusalem as recorded by Michael the Syrian and the chronicle of 1234 (for the references, see n. 38), and to demolish the Church of St. John for the construction of the Great Mosque of Damascus as attested in the Islamic tradition (Tritton, *The Caliphs and their non-Muslim Subjects*, p. 95).

    [46] G. Ostrogorsky, "Les débuts de la querelle des images," *Mélanges C. Diehl* I, Paris 1930. Theophanes' suggestion that Leo began to display his hostility to images already in 724f. is not so unlikely: the volcanic eruption in 726 was simply the sign that spurred him into action (cf.

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to be coincidental, and two further points reinforce the suspicion that what we see is a pattern. First, when Constantine of Nacoleia, the Phrygian bishop involved in the iconoclast outbreak of 724, argued that pictures were idolatrous and against the law, Germanus, the Patriarch, sent him a letter telling him not to worry: their attacks on the Christians notwithstanding, the Jews are also idolatrous, and so for that matter are the Saracens who worship the black stone.[47] The contemporary Germanus, in other words, had no doubts that the raw nerve of the Phrygians had been hit by Jewish and Arab polemics. Secondly, in Armenia there was a suggestive revival of iconoclasm after the arrival of the Arabs,[48] while in the West there was an isolated outburst of iconoclasm at the hands of a bishop who came from Spain, combined his attack on images with an onslaught on intercession and saints and was, moreover, an Adoptianist, that is, an adherent of a Spanish heresy which had certainly been launched in response to Islam.[49] The Arabs, in other words, appear to have hit raw nerves wherever they went.[50] In sum, we have a general expectation that Islam might provoke iconoclasm, a perfect chronological sequence, explicit contemporary testimonia and striking parallels — a cluster of evidence which is all the more impressive for coming from a period for which most of the source material has been lost.[51] To dismiss all this as accidental would require a scepticism verging on the fideist.

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ibid., pp. 240f.). But whether an edict was actually issued before 730 scarcely matters in this context.

[47] Germanus, *Epistola*, col. 168.

[48] S. Der Nersessian, "Une apologie des images du septième siècle," *Byzantion* 17 (1944–45), p. 71.

[49] Martin, *Iconoclastic Controversy*, pp. 262 ff. Note that Claudius of Turin also asked the Christians why they did not worship asses (*ibid.*, p. 266).

[50] They would appear to have hit even the Jews; cf. Qūmisī's rejection of incense, lamps and prostrations before the scrolls of the law in the synagogues (J. Mann, "A Tract by an early Karaite Settler in Jerusalem," *Jewish Quarterly Review* 12 [1922], p. 277 = 266; cf. N. Wieder, *The Judean Scrolls and Karaism*, London 1962, p. 267); the Gaonic embarrassment about mosaic floors in synagogues (Neusner, *Talmudic Judaism*, p.88n.; cf. n. 32); and the sarcastic references of a 10th-century Rabbanite to Christian icons and paintings (J. Mann, "An Early Theologico-Polemical Work," *Hebrew Union College Annual* 12–13 [1937–38], p. 417). Christian iconoclasm on the other side of the border by contrast failed to inhibit Jewish speculations about the images on Solomon's throne (E. Ville-Patlagean, "Une image de Solomon en basileus byzantin," *Revue des Etudes Juives* 121 [1962], pp. 26 ff.). And conversely Muslim iconoclasm failed to infect the Christians within the Arab dominions, presumably because unlike the Christians outside and the Jews within, they had to hang on to what they had.

[51] Note also the effect of Christian counter-accusations on the Arabs. Germanus having identified the black stone as idolatrous, 'Umar had qualms about kissing it (Vasiliev, "The Iconoclastic Edict of the Caliph Yazid II," p. 27; the black stone is similarly presented as the Muslim equivalent of the cross in K. Vollers (tr.), "Das Religionsgespräch von Jerusalem (um 800 D) aus dem Arabischen übersetzt," *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte* 29 [1908], pp. 215f., and in Jeffery, "Ghevond's Text," pp. 322f.). Abū Qurra's charge, that God tells the angels to kneel for Adam in the Koran, is dealt with by Ibn Ḥazm, who presumably found his arguments in earlier sources (Becker, *Islamstudien* I, p. 449).

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A similar case can be made for law. That the Christians have no law was a favourite Muslim accusation which is attested already in 644[52] and which likewise gave backing to Jewish arguments.[53] The Christian reaction can be followed in Iraq. Already in 676 a preamble to the acts of a Nestorian synod displayed an unusual interest in Christian jurisprudence,[54] and after the transfer of the Muslim capital to Iraq in 750, the Nestorians busied themselves refurbishing the theoretical foundations of Christian law on the one hand[55] and compiling books of substantive law on the other;[56] and the man who perhaps began this activity explicitly referred to the Jewish and Arab polemics which had set him going.[57] Now if one turns from ʿAbbāsid Iraq to Umayyad Syria, one finds that the Arabs had precisely the same effect on the Christians across the border in Byzantium, where Leo III compiled his Eclogue.

The Eclogue is an unusual document. For one thing, Byzantine emperors did not often compile legal codes: after Justinian only Leo III and Basil I (867-86) did so, and Basil explicitly stated that he did so in order to blot out Leo's compilation.[58] For another, both Justinian and Basil were interested in Roman law, whereas Leo's concern was Christian: where Basil improved his selection of Roman

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[52] F. Nau (ed. and tr.), "Un colloque du Patriarche Jean avec l'émir des Agaréens," *Journal Asiatique* (11ème série) 5 (1915), p. 251 = 261 (where the accusation still takes the form of a question: are the Christian laws in the Gospel or not?).

[53] They seem in fact to have done more than that. The standard Jewish question before the rise of Islam is why the Christians have abrogated the law of Moses, not why they have no proper replacement; but by the late 8th century it is the second question that both Jews and Muslims ask (for the reference see below, n. 57).

[54] J.-B. Chabot (ed. and tr.), *Synodicon Orientale ou Recueil de synodes nestoriens* (= *Notices et extraits des manuscripts de la Bibliothèque Nationale* XXXVII), Paris 1902, pp. 215f = 480f. Contrast the absence of such preoccupations in the earlier preambles.

[55] Crone and Cook, *Hagarism*, p. 180, n. 18. Compare the preamble to the Syro-Roman lawbook, which would appear to be the Jacobite answer to the same accusations (K.G. Bruns & F. Sachau [eds. and trs.], *Syrisch-römisches Rechtsbuch*, Leipzig 1880, preambles to Fr., P., Ar., Arm.; A. Vööbus [ed. and tr.], *The Synodicon in the West Syrian Tradition* II [CSCO, Scriptores Syri, vols. CLXI-CXLIIII], Louvain 1975–76, pp. 100 f = 106ff; cf. also E. Sachau [ed. and tr.], *Syrische Rechtsbücher*, Berlin 1907–14, 1, pp. 46f = 47f., for its Nestorian version). The preamble is missing from the 6th century manuscript of the lawbook, and there is no evidence of interest in Christian jurisprudence in pre-Islamic Syria: even John Bar Qursos, who does broach the subject, is interested in obedience rather than principles (Vööbus, *op. cit.* I, pp. 145f. = 142f.). A pre-Islamic date thus seems implausible. But conversely, of course, it may be very late, for it is first attested in an 11th century manuscript (Bruns & Sachau, *op. cit.*, p. 159), and as late as the 13th century Christians felt impelled to justify their antinomianism (M. Steinschneider, *Polemische und apologetische Literatur in arabischer Sprache zwischen Muslimen, Christen und Juden*, Leipzig 1877, p. 33).

[56] It is worth noting that the first codifier of Christian law in Armenia is John of Ojun (ca. 720).

[57] Sachau, *Syrische Rechtsbücher* III, p. 20 = 21 (Ishoʿbokht).

[58] I. Zepos & P. Zepos, *Ius Graeco-Romanorum* II, Athens 1961, pp. 116, 237; cf. E.H. Freshfield, "The Official Manuals of Roman Law of the Eighth and Ninth Centuries," *The Cambridge Law Journal* 4 (1930), pp. 44f.

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laws in the direction of greater *utility*,[59] Leo by contrast improved his in the direction of greater *philanthropy*, a term which, however it is to be understood, was certainly loaded with Christian connotations.[60] But it is above all Leo's Old Testament orientation which is unusual.[61] It is apparent in the selection of script-ural quotations, in the literal application of the Mosaic principle of retribution,[62] in the selection of Mosaic laws appended to the Eclogue by either Leo himself or one of his Iconoclast successors,[63] and, most strikingly, in the presentation of the Eclogue as scriptural law in Leo's preamble.[64] This orientation is very much in line with the general Iconoclast attachment to the Old Testament;[65] and it is of course manifest Judaizing.[66]

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[59] Zepos & Zepos, *Ius Graeco-Romanorum* II, p. 116 = Freshfield, "Official Manuals," p. 43.

[60] Zepos & Zepos, *op. cit.*, p. 11 = E.H. Freshfield (tr.), *A Manual of Roman Law, the Ecloga*, Cambridge 1926, p. 66; cf. T.E. Gregory, "The Ekloga of Leo III and the Concept of Philanthropia," *Byzantina* 7 (1975).

[61] S. Gero, *Byzantine Iconoclasm during the Reign of Leo III* (= CSCO, Subsidia, vol. 41), Louvain 1973, pp. 56f.

[62] Gregory, "The Ekloga of Leo III," p. 277.

[63] The appendices to the Eclogue, which consist partly of imperial legislation and partly of Mosaic law, were not found in the manuscripts used by Zachariae von Lingenthal, whose edition is reproduced in Zepos & Zepos, but in a 16th century manuscript which was edited by A.G. Montferratus, *Ecloga Leonis et Constantini*, Athens 1889 (this is the edition used by Freshfield for his translation of the Eclogue), and in a Norman manuscript of imperial codes dating from the 12th century (E.H. Freshfield [tr.], *A Manual of Later Roman Law*, Cambridge 1927, p. 6). There is no doubt that the appendices were added officially. Now, the Norman manuscript includes the *Procheiron Nomos* and a novel of Basil, but no later legislation, presumably because the Arabs completed their conquest of Sicily in 878 (*ibid.*, p. 2), so the appendices must have been added before then; and since no Iconodule ruler (least of all Basil) would wish to augment, as opposed to supersede, the Eclogue, the only question is which Iconoclast emperor did it, a point of subsidiary interest in this context. The concern with sorcerers, magicians, Manicheans and heretics in the appendices might indicate a time when Paulicians and Athinganoi were very much in the open, i.e. the second Iconoclast period, and if that is correct, Michael II is an obvious candidate for the authorship.

[64] Leo's preamble may be paraphrased as follows: God gave man a law so that he might be saved; His word endures for ever and He will judge man according to his deeds; *therefore* I, who have been bidden to feed my flock, will break the bonds of wickedness by drawing up a selection of Roman laws in an intelligible language. Leo's Roman laws are thus part of God's enduring words. Contrast the wholly pragmatic attitude of Basil: the law is in a frightful mess which is tiresome to students (Zepos & Zepos, *op. cit.*, p. 115 = Freshfield, 'Official Manuals,' p. 43).

[65] Cf. Theodore the Studite's mockery of the Iconoclasts for their Old Testament obsession (Martin, *Iconoclastic Controversy*, p. 192).

[66] That the Iconoclasts were Judaizers was not lost on contemporaries (cf. Gero, *Byzantine Iconoclasm*, p. 60). But note that in the domain of political authority the Iconoclasts opted, not for a Solomonic restoration in the style of the contemporary Franks, but for a Byzantine caliphate: Leo III's assertion that he was both high-priest and emperor, Leo V's order that the bishops must regard him as the highest ecclesiastical authority, Leo III's and Constantine V's appeal to the laity over the heads of the clergy, and Constantine V's uncanonical election of a Patriarch all recall the Islamic imāmate, not the Jewish monarchy (Ostrogorsky, "Débuts,"

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In view of the Nestorian parallel, this unusual code can plausibly be seen as a response to Islam, and again there are two subsidiary points to reinforce the plausibility. First, it is notable that the Byzantines should opt for scriptural law where the Nestorians, by contrast, chose to buttress their law with the concept of a Christian oral tradition.[67] To put it rather summarily, these diverse reactions correspond very neatly with the two major stages in the evolution of Muslim jurisprudence.[68] Second, it is notable that Leo should open his preamble by proclaiming that man has been endowed with free will.[69] On the one hand, free will was not a conventional *topos* of legal preambles;[70] and on the other, it had just become a major issue in Islam[71] so that already John of Damascus thought of determinism as a key Saracen tenet.[72] To someone coming from an Islamic background Leo's statement sounds extremely aggressive, and it is hard to believe that it was not meant as such, particularly as he goes on to state his confidence that, by "breaking the bonds of wickedness" with his law, he may be victorious over his enemies.[73] For Leo, who had risen to the throne shortly before, or during the siege of Constantinople, the Arabs were *the* enemies. The Eclogue was thus conceived as an instrument of Christian warfare against the Arabs, a rectification of the faith so that God might rejoin the Byzantines; and this is perhaps the neatest evidence that Byzantine Judaizing was a response to the moral and military incursions of the Arabs into the Byzantine world.

Now the Arab-Byzantine interaction might well have taken place directly; there was no lack of direct confrontation, be it military, political, polemical or cultural at the highest level,[74] and the diplomatic warfare that was waged on contemporary coinage was certainly part of such a direct dialogue.[75] There is, nonetheless, a case to be made for an intermediary milieu.

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p. 250; Martin, *Iconoclastic Controversy*, pp. 52, 179; Alexander, *The Patriarch Nicephorus*, pp. 9, 11; contrast W. Ullmann, *The Carolingian Renaissance and the Idea of Kingship*, London 1969).

[67] Crone & Cook, *Hagarism*, p. 181, n. 18.

[68] *Ibid.*, pp. 29f., 38.

[69] Zepos & Zepos, *Ius Graeco-Romanorum* II, p. 12 = Freshfield, *The Ecloga*, p. 66.

[70] It is absent from Justinian's Codex, Basil's *Procheiron Nomos* and the Syrian codes.

[71] J. Van Ess, *Zwischen Ḥadīṯ und Theologie*, Berlin–New York 1975, p. 181. Given Van Ess's dating of the controversy, it is not surprising that the *topos* is still absent from the Nestorian preamble of 676.

[72] John of Damascus, *Disputatio Saraceni et Christiani* in *MPG* CVI, cols. 1336ff. (reprinted with an English translation in D.J. Sahas, *John of Damascus on Islam*, Leiden 1972, pp. 142ff.); for the authorship of this work see Khoury, *Théologiens byzantins et l'Islam*, pp. 68–71.

[73] Zepos & Zepos, *op. cit.*, p. 13 = Freshfield, *The Ecloga*, p. 67.

[74] Cf. H.A.R. Gibb, "Arab–Byzantine Relations under the Umayyad Caliphate," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 12 (1958).

[75] Though needless to say, there are those who believe it a mere coincidence that Justinian II (685–95, 705–11) called himself *servus Christi* and put images of Christ on his coins, while ʿAbd al-Malik (685–705) was experimenting with his *miḥrāb* and *ʿanaza* coins.

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The milieu in question is one of Judaizers who had, so to speak, gone over the edge to become Judeo-Christians. There was nothing new about the existence of such groups, and Judaizers who had to a greater or lesser extent gone over the edge are attested, *inter alia,* in fifth-century Phrygia[76] and in Syria from the fourth to the thirteenth century, the Syrians in particular being recidivists.[77] But once again Islam made a difference. For one thing, it was always in the Muslim interest to play minorities against the mainstream traditions;[78] and for another, Muslims and Judeo-Christians were natural allies in that both claimed to be representatives of true Christianity. Islam made Judeo-Christianity a polemically viable position, and accordingly the Judeo-Christians came out of hiding and began to recruit. On the Byzantine side there is some weak evidence of baptized Jews being known as Montanists, presumably in Phrygia;[79] and it is also in Phrygia, more precisely in Amorium, that we find the Athinganoi who combined Christianity with Mosaic law and Gnostic beliefs;[80] they appear, in fact, to have been Samaritan Gnostics, a point which will be taken up later. On the Arab side there is a tenth century attestation of Christians, apparently in the Jazīra, who rejected the divinity of Jesus, accepting him only as a good man and more specifically as a good Jew[81] — a point which distinguishes them from the many other Christians in Iraq, Egypt, Armenia and Spain who, on exposure to the Muslims, denied that Jesus was other

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[76] A. Sharf, *Byzantine Jewry from Justianian to the First Crusade,* London 1971, p. 73; cf. also p. 34 for Judaizers in 5th-century North Africa.

[77] For the evidence, see S. Kazan, "Isaac of Antioch's Homily against the Jews," *Oriens Christianus* 97, 99 (1963, 1965), to which Hayman, *The Disputation of Sergius the Stylite,* pp. 73f. = 72f. should now be added. Cf. also B. Blumenkranz, *Juifs et chrétiens dans le monde occidental,* Paris 1960, pp. 55ff., for medieval Europe. Most of this Judaizing appears to have been behavioural rather than doctrinal, a point which distinguishes it from that which was to appear in the Islamic world.

[78] For a striking illustration from the time of Ma'mūn, see Michael the Syrian, *Chronique* IV, p. 517 = III, p. 56; cf. also C. Cahen, "Points de vue sur la révolution ʿabbāside," *Revue Historique* 230 (1963), p. 299.

[79] Leo the Grammarian has it that the Jews baptized by Leo were known as Montanists, and an abjuration formula mentions that the Montanists stand outside the synagogue for unspecified reasons (A. Sharf, "The Jews, the Montanists and the Emperor Leo III," *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 59 (1966), p. 40; Sharf's suggestion that the Montanists, who preferred death to baptism by Leo, were also such Jews is, however, not convincing).

[80] Timothy of Constantinople, *De Receptione Haereticorum, MPG* LXXXVI [1], col. 33, translated by G. Bardy, "Melchisédek dans la tradition patristique," *Revue Biblique* 36 [1927], p. 37; anonymous, *Peri Melkhisedekiton kai Theodotianōn kai Athinganōn,* ed., with a Norwegian translation, by C.P. Caspari, "Kirkehistoriske Rejsefrugter," *Theologisk Tidsskrift for den Evangelisk-Lutherske Kirke i Norge* NS 8 (1882), partially translated into French by Bardy, *op. cit.,* p. 38; Theophanes Continuatus, *Chronographia,* (ed. and tr. I. Bekker), Bonn 1837, pp. 42f.; cf. J. Starr, "An Eastern Christian Sect: the Athinganoi," *Harvard Theological Review* 29 (1936).

[81] ʿAbd al-Jabbār, *Tathbīt,* p. 199 = S.M. Stern, "Quotations from Apocryphal Gospels in ʿAbd al-Jabbār," *Journal of Theological Studies* NS 18 (1967), p. 51.

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than a man or at the most a spiritual or adopted son of God.[82] Conversely, there were also Jews, primarily Karaites, who accepted Jesus as a good and learned man of their own.[83] And there is other evidence of Jewish-Christian contamination.[84]

What did these sects have to say for themselves? On the Byzantine side the evidence is limited. The Athinganoi, we are told, accepted Christ as a mere man, replaced circumcision by baptism or had neither one nor the other, observed the Sabbath, at least when with Jews, and also Levitical purity and Mosaic law in general; they had Jewish preceptors; they held that Melchizedek was a "great power" or God himself, basing themselves on Hebrews 7; they invoked the demons Arkhe, Sakhan and Sōron and practised divination and magic.[85] More interesting evidence, however, is available on the Arab side of the frontier. In a number of Muslim and Jewish sources there is a very odd account of how Christianity was corrupted by the introduction of Roman customs. The longest version is that preserved by ʿAbd al-Jabbār, a Muslim who wrote in 995,[86] but there is also a fairly substantial one in Qirqisānī, a tenth century Karaite who excerpted it from a book by Dāwūd b. Marwān al-Muqammiṣ, a ninth century Jew who had converted to Christianity and studied Christian doctrine in Nisibis before he proceeded to write anti-Christian books;[87] and of shorter versions there are a great many.[88] The full argument runs that Jesus did not claim divinity, that he did not abrogate the law of Moses, that it was Paul (and/or Peter) who jettisoned the law in an attempt

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[82] H.A. Wolfson, "An Unknown Splinter Group of Nestorians," in his *The Philosophy of Kalam*, Cambridge (Mass.) 1976, pp.337–49 (Iraq); Saadia Gaon, *Kitāb al-amānāt ꞉ waʾl-iʿtiqādat* (ed. S. Landauer), Leiden 1880, pp. 90f = *idem.*, *The Book of Beliefs and Opinions* (tr. S. Rosenblatt), New Haven 1948, p. 109 (presumably Iraq or Egypt); W. Madelung, *Der Imam al-Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm und die Glaubenslehre der Zaiditen*, Berlin 1965, p. 89 (Egypt); on Spanish Adoptianism see E. Amann, "L'Adoptianisme espagnol du VIIIe siècle," *Revue des Sciences Religieuses* 16 (1936).

[83] ʿAbd al-Jabbār, *op. cit.*, p. 142; Qirqisānī, *Kitāb al-anwār waʾl-marāqib* (ed. L. Nemoy), New York 1949, pp. 42f.

[84] Cf. the 8th century Serenus/Severus who converted to Judaism and proclaimed the coming of the Messiah in Mesopotamia (J. Starr, "Le mouvement messianique au début du viiie siècle," *Revue des Etudes Juives*, NS 2 [1937]), Abū ʿIsā's acceptance of Jesus as a prophet along with Muḥammad, and the prohibition of divorce by the same heretic (Qirqisānī, *op. cit.*, pp. 51f.).

[85] For the references see above, n. 80.

[86] ʿAbd al-Jabbār, *Tathbīt*, pp. 91ff.; partial translation by Stern, "Apocryphal Gospels" and "ʿAbd al-Jabbār's Account."

[87] Qirqisānī, *Anwār*, pp. 44f. = L. Nemoy (tr.), "al-Qirqisānī's Account of the Jewish Sects and Christianity," *Hebrew Union College Annual* 7 (1930), pp. 366ff. For a bibliography on Muqammiṣ, see G. Vajda, "La finalité de la création de l'homme selon un théologien juif du IXe siècle," *Oriens* 15 (1962), p. 61n. He does not appear to be the author of the account preserved in ʿAbd al-Jabbār; there are no verbal correspondences and Peter who, together with Paul, makes up Christian pseudo-laws in Muqammiṣ' account, scarcely figures in ʿAbd al-Jabbār's.

[88] For these see Stern, "ʿAbd al-Jabbār's Account," pp. 176ff., to which the anonymous treatise published by Pines (below, n. 158), a passage in Ibn Ḥazm (discussed in the same publication), and another in Shahrastānī (below, n. 167) should be added.

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to win over the gentiles, and that the adoption of Christianity by Constantine completed the process of paganization. In short, what the Iconoclast Council defined as a middle course between Judaism and paganism is here taken up for a close and hostile analysis. The Judeo-Christian character of this analysis is unmistakable.[89] It is not, however, very likely that we have here a document going back to the Judeo-Christians of the fourth century, as was suggested by Pines.[90] But equally, it is most unlikely that it was invented by Muslims or Christian converts to Islam, as Stern maintained.[91] If, on the one hand, we have new Judeo-Christian sects and, on the other hand, new Judeo-Christian accounts, it seems natural to put the two together.

The demonstration that they should indeed be put together is a rather lengthy one and has for that reason been relegated to a special section at the end of this paper. Suffice it here to say that if the argument set out there is accepted, there are three conclusions to be drawn. First, there were Judeo-Christian sects in Mesopotamia and Phrygia who broadcast far and wide that Christianity was a corruption of Christ's religion. Second, the Muslims were aware of these sects by the eighth century, and indeed almost certainly before. And third, the Muslims could use their arguments. So could the Jews. That, of course, is precisely why the arguments survived in Muslim and Jewish sources.

We thus have a situation in which Byzantine Christianity is under triple attack: the Arabs on the Byzantine frontier are backing up the Jews inside the Byzantine state and the Judeo-Christians inside the Byzantine church. Now it is these Judeo-Christians who were so eminently well placed to spark off iconoclasm on *both* sides of the frontier.

If we start on the Arab side, what we are told is this. A Jew promised Yazīd II thirty or forty years of rule if he would smash up Christian and other images in his dominions;[92] Yazīd's successor killed the Jew, but the Phrygian bishops had got

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[89] Fritsch noticed it already for the versions preserved in thirteenth century sources (*Islam und Christentum im Mittelalter*, p. 50; cf. Stern, *op. cit.*, p. 182).

[90] S. Pines, *The Jewish Christians of the Early Centuries according to a New Source* (Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, Proceedings II, 13), Jerusalem 1966. For a discussion of this theory (which was by no means as unlikely as Stern would have it), see the section on the Judeo-Christians below.

[91] Stern, "ʿAbd al-Jabbār's Account," pp. 184f. For one thing, Pines is certainly right that the original must have been in Syriac (*The Jewish Christians*, pp. 8f.); for another, it was not in the Muslim interest to argue that the Christians ought to be Jews (cf. the neat contrast between Jāhiẓ's and ʿAbd al-Jabbār's handling of the same arguments in S. Pines, " 'Israel, My Firstborn' and the Sonship of Jesus," in *Studies in Mysticism and Religion presented to G.G. Scholem*, Jerusalem 1967, pp. 179f.). But it is, above all, the fact that the author purports to give the inside story which is such striking evidence that he was himself a Judeo-Christian.

[92] Thirty years, according to John of Jerusalem's report at the Council of Nicaea in 787 (tr. L.W. Barnard, *The Graeco-Roman and Oriental Background of the Iconoclastic Controversy*, Leiden 1974, pp. 15ff.); forty years, according to Theophanes (*Chronographia* I, pp. 401f., A.M. 6215) and Ṭabarī, who omits the condition that Yazīd should destroy images (*Taʾrīkh al-rusul waʾl-mulūk* (ed. M. De Goeje et al.), Leiden 1897–1901, ser. ii, pp. 1463f.).

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the idea;[93] or according to another version, we do not know what happened to the Jew, but Leo got the idea from a Byzantine Christian who had converted to Islam in captivity and subsequently escaped.[94] This convert, Bēser, i.e. Bishr, is also known to the Islamic tradition,[95] and there is some ground for identifying him with the Jew. The Jew was known as Tesserakontapechys, "forty cubits", which is not a name, but a nickname and clearly a reference to the forty years which, according to Ṭabarī, he had promised Yazīd by misreading forty "reeds" as forty years instead of forty weeks.[96] Bishr, the convert, is known to have been a patrician.[97] Now in a late Arabic source we meet a man by the name of "son of forty cubits" who was a patrician in the entourage of Leo III.[98] Presumably, then, the Jew and the convert were identical.

What happened to Bishr? If we go by Theophanes he was killed, not on the death of Yazīd II, but in the course of Artavasdus' revolt on the death of Leo III.[99] According to Michael the Syrian, however, he escaped to the Arabs, pretended to be Tiberius and offered them his help.[100] He was, we are told, a former Muslim and now once more a Melkite Christian; yet he was also something of a Jew, for he had the Jews come and sing their incantations for him, and deep down he was a pagan, for he had the head of the Harranian community predict the outcome of his venture. If we put the various testimonia together, what they suggest is, first, that the man was historical and, second, that he was very hard to classify.

The interesting point about his unclassifiability is that it fits precisely with that of the Judeo-Christians in general and the Athinganoi in particular. The pagans of Harrān and the Judeo-Christians appear as common victims of Roman Christi-

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[93] Thus John of Jerusalem.

[94] Thus Theophanes (who, together with John of Jerusalem, lies behind all subsequent Greek accounts; for these, see Vasiliev, "The Iconoclastic Edict of the Caliph Yazid II," pp. 31ff.).

[95] Steinschneider, *Polemische und apologetische Literatur*, p. 44.

[96] Ṭabarī, *loc. cit.*

[97] Theophanes, *Chronographia* I, p. 414, A.M. 6233.

[98] M.J. De Goeje (ed.), *Fragmenta Historicorum Arabicorum* I, Leiden 1869, pp. 30f. (= *Kitāb al-ʿuyūn waʾl-ḥadāʾiq*); the passage has been translated by E.W. Brooks, "The Campaign of 716–718 from Arabic Sources," *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 108 (1899), pp. 26f. Cf. also J. Starr, "An Iconodulic Legend and its Historical Basis," *Speculum* 8 (1933).

[99] Theophanes, *loc. cit.*; there is thus agreement that he was finished on the death of his protector, if not on the protector's identity.

[100] Michael the Syrian, *Chronique* IV, pp. 462f. = II, pp. 503f. (also in the *Chronicon ad 1234* I, pp. 311f. = 242f., without the details of Bishr's religion). Michael does not explain why Bishr suddenly turned up in Mesopotamia, and moreover he places his appearance in 1048 A.S. = 736f A.D., that is, before Leo's death and Artavasdus' revolt. Ps.-Dionysius, however, also places Artavasdus' revolt before Leo's death, specifically in 1045 A.S. = 733f. A.D. (J.-B. Chabot (tr.), *Chronique de Denys de Tell-Maḥré*, Paris 1895, pp. 24f.), and it is presumably because of this tradition that Bishr's return is placed too early.

anity in 'Abd al-Jabbār,'[01] and of the Athinganoi we are explicitly told that they combined their Mosaicism with Gnostic beliefs;[102] moreover, they were famed for their predictive skills.[103] That Bishr was a Phrygian is possible;[104] that he was a friend of Leo III, a former *strategos* of the Anatolikon theme based in Amorium, is certain; and if, moreover, he was a Jew, a Christian and a pagan involved above all in the business of prediction, it is impossible not to recognize in him an Athinganos abroad.

If on the Arab side of the frontier we see the Arabs welcome an Athinganos abroad, on the Byzantine side we can see them back up the Athinganoi at home. The evidence here comes in the Definition of the Iconoclast Council of 754. This Council took up a moderate position between two extremes. On the one hand, it said, we will not tolerate images, but, on the other hand, we will not reject the cult of saints, nor will we deny the resurrection.[105] Now what, one might say, does Iconoclasm have to do with resurrection? Evidently something, for doubts over the resurrection crop up again in the second Iconoclast period among the followers of Leo V (813–20) and Michael II (820–29);[106] and with Michael there is no longer any doubt where it comes from, for Michael was an Athinganos or at least acquainted with Athinganic beliefs.[107]

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[101] 'Abd al-Jabbār, *Tathbīt*, p. 163 = Stern, "'Abd al-Jabbār's Account," p. 145; cf. p. 176. The integration of the Judeo-Christian and Harrānī accounts *might* of course be the work of 'Abd al-Jabbār himself, but it is hard to see what motive he could have.

[102] The author of the *Peri Melkhisedekitōn* even thought that the Athinganoi were largely drawn from pagans (Caspari, "Kirkehistoriske Rejsefrugter," p. 308 = 313).

[103] Caspari, "Kirkehistoriske Rejsefrugter," pp. 308, 312 = 313, 316; cf. Starr, "An Eastern Christian Sect," p. 103; it was an Athinganos who predicted the accession of Michael II (*ibid.*, p. 95).

[104] According to Michael the Syrian, Bishr was from Pergamon, and according to Theophanes the fortune-telling Jew was from Laodicea in Phoenicia. Since the location of Laodicea may well be Theophanes' own gloss to his (presumably Syriac) source, it is worth considering that he may have come from the Phrygian, not the Phoenician, Laodicea.

[105] Anastos, "The Argument for Iconoclasm," p. 186.

[106] Nicephorus, *Antirrhetici* (MPG C), col. 489; Theophanes Continuatus, *Chronographia*, pp. 48f. On the face of it Nicephorus' passage suggests that the offenders were merely having a good time in defiance of the clergy, but there is more to it than that. Leo V's adherents were coarse soldiers who, out of their boundless admiration for Constantine V, did everything Constantine had done, but did it entirely without his theological finesse. Thus the banquets in which monks were forced to drink wine and eat meat were crude imitations of Constantine's dealings with monks (Martin, *Iconoclastic Controversy*, pp. 60, 170; cf. also Alexander, *The Patriarch Nicephorus*, pp. 115–25). Equally, Leo, like Constantine, disbelieved in saints (Martin, *op. cit.*, p. 180). Presumably, Leo and his cronies were also imitating Constantine when they displayed their conspicuous insouciance about the fate of their souls, and it is certainly not implausible that it was Constantine whom the Council of 754 had in mind, not just when it condemned disbelief in saints, but also when it anathematized doubts over the resurrection.

[107] Genesius only knows that he was from Amorium, a city teeming with Athinganoi, and that one of them predicted his accession (*Historia de rebus Constantinopolitanibus* [MPG, CIX] col. 1028), but Theophanes Continuatus is explicit that he was brought up within this sect (*Chronographia*, pp. 42f.), and his testimony is corroborated by Michael the Syrian, whose

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The Athinganoi were Samaritan Gnostics. The Samaritan component is attested partly in their name, "touch-me-not", a reference to the Samaritan obsession with ritual purity with which the Koran is also familiar,[108] and partly in the Mosaic fundamentalism of Michael II who, like the Samaritans, accepted only the Pentateuch as scripture.[109] Now Pentateuchism was once associated with denial of the resurrection, and had continued to be so either in Samaritanism at large or else in Samaritan heresy;[110] it was, moreover, clearly on Pentateuchal grounds, not for Gnostic motives, that Michael II would have none of the resurrection.[111]

The Arab backing consists in the fact that the Arabs had themselves been Mosaic fundamentalists at one stage. That the Arabs once accepted the Pentateuch as their one and only scripture is admittedly not a traditional scholarly view, but it is attested in a dispute dating from 644.[112] And it was surely because

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statement that Michael II's grandfather was a Jewish convert to Christianity derived from the lost early 9th century chronicle of Dionysius of Tell-Mahré (*Chronique* IV, p. 521 = III, p. 72; the source is explicitly named on p. 520 = 70). Moreover, Theophanes' continuator proceeds to give an account of Michael II's beliefs which is far too coherent to be the product of scurrilous fantasy (pp. 48f.). Nor can it be dismissed as merely an elaboration of the equation "Athinganos = Samaritan" (as does J. Gouillard, "L'hérésie dans l'empire byzantin des origines au xiiᵉ siècle," *Travaux et Mémoires* 1 [1965], p. 311). For one thing, this equation is quite unknown to the early sources on the Athinganoi; Germanus does compare their fear of pollution to that of the Samaritans (*De haeresibus et synodis* [*MPG* XCVIII], col. 85), but that is hardly to equate the two, and Theophanes' continuator explicitly describes Athinganism as a new faith (*Chronographia*, p. 42). For another, such an elaboration would merely have reproduced the Patristic stereotypes on the Samaritans; but just as the continuator's account is not incoherent, so also it is not stereotyped.

[108] 20:97; note also the Hagarene belief attested in Greek sources that the Samaritans will go to heaven where they will be busy keeping Paradise clean (Khoury, *Les Théologiens Byzantins et l'Islam*, pp. 184, 198). This obsession with ritual purity was not peculiar to the Dositheans; Epiphanius notes it for all the Samaritans, and the 6th century Samaritan who burnt straw over the footsteps of the pilgrim from Piacenza and made him throw his coins into water to avoid his polluting touch, was hardly a heretic (Sharf, *Byzantine Jewry*, pp. 30, 44). For the very similar behaviour of the Athinganoi, see Timothy of Constantinople, *De Receptione*, col. 33 = Bardy, "Melchisedek," p. 37.

[109] Theophanes Continuatus, *Chronographia*, pp. 48f. (he abused the Prophets, and denied the existence of the Devil on the ground that Moses does not mention him).

[110] That it was the Samaritans at large and not the Dositheans who continued to deny the resurrection has recently been argued by S.J. Isser, *The Dositheans*, Leiden 1976.

[111] It is mentioned in the same breath as his denial of the Devil. Note that he also found fault with the Christian computation of Easter and toyed with the idea of fasting on the Sabbath, a most unorthodox idea from the Jewish point of view.

[112] Crone & Cook, *Hagarism*, pp. 14f. Mosaic fundamentalism (presumably combined with at least partial acceptance of the New Testament; cf. their use of Hebrews 7) is not attested for the Athinganoi before Michael II, so the possibility cannot be excluded that they picked it up from the Arabs. But it is not very likely, for Pentateuchism was not just a Samaritan, but also a traditional Judeo-Christian position: it is attested for Epiphanius' Ebionite Elkesaites whose combination of Judeo-Christianity and Gnosticism so recalls that of the Athinganoi (A.F.J Klijn & G.J. Reinink, *Patristic Evidence for Jewish-Christian Sects*, Leiden 1973, p. 186). At all events, the general point made here remains unaffected. The Arabs may have suggested this

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the Arabs took up this scriptural position that the old question of the resurrection was suddenly revived. Thus Levond has 'Umar II (717–20) deny the resurrection on Pentateuchal grounds, while Leo III refers to a Muslim sect which similarly denied it and which is perhaps also referred to in the Koran;[113] and doubts over the resurrection are also indicated among the Zaydīs.[114] It was thus against the background of Muslim interest in the question that the doubts of the Athinganoi could reach Constantinople.

If we put the evidence on the two sides together, the situation is this. On the Arab side, there is an inveterate hostility to Christian pictures, but the Arabs cannot usually be bothered to go and smash them up. On the Greek side, there is an endemic bad conscience about such pictures, but the Greeks do not usually have the nerve to smash them up. Now if a Phrygian Athinganos should start tinkering with these highly charged wires, the outcome would be precisely what actually occurred; a short anti-Christian blast among the Arabs, and an enormous explosion burning up the accumulated qualms of the Greeks. It is not that all Iconoclasts were Athinganoi; but it is precisely because they detonated the explosion that some of their shrapnel was likely to fall in the capital.

It is worth concluding this argument with a brief discussion of the very different outcomes of hostility to images in Byzantium and Islam. Evidently, Byzantine Iconoclasm was a failure and, insofar as this is a fact about Byzantine history, it is not a very interesting one. Unlike the European Reformation, that of the Byzantines was a conspiracy between a ruling elite and a religious minority which, in the absence of long-term social or political upheavals, could not possibly issue in a religious revolution. No wonder then that in the last resort the Byzantines opted for John of Damascus' justification of image worship and sealed the question once and for all by making the cult of images part of their faith.[115] Already by the second Iconoclast period, everyone was sick and tired of the whole question,[116] and it was resumed largely because it was held to bring military success.[117] The

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scriptural position to the Athinganoi or they may have reinforced it, but either way their effect was to boost the polemical position of the heretics.

[113] Crone & Cook, *op. cit.*, p. 165, n. 49. Note also the query "whence do we know for certain that the soul does not die with the body? for there are some who hold this view" (*Quaestiones*, col. 608, question xvii).

[114] Nawbakhtī, *Kitāb firaq al-Shī'a* (ed. H. Ritter), Istanbul 1931, p. 37.

[115] Note how veneration of images and saints is included in the formula for conversion from Islam (Khoury, *Théologiens Byzantins et l'Islam*, pp. 193f).

[116] Cf. Michael II's attempt to bury the issue by prohibiting all discussion of images, be it for or against (Martin, *Iconoclastic Controversy*, p. 201).

[117] The Iconoclast Leo V argued that he had to satisfy public opinion, that image worship was being held responsible for pagan military success, that Leo and Constantine had found the observance of orthodoxy the best safeguard of public security, and that only the Iconoclast emperors had succeeded in founding a dynasty and dying full of honour (Martin, *ibid.*, pp. 162, 165, 168, 172; compare the very similar evaluation of the Iconoclast emperors by J. Herrin in Bryer and Herrin, *Iconoclasm*, pp. 15ff.). It was soldiers who broke into Nicephorus' house, soldiers who stoned the Chalce image, soldiers who constituted the following of Leo V who was

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success failed to materialise, and when the Arabs finally took Amorium in 838, it was the Iconoclasts, not the icons, that got the blame.[118]

As a fact about Christian history, however, the failure is an illuminating one. The pagan component of Christianity is intrinsic in respect of both faith and culture. In respect of the faith it has generated the trinity, and there is thus a limit to the extent to which Christians can afford to be monotheists. Constantine V (741–75) might well reject the saints, but he could not very well reject Christ, the intercessor par excellence; so it is hardly surprising that he was haunted by worries about Christology. The Christians across the border also worried. "If, on the one hand, we worship one God," as a puzzled Syrian in a seventh century treatise put it, "it is plain that, being monarchianists, we are practising Judaism; but if, on the other hand, we worship three gods, it is clear that we are practising paganism."[119] Constantine is accused now of having played up the divinity of Christ[120] and now of having played it down,[121] and he is likely enough to have tried both expedients; it was precisely because the Iconoclasts wished to be mono-theists that they had to choose, as Theodore the Studite so rightly saw, between the error of Mani, who held that Jesus was wholly divine, and that of Paul of Samosata, who considered him wholly human.[122] Within the middle course which constituted orthodox Christianity, their problem was not amenable to solution.

In respect of culture, the pagan component of Christianity was to leave room for secularism. Because Christianity is only a faith, the culture must of necessity come from elsewhere. This extraneous culture can be sanctified by a profusion of saints — what Peter Brown calls a haemorrhage of the divine,[123] or it can be desanctified in the name of the one God; but just as it cannot become intrinsically holy, so also, having no Christian alternative, it cannot be totally

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himself a soldier (Martin, *op. cit.*, pp. 166, 168, 170, cf. above, n. 106), and it was also soldiers who rushed to Constantine's grave in the face of the Bulgarian threat in 813, telling him to get up and save his city (Theophanes, *Chronographia* I, p. 504, A.M. 6305).

[118] Khoury, *Théologiens Byzantins et l'Islam*, pp. 169ff.

[119] *Quaestiones*, col. 597, question i (*Ioudaizomen . . . Hellēnizomen*). The answer charac-teristically is to stop thinking.

[120] G. Ostrogorsky, *Studien zur Geschichte der byzantinischen Bilderstreites*, Breslau 1929, pp. 24ff. For a different view see S. Brock in Bryer and Herrin, *Iconoclasm*, pp. 53ff. Michael the Syrian's belief that Constantine V was "orthodox" (viz. a Monophysite) is however unlikely to derive entirely from his personal misinterpretation of John of Damascus' condemnation, for when he later describes Leo IV as "orthodox," he states that he has this information from a Melkite writer (*Chronique* IV, pp. 473, 479 = II, p. 521; III, p. 2). But Brock is evidently right that Monophysitism has nothing to do with the *outbreak* of Iconoclasm.

[121] He asked the Patriarch if one could call Mary the mother of Christ (rather than the mother of God), which the Patriarch thought Nestorian, and on another occasion he denied that Christ was more than a mere man (Theophanes, *Chronographia*, I, pp. 415, 435, A.M. 6233, 6255; George the Monk, *Chronographia* II (ed. C. de Boor), Leipzig 1904, p. 756). Just how much of this is true is of course hard to tell, but that he worried is equally hard to deny.

[122] Theodore the Studite, *Quaestiones Iconomachis Propositae*, (*MPG* XCIX), cols. 480f.

[123] Brown, "A Dark-Age crisis," p. 8.

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rejected. Christian fundamentalism thus has no foundations,[124] and it is precisely this point which the Iconoclasts illustrate by their setting out as Judaizers and their ending up as Hellenizers.

In the domain of art, both the Muslims and the Iconoclasts were up against an unholy alliance between monotheism and a pagan craft — unholy in that God did not want pictures and the pagans did not want God. But whereas in Islam the dissolution of this alliance eventually led to the virtual occlusion of the pagan craft,[125] in Byzantium the outcome was rather an artistic reorientation. Leo III, it is true, would have nothing but the cross — at the same time aniconic and anti-Islamic. But Constantine V proceeded to fill the churches and palaces with secular pictures, possibly, though this is largely guesswork, in the illusionist style which ultimately went back to the Hellenistic world;[126] and Theophilus (829—42) was bent on wholesale imitation of the courtly art of Baghdad.[127] Neither, in other words, suppressed the pagan craft: they could only render it religiously inert.

Similarly, in the domain of learning the Iconoclasts were up against an unholy alliance between scripture and philosophy. What, in the words of ʿAbd al-Jabbār, did Aristotle know of God?[128] But again, where in Islam the dissolution of this alliance eventually led to the virtual occlusion of philosophy,[129] in Byzantium the outcome was rather a cultural reorientation. Leo once more set out as a fundamentalist: he is credited with an attack on higher learning, presumably secular.[130] Michael the Amorian is similarly described as hostile to Hellenic learning;[131] and at the same time there appears to have been a significant shift from

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[124] Cf. Crone & Cook, *Hagarism*, pp. 139ff.

[125] The long history of this process is certainly an interesting one, but its protracted nature does not invalidate the point. The misfortune of the Muslim rabbis was that ʿAbbāsid priestliness having worn off, the east fell to Zaydīs and the west to Ismāʿīlīs (for the slightly more favourable attitude to images among Shīʿites see Paret, "Das Islamische Bilderverbot und die Schia"; note the typical instance of priestly discretion by Muʿizz on p. 230). The Seljuqs did indeed restore Sunnism, but what with Turkish ethnicity, Persian culture, political dissolution and Christian secretaries, pictures inevitably came back; witness the neo-Hellenistic coinage of the Artuqids, the Christian scribe of the Arabic Dioscorides, and the general renaissance of Byzantine art in Islamic books. But the thirteenth century was a turning point, for if the Mongol conquest provided the background for the flowering of Persian miniatures, in the west the *ʿulamāʾ* came back for ever.

[126] Cf. R. Cormack, "The Arts during the Age of Iconoclasm" in Bryer & Herrin, *Iconoclasm*, pp. 38, 42f.

[127] C. Diehl, *Manuel d'art byzantin* I, Paris 1925, pp. 369f., 377f. Compare the large-scale adoption of Islamic law by the Syriac-speaking Christians (H. Kaufhold, *Syrische Texte zum islamischen Recht*, Munich 1971, pp. 32ff.).

[128] ʿAbd al-Jabbār, *Tathbīt*, p. 193 = Stern, "ʿAbd al-Jabbār's Account," p. 150.

[129] This also took some time, but again the moral is clear.

[130] Theophanes, *Chronographia* I, p. 405, A.M. 6218; P. Lemerle, *Le premier humanisme byzantin*, Paris 1971, pp. 94ff.

[131] Theophanes Continuatus, *Chronographia*, p. 49. The fact that Michael II himself had no education does not of course mean that he could have no views on the matter.

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Greek to biblical reading matter in primary education.[132] But it is no accident that the fundamentalism failed to last. In Christianity even Iconoclasts must have a philosophy. To take an obvious example, in the legal culture of Islam, hostility to images will generate the question "when precisely are images permitted?"; but in the philosophical culture of Christianity the corresponding question will inevitably be "what precisely is the nature of an image?"[133] And just as the Iconoclasts needed a theory of art to justify their Iconoclasm, so they needed theories of nature to support their fundamentalism. Now though the evidence is depressingly scarce, they seem to have solved this problem by recourse to a pre-Mosaic philosophy which, like that invoked by the Protestants in the West, was formally mono-theist and substantively Hermetic. That much is implied by the character of the book which Leo VI (775—80) sent to Mahdī (775—85),[134] the number speculation and antiquarian bent of Leo the Mathematician[135] and the magic skills of John the Grammarian.[136] And it is in line with this that there are suggestions of Origenist as against Aristotelian lines of thought in the Iconoclast view of pictures,[137] and of Alexandrian science in their view of the universe.[138] The outcome of Iconoclasm was thus not the rejection of the pagan tradition, but rather the sponsorship of a different branch of it. And it is certainly to some extent thanks to the confronta-tion between these two traditions that what has here been dubbed the Byzantine Reformation issued in what others have called the Byzantine Renaissance.

THE JUDEO-CHRISTIANS
We may now turn to a more detailed examination of the Judeo-Christian sects and the writings which have been attributed to them in the above. The first point to be

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[132] A. Moffatt, "Schooling in the Iconoclast Centuries," in Bryer & Herrin, *Iconoclasm*, p. 90. Compare the role of scripture in Jewish and Muslim education.

[133] Compare the articles of Paret with for example L. Barnard, "The Theology of Images," in Bryer & Herrin, *ibid.*; note how the appeal to the immense antiquity of image worship never sparked off any jurisprudential discussion of the authority of practice in Christianity.

[134] Mahdī was much given to magic, divination and sorcery, so Leo sent him a book entitled *Iannes and Iambres*, which contained all the magic of the Egyptians and all they did when they met Moses (Michael the Syrian, *Chronique* IV, p. 478 = III, p. 1). For this book see E. Schürer, *A History of the Jewish People in the Time of Jesus Christ*, Edinburgh 1896, div. II, vol. III, pp. 149ff.; L.I. Iselin, "Zwei Bemerkungen zu Schürer's Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes im Zeitalter Jesu Christi," *Zeitschrift für Wissenschaftliche Theologie* 37 (1894).

[135] Lemerle, *Humanisme*, p. 157.

[136] *Ibid.*, p. 145.

[137] G. Florovsky, "Origen, Eusebius and the Iconoclastic Controversy," *Church History* 19 (1950); P.J. Alexander, "The Iconoclastic Council of St. Sophia (815) and its Definition (*Horos*)," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 7 (1953), pp. 48f, 50f.; Lemerle, *Humanisme*, p. 146.

[138] Leo the Mathematician had Ptolemy's Almagest copied and studied, thereby displaying the first Byzantine interest in astronomy since the days of Stephen of Alexandria and virtually the last until those of the Palaeologi (D. Pingree, "Gregory of Chioniades and Palaeologan Astronomy," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 18 (1964), p. 135; cf. Diehl, *Manuel*, p. 376; the interest survived long enough for the Byzantines to translate Abū Ma'shar in the tenth century, cf. D. Pingree (ed.), *Albumasaris de revolutione nativitatum*, Leipzig 1968 (I owe this reference to Dr. F. Zimmermann).

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made concerns the Athinganoi. J. Starr, the one person to have worked on them in the past, tried to explain away their Judaizing so as to make them a purely Gnostic sect along Paulician lines.[139] This is certainly arbitrary. But it is worth adding some evidence from the Syrian side in corroboration of the Byzantine sources.

In the catalogue of heresies compiled by Mārūthā (d. before 420), there is a description of heretics known as Sabbatians. Their heresy consisted in belief that the Gospel did not abrogate the Old Testament, that the Mosaic law was still valid, that circumcision should be retained, and that the eucharist should be taken on the Sabbath; it was, according to Mārūthā, these heretics Paul had in mind when he spoke of circumcision.[140] This is plainly a description of Judeo-Christians, not of the Novatian schismatics similarly known as Sabbatians who cannot even have been misrepresented here: we may take it that in the fifth century Middle East there were Judeo-Christians of that name. Now three centuries later we learn from Jacob of Edessa (d. ca. 715) that two kinds of heretics were known as Sabbatians, the first being the Novatian schismatics and the second a sect which, like Mārūthā's, is said to date from the time of the Apostles.[141] The natural assumption that he is referring to Mārūthā's sect is reinforced by his observation that they derived their name from their observance of both Sabbath and Sunday,[142] which is not, of course, true of the Novatian offshoot, and by his view that literalist exegesis is a "Jewish and Sabbatian" feature.[143] The importance of this lies in the fact that, according to Jacob, the Sabbatians are *still* observing both Sabbath and Sunday in Galatia and *Phrygia.*[144] That this is a reference to the Athinganoi is hardly in doubt. It is true that he goes on to say that the Novatian offshoot (also?) survives in Galatia, but that is likely to have been true,[145] and unless he is simply muddle-

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[139] Starr, "An Eastern Christian Sect."

[140] A. Harnack (tr.), "Der Ketzer-Katalog des Bischofs Maruta von Maiperkat," in O.V. Gebhardt & A. Harnack (eds.), *Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur,* NF IV, Leipzig 1899, p. 7. The Syriac term is *Shabbetāyē.*

[141] W. Wright (ed.), "The Epistles of Mār Jacob, Bishop of Edessa," *Journal of Sacred Literature* (4th series), 10 (1867), p. 26 of the text = F. Nau (tr.), "traduction des lettres XII et XIII de Jacques d'Edesse," *Revue de l'Orient Chrétien* 10 (1905), p. 278. The Syriac terms are *Sambatyānū* and *(bēth) Shabbetāyē,* the first clearly Greek, the second Syriac, but treated as interchangeable.

[142] Mārūthā does not say so, and Jacob clearly did not owe his knowledge of the sect to him.

[143] R. Schröter (ed. and tr.), "Erster Brief Jakob's von Edessa an Johannes den Styliten," *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* 24 (1870), p. 271 = 275. The term for "in the Sabbatian fashion" is *sabbetānāïth* (sic).

[144] Wright, *loc. cit.* = Nau, *loc. cit.*

[145] The far older sect of the Quartodecimans (Tetraditai) has a continuous history in Asia Minor until the 9th century. Like the Novatian offshoot they held Jewish views regarding the date of Easter, and by the time of Theodoret they had also come to agree with the Novatians on the inefficacy of penance. In short, they had fused with the Sabbatians (C. Mango, *The Homilies of Photius Patriarch of Constantinople,* Cambridge [Mass.] 1958, pp. 279ff.). Timothy of Constantinople could thus identify the Quartodecimans with the Sabbatians (*ibid.,* p. 281n.); and it is very likely the same sect that Jacob had in mind.

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headed (which he was not usually), it hardly invalidates his previous statement. Moreover, the Sabbatian name reappears on the Byzantine side. Thus the Athinganic obsession with ritual purity is presented by one source as a Sabbatian feature, while Michael II, who is usually known as an Athinganos, appears as a Sabbatian in another.[146] It was thus not only to the Byzantines, but also to the Syrian Christians, that the Athinganoi were known to be Judeo-Christians. Obviously, Starr is right that they were in some way related to the Paulicians with whom they are often enumerated in the Byzantine chronicles, for just as the Judaizing Athinganoi subscribed to a number of Gnostic ideas, so the Gnosticizing Paulicians, or rather some of them, had Adoptianist beliefs.[147] But Judaism and Gnosticism, though in theory antithetical, have in practice coexisted more than once.

That brings us to the writings preserved in ʿAbd al-Jabbār and elsewhere. That these were Judeo-Christian in character has already been seen. What remains to be done here is to find a context for the authors. The first point to be noted is that they must have lived in a milieu equally open to Christian and Jewish literature, for not only were they wholly at home in Christian history and scripture, as only Christians could be,[148] they were also acquainted with such Jewish lore as the *Toledoth Yeshu*, which was not normally accessible to Christians;[149] and what is more, their own writings can be shown to have passed back into Jewish literature in the form of the additions to the *Toledoth*.

There are two completely different kinds of material in the *Toledoth* as it exists today. The first is a straightforward anti-Christian life of Jesus to the effect that Jesus was a bastard conceived in ritual impurity who became a magician by getting hold of the secret letters of God's name,[150] and who was crucified after

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[146] Caspari, "Kirkehistoriske Rejsefrugter," p. 309 = 314; Nicetas of Paphlagonia, *Vita Ignatii* (*MPG* CV), col. 493. It is of course possible that it was Michael II's views on the date of Easter that resulted in his identification as a Sabbatian (of the Novatian type), but it is hard to see how the concern with ritual purity could come to be classified as such. It is far more likely that "Sabbatian" in this context meant "Judeo-Christian", and if the anonymous author in Caspari nonetheless glosses it as Novatian, it is because the Byzantine tradition knew of no Judeo-Christian sect of that name.

[147] For the evidence see N. Garsoian, *The Paulician Heresy*, Paris—The Hague 1971, where the general conclusion is, however, quite unacceptable.

[148] The rabbis had only the haziest notions of the period to which Jesus belonged, and neither Paul nor Pilate figures in the Talmud (for a possible, but not exactly transparent reference to the former, see R. Travers Herford, *Christianity in Talmud and Midrash*, Edinburgh 1903, pp. 97ff.).

[149] For this work see S. Krauss (ed. and tr.), *Das Leben Jesu nach jüdischen Quellen*, Berlin 1902. It is doubtless because Helen appears as the queen of Israel in the *Toledoth* that she has become the wife of Pilate (Baylāṭus) in ʿAbd al-Jabbār (Krauss, *op. cit.*, pp. 53f. and *passim*; ʿAbd al-Jabbār, *Tathbīt*, p. 159 = Stern, "ʿAbd al-Jabbār's Account," p. 140). Perhaps it was also from the *Toledoth* that ʿAbd al-Jabbār's Christians got the idea that Jesus was crucified in a vegetable garden (Krauss, *op. cit.*, p. 59; ʿAbd al-Jabbār, *op. cit.*, p. 139 = Stern, "Apocryphal Gospels," p. 44). Note also that ʿAbd al-Jabbār's *Ḥīrīdh.s* for Herod is more easily explained if the text misread by his source was in Aramaic rather than in Syriac (ʿAbd al-Jabbār, *op. cit.* = Stern, "Apocryphal Gospels," p. 42n.).

[150] In an earlier version apparently by learning magic in Egypt.

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having lost his spells in an air-battle with Judas. This story dates from the early centuries of Christianity. It was known to Celsus[151] and Tertullian,[152] and almost all of it is attested in the Talmud.[153] The second consists of stories of Paul, Peter and Nestorius, all presented as Jewish heroes or Judaizers: Paul (or Peter) was a crypto-Jew who completed the split between Judaism and Christianity by making up pseudo-laws so that the Jews might be rid of the Christian trouble-makers; Peter continued to send synagogal poetry to the Jews after his apparent conversion; Nestorius undid some of Paul's work, though he also prohibited polygamy and divorce, a pseudo-law attributed to Paul in 'Abd al-Jabbār. These stories have no intrinsic connection with the biography of Jesus, they were not known to Celsus, Tertullian or even Agobard, who knew the rest of the *Toledoth*,[154] and they are not found in all the MSS of the *Toledoth;* all originated in a Syriac-speaking environment, none are earlier than the fifth century,[155] and the hostile reference to the rise of the Ishmaelites in the story of Paul leaves no doubt that this story at least was composed after the Arab conquest.[156] How then do we account for the addition of these stories to the *Toledoth?* That they are closely related to narratives of Muqammiṣ and 'Abd al-Jabbār is evident. There is however no question of the additions to the *Toledoth* being the source of the Arabic accounts,[156a] for where the Arabic accounts have historical focus and details, the *Toledoth* by contrast envelops the events in a characteristic rabbinical haze. Nor are the stories in the *Toledoth* directly derived from the Arabic accounts: what we have are clearly Jewish and Muslim adaptations of the same Judeo-Christian polemic against Christianity.[156b] The Judeo-Christians possessed a knowledge of Christianity which the

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[151] N.R.M. De Lange, *Origen and the Jews*, Cambridge 1976, pp. 66, 69.

[152] Krauss, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

[153] Travers Herford, *Christianity in Talmud and Midrash*, pp. 33, 48ff., 54f., 62, 75f., 79f., 90f.; H. Strack, *Jesus, die Häretiker und die Christen*, Leipzig 1910.

[154] Agobard, *Epistola*, cols. 77—100.

[155] The story of Paul gives the names of the Christian festivals in Syriac (Krauss, *op. cit.*, pp. 60f.; cf. Stern, "'Abd al-Jabbār's Account", p. 179n.); Peter (Simon Kefah) is confused with Simeon Stylites, the 5th century Syrian saint, Nestorius with Bar Ṣauma, the 5th century Nestorian churchman (S. Gero, "The Nestorius Legend in the *Toledoth Yeshu*", *Oriens Christianus* 59 (1975).

[156] Krauss, *loc. cit.*; there are no references to Islam in the other stories, and Gero may be right in dating the fixation of the Nestorius legend to the second half of the 6th or the beginning of the 7th century (*op. cit.*, p. 120). The reference to the Sāsānid empire, however, in no way implies that it was still in existence when the story was composed, only that it existed at the time of Nestorius, and the legend is so incoherent that its various stages and dates can hardly be sorted out (Nestorius is a Judaizer, yet he prohibits polygamy and divorce; women like his pseudo-laws, yet he is killed by women).

[156a] As suggested by Stern, "'Abd al-Jabbār's Account," pp. 179f. But Stern's view was clearly dictated by his extraordinary reluctance to concede that the Arabic accounts are Judeo-Christian in character.

[156b] Pines' view that the stories in the *Toledoth* were composed as an answer to the Judeo-Christian argument seems a little excessive: Jews and Jewish Christians alike were concerned to refute the Christians, not each other (cf. Pines, *The Jewish Christians*, p. 42).

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Jews themselves had not enjoyed for centuries, while at the same time they were sufficiently close to the Jews for knowledge to be exchanged between them. Hence on the one hand the echos of the *Toledoth* in ʿAbd al-Jabbār's biography of Jesus, and on the other hand the addition of an 'Acts of the Apostles' to the biography of Jesus in the *Toledoth*.

Now of such circles through which Jewish and Christian literature could freely pass there were two kinds. The first is that of the philo-Christian Karaites mentioned by both Qirqisānī and ʿAbd al-Jabbār,[157] and these Karaites form by far the most plausible milieu in which to locate Muqammiṣ and others like him.[158] It is true that Muqammiṣ is never identified as a Karaite, philo-Christian or otherwise, by either Qirqisānī or any other author, but he is known to have written a commentary on Genesis using Syriac rather than rabbinical methods of exegesis, a work of which the Karaite Qirqisānī speaks with approval;[159] he seems to have held that retribution (and thus resurrection) was purely spiritual, a view of some currency in Karaite circles;[160] and his disparaging use of the term *abbā*, a rabbinic honorific, would also indicate Karaite rather than Rabbinic persuasions.[161] More-

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[157] Cf. above, n. 83. Although ʿAbd al-Jabbār does not specify that his Jews were Karaites, he is clearly describing the same sect as Qirqisānī: both accepted Jesus as a pious and learned man who had got the leadership of the Jews, aroused the envy of other Jews (Rabbanites according to Qirqisānī) and been killed by them (as they tried to kill ʿAnan according to Qirqisānī). The similarity was also noted by Pines (*The Jewish Christians*, p. 47). Compare Shahrastānī, *Kitāb al-milal waʾl-niḥal* (ed. W. Cureton), London 1846, pp. 167f., where *all* Karaites entertain such ideas (Jesus was learned in the Old Testament, he did not claim to be a prophet or God, though according to these Karaites he was a messiah; he did not abrogate the old law, the Gospel is not revelation and the Jews were wrong to kill him). There were still Karaites in the sixteenth century who thought along the same lines (Krauss, *Das Leben Jesu*, pp. 200f.).

[158] *Pace* Pines, who conjectures that it was during his Christian period that Muqammiṣ was in contact with Judeo-Christians (S. Pines, "Jewish-Christian Materials in an Arabic Jewish Treatise," *Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research* 35 [1967], p. 212n.; I am indebted to Professor Pines for sending me an offprint of this article).

[159] G. Vajda, "Du prologue de Qirqisānī à son commentaire sur la Génèse," in M. Black & G. Fohrer (eds.), *In Memoriam Paul Kahle*, Berlin 1968, p. 24.

[160] G. Vajda, "A propos de la perpetuité de la rétribution d'outre-tombe en théologie musulmane," *Studia Islamica* 11 (1959), pp. 37f. The statement in favour of purely spiritual retribution on p. 37 seems so emphatic that the conclusion of p. 38 must be Yehuda b. Barzillai's. Compare Mann, "A Tract by an early Karaite Settler," p. 259; Qirqisānī, *Anwār*, pp. 54, 62; G. Vajda, *Deux Commentaires Karaïtes sur l'Ecclesiaste*, Leiden 1971, p. 111n.

[161] Muqammiṣ calls Paul Abba Shaul, as does the *Toledoth* (Qirqisānī, *Anwār*, p. 44 = 367; A. Jellinek [ed.], *Beth ha-Midrash*, Leipzig 1855, pt. VI, pp. xi, 156), but in the *Toledoth* the title is reverential (presumably the rabbis identified him with the 2nd century *tanna* of that name). The force of Muqammiṣ' usage by contrast is to equate Paul's pseudo-laws with the oral law of the Rabbanites: *both* have corrupted the true religion in their different ways. It is thus not surprising that it is in Karaite circles that "Abba Shaul" lived on as an abusive (R. Poznansky, "Meswi al-Okbari, chef d'une secte juive du ixe siècle," *Revue des Etudes Juives* 34 [1897], p. 182; Krauss, *Das Leben Jesu*, p. 200; D.S. Margoliouth [ed. and tr.], *A Commentary on the Book of Daniel by Jepheth ibn Ali the Karaite*, Oxford 1889, p. 119 = 62).

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over, there is an anonymous author who combined the usual Judeo-Christian argument that Jesus was a Jew with an unusual insistence on the contention that Jesus endorsed retaliation.[162] Inasmuch as Rabbanite law circumvented the Mosaic principle of retaliation, while Karaite law accepted it, this particular author would also indicate that it was in Karaite circles that Judeo-Christian views were current.[163] Finally, 'Abd al-Jabbār actually quotes the philo-Christian Karaites in the course of his discussion of Christianity, and what they say is that Jesus was a good and learned Jew who disclaimed messianic status, and that all the stories of his miracles were made up by the Christians, in particular by Paul, a *well-known* liar.[164] This is, of course, very much in line with the general argument of both Muqammiṣ and 'Abd al-Jabbār:[165] what they offer is precisely accounts of *how* Paul made them up. We are thus unlikely to be far wrong in tracing both Muqammiṣ and other authors to such philo-Christian Karaite circles.

The philo-Christian Karaites were, however, not the only locus of such authors. The second milieu of relevance is that of the Christians mentioned by 'Abd al-Jabbār, who held that "their lord was a Jew, his father a Jew, his mother a Jewess, and his mother the wife of his father."[166] It was Christians of this kind who

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Note also that 'Abd al-Jabbār's Karaites speak disparagingly of an Abba Marqos, a monk whom the Christians credit with various miracles (*Tathbīt*, pp. 142, 202f., 207; it might of course be Coptic, but that does not seem very likely).

[162] Pines, "Judaeo-Christian Materials," pp. 192f. This treatise, which survives in a pre-13th century, but otherwise undatable Christian refutation, is very close to 'Abd al-Jabbār's account, and Pines suggests that the two used a common source (*ibid.*, p. 210). It differs from 'Abd al-Jabbār's account, not only in its insistence on the righteousness of retribution, but also by the argument that although Jesus was a good Jew whose ways the Christians have abandoned, he was an incomparably lesser prophet than Moses. That the author is more likely to have been a Jew than a Jewish Christian is a plausible inference (*ibid.*, pp. 204f.); but the comparison of Jesus and Moses as well as the rest of the argument reveals an interest in and knowledge of Christian scripture which was not common in ordinary Jewish circles.

[163] That the author cannot have been a Rabbanite Jew was also noted by Pines ("Judaeo-Christian Materials," p. 193).

[164] 'Abd al-Jabbār, *Tathbīt*, pp. 142f. Syntactically, the passage goes wrong towards the end, where the literal meaning is that the Christians have made up these miracles on behalf of (*li*) Jesus, Paul, George and Abba Marqos. On the face of it all four are thus whitewashed, but the idea is clearly that only Jesus is innocent, for Paul is said to be *maʿrūf al-ḥāl waʾl-ḥiyal waʾl-kidhb waʾl-suqāṭ*, viz. he invented it; and the silly stories told by the Christians of St. George and Mark the monk, *ibid.*, pp. 202f., 205ff., discredit both the narrators and the subjects (note the *ya rabbān* on pp. 202f., a Syriacism emended to *ya rabbānī* in the text).

[165] But note that both Shahrastānī's and Pines' Karaites accepted Jesus as a saviour, the latter with the qualification that he was sent only to the Jews (above, n. 157; Pines, "Judeo-Christian Materials," pp. 200f.); the latter also accepted Jesus' miracles, but insisted that like other prophets he had to implore God to work them (*ibid.*, p. 198).

[166] Cf. above, n. 81. Stern's translation of *rabb* as God seems unwarranted; the Christians in question may well have been Adoptianists (and if the Gospel citations come from them they almost certainly were), but they may also have denied Jesus' divinity altogether. It is also something of an understatement that this passage denies the virgin birth; there could hardly be a more emphatic way of saying that Jesus was a Jew and his followers Jewish Christians.

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were the source of Shahrastānī's short notice of how Paul ousted Peter from the leadership of the Christians and perverted Christianity by introducing philosophy and his own opinions.[167] And it must similarly have been from such Christians that ʿAbd al-Jabbār got his apocryphal Gospel citations.[168] But whereas Shahrastānī's Christians clearly held views precisely opposite to those of the Armeno-Mesopotamian Gnostics who "execrated Peter and loved Paul",[169] those of ʿAbd al-Jabbār were both Judaizers and Gnosticizers: Jesus is presented as a mere man and moreover an observant Jew,[170] but the long account of the passion is docetic.[171] And this doctrinal combination shows that we have now arrived at circles closely related to the Athinganoi of the Byzantine sources.[172]

The exact relationship between the Jewish Christians and the Christian Jews is a hazy one:[173] we doubtless have to envisage a plurality of loosely related sects on both sides.[174] But it is manifest that for all their diversity these sects were part and parcel of the same phenomenon.

Geographically, these sects can be located in the first instance in Mesopotamia. In ʿAbd al-Jabbār, the faithful flee to Mosul and Mesopotamia,[175] while in

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[167] Shahrastānī, *Milal*, pp. 172f.; compare the relationship between Peter and Paul (Simon Magus) in the Pseudo-Clementines. Shahrastānī's tradition is independent of Muqammiṣ and ʿAbd al-Jabbār alike, the former being hostile to Peter and the latter having little to say about him, and it came from Christians who accepted both the crucifixion and the resurrection without recourse to doceticism.

[168] Most, though not all of these are discussed in Stern, "Apocryphal Gospels" and Pines, *The Jewish Christians*, pp. 51ff.

[169] Gregory Magistros, in F.G. Conybeare (tr.), *The Key of Truth*, Oxford 1898, p. 148.

[170] Stern, *op. cit.*, p. 51; Pines, *op. cit.*, pp. 63f.; add ʿAbd al-Jabbār, *Tathbīt*, p. 144, where John 4:9f. is twisted so as to make Jesus avow his Jewishness.

[171] This is surely the case not just of the passages in Pines, *op. cit.*, p. 58, but also of the long account in ʿAbd al-Jabbār, *op. cit.*, pp. 137ff. = Stern, *op. cit.*, pp. 42ff. Here the Romans and the Jews alike admit that they do not know Jesus, the person taken is scared out of his wits, he is a great disappointment to Pilate who had expected a man of wisdom, and he is laboriously left unnamed: Judas has clearly tricked the Romans into taking the wrong man. Note also the passage in which Jesus (here somewhat inconsistently hanging from the cross) disavows his mother and brothers very much as he did in the Elkesaite Gospel as quoted by Epiphanius (ʿAbd al-Jabbār, *op. cit.*, p. 201 = Stern, *op. cit.*, p. 52 and Pines, *op. cit.*, p. 61; Klijn and Reinink, *Patristic Evidence*, p. 181), presumably to make the point that he had become wholly divine on his baptism.

[172] No Athinganic views of the passion have been recorded, but compare the revaluation of Judas by Michael II the Athinganos (Theophanes Continuatus, *Chronographia*, p. 49). Doceticism was commonplace among the Paulicians.

[173] But the Gnostic beliefs of the Christian Judaizers have no Judaic counterpart: despite ʿAnan's alleged belief in metempsychosis and Nihāwandī's demiurge, Gnosticism does not appear to have infected Karaite Christology.

[174] Note how ʿAbd al-Jabbār, *Tathbīt*, p. 194, twists Matthew 25:32ff. so as to have Jesus bless the Christian *ṭawāʾif* against the Christian majority who use his name, but do not bear witness to him in truth.

[175] ʿAbd al-Jabbār, *Tathbīt*, p. 153 = Stern, "ʿAbd al-Jabbār's Account," p. 135 (*Jazīrat al-ʿarab* obviously is a translation of *Bēth ʿArbāyē*). Cf. also below, n. 199.

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an earlier version they flee to the north where they are received by the Jews.[176] Mosul did indeed have a Jewish population, but a more famous Jewish centre in Mesopotamia was Nisibis; and it was precisely in Nisibis that Muqammiṣ picked up his story. They can, however, also be located further afield. In Ibn Isḥāq's biography of the Prophet, there is a description of a pre-Islamic search for the true monotheism. A convert to Christianity by the name of Salmān is told by his dying mentor that "men have died and either altered or abandoned most of the true religion, except for a man in Mosul, so join yourself unto him."[177] Salmān accordingly goes off to Mosul, where the story is repeated, the mentor dies and Salmān goes on to find the last surviving representative of true Christianity who, this time, is found in Nisibis. And here, too, the same thing happens whereupon Salmān sets off to find the last true Christian in Amorium.[178] Salmān, in other words, retraces the steps of the Judeo-Christians to end up among the Athinganoi in Phrygia.[179]

Chronologically, these sects are best attested in the tenth century, to which both ʿAbd al-Jabbār and Qirqisānī belong, and there is no doubt that many of the Christians who denied the divinity of Christ were heretics of recent growth.[180] But the phenomenon itself is considerably older. Muqammiṣ flourished in the later ninth century, Christians who argue for a purely spiritual interpretation of Jesus' sonship are mentioned in Muslim sources in the mid-ninth century,[181] and the Athinganoi are first mentioned by Byzantine chroniclers under the year 811.[182] The direct evidence in fact takes us to the beginning of the eighth century; for the Athinganoi were known to Byzantine theologians by about 730 at latest;[183] Ibn

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[176] Stern, *op. cit.*, p. 180 (citing Qarāfī).

[177] H.F. Wüstenfeld (ed.), *Das Leben Muhammed's nach Muhammed Ibn Ishâk, bearbeitet von ʿAbd al-Malik Ibn Hischâm*, Göttingen 1858–60, I, pp. 136ff.= A. Guillaume (tr.), *The Life of Muhammad*, Oxford 1955, pp. 95ff.

[178] From here, of course, he goes to Mecca.

[179] A marginal note in the *Sira* explicitly identifies Salmān as a descendant of the fugitives from Paul (Wüstenfeld, *op. cit.* II, p. 45, cf. Stern, "ʿAbd al-Jabbār's Account," pp. 180f.). His Persian descent does not, of course, go very well with this story, but then it is likely to be a secondary feature, for his Semitic name is perfectly at home in Phrygia (A. Reinach, "Noé Sanganou, étude sur le déluge en Phrygie et le syncrétisme Judéo-Phrygien," *Revue des Etudes Juives* 65 [1913], pp. 216, 221), and his Iranian name, insofar as it is known at all, has no colour in the Islamic tradition.

[180] Saadia says so explicitly of the sect he knew (for the reference see n. 82). But then there is no evidence to show that his heretics (or any of the others in n. 82) were concerned to stress that the human Christ had been a Jew.

[181] Pines, " 'Israel, My Firstborn'," p. 182. The Copt who declared belief in the divinity of Christ to be polytheism also lived towards the middle of the ninth century (Madelung, *Qāsim*, p. 89).

[182] Theophanes, *Chronographia* I, p. 488, A.M. 6303; cf. Starr, "An Eastern Christian Sect," pp. 93ff.

[183] Germanus, who knew both the Athinganoi and the Samaritans as "touch-me-nots", died in 735. Timothy of Constantinople's section on the Athinganoi probably dates from the same century. Timothy himself is assumed to have lived before 622, but Starr has a point in thinking the relevant section an interpolation. It seems, however, to have formed part of the treatise by the time of Theodore the Studite, who died in 826 (Gouillard, "L'hérésie," pp. 304n., 307n.),

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Ishāq, who sent Salmān to Amorium, died in 767;[184] another account of Paul's corruption of Christianity is attributed to Kalbī, who died in 763;[185] and Jacob of Edessa died about 715. Jacob, moreover, knew not just of Sabbath-observers in Phrygia, but also of writings by a Judaizing Gnostic which had fallen into the hands of the faithful at home.[186] But if we want to go beyond this date, the evidence becomes circumstantial. Evidence there nonetheless is. First, the Judeo-Christian argument was put to polemical use by both Muslims[187] and Jews;[188] and that at least the Jews, but probably also the Muslims, must have made use of it already in the second half of the seventh century is clear from the Christian treatises against the Jews, in which the authors display a painful awareness of the fact that Christian customs fail to conform entirely with those of Christ. "If, as you say, your Christ has come . . . and was one of ours, why aren't you circumcised? . . . why do you pray east if not to adore the sun?", asks the Jew in a tract composed in 681.[189] "If Christ was circumcised, why aren't we? . . . why do we Christians pray towards east and the Jews towards south?" echoes the bewildered Christian.[190] Second, it is worth noting that the Seven Sleepers of Ephesus, a Christian story of the resurrection, got into the Koran via people who wrote in Aramaic and had

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and it was certainly known to the author of the treatise on the Melchisedekites and the abjuration formula which it contains, doubtless dating from the ninth century in which attempts were made to eradicate the heresy. Note that according to this formula the heresy had been around for a long time: the convert has to anathemize the teachers of the Athinganoi who have appeared "generation upon generation until now" (Caspari, "Kirkehistoriske Rejsefrugter," pp. 311 = 316).

[184] Or slightly earlier (cf. *Encyclopaedia of Islam¹, s.v.*).

[185] Cf. Stern, "'Abd al-Jabbār's Account", pp. 177f.

[186] One of his letters answers the queries of John, a stylite in the vicinity of Aleppo, who had got hold of some homilies attributed to Jacob of Sarug and wanted further information. As Jacob said, they contained many un-Christian notions and could not possibly have been written by the man celebrated by the Syrians as the "flute of the Holy Spirit". They appear to have been primarily cosmological, describing the genesis of various powers, but the author also boasted of following Moses' word and explained everything literally in the Jewish and Sabbatian fashion (Schröter, "Erster Brief Jacobs"). Jacob did not suggest that the author might be a Sabbatian: he thought him a minor rhetor. In other words, he did not know of sects that might be producing this kind of literature at home.

[187] In the accounts of Kalbī and Qarāfī Jewish Christianity *is* Islam (Stern, "'Abd al-Jabbār's Account," pp. 178, 180). In that of Ibn Ishāq Amorium, which is nowhere on the religious map of classical Islam, lies on the road to Mecca. By the end of the eighth century the Muslims were asking the Christians why they were not circumcized and why they prayed east (*ibid.*, pp. 155n., 157n.). And the spiritual interpretation of Jesus' sonship became a standard topic of Muslim polemics (Pines, " 'Israel, My Firstborn' ", p. 183).

[188] Cf. the spiritual interpretation of Jesus' sonship in the anti-Christian work of a tenth-century Jew (Mann, "An Early Theologico-Polemical Work," p. 417).

[189] Bardy, *Trophées de Damas*, pp. 250, 254.

[190] *Quaestiones*, cols. 617, 620, questions xxxvii f. (this treatise is likely to be the earlier; cf. n. 8). Jacob of Edessa was also confronted with the question of prayer direction: it was in answer to it that he wrote his exposition of how the Jews and the Hagarenes do not in fact pray towards the south (Crone & Cook, *Hagarism*, p. 173, n. 30).

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rules of kosher food:[191] one tradition duly locates the cave in the vicinity of Amorium.[192] Equally, the Sāmirī, the Samaritan magician who cries "touch me not" in the Koran, was perhaps not an ordinary Samaritan so much as an Athinganos.[193] There was at all events no lack of contacts between the Arabs and Amorium from as early as 644 onwards,[194] and there are oddities to suggest that Amorium was more than just another Anatolian city to the Arabs at the time.[195] All in all, the evidence certainly suggests that Judeo-Christian ideas had reached the Arab world already before the end of the seventh century.

As far as the role of the Judeo-Christians in the outbreak of the Iconoclast movement is concerned, it is of no importance whether the Judeo-Christian sects were any older. By way of concluding, however, we may briefly look at Pines' suggestion that these sectarians not only subscribed to the same doctrines as, but also preserved the very tradition of the Jewish Christians of the early Christian centuries. A priori, it is by no means impossible. Jewish Christians could not, of course, survive in Palestine, nor do we hear of them there; but in the mountains and across the Roman border in Persia, where the Christian church lacked the coercive apparatus of the state, Judeo-Christians could certainly have found a refuge: that is precisely what the Gnostics did. Amorium, however, was not located in inaccessible mountains and it was very close to Constantinople, a point which explains how Samaritans could get there,[196] but which virtually rules out heretical survival there. If the Jewish Christians did survive, they are more likely to have done so elsewhere. That brings us to Mārūthā's Sabbatians. Now Mārūthā gives no indication of where they flourished, and he himself was a much travelled man;[197] but he was bishop of Mayferqat on the border of Persia, Armenia and Byzantium, and since Jacob of Edessa states that there had been a church of Sabbath-observing Sabbatians in Edessa in the past,[198] they are likely to have been a Mesopotamian

[191] C.C. Torrey, *The Jewish Foundations of Islam*, New York 1933, pp. 46f., 120f.; cf. also P.M. Huber, *Die Wanderlegende von den Siebenschläfern*, Leipzig 1910, p. 336.

[192] Huber, *op. cit*., p. 226.

[193] Note that just as the Amorian Salmān acquired a Persian genealogy, so did the Koranic Sāmirī (Ibn Ḥanbal, *Kitāb al-ʿilal* I [ed. T. Koçyiğit & I. Cerrahoğlu], Ankara 1963, vol. I, p. 291, no. 1885).

[194] *Encyclopaedia of Islam²*, *s.v.* "ʿAmmūriya"; cf. W.E. Kaegi, "The First Arab Expedition against Amorium," *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* 3 (1977).

[195] For one thing, the Arabs write Amorium with an ʿayn, though there was none in the Syriac transcription (or Greek original, of course); from what Semitic population did they get this spelling of the name? For another, the "ancient historical books" of the Arabs prophesied that their kingdom would fall if they ever conquered the city, whence the reluctance of many Arabs to participate in Muʿtaṣim's campaign in 838 (*Chronicon ad 1234* II, p. 34 = 24; Michael the Syrian, *Chronique*, IV, p. 538 = III, p. 100); from what predictive specialists did they get this idea?

[196] For Samaritans in Constantinople in the days of Justinian see Sharf, *Byzantine Jewry*, p. 30. Note that confusion of *aleph* and ʿayn is commonplace in Samaritan Aramaic.

[197] Cf. Baumstark, *Geschichte*, pp. 53f.

[198] Wright, "Two Epistles," p. 26 of the text = Nau, "Traduction," p. 278.

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phenomenon. In the Mayferqat area they might well have survived together with their Gnostic enemies; the Armeno-Mesopotamian border certainly plays a notable part in the history of the Judeo-Christians and Paulicians in whom the two heresies have been mixed up, and the faint suggestions of Judeo-Christians in north-western Persia would also support the hypothesis that it was in this border area that they had entrenched themselves.[199] But two problems remain. First, even if we assume that Mārūthā's heretics survived in northern Mesopotamia, it is, *pace* Jacob of Edessa, still not obvious that it is they who reappear in Amorium.[200] It *might* be, for the Sabbatian label reappeared on the Byzantine side where it was not understood,[201] and the Paulicians likewise got there. But the Paulicians were militant adventurers, and they only got there late, whereas the Judeo-Christians are not known to have roamed, and the Amorium of which Salmān went in search was presumably there before the Arabs made their impact felt. Secondly, even if we assume that all the Judeo-Christians of the seventh century and beyond are ultimately related to Mārūthā's heretics, it is, *pace* both Mārūthā and Jacob of Edessa, still not obvious that these heretics in their turn have anything to do with the Jewish Christians of Palestine referred to in the New Testament and Patristic literature. That Jesus was a Jew and Paul ceased to be one can be read in the Christian scripture, and Jewish Christianity can, to that extent, appear wherever Christianity exists, particularly where it coexists with Judaism. The original Jewish Christians were Jewish converts to Christianity, as was also at least one of the Athinganoi in Amorium,[202] where a large Jewish (and presumably also

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[199] The Judeo-Christian argument that Jesus did not abrogate the law of Moses unexpectedly turns up among the Gnostic Ismaʿīlīs, where it was clearly extraneous (H. Halm, *Kosmologie und Heilslehre der frühen Ismāʿīliya*, Wiesbaden 1978, p. 121; that Jesus abrogated the law of his predecessor like other *nāṭiqs* was a key Ismāʿīlī doctrine). And the Ismāʿīlī who picked up this piece of Judeo-Christianity was Abū Ḥātim al-Rāzī (d. ca. 934), a native and *dāʿī* of Rayy. It seems most likely that he picked it up locally. Inasmuch as ʿAbd al-Jabbār was a native of Asadābādh and *qāḍī* of Rayy, one wonders if he did the same, but that seems unlikely. That his account comes from a Nestorian *milieu* on the Persian side of the old imperial frontier is clear, indirectly from the inclusion of a story about Nestorius in the *Toledoth*, directly from the comparison of Constantine and Ardashīr in the Judeo-Christian account (*Tathbīt*, pp. 163f = Stern, "ʿAbd al-Jabbār's Account," p. 145), the comparison of conversion to Christianity and Zoroastrianism (below, n. 205), and the stories of Christian miracle-makers involving the *maṭrān* of Khurāsān, the *jithlīq* of Iraq, St. George, the martyr of Mosul (cf. Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, ser. I, pp. 795ff.), and the unknown Abbā Marqos (*Tathbīt*, pp. 202ff.). It could be argued that neither the discussion of conversion nor the stories of the miracle-makers are part of the Judeo-Christian account, but the fact that St. George and Abbā Marqos who figure in both, are also denounced as miracle-makers by the philo-Christian Karaites would suggest that they were (above, n. 164). Even so, however, there is nothing to suggest that this milieu was located as far east as Rayy: Nestorian Mesopotamia would seem a more likely location, especially as the Christian terminology is given in Syriac (*Tathbīt*, pp. 206f.).

[200] Jacob's statement that Sabbatians *survive* in Phrygia and Galatia is not necessarily to be taken literally, of course. Christian churchmen would see contemporary Athinganoi as Sabbatians just as Greek *littérateurs* would see contemporary Turks as Scythians.

[201] Cf. above, n. 146.

[202] Viz. Michael II's grandfather (above, n. 107).

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Samaritan) population lived in symbiosis with the Christians. It is precisely to the interaction of Jews and Christians that Theophanes' continuator attributes the genesis of the Athinganic faith;[203] and Mārūthā's heretics may well have come into existence in the same way.

The case for the survival of the Judeo-Christian tradition thus rests entirely on the Judeo-Christian writings, in particular the account preserved by ʿAbd al-Jabbār. Now ʿAbd al-Jabbār's account models Constantine's persecution of Judeo-Christians and pagans on Justinian[204] and has references to the conversion of the Khazars.[205] As we have it, the account is therefore not particularly old.[206] But if that proves that it must have come from live Judeo-Christians, it does not in itself disprove that these Judeo-Christians had a venerable tradition to pass on. Of such a tradition, however, there is hardly a trace. On the one hand, the account contains little information that could not be gathered from the New Testament and current history books;[207] and, on the other hand, the apocryphal Gospel citations fail to correspond with those recorded in Patristic literature. Admittedly, one

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[203] Theophanes Cont., *Chronographia*, p. 42.

[204] Cf. the closure of the Athenian academy reported for Constantine in ʿAbd al-Jabbār, *Tathbīt*, pp. 161f. = Stern, "ʿAbd al-Jabbār's Account," p. 143.

[205] ʿAbd al-Jabbār, *Tathbīt*, p. 186. To what extent this was part of the Judeo-Christian account is not entirely clear. It comes in the course of a long argument against the Christian claim to have spread the faith without the use of force, the first objection being that the claim is untrue, and the second that even if it were true, other religions have spread in the same way (*ibid.*, pp. 173, 182ff). On the one hand it could be argued that a Muslim would be more concerned than a Jewish Christian to dispose of this claim and that it was ʿAbd al-Jabbār himself who supplied the evidence. But on the other hand the insistence that the many may go wrong against the few (p. 173), the account of Zoroastrian attitudes to conversion and of Persian grandeur (p. 185), the sympathetic attitude towards the Khazar converts, and the role of Paul, St. George and Abba Marqos in the discussion (p. 182; cf. above, n. 199), would all suggest that the entire discussion goes back to a Judeo-Christian and was simply adapted by ʿAbd al-Jabbār. Pines suggested that the reference to the Khazars was added by a Judeo-Christian to an earlier account (*The Jewish Christians*, p. 49). This is possible. That the Judeo-Christian account has no references to the rise of Islam is perhaps not decisive, but the account of Persian grandeur and above all that of Zoroastrian attitudes to conversion certainly does seem to take the existence of the Sāsānid empire for granted. The identification of late Byzantine and early Christian figures in ʿAbd al-Jabbār and the *Toledoth* (Justinian/Constantine, Simeon Stylites/Peter, Bar Ṣauma/Nestorius/Paul) would also suggest that, whatever the date of the writings as we have them, it was in the century before the Arab conquest that the sect's account of Christian history was shaped.

[206] According to Pines, *The Jewish Christians*, p. 35n., the account also speaks of the Nicaean council as having taken place some 500 years after Christ. But the published work gives the date as about 300 years after Christ (ʿAbd al-Jabbār, *Tathbīt*, p. 93 [corresponding to f. 43b according to the editor, but 43a according to Pines]).

[207] The one exception is the detailed knowledge of the origins of Christmas (Stern, "ʿAbd al-Jabbār's Account," p. 158). But it is hard to imagine that this is what Judeo-Christians eking out a tenuous existence in the backlands would choose to remember.

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citation has a parallel in the Gospel of Thomas,[208] while another corresponds closely in idea, though not quite in words, to a passage in the Gospel of the Elkesaites.[209] But both passages are Gnostic and, insofar as there was any continuity, it is thus likely to have been on the Gnostic rather than the Judeo-Christian side.[210] The Judeo-Christians of the Muslim world did indeed use very much the same passages of the Gospels, apocryphal or otherwise, in demonstration of very much the same points as the Judeo-Christians of the first Christian centuries; but given that they knew what they wanted to demonstrate, there was only a limited number of passages that could be so employed. And though Symmachus' Ebionite commentary on Matthew appears to have been available in Syriac as late as the fourteenth century,[211] they hardly knew of it: they invoke no authorities, presumably because they had none.

The link between the Jewish Christians of Epiphanius and those of 'Abd al-Jabbār thus remains tenuous. That 'Abd al-Jabbār's heretics existed before Islam seems clear. That they were genetically related to a fifth century sect entrenched in the mountains of northern Mesopotamia is possible. But that this sect in its turn preserved the tradition of the heretics of Palestine can only be said to be unlikely in the present state of the evidence.[212] That is not, of course, particularly remarkable. What is very remarkable indeed is the fact that Jewish Christianity, which was nothing if not an obsolete heresy in the eyes of the victorious gentiles who had long ceased to be greatly bothered by it, could suddenly reemerge as an attractive version of the Christian faith. And that is perhaps the neatest testimony we possess of the extent to which the rise of Islam changed the plausibility structures of the world on which it made its impact felt.

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[208] G. Quispel, *Gnostic Studies*, Istanbul 1974–5, II, p. 150.

[209] Cf. above, n. 165.

[210] Note that Gnosticizing Gospel citations also circulated among the Ismāʿīlīs (Halm, *op. cit.*, p. 113).

[211] H.J. Schoeps, *Theologie und Geschichte des Judenchristentums*, Tübingen 1949, p. 34 (also noted by Pines).

[212] If it was in the century preceding the Arab conquest that the sect's account of Christian history was shaped (cf. n. 205), the possibility is of course virtually ruled out.

Martyrdom, Jihād, Holy War

14

SOME OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF JIHAD ON THE ARAB-BYZANTINE FRONTIER

Michael Bonner

Jihad, like other Islamic institutions, doctrines and practices, must have gone through stages of development in the early period. But it is difficult to detect these stages from the historical sources for the formative period of Islam, which are notoriously stereotyped, and never so much as when they discuss conquest and jihad.([1]) If we look beyond to other sources not usually considered under the rubric of history *(ta'rīkh)*, we encounter a number of conceptual difficulties. These include problems which we may call political: changing and conflicting views concerning who is to wield authority over whom, and against whom. They also include a complex of literary problems, which we see in the simultaneous growth and intermingling of such concepts as *maghāzī*, *ḥadīth*, *sīra*, *siyar*, and even *jihād* itself. These are the political and literary aspects of a new society's changing view of itself, always as a conquest society. These two aspects (the political and the literary) must be considered together if we are to improve our understanding of these matters.

Since this problem is so large, this essay will limit itself to developments in one particular historical context, albeit an important one. It will discuss two of the earliest extant Arabic literary works devoted to the theme of war, both of which have now been edited for the first time: the *Kitāb al-siyar* of Abū Isḥāq

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(1) A. Noth, *Quellenkritische Studien* (Bonn, 1973), passim; P. Crone, *Slaves on Horses* (Cambridge, 1980), pp. 3-17.

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al-Fazārī (d. after 185/802)([2]) and the *Kitāb al-jihād* of 'Abdallāh b. al-Mubārak (d. 181/797).([3])   These books are important enough in themselves to merit more study than they have hitherto received.   But also of significance is the fact that they originated in a common environment, that of the Arab-Byzantine frontier area *(thughūr)* in the early 'Abbāsid period, where from at least 156/773 we may detect the arrival of numerous scholars and ascetics.

Similar persons, participating in warfare in their capacity as learned men, had already been seen in the area on earlier occasions, such as the great expedition of 717, when a group of *"fuqahā'* from Syria and Iraq" are said to have accompanied the Umayyad army to Dābiq.([4])   But the scholar-ascetics of the early 'Abbāsid period, unlike their predecessors of 717, had nothing of the imperial cortège about them: indeed, one of their distinguishing features was their indifference to and at least partial rejection of the authority of the caliphs in the conduct of war.   They were also the first of their kind to create a permanent presence in the area (though "settled" is too strong a word).   They were afterwards given credit for deeds of martial valor, which grew with time.   For instance, we are told that the *muḥaddith* 'Alī b. Bakkār (d. 207 or 208) was once wounded in battle, so that his entrails came pouring out onto his saddle.   He stuffed them back into place, wound his turban around his belly, and proceeded to kill thirteen of the enemy.([5])   But they were also known for their scholarly activity,

(2) Ed. F. Ḥamāda, Beirut 1987.   See also M. Muranyi, "Das *Kitāb al-Siyar* von Abū Isḥāq al-Fazārī.   Das Manuskript der *Qarawiyyīn*-Bibliothek zu Fās," *Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam* 6 (1985), pp. 63-97.   The transmission history of the book is discussed by Ḥamāda in his introduction, pp. 62-75, and by Muranyi, pp. 71-85.

(3) Ed. N. Ḥammād, Cairo, 1978.   Ḥammād's Beirut, 1971 edition has been unavailable to me.   See further Sezgin, *Geschichte des arabischen Schriftlums*, 1: 95.

(4) *Kitāb al-'uyūn*, Vol. I of *Fragmenta historicorum arabiscorum*, ed. M.J. de Goeje and P. de Jong (Leiden, 1869), p. 25.   There are, of course, Companions of the Prophet and Followers who are said to have participated in campaigns earlier than this.   But these accounts are not trustworthy; and in any case these men did not participate specifically in their capacity as learned men.   Fazārī and Ibn al-Mubārak are the first from whom we have texts.

(5) Ibn al-Jawzī, Ṣifat al-ṣafwa (Aleppo, 1969-73), 4: 267.   From earlier sources we learn only that 'Alī "settled in al-Maṣṣīṣa as a *murābiṭ*" (Ibn Sa'd, *Ṭabaqāt* [Leiden, 1904-21], 7: 2: 186; Ibn Abī Ḥātim, *al-Jarḥ wal-ta'dīl* [Hyderabad, 1952-53], 3: 1: 186).   Elsewhere we find 'Alī sitting in the wilderness with a lion sleeping on the fold of his garment (*Ṣifa*, 4: 267), which makes a less warlike impression, as does the statement that 'Alī wept until he went blind.

especially the transmission of hadith, and for their prowess as ascetics. This peculiar combination remained characteristic of them until the Byzantine reconquest of Cilicia in the fourth/tenth century, and may remind us of the literary type of the French warrior-cleric which later emerges in Don Jérôme (Jerónimo) in the *Cantar de mio Cid* and Turpin in the *Chanson de Roland*.

Abū Isḥāq al-Fazārī and Ibn al-Mubārak were among the first of these scholar-ascetics to arrive on the scene, and they remained the two most important figures of this milieu, both during and after their lifetimes. They are certainly the first from whom texts are extant. We can detect in them and their companions a desire to imitate the Prophet and his Companions, by reenacting the early conquests of Islam. All this takes place in an atmosphere of preaching and persuasion.

The two books to be discussed here contain various sorts of material, being works of *siyar, maghāzī* and *ḥadīth:* most, if not all of their contents originated in earlier generations, and Fazārī and Ibn al-Mubārak must have seen themselves, in some sense, as relayers of traditions. Nonetheless, we may discuss Fazārī and Ibn al-Mubārak not as mere compilers, but as authors. This is because, first, of their unusual relation to their immediate surroundings; and second, because their books on *siyar* and *jihād* are among the first complete works on those subjects which have survived. Furthermore, it is not that these things happened only on the Byzantine frontier: other scholar-ascetics went to live on other frontiers, while other men of learning, particularly in Iraq and the Hijaz, also took an interest in these matters, at times agreeing and at times disagreeing with Fazārī and Ibn al-Mubārak. But these scholar-ascetics of the Byzantine frontier have pride of place in this matter, at least from our point of view: it is the figures cut by Fazārī and Ibn al-Mubārak which first allow us to perceive two trends which already for some time have been in a process of formation, but which cohere only now.

Each of these two figures may be related to distinctive notions regarding authority in the conduct of war. For Fazārī, this authority is tending to inhere in the scholar-ascetic himself, and away from the imam and his representatives. This vision of proper authority is reflected in Fazārī's activity in the frontier region, where he imposes the *sunna* without having been delegated by anone. In Ibn al-Mubārak, we may detect a similar trend; but beyond this, we find in him an emphasis on merit, reward and volunteering, which leads to an internalization of norms, which in

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its turn is essential to that relation between society and individual which characterizes jihad as we know it. Ibn al-Mubārak's style is accordingly one of "companionship," and here the authority of the scholar begins to seem problematic, as does already the authority of the ruler and his representatives. As has already been mentioned, scholars in other places continued to express different views, for instance in regard to the role of the imam in the conduct of war, during this time and afterwards. But on the Arab-Byzantine frontier in this period, these were the two trends which prevailed, in apparent coexistence with one another. Their later history may have been less harmonious, but that is another subject.

In constructing this argument, I have been helped most by the work of three scholars. Albrecht Noth, especially in his *Heiliger Krieg und heiliger Kampf in Islam und Christentum*, has helped me to identify what I referred to at the beginning as the political aspect of the problem. Jihad consists of warfare conducted by a constituted authority (in the jurists, this usually the imam) against duly defined enemies. At the same time it consists of actions untertaken by individuals in search of religious merit. The warrior therefore frequently appears not to be bound to strictly military purposes, and warfare can even seem an excuse for religious observance and ascetic practice.[6] Even so, jihad remains a kind of warfare, and the question remains: who is to have authority over whom, and against whom?

For the literary aspect, I am indebted to the work of the late Martin Hinds. Of particular relevance is Hinds' discussion of the evolution of the term *maghāzī*, which went "from being a record of a past collective quest and achievement of goals including, but not limited to, the achievements of the Prophet, to one which was restricted to the period and background of the Prophet, and then to one which was further restricted (at least by al-Wāqidī) to the Medinan period of the Prophet' life."[7]

For the underlying problem, which has to with *iqtidā'* or imitation, John Wansbrough's *Sectarian Milieu* is most relevant. Wansbrough discusses a transition from *sīra*, or *narratio*

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(6) A. Noth, *Heiliger Krieg* (Bonn, 1966), pp. 9-92, esp. 42f., 54f.
(7) M. Hinds, "Maghāzī and Sīra in Early Islamic Scholarship," in *La vie du prophète Mahomet*, Colloque de Strasbourg, 23-24 octobre 1980 (Paris, 1983), p. 65. See also Hinds' article "maghāzī" in EI2 5: 1161f.

(where *ecclesia* is the dominant cognitive category), to *sunna*, or *exemplum*, (where the dominant cognitive category is *nomos*).(8) This may also be understood as a scholastic ordering of old materials relating to warfare in Arabia, into Islamic categories; and the elevation of custom and mythology to the status of legal and theological doctrine. At the same time, this process also involves a conceptual shift from *maghāzī* to *jihād*.(9) For Wansbrough the *exemplum* which emerges, and which finds its literary expression in the classical hadith, is that of the *imām*; and this notion of "apostolic" authority is associated with the vested interest of a "clerical elite."(10)

In what follows, a section will be devoted to Fazārī and his *Kitāb al-siyar*, and then another section to Ibn al-Mubārak and his *Kitāb al-jihād*. At the end, a few general consequences will be drawn.(11)

<div style="text-align:center">I</div>

Abū Isḥāq al-Fazārī was the leading figure in the first generation of these scholar-ascetics of the *thughūr*. Like his colleagues, he is said to have taken part in military campaigns;(12) and generally speaking, the later the biographical source, the more information it has on Abū Isḥāq's martial exploits.(13) But his main significance

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(8) This is the paraphrase of Hinds, "Maghāzī and Sīra," p. 63. See *Sectarian Milieu* (Oxford, 1978), pp. 71-87, where Wansbrough speaks of a "transition from polemic to paradigmatic description" of the early community. "The formative principle of Sunna is *exemplum*, an intentionally ambiguous notion where various applications may be discerned in the Arabic term *imām*" (p. 71).

(9) Wansbrough, *Sectarian Milieu*, pp. 46, 71.

(10) *Ibid.*, pp. 71-72.

(11) This essay is part of a larger project. I wish to thank in particular David Eisenberg, Daniela Gobetti, the participants in the Princeton Near Eastern History Workship, and Ella Landau-Tasseron (who will probably still disagree).

(12) The earliest date for any of them is 156/773, when Abū Isḥāq, accompanying a summer expedition, certifies that ten corpses which the Muslim raiders have found preserved in an Anatolian cave are indeed the *aṣḥāb al-raqīm*, or Sleepers of the Cave. Azdī, *Ta'rīkh al-Mawṣil* (Cairo, 1967), p. 225; Muranyi, "Das Kitāb al-Siyar," pp. 67-71.

(13) Bukhārī (d. 256) does not mention these activities (*al-Ta'rīkh al-kabīr* [Hyderabad, 1952], 1: 1: 321, # 1005). But Ibn Sa'd (d. 230) calls him ṣāḥib sunna wa-ghazw (see below, n. 34). Ibn Qutayba (d. 276) reports simply that Abū Isḥāq died in al-Maṣṣīṣa (*Ma'ārif* [Cairo, 1969], p. 514), while Ibn Ḥibbān (d. 353) says that Abū Isḥāq lived in the frontier garrisons until his death (*Mashāhīr 'ulamā' al-*

is as author of the *Kitāb al-siyar*, which won high praise from al-
Shāfīʿī. (14)

The *Kitāb al-siyar* now looks like a book of mixed genre.   Over
half of the surviving fragment consists of *responsa* from Awzāʿī,
Sufyān al-Thawrī and other early jurists, answers to detailed
questions concerning the law of war, what will be identified in this
essay as *siyar*. (15)   But Abū Ishāq's *Siyar* also contains swatches
of early *tafsīr*, and above all, long sections of *maghāzī*, that is,
historical narratives not only about the life and campaigns of the
Prophet, but also about the *ridda* wars and the great
conquests. (16)   This is, generally speaking, what we might expect
of *maghāzī* works of this period, although here their range is more
limited than in, for example, the work of Maʿmar b. Rāshid and
ʿAbd al-Razzāq. (17)   Abū Ishāq's procedure differs that of the
other early work on siyar which has survived, that of
Shaybānī.   Why has he combined these apparently disparate
materials?   An answer to this question may clear up the confusion
over the title of this book, (18) and help us to understand the nature
of Abū Ishāq's enterprise.

Muranyi assigned the *Kitāb al-Siyar* to the genre of law of war,
that is, to *siyar* as a kind of *fiqh*.   For him the chapter headings
which have survived of otherwise lost parts of the book are proof of
the "secondary" nature of its sections on prophetical
biography. (19)   While Muranyi's assessment must in some sense be
correct, from a rhetorical point of view the hierarchy of topics and

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amṣār [Wiesbaden, 1959], p. 182).   Warlike details accumulate in Abū Nuʿaym
(*Ḥilyat al-awliyāʾ* [Cairo, 1967], 8: 253-65), Ibn al-Jawzī (*Ṣifa*, 4: 259-60) and later
writers.

(14) *Lam yuṣannif aḥad fil-siyar mithlahu*.   Ibn Ḥajar, *Tahdīb al-tahdīb*
[Hyderabad, 1325, repr. Beirut, 1968], 1: 152.

(15) The term is, of course, more complex: see Hinds, "Maghāzī and Sira,"
pp. 61f.

(16) *Ridda* accounts at pp. 246f.; a series of conquest narratives at pp. 206f.,
including Marw al-Rūdh (# 314), Nihāwand (# 316), Yarmūk (# 317); see also
p. 149, # 119, "in the year of Yarmūk," transmitted by Mūsā b. ʿUqba.

(17) As in the book of *maghāzī* in the *Muṣannaf* of ʿAbd al-Razzāq (Beirut, 1983),
5: 313-492, which includes episodes from the digging of Zamzam down to the first
fitna.   See Hinds, "Maghāzī and Sīra," pp. 64-66; EI2 5: 1161-64.

(18) Titles listed include *Kitāb al-siyar fil-akhbār* and *Kitāb al-siyar fil-akhbār
wal-aḥdāth*.   Ibn Saʿd (*Ṭabaqāt*, 7: 2: 82.11) refers to the work as *Kitāb al-siyar fī dār
al-ḥarb*.   See Sezgin, GAS 1:292; Hinds, "Maghāzī and Sīra," p. 61; Muranyi, "Das
Kitāb al-siyar" pp. 64-65.

(19) Muranyi, "Das *Kitāb al-siyar*," pp. 70, 87-88.

genres is not so obvious. At least in that part of the text which has survived, the *maghāzī* narratives and the *siyar* material in form of *responsa* are thoroughly interspersed. On some occasions, the following pattern emerges: Fazārī will recite several conquest narratives, without indicating what lesson is to be drawn from them; then this becomes apparent when he quotes *responsa* from Awzāʿī and Sufyān al-Thawrī. [20] The technique resembles that of Bukhārī's chapter headings, but in reverse. Even if this pattern occurs only occasionally, the *maghāzī* narratives are still not clearly "secondary" to the "straightforward" or "primary" sections of *siyar*, again, from a rhetorical point of view. Fazārī does not use the more rigorous categories of *fiqh* which we find in the work of his Iraqi contemporaries Abū Yūsuf and Shaybānī. He may represent an older state of affairs, or a local tradition, or both. In any case, medieval readers associated his book with the *maghāzī* tradition. [21]

What, then, is the relation of *siyar* to *maghāzī* in this work? The answer has to be found in Abū Isḥāq's ideas concerning authority. These, however, are not easy to find in the *Kilāb al-siyar*. Abū Isḥāq relays the views of various jurists on such questions as whether a man may attack the enemy without permission from the imam. [22] He does not, however, concern himself in the *Siyar* with the general theme of obedience to the imam, which elsewhere occurs in early hadith concerned with jihad. [23] He likewise ignores the question, "Is it all right to go on

(20) For instance, at p. 167 there begins a series of narratives whose point does not become clear until p. 169, # 195, when Fazārī obtains a *responsum* from Awzāʿī. Similarly at p. 196 we find what seems like a chapter of *maghāzī* of in the style of Maʿmar and ʿAbd al-Razzāq *(ma jāʾa fil-bayʿa)*, the point of which does not emerge until p. 199, # 293, in a *responsum* from Awzāʿī.

(21) Listed over the title page of Part 2 of the ms. are the titles of several *maghāzī* works: the *Maghāzī* of Mūsā b. ʿUqba, Ibn Isḥāq, ʿAbd al-Razzāq, al-Taymī, Ibn Shihāb [al-Zuhrī], together with the *Siyar* of al-Fazārī, the *Siyar* of al-Walīd b. Muslim from *(ʿan)* al-Awzāʿī, *al-Durar fī khlisār al-maghāzī wal-siyar* [of Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr] and the *Futūḥ al-[Shām]*. See Muranyi, "Das *Kilāb al-siyar*," p. 86. Of course the word *siyar* afterwards "took over from *al-maghāzī* on the tongues of the *fuqahāʾ*" (al-Fayyūmī, cited by Hinds, "Maghāzī and Sīra," pp. 61-2). But this is a later development.

(22) Fazārī, *Siyar*, p. 219f.; cf. Ṭabarī, *Kilāb ikhlilāf al-fuqahāʾ* (Leiden, 1933), pp. 78-80; Noth, *Heiliger Krieg*, pp. 44-45.

(23) In Ibn Abī Shayba's *al-Kilāb al-muṣannaf* (Beirut, 1989), 6: 418-19, this is the subject of the opening chapter of the *Kilāb al-siyar*, followed by chapters on *imāra* and the just imam. Comparable sections are to be found in the Six Books.

campaign with any amir?" *(al-ghazw ma'a kull amīr)*, which has also survived in hadith from the Umayyad period.[24] We must therefore step outside the *Kitāb al-siyar*, by contrasting the man Abū Ishāq with the man who was his own master, and his main authority in the *Kitāb al-siyar*, that is, the great Syrian al-Awzāʿī (d. 157/774), himself supposed to have been the author of a (now lost) book on siyar. In doing so we must look to the figures which Fazārī and Awzāʿī present in Arabic biographical tradition. Only then will an answer to the literary problem take shape.

The relation between Awzāʿī and Fazārī was somewhat unique: Awzāʿī is said to have held such a high opinion of Abū Ishāq that he called him *al-ṣādiq al-maṣdūq*,[25] and transmitted hadith from him, even though he was younger.[26] The two together were known as "the two imams of Syria,"[27] despite the fact that Abū Ishāq was a transplanted Kufan.

We may begin by contrasting the views of Awzāʿī and Fazārī on positive law. Here there can be few differences, since Fazārī's major authority is Awzāʿī himself. Fazārī also cites other jurists, but among these Sufyān al-Thawrī (d. 161/778) appears most often, after Awzāʿī himself, and usually in agreement with Awzāʿī. But on the matter of past authority, we have the comprehensive statements by Awzāʿī which Abū Yūsuf cited in the *Kitāb al-radd*:

> Al-Awzāʿī said: Every time the Messenger of God returned from a campaign on which he had captured booty, he extracted a fifth and divided up [the rest] before returning home... After him the Muslims continued in this way. In the caliphate of 'Umar their armies [invaded] the land of the Rūm, and in the caliphate of 'Uthmān on the sea and the dry land... until the *fitna* broke out, and al-Walīd b. Yazīd was killed [in 126/744]... [Discussing another matter:] This was the

    (24) 'Abd al-Razzāq, *Muṣannaf*, 5: 283f.; Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ* (Leiden, 1862-1908), 2: 238-39.

    (25) Ibn 'Asākir, ed. Badrān, *Tahdhīb al-ta'rīkh al-kabīr* (Damascus, 1911-32), 2: 256; Dhahabī, *Tadhkirat al-ḥuffāẓ* (Hyderabad, 1955-58), 1:273; Muranyi, "Das *Kitāb al-siyar*," pp. 68f.

    (26) Ibn Ḥajar, *Tahdhīb*, 1: 152; Abū Nu'aym, *Ḥilya*, 8: 256. Awzāʿī is supposed to have told a scribe to whom he was dictating a letter to Abū Ishāq: "Begin with [his name], for by God, he is better than I am." Abū Nu'aym, 8: 243; Ibn 'Asākir, ed. Badrān, 2: 253; Dhahabī, *Tadhkira*, 1: 274; Ibn Ḥajar, *loc. cit.*

    (27) Ibn 'Asākir, ed. Badrān, 2: 254, where 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. Mahdī (d. 198) notes that the Basrans follow Ḥammād b. Zayd, while the Kufans prefer Zā'ida and Mālik b. Mighwal, and the Hijazis opt for Mālik b. Anas. "And if you see a Syrian, he will prefer al-Awzāʿī and al-Fazārī, and will put his trust in them. [All] these are imams of the *sunna*." See also Abū Nu'aym, *Ḥilya*, 8: 254.

practice of the imams of the Muslims in the past, until the *fitna* broke out and al-Walīd b. Yazīd was killed...[28]

Awzāʿī sees a continuous precedent from the Prophet to the end of the Umayyad period; this is the "uninterrupted practice of the Muslims" which Schacht identified as Awzāʿī's notion of "living tradition" or *sunna*.[29]   Awzāʿī does often refer to the authority of the Prophet, and a tradition of the Prophet, without *isnād*, suffices to establish a *sunna*; but then so does the precedent of one of the caliphs.   The scholars *('ulamā')* then follow this practice which has been laid down by the "imams of the Muslims."[30]

Abū Isḥāq makes no such comprehensive statements, and indeed states nothing on his own authority. To understand what Abū Isḥāq represents in this respect, we must look for him in Arabic biographical tradition. We have already seen that Abū Isḥāq was the central figure among the scholar-ascetics who settled along the Byzantine frontier in the reign of al-Manṣur. In his dealings with the (no doubt uncouth) inhabitants of the frontier district, Abū Isḥāq is said to have taken a hard line. According to al-ʿIjlī (d. 210 or 211), Abū Isḥāq "was the one who taught the inhabitants of the frontier region how to behave *(addaba ahl al-thughūr)*. He instructed them in the sunna and used to command and prohibit. Whenever a man inclined to innovation *(rajul mubtadiʿ)* entered the frontier region, Abū Isḥāq would throw him out."[31]   His opposition to Qadarites was just as energetic: once when a man arrived in al-Maṣṣīṣa and began to speak favorably of *qadar*, Abū Isḥāq sent word to him, saying, "Get away from us!"[32] Similarly, the Damascene Abū Mushir al-Ghassānī (d. 218) reported that when Abū Isḥāq visited Damascus, and people gathered to hear him speak, he would instruct Abū Mushir to dismiss all Qadarites from the room.[33]

With this stern character in mind we must consider Ibn Saʿd's description of Abū Isḥāq as a *ṣāḥib sunna wa-ghazw*.[34]   The first

(28) Abū Yūsuf, *Kitāb al-Radd ʿalā siyar al-Awzāʿī* (Cairo, 1357), pp. 1-2, 20.

(29) J. Schacht, *The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence* (Oxford, 1959), pp. 34-35, 70-73.

(30) *Al-Radd*, p. 83.

(31) Ibn ʿAsākir, ed. Badrān, 2: 253; Ibn Ḥajar, *Tahdhīb*, 1:151; Muranyi, "Das Kitāb al-siyar, " p. 69.

(32) Abū Nuʿaym, *Ḥilya*, 7: 254; Ibn ʿAsākir, ed. Badran, 2: 255.

(33) Ibn ʿAsākir, ed. Badrān, 2: 253; Dhahabī, 1: 273; Ibn Ḥajar, *Tahdhīb*, 1: 151.

(34) *Ṭabaqāt*, 7: 2: 185; cf. Ibn al-Jawzī, *Ṣifa*, 4: 259.

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part of this epithet, *ṣāḥib sunna*, has been discussed by
Juynboll.([35]) It certainly does not mean master of prophetical
hadith,([36]) and one way or another, Abū Isḥāq shares this epithet
with a number of people; his own master al-Awzāʿī was called *imām
fil-sunna*.([37]) Keeping in mind the resolve with which Abū Isḥāq
is reported to have applied the sunna to the people of Maṣṣīṣa, we
may say that the epithet *ṣāḥib sunna* refers here ambiguously both
to one who observes the sunna, and to one who goes out of his way
independently to enforce it. Above all, the *ṣāḥib sunna* is not a
person of recognized authority, such as a magistrate.

The second part of this epithet, *ṣāḥib ghazw*, has a similiar
ambiguity, meaning either one who is master of the literary genre
of *maghāzī*, or one who performs *ghazw* as an active warrior. Of
course both apply to Abū Isḥāq. But while we find the epithet
ṣāḥib maghāzī applied, for instance, to Muḥammad b. Isḥāq,([38])
who was a scholar but no warrior, true *aṣḥāb ghazw* are rare. One
such is Ṣāliḥ b. Muḥammad b. Zāʾida al-Madanī (d. after 145),
who appears in Abū Isḥāq's *Siyar* relaying a decision made in
enemy territory by al-Walīd b. Hishām.([39]) Like Abū Isḥāq,
Ṣāliḥ b. Muḥammad combines an interest in law of war with
participation on campaigns. But he is a minor figure, who does
not reside in the *thughūr*. In all this he differs from Abū Isḥāq,
who seems to have been the only *ṣāḥib sunna wa-ghazw*.

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(35) G. H. A. Juynboll, "Some New Ideas on the Development of *Sunna* as a
Technical Term in Early Islam," *Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam* 10 (1987),
pp. 112f. The *aṣḥāb sunna* tend to receive poor to middling grades as traditionists,
they are characterized repeatedly as ascetics, and the hadith which do purvey is
often of the genre of *tarhīb wa-targhīb*, without much actual legal content.

(36) *Ibid.*, pp. 111f. The authorities were divided on Fazārī's qualifications in
this respect. Ibn Qutayba (*Maʿārif*, p. 514) damned him as *kathīr al-ghalaṭ
fil-ḥadīth*. Ibn Saʿd (*Ṭabaqāt*, 7: 2: 185) gave a mixed review. The tendency to
error may be partially the result of Abū Isḥāq's late start, at the age of 28, in
the writing of hadith (Ibn Ḥajar, 1: 153). But other early authorities, namely
Ibn Maʿīn, Abū Ḥātim, al-ʿIjlī and al-Nasāʾī, praised his hadith: see Ibn Abī Ḥatim,
Jarḥ, 1: 1: 127-29; Ibn Ḥajar, 1: 152-53.

(37) Above, n. 27; Ibn Abī Ḥātim, *Taqdimat kitāb al-jarḥ wal-taʿdīl* (Hyderabad,
1952), p. 203; Goldziher, *Muslim Studies*, tr. C. R. Barber and S. M. Stern (London,
1967-71), 2: 25.

(38) Hinds, "Maghāzī and Sīra," p. 66.

(39) Fazārī, *Siyar*, p. 241, # 405. Also present are Sālim b. ʿAbdallāh, ʿUmar b.
ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz and Makḥūl. See the variant at ʿAbd al-Razzāq, *Muṣannaf*, 5: 247,
9510. Ṣāliḥ was condemned as *daʿīf yuktabu ḥadīthuhu*: Mizzī, *Tahdhīb al-kamāl*
(Beirut, 1985-), 13: 84-89; Ibn Ḥajar, *Tahdhīb al-tahdhīb*, 4: 401-02.

In the generation of Ṣāliḥ b. Muḥammad, the major figure in *siyar* was, of course, the Syrian Awzāʿī.   But we never find Awzāʿī called *ṣāḥib ghazw*.   Instead we are told that when Awzāʿī in his youth was called up for military service *(ḍuriba ʿalayhi baʿth)*, what proved decisive for him during his tour of duty was an encounter in a mosque with Yaḥyā b. Abī Kathīr, which resulted in Awzāʿī's conversion to the life of scholarship.   The only effect which this had upon his brief military career was that he refused to accept his military stipend *(rafaḍa al-dīwān)*. (⁴⁰)   Ibn Saʿd lists Awzāʿī as first among the scholars of the *ʿawāṣim* and the *thughūr*, (⁴¹) but this must be, first because of his residence later in life in Beirut, considered a frontier post because of its being open to the sea; (⁴²) and second, because many of the scholars who did settle there were intellectual descendants of Awzāʿī, through their own master Fazārī.   Awzāʿī himself died un unheroic death in the bath. (⁴³)

By contrast, Abū Isḥāq al-Fazārī participates physically in the activity which he studies.   And whereas in Awzāʿī's view the precedent of the "imams of the Muslims" meant an uninterrupted sequence of political rulers, from the Prophet to the end of the Umayyad dynasty, for Fazārī the role of "imams of the Muslims" has in effect devolved upon such figures as Awzāʿī in the past, and Fazārī himself in the present.   This shift in notions of authority thus comes together with a new, more literal sense of imitation, a deliberate attempt to make Muḥammad palpably present in one's own time and place.   Here we are in the midst of the shift which Wansbrough has described, from *narratio* to *exemplum*, with the "clerical elite" making its claim to authority.   And we may note further that the style which Abū Isḥāq adopts here resembles what

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(40) Ibn Abī Ḥātim, *Taqdima*, p. 186.

(41) *Tabaqāt*, 7: 2: 185; cf. Ibn al-Jawzī, *Ṣifa*, 4: 255.

(42) The cities of the Levantine coast had a front-line character.   An ascetic who lived in one of them was once asked why he hadn't laughed in forty years.   He replied, "How can I laugh, so long as a single Muslim remains captive in the hands of the unbelievers?" Ibn al-Jawzī, *Ṣifa*, 4: 275 (ʿAbbād al-ʿAsqalānī al-Sāḥilī; cf. Ibn Ḥajar, *Tahdhīb*, 5: 97).

(43) Ibn Abī Ḥātim, *Taqdima*, p. 202.   See, however, the letters which Awzāʿī wrote to the caliph al-Manṣūr and other figures in the ʿAbbāsid governement, interceding on behalf of the "people of the coast" after a reduction in their stipend, and pleading for ransom money for Muslims who had fallen captive in Qālīqalā, *ibid.*, pp. 193-202; cf. Sezgin, GAS, 1:517.

Peter Brown has described as the late antique (as opposed to late medieval) version of the *imitatio Christi*. [44]

At this point it might be objected that when Fazārī acted as a *ṣāḥib sunna* he was not, so far as we can see, devoting himself to matters pertaining to war; he was rather, with his "commanding and prohibiting," taking up the burden of "enjoining what is good and forbidding what is reprehensible" *(al-amr bil-ma'rūf wal-nahy 'an al-munkar)*. But even on the frontier a model of authority must necessarily embrace areas than war itself. It must be remembered that the Fazārī of our sources is a construction, a literary type, and that none of the details about him are necessarily reliable historically. In this construction we find emphasis on two areas: theology (opposition to *qadar*), and above all, war and conquest in many aspects, including participation in military campaigns. As for *al-amr bil-ma'rūf*, its significance for this early period is not clear, at least for such figures as Fazārī and other *aṣḥāb sunna* like him. [45] In this particular context it seems to support precisely the point which I am making, namely that Fazārī enforced the sunna of his own accord, without having been delegated by a higher authority.

A more telling objection would be that in Fazārī's *Siyar* the imam and his representatives are still present. And indeed, Fazārī never explicitly rejects the authority of the imam, but rather retains an ambiguous attitude, as do many others after him. But in his *Siyar* he avoids the general theme of obedience to the imam. [46] He also does not report his own views on this and other subjects, but only those of this scholarly predecessors, above all Awzā'ī, who, I maintain, differed from him precisely on this

(44) P. Brown, "The Saint as Exemplar in Late Antiquity," in J. S. Hawley, ed., *Saints and Virtues* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1987), pp. 6-7. "The imitation of Christ... was to bring that elusive touch of the majesty of Adam into the present age. Though the phrase does not, to my knowledge, occur among Late Antique Christian writers in this context, *repraesentatio Christi*, making Christ present by one's own life in one's own age and region, appears to be the aim and effect of the early Christian *imitatio Christi*."

(45) *Al-amr bil-ma'rūf*, as a principle of active revolt, was espoused by the Khārijites and the Zaydīs, and also by the early Mu'tazila. But for the early *ahl al-jamā'a* (which would seem to include Fazārī), it is not clear if it meant anything specific at all. See W. Madelung, *"Amr be ma'rūf,"* Enc. *Iran.*, 1: 992-995. All this will become clearer when Michael Cook completes his book on this subject.

(46) Above, n. 23. There is a story saying that Fazārī once practiced *al-amr bil-ma'rūf* an *"a sulṭān"*, For which he received two hundred lashes. Ibn 'Asākir, 2: 254; Abul-'Arab Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Tamīmī, *Kitāb al-miḥan* (Riyad, 1984), p. 379. (Thanks to M. Cook.)

point.   This difference appears in a discussion of the vital subject
of distribution of lands in the *thughūr*:

> Someone asked al-Awzāʿī, "Concerning the lands of al-Maṣṣīṣa, and the
> lands granted by the authorities *(qaṭāʾiʿ al-sulṭān)* on them, is it your
> view that the amīr of Qinnasrīn may make grants to the people
> *(yuqṭiʿuhum)* [out of them]?"   He replied, "I see no harm in this in the
> town, [making grants] out of its houses.   But as for the agricultural
> lands, that is a matter for the Commander of the Faithful."(47)

For Awzāʿī, only the caliph may allot lands in newly-conquered
areas.   In a source other than the *Siyar* we find Fazārī's views on a
similar subject:

> Abū Ṣāliḥ al-Anṭākī told me [al-Balādhurī] that Abū Isḥāq al-Fazārī
> used to disapprove of buying land in the *thughūr*.   He would say that
> at first a group of warriors *(qawm)* had taken possession of [this land],
> and debarred the Rūm from it.   However, they did not divide it up
> among themselves, and it [later] fell into the possession of others.   As a
> result, an intelligent person must retain a measure of doubt, such as it
> would be better for him to avoid.(48)

Here the role of the caliph or the imam, if it exists at all, is
ambiguous.   It would have been netter, apparently, if the original
qawm had had with it someone qualified to pronounce on these
matters—just as Fazārī himself is said to have done on the
expeditions which he accompanied.(49)

Now we may return to the question with which this section
began: why does Abū Isḥāq mix historical narratives *(maghāzī)*
with legal *responsa (siyar)*?   In this Abū Isḥāq's *Siyar* contrasts
with the early work on siyar which is best known, that of
Shaybānī, which consists, like Abū Isḥāq's book, mainly of
responsa (though here from Abū Ḥanīfa), but also includes
traditions in which the narrative aspect is kept to a bare minimum.

Sarakhsī reports a story which has become well known, to the
effect that Shaybānī's and Awzāʿī's works on siyar arose out of a
rivalry, or even enmity between the Iraqi and the Syrian

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(47) Fazārī, *Siyar*, p. 111, # 25.

(48) Balādhurī, *Kitāb futūḥ al-buldān* (Leiden, 1866), p. 171.

(49) Even if these expeditions were commanded by ʿAbbāsid generals such as
Zufar b. ʿĀṣim al-Hilālī (Azdī, *Taʾrīkh al-Mawṣil*, p. 225, see above, n. 12), or ʿAbd
al-Malik al-Hāshimī (Ibn ʿAsākir, ed. Badrān, 2: 225).   Fazārī's espeditions often
appear as background information in biographies of other scholar-ascetics, such as
that of Ibrāhīm b. Adham in Abū Nuʿaym, *Ḥilya*, 3: 367-395.

schools.(⁵⁰)   Fazārī is an odd figure in all this: he was born and raised in Kufa (though some say Wasit),(⁵¹) and is said to have been a disciple of Abū Ḥanīfa.(⁵²)   However, the lists of men from whom Abū Isḥāq transmitted hadith include neither Abū Ḥanīfa, nor Abū Yūsuf, nor Shaybānī; and these three do not appear in the surviving portions of Abū Isḥāq's *Siyar*, even though Abū Isḥāq does quote many other Iraqi jurists.   Elsewhere we find traces of outright enmity between Fazārī and Abū Yūsuf.(⁵³)

This is relevant to our problem concerning maghazi narratives, because here Awzāʿī cannot be viewed except through a Ḥanafī lens.   Awzāʿī figures as transmitter of some of the longer maghazi stories in Fazārī's *Kitāb al-siyar*.(⁵⁴)   We see further from Abū Yūsuf's *Kitāb al-radd*, especially its later parts, that Awzāʿī tended to use these narratives.   At one point Abū Yūsuf attacks Awzāʿī: "This is not something which has been accepted [transmitted] among the people of learning, and if it were something from the *maghāzī*, it would not be hidden from us."(⁵⁵)   Abū Yūsuf, who is said to have had an interest in these *maghāzī* narratives himself,(⁵⁶) thus distinguishes between two kinds of material, *ʿilm* and *maghāzī*; a similar distinction might be said to underly the *Siyar* of Shaybānī.   But for Awzāʿī the historical narratives are unproblematical, simply a means of finding out the precedents which have been set in the past by the "imams of the Muslims."   He has no method for distinguishing the universal from the particular in these narratives — and for this Abū Yūsuf rakes him over the coals.   It is not by accident that, with the exception of the hostile *Kitāb al-radd*, Awzāʿī's teachings have survived piecemeal, mostly in the form of *responsa*.

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(50) Sarakhsī, *Sharḥ al-siyar al-kabīr lil-Shaybānī* (Cairo, 1971), 1: 3; M. Khadduri, *The Islamic Law of Nations. Shaybani's Siyar* (Baltimore, 1966), p. 30.

(51) Ibn Ḥibbān, *Mashāhīr*, p. 182; Ibn Ḥajar, *Tahdhīb* 1: 153.

(52) Khadduri, *Islamic Law of Nations*, p. 39 (giving no references); Hinds, "Maghāzī and Sīra," p. 61, referring to "al-Fazārī's links with al-Awzāʿī and with Abū Ḥanīfa."

(53) Ibn Abī Ḥātim, *Jarh*, 1: 284; Yāqūt, *Udabā*', 1: 215-16; Ibn ʿAsākir, cited in editor's introduction to the *Kitāb al-siyar*, pp. 45-46.

(54) Awzāʿī appears in the isnads of some of the long series of conquest narratives beginning on p. 203 (# 306, # 329).

(55) Abū Yūsuf, *al-Radd*, p. 43.   *Wa-inna hādhā la-ghayr maʿrūf ʿan ahl al-ʿilm, wa-law kāna hādhā fī shayʾ min al-maghāzī mā khafiya ʿalaynā.*

(56) Goldziher, *Muslim Studies*, 2: 193.

Fazārī, his principal heir, preoccupied with playing the role of *ṣāḥib sunna wa-ghazw*, failed to compete on this terrain with the (hostile?) Ḥanafīs. Before very long, Fazārī's own work fell into near-oblivion (except in Spain), as did eventually the entire *madhhab* of Awzā'ī. But Abū Isḥāq must not be seen as a merely local phenomenon. Even his status as Iraqi immigrant to the Syrian *thughūr* would argue against this. Instead he represents a particular trend in the development of jihad, which we see reflected in the mixed nature of his *Kitāb al-siyar*. It is not simply that Abū Isḥāq goes further than his predecessor Awzā'ī in juxtaposing siyar and maghazi elements. For him the historical narrative about the early community has become tied to the authority of the scholar who knows the sunna and enforces it on his own. In this way the *responsa* may be said to interpret and control the maghazi stories in this book.[57] This will also help us to understand why from this time onward the word *maghāzī* came to be applied more restrictively, until it finally referred only to the campaigns of the Prophet.[58] As Abū Isḥāq reenacts the life of Muḥammad on the Byzantine frontier, the example of the Prophet changes in force. At the same time, proper authority comes to inhere in the religious scholar, rather than in the delegated representatives of the imam.

II

The famous Khurasanian 'Abdallāh b. al-Mubārak (d. 181-797) was accounted one of the scholar-ascetics of the *thughūr*;[59] he was also a contemporary and friend of Abū Isḥāq al-Fazārī himself.[60] But his *Kitāb al-jihād* represents something new, being the first book ever devoted to the subject of jihad.[61] In its form the *Kitāb al-jihād* is recognizably a book of hadith. It

(57) Above, nn. 19, 20. Muranyi's assessment may thus be considered correct, but not in completely straightforward fashion.
(58) Hinds, "Maghāzī and Sīra," pp. 64-6; EI2 5: 1163.
(59) Al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, *Ta'rīkh Baghdād* (Cairo, 1931), 10: 159, *wa-kāna kathīr al-ikhtilāf ilā Ṭarsūs.*
(60) Abū Isḥāq called Ibn al-Mubārak *imām al-muslimīn*, Ibn Abī Ḥātim, *Jarḥ*, 2: 2: 180; Khaṭīb, 10: 163; Ibn Ḥajar, *Tahdhīb*, 5: 285. Khaṭīb reports that Abū Isḥāq and Ibn al-Mubārak would sit together, asking one another questions.
(61) See editor's introduction, pp. 18-19. In Fazārī's *Siyar* the word *jihād* occurs rarely.

includes a few longish narratives taken from works of *maghāzī*, but even here the historical narrative has been reduced to mere background, and the work as a whole conveys a noticeably different message from that of Fazārī's *Kitāb al-Siyar*; to borrow the vocabulary of Wansbrough once again, *exemplum* now predominates over *narratio*.

Ibn al-Mubārak shows even less interest than Fazārī in the theme of obedience to the imam.(⁶²) In his *Kitāb al-jihād* he concentrates instead on the notions of merit and reward, which do occur in Fazārī's *Siyar*, but with far less emphasis.(⁶³) The manuscript which has survived of this work gives its title simply as *Kitāb al-jihād*. But it was also known, at least in Spain, as *Kitāb faḍl al-jihād*, "the book of the merit of jihad,"(⁶⁴) which gives a correct idea of its contents. Merit is the dominant notion, in a book designed to exhort its audience to perform jihad. In this it succeeded: during the Second Crusade, Ibn 'Asākir gave a public reading of the *Kitāb al-jihād* in Damascus, as a result of which Abū l-Ḥasan b. Munqidh, brother of the famous Usāma, volunteered to help raise the siege of Ascalon, and soon afterward achieved martyrdom.(⁶⁵)

As in the case of Fazārī's *Siyar*. much, and probably most of the actual contents of the *Kitāb al-jihād* were in circulation some time before Ibn al-Mubārak collected them. In these traditions we may trace the development, over several generations, of conceptions of the relation between the individual and the community, and between these two and God. I wish to emphasize that the rhetorical emphasis on merit and reward, which is a distinguishing feature of Ibn al-Mubārak's *Kitāb al-jihād*, comes only at the end of this process.

Traditions on warfare concerned with merit and reward may be reduced to three main types, which I shall illustrate briefly, in part

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(62) Above, n. 23.

(63) The list of chapter headings for Part 3 (p. 276) of the *Kitāb al-siyar* indicates the existence of a *bāb faḍl khurūj al-sarāyā* (not *faḍl al-jihād*) and a *bāb al-shahāda*. The texts of these have not survived, and they were surrounded in any case by various other topics.

(64) The work was transmitted in Toledo and Cordova under the title *Kitāb faḍl al-jihād*, in the recension of Abū Marwān al-Maṣṣīṣī, *rāwī* of the surviving recension of Fazārī's *Siyar*: see Muranyi, "Das *Kitāb al-Siyar*," pp. 71, 73. However, the manuscript of the *Kitāb al-jihād* which has survived is in a Syrian tradition. See also Abū Bakr b. Khayr, *Fihrist ma rawāhu 'an shuyūkhihi* (Beirut, 1979), p. 493.

(65) E. Sivan, *L'Islam et la croisade* (Paris, 1968, p. 75.

from the *Kitāb al-jihād* itself, and in part from other early books, especially the *Kitāb al-siyar* of Fazārī and the *Muwaṭṭa'* of Mālik b. Anas. These types may be understood to fall into a rough Schachtian scheme. The first type consists mainly of traditions of jurists (Successors), the second type of traditions of Successors and of Companions of the Prophet, while the third type consists mainly of hadith of the Prophet. The temporal sequence does not have to be conceived rigidly, at least in the case of the first two, which developed simultaneously over several generations. But the third and final type emerges at a distinct moment which may be identified with the composition and circulation of Ibn al-Mubārak's *Kitāb al-jihād*.

The first type consists mainly of hadith of Successors, concerned with the issue of reward *(ajr)*. Here the jurists are concerned that the individual's reward should come through the community, and not from other individuals. For instance, Awzāʿī in the *Siyar* of Fazārī does mention merit *(faḍl)*, but infrequently, and never uses the word *ajr* in the sense of divine reward. But he does discuss the case of the camp follower, the hireling *(ajīr)*, who receives a wage *(ajr)* for his service; Awzāʿī differs from most of the early jurists by awarding this person a share of the spoils, but insists that it is not permissible to hire someone for the purpose of fighting *(al-kirā' fil-ghazw ḥadalh)*.[66] Other related instances may be cited: the question of *ja'ā'il*, paying individuals for military service, which has been dealt with elsewhere, conforms to this pattern.[67] Fazārī also includes traditions in which Ibn Sīrīn, al-Qāsim b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, and then ʿUmar I rule against the practice of giving a (monetary) reward, *ajr*, to someone who apportions the spoils, as well as for other activities such as serving as judge.[68] We thus have a fairly large group of traditions which are unaware of the notion of *ajr* as divine reward, or which choose to ignore it; these tend to be traditions on more or less technical matters relating to law of war, related upon the authority of jurists (Successors). The larger trend here is to identify God as the

(66) Fazārī, *Siyar*, p. 195, # 279, 280. *Wa-innamā al-ajīr man akhadha ʿalā ʿamalihi ʿirḍan min al-dunyā*. See further Abū Yūsuf, *al-Radd*, pp. 37-45; Ṭabarī, *Ikhtilāf*, pp. 20-21; M. Bonner, "*Ja'ā'il* and Holy War in Early Islam," *Der Islam* 68 (1991), p. 57.

(67) Bonner, "*Ja'ā'il* and Holy War," pp. 50f.

(68) Fazārī, *Siyar*, pp. 112-14.

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source of authority in the community, which in its turn must be the source of reward.

The second of these three types consists of traditions of Successors and of Companions of the Prophet, with a small proportion of the total going back to the Prophet himself. These traditions concentrate upon the warrior's intention *(niyya)*.[69] Here, of course, the emphasis is not on the community, but rather on the individual in his relation to God. Thus Fazārī asks Awzāʿī about the case of someone who sets out on a raid with his mind on both the merit *(faḍl)* of the action and the possibility of extra spoils *(nafal)*. Awzāʿī responds cautiously; in any case, the discussion here revolves around the decisions and commands of the imam, and not around the reward of jihad.[70] But in a different mode, Ibn al-Mubārak relates traditions which explore the intention *(niyya)* and inner state *(ḥāl)* of the individual believer, usuallly without mentionning the divine reward *(ajr)*. Typical is the saying of Salmān, that if the warrior has a quivering heart, his sins will fall off like dates from palm-tree.[71]

The problem of intention *(niyya)* in war becomes more complex in certain traditions of Companions of the Prophet, most often Ibn ʿUmar and his father the caliph ʿUmar I. Ibn al-Mubārak includes a number of these traditions, which classify the martyrs according to the purity of their intentions: some of these traditions go back to the Prophet, and some mention *ajr*, though usually without much rhetorical emphasis.[72] These are already tending toward the third type, particularly when they use such phrases as *ajr al-muʾminīn*.[73] But in general what stands out in traditions of this second *(niyya)* type is the internalization of norms. This has the result of removing the conduct of war from the jurisdiction of the imam and his representatives,[74] a trend which we have already

(69) On this see Noth, *Heiliger Krieg*, pp. 29-33.
(70) Fazārī, *Siyar*, pp. 124-25, # 56. Awzāʿī mentions *niyya* in a different context at p. 229, # 370 (prisoners returning).
(71) Ibn al-Mubārak, *Kitāb al-jihād*, pp. 50-51, # 35. Parallels to these traditions may be found in Ibn al-Mubārak's *Kitāb al-zuhd* and in later hadith collections.
(72) For instance, *Jihād*, p. 108, # 126, where ʿUmar relates from the Prophet: four types of martyr, arranged according to purity of intention.
(73) *Jihād*, p. 32, # 8 (a *niyya* tradition from Ibn ʿUmar).
(74) For instance, at *Jihād*, pp. 32-34, # 8, Ibn ʿUmar divides fighters into two categories *(al-nās fil-ghazw juzʾān)* according to the purity of their intention in performing *ghazw*. This may be an answer to the saying of Muʿādh b. Jabal,

found in Abū Isḥāq al-Fazārī. But this concentration on intention also has the potential of removing the conduct of war from the purview of the "clerical elite." For the religious scholar may surmise our intentions more completely than the magistrate, but finally these are known only to God. (75)

It is only in the last of the three types that we find the rhetorical emphasis on merit and reward. Almost all traditions of this hortatory type are traditions of the Prophet. And whereas traditions of the first type discussed *ajr* in the sense of wage, here the word is used either exclusively in the sense of divine reward, or else both as divine reward and earthly wage, contrasted to the disadvantage of the earthly wage. Of course the language used for the divine reward comes from the Qur'ān: the point is that this Qur'ānic language does not enter the picture until this relatively late stage. (76) We likewise find the issue of intention taken over from traditions of the second type; but now the warrior's correct intention is more or less taken for granted, in hadiths whose style is basically hortatory. This final stage does not contradict the previous two, but rather subsumes them, as the notion of divine reward triumphs over everything else. Prior to this moment there had been holy war of some kind, to be sure; but now the individual, while striving for individual merit and salvation, has also internalized the needs and goals of the community. In other words, it is only at this relatively late stage that we have jihad in the full sense, as a force uniting the individual, the community and God.

It is possible to argue from the contents of these traditions that the third type comes after the other two. This can also be done on general Schachtian grounds, since hortatory traditions emphasizing merit and reward are usually prophetical. But other, more specific indications can be found that these traditions did not circulate until the lifetime of Ibn al-Mubārak. The most important literary works touching upon these matters, which have survived from the generation of Ibn al-Mubārak (other than Ibn al-

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recorded at Mālik, *Muwaṭṭa'* (Cairo, 1951), 2: 466 (*Jihād*, 43), about two kinds of *ghazw (al-ghazw ghazwān)*, of which the good kind involves obeying those in authority *(yuṭā' fīhi dhū l-amr)*.

(75) See the speech of Awzā'ī transmitted by Fazārī at Abū Nu'aym, *Ḥilya*, 8: 254-55, in which Awzā'ī inveighs against those who ask people "are you a believer?" *(a-mu'min anta)*.

(76) Bonner, *Ja'ā'il*, p. 57.

Mubārak's *Jihād)* are the books of siyar by Fazārī and Shaybānī, and the *Muwaṭṭa'* of Malik.   Fazārī's and Shaybānī's works do not concentrate on merit and reward.   But the *Muwaṭṭa'* in the recension of Yaḥyā b. Yaḥyā includes a *Kitāb al-jihād,* which begins with a chapter on exhortation *(al-targhīb fil-jihād),* which opens with the following tradition.

> [Mālik—Abū l-Zannād—al-A'raj—Abū Hurayra:] The Prophet said:
> The mujāhid in the path of God is like one who stands continually
> praying, without ceasing from his fast and prayer, until he returns.(⁷⁷)

This comparison of jihad with other meritorious activities such as prayer, pilgrimage and fasting is common in traditions on merit and reward, and this *mathalu... ka-mathali* schema remained characteristic of hadith of the *faḍā'il al-jihād* type.(⁷⁸)   In Ibn al-Mubārak we find a variant:

> [Ibn al-Mubārak—Ma'mar—Zuhrī—Sa'īd b. al-Musayyab—Abū
> Hurayra:] I heard the Prophet say: The mujāhid in the path of God
> (and God knows best who performs jihad in his path) is like one who
> stands, fasts, is humble, who kneels and prostrates himself.(⁷⁹)

The parenthetical aside about intention recalls certain traditions of our second type, which also compare jihad with other activities.   The difference is that the *niyya* traditions are concerned with the effects of these activities upon the individual believer, how they affect his relation with God; whereas this tradition is basically concerned with exhortation.(⁸⁰)   In any case, there is no way of knowing which of these two versions (Mālik's or Ibn al-Mubārak's) came first, nor does it matter.

In the *Muwaṭṭa'* this opening chapter of exhortation *(targhīb),* which consists of prophetical hadiths emphasizing *ajr* (except for one tradition about 'Umar I),(⁸¹) is followed by several chapters on siyar topics: carrying the Qur'ān in enemy territory, killing women, observing safe-conduct, donations to warriors, various problems

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(77) Mālik, *Muwaṭṭa',* 2: 443 *(Jihād,* 1).

(78) Noth, *Heiliger Krieg,* p. 52.

(79) Ibn al-Mubārak, *Jihād,* p. 35, # 11. See also Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ,* 2: 199 (Shu'ayb—Zuhrī—Sa'īd b. al-Musayyab—Abū Hurayra).

(80) This comes out more clearly in variations on this theme which overtly emphasize the reward: *ribāṭ yawm wa-layla ka-ṣiyām shahr ramaḍān wa-qiyāmihi wa-man māta murābiṭan ujrā 'alayhi mithl dhālika min al-ajr. Jihad,* pp. 142-43, # 172; Bukhari, 2: 221-22.

(81) 2: 443-46.

relating to distribution of spoils. Then come three chapters on martyrdom, and then another chapter on *al-targhīb fil-jihād*, where most of the traditions have parallels in Ibn al-Mubārak's *Kitāb al-jihād*. We cannot know if Yaḥyā's recension of the *Muwaṭṭa'* corresponds to Mālik's own arrangement. But it does show evidence of change. This section of the *Muwaṭṭa'* consists mainly of siyar in the old style; it is the hortatory hadith, placed at the very beginning and then toward the end, which makes of it a book of jihad.

In Shaybānī's recension of the *Muwaṭṭa'*, [82] we find a short *bāb al-*siyar, but nothing about jihad. Here there is no trace of the chapters in Yaḥyā's recension of the *Muwaṭṭa'* devoted to *targhīb* and martyrdom. This does not mean that Ḥanafīs were hostile to these ideas. It more probably means that in Shaybānī's youth, when he visited Medina (perhaps around 150/767), these traditions were not yet in circulation.

They came into circulation over the next few decades, as layers of *targhīb* traditions were added to the *Muwaṭṭa'*, very likely at different times. However, the book of jihad in the *Muwaṭṭa'* retained the old style together with the new. It is Ibn al-Mubārak's *Kitāb al-jihād*, composed during these same years, which constitutes the pure type. Here we have a book devoted entirely to exhortation, with no place for siyar in the old style, and in which maghazi narratives have been pounded into the shape of hadith. Both here and in the *Muwaṭṭa'*, this state of affairs is associated with the very notion of jihad.

Ibn al-Mubārak shows even less interest than Fazārī in the general theme of obedience to the imam, or in the issue of who may grant permission to wage war. Instead, the *Kitāb al-jihād* exhorts people to take the obligation upon themselves, to volunteer. An interesting example of this appears in the words of the dying martyr Sa'd b. al-Rabī' at Uḥud. Since the next of Ibn al-Mubārak is here more garbled than usual, the version in Malik's *Muwaṭṭa'* will also be cited in part.

> Convey my greetings to the Messenger of God, and say to him: Sa'd says to you, may God reward you for the good you have done us, such as he has rewarded no [other] prophet for [good done to] an *umma*. Convey my greetings to your people, and say to them that Sa'd says to them:

(82) Shaybānī, *Muwaṭṭa al-imām Mālik... riwāyat al-Shaybānī* (Cairo, 1967), pp. 306f.

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there is no excuse for you with God [for not fighting] if he has reached
[?] your prophet [*Muwaṭṭa'*: if the Messenger of God has been killed], as
long as there is an eye among you which still blinks.(⁸³)

Sa'd's two greetings recapitulate the first two types of hadith
relating to merit and reward: first, the relation between God and
the community *(ajr)*, and second, the relation between God and
the individual *(niyya)*.   Now these two come together in the third
and final type.   The martyr's death links each Muslim individually
with God and the community, and guarantess that he will take it
upon himself to supply its needs, to volunteer.

This highly charged notion of volunteering for the jihad, which
we find on every page of Ibn al-Mubārak's *Kitāb al-jihād*, stands
out also in biographical accounts of the man himself.   For
instance, we have seen that the notion of *faḍl al-jihād* assumes its
classic form in prophetical hadith of the *maṭhalu* type, comparing
jihad to other activities such as pilgrimage and fasting.   Ibn al-
Mubārak accordingly wrote polemical verses on the superiority of
jihad over pilgrimage.(⁸⁴)   But he was known as a virtuoso of
pilgrimage as well as of jihad; and a story told about his generosity
on the *hajj* recurs in a setting of jihad, the only difference being
that the action takes place on a journey from Baghdad to al-
Maṣṣīṣa, instead of from Marw to Mecca.(⁸⁵)   His friends and
pupils liked to catalogue his many virtues *(khiṣāl)*, "such as were
never united in any man of learning in our time in all the
world," (⁸⁶) and it is worth noting that the qualities of physical
courage *(shajā'a)* and jihad are not on the earliest versions of these
lists, but enter and expand gradually, until they become great
feats of derring-do.(⁸⁷)   But what matters most is the way in
which he is imitated.

> [Al-Qāsim b. Muḥammad said:] We were traveling with Ibn al-
> Mubārak, and I would often ask myself, why is this man's merit so
> superior to ours, so that it has become so well known?   If he prays,

(83) *Jihād*, pp. 85-6, # 94; Mālik, *Muwaṭṭa'*, 2: 465-66 (*Jihād*, 41).   There is also
a variant in Ibn Sa'd, *Ṭabaqāt*, 3: 2: 77-8 (related by Yaḥyā b. Sa'īd to Mālik b. Anas
to Ma'n b. 'Īsā to Ibn Sa'd), elaborated further at Wāqidī, *Maghāzī* (London, 1966),
1: 293-4.
(84) Dhahabī, *Siyar a'lām al-nubalā'* (Beirut, 1981-88), 8: 364-65; Ibn Taghribir-
dī, *al-Nujūm al-zāhira* (Cairo, 1964), 2: 103-04.
(85) Khaṭīb, 10: 157-58.
(86) Ibn Ḥibbān, in Ibn Ḥajar, *Tahdhīb* 5: 386.
(87) Se the long story recited by Khaṭīb, 10: 167; Ibn al-Jawzī, *Ṣifa*, 4: 144.

then we pray; if he fasts, then we fast; if he goes to war *(in kāna yaghzū)*, then we go to war; and if he goes on pilgrimage, then we go on pilgrimage. We were then on a leg of our journey on the Syrian road, having our supper at night in a house, when the lamp went out. One of our group stood up, took the lamp, and went out to light it. He stayed outside for a while, and then brought the lamp back. Then I looked at Ibn al-Mubārak's face, and his beard was wet from his tears. I then said to myself, this is why this man's merit is superior to ours. While the lamp was gone, he was probably sitting in the dark, recalling the Judgment Day. [88]

Ibn al-Mubārak served as a model of zeal in volunteering. His piety and asceticism gave him enormous strength: whenever he read from his *Kitāb al-zuhd*, he would bellow like a bull or a cow being slaughtered. [89] His fellows continued to be drawn to this power after his death, when his tomb in Hit became much-visited *(mashhūr yuzār)*; [90] and not coincidentally, the *Kitāb al-jihād* exhorts the believers to "go to the martyrs, visit them, and greet them." [91] At one point Ibn al-Mubārak is even proposed for the imamate. [92]

But during his lifetime, Ibn al-Mubārak did not exert this power in the manner of Abū Isḥaq al-Fazārī, who commanded and prohibited as he imposed the sunna on the people of the frontier. It rather took the form of companionship, *ṣaḥāba*, a style which may be further illustrated by some of the hadiths in the *Kitāb al-jihād*. 'Amr b. 'Utba serves his companions *(aṣḥāb)*; [93] when Mujāhid [b. Jabr] becomes a companion of Ibn 'Umar, he finds himself being served by the master; [94] a hadith of Ibn 'Amr magnifies the *ajr* of those serve their *aṣḥāb* while on the path of God, [95] and a hadith of the Prophet says, "The lord of the

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(88) Ibn al-Jawzi, *Sifa* 4: 145.

(89) Khaṭīb 10: 167, from Nu'aym b. Ḥammād.

(90) Ibn Ḥibbān, *Mashāhīr*, p. 195.

(91) Ibn al-Mubārak, *Jihād*, p. 87, # 96.

(92) *Yaṣluḥu li-hādhā l-amr*, said by al-'Umarī at Abū Nu'aym, *Ḥilya*, 8: 162. Al-'Umarī leaves no doubt that he means the actual imamate, going beyond the familiar claim of the biographies, as when Fazārī calls Ibn al-Mubārak *imām al-muslimīn* (Ibn Abī Ḥātim, *Jarḥ*, 2: 2: 180, Khaṭīb, 10: 163; Ibn Ḥajar, *Tahdhīb*, 5: 285), or says "If I were told to choose [an imam] for the *umma*, I would choose al-Awzāʾī" (Abū Zurʿa al-Dimashqī, *Taʾrīkh* [Damascus, n.d.], 2: 724, # 2318).

(93) *Jihād*, p. 163, # 210.

(94) *Ibid.*, p. 162, # 208.

(95) *Ibid.*, p. 163, # 211.

people is the one who serves them on their journey."[96]   On a more practical note, 'Umar advises his hearers to learn trades.[97]   But dependence remains the dominant mode, as when Ṣila b. Ashyam al-'Adawī says: "I divined that this was the way of Abū Rafā'a, and I strove mightily to model my action after him" *(wa-la'awwallu annahu ṭarīq Abī Rafā'a ākhudhuhu wa-anā akuddu al-'amal ba'dahu kaddan).*[98]   This Abū Rafā'a is also a Companion of the Prophet, and here we see the notion of *ṣaḥāba* assuming its familiar form.[99]   Ibn al-Mubārak liked to sit in his house, because there he enjoyed the company of the Companions of the Prophet.[100]   Sufyān b. 'Uyayna said that the only advantage which the Companions of the Prophet had over Ibn al-Mubārak was "their companionship with the Prophet and their taking part with him in campaigns."[101]   Imitation, *iqtidā',* has gone beyond what it was for Abū Isḥāq al-Fazārī.   But nowhere can this style of companionship be so well illustrated as from biographical materials relating to Ibn al-Mubārak and his companions, the scholar-ascetics of the frontier.

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    This essay has sought to identify two trends, which had been in a process of formation for some time, but which first cohered in Abū Isḥāq al-Fazārī and 'Abdallāh b. al-Mubārak, especially in their activity on the Arab-Byzantine frontier.   Both of these have been related to notions of authority in the conduct of war.   Our own thinking on this subject tends to be colored by the classical theory of *farḍ kifāya,* which was not yet available to Fazārī and Ibn al-Mubārak.   This theory was elaborated by al-Shāfiʿī (d. 204/820), specifically in relation to the problem of finding enough men to fight on the frontiers *(sadd aṭrāf al-muslimīn bil-rijāl),* while preserving a role in all this for constituted authority, the *sulṭān.*[102]   Shāfiʿī's notion of *sulṭān*

    (96) *Ibid.,* p. 162, # 207.
    (97) *Ibid.,* pp. 162-163, # 209.
    (98) *Ibid.,* p. 133, # 158.
    (99) *Ibid.,* p. 87, # , *innamā aṣḥāb Muḥammad ṣ alladhīna dufinū ma'ahu fil-burūd.*
    (100) Dhahabī, *Siyar,* 8: 339.
    (101) *Ibid.,* 8: 346.
    (102) Bonner, *"Ja'ā'il,"* pp. 59-61.

comes after the stages which have been examined here. We may now briefly consider some of the earlier ones.

The early hadith on warfare includes polemical material apparently directed against the Umayyads.[103] Propaganda for the 'Abbāsid revolution made use of this material. But even earlier, from the beginning of the Umayyad period, opposition movements, the Khārijites and the early Shī'a, had all expressed themselves in something like the idiom of jihad (if our sources for this period are to be believed at all). At the same time other persons also practiced a kind of holy war, a war against external, non-Muslim enemies. These practitioners included some of the Umayyads themselves, who in doing so did not primarily follow the military model of Muḥammad: we see this in the story of 'Abd al-Mālik forbidding his son to read books of *hadīth al-maghāzī*,[104] and in the case of Sulaymān, who thought that he was destined to conquer Constantinople, because it had been prophesied that the city would fall only to a ruler who had the name of a prophet.[105] It may therefore be most accurate to say that jihad began as warfare against the enemies of God, and that it took some time for consensus to emerge as to who those enemies were.

It will be recalled that the point of the first of the three types of hadith relating to merit and reward was that the individual's reward should come from the community and not from other individuals. Even as the other two types entered the picture, this principle remained valid. Nothing must come between the individual and the *umma*, and between the individual and God; and especially not loyalty to or affinity with other persons. This opposition to fealty to persons grows together with, and is inseparable from, the two related trends which have been described in this essay, which culminate in the rejection of constituted political authority and the internalization of norms.

To the predecessors of Fazārī and Ibn al-Mubārak, the threat posed by the Umayyads came not so much from their impiety and drinking, nor even from their dynastic succession to the caliphate, so much as from their support for various relatives, followers and retainers seeking to establish themselves permanently on the

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(103) Ibn al-Mubārak, *Jihād*, p. 90; above, n. 24.
(104) Goldziher, *Muslim Studies*, 2: 191.
(105) *Kitāb al-'uyūn*, p. 24. Of course this prophecy proved correct, but much later than expected.

land.   The jurists' opposition to this incipient aristocracy centered on the complicated and constantly developing concept of *fay'*.   Once this concept had reached maturity,[106] it permitted the Muslim community to consider all (or at least many) of the conquered lands as an endowment of which it was the perpetual beneficiary.   Anyone who appropriated these lands, or made them over to relatives or followers, was a usurper, one of the "imams of tyranny   who   devoured   the   *fay'*   and   arrogated   it   to themselves."[107]

The threat did not cease with the overthrow of the Umayyads; to some observers it may even have seemed to grow.[108]   Yet the 'Abbāsids themselves professed to rule in the name of the Muslim community.   In the reign of al-Manṣūr, therefore, numbers of scholar-ascetics began to move to the frontiers; and with this movement came the two trends which have been discussed in this essay.   But the authority which Abu Isḥāq al-Fazārī exerted in al-Maṣṣīṣa, and even more so the style of companionship *(ṣaḥāba)* which Ibn al-Mubārak embodied wherever he went, are both echoes of and answers to this threat of fealty and affinity.

Throughout the early 'Abbāsid period, the war against Byzantium was mainly conducted, as before, by the caliph's governors and other representatives.   This fact might lead us to describe the attitudes which here have been ascribed to Fazārī and Ibn al-Mubārak as the minority views of outsiders.   But this view will not hold.   According to one story, when the caliph Hārūn al-Rashīd (r. 786-809) once arrived in al-Raqqa on his way to the frontier, the people of that town were so eager to hear and follow Ibn al-Mubārak that an *umm walad* of the caliph exclaimed that Ibn al-Mubārak was king, and not Hārūn.[109]   Elsewhere Hārūn is said to have expressed admiration for Fazārī and Ibn al-Mubārak.[110]   Of course these stories occur in biographies of religious scholars, prejudiced in favor of their subjects, but the fact remains that Hārūn made much of his activity as "ghāzī-caliph,"

(106) This may be related to Sufyān al-Thawrī's declaration that "The *fay'* and the *ghanīma* (spoils) are two different things," 'Abd al-Razzāq, *Muṣannaf*, 5: 310, # 9715.

(107) Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh* (Leiden, 1879-1901), 3: 600.

(108) In relation specifically to the Byzantine frontier district, see above, nn. 47, 48.

(109) Khaṭib, *Ta'rīkh Baghdād*, 10: 156-157.

(110) Ibn Ḥajar, *Tahdhīb*, 1: 152; Ibn 'Asākir, ed. Badrān, 2: 153f.

and campaigned frequently against the Byzantines. We may note also that Hārūn was actually the first such "ghāzī-caliph", ([111]) and that in assuming this role he followed the precepts of the religious scholars, who gave him high marks for this. ([112]) The attitudes and teachings of Fazārī and Ibn al-Mubārak, while not universally imitated and accepted, thus had some effect on at least one caliph, and certainly remained dominant among scholar-ascetics in the Byzantine frontier region for as long as it lasted.

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(111) M. Bonner, review of C. E. Bosworth, tr. and ed., *The History of Ṭabarī*, vol. 30, in *MESA Bulletin* 25 (1991), p. 69; idem, "*Al-Khalīfa al-Marḍī*. The Accession of Hārūn al-Rashīd," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 108.1 (1988), pp. 79-91.

(112) Mu'āwiya b. 'Amr (d. 214), a disciple of Fazārī and transmitter of the *Kitāb al-siyar*, expresses admiration for Hārūn's diligence in *ghazw* and jihad, at Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 163.

15

THE 60 MARTYRS OF GAZA AND THE MARTYRDOM OF BISHOP SOPHRONIUS OF JERUSALEM

David Woods

The 60 martyrs of Gaza were soldiers who were executed for their refusal to convert to Islam shortly after the conquest of that town during the Muslim invasion of Palestine. They were executed in two groups, a first group of 10 at Jerusalem followed by the remaining 50 at Eleutheropolis. For whatever reason, their passion has only survived in Latin, and in two different recensions. Indeed, no eastern source shows any knowledge whatsoever of these martyrs. The earlier Latin recension (*BHL* 5672m: see Appendix A) survives only in a 10th-century manuscript, while the later (*BHL* 3053b: see Appendix B) survives in two 15th-century manuscripts.[1] The priority of the former, the fact that it is direct translation from a lost Greek original of this passion, is obvious from its very language. It also preserves important technical details absent from the later text, such as the exact names of the military units to which these martyrs had belonged – the *Scythae* and the *Voluntarii* – as well as the names of all the martyrs themselves, even if in a somewhat corrupt form.[2] Finally, it preserves a relatively simple narrative unadorned by any miraculous events. In contrast, the anonymous author of the later recension begins by revealing that he has discovered the passion of these martyrs 'in ancient manuscripts' (*in antiquis codicibus*), but does not mention having had to translate their contents from Greek into Latin, from which we may infer that they were already in Latin. Next, he omits important details of the type which we would expect to find in an early recension of the text, such as the names of the military units to which these martyrs had belonged as well as the

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[1] I refer to both texts by their ennumeration in H. Fros (ed.), *Bibliotheca Hagiographica Latina Antiquae et Mediae Aetatis: Novum Supplementum*, (Subsidia Hagiographica 70, Brussels, 1986). H. Delehaye, "*Passio Sanctorum Sexaginta Martyrum*", *Analecta Bollandiana* 23 (1904), pp. 289-307, publishes both texts. *BHL* 5672m survives in the Vatican (Arch. Cap. S. Pietro. A. 5 (alias D), 222-223v). *BHL* 3053b survives in manuscripts at Bologna (BU 2134, 109r-112r) and Rome (Corsin. codex 0064 (alias 40 F. 1), 098-099v). *BHL* 5672m is reprinted in *Acta Sanctorum, Nov.* III (Brussels, 1910), pp. 247-50. *BHL* 3053b may sometimes be described as the passion of St. Florian of Bologna, but it is important to note that the text of the passion itself makes no mention whatsoever of Bologna or any other place not named also in *BHL* 5672m. We seem to owe the survival of this recension of the passion of the 60 martyrs to the fact that the Florian apparently named there was mistakenly identified with the Florian, and companions, whose relics were allegedly discovered in the Church of St. Stephen at Bologna in 1141. See *Acta Sanctorum, Oct.* II (Antwerp, 1768), p. 468.

[2] For the restoration of these names from the corrupt Latin of *BHL* 5672m, see J. Pargoire, "Les LX soldats martyrs de Gaza", *Echos d'Orient*, 8 (1905), pp. 40-43.

names of all the martyrs themselves. These are precisely the sort of details that are most easily corrupted during the transmission of a text, and we may assume that he could not recover them from his immediate sources. Finally, he introduces many miraculous elements into the narrative such as we would normally expect to find in hagiographical texts which have suffered revision over time. For these reasons, therefore, while historians have generally accepted that the passion of the 60 martyrs of Gaza has an important contribution to make to our reconstruction of the Muslim invasion of Palestine, they have tended to ignore the later recension in favour of the earlier.[3] The assumption, usually implicit, has been that the later Latin recension must derive from the earlier Latin recension.[4] In contrast, I wish to argue here that the later recension derives not from the surviving early recension, but from another early Latin translation if not of the same recension of the lost Greek original passion, then of a fuller version of the same. There are three main arguments in support of this hypothesis.

[3] See, e.g., F.-M. Abel, *Histoire de la Palestine depuis la Conquête d'Alexandre jusqu'a l'Invasion Arabe II*, (Paris, 1952), pp. 403-04; A. Guillou, "Prise de Gaza par les Arabes au VIIe Siècle", *Bulletin de Correspondance Hellenique*, 81 (1957), pp. 396-404; A.N. Stratos, *Byzantium in the Seventh Century. II 634-641*, (Amsterdam, 1972), pp. 78-79; C. Glucker, *The City of Gaza in the Roman and Byzantine Periods*, (British Archaeological Reports International Series 325, Oxford, 1987), pp. 58-59; W.E. Kaegi, *Byzantium and the Early Islamic Conquests*, (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 95-97; R. Schick, *The Christian Communities of Palestine from Byzantine to Islamic Rule*, (Studies in Late Antiquity and Early Islam 2, Princeton, 1995), pp. 171-72. It is because of this text that the fall of Gaza has been redated to June-July 637, whereas it had previously been dated to 634 on the basis of Theophanes AM 6124. None of the above authors make any effort to evaluate the relative merits of the late recension. The scepticism of R. Hoyland, *Seeing Islam as Others Saw It*, (Studies in Late Antiquity and Early Islam 13, Princeton, 1997), pp. 347-51, concerning the value of even the early recension of the passion is such that it is not surprising that he also ignores the later recension. It must be said, however, that his reasons for doubting the value of this text are flimsy at best and start with the *a priori* assumption that the choice of conversion or death was reserved for Arab Christians and apostates from Islam and that the passion must be suspect for this reason. In particular, he criticizes the passion, p. 350, on the grounds that it "is the only reference we have to a garrison at Gaza in any Roman or Byzantine source". This is hardly surprising, though, since our only complete, or almost complete, list of Roman garrisons in the region is provided by the *Notitia Dignitatum* which was composed c.401. The reality is that we know extremely little about where the army was stationed in the succeeding centuries. More importantly, neither recension of the passion actually says that Gaza had possessed a permanent or long-standing garrison. Indeed, the later recension makes it quite clear that the martyrs to be were only a relatively recent arrival in Gaza specifically to deal with the new Muslim threat and there is no hint either that they had replaced previous units there or that their presence was intended other than as a temporary measure only. This fact, that the martyrs of Gaza were not actually from Gaza, fatally undermines another of Hoyland's criticisms of the text also, p. 350, that the limited range of names attributed to the martyrs "compares unfavourably with the diversity one finds in the inscriptions of Gaza", and this is before we raise the dating of these inscriptions. As will become clear, however, I agree, with him when he says of the early recension, p. 349, that "it is very likely that we have merely a summary of a much longer piece", although on different grounds.

[4] G. Huxley, "The Sixty Martyrs of Jerusalem", *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies*, 18 (1977), pp. 369-74, at p. 374, is unusual in his explicit description of *BHL* 3053b as a mere descendant of *BHL* 5672m.

My first argument concerns the omission by the later recension of a serious error present in the description by the earlier Latin recension of the travels of the 60 martyrs before their final execution. The earlier recension states that a certain Ambrus, whose title it does not preserve but who seems identifiable as Amr b. al-As, tried to persuade the 60 to convert to Islam on the day following the capture of Gaza, at an unspecified location at or near Gaza itself presumably.[5] He then sent them to prison for 30 days, after which he ordered them to be transported to Eleutheropolis. They spent two months there, after which he ordered them to be transported to a town whose name the manuscript preserves as Theropolis. Then, when they had spent three months there, he ordered them to be sent to Jerusalem where 10 of their number were executed after 10 months. Hence the martyrs were present at Gaza, Eleutheropolis, Theropolis, and Jerusalem in that order. The problem concerns the identification of Theropolis. There is clearly something wrong with our text here since there is no town of that name. Delehaye argues that this name should be restored to read Eleutheropolis, and that there is a lacuna in our text here which should have recorded the removal of the martyrs from Eleutheropolis before their return there once more.[6] Alternatively, Guillou prefers a more radical restoration of the name to read either Nicopolis or Diospolis, based simply on the geography of the region and his reluctance to accept what he regards as an unnecessary lacuna.[7] Neither has paid due attention to the later Latin recension. It records that Ambrus interviewed the 60 on the day following the capture of Gaza, sent them to prison for 30 days, then ordered them to be transported to a city which it names Eutropolis, a corruption, obviously, of Eleutheropolis. They then spent two months there, after which they were sent to Jerusalem. Hence it records that the martyrs were present at Gaza, Eleutheropolis, and Jerusalem in that order. In so far as it omits a problematic passage whose problematic nature its author could hardly have realized, and produces thereby a simpler, more convincing account of the travels of the martyrs before they were sent to Jerusalem, it is arguable that the later recension best preserves the original account of their journey as described in their lost Greek passion. To this extent, it seems to be independent of the surviving early Latin recension.

It remains to explain the problem in the early recension. One must turn at this point to the earliest surviving evidence for the cult of the 60 martyrs of

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[5] The identification of Ambrus as Amr b. al-As has been accepted by all commentators noted above. The Latin Ambrus is a transliteration of the Greek Ἄμβρος as used, e.g. by Nicephorus of Constantinople, *Breviarium* 23, (ed. C. Mango), (Washington, D.C. 1990) in description of Amr b. al-As. This identification is reinforced by the fact that Amr b. al-As owned a large estate called Ajlan in the territory of Eleutheropolis. See M. Lecker, "The Estates of Amr b. al-As in Palestine: Notes on a New Negev Arabic Inscription", *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, 52 (1989), pp. 24-37.

[6] Delehaye, "*Passio*", p. 290, followed by Huxley, "The Sixty", p. 372.

[7] Guillou, "Prise de Gaza", p. 399, n. 1.

Gaza as preserved in the martyrology which Ado composed c.853. In a notice for 6 November, he records the execution of the first group of 10 martyrs at the city of Theopolis.[8] While this was actually the name used of Antioch in Syria since the 520s, it is clear that it must refer to Jerusalem here. Indeed, since the early Latin recension uses the phrase 'holy city of God' (ch. 2: *sanctam Dei civitatem*) to describe the place of execution of the first group of 10 martyrs, it is clear that the name Theopolis constitutes a transliteration of the original Greek phrase Θεοῦ πόλις 'city of God' in the mistaken understanding that it was a real name rather than a periphrastic formula. In turn, this suggests that the name Theropolis results from a corrupt reading of the same Greek phrase. It is my argument, therefore, that the description of the despatch to and stay in Theropolis of the martyrs of Gaza constitutes a doublet of their despatch to and stay in Jerusalem. The author of the early Latin recension seems to have been deceived by a corrupt reading in his Greek source and his own ignorance of Palestinian geography. He then supplied the missing detail which this misunderstanding seemed to require, a length of stay in the town of Theroplis also, from his own imagination.

My second argument concerns the different chronologies proposed by the different recensions. The early recension requires that the martyrs spent 30 days in Gaza, 2 months in Eleutheropolis, 3 months in Theropolis, and 10 months in Jerusalem before the first group of 10 martyrs were executed on 11 November during the 13th indiction. The remainder spent another 30 days in jail in Jerusalem before they were returned to Eleutheroplis and executed on 17 December during the same indiction. Hence the early recension requires a minimum period of about 17 months between the fall of Gaza and the execution of the last of the martyrs. To be specific, since the 13th indiction ran from 1 September 639 until 31 August 640, it seems to date the fall of Gaza to July 638. In contrast, the late recension requires that the martyrs spent 30 days in Gaza, 2 months in Eleutheropolis, and an unspecified amount of time in Jerusalem before the execution of the first group of martyrs. The remainder then spent another 30 days in jail in Jerusalem before they were returned to Eleutheropolis and executed. Hence it allows the capture and execution of the martyrs to have occurred over a much shorter timespan, well within a year even.

The first point of interest here is the failure of the late recension to record the time spent by the martyrs in Jerusalem before the execution of the first 10. This contrasts noticeably with its agreement otherwise with the early recension concerning the time spent both in Gaza and in Eleutheropolis, as well as the time that elapsed between the execution of the first and second groups of the

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[8] See J. Dubois and G. Renaud (eds.), *Le Martyrologe d'Adon, ses Deux Familles, ses Trois Recensions: Texte et Commentaire* (Paris, 1984), p. 375: In Oriente, civitate Theopoli, sanctorum decem martyrum, qui sub Saracenis passi leguntur in gestis sanctorum quadraginta.

martyrs. This contrast suggests that the reason that its author did not record this similar item of information also is that it was not actually present in his exemplar. Hence the author could not have been using the surviving early Latin recension as his main source. More importantly, the claim by the early Latin recension that the martyrs spent 10 months in Jerusalem is inconsistent with its other chronological indicators. It claims that the martyrs were captured during the 27th regnal year of Heraclius and executed during his 28th regnal year, i.e. that their capture and martyrdom took place within two successive regnal years. However, since Heraclius' regnal year began on the 6 October, it is impossible to fit the dates and timespans recorded by the early recension within two successive regnal years. In contrast, one can fit the dates and timespans recorded by the later recension within two successive regnal years, even though it does not itself preserve sufficient information concerning the regnal years so as to allow us immediately to appreciate this.

An important complication presents itself at this point. The early recension claims that the last group of martyrs were killed during the 28th regnal year of Heraclius and the 13th indiction, but the 13th indiction ran from 1 September 639 until 31 August 640 while the 28th regnal year ran from 6 October 637 until 5 October 638, so that the two chronological systems seem to be misaligned by about 2 years. One possibility is that this problem has arisen due to the corruption of a numeral during the transmission of our text. The point I wish to emphasize here is that none of the possible corrections that might be made to bring the regnal and indiction years into their correct relationship once more will also solve the problem posed by the inconsistency between the apparent claims by the early recension both that the sequence of events described occurred during two successive regnal years and that they took place over a 17 month period terminating in December. No single correction will suffice. There are two separate but related problems here. It is my suggestion, therefore, that the early Latin recension errs in its claim that the martyrs were 10 months in Jerusalem before their first group was executed. It is an implausibly long period of time anyway, and may well have arisen from some confusion concerning the number of martyrs executed at Jerusalem, 10 also. Hence the martyrs were probably captured and executed during the same calendar year, as the later Latin recension seems to imply, but during two successive regnal years, as the early recension states.

It remains to explain why the author of the early Latin recension or, more probably, the author of the original Greek passion, failed to synchronize the regnal years of Heraclius with the correct indiction years, or vice versa. More importantly, which date do we then prefer for our calculations, that suggested by the regnal years or that suggested by the indiction year? The answer lies in the nature of the text itself. The contents and nature of the surviving Latin recensions, particularly the early recension, suggest that the passion was com-

posed by someone of relatively humble education who was moved to write as he did more by his knowledge of these shocking events and a genuine desire to preserve the memory of the same rather than by any grander literary aspirations. The very anonymity of the text reinforces this impression. The question which we must then ask ourselves is how would such a person normally have dated the events of his day. Contemporary inscriptions suffice to prove that, at this level of society, people thought in terms of the provincial or local era and indiction years, but not in regnal years. Hence, however the author of the passion first came to learn of the deaths of these martyrs, he or his immediate source had presumably dated these events in the normal manner, in indiction years, not regnal years. The regnal years represent a secondary calculation. It may have been the author himself of the original Greek passion who first performed this calculation, or a subsequent editor or translator, but there can be no guarantee that whoever it was must have got it right originally.[9] I suggest, therefore, that the two groups of martyrs were killed during November and December of 639, and that the confusion concerning this date is due to an original mistaken conversion of indiction years into regnal years rather than to the corruption of the numerals describing these regnal years during the transmission of the text.[10]

My third argument in favour of the derivation of the late Latin recension from a lost early Latin translation of a fuller version of the original Greek passion rather than from the surviving early Latin translation rests on its preservation of a unique description of an event whose occurrence is securely proven by other Greek and Syriac sources, even if the details vary. I refer here to its apparent description of the destruction of the first mosque on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem. According to the late Latin recension, the Saracen commander Ambrus summoned a certain Florianus to him, at Eleutheropolis apparently, because of his role in persuading the martyrs of Gaza not to apostatize (ch. 5). During their subsequent confrontation an earthquake occurred and destroyed a building which was evidently a mosque despite the fact that the author of the

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[9] Incorrect synchronisms occur in the works of even the most experienced and best educated of chroniclers. See, e.g., C. Mango and R. Scott, *The Chronicle of Theophanes Confessor: Byzantine and Near Eastern History AD284-813*, (Oxford, 1997), pp. lxv-lxvii, on the discrepancies between indiction year and AM date in Theophanes' account of the period c.603-659.

[10] Delehaye, "*Passio*", p. 291, preferred to date the deaths of the martyrs to November and December 638. He did so on the basis that the early recension records that the group of 50 martyrs were executed on 17 December, a Thursday (feria V), and it was in 638 that 17 December fell on a Thursday. In 639, 17 December fell on a Friday (feria VI). I prefer the indiction year as a more secure basis on which to build my calculation because it is stated twice, at two different locations in the text, first at the notice concerning the deaths of the 10 martyrs on 11 November (ch. 2), then at the notice concerning the deaths of the 50 martyrs (ch. 4), and the first of these notices states the indiction in full (indictione tertia decima) rather than using numerals (indictione XIII). Since a day of the week is recorded on just one occasion throughout the text, and in numerals then, it is more likely to have been corrupted during the transmission process than the indiction year.

passion characterizes it as a temple of the gods, full of idols.[11] Shortly after this, Florianus baptized some Saracens, as a result of which Ambrus had him beheaded. Now, while the text does not specify where exactly this mosque had been situated, the fact that Ambrus had to send messengers in order to discover its condition suggest that it was located away from Eleutheropolis. More importantly, Greek and Syriac sources prove the collapse of the first mosque on the Temple Mount at this very period. Writing c.814, the Byzantine chronicler Theophanes dates this event to AM 6135, i.e. AD 642/43, and states:

> In this year Oumaros started to build the temple at Jerusalem, but the structure would not stand and kept falling down. When he enquired after the cause of this, the Jews said, "If you do not remove the cross that is above the church on the Mount of Olives, the structure will not stand." On this account the cross was removed from there, and thus their building was compacted. For this reason Christ's enemies took down many crosses.[12]

The Syriac *Chronicle of 1234* preserves a similar account also, but dates it to AD 643/644:

> In this year a violent gale uprooted great trees and toppled many columns of holy stylites. At the time of the gale the Arabs were building their temple in Jerusalem; the structure was damaged and it began to fall. When they asked why this was happening the filthy Jews told them: "Unless you take down that cross on the Mount of Olives opposite the temple, you will never succeed in building it." They took the cross down and after that the structure was stabilized."[13]

The obvious suggestion is that the late Latin recension of the passion of the 60 martyrs and the various Greek and Syriac chronicles describe the same collapse of the one mosque, that on the Temple Mount.

It is important at this point to realize that, despite some differences of detail, the surviving eastern accounts of this event all derive from the same ultimate source, a Syriac chronicle composed by a certain Theophilus of Edessa c.750.[14]

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[11] This is not a surprising claim since Bishop Germanus of Constantinople (715-30) and John of Damascus could still describe the Muslims as idol-worshippers over a century later. See D.J. Sahas, "Eighth-Century Byzantine Anti-Islamic Literature", *Byzantinoslavica*, 57 (1996), pp. 229-238.

[12] Trans. from Mango and Scott, *The Chronicle*, p. 476.

[13] Trans. from A. Palmer, *The Seventh Century in the West-Syrian Chronicles*, (Translated Texts for Historians 15, Liverpool, 1993), p. 167.

[14] See L.I. Conrad, "The Conquest of Arwad: A Source-Critical Study in the Historiography of the Early Medieval Near East", in A. Cameron and L.I. Conrad, (eds.), *The Byzantine and Early Islamic Near East 1: Problems in the Literary Source Material*, (Studies in Late Antiquity and Early Islam 1, Princeton, 1992), pp. 317-401, at pp. 322-48; also, Hoyland, "Seeing Islam", pp. 400-09, and pp. 631-71 where he attempts to reconstruct Theophilus' text based on its use by Theophanes, Dionysius of Tellmahre (as preserved in the chronicle of Michael the Syrian and the *Chronicle of 1234*), and Agapius. Hoyland makes the important point, p. 402, that Theophilus did not necessarily date all the events which he records, and their dating by later authors may represent no more than their own guesses based on the order of events and their need to distribute this material evenly throughout the relevant sections of their annals.

It is significant, therefore, that Theophanes saw no connection between the great storm which the *Chronicle of 1234* dates to the same year as the collapse as the mosque and this collapse, as is evident from the fact that he dates it four years later (AM 6139). Combined with the ambiguity of the *Chronicle of 1234* itself in this matter, Theophanes' evidence argues against the belief that their common source, Theophilus, must have viewed the great storm as the cause of the collapse of the mosque. More importantly, the claim that this storm toppled the columns of many stylites suggests that it actually occurred far north of Jerusalem, in the region which saw the greatest concentration of stylites, northern Syria. Therefore, the eastern sources do not contradict the claim by the passion of the 60 martyrs that it was an earthquake that was responsible for the destruction of the mosque.

Unfortunately, there is no other evidence to support the occurrence of an earthquake at Jerusalem in or about 639.[15] The sceptic may be tempted to suspect, therefore, that this earthquake was a pious invention, if not by the author of the original Greek passion, then by a subsequent editor or translator.[16] The fact remains, though, that something caused the collapse of the mosque on the Temple Mount, and an earthquake seems as plausible an explanation as any other. Two earthquakes are known to have struck Palestine and caused serious damage during the first half of the 7th-century, the first of which seems to have occurred in September 634, the second in June 659.[17] It is possible that another earthquake may have struck the region sometime during the intervening period and have proved the final straw for a section of the Temple Mount that had been weakened by the first earthquake and subjected to new stresses by the subsequent building project.

I have now outlined in brief three reasons why the later Latin recension of the passion of the 60 martyrs deserves to be considered as a descendant from the lost Greek passion of these martyrs by another line rather than as a mere derivative of the surviving early Latin recension. It follows, therefore, that any extra light which it may seem to throw on events during the early Muslim occupation of Palestine deserves to be taken seriously. This brings me to the subject of bishop Sophronius of Jerusalem. The early Latin recension of the

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[15] In general, see E. Guidoboni, *Catalogue of Ancient Earthquakes in the Mediterranean Area up to the 10th Century* (Rome, 1994).

[16] See, e.g., *"Passio Sancti Christophori Martyris"*, *Analecta Bollandiana*, 1 (1882), pp. 394-405, at p. 404. Although I have argued elsewhere that the passion of St. Christopher has a historical basis ("St. Christopher, Bishop Peter of Attalia, and the *Cohors Marmaritarum"*, *Vigiliae Christianae*, 48 (1994), pp. 170-86), I do not believe that this element has any basis in fact. The passion describes how a great earthquake occurred, the skies opened, and the Lord descended. Accompanied by a great choir of the just, He then took his throne and addressed St. Christopher. It is the absence of these other elements also that encourages one to believe that the earthquake described by the late recension of the passion of the 60 martyrs really did occur.

[17] For the earthquake in 634, see, e.g., Theophanes AM 6124. For that in 659, see, e.g., Theophanes AM 6150.

passion describes his role in the events surrounding the execution of the 60 martyrs at length. It describes how he visited them one night at prison in Jerusalem and encouraged them to imitate the 40 martyrs of Sebasteia and remain true to the faith (ch. 1). Then, when the first group of 10 martyrs had been executed, it was he who buried them and founded a chapel of St. Stephen on the spot (ch. 2). In contrast, the late Latin recension of this passion never mentions him once. Instead, it ascribes similar actions to a figure by the name of Florianus. An angel brought the news of the plight of the 60 martyrs to Florianus, who happened to be at Jerusalem at the time, immediately following their capture and imprisonment at Gaza (ch. 2). Florianus visited them, in a vision apparently, during their imprisonment at Eutropolis, or Eleutheropolis as it should be called (ch. 3). Finally, it was Florianus who buried the bodies of the second group of martyrs at Eleutheropolis and built a Church of the Holy Trinity on the spot (ch. 4). In view of their similar roles in the two recensions and the fact that the author of the late Latin recension does not introduce any other new characters into his tale unknown to us from the early recension, the obvious suggestion is that Florianus is identifiable as Sophronius. The similarity of their names reinforces this point. The name Florianus seems to preserve a corrupt form of the last three syllable of the name Sophronius. It is arguable, therefore, that the name Sophronius has been subjected to the same sort of corruption as the name of the town Eleutheropolis in the same text. Successive Latin copyists and editors have transformed the relatively unknown name Sophronius into the more familiar Florianus. Finally, the fact that, on one occasion, the author compares the position of Florianus to that of the patriarch suggests a confused preservation of this identification in his sources.[18]

The realization that Florianus and Sophronius are identifiable is important because it transforms our understanding of the circumstances surrounding the death of bishop Sophronius and provides a brief glimpse into a poorly documented phase in the history of the patriarchate of Jerusalem.[19] When the late recension of the passion of the 60 martyrs of Gaza describes how Ambrus had Florianus executed because of his baptism of his guards in the aftermath of the destruction of a mosque, it actually describes how Amr b. al-As had Sophronius executed in the aftermath of the collapse of the mosque on the Temple Mount. The construction of this mosque can only have angered the Christian community. Theophanes preserves an account of its initial construction, and

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[18] *BHL* 3053b, ch.6: Ambrus autem audiens quod beatus Florianus eorum dux erat et quasi quidam patriarcha,.....

[19] See A. Linder, "Christian Communities in Jerusalem", in J. Prawer and H. Ben-Shammai, *The History of Jerusalem: The Early Muslim Period 638-1099* (Jerusalem, 1996), pp. 121-62, at pp. 126-9; also M. Levy-Rubin, "The Role of the Judaean Desert Monasteries in the Monothelite Controversy in Seventh-Century Palestine," in J. Patrich (ed.), *The Sabaite Heritage in the Orthodox Church from the Fifth Century to the Present* (Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta 98, Louvain, 2001), pp. 283-300.

bishop Sophronius' reaction to the same, which surely preserves the spirit of
the occasion if nothing else:

> In this year Oumaros invaded Palestine and, after investing the Holy City for two
> years, took it by capitulation; for Sophronios, the bishop of Jerusalem, received a
> promise of immunity for the whole of Palestine. Oumaros entered the Holy City
> dressed in filthy garments of camel-hair and, showing a devilish pretence, sought
> the Temple of the Jews – the one built by Solomon – that he might make it a place
> of worship for his own blasphemous religion. Seeing this, Sophronios said, "Ver-
> ily, this is the abomination of desolation standing in a holy place, as has been
> spoken through the prophet Daniel." And with many tears the defender of piety
> bewailed the Christian people.[20]

The sudden destruction of the mosque on the Temple Mount, before it was
finished even, could not have occurred at a worst time or in a worst way. Even
those who had no great knowledge of Christian theology or church history must
have been tempted to see this as a sign of God's rejection of the Muslim
invaders of Palestine and their new faith. The better educated could hardly have
failed to draw a parallel with events in 363. The pagan emperor Julian the
Apostate had supported an attempt to rebuild the Temple of Solomon on the
Temple Mount, but an earthquake had caused a temporary abandonment of this
project, in late May 363 apparently, only days after it had started.[21] Worse still,
Julian was himself assassinated only about a month later, on 26 June 363. It is
arguable, therefore, that the collapse of the mosque would have dramatically
increased religious tensions in Palestine. Christians would have been encour-
aged to defy the Muslim authorities in the expectation that God was about to
liberate them from their rule in the way that he had once liberated their ances-
tors from Julian's rule, while recent converts to Islam would have encouraged
to return to their original faith more. On the other hand, the Muslim authorities
may also have been tempted to view this accident as a sign from God, in par-
ticular, as a criticism of their relative tolerance of other faiths in the city, as they
would have seen it. The fact that Theophanes and other sources report that the
Muslim authorities ordered the removal of a cross from a church on the Mount
on Olives in response to the collapse supports this view.

It is arguable, therefore, that when news of the collapse of the mosque on
the Temple Mount reached Sophronius in Eleutheropolis, where he was
already in custody and under investigation for having prevented the conversion
of the 60 martyrs of Gaza to Islam, he was then tempted to an even more open
defiance of the Muslim authorities. He agreed to baptize, or perhaps rebaptize,
a number of his guards who were equally excited by the same news and had

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[20] Theophanes AM 6127. Trans. from Mango and Scott, *The Chronicle*, p. 471.

[21] See, e.g., Greg. Naz. *Contr. Jul.* 2.4; Socrates, *HE* 3.20. On the vexed question of Julian's
motivation, see J.W. Drijvers, "Ammianus Marcellinus 23.1.2-3: The Rebuilding of the Temple
in Jerusalem", in J. den Boeft et al. (eds.), *Cognitio Gestorum: The Historiographic Art of
Ammianus Marcellinus* (Amsterdam, 1992), pp.19-26. On the archaeological evidence for the
earthquake, see K.W. Russell, "The Earthquake of May 19, AD 363, *Bulletin of the American
School of Oriental Research*, 238 (1980), pp. 47-64.

decided to convert, or re-convert, to Christianity. One may doubt whether Amr b. al-As could have ignored this even in the best of tim.s, but at that particular point of time, he may have felt that he had no choice but to act swiftly and decisively. Hence his execution of Sophronius.

One obvious question raises itself at this point: why do no other sources, more importantly, no other eastern sources, preserve any knowledge that Sophronius suffered martyrdom under the Muslim authorities?[22] There can be no simple answer to this question. The answer lies partly in the relative dearth of sources for the 7th century, particularly the lack of a detailed contemporary narrative account. It also lies in the disruption caused by war and disease. The almost continuous state of war that existed between the Byzantine and Arab empires meant that news no longer travelled as far and as fast as it had once done, nor could it be confirmed as easily as it once had. As for disease, a great plague seems to have broken out in Palestine in 639, centred at Emmaus, and this may have removed many key witnesses who might have spread the news of this event otherwise.[23] Nor should one forget the continuing, often bitter, religious divides within Christianity itself. Neither the Monophysites, who constituted the majority of Christians within the Arab empire, nor the Monothelites, who dominated the hierarchy within the eastern Byzantine empire until the Council of Constantinople in 681, would have been inclined to recognize the combative Chalcedonian Sophronius as a genuine martyr, his being a heretic from their points of view.[24] Indeed, it is important to clarify at this point that surviving sources preserve remarkably little at all about Sophronius, and nothing that excludes the possibility that he ended his life as a martyr exactly as reconstructed here. No-one has left us a life of Sophronius.

The chronicler Theophanes notes the death of Sophronius in the same notice for AM 6127, i.e. AD 634/35, where he records the entrance of the caliph Umar into Jerusalem and his desire to construct a mosque on the Temple Mount, and gives the impression that he died immediately afterwards.

> While Oumaros was there, the patriarch begged him to receive from him a kerchief and a garment to put on, but he would not suffer to wear them. At length, he

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[22] The only possible hint that I have been able to discover that some account of the martyrdom of Sophronius may have survived in the East also occurs in the calendar preserved by the 14th-century encyclopaedist Abou'l-Barakât. See E. Tisserant, (ed.), "Le Calendrier d'Aboul Barakât: Texte Arabe Édité et Traduit", *Patrologia Orientalis*, 10, pp. 247-286. This commemorates an otherwise unknown martyr by the name of Sophronius on 27 Toubah (=22 January), but his name may be corrupt.

[23] In general, see L.I. Conrad, "Arabic Plague Chronologies and Treatises: Social and Historical Factors in the Formation of a Literary Genre", *Studia Islamica*, 54 (1981), pp. 51-93. This plague killed many Muslim notables including the supreme commander of the army, Abu Ubayda. The fact that the earthquake which destroyed the mosque on the Temple Mount occurred during this devastating plague must have added weight to the opinion of those who interpreted it as a sign of divine disfavour towards the Muslims.

[24] Levy-Rubin, "The Role of the Judaean Desert Monasteries," argues that the majority of the population and clergy within Palestine itself were Monothelite also, while the Diothelite faction was led mainly by monks from the Judaean desert

> persuaded him to put them on until his clothes were washed, and then he returned them to Sophronios and put on his own. Thereupon Sophronios died after adorning the Church of Jerusalem by word and deed and struggling against the Monothelete heresy of Heracleios and his companions Sergius and Pyrros.[25]

Unfortunately, the contradictory nature of our sources means that the exact date of the surrender of Jerusalem to the Arabs is disputed.[26] Furthermore, there is a danger of circular argument here because some commentators have attempted to use late evidence for the duration of Sophronius' tenure of the post of bishop of Jerusalem as a means to date this event, as if this information was itself secure. On the whole, if one can trust Theophanes' claim in the same notice that the city was besieged for two years before it fell, it seems probable that it surrendered sometime during 638. Then, if one assumes that the commemoration of Sophronius as a saint on the 11 March in the Greek synaxarion of the church of Constantinople preserves the date of his death,[27] it seems a not unreasonable conclusion that he actually died on 11 March 639. So the current consensus runs.[28] The problem here is that neither Theophanes nor the notice in the Greek synaxarion reveal any genuine knowledge whatsoever of the circumstances surrounding the death of Sophronius. Neither notes exactly where and how he died. The synaxarion in particular reveals only a superficial knowledge of his life that was presumably gained from his surviving works. More importantly, it seems to have been composed only during the 10th century.[29] It is not clear what authority, if any, it has for commemorating Sophronius' memory on 11 March in particular, the same day on which it also commemorates the memory of an early predecessor, bishop Cyril of Jerusalem (348-82). It would not be safe, therefore, either to use this date in an attempt to evaluate the present reconstruction, or to combine the two and conclude that Sophronius was executed on 11 March 640.

It is appropriate at this point to comment on various other differences between the two recensions of the passion of the 60 martyrs of Gaza, not least to explain how some of the least convincing elements in the late recension may have their origin in misunderstandings concerning real events which the early recension has omitted altogether. I refer here to the fact that the late recension claims that an angel appeared to the 60 martyrs during their initial imprisonment at or near Gaza, and that it then visited Florianus in Jerusalem. One suspects that the reference to an angel here is due to a transliteration of the Greek term ἄγγελος meaning simply 'messenger', and that this passage

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[25] Trans. from Mango and Scott, *The Chronicle*, pp. 471-72.

[26] See M. Gil, *A History of Palestine 634-1099* (Cambridge, 1992), p. 51.

[27] See H. Delehaye (ed.), *Propylaeum ad Acta Sanctorum Novenbris: Synaxarium Ecclesiae Constantinopolitanae e Codice Sirmondiano Nunc Berolinensi Adiectis Synaxariis Selectis* (Brussels, 1902), cols. 527-28.

[28] See, e.g., C. von Schönburn, *Sophrone de Jérusalem: Vie Monastique et Confession Dogmatique*, (Théologie Historique 20, Paris, 1972), p. 97, n. 136.

[29] Delehaye, *Synaxarium*, pp. LIII-LVII.

preserves a poor memory of a messenger whom the martyrs had sent from Gaza to Sophronius in Jerusalem in order to alert him to their plight and plead for his intercession. This brings us to the vision of Florianus which the martyrs allegedly experienced sometime during their two-month imprisonment in Eleutheropolis. This seems to preserve a memory of a visit paid by Sophronius to the court of Amr b. al-As, and to the martyrs imprisoned there, in response to messenger whom had been sent to him. Part of the reason why this incident was reinterpreted as a vision on the part of the martyrs may lie in its timing. The early recension claims that when Sophronius visited the martyrs during their imprisonment at Jerusalem, he did so at night. If he visited the martyrs at night also during their earlier imprisonment at Eleutheropolis, then it is easy to understand how an original account of a visitation by night may have been misinterpreted subsequently as a vision. The next question concerns the number of visits paid by Sophronius to the martyrs. Since the two recensions seem to record only one such visit, one may wonder whether they both record the same visit, but that one of them has changed its place within the narrative, for whatever reason. While this is possible, it is also possible that the original Greek passion had described two visits by Sophronius to the martyrs and that the surviving Latin recensions both preserve only abbreviated accounts of its fuller narrative, although rather different abbreviations. Finally, some comment is necessary also concerning the nearest thing to a contradiction between the two sources, the claim by the earlier recension that it was some holy men who ransomed the bodies of the second group of 50 martyrs and built a Church of the Holy Trinity over their grave in Eleutheropolis, and the claim by the later recension that it was Florianus, i.e. Sophronius, who buried the bodies and caused the church to be built. The answer to this apparent contradiction is that Sophronius was one of the holy men noted by the early recension in this matter, probably the most important of them also, but that the author of the early recension has omitted the passage or phrase which recorded their full names or titles due to his severe abbreviation of his source once more.

If it is clear why Sophronius was put to death, the same cannot be said of the 60 martyrs themselves. Attention has been drawn to the fact that the martyrdom of the 60 soldiers from Gaza does not fit the pattern followed by the other known martyrs during the Umayyad and early Abbasid periods.[30] Other martyrs were condemned for "blasphemy" against Islam, but there is not the slightest indication in either of the surviving recensions of the passion of the 60 martyrs that they did or said anything against the religion of their enemies and captors. This contrast is important. It cannot credibly be claimed that the authors of either surviving recension deliberately omitted such material in order to portray the martyrs in a better light, to highlight their total innocence,

[30] Schick, *The Christian Communities*, p. 177.

for the simple reason that they would have regarded such behaviour as a cause for pride rather than for shame, as would have most Christians up to the present. Indeed, the fact that both of these independent recensions omit such material reinforces the point that such material was not present in their ultimate Greek source to start with. Curiously, at least two recent commentators seem determined to prove that the martyrs must somehow have been to blame for their own deaths, that they cannot possibly have been executed simply for refusing to convert to Islam.[31] Both draw attention to a tale preserved by Eutychius that the commander of the garrison in Gaza refused to surrender to Amr b. al-As and then plotted to kill him during a parley, apparently during the early raids into southern Palestine in 634.[32] The assumption is that when Amr b. al-As had the soldiers from Gaza executed in 639, that he did so in order to revenge himself upon them for their actions against him previously. This rests on several other large assumptions in turn. The first of these is that Amr found the same men, officers in particular, at Gaza in 639 that he had met their earlier in 634, despite the fact that Eutychius' anecdote implies the presence of a much larger force at Gaza c.634 than the mere 60 soldiers or thereabouts present there in 639, a counter-offensive rather than a strictly defensive force. The second is that it was Amr who had the final decision concerning the fates of these soldiers. However, the fact that he decided to send them to Ammiras in Jerusalem (see next) and that it was Ammiras who executed the first group of these martyrs, not Amr himself, suggests otherwise. In brief, Eutychius' tale concerning the parley at Gaza in 634 has no relevance to events in 639. The real and neglected difference between the martyrs of Gaza and other martyrs under the Umayyads was that the former had been soldiers captured during war, and the sad reality is that we know next to nothing about how the early Muslim commanders really treated their prisoners-of-war.

A final point remains. Both recensions refer to two Arab officials, Ambrus, who seems identifiable with Amr b. al-As, and a second official who is referred to only by the term *ammiras*. This may translate either the Arabic name Amir or the term 'emir', meaning simply 'commander', being a transliteration of the Greek term ἀμηρᾶς. Guillou interprets this term to mean 'emir', and identifies this emir with the caliph himself, Umar I.[33] One problem with this interpretation is that both recensions are agreed that Ambrus gave orders to the 'emir' in Jerusalem, but no-one would have been in a position to give orders to Umar. Another is that Umar himself spent very little time in Jerusalem. More importantly, especially if one accepts the dates proposed here, several sources report that Umar had already left Palestine before the

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[31] Kaegi, *The Early Islamic Conquests*, p. 96; Schick, *The Christian Communities*, p. 172.
[32] Eutychius, *Ann.* 276.
[33] Guillou, "Prise de Gaza", p. 399, n. 2. Hoyland, "Seeing Islam", p. 349, argues similarly, but does not speculate as to who this 'emir' actually was.

outbreak of the plague of Emmaus in 639. It is noteworthy also that of the sources who report the Muslim order to remove the cross from the church on the Mount of Olives following the collapse of the mosque on the Temple Mount, it is Theophanes alone who names Umar as responsible for this order, thereby giving the impression that the caliph was at Jerusalem still. This suggests that this was simply an assumption on Theophanes' own part. Finally, it seems preferable to assume some consistency on the part of the author of the original Greek passion, and that if he referred to Ambrus by his real name alone rather than by some official title, then he probably did likewise in the case of the only other senior Arab figure whom he mentions, Ammiras.

Unfortunately, Guillou argued as he did in the false assumption that the title of 'emir' could only be used of the caliph himself, whereas it could in fact be used of any of his subordinate commanders also.[34] However, his identification does raise an important question which neither of the surviving Latin recensions of this passion answers: why exactly did Amr b. al-As send his captives to Ammiras in Jerusalem? The obvious inference, made by Guillou, is that despite all the indications to the contrary, Ammiras must have been senior to Amr b. al-As who sent the captives to him for this reason. This does not mean, however, that Ammiras must be identifiable with the caliph himself. Khalid b. al-Walid had served as the supreme commander of the Arab armies invading Byzantine territory from 634 until after the battle of Yarmuk in 636 when he was replaced by Abu Ubayda.[35] Abu Ubayda had then continued in this position until he died during the so-called plague of Emmaus in 639. The key point as far as we are here concerned is that Abu Ubayda was also known as Amir b. Abdallah b. al-Jarrah. It is my suggestion, therefore, that our Ammiras is identifiable as Amir b. Abdallah b. al-Jarrah, i.e. Abu Ubayda. Furthermore, it is arguable that the reason that Amr b. al-As sent the martyrs of Gaza to Abu Ubayda in Jerusalem, rather than dare to begin their execution himself, but then dared to execute a far more senior figure, the bishop of Jerusalem, without following the same procedure, is that Abu Ubayda had died and left his post vacant in the meantime. Hence the execution of the 10 martyrs of Gaza at Jerusalem on either 6 November or 11 November 639 provides a firm *terminus postquam* for the death of Abu Ubayda, while the fact that Amr b. al-As dared to execute Sophronius without recourse to his supreme commander reinforces the present dating of the deaths of these martyrs in so far as it suggests that this post was actually vacant at the time.

In conclusion, the late Latin recension of the passion of the 60 martyrs of Gaza (*BHL* 3053b) preserves a better account, in many respects, of the lost

[34] See the article by A.A. Duri in *EI* ², pp. 438-39.
[35] See K. Athamina, "The Appointment and Dismissal of Khalid b. al-Walid from the Supreme Command: A Study of the Political Strategy of the Early Muslim Caliphs in Syria", *Arabica*, 41 (1994), pp. 253-272.

Greek passion of these martyrs than does the surviving early recension (*BHL* 5672m). Gaza seems to have fallen to the Arabs in early 639, so that Abu Ubayda had the first group of 10 martyrs executed at Jerusalem in November 639 and Amr b. al-As executed the second group of 50 at Eleutheropolis in December 639. Bishop Sophronius of Jerusalem had intervened on the part of these martyrs from an early stage with the result that he was already present at Eleutheropolis when an earthquake destroyed the mosque on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem in early 640. Amr b. al-As then had him executed for his baptism of some Muslim converts to Christianity during the period of heightened religious tension that followed immediately upon this destruction.

APPENDIX A
THE EARLY RECENSION OF THE PASSION OF THE 60 MARTYRS
OF GAZA (*BHL* 5672m)

Here begins the passion of the 60 martyrs who suffered under the Saracens on 17 December.

1. The martyrdom of the 60 soldiers of Christ who were captured by the wicked Saracens in the Christ-loving city of Gaza during the reign of Our Lord Jesus Christ, in the 27th year of the God-crowned emperor Heraclius. It happened at that time concerning the godless Saracens that they were besieging the Christ-loving city of Gaza. Forced by need, the city sought an agreement, and this was done. They gave their word to the Saracens, apart from the soldiers who were captured in the same city. Entering the city and capturing the most Christian soldiers, [the Saracens] sent them to prison. On the following day, Ambrus ordered the holy soldiers of Christ to be brought forward. He tried to force those brought before him to desert their confession of Christ and the precious and life-giving cross of Our Lord Jesus Christ. However, when they did not submit, Ambrus ordered them to be separated from their wives, sons and weapons, and to be sent to prison again. When they had passed 30 days in prison, he ordered them to be brought in irons again to the city which is called Eleutheropolis and to be sent to jail there again for two months. Giving orders to the Saracens again, he sent them to Theropolis in irons. And when they had passed three months there again, wicked Ambrus took thought, gave orders to the Saracens, removed them from prison and ordered them to be sent to prison in the Holy City. When he learned this, the most holy patriarch Sophronius visited them by night and urged and begged them not to desert their confession of Christ who suffered for us, and that not one of them should be separated from faith in Our Lord Jesus Christ. The chief of the holy martyrs of Christ, Callinicus by name, did likewise, daily urging and begging them to

imitate the 40 holy martyrs. However, the Devil again inspired godless Ambrus and after 10 months he wrote concerning the holy mar·;·rs to Ammiras, who was the leader in the holy city, telling him to go to the holy martyrs in prison and to tell them to deny their faith; and that if they agreed to deny Christ, to remove the irons from them and to send them on with great honour; and that if they refused to submit, to behead their chief, together with nine others, in front of them, so that, seeing this, the rest would, perhaps, be led by fear and deny their faith.

2. When he had heard this, the most holy patriarch Sophronius did not rest that night, but implored each one with tears, and reminded them of their faith in Christ. It happened, therefore, that when Ammiras came to them, released them from prison, and read to them what Ambrus had written, the holy martyrs of Christ did not submit to his commands, but all confessed together the faith of Our Lord Christ. Then, angered, Ammiras cast the saints outside the city, before its gates, and ordered their chief to be beheaded, together with nine other martyrs. The most holy patriarch Sophronius took them up and buried them in the one place where he also founded a church of St. Stephen, the first martyr. These are the names of the saints who suffered in the holy city of God: from the unit of the *Scythae* - Callidicus, Imerius, Illustrius, Theodore, Stephen; from the unit of the *Voluntarii* – Peter, Paul, Theodore, John, and another John. These martyrs of Christ died on 11 November during the 13th indiction.

3. The other saints were returned to prison. Ammiras wrote to Ambrus, saying, "I have acted in accordance with your command, and when those soldiers did not submit, I imposed the death-penalty upon them, but locked the others in prison. Write back to me what course of action seems best to you." After 30 days, however, the devil planted evil in the heart of Ambrus again, and he ordered Ammiras to send the other saints in irons to him, and the martyrs of Christ stood together before Ambrus. Ambrus ordered their wives and sons to be brought before them. When these had been brought forward, Ambrus said to the holy martyrs of Christ, "How stiff-necked you are in your refusal to submit to us concerning our rites! If you submit to us, behold, you will have your wives and sons, and will be like us, and will be honoured just like one of us; but if you do not, you too will suffer what your fellow-soldiers have suffered." Then the holy martyrs responded together to Ambrus, saying, "No-one can separate us from the love of Christ, neither wives, nor sons, nor all the wealth of this world, but we are servants of Christ, the Son of the living God, and we are prepared to die for Him who died and rose for us." When the most cruel Ambrus heard this, he was filled with anger, his face changed, and he ordered the holy martyrs of Christ to be surrounded by a crowd of Saracens,

and in this way he wickedly killed them on account of their faith in Christ. When they had died in this way, some Christ-loving men came and bought their bodies, paying 3,000 solidi for them. And they buried the martyrs of Christ with great honour, laying them to rest in Eleutheropolis and building there a church in which the Holy, Life-giving and Consubstantial Trinity is adored.

4. These are the names of the saints who died for their faith in Christ: from the unit of the *Scythae* – John, Paul, and another John, Paul, Photinus, Zitas, Eugenius, Musilius, John, Stephen, Theodore, John the father and the son Theodore, George, Theopentus, George, Sergius, George, Theodore, Quiriacus, John, Zitas and John, Philoxenus, George, John, George; from the unit of the *Voluntarii* – Theodore, Epiphanius, John, Theodore, Sergius, George, Thomas, Stephen, Conon, Theodore, Paul, John, George, John and John, Paulinus, Galumas, Habramius, Mermicius, and Marinus. These martyrs of Christ died on 17 December, on the 5th day of the week, at the 6th hour, during the 13th indiction, in the 28th year of the emperor Heraclius, during the reign of Our Lord Jesus Christ who lives and reigns with the Father and the Holy Spirit forever and ever. Amen.

APPENDIX B
THE LATE RECENSION OF THE PASSION OF THE 60 MARTYRS
OF GAZA (*BHL* 3053b)

This is the story of St. Florian and his companions which has been discovered in most ancient and trustworthy writings.

1. For the praise of Almighty God! As has been discovered in ancient codices, these 60 glorious martyrs suffered and died for the name of Christ with great steadfastness, as follows. For when they were most valiant soldiers, they steadfastly confessed Christ among the Saracens, swearing to defend the Christian faith everywhere and that they were not at all afraid to die for Christ and their faith in Him. For this reason, after they had defended by means of their advice and arms many Christian towns and cities besieged by the wicked Saracens, the Saracens pursued them with clear hatred, so that they swore that if anyone captured them, he would receive great honours and wealth, and that they would order them either to deny the faith of Christ or to die a most cruel death. When these soldiers of Christ had learned all this, they were not scared, but became braver, fortifying themselves in the strength of Christ by means of the powerful sign of the cross. All 60 soldiers of Christ went armed with a brave heart to the faithful and Christ-loving city which was called Gaza, since

it was being besieged by the most wicked Saracens, in order to defend all the Christian faithful who were present there. This happened during the reign of Our Lord, in the 27th year of the God-crowned emperor Heraclius. When the Saracens learned this, that these soldiers of Christ were definitely present in the aforementioned city, they gathered a much stronger army so that they would not be able to agree a treaty and leave; and since the martyrs of Christ fought day and night, they continuously slew many of these Saracens. Nevertheless, the city itself, which had been besieged for a long time, was forced by need, since they did not have anything to eat, to agree a treaty with the Saracens, although unwillingly, lest the city should be destroyed and the citizens slain. Accordingly, when the city, together with all the soldiers of Christ, had been captured, the Saracens sent all the soldiers of Christ to prison in irons; they continuously entrusted themselves to God, praying that they would be brave in faith and in the love of Christ and that God would deign to send His grace to them from heaven.

2. An angel appeared to them in a great light, and comforted them and warned them not to be swayed from their love of or faith in Christ by the threats or tortures of Ambrus because Christ had prepared unfading crowns for them on account of these struggles. Then, comforted, they asked the angel to tell blessed Florian what their situation was, because he was their leader, in order that they might be able to see him before they died, in the hope that they would be able more bravely to withstand tortures for the name of Christ on account of his saving encouragement. When the angel had done all this, blessed Florian said to the angel, "And can I not also become a soldier of Christ at all? Since I am prepared to do and suffer everything on His behalf." The angel said to him, "The greater struggle is due to be led by you, so to speak, in order that you may afterwards receive the reward of your triumph and a more glorious crown; these go before you, but you will follow them." The angel left, and blessed Florian, who was then situated in Jerusalem, kneeled and besought Christ with tears to grant wisdom and such great grace to him that those soldiers would courageously confess Christ as the only-begotten Son of God and redeemer of the human race and, withstanding the tortures of the Saracens for the name of Christ, would gain eternal blessedness in the end by their dying. When he had finished his prayer, 60 young martyrs appeared to him, most resplendent in their golden crowns and adorned with precious stones; one of them, who was in charge of the others, cried out in a most sweet voice, "Most blessed Florian, you deserve to be our leader and we have been crowned with these crowns by Our Lord Jesus Christ on account of your merits." When he had heard and seen this, the holy man immediately understood what God wished to fulfil through him. And, immediately fired with a love of God, he then decided to do whatever he could for the honour of Christ.

3. On the following day Ambrus ordered the soldiers of Christ to be brought to him; and he promised them both honours and great wealth if they would deny Christ and not worship His cross any longer. However, they refused to do this, and paying no attention to either the wealth or the honours, they praised Christ more and more and confessed that he was the True God. Ambrus then ordered them to be thrust, in irons, into a harsher prison for 30 days in order to see if they would cease from their resolution; when these days had passed, since they were still most firm in their faith in Christ, he ordered them to be taken to the city of Eutropolis and to be thrown into a most foul prison for two months. There was darkness, filth, creatures most foul and horrible things in this prison. They thought that, being unable to endure these things, they would die there in a short time; nevertheless, they prayed to God that they might merit seeing blessed Florian before they died. Blessed Florian immediately appeared to them as a most valiant and most splendid soldier, and said to them, "Do not be afraid; I am the Florian whom you so greatly desired to see; Our Lord Jesus Christ has sent me to you in order to show you what you will be like after this struggle if you endure all the tortures patiently and willingly for Him, and with what crowns you will be crowned in heaven where you will reign forever together with Our King Jesus Christ." And then the 60 youths similar to those whom blessed Florian had seen previously, immediately appeared to them there, and they, having been strenghthened in Christ, said, "We are prepared to suffer all things and to die even for Christ."

4. Accordingly, when the two months had passed, most wicked Ambrus, inspired by the Devil, ordered these holy soldiers to be led bound to the holy city of Jerusalem, and he wrote to Ammiras in these words, that he was to examine these soldiers, and that if they denied Christ, he was to free them; but that if they refused to do this, he was first to behead, in the most cruel fashion, the chief of them, Climacus by name, and nine others, in the presence of the rest. However, since they all confessed Christ firmly and said that they did not fear all his tortures, and since they had Christ as their helper, they were immediately killed. The rest of the soldiers were locked in a most harsh prison until Ambrus gave another command concerning them. After 30 days Ambrus wrote to Ammiras that he was to send them in irons to him. When they were present, he said to them, "How stiff-necked you are in your refusal to submit to me! However, if you carry out my command, you will be great lords in my kingdom; but if you refuse to submit to it, you will suffer most cruelly." Then they all cried out together, "Definitely, no-one will be able to separate us from our love of and faith in Christ, neither our wives, our sons, nor the contempt of this world; but we are servants of Christ, sons of God, and are ready to live and die for love of Him because He died and rose for us." When they had said these things and Ambrus had heard them with fury, they were led outside the

city and most cruelly killed by means of various tortures. And there immediately appeared in the sky as many doves as those that had died. And preceding them, a single angel ascended heavenwards with them. Then blessed Florian caused their bodies to be buried in the city of Eutropolis where a church was built in honour of the most holy Trinity.

5. Ambrus, hearing that blessed Florian was their leader and like their patriarch, one might say, and that they had stood firm in their faith in Christ as a result of his encouragement, and that he had also caused their bodies to be given an honourable burial, summoned him and asked whether he was willing to deny Christ and worship his gods. Blessed Florian said to him, "I am amazed that you think that you are wise and do not know how much I love Christ My Lord and do not perceive the foolishness and deceit of your idols." When Ambrus heard this and took it badly, he ordered him to be shot with javelins and arrows and killed. Blessed Florian, with his hands lifted to heaven, prayed to Christ with tears, and his prayer was so effective that the servants were unable to see him, although he was in the middle of them, and were unable to touch him with a single blow; but they raged one against the other, each believing the other to be Florian, and in this way 200 were killed among them. Seeing all this, Ambrus attributed it not to divine justice but to magical skill; on the contrary, he ordered him to be brought to the temple of the gods in order to see their power and strength. Blessed Florian then said to him, when he had finished his devout prayer to Christ, "O Ambrus, do you not hear the great shaking of the earth and the voices of those shouting?" As he listened to this, Ambrus heard the great ruin of the temple and terrible voices crying in the air and, when he had sent messengers, he afterwards learned that the whole temple had collapsed and that the idols had been reduced to dust. Since Ambrus did not know what to do after this, he ordered him to be bound most tightly and to be thrown into the most horrible prison; when he had been set there, a great light immediately appeared to him, and a most sweet smell as if many flowers of various types and colours had been scattered there. When those who had brought him there saw this, they fell at his feet, and, asking for forgiveness, sought to be baptized by him. When Ambrus heard this, he ordered them to be beheaded.

6. Blessed Florian strengthened them, and in this way all those blessed in Christ were killed. On the following day, Ambrus ordered blessed Florian to be beheaded after he had been led, naked and cruelly bound, throughout the whole city on a single cart, where some might mock him and others beat him with sticks and knotty clubs, and for his body to be thrown to the dogs. On the same night, an angel appeared to him, and revealed to him the decision of his death and suffering, strengthening him to endure everything bravely and will-

ingly for the name of Christ, because glory without compare had been pre-pared for him by God on account of his suffering and shame. And in this way he revealed to him how all the other soldiers had been glorified in heaven, and even those 20 servants whom he himself had baptized were revealed to him in their great brilliance. When this vision had finished and he was totally strengthened in Christ, he wished for the hour of his passion to come. When he had arrived at the place of his passion, blessed Florian kneeled, and, raising his hands and eyes to heaven, he praised Christ that He had made him worthy of such a death for love of Him. He saw Christ with a very great army of his saints, and heard a voice saying, "Come, Florian, come, because today you will gather the most abundant fruit of your flowers and receive the glorious crown of the eternal kingdom as the reward of your passion." For the praise of Almighty God! Amen.

GENERAL INDEX

Note: Page references in italics indicate illustrations. The prefix al- is ignored in alphabetical sequence.